UK Government

COBR
Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms

Lead Government Department Expectations Set

Author	**COBR Directorate**
Date	**November 2026**
Version	**Version 2.0**

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Contents

Contents 3
Revision History 6
.Chapter 1 Preface 7
Purpose 7
Audience 9
Scope 9
Structure 9
Linkages 10
.Chapter 2 An overview of the Lead Government Department Model 11
Role of Lead Government Departments 11
Role of the Cabinet Office 12
Role of other government departments 13
Role of regulators 13
Role of devolved governments 13
Offices for the Nations 14
Role of Crown Dependencies 14
Role of Overseas Territories and Sovereign Base Areas 15
Catastrophic Risk Management 15
.Chapter 3 The role of government departments in building resilience 16
.Expectation 1 Risk Anticipation and Assessment 17
Desired Outcome 17
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 17
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 18
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 19
.Expectation 2 Prevention and Mitigation 20
Desired Outcome 20
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 20
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 21
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 22
.Expectation 3 Emergency Planning (Preparedness) 23
Desired Outcome 23
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 23
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 25
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 25
.Expectation 4 Response Capabilities (Preparedness) 27
Desired Outcome 27
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 27

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 28
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 28
.Expectation 5 Training (Preparedness) 29
Desired Outcome 29
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 29
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 30
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 30
.Expectation 6 Exercising (Validation and Assurance) 31
Desired Outcome 31
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 31
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 32
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 33
.Expectation 7 Governance and Assurance (Validation and Assurance) 34
Desired Outcome 34
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 34
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 35
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 36
.Chapter 4 The role of government departments in responding to, recovering from, and learning from emergencies 37
.Expectation 8 Response 38
Desired Outcome 38
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 38
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 40
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 40
.Expectation 9 Recovery 42
Desired Outcome 42
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 42
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 44
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 44
.Expectation 10 Continual Improvement (Learning and Improvement) 46
Desired Outcome 46
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 46
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 47
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 47
.Chapter 5 Whole-of-Cycle Expectations 48
.Expectation 11 Working with the devolved governments 49
Desired Outcome 49
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 49
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 51
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 52

.Expectation 12 Working with the Voluntary, Community and Faith Sector 53
Desired Outcome 53
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 53
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 53
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 54
.Expectation 13 Working with the local resilience tier 55
Desired Outcome 55
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 55
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 56
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 56
.Expectation 14 Human Aspects 57
Desired Outcome 57
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 57
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 58
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 58
.Expectation 15 Using Scientific and Technical Advice 60
Desired Outcome 60
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 60
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 62
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 63
.Expectation 16 Public Communications 64
Desired Outcome 64
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 64
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 65
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 65
.Expectation 17 Using Data and Analytics 66
Desired Outcome 66
At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should: 66
For good practice, Lead Government Departments could: 68
In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should: 68
.Chapter 6 Catastrophic Risk Management Expectations 69
Catastrophic Risks 69
Role of Cabinet Office 70
Role of the Lead Government Department 71
Role of other government departments 71
Working with devolved governments 72
.Annex A: Glossary 73
.Annex B: Reading list 78

Revision History

The revision history of the Lead Government Department Expectations Set is summarised below.

Version	Date of issue	Change history	Authorisation
Version 1	March 2004	The Civil Contingencies Secretariat first published the 'Lead Government Department and its role - Guidance and Best Practice'. This guidance looked to enable UK government departments to carry out effectively the responsibilities and functions associated with their role as Lead Government Department.	Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Cabinet Office
Version 2	November 2026	The COBR Directorate withdrew and replaced the 'Lead Government Department and its role - Guidance and Best Practice' with the Lead Government Department Expectations Set. This was in line with a commitment in the UK government Resilience Action Plan to publish Lead Government Department Expectations, setting out the role of Cabinet Office and other UK government departments in planning, preparing, responding to and recovering from emergencies, including whole-of-system risks.	COBR Directorate, Cabinet Office

Chapter 1 Preface

Purpose

1.1. The risks that the UK faces are increasingly volatile, varied and interconnected. While the vast majority of emergencies are handled effectively by local responders, the increased scale and complexity of modern emergencies have increased the frequency of situations which require national support and co-ordination. The UK government uses a Lead Government Department (LGD) model for risks within the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA), and the public-facing National Risk Register, whereby risks are primarily owned and managed by designated LGDs.[1]

1.2. In this challenging context, establishing consistency across LGDs is critical to enhancing cross-government working, building collective capacity, and ultimately strengthening the public sector resilience system as a whole. The LGD Expectations Set supports this by providing a unified baseline for national-level resilience, establishing a clear set of expectations to drive continual improvement, and forming a consistent, evidence-led basis for self-assessment and assurance in national arrangements.

1.3. As well as setting out what is expected of LGDs, this guidance outlines what other government departments (OGDs) should do in support of the LGD given their responsibility for impacts arising within their sectors and/or policy areas. It also details the role of the Cabinet Office in supporting the UK's resilience to major emergencies, including the leadership role it plays for whole-of-system catastrophic emergencies. The expectations are structured against the Resilience Cycle, allowing LGDs to clearly identify what elements apply to them based on the stages for which they are the designated LGD.

1.4. Departments should apply the expectations proportionately. Application should reflect the department's risk profile, role, organisational capability and maturity, and understanding of the system related to their risk. While the guidance looks to define outcomes to be achieved, the overall delivery of these outcomes is left to departmental determination. This ensures departments retain the primacy, flexibility, and autonomy to manage their own arrangements and tailor them to their risks and circumstances.

1.5. For ease of use, each of the Expectations shares a common and consistent template structure. Every Expectation is subdivided into the following four sections:

a. **Desired outcome**: sets out the collective capability and strategic outcome that the LGD should seek to achieve. Desired outcomes are designed to be outcome-focused

[1] Cabinet Office, 'The Roles of Lead Government Departments, Devolved Administrations and Other Public Bodies', 2023, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/list-of-lead-government-departments-responsibilities-for-planning-response-and-recovery-from-emergencies/the-roles-of-lead-government-departments-devolved-administrations-and-other-public-bodies-html

rather than process-driven, allowing LGDs the flexibility to determine the most effective delivery models for their area.

b. **At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:** sets out the minimum baseline expectations of what LGDs should, as the norm, have in place, be able to do, and demonstrate. Minimum baseline expectations are those which meet base national-level responsibilities in a way that is thorough, consistent with established guidance, and effective in the national operating context.

c. **For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:** sets out developmental, progressive, and aspirational arrangements that LGDs could adopt to drive a culture of continual learning and maturity beyond the baseline.

d. **In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should**: recognising that LGDs do not take sole responsibility for their risks, and OGDs have responsibility for supporting the LGD for disruption to their sectors and policy areas, this section articulates the expectations on OGDs to support the LGD.

1.6. The aims of this guidance are to:

a. **clarify national-level responsibilities:** the guidance outlines what LGDs are expected to achieve in line with their national-level resilience responsibilities. While promoting consistency in approach, the expectations remain flexible and scalable enough to account for different risk profiles of LGDs. The expectations are there to guide interactions and joint working between LGDs and supporting departments.

b. **support continual improvement**: by focusing on achievable outcomes rather than prescribing rigid processes, the standards drive learning and continual improvement. They define baseline expectations and good practice, helping LGDs identify what they should have in place, what they can develop further, and what evidence they can use to demonstrate progress over time.

c. **guide self-assessment and form the basis for assurance:** the expectations provide a consistent, structured framework for LGDs to self-assess their readiness, identify capability gaps, and engage in constructive challenge.

d. **support catastrophic risk management:** recognising the scale and complexity of catastrophic risks (those which are assessed in the NSRA as having a Catastrophic impact), this guidance sets out further expectations of LGDs, OGDs and the Cabinet Office on how to effectively manage this category of risk. This includes the enhanced support and leadership role the Cabinet Office provides.

Audience

1.7. The LGD Expectations Set is primarily aimed at UK government departments, public bodies and agencies as it provides further detail on the UK government's national resilience arrangements.

1.8. However, it will also be of use to other relevant stakeholders who interact with the UK government's national resilience arrangements (such as local responders and the devolved governments) to inform their understanding of how their own structures interact with those of the UK government.

Scope

1.9. The LGD Expectations Set provides guidance on what UK government departments are expected to do across the Resilience Cycle. It is risk-agnostic and applies equally to all the different types of emergencies the UK faces, as documented in the 'Roles of Lead Government Departments, Devolved Administrations and Other Public Bodies'.[2]

1.10. The expectations set out in this guidance apply to UK government departments, in their capacity either as an LGD or as an OGD supporting the LGD. The arrangements only apply to local responders, devolved governments and other external stakeholders in relation to how they interact with UK government departments.

Structure

1.11. The LGD Expectations Set's chapters are as follows:

a. **Chapter 2** : provides an overview of the UK government's LGD model

b. **Chapter 3** : covers expectations surrounding building resilience for risks for which they are the nominated lead, as well as new risks which might materialise in their areas of responsibility

c. **Chapter 4**: details expectations surrounding the response to, and recovery from, emergencies, including learning lessons

d. **Chapter 5**: sets out expectations that apply across the entirety of the Resilience Cycle

e. **Chapter 6**: details arrangements for how the LGD model applies to whole-of-system catastrophic risks

Linkages

1.12. The LGD Expectations Set should be read in conjunction with the following documents:

a. The Roles of Lead Government Departments, Devolved Administrations and Other Public Bodies: provides an overview of the LGD model and which UK government

[2] Cabinet Office, The Roles of Lead Government Departments, Devolved Administrations and other Public Bodies, 2023, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/list-of-lead-government-departments-responsibilities-for-planning-response-and-recovery-from-emergencies/the-roles-of-lead-government-departments-devolved-administrations-and-other-public-bodies-html

department, devolved government(s) or other public body leads the co-ordination for different types of emergency at different stages of the Resilience Cycle[3]

b. The Amber Book - Managing Crisis in Central Government: sets out the UK government's crisis management framework[4]

c. National Risk Register (updated regularly and found on gov.uk): UK government's public-facing assessment of the most serious risks facing the UK. In addition, UK government resilience practitioners should consult the NSRA[5]

d. Orange Book: establishes the concept of risk management and provides a basic introduction to its concepts, development and implementation of risk management processes in government organisations[6]

e. Chronic Risk Analysis: outlines the most critical medium- to long- term challenges facing the United Kingdom[7]

f. National Resilience Standards for Local Resilience Forums: a set of individual standards for Local Resilience Forums to consistently identify good and leading practice, and help self-assure their capabilities and overall level of readiness[8]

[3] *ibid*
[4] Cabinet Office, Amber Book - Managing Crisis in Central Government, 2025, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations
[5] Cabinet Office, 'National Risk Register'
[6] HM Treasury, 'Orange Book', 2024, available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/orange-book
[7] Cabinet Office and Government Office for Science, 'Chronic risk analysis', 2025, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chronic-risks-analysis
[8] Cabinet Office, 'National Resilience Standards for Local Resilience Forums', 2026, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-resilience-standards-for-local-resilience-forums-lrfs

Chapter 2 An overview of the Lead Government Department Model

2.1. This chapter provides an overview of the Lead Government Department (LGD) Model as part of the UK government's national approach to resilience. It sets out the distinct roles of the LGD, Cabinet Office and other UK government departments in driving national resilience.

Role of Lead Government Departments

2.2. The UK government uses an LGD model to co-ordinate all phases of the Resilience Cycle.[9] Designated LGDs are responsible for leading the co-ordination of work to identify and assess risks and ensuring that the right prevention, planning, response and recovery arrangements are in place for the risks for which they are designated owners. They are also responsible for training and exercising these aspects as well as implementing lessons that have been identified. LGDs, through their Secretary of State, are accountable to Parliament for their department's actions and performance in relation to their designated risks, including any relevant NATO commitments where applicable.

2.3. The Cabinet Office is responsible for designating LGD status for all risks within the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) and any new risks that may emerge. Usually, the LGD is the department with primary policy responsibility for the risk and expertise for the area impacted by the emergency scenario. For example, HM Treasury leads on financial services policy and is also the LGD for managing the risk of disruption to critical financial services.

2.4. The LGD may change between different phases of an emergency as the impacts change and different competencies are required. For example, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is the LGD for responding to significant flood events, but the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) leads on flood recovery given its role in supporting communities.

2.5. Any emergency that requires a UK government response will require involvement from multiple departments and, in some cases, devolved governments, as well as other national and local bodies. For instance, while Defra is the LGD for the response to significant flooding events, a flood can have secondary impacts on transport networks, power supply, buildings, and the health and social care sector. Consequently, the LGD would need to be supported by

[9] Cabinet Office, 'The Roles of Lead Government Departments, Devolved Administrations and Other Public Bodies', 2023, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/list-of-lead-government-departments-responsibilities-for-planning-response-and-recovery-from-emergencies/the-roles-of-lead-government-departments-devolved-administrations-and-other-public-bodies-html

the Department for Transport, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, MHCLG, and the Department of Health and Social Care respectively to effectively prepare for and respond to the cascading impacts caused by a flood.

2.6. LGDs should maintain an end-to-end understanding of the systems associated with their risks, including critical functions, upstream and downstream dependencies, single points of failure and cascading impacts. Based on this understanding of their risk, the LGD is responsible for identifying those other departments and devolved governments who will likely be impacted by their risk, ensuring that there are clear roles and responsibilities and co-ordinating work across all phases of emergency management for which they have been designated LGD status. LGDs are also likely to need to work closely with other responsible stakeholders, such as local responders or private sector operators. LGDs will usually do this through their agencies or the sectors they represent or with support from MHCLG.

2.7. The UK government operates a decentralised model for Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). LGDs and, where CNI is devolved, devolved governments are responsible for identifying and assessing the criticality of infrastructure within their sectors to make CNI designations. They are responsible for setting sectoral policy, engagement with industry and assuring the security and resilience of their sector/s, and working collaboratively between departments, Owners and Operators, National Technical Authorities and other relevant stakeholders.

Role of the Cabinet Office

2.8. The role of the Cabinet Office, in its capacity in supporting the Prime Minister and the effective running of government, is to facilitate the development, co-ordination and implementation of policies and activities to support the preparedness and response to emergencies relevant to the UK. The Cabinet Office provides overarching system leadership of the UK government's approach to resilience and crisis response including:

a. setting the strategic direction and priorities for the UK government's approach to strengthen public sector resilience

b. raising standards of resilience through the provision of training and co-ordination of the National Exercising Programme

c. ownership of the legislative framework for emergency preparedness across the UK (the Civil Contingencies Act 2004) and accompanying supporting guidance

d. identifying and assessing significant risks facing the UK, including through maintenance of the NSRA and accompanying National Risk Register, and strengthening the cross-government capability to respond through the National Capabilities Programme

e. delivering a strategic approach to build the resilience of UK CNI and drive a 'whole-of-society' approach through public communications, household and community resilience, and reducing our vulnerabilities

f. leading UK government preparedness and the response to emergencies, including horizon scanning, 24/7 watchkeeping, and situational awareness

g. managing the UK government's central crisis facilities, communications and delivery systems, and continuity of crisis management arrangements

h. providing vital situational awareness for national resilience, through secure information sharing, and monitoring emerging threats

i. providing leadership for the response to whole-of-system emergencies, and co-sponsoring the planning phase with the LGD responsible for that risk

2.9. In rare cases, an emergency may occur where it is unclear which department should take the overall lead. In this instance it is the responsibility of the Cabinet Office to advise the Prime Minister on which is the most appropriate LGD, and co-ordinate the central government response until an LGD is confirmed.

Role of other government departments

2.10. While LGDs have national-level responsibility for the overall national co-ordination of work across the whole Resilience Cycle for their designated risk, they are expected to be supported by other government departments (OGDs) who retain responsibility for their policy areas and/or sectors. OGDs are expected to support LGDs to understand, prepare for, respond to and recover from impacts related to their policy areas and/or sectors, and should collaborate with the LGDs across the Resilience Cycle.

2.11. OGDs are expected to understand how LGD-owned risks could significantly impact their areas of responsibility, services and/or stakeholders and maintain proportionate preparedness to be able to respond to and recover from disruption.

Role of regulators

2.12. Where risk ownership sits in a department that has regulatory responsibilities for aspects of the Resilience Cycle and for responders and other involved parties, the risk ownership role will not create conflict with other duties or impinge on regulatory independence.

2.13. For example, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) would carry out its role as a regulator in proactive and reactive intervention work to ensure operators and site owners carry out their legal duties and to take enforcement action as appropriate. HSE would not lead a central government response but rather work with specific LGDs depending on the nature of the event.

Role of devolved governments

2.14. Responsibility for managing certain risks and their impacts is devolved for all or some phases of the Resilience Cycle. Where a matter is devolved (such as flood defence), the

devolved government in that nation leads all elements of the Resilience Cycle for these areas. Where a risk or emergency in a devolved policy area spans across borders or is UK-wide, the relevant devolved governments and the UK government will work together in a co-ordinated manner as much as is possible.

2.15. Where a risk or emergency is a reserved matter, the UK LGD will work closely with the devolved governments, who will retain responsibility for the cascading impacts which are related to devolved areas. For example, managing the risk of disruption to the GB energy network would be led by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), but responsibility for many of the secondary impacts of this risk (for example, the impact of energy failure on transport, schools, healthcare) is devolved.

2.16. A partnership approach between all parts of the UK is essential to ensure the UK government and the devolved governments can effectively respond to risks wherever in the UK they occur. Further information on how LGDs and devolved governments should work together in crisis response is set out within the Amber Book - Managing Crisis in Central Government.[10]

Offices for the Nations

2.17. The Offices for the Nations consist of the Scotland Office, the Wales Office and the Northern Ireland Office, all of which are UK government departments. They represent the UK government's interests in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the interests of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the UK government.

2.18. The Offices for the Nations play an important role in facilitating partnership between UK government and the devolved governments, given their close relationships and knowledge of both UK government and the relevant devolved government. The Offices for the Nations can support effective collaboration between the UK government and the relevant devolved government, and can support effective liaison and handling of particular issues. They can provide support and advice to UK government departments when working with the devolved governments.

Role of Crown Dependencies

2.19. The Crown Dependencies (CD) are responsible for their own domestic affairs including all phases of the Resilience Cycle. The UK government is responsible for their defence (and certain national security matters), international relations and (acting on behalf of The King) their good government. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is the UK government lead department for managing the UK's constitutional relationship with the CDs; however, where matters owned by UK LGDs have impacts on or are of interest to the CDs, they should engage with the CDs directly. MoJ can advise on handling where necessary.

[10] Cabinet Office, Amber Book - Managing Crisis in Central Government, 2025, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations

Role of Overseas Territories and Sovereign Base Areas

2.20. There are 14 UK Overseas Territories (OT) across the globe which have historic links to the UK, 10of which are permanently inhabited by British Nationals. The UK government has a complex relationship with its OTs spanning constitutional, security and financial aspects. The territories operate with differing levels of self-governance, balancing local decision-making with UK government responsibilities. The UK government collaborates closely with the territories on security and defence. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) is responsible for managing the relationship with the OTs. LGDs should be aware of any impacts that could be felt across the OTs and Sovereign Base Areas. Where engagement is necessary it should be done via FCDO and also the Ministry of Defence for the Sovereign Base Areas.

Catastrophic Risk Management

2.21. For the risks identified in the NSRA as having “catastrophic” impacts in the Reasonable Worst-Case Scenarios (RWCS), the Cabinet Office will co-sponsor the “planning” phase with the LGDs. This is in recognition of the scale and severity of risks that would have system-wide impacts, meaning that significant cross-government activity, close working with devolved governments and broader co-ordination is required. There is a greater emphasis on OGD preparedness for this category of risk, given the expected impacts on their policy areas and/or sectors. There is further detail on expectations of LGDs, the Cabinet Office and OGDs for these risks in Chapter 6.

Chapter 3 The role of government departments in building resilience

3.1. This chapter is focused on activities departments should undertake to build resilience for civil contingencies and national security risks.

3.2. This section is structured around the following areas:

a. Risk Anticipation and Assessment
b. Prevention and Mitigation
c. Preparedness - Emergency Planning
d. Preparedness - Response Capabilities
e. Preparedness - Training
f. Validation and Assurance - Exercising
g. Validation and Assurance - Governance and Assurance

Expectation 1 Risk Anticipation and Assessment

Desired Outcome

The LGD maintains a thorough and dynamic assessment of the most significant risks within, and related to, their areas of responsibility which require a national response, based on how likely they are to happen and what their impacts might be. Risks should be assessed through an understanding of how threats, hazards, vulnerabilities, exposure, dependencies and behaviours interact to affect likelihood and impact.

This information informs a range of risk management decisions, including the development of proportionate prevention and preparatory work. LGDs should understand and monitor how chronic risks can impact and influence acute risks in their departmental area(s) of responsibility and aim for chronic risks to be effectively mitigated or managed through departmental policies and actions where possible.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

Risk Anticipation

A. Maintain horizon scanning functions to provide foresight by identifying potential emerging and/or escalating risks in their policy area that can materialise in the medium- to long-term, and those which can escalate with very little warning.

B. Use open-source tools to complement other authoritative evidence sources, to support the early identification and escalation of emerging events.

C. Maintain processes which support the early identification of their risk escalating, including agreed protocols with other organisations where this capability is held elsewhere. This should include accompanying protocols to support the escalation of the warning to both relevant stakeholders within and outside of the department to inform appropriate and timely action.

Risk identification and assessment

D. Develop and maintain comprehensive risk identification processes for non-malicious and malicious risks within their areas of responsibility. This includes informing the Cabinet Office of existing acute risks to be updated or removed from the National Security Risk Assessment, or new acute risks that meet the threshold for inclusion in the NSRA, even if not directly in their departmental area(s) of responsibility.

E. Draw on the best available expertise to develop risk identification and assessment in their area(s) of responsibility, including engaging with departmental Chief Scientific Advisers and

cross-government subject-matter experts. This should be done early in the identification and assessment process and embed diversity of thought.

F. Produce and maintain risk assessments for risks they take ownership of or which would have significant consequences in their area of remit over different timeframes (e.g. short-, medium- and long-term) in conjunction with the risk-owning department.

G. Take responsibility for high-quality and timely contributions to the National Security Risk Assessment and other cross-government risk registers, such as the Cabinet Office's Civil Contingencies Forward Look, based on the best possible evidence and data, and agreed at the appropriate ministerial and/or senior official level. This should include regularly reviewing and updating risk assessments as new information becomes available (such as after exercises, incidents and recovery activity), ensuring that changes are reflected in the dynamic National Security Risk Assessment as required.

H. Identify, understand and assess impacts of a risk on vulnerable people; involving a range of organisations who hold information on vulnerable persons.

I. Maintain and regularly review departmental risk registers which include both risks which they have been assigned Lead Government Department responsibility for through the NSRA, as well as risks which are sufficiently impactful to pose a disruptive challenge, but which have not been included in the NSRA.

J. Understand how the chronic risks set out in the Chronic risk analysis impact the acute risks in their departmental area(s) of responsibility, including ensuring relevant strategy, policy and operational teams are sighted on the chronic risk analysis.

K. Maintain dynamic risk assessment processes to respond to real-time changes in circumstances during exercises, live incidents and recovery where new information emerges.

L. Share and validate risk assessment information, as appropriate and with consideration of the sensitivity of the information, with other UK government departments, devolved governments, public bodies, agencies, sectors, and local responders, to collectively improve understanding of risk impacts.

M. Have regular discussions at senior departmental forums (e.g. departmental boards and executive committees) and industry forums about the risk landscape, using the National Security Risk Assessment (or National Risk Register for non-government forums) and Chronic risk analysis as framing products.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

N. Implement both quantitative and qualitative risk monitoring systems to maintain oversight and detect early signals of escalating risks.

O. Engage and use tools provided by the Government Office for Science (GO-Science) and Cabinet Office to support risk identification and assessment, including Futures thinking tools.

P. Monitor risk trends over time, in line with the dynamic NSRA, to develop understanding of how the risk landscape is evolving and emerging trends to inform strategy and policy development, alongside funding decisions.

Q. Use a number of different scenarios when conducting risk assessments, including scenarios where policy overlaps or links with devolved governments' areas of responsibilities.

R. Use independent peers to provide objective challenge and fresh perspectives within the risk assessment process.

S. Form communities of interest around identifying and assessing thematic/cross-cutting risks that have cross-departmental and/or cross 4 Nations interest.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Maintain processes for notifying the LGD of risks materialising under the OGD's areas of responsibility which could influence the likelihood or impact of the LGD's risks.

B. Proactively support LGDs with identifying and assessing risks. This can include providing insight into how a risk might impact the OGD's departmental area(s) of responsibility, or supporting where the department has relevant subject-matter expertise. This should be done in a timely way to allow input into the Civil Contingencies Forward Look and NSRA process.

C. Contribute to cross-government discussions about new, emerging or evolving acute and chronic risks, even if not directly in their departmental area(s) of responsibility, and communicate this information to the Cabinet Office in a timely manner. The Cabinet Office will work through risk ownership issues with relevant parties.

D. Periodically identify and develop an understanding of how LGD risks in the NSRA could directly impact their areas of responsibility and consider whether additional departmental planning or preparedness activity is required.

Expectation 2 Prevention and Mitigation

Desired Outcome

Based on comprehensive risk management processes, the LGD takes appropriate steps to reduce the likelihood and impact of their risks. This will include having systems that can identify escalating risks early and take appropriate actions to look to prevent the risk manifesting, as well as longer term structural and/or non-structural measures to address vulnerabilities and build resilience.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Regularly monitor risks and establish early warning systems to identify potential crises, enabling prompt and pre-emptive action when risks exceed defined thresholds.

B. Build an understanding of their risks in terms of their dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure, hazard characteristics and the environment to inform appropriate prevention and mitigation measures. This should include understanding how hazards, vulnerabilities, exposure, capacity, dependencies and behaviours interact to cause or amplify the risk.

C. Develop and implement appropriate prevention and mitigation strategies and corresponding work programmes, based on their understanding of their risk and effective risk management processes. The development and implementation of prevention and mitigation strategies should involve engaging relevant sectors, agencies and local responders as appropriate.

D. Assess whether prevention and mitigation interventions could transfer risk, create new dependencies or reduce resilience elsewhere.

E. Consider and implement appropriate structural (e.g. physical construction such as flood walls, earthquake-resistant construction etc.) and/or non-structural (e.g. non-physical construction measures such as policies, laws, regulation, public awareness etc.) measures to reduce the likelihood or impact of their risks. Measures should represent the best value for money and be affordable, following the Five Case Model.

F. Work with regulators, operators and relevant stakeholders to define, communicate and monitor resilience expectations and standards across their sectors.

G. Identify and engage relevant OGDs and devolved governments whose policy areas influence the likelihood of their risk occurring or whose areas, sectors or populations would be significantly impacted if it were to arise, and work together to consider and introduce appropriate risk reduction measures to reduce likelihood or impact.

H. Proactively share good practice on prevention and mitigation approaches with OGDs and devolved governments.

I. Ensure, where applicable, that Critical National Infrastructure Owners and Operators, and regulators (where relevant) are taking steps to address vulnerabilities and adopt appropriate mitigations or tolerance.

J. Integrate risk assessment products, including the National Security Risk Assessment, to appropriate senior level governance forums to inform strategy, policy and funding decisions on risk prevention and mitigation.

K. Provide clear national risk communication, which supports local risk messaging, and provide practical information on how to mitigate the risk or what actions to take in the event of the risk materialising.

L. Factor in prevention costs (the costs associated with measures to prevent, reduce, transfer or avoid risks in a proposal) into risk appraisal for investment decisions, in line with HM Treasury's Green Book.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

M. Draw from relevant international examples of prevention and mitigation approaches to inform their approach.

N. Pilot and fund innovative prevention and mitigation approaches, co-designing schemes in close collaboration with appropriate wider stakeholders, including:

   i. Communities who have been/could be impacted by the risk,

   ii. Local Resilience Forums

   iii. Industry

   iv. Academia

   v. Voluntary, community and faith sector organisations

O. Share lessons identified from embedding the Chronic risk analysis into their wider strategy, policy and operational programmes.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Provide early warning if an escalating risk within their area of responsibility has the potential to increase the likelihood of the LGD's risk occurring, or to cause disruption to their sectors.

B. Support the LGD to understand how their sectors and policy areas interact with the LGD's risk, in terms of their dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure, hazard characteristics and the environment.

C. Develop and implement proportionate prevention and mitigation strategies for areas under its responsibility, which will reduce the likelihood or impact of the LGD's risk.

D. Participate and contribute to LGD-led prevention and mitigation activities for areas falling under their area of responsibility.

E. Communicate risk information to their sectors, public bodies, and agencies to build wider understanding of how the LGD-owned risk can impact them and what steps they should be taking to mitigate the risk or actions to take in the event of the risk materialising.

Expectation 3 Emergency Planning (Preparedness)

Desired Outcome

The LGD maintains a coherent, flexible and proportionate set of emergency plans, frameworks and procedures to be able to effectively respond to their risks and manage wider disruption to their sectors/policy areas. Planning is informed by associated national planning assumptions, but can respond to different manifestations of their risks. The planning framework supports co-ordination, co-operation and integration between relevant national, regional, and local bodies to respond to cascading impacts.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

Risk-based and Generic Planning

A. Maintain a coherent set of emergency plans, frameworks and procedures which support proportionate planning to their risks within the National Security Risk Assessment, as well as the ability to respond to wider disruption in their areas of policy responsibility.

B. Undertake a combination of generic planning and risk-specific planning, with a clear rationale for the balance between the two.

C. Use the National Resilience Planning Assumptions to identify what bespoke planning is required, in addition to generic planning, to prepare for their risks.

Governance

D. Establish clear governance arrangements for national-level plans, including defined responsibility for plan development, validation and maintenance. This should include consideration of the appropriate involvement of other government departments, the devolved governments, public bodies, regulators and their sectors within relevant governance.

E. Use cross-government governance to identify and constructively discuss differences in how UK government departments perceive and tolerate risk, as well as to address variations in capabilities and expected response arrangements that could impact cross-government preparedness, response, or recovery.

Plan development and components

F. Develop plans that enable the anticipation of rising tide emergencies, outlining triggers for pre-emptive, precautionary and preparedness actions.

G. Develop plans with input from relevant OGDs, public bodies, devolved governments, sectors and local responders who may be involved in the response to or recovery from the risk.

H. Maintain plans that are scalable and identify the capabilities and resources likely to be required to support response and recovery activities across a range of national planning assumptions.

I. Maintain plans which have a clear notification process for seeking wide support, inclusive of relevant other government departments, devolved governments, agencies and local responders as appropriate, including Military Aid to Civil Authorities, and national capability owners.

J. Explicitly identify where national and specialist capabilities are likely to be required, recognising and documenting associated planning assumptions, dependencies, and limitations.

K. Develop protocols for establishing appropriate governance structures in the early stages of a response that can oversee the future transition from response to recovery.

L. Maintain plans with clear and agreed arrangements for communication with all stakeholders and the public across the full range of media.

M. Develop an understanding of the legal powers available, including specific legislation covering their sectors as well as wider relevant legislation which could have effects on the emergency powers available.

N. Embed counter-fraud controls such as mandating the completion of Initial Fraud Impact Assessments (IFIAs), and financial propriety considerations into resilience and emergency planning, particularly where emergency spending or financial support schemes are anticipated.

O. Identify and plan for the disproportionate impacts that can be felt by vulnerable groups, considering the tailored support which might be required and noting this may differ from risk to risk. When assessing risks and developing plans, LGDs should explicitly consider whether children and young people may experience distinct or disproportionate impacts, and identify any tailored mitigations or support required.

P. Ensure plans and related arrangements are suitable for complex, cascading and concurrent emergencies, which may require sustained response and recovery operations over an extended period of time. This should include recording material dependencies, responsible organisations, capacity limits, lead times, fallback arrangements and consequences of failure within plans.

Integration

Q. Ensure plans can facilitate integration with COBR (when activated), as well as with local resilience tier arrangements, ensuring roles and responsibilities are clearly defined at a local, regional and national level.

R. Share their plans with relevant OGDs, devolved governments, public bodies and agencies, their sectors and local responders as appropriate, to support integration of the different organisations who will be involved in the management of an emergency and joined-up planning activities.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

S. Maintain and use a clear, commonly understood definition and typology that distinguishes between emergency plans, frameworks, protocols, standard operating procedures and guidance notes to ensure the LGD produces the most appropriate and proportionate planning product for a given risk.

T. Format emergency plans to maximise usability by incorporating clear signposting, digital accessibility, and structured tools like action cards, diagrammatic instructions, detachable annexes, and directories.

U. Collaborate with the Public Sector Fraud Authority and HM Treasury to incorporate pre-tested counter-fraud controls, data sharing protocols, and public messaging frameworks into emergency response and stimulus scheme designs.

V. Use independent evaluators from other government departments to assess emergency plans, frameworks and protocols.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Use the National Security Risk Assessment and National Resilience Planning Assumptions to determine the required balance of generic and specific planning which is required to be able to effectively respond to and/or recover from the LGD's risk.

B. Ensure that their departmental planning assumptions are aligned with national-level planning assumptions developed by the LGD.

C. Participate and contribute to LGD-led governance which supports national level planning activity.

D. Co-operate with and contribute to LGD-led planning, to ensure that the LGD's planning arrangements sufficiently take into account impacts on their policy areas/sectors.

E. Proactively communicate to the LGD relevant capabilities or subject matter expertise the department holds which can support the response to or recovery from the emergency, including associated assumptions, dependencies, and limitations.

F. Share relevant plans, as appropriate, with the LGD to ensure their plans integrate effectively with the LGD's national planning arrangements.

G. Identify and communicate where their services, sectors or plans depend on the LGD or other departments, including the consequences if those dependencies fail.

Expectation 4 Response Capabilities (Preparedness)

Desired Outcome

Emergency response capabilities are fully integrated into emergency plans, ensuring resources are deployed effectively and gaps in capability are proactively managed to prevent operational failure.This should include consideration of both national capabilities, as well as wider capabilities which exist within the department or across other organisations which can be deployed in an emergency.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Identify which emergency response capabilities will be required should their risk materialise.

B. Identify and validate critical dependencies, limitations and assumptions associated with emergency response capabilities and reflect these within their planning arrangements.

C. Identify and work with the national capability owner(s) for each risk to ensure a shared understanding of the risk planning assumptions, existing preparedness planning, and how the risk could require the support of the national capability.

D. Understand how the relevant emergency capabilities can support risk planning and incorporate activation mechanisms of the capability as part of this.

E. Demonstrate that plans, capabilities, trained personnel and governance arrangements can operate effectively under realistic conditions.

F. Ensure staff are adequately trained to understand how capabilities are used during a response and the resources that might be required as part of this.

G. Maintain engagement with capability owners to ensure that reviews, changes and updates to an applicable response capability are also reflected in risk planning reviews.

H. Test and exercise risk management plans to include capabilities where possible, validating the process of standing up a capability response with capability owners, OGDs and, where appropriate, devolved governments.

I. Ensure that any capability gaps are identified and take steps to address gaps where proportionate and possible.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

J. Develop an understanding of the wider capabilities that may not be directly applicable to the LGD's risk, but would support the wider understanding of the national capability programme as a whole.

K. Engage with other risk owners to establish common risk areas and use of capabilities.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Have a general understanding of what national capabilities are and which have relevance to their department.

B. Consider how they are involved in the response to risk and the capabilities they may have which could be used to support consequence management.

C. Work closely with LGDs to identify where involvement of OGDs is required, maintaining an understanding of the risk planning and capability response required as part of that.

D. Attend exercises led by the LGDs to support the validation of risk plans, taking part in capability cells as required.

Expectation 5 Training (Preparedness)

Desired Outcome

Core crisis management and surge support staff should be competent to fulfil their roles in emergency response and recovery. Teams across government work together as a matter of routine to understand each other's roles and responsibilities, underpinned by a systematic approach to individual and collective training, rehearsal, validation, learning and improvement.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Conduct a Training Needs Analysis to inform and prioritise the training plan in line with their risk profile and capability requirements, aligned, where relevant and available, to recognised National Occupational Standards, competency frameworks or equivalent departmental role profiles.

B. Use the Training Needs Analysis to develop a training plan with a clear aim and related objectives. The plan should establish agreed role profiles, minimum competencies, proportionate learning pathways and defined refresher training cycles for significant roles. It should also balance what is required and proportionate for dedicated staff who work in resilience roles against surge staff who can provide additional support in major emergencies.

C. Use suitably qualified and experienced people to develop and/or deliver training. This should include having due regard to relevant professional standards, competency frameworks, or recognised equivalent operational experience.

D. Create a safe learning environment that enables no-fault learning across the range of its training activities and supports honest reflection, challenge and improvement.

E. Assure the quality, currency, and effectiveness of the training, covering both what is taught and how it is delivered, with arrangements for regular review.

F. Ensure training reflects relevant legislation, guidance and doctrine, and applies lessons identified from exercises and real-world incidents to close the learning loop.

G. Ensure that staff who are on surge support are enrolled in and complete appropriate training for them to be able to perform the required functions in response and/or recovery.

H. Enrol all appropriate staff in the relevant elements of the Cabinet Office's Crisis Management Excellence Programme training.

I. Establish proportionate arrangements to assess and record competence for critical response and recovery roles, using observation, rehearsal, exercises and/or evidence from

real incidents. Completion of training alone should not be treated as assurance of operational readiness.

J. Where delivery of the response depends on other government departments or relevant partners, provide opportunities for joint role familiarisation and collective training to develop a shared understanding of roles, responsibilities and ways of working.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

K. Encourage the use of secondments, shadowing and surge support as part of a career development programme.

L. Encourage a culture of continual improvement within the department through sharing experience across teams and with the wider government resilience community through cross-government and devolved government forums.

M. Establish clear criteria to assess and evaluate the impact of training using an outcome-based framework, considering whether training has successfully translated into observable operational behaviour, shared competencies, and departmental readiness.

N. Actively share departmental training packages, Training Needs Analysis, and notable practices with other government departments and their public bodies to reduce administrative duplication and support the wider training community of practice.

O. Provide appropriate training for ministers on their functions, including enrolling them in Cabinet Office-led training.

P. Use independent observers and evaluators from other parts of the department, other government departments, their public bodies or wider partners to assess training.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Maintain training arrangements proportionate to their anticipated role in supporting the LGD and managing impacts within their own area of responsibility, including common core and role-specific training where required.

Expectation 6 Exercising (Validation and Assurance)

Desired Outcome

The LGD develops, trains, and assures national preparedness through a structured and proportionate departmental exercising programme that is informed by the Cabinet Office's National Security Risk Assessment, National Capabilities Assessment and National Exercising Programme. Co-ordinated with local, regional, and national arrangements and involving necessary and appropriate wider partners, this exercising programme balances essential learning and training with opportunities for familiarisation, confidence building, and relationship building. The LGD embeds exercising as part of continual improvement to evaluate outcomes, enhance interoperability, and strengthen national capability.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Establish an appropriate mechanism to oversee, co-ordinate, and communicate a regular schedule of exercising activities, integrated within a culture of learning, and continual improvement.

B. Bring together individuals with relevant expertise and experience to plan, deliver, debrief and evaluate exercises.

C. Promote a safe learning-focused environment across exercising activities to support honest reflection, constructive challenge, and no-fault collective learning.

D. Establish arrangements so that all exercises conducted have a single set aim, clear objectives, a defined scope within the bounds of the analytical or training requirement, and use the most appropriate form of exercise format to meet those pre-defined requirements.

E. Develop realistic and challenging exercise scenarios that reflect National Resilience Planning assumptions and the National Security Risk Assessment.

F. Design exercise scenarios which test cross-sector dependencies, downstream impacts, critical assumptions and potential cascading and compounding impacts where these are relevant to the risk being exercised.

G. Ensure exercises test how organisations' individual and collective actions may create gaps, conflicts, duplication or unintended consequences.

H. Maintain arrangements to involve relevant partners in exercises appropriate to the risk being exercised, including:

   i. other government departments and public bodies

ii. devolved governments

iii. local responders

iv. sectors

v. voluntary, community and faith sector organisations

I. Identify, document, rehearse, and validate response capabilities through their exercise programme.

J. Validate the interplay between different levels of command and control, and co-ordination, including testing virtual and hybrid arrangements.

K. Test and evaluate arrangements for a sustained response against Reasonable Worst-Case Scenarios, and explicitly test virtual or hybrid command and control environments.

L. Ensure that the appropriate focus of exercises is on people and processes, as well as response structures, to ensure sufficient attention to issues related to leadership behaviours, decision-making under pressure and staff resilience.

M. Seek to incorporate consideration of the consequences of financial or capability expenditure, where proportionate and in collaboration with relevant departments and partners, recognising that costs and associated expertise may sit across government and outside the LGD.

N. Seek to introduce fraud vulnerability crisis preparedness tabletop and live exercises to include fraud prevention and mitigation scenarios, specifically testing counter-fraud responses and control mechanisms during emergency spending. The exercises should include scenarios that test financial controls, invoice verification, and beneficiary checks under pressure, for example, simulating attempts at exploitation by malicious actors e.g. bogus suppliers or diversion of relief funds.

O. Ensure their exercise programme includes a dedicated opportunity to validate recovery arrangements and decision-making, not solely response activity.

P. Establish an agreed process for debriefing and evaluating exercise outcomes, which includes producing Post-Exercise Reports (PXRs) to document the exercise, evaluate pre-defined objectives, and detail observations and lessons identified (which may have a restricted audience).

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

Q. Contribute to the wider exercising community of practice by sharing exercise design, scenarios, and lessons identified.

R. Support personnel to develop specialised exercising skills - including exercise design, delivery, facilitation, debriefing, and evaluation - through ongoing professional development and training opportunities.

S. Use a diverse and innovative range of exercise formats (e.g. tabletop exercises, live exercises, red teaming challenge sessions, snap exercises).

T. Promote the parallel incorporation of business continuity scenarios (e.g. loss of personnel, systems, communications, facilities and/or essential services) into exercises.

U. Use independent observers and evaluators from other organisations to assess exercise outcomes.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Contribute to exercise planning and design, sharing information and assessments related to their policy areas/sectors which can support realistic exercise design.

B. Participate and actively contribute to LGD-run exercises, ensuring they appropriately staff their crisis response functions as well as having appropriate representation from their department, public bodies, agencies and sectors in the exercise.

C. Participate in the LGD's post-exercise debriefing and evaluation activities.

Expectation 7 Governance and Assurance (Validation and Assurance)

Desired Outcome

Effective strategic leadership, direction and efficient structures enable decision-making, oversight and validation of anticipation, assessment, prevention/mitigation and preparedness at the appropriate levels. Governance and assurance arrangements should be aligned with established government risk management principles, including the Orange Book, and should support proportionate, risk-informed decision-making across the Resilience Cycle.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Establish and maintain appropriate executive/senior governance arrangements that provide strategic leadership and direction for the management of their risks.

B. Ensure the management of their risks is consistent with the 'Governance and Leadership' section of the Orange Book.

C. Reflect, as appropriate, in their Annual Report and Accounts how they are actively managing risks and fulfilling their LGD responsibilities.

D. Establish a risk escalation policy to ensure risks are considered at the appropriate governance level based on how they perceive, accept, and tolerate risk. Escalation arrangements should set out thresholds, governance routes, decision points, links to risk tolerance and escalation to Cabinet Office oversight where relevant.

E. Define a strategy for discharging their LGD responsibilities, supported by a coherent, flexible work programme agreed by an appropriate governance structure. The work programme should set out specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound objectives, with clear ownership and review arrangements that can be adapted to meet changing priorities.

F. Integrate risk assessment products at governance meetings to ensure this information informs a range of risk management decisions, including the development of proportionate prevention and preparatory work.

G. Maintain an effective structure of mechanisms (e.g. groups, sub-groups and workstream leads) to oversee the delivery of the work programme and drive continual improvement. This structure should include clear arrangements for managing risk ownership, tracking actions to closure, and escalating delivery issues through the governance structures and to Cabinet Office where required.

H. Have in place arrangements to ensure that decisions on the allocation of resources, staff and funding can be taken quickly in a crisis, while taking proportionate efforts to ensure value for money.

I. Maintain a reliable process to involve other UK government departments, public bodies, devolved governments and other stakeholders within meetings as appropriate. Meetings should be focused, purposeful, and subject to regular, proportionate review to ensure their ongoing value.

Assurance

J. Undertake regular internal audits of their preparedness activities to provide objective evaluation of how effectively the organisation assesses and manages their risks.

K. Assure that system maps, dependency assessments and planning assumptions are current, evidence-based and validated with relevant organisations. Ownership should be assigned for maintaining system maps, dependency assessments, and associated improvement actions.

L. For CNI sectors (where relevant), assure that appropriate and proportionate internal mechanisms are in place to correctly identify and track: capability gaps; vulnerability; and risk likelihood and mitigation across the CNI sector.

M. In line with the CNI programme, produce an assurance return to the Cabinet Office for CNI sectors that they are responsible for. The return should identify how the LGD is fulfilling its responsibilities to ensure the security and resilience of their CNI sector, including preventing, mitigating, and preparing for risks.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

N. Use the principles and standards outlined in the Code of Good Practice on Corporate Governance in Central Government Departments, to strengthen their assurance and governance frameworks.

O. Hold regular discussions at Audit and Risk Assurance Committees about the risk landscape and the department's management of civil contingency and/or national security risks.

P. Conduct challenge boards to assure preparedness using internal and OGD participants, including expertise from relevant Functions. Consider, where appropriate, the use of sufficiently security cleared external experts.

Q. Use external assurance (such as the Government Internal Audit Agency and National Audit Office) to audit aspects of their national level resilience activities.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Maintain their own governance arrangements in line with the full complement above to oversee their department's resilience activities.

B. Attend, support and contribute to appropriate LGD governance structures established to support the management of National Security Risk Assessment risks across government.

C. Consider how risks owned by other LGDs which significantly impact their areas of responsibility are appropriately considered at their own governance forums.

D. Raise and escalate issues to the LGD which may require consideration at appropriate LGD governance forums.

Chapter 4 The role of government departments in responding to, recovering from, and learning from emergencies

4.1. This section focuses on activities relevant to when an emergency has taken place, and requires a national response and/or recovery from UK government. It also encompasses the processes post-incident to ensure that lessons are identified and learnt, to support a culture of continual improvement.

4.2. This section is structured around the following areas:

a. Response
b. Recovery
c. Learning and Improvement - Continual Improvement

Expectation 8 Response

Desired Outcome

Command, Control and Co-ordination arrangements and supporting capabilities are in place at an appropriate level of capacity, with due regard to security and resilience considerations, to support and sustain the effective co-ordination across the national, regional and local levels of response. These arrangements can be activated promptly and efficiently to support national strategy, enable timely and informed decision-making, co-ordinate response activity, communicate and facilitate interoperability at local, regional and national levels.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

Infrastructure

A. Maintain crisis management capabilities, facilities, IT and communications arrangements that enable effective national co-ordination of crisis response. These arrangements should be able to host a fully staffed Departmental Operations Centre and be able to host Liaison Officers from other organisations.

B. Define and rehearse business continuity arrangements related to their crisis management function. These are critical to ensure response activities can take place during disruptive events, including loss of power, communications, or displacement from the primary emergency location.

C. Establish and validate communications, procedural and technical links between their crisis management facility and other command, control and communication levels that facilitate interoperability with other agencies at local, regional and national levels.

D. Maintain validated IT, communications access and security procedures that enable capabilities to be activated at short notice and to support sensitive discussions securely, including the ability to operate at higher security classifications where required.

Governance and Activation

E. Maintain a clearly defined protocol for notifying, activating and standing down the Command, Control and Co-ordination structure, including trigger points for escalation and de-escalation. These arrangements should include processes for alerting relevant UK government departments, devolved governments and wider stakeholders.

F. Establish arrangements and triggers for co-ordinating pre-emptive meetings during rising tide emergencies. This ensures early information sharing, joint risk monitoring, and precautionary strategic oversight before formal response structures are activated.

G. Ensure their Command, Control and Co-ordination structure integrates the national, regional and local levels of response, including how this interplays with devolved government structures where appropriate.

H. Define clear arrangements for activating different tiers of appropriate crisis co-ordination structures during an emergency, depending on the scale of the situation. These protocols should explicitly detail how leadership and co-ordination transition across different emergency types and establish a process for the timely transfer of co-ordination authority from the response phase to recovery, including handing over to a different LGD where this is the case.

Response

I. Maintain procedures and the ability to activate a Departmental Operations Centre to co-ordinate the department's crisis response activity, both within the department and with other parts of the Command, Control, and Co-ordination structure. These arrangements should include the ability to activate specific cells and specialist advisory groups with appropriately security cleared staff, as well as providing welfare support for sustained operations.

J. Establish arrangements to attain and maintain shared situational awareness. This includes the establishment of a Situation Cell, standardised situation reporting and briefing templates, and establishing effective information flows.

K. Detail a process for how strategic aims and objectives of the response will be set, kept under review, and implemented.

L. Define arrangements for co-ordinating cross-government response activity. This should include consideration of establishing a daily rhythm of activity, processes for establishing shared situational awareness, and the ability to chair and secretariat cross-government meetings to co-ordinate crisis response. This should include agreed escalation pathways for when it may be appropriate for the Cabinet Office to take on the co-ordinating role.

M. Maintain comprehensive, auditable arrangements to record and log decisions and important discussions at all seniority levels, and ensure records are accessible and retained in line with departmental policies. Decision records should capture the risk assessment underpinning significant decisions, including decision rationale, risk acceptance, rejected options and relevant governance approvals.

N. Establish and maintain financial oversight and control during the response to emergencies in line with HM Treasury's Spending in a Crisis guidance and wider authoritative guidance, ensuring Accounting Officer duties are fulfilled or Ministerial directions sought as needed.

This should be achieved through appropriate systems of governance and delegation, and include protocols to monitor for sudden spikes in fraudulent activity or financial irregularities during the acute response phase.

O. Possess the ability to staff a response 24/7 during the emergency, drawing on appropriately trained surge support from the wider department when required. This should include arrangements to manage staff welfare, resilience and knowledge transfer during sustained operations.

P. Possess the ability to receive and deploy Liaison Officers as appropriate to support integration and co-operation of activities.

Q. Maintain arrangements to co-ordinate and disseminate information to the public and the media at the national level, with No.10 oversight and expert support from the Government Communication Service (GCS) Crisis Team. Communications should be clear on territorial extent and include close working with devolved governments where appropriate for cross-border issues.

R. Work with the Independent Public Advocate (IPA) as necessary where their involvement has been deemed appropriate.

S. Understand and be able to fulfil its responsibilities in line with the Amber Book - Managing Crisis in Central Government.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

T. Have a crisis management facility physically separate from ongoing departmental business-as-usual activities. Ideally, it will be a dedicated emergency management facility; if a limited business-as-usual function exists, it should be secondary, with response activities taking clear precedence.

U. Possess the ability for cells to co-locate in clearly marked ‘cells’. These cells should be in close proximity to each other, to ensure collaboration and close working between them.

V. Have a designated fallback facility, ideally outside of London, with similar capabilities to ensure the replicability of the functions of the primary emergency management locations.

W. Possess a ‘fallback’ resilient telecommunications system, essential for maintaining critical communication in the event of the degradation or total loss of terrestrial communications.

X. Adopt and use commonly agreed terminology, definitions, and symbols in plans, briefings and situation reporting.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Maintain a crisis management facility which is interoperable with the LGD and other OGDs, and facilitates the effective contribution of the department to the response to the emergency.

B. Maintain the ability to stand up and resource a Departmental Operations Centre, to co-ordinate the actions and information flows within their department, and provide a singular point of contact for the LGD and OGDs.

C. Support shared situational awareness, by providing timely situational reporting products to the LGD for impacts arising in areas falling under their area of responsibility.

D. Manage issues falling under their areas of responsibility in line with the principle of subsidiarity, escalating actual/potential issues to the LGD which require their strategic attention. This should include raising at the earliest opportunity where there are any perceived clashes in responsibility with the LGD for a specific risk and, wherever possible, avoid realigning responsibilities during a live crisis response.

E. Maintain arrangements to support financial oversight of their department's spend in line with HM Treasury's Spending in a Crisis guidance and wider authoritative guidance, ensuring Accounting Officer duties are fulfilled or Ministerial directions sought as needed.

F. Proactively communicate relevant departmental capabilities to the LGD that can support consequence management.

G. Provide any technical advice to the LGD in the most actionable format possible, including aligning on the department's position internally before disseminating to the LGD.

H. Possess the ability to deploy a suitably trained Liaison Officer to the LGD, as well as receive them.

I. Support the LGD's public communications by providing communication lines for their policy areas and sectors, and which align with wider government messaging.

Expectation 9 Recovery

Desired Outcome

The LGD co-ordinates comprehensive, embedded, and flexible recovery management arrangements, establishing recovery as a vital component of the Resilience Cycle. There should be agreed processes in place to support a smooth, co-ordinated transition from response to recovery, including where the LGD for Response is a different department, which commences at the earliest possible stage of an emergency. National recovery arrangements should support decision-making to start, resource, monitor, sustain and conclude recovery activities, including consideration of how national response arrangements support local multi-agency recovery.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

Governance and recovery planning

A. Define arrangements for establishing, operating and resourcing appropriate national recovery governance.These arrangements should support the co-ordination of cross-government national recovery activity, support integration with any local Recovery Co-ordinating Groups, and be able to operate concurrently with response governance.

B. Develop and maintain a flexible recovery framework which will co-ordinate the national-level recovery from the emergency situations for which they are the designated LGD. This framework should define and agree clear roles and responsibilities for other government departments, devolved governments and public bodies that may support recovery work, including how national, regional and local recovery arrangements integrate.

C. Define protocols for establishing recovery management structures as early as possible to enable an effective transition from response to recovery. This should include details of managing the transition of leadership from response to recovery, agreeing this with the LGD for Response where different.

Recovery Co-ordination

D. Ensure that the short, medium and longer term impacts of emergencies on people, communities and responders are considered as part of recovery planning, as well as any risk-specific recovery considerations required to better support individuals and/or communities.

E. Agree arrangements for setting and monitoring clear strategic aims and objectives for the recovery process, including criteria for reducing or standing down recovery structures and transitioning to business-as-usual arrangements.

F. Establish and agree mechanisms, with MHCLG RED or relevant devolved governments where appropriate, for providing appropriate national support to the local resilience tier during the recovery phase. This could include the continued presence of a Recovery Liaison Officer(s) in the local Recovery Co-ordinating Group(s), to perform similar functions to the designated Government Liaison Officer in response.

G. Maintain processes for achieving shared situational awareness on the nature and scale of the recovery issues using an agreed recovery reporting framework.

H. Establish a framework to support national decision-making to provide support to the local recovery effort, while adhering to the principle of subsidiarity and respecting devolved competencies. This should include consideration of relevant national capabilities, required financial interventions and corresponding eligibility criteria.

I. Determine the departmental role in commemorations/memorials.

J. Establish scalable resourcing arrangements that enable recovery operations to be sustained over an extended period.

K. Establish and maintain financial oversight and control during recovery in line with HM Treasury's Spending in a Crisis guidance and wider authoritative guidance, ensuring Accounting Officer duties are fulfilled or Ministerial directions sought as needed. This should be achieved through appropriate systems of governance and delegation, and include protocols to monitor for sudden spikes in fraudulent activity or financial irregularities during the recovery phase.

L. Maintain arrangements to co-ordinate and disseminate information on recovery for the public and the media at a national level, collaborating with the local resilience tier, other government departments, devolved governments, and the Cabinet Office.

M. Maintain arrangements to support victims by co-operating with the Victims' Commissioner and the Independent Public Advocate (IPA), as appropriate.

N. Ensure national recovery arrangements identify those who might be disproportionately impacted by an emergency and what additional national support may be required in the recovery phase, with an explicit focus on promoting long-term recovery and building community cohesion and trust.

O. Review national recovery management arrangements to ensure that there is an active consideration of community demographics, the needs of those with pre-existing vulnerabilities, and embed a trauma-informed approach to the welfare and psychosocial needs of individuals, communities, and responders in an emergency.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

P. Establish an annual briefing programme for ministers and senior officials who are likely to be involved in response and recovery. This briefing programme could include information on the relationship between response and recovery, their responsibility for and role in recovery management, and the department's recovery management processes and plans.

Q. Develop financial support frameworks that can quickly be operationalised if ministers determine central financial support is required. This should include understanding what financial and other support is available and whether this is being accessed appropriately.

R. Ensure national recovery management arrangements are flexible for complex, cascading, and concurrent emergencies, which may require sustained recovery operations over an extended period of time.

S. Establish mechanisms to convene cross-sector expert panels to inform recovery activity, such as those with expertise on the environment, economy, and/or human aspects.

T. Maintain a common understanding of risks, local responders' capabilities, limitations, priorities and working practices, in order to facilitate an efficient, effective and co-ordinated recovery from incidents of varying levels of severity and scale.

U. Co-create and develop recovery guidance, tools, and communications approaches with relevant sector partners and local partners with experience of engaging with communities with pre-existing vulnerabilities.

V. Maintain strategic awareness of opportunities to reduce future vulnerabilities and strengthen resilience through policy, investment, infrastructure renewal and organisational change. This could include exploring opportunities to embed community development, education, environmental sustainability, climate adaptation, economic regeneration, and future risk mitigation directly into national recovery management arrangements.

W. Engage in peer review with other departments to validate recovery arrangements.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Maintain appropriate and proportionate recovery planning to enable the department to effectively support their sectors and contribute to LGD recovery activities.

B. Ensure their recovery arrangements are integrated into the recovery structures established by the LGD, participating and contributing to LGD-led meetings as required.

C. Support shared situational awareness on the nature and scale of the recovery issues by feeding into the agreed recovery reporting framework.

D. Provide support to areas and sectors falling under their area of responsibility, to support their sectors return to business-as-usual. This should include consideration of the required financial support to impacted areas falling under their department's responsibility.

E. Ensure that any required specific communications to local responders are agreed with the LGD and are channelled through MHCLG RED.

Expectation 10 Continual Improvement (Learning and Improvement)

Desired Outcome

An embedded, no-fault lessons management system and culture are in place so that learning from emergencies and exercises is systematically collected, assessed, prioritised, tracked, reported, shared and integrated into business-as-usual activity, future plans, training, exercising, governance and assurance.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Promote a culture of learning and continual improvement that actively encourages open reflection and constructive challenge. Training, exercising, debriefs, assurance and wider evaluations should be recognised as opportunities for continual improvement.

B. Establish and maintain a senior governance mechanism to oversee the department's lessons management framework. This framework should support the identification, prioritisation, implementation, and embedding of lessons.

C. Develop and maintain a system to host lessons identified reports, curated in a standardised format, to ensure knowledge retention and institutional learning.

D. Detail debrief procedures to identify lessons and notable practices from exercises and emergencies. This should include arrangements for following up with individuals, other government departments, devolved governments and wider organisations involved in the emergency or exercise to identify learning opportunities.

E. Ensure lessons are incorporated into risk assessment, including through the NSRA where relevant, planning assumptions and capability development.

F. Develop a process to prioritise lessons identified based on clear criteria (e.g. risk, likelihood of recurrence, impact of recurrence) to determine priority action areas for continual improvement.

G. Establish a clear, auditable process to implement lessons which defines explicit lesson ownership, outputs, milestones and outcomes.

H. Establish arrangements to monitor, evaluate and report progress against agreed actions from lessons learned and/or notable practice, ensuring these insights are embedded and translated into measurable improvements in national capability.

I. Establish arrangements to proactively and promptly share relevant lessons and notable practice with other government departments, the devolved governments, and other

partners as appropriate to prevent duplication, especially, but not limited to, where there are cross-cutting themes and dependencies.

J. Conduct post-event fraud risk evaluations and forensic reviews of emergency expenditure as part of the lessons-learned process, ensuring transparency, accountability, and the continuous improvement of future financial controls.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

K. Record and categorise lessons in a consistent, structured manner to identify and analyse recurring trends, themes and insights across exercises and emergencies.

L. Invite external peers to participate in the lessons management process to provide objective challenge and fresh perspectives.

M. Train staff in debriefing skills and techniques.

N. Engage internal audit functions, to support the tracking of the implementation of lessons learned.

O. Review international lessons identified and notable practice where they are relevant to the LGD's activities.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Maintain lessons management arrangements based on the expectation set above.

B. Undertake their own internal lessons process after an emergency or exercise to ensure they identify lessons relevant to their own organisation, sharing with others as appropriate.

C. Proactively contribute and participate in the LGD's lesson identification process, sharing insights and notable practices.

D. Take ownership and accountability for delivering any recommendations which fall under their remit, that originated from either LGD findings or their own findings, based on their own prioritisation framework. Where a lesson is not taken forward, a clear rationale should be provided to the LGD.

Chapter 5 Whole-of-Cycle Expectations

5.1. This chapter sets out expectations on activities that should be undertaken across the Resilience Cycle.

5.2. It includes sections on:

a. Working with the devolved governments
b. Working with the voluntary, community and faith sector
c. Working with the local resilience tier
d. Human Aspects
e. Using Scientific and Technical Advice
f. Public Communications
g. Using Data and Analytics

Expectation 11 Working with the devolved governments

Desired Outcome

A strong understanding of the devolution landscape for resilience and the ability to work effectively with the devolved governments to prepare for, respond to, and recover from risks and emergencies where appropriate.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

Reserved Policy Areas

A. Understand and respect the devolved responsibilities associated with the consequences of a reserved risk; specifically identifying how the exercise of reserved powers may create secondary impacts on devolved policy areas, and ensuring that the management of the risk accounts for the distinct operational and social landscapes in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

B. Lead on strategy and policy for national resilience activities within reserved competence, while communicating with devolved governments from the outset on territorial impacts and devolved consequence management.

C. Ensure comprehensive understanding of legal bases, using statutory powers proportionately and with prior consultation.

D. Engage and establish links with devolved civil contingencies structures and maintain a relationship with the devolved governments' central civil contingencies teams (and be receptive to reciprocal practice from the devolved governments). This should include working together to define arrangements for effective preparation, response and recovery activities to manage cross-jurisdiction implications of the risk.

E. Establish arrangements, as and if required, to include the Offices for the Nations when engaging directly with the devolved governments to leverage their role as critical advisers and facilitators of UK government and devolved governments working. Seek support and advice from the Offices for the Nations on working with the devolved governments and on the handling of particular issues where necessary.

F. Maintain arrangements to co-design resilience practice with devolved governments in devolved territories that achieve UK outcomes while fitting devolved responsibilities, systems and responder structures.

G. Agree and operate secure reciprocal data-sharing arrangements with devolved governments that are compliant with the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK GDPR.

H. Jointly exercise with the devolved governments to maintain operational readiness for complex emergencies where devolved and reserved responsibilities intersect.

I. Define arrangements to invite devolved governments' ministers and officials to relevant meetings, where devolved governments may be directly or indirectly impacted by UK government policy decisions, and share documents and materials in good time.

J. Maintain arrangements to build shared situational awareness reporting to develop a cross-jurisdiction picture and benefit from expertise on both sides. This includes requesting situational reporting and processes to share situational awareness products.

K. Maintain the capability to welcome and deploy Liaison Officers with the relevant devolved government(s).

L. Define arrangements which can support the effective co-ordination of response and recovery activity to ensure effective consequence management. This should recognise where wider consequence management is devolved.

Devolved Policy Areas with actual/potential cross-border implications

M. Understand and respect the devolution arrangements associated with the risk, considering if there are any secondary impacts of devolved risks on policy areas that are reserved, engaging the appropriate LGD for reserved areas where identified.

N. Identify and engage with the relevant devolved government department(s)/directorate(s) leading on the associated risks, impacts or policy areas.

O. Engage and establish links with devolved civil contingencies structures and maintain a relationship with the devolved governments' central civil contingencies teams (and be receptive to reciprocal practice from the devolved governments). This should include working together to define arrangements for effective preparation, response and recovery activities to manage cross-jurisdiction implications of the risk.

P. Where appropriate, agree and operate secure, reciprocal data-sharing arrangements with devolved governments that are compliant with the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK GDPR.

Q. Jointly exercise with the devolved governments to maintain operational readiness for complex emergencies where devolved and reserved responsibilities intersect.

R. Define arrangements to invite devolved governments' ministers and officials to relevant meetings, where devolved governments may be directly or indirectly impacted by UK government policy decisions, and share documents and materials in good time.

S. Define arrangements for maintaining shared situational awareness across relevant parts of the UK, including sharing situation reports, as appropriate, with the devolved governments.

T. Establish arrangements to effectively co-ordinate response and recovery activity with relevant devolved governments, aligning objectives and activity as appropriate.

U. Maintain the capability to welcome and deploy Liaison Officers with the relevant devolved government(s).

V. Maintain arrangements to, where appropriate, seek to align public communications with devolved governments.

W. Establish mechanisms to, where appropriate, provide and support (mutual) aid and cross-jurisdiction deployment of people, assets and information with clear authorisation and reimbursement routes.

X. As and if required, include the Offices for the Nations when engaging directly with the devolved governments to leverage their role as critical advisers and facilitators of UK government and devolved governments working. Seek support and advice from the Offices for the Nations on working with the devolved governments and on the handling of particular issues where necessary.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

Reserved Policy Areas

Y. Where appropriate, establish comprehensive linkages with devolved governments to ensure that the execution of powers reserved to the LGD accounts for immediate impacts on devolved responsibilities. This requires maintaining direct information flows to manage the practical interplay between jurisdictions during the planning, response and recovery phases of an emergency.

Z. Agree recovery closure criteria and conduct joint assurance of delivery, tracking lessons into future plans and exercises.

Devolved Policy Areas with actual/potential cross-border implications

AA. Seek to surface policy disagreements early and establish processes to resolve disputes according to a clear and agreed process.

BB. Seek to run jointly led debriefs and create a shared lessons action plan with named owners and timelines, and be prepared to consider participating in joint learning activities where devolved governments organise them.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Where there are cross-border implications for cascading impacts for which they have responsibility, identify and engage with the linked devolved governments' department(s)/ directorate(s) that either wholly or partially lead on the associated risks, impacts or policy areas within the devolved governments' structures.

B. Enable sector mutual aid and resource offers with clear authorisation, reimbursement and escalation routes, flagging cascading risks and interdependencies promptly to the LGD.

C. Seek to jointly plan and exercise with the UK government LGD and devolved governments to maintain operational readiness for complex emergencies where devolved and reserved responsibilities intersect.

Expectation 12 Working with the Voluntary, Community and Faith Sector

Desired Outcome

Relevant voluntary, community and faith sector data, information and capabilities are integrated into resilience and emergency management activities.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Invite appropriate sector representatives to participate in the development of policy interventions and planning, particularly where organisations hold experience of working with specific (e.g. marginalised and at-risk) communities, or if they have specialist capabilities and assets.

B. Maintain a record of relevant and suitable voluntary, community and faith sector organisations, based on their capabilities and/or functions, who can be approached to assist during national emergency planning, response and recovery.

C. Consider relevant voluntary, community and faith sector data and information sources that can support whole-cycle activities (e.g. horizon scanning, trend analysis from service use statistics).

D. Consider where voluntary, community and faith sector organisations can be part of lessons identification processes following an emergency.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

E. Explore how relevant sector data can be shared and used. This includes exploring how departmental data pathways work with voluntary, community and faith sector organisations and/or investigating the development of data sharing agreements between relevant sector organisations and the LGD.

F. Co-create and develop guidance, tools, and communications campaigns with relevant sector partners, particularly those with experience of engaging with at-risk and marginalised communities.

G. Encourage voluntary, community and faith sector partners to support government communication activities, recognising their broad reach. Consider co-developing an agreed strategic approach to public communications activity.

H. Consider arrangements to formally involve voluntary, community and faith sector organisations in whole-cycle (and specifically response and recovery) activities. For example, establish roles, responsibilities and activation models; involve voluntary capabilities in training and exercising; consider formal capability or support arrangements in specific and defined plans, possibly developing Service Level Agreements or Memoranda of Understanding.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Encourage the representation of relevant voluntary, community and faith sector organisations at meetings, where appropriate.

B. Identify and maintain a network of relevant voluntary, community and faith sector stakeholders and take steps to enhance co-operation and engagement (e.g. where opportunities exist for co-ordinated input into relevant policy development and whole cycle activities).

Expectation 13 Working with the local resilience tier

Desired Outcome

The LGD has developed effective relationships with Category 1 and 2 responders (local responders) when preparing for, responding to and recovering from emergency situations. The relationship with local responders should be based on the principle of subsidiarity, whereby it is recognised that decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Maintain appropriate infrastructure to facilitate effective communication and joint working in an emergency between the local and national response.

B. Establish a clear understanding of the roles and capabilities of Category 1 and 2 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, as well as the capabilities of other organisations supporting the response, and the interface between government and local emergency response structures.

C. Articulate any capabilities the LGD planning is reliant upon to be delivered at the local level through Category 1 and Category 2 responders and establish a process to assess and support development of these capabilities if they are not already in place or are beyond the current role or expectation of responders.

D. Ensure that local responders have appropriate access to national emergency plans, planning assumptions, and wider planning materials, using tools like Resilience Direct to share information securely, to enable them to deliver their roles effectively.

E. Establish arrangements with MHCLG RED to support effective working with the local resilience system during the preparation for, response to and recovery from emergencies. This should include supporting information flows, national communications and delivery of support to the local resilience tier.

F. Maintain arrangements to engage with devolved government equivalents to MHCLG RED, to work with local multi-agency structures in devolved territories for issues which are reserved or require cross-border co-ordination.

G. Establish arrangements to ensure requests to the local resilience system are channelled through MHCLG RED to prevent duplication. Requests should be proportionate and should

not look to burden the local response.

H. Engage and work collaboratively with local responders, via MHCLG RED, to ensure local knowledge and expertise feeds into activities across the Resilience Cycle.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

I. Maintain a common understanding of local risks, local responders' capabilities, limitations, priorities and working practices, in order to facilitate an efficient, effective and co-ordinated response to incidents of varying levels of severity and scale.

J. Establish secondment programmes to facilitate the transfer of staff between the national and local resilience tier, to support knowledge sharing and capability building.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Maintain a common understanding of local risks, local responders' capabilities, limitations, priorities and working practices, in order to facilitate an efficient, effective and co-ordinated response to incidents of varying levels of severity and scale.

B. Maintain arrangements for working with the local resilience system to prepare for, respond to and recover from impacts on their sectors/policy areas. All communications and requests to the local resilience tier during a response should be fed through the relevant LGD, MHCLG RED and/or the relevant devolved governments to avoid duplicated requests.

C. Contribute to the transition from response to recovery, by providing continued support to response and recovery arrangements as required.

D. Provide national support, as required, to the local resilience system for areas falling under their areas of responsibility. This should include prompt responses to requests from the local resilience tier channelled through MHCLG.

Expectation 14 Human Aspects

Desired Outcome

The LGD has established arrangements in place to address the welfare and psychosocial support needs of people impacted by emergencies, often referred to as Human Aspects or Humanitarian Assistance (HA). This includes embedding a people-centred and trauma-informed approach to identifying, considering and addressing the needs of individuals and communities across the Resilience Cycle. Arrangements should be regularly reviewed, inclusive, and consider those who may be, or become, vulnerable during emergencies.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Ensure compliance with the Public Sector Equality Duty as part of planning, response and recovery activity.

B. Consider the impacts of emergencies on people and those responding to an emergency including individuals, households, and communities. This should include consideration of the specific needs of children and young people, which may differ from those of the adult population; welfare, and psychosocial impacts of an emergency; and a recognition that these needs may change during response and recovery, and in the short, medium and longer term.

C. Engage with diverse networks and representative bodies, such as voluntary, community and faith sector organisations, who can contribute relevant information and expertise, to support the development of appropriate approaches for identifying and supporting vulnerable people.

D. Identify and develop national support mechanisms, working with other government departments where these capabilities are held elsewhere, to address the needs of those who may be, or become, vulnerable in an emergency, particularly those who are likely to require additional support in response and recovery.

E. Establish mechanisms to assess whether national support arrangements are effectively meeting the needs of affected individuals and communities throughout response and recovery.

F. Create tailored public communications and messaging for different groups (e.g. taking into account different formats, channels, languages or cultures and faiths, and those with accessibility needs).

G. Ensure systems are in place for the effective and timely sharing of data and information about people who are, or may become vulnerable in an emergency, within and between

national and local public sector bodies. Data sharing arrangements must be compliant with the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK GDPR.

H. Regularly review and update processes for identifying vulnerable people, including those at risk of disproportionate impacts during an emergency, particularly after any significant learning has been identified from emergency response or exercising.

I. Use trusted sources to communicate information, as part of a wider communications strategy, to the intended audience – these include, but are not limited to, faith groups and community leaders. Ideally, individuals should be identified and trained before an emergency.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

J. Co-produce and pre-test information and messages with the intended audience.

K. Gather insight on what concerns and motivates intended audiences (segmented to groups that may be disproportionately impacted) and develop an understanding of existing barriers for these groups within preparedness and response activities, to inform response measures, policy development and communications approaches.

L. Overlay compounding and cascading impacts within planning, to understand and address what could make the identified groups more vulnerable to the impacts of an emergency.

M. Strengthen existing Human Aspects arrangements, to ensure that the needs of people are better considered and integrated within planning, response and recovery.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Ensure compliance with the Public Sector Equality Duty as part of planning, response and recovery.

B. Consider the significant impacts of emergencies on individuals, households, communities and those responding to the emergency.

C. Consider the welfare and psychosocial impacts of an emergency on individuals and communities, recognising that these needs may change during response and recovery, and in the short, medium and long term.

D. Proactively identify and assess the potential for primary and cascading impacts of an emergency on vulnerable people, who are more likely to be disproportionately impacted by an emergency.

E. Ensure that the needs of people are being considered and integrated within planning, response and recovery arrangements.

F. Develop approaches to provide appropriate national-level support for all those who have been affected by an emergency, where appropriate.

G. Engage with diverse networks and representative bodies, such as voluntary, community and faith sector organisations, who can contribute relevant information and expertise to support the development of appropriate plans to identify and support vulnerable people.

Expectation 15 Using Scientific and Technical Advice

Desired Outcome

Risk anticipation, assessment, mitigation, planning, response and recovery are all informed by quality scientific and technical advice, evidence and analysis.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Take responsibility for ensuring activities across the Resilience Cycle are informed by relevant scientific and technical advice, evidence and modelling. This should consider and use all appropriate scientific disciplines (e.g. behavioural science).

B. In all phases of the Resilience Cycle engage internal and external experts. This includes the departmental Science and Technical functions and teams (such as Science Advisory Committees or their equivalents, and Chief Scientific Advisers), specialist functions within other government departments and public bodies, and nationally recognised experts (e.g. from academia or industry).

C. Ensure that, if scientific and technical advice has been used, rejected or overruled, the reasons for doing so and the sources are clearly cited and explained in a written document, to support transparency and accountability.

D. Maintain arrangements to make expert advice underpinning plans, strategies and the response to and recovery from emergencies available to the public.

E. Identify and implement the critical Science and Technical capabilities that are required across the Resilience Cycle, for example: scenario modelling, horizon-scanning/early warning (where feasible), surveillance/monitoring mechanisms that allow technical/scientific data collation, and emergency-phase rapid modelling. (If unclear on what Science andTechnical capabilities would be required for the risk, seek GO-Science advice).

F. Ensure that plans account for the different Science and Technical roles and structures, including:

   i. the departmental Chief Scientific Adviser's role in providing science support during emergency preparedness and response;

   ii. Scientific Advisory Groups for Emergencies, in order to a) co-ordinate science advice going to COBR, and b) lead on complex and/or uncertain science advice;

iii. precautionary SAGE, when national science advice (co-ordination) is required, and there is not an alternative/existing structure to deliver this;

iv. other science advice structures for other decision and policy-making venues.

G. Ensure that thresholds or triggers for escalation of an emergency response have been shaped by scientific and technical advice where appropriate.

H. Ensure that processes are in place to communicate all necessary scientific and technical advice, information analysis, evidence and data to those that may need it for planning, risk mitigation, and during emergency response and recovery. Audiences include:

- within the LGD, including the departmental Chief Scientific Adviser
- SAGE (via the SAGE secretariat), so it can effectively advise COBR
- other UK government departments
- local responders
- the Cabinet Office's National Situation Centre
- The Government Chief Scientific Adviser
- devolved governments.

I. Ensure that LGD communications teams have considered how to support the dissemination of complicated scientific and technical advice clearly and effectively to the public at local, regional and national levels.

J. Ensure that the processes for generating, co-ordinating and communicating scientific and technical advice during emergency response have been exercised and stress-tested by all relevant officials.

K. Drawing on the expertise of its departmental Chief Scientific Adviser, during the response phase take responsibility for ensuring that appropriate scientific questions relating to the response are asked and addressed, either through SAGE or other appropriate bodies.

L. In the response phase ensure that the departmental Chief Scientific Adviser is prepared to attend SAGE (both ahead of time and briefing during response), and aware of their roles and responsibilities.

M. Ensure that SAGE can access the data, analysis, and evidence required during the response phase (in order to effectively advise COBR).

N. Ensure that, in any response where SAGE is activated:

i. SAGE co-ordinates the provision of science advice into COBR,and

ii. complex or uncertain science advice, evidence or data intended to inform collective agreement (e.g. COBR decisions) is challenged and agreed through the SAGE process. Where this is not feasible (e.g. due to timeliness requirements or classification), ensure that the SAGE Chair(s) are sufficiently briefed on the advice prior to any COBR meeting.

O. Maintain arrangements to sustain scientific and technical advice arrangements for the response to and recovery from emergencies for a prolonged period.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

P. Conduct futures analysis to inform risk anticipation and commission any research to assist with planning and mitigation.

Q. Work with local responders to ensure that local resilience tier arrangements are supported by appropriate scientific and technical expertise, including supporting Science and Technical Advice Cells.

R. Ensure that scientific and technical advice, including specific standards (e.g. safe levels of contamination), is up to date and (where possible) pre-agreed and subjected to independent challenge. This is especially important where advice may be challenging, contentious, or needed quickly.

S. Consider whether specific space should be reserved for a scientific or technical advice cell within the LGD's Departmental Operations Centre during an emergency response.

T. Consider Research and Development requirements related to the risk and have mechanisms in place for commissioning research and development or sharing requirements with researchers.

U. Consider how to best retain Science and Technical knowledge and relationships within teams, departments, and with OGDs and external experts during staffing and structural changes and over long periods of time.

Working with SAGE/GO-Science

V. Consult GO-Science (SAGE team) for advice on how to build science into response and recovery plans.

W. Ensure that the department's interaction with SAGE processes, particularly around escalation triggers, is tested and demonstrated through joint exercising with GO-Science. This should also look to support officials' familiarity with these processes.

X. Ensure that consideration has been given to the role the LGD and OGDs can play in supporting or creating specialist expert committees and SAGE sub-groups; consideration

should be given to other existing science advisory councils, groups and networks which may cover similar issues to avoid groups with overlapping remits.

Y. Ensure that the LGD has assisted the SAGE Secretariat in agreeing a pre-determined list of the likely science questions and potential SAGE participants for relevant risks.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Support the LGD by providing specialist technical advice, data, and analysis, where that expertise is held within the OGD.

B. Ensure scientific evidence, analysis, and modelling is actively shared with the LGD to inform policies, preparedness plans, and response strategies.

C. Ensure that, in any response where SAGE is activated, any complex or uncertain science advice, evidence or data produced by the OGD – and intended to inform collective agreement (e.g. COBR decisions) – is challenged and agreed through the SAGE process. Where this is not feasible (e.g. due to timeliness requirements or classification), ensure that the SAGE Chair(s) are sufficiently briefed on the advice prior to any COBR meeting.

Expectation 16 Public Communications

Desired Outcome

Tested crisis communications strategies and products are in place, with communications professionals fully embedded in wider emergency management processes.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Align with the Government Communication Service's (GCS) Crisis Communications Operating Model.

B. Develop and maintain up-to-date crisis communications plans for their risks, following GCS best practice standards. These plans should include:

   i. communication objectives and audiences.

   ii. stakeholder mapping on a local and national level, with clear communication approaches to address the needs of different audience groups and meeting accessibility requirements.

   iii. handling plans for significant consequences and impacts owned by OGDs.

   iv. the application of behavioural insights principles to crisis messaging to ensure public understanding and appropriate action.

   v. processes for monitoring media and public reactions and addressing misinformation/disinformation.

   vi. up-to-date contact lists for relevant stakeholders to enable rapid information sharing during crises.

   vii. operational requirements for communications, such as onboarding surge crisis communications staff at short notice.

C. Involve communications leads in all stages: planning, exercising, response and recovery.

D. Maintain arrangements to share and socialise, where appropriate, crisis communication plans across departments to support coherent cross-government communications.

E. Ensure relevant communications leads complete appropriate crisis communications training, run by the Cabinet Office.

F. Maintain arrangements to produce an effective and timely internal and external communications strategy in response and recovery, co-ordinating communications activity across government to ensure national-level messaging is aligned and consistent. This

should draw from, adapt and implement existing crisis communication plans where they exist.

G. Engage devolved governments as early as possible, where a message or communications plan has the potential to cut across a devolved government area of responsibility or will be received/targeted at the citizens of a devolved government.

H. Ensure communications are informed by subject matter expertise in order to offer appropriate communication advice during a crisis.

I. Have the ability to monitor media, public reactions and address mis/disinformation.

J. Ensure the Director of Communications or an appropriate deputy represents the Communications Function at relevant meetings, including COBR meetings where required.

K. Run tabletop and/or red teaming exercises to test communications plans, involving cross-Whitehall stakeholders.

L. Document and share lessons learned from previous crises or exercises to continually improve communications preparedness.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

M. Engage with other LGDs responsible for similar risks to ensure provision of consistent information to the public.

N. Encourage communications professionals to volunteer for relevant crisis management training.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Participate in crisis communications exercises led by LGDs to test cross-government response capability.

B. Contribute to the development of relevant communications plans led by LGDs.

C. Consider potential concurrent communications risks and cascading impacts.

D. Help cascade and share information to their sectors and stakeholders.

E. Ensure that relevant communication leads complete appropriate crisis communications e-learning.

F. Encourage communications professionals to volunteer for relevant crisis management training.

Expectation 17 Using Data and Analytics

Desired Outcome

Work against all phases of the Resilience Cycle is informed by quality data and analysis.

At a minimum, Lead Government Departments should:

A. Maintain a robust information management and governance system that enables the work of the Lead Government Department and the secure, lawful, and timely sharing of sensitive information with relevant organisations.

B. Engage their knowledge and information management teams as early as possible in incident planning and response. Knowledge and information management team support and advice should enable resilience teams to establish information governance controls and oversight.

C. Adhere to the principles and guidance set out in the Government Analysis Function's Data sharing for national crisis response guidance.

D. Deliver an agreed process to identify and share appropriate and proportionate data and information across relevant departments, devolved governments, public bodies and sectors during an emergency. Arrangements should also include an agreed approach to data protection and an awareness of lawful data sharing practices.

E. Develop baseline protocols to facilitate data sharing in advance of an emergency that anticipate and mitigate the increased likelihood of incidents involving hidden data (non-visible or embedded personal data stored within digital files, systems, or storage media) during an emergency situation – especially where high-risk datasets are either being created ad hoc or shared rapidly.

F. Engage their departmental data protection officer on expectations surrounding the handling of data (including personal data) as early as possible so that the necessary emergency risk assessments can be conducted urgently for relevant risk mitigation to take place.

G. Adhere to the Information Commissioner's Office guidance on Data sharing in an urgent situation or in an emergency when sharing personal data, including in scenarios where cascading impacts of an emergency may affect OGDs – such as flooding leading to a power outage.

H. Establish and implement a controlled transition from emergency data sharing arrangements back to business-as-usual data protection, including:

- a short post-incident evaluation to identify any high-risk datasets and migrate them to more secure platforms with stronger security controls, auditing and manageable processing
- revocation of emergency access and permissions
- reinstatement of information-sharing agreements, retention and deletion schedules
- completion of any required data protection impact assessments, records updates and assurance reporting

I. Outline which departments are the responsible data controllers for data processing activity during an emergency response, and work with departments to ensure that Senior Responsible Owners are assigned as single points of contact in their departments.

J. Establish a quality assurance process that is proportionate to the risks associated with the use of the analysis and the time available.

K. Maintain arrangements to, where appropriate, publish important data and modelling approaches, to support public trust in the statistical system underpinning activities across the Resilience Cycle. This could be achieved through the publication of technical reports or publication of datasets.

L. Maintain awareness that imminent threat to life and limb always takes precedence over other restrictions and policies. All data can be shared when necessary to mitigate imminent threat.

M. Ensure timely sharing of information and data with local responders where relevant to the management of the local response, subject to proportionality and privacy safeguards.

N. Engage with the National Situation Centre to develop a common understanding of the use of departmental data in centrally co-ordinated crisis response, ensuring dataflows are accurate, relevant, and concise.

O. Understand any data gaps in emergency response capabilities, including assessing whether the timeliness and demographic/geographic granularity of the available data will enable decision making during a crisis, and have developed plans for addressing these gaps.

P. Identify the minimum number of staff, and the mix of skills and seniority, needed to provide data and analysis during an emergency.

Q. Work with their Counter Fraud Teams to ensure appropriate use of data, analytics and AI to support fraud detection.

For good practice, Lead Government Departments could:

R. Strongly encourage relevant public bodies to also adhere to the 'Data sharing for national crisis response guidance'.

S. Strongly encourage relevant public bodies to adhere to the Information Commissioner's Office guidance on Data sharing in an urgent situation or in an emergency.

T. Engage with the National Situation Centre's Data Strategy to anticipate data requirements ahead of an emergency situation materialising.

In support of the Lead Government Department, other government departments should:

A. Develop baseline protocols to facilitate data sharing in an emergency in line with the Analysis Function's emergency data guidance.

B. Work with the LGD to establish the desired flow of relevant emergency data in advance.

C. Understand any data gaps in emergency response capabilities, and have developed plans for addressing these.

D. Engage with the National Situation Centre to develop a common understanding of the use of departmental data in centrally co-ordinated emergency response.

E. Identify the minimum number of staff, and the mix of skills and seniority, needed to provide data and analysis during an emergency.

F. Engage with cross-government groups to support and share good practice in data and analytics.

G. Strongly encourage relevant public bodies to also adhere to the 'Data sharing for crisis response guidance'.

H. Strongly encourage relevant public bodies to adhere to the Information Commissioner's Office guidance on Data sharing in an urgent situation or in an emergency.

Chapter 6 Catastrophic Risk Management Expectations

6.1. This chapter provides an overview of how Catastrophic Risks are managed across the UK government. This includes setting out additional expectations on the Cabinet Office, Lead Government Department and other government departments to effectively manage this category of risk. It also includes information on how UK government is expected to work with the devolved governments to manage impacts wherever they are felt across the UK.

Catastrophic Risks

6.2. Catastrophic risks are those assessed in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) and National Risk Register (NRR) as having catastrophic impact. The government uses the Lead Government Department (LGD) model for all risks, including those with a catastrophic impact in the NSRA. This approach ensures that the responsibility and oversight sits with the department with the best understanding, relationships and mechanisms for delivery to identify and address a risk. The system is most effective when responsibilities for resilience are managed by those most able to discharge them, with central support for cross-system collaboration and information sharing, as no single organisation or government can manage these risks alone.

6.3. To support that balance, UK government retains the LGD model for catastrophic risks, but with a greater role for the Cabinet Office in driving work to improve preparedness and resilience. The Cabinet Office is expected to provide leadership in responding to catastrophic risks should they arise, working closely with the LGD, to co-ordinate a whole-of-system response. This supplements the role of all government departments to prepare for and respond to the cascading impacts of these risks in the areas for which they are responsible. The Cabinet Office will collaborate closely with the LGDs and all departments to place the best available expertise on each catastrophic risk at the heart of our national preparations, supporting departments to identify and plan against a fuller range of cascading impacts.

6.4. While all of the expectations for LGDs and OGDs set out in the previous sections of this document continue to apply for catastrophic whole-of-system crises, this section sets out additional expectations and arrangements which are required to effectively manage this category of risk. While these expectations guide catastrophic risk management activity, departments may meet catastrophic planning expectations through a proportionate combination of risk-specific, consequence-based and capability-specific plans, supported where appropriate by business continuity arrangements.

Role of Cabinet Office

6.5. For catastrophic risks, the Cabinet Office co-sponsors the "planning" phase with the LGD, to support co-ordination work across government to increase overall readiness to respond and recover. This is in recognition of the scale and severity of risks that would have system-wide impacts, meaning that significant cross-government activity and broader co-ordination are required ahead of the risk emerging. The additional planning work led by the Cabinet Office does not seek to transfer ownership of the catastrophic risk away from its usual departmental owners, but instead to formalise the way that Cabinet Office will give enhanced support by standing up structures to provide central co-ordination and strategic direction.

6.6. To effectively support the LGD to prepare for catastrophic risks, the Cabinet Office's co-sponsorship of the planning phase includes:

a. developing and maintaining Capping Concept of Operations (ConOps) documents which set out arrangements for moving into central response arrangements, where Cabinet Office takes on leadership of the response.

b. establishing governance structures with the relevant LGD to reflect the Cabinet Office's role in planning for defined catastrophic risks. In this governance structure, the Cabinet Office supports departments to correct problems, and escalate issues to the UK Cabinet-level National Security Council (Resilience) and supporting senior official groups

c. mapping the cascading impacts arising from the risk, working collaboratively with the LGD, other UK government departments, and the devolved governments, to inform wider cross-government planning and to identify gaps where further work is required (i.e. new capabilities), which can be escalated and addressed through appropriate governance structures.

d. co-ordinating an independent assurance panel process to provide independent scrutiny and comprehensive challenge and advice on the LGD's plans and preparedness for this category of risk.

6.7. As a whole-of-system risk materialises, the Cabinet Office will take on a leadership role for the emergency response, in line with arrangements set out in the Amber Book - Managing Crisis in Central Government.[11] Further detail on specific arrangements for responding to each catastrophic risk is contained within the Cabinet Office's risk-specific Capping ConOps. Capping ConOps documents define guiding triggers for when a risk might escalate into a catastrophic emergency, and the Cabinet Office takes on the leadership role for the response.

6.8. While COBR will be used to co-ordinate the UK government response to the acute phase of the emergency, it is expected that new Cabinet committee structures and a supporting

[11] Cabinet Office, Amber Book - Managing Crisis in Central Government, 2025, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations

taskforce will be established, drawing on existing planning led by the LGD and CO, to co-ordinate the government's enduring response to the emergency, as well as the corresponding recovery activity.

Role of the Lead Government Department

6.9. The designated LGD remains in place for this category of risk and is subject to the full set of expectations set out within this document. Whole-of-system risks do not alter the responsibilities of the LGD for this category of risk, but they instead will be supported by the Cabinet Office in driving work to improve preparedness and resilience as set out above.

6.10. If a whole-of-system risk materialises, leadership of the response will transfer to the Cabinet Office which will co-ordinate the UK government response. However, the LGD will continue to work closely with the Cabinet Office in response, given they are the department with the responsibility for the risk and have the relevant expertise for the primary impact. The LGD will play a critical role in developing policy and wider advice to inform decision-making at COBR and in setting the strategic direction of the response. The LGD will also possess many of the necessary levers and capabilities required to respond to the primary impact of the emergency. The response should be guided by the LGD's planning arrangements, developed in line with their national level responsibilities for preparation, and lessons identified from previous crises.

6.11. It should be noted that even if the Cabinet Office leads the response to a risk, the LGD remains the LGD for all phases of risk management and should continue to fulfil the expectations covered in this document, as is the case for any risk that results in a COBR response.

Role of other government departments

6.12. Individual departments are responsible, and accountable to Parliament through their Secretary of State, for issues arising within their sectors. This applies to all risks, including whole-of-system risks. Under the LGD model, relevant government departments are expected to support the LGD by preparing for and responding to the cascading impacts of these risks in the areas for which they are responsible.

6.13. Recognising that whole-of-system risks are expected to impact all areas of government, all UK government departments are expected to prepare for catastrophic risks in a proportionate way. This includes:

a. integrating whole-of-system risks into their departmental risk management processes

b. maintaining proportionate readiness arrangements to be able to manage impacts on their policy areas and/or sectors based on planning assumptions

c. working towards having a risk-specific plan for each catastrophic risk, setting out how their department would respond to impacts falling under their area of responsibility as well as how they would support their sector's recovery, while recognising this will depend on resourcing and other priorities

d. contributing to Cabinet Office-led mapping of cascading impacts on their sectors

e. participating, as required, in cross-government governance

f. being able to stand up and resource a function which can co-ordinate their department's contribution to a whole-of-government response

Working with devolved governments

6.14. Given the scale of catastrophic whole-system crises, it is expected that these situations will have UK-wide impacts and it is likely that the emergency will impact issues which are both devolved and reserved. As such, a partnership approach is required for preparing for and responding to this category of risk. The principles of working between UK government and the devolved governments should be founded on the principles set out within the Amber Book[12]. The Cabinet Office is responsible for ensuring the devolved governments are engaged with wider UK government structures for preparing for and responding to this category of risk.

[12] Cabinet Office, Amber Book - Managing Crisis in Central Government, 2025, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations

Annex A: Glossary

Acute Risk	Time-bound, discrete events, for example a major fire or a terrorist attack. Contrast with chronic risks.
Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)	Refers to the facility and central crisis management arrangements which provide the strategic co-ordination mechanism through which the UK government responds quickly to major emergencies that require urgent collective decision-making
Capabilities	The organisations, tools, data, legislation or resources required to respond to risks. There are both specific capabilities, which are needed to manage specific risks, as well as generic response ones which can be used to respond flexibly to multiple risks.
Cascading Impact	The knock-on impacts of a risk that cause further physical, social or economic disruption. For example, severe weather could cause flooding, which then causes damage to electricity infrastructure, resulting in a power outage which then disrupts communications service providers (and so on).
Catastrophic Risk	Risks assessed in the National Security Risk Assessment to have the biggest impacts such as large numbers of fatalities and casualties, and high economic costs. These risks fall into the top row of the matrix to the right and are assigned the highest impact score (5) in the National Security Risk Assessment.
Chronic Risk	Continuous challenges which gradually erode our economy, community, way of life and/or national security (e.g. money laundering; antimicrobial resistance). Contrast with Acute risks.
Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004	Act of 2004 which established a single framework for Civil Protection in the United Kingdom. Part 1 of the CCA establishes a clear set of roles and responsibilities for Local Responders; Part 2 of the CCA establishes emergency powers.
Civil Contingencies Forward Look	The primary source of cross-government assessments of potential civil emergency risks and disruptive challenges over a 6-month period, drawing from a wealth of departmental expertise and horizon scanning.
Common Consequences	The generic impacts that arise across a range of different risks identified in the National Security Risk Assessment e.g. mass

	fatalities and casualties, contaminated environments, and disruption to critical services. Common consequences are used to inform the development of flexible and scalable emergency response capabilities, ensuring efficient resilience planning.
Departmental Operations Centre (DOC)	A centre within a department that is set up to co-ordinate their department's contribution to an emergency response.
Emergency	An event or situation which causes or may cause serious damage to human welfare; the environment; or War, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to security. This definition is set out in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
Exercise	1. A process to train for, assess, practice, and improve performance in an organisation. 2. A simulation designed to validate organisations' capability to manage incidents and emergencies. Specifically, exercises will seek to validate training undertaken and the procedures and systems within emergency or business continuity plans.
Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA)	The official responsible for providing scientific advice to the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet, advising the government on aspects of policy on science and technology, as well as ensuring and improving the quality and use of scientific evidence and advice in government.
Hazard	Accidental or naturally occurring (i.e., non-malicious) event or situation with the potential to cause death or physical or psychological harm, damage or losses to property, and/or disruption to the environment and/or to economic, social and political structures. Contrast with Threat.
Human Aspects	Impacts on individuals during and after an emergency. This also includes humanitarian assistance, which refers to the activities carried out during and after an emergency to meet the needs of those affected.
Lead Government Department	The designated department with national level responsibility for leading work to identify serious risks and ensuring that the right planning, response and recovery arrangements are in place.
Liaison Officer	A liaison officer is a person who liaises between two or more organisations to communicate and co-ordinate their activities on a matter of mutual concern.

Local Resilience Forum (LRF)	Process for bringing together all the Category 1 and 2 responders within a police force area for the purpose of facilitating co-operation in fulfilment of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act.
Local Resilience Tier	The 38 Local Resilience Forums in England
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government Resilience and Recovery Directorate (MHCLG RED)	Acts as a conduit for communications between central government and the local level. They are responsible for supporting local response and recovery efforts, and ensuring that there is an accurate picture of the situation in their area.
National Risk Register (NRR)	The external version of the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA), which is the UK government's assessment of the most serious risks facing the UK.
National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA)	The NSRA assesses, compares and prioritises the top national level risks facing the UK, focusing on both likelihood of the risk occurring and the impact it would have, were it to happen. It is the main tool for assessing the most serious civil contingencies risks facing the UK.
National Situation Centre (SitCen)	The National Situation Centre brings together data, insights and expertise from across and beyond government to provide situational awareness to ministers and seniors during crisis preparedness and response. It provides 24/7 cover for reporting against all NSRA risks, from civil contingencies to national security.
Post Exercise Review / Report (PXR)	A review or report identifying any potential 'lessons identified' by an exercise, ensuring they are captured and forwarded to the authority responsible for lessons management.
Public Bodies	A public body is a formally established organisation that is publicly funded to deliver a public or government service, though not as a ministerial department. The term refers to a wide range of public sector entities. Arm's length bodies (ALB) are a specific category of central government public bodies that are administratively classified by the Cabinet Office.
Reasonable Worst-Case Scenario (RWCS)	A tool used for planning purposes to illustrate the worst manifestation of a risk that can reasonably be expected potentially to occur based on current information and data.

Resilience	The ability to anticipate, assess, prevent, mitigate, validate, respond to, and recover and learn from natural hazards, deliberate attacks, geopolitical instability, disease outbreaks, and other disruptive events, civil emergencies or threats to our way of life.
Resilience Cycle	A conceptual model that breaks the management of a risk down into stages at which different preparatory actions can be taken. The UK government is using eight stages: anticipation, assessment, prevention, validation, preparation, response, recovery and learning. The resilience cycle is also known as the risk life cycle.
Risk	An event, person or object which could cause loss of life or injury, damage to infrastructure, social and economic disruption or environment degradation. The severity of a risk is assessed as a combination of its potential impact and its likelihood. The UK government subdivides risks into: hazards and threats.
Sector	A sector is a broad area of the economy or public service with shared functions and responsibilities.
Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG)	A multi-agency group responsible for co-ordinating the joint response to an emergency at the local strategic level.
Subsidiarity	The principle whereby decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level, with co-ordination at the highest necessary level. In practice this means that most incidents are handled within the capabilities of local agencies and responders, without central involvement.
Threat	Malicious risks such as acts of terrorism, hostile state activity and cyber crime. Contrast with Hazard.
Training Needs Analysis (TNA)	A process used by local responder organisations and businesses to identify key areas in which staff require training, which is also delivered within a specific amount of time. The purpose being to improve employee job performance, including professional growth and progress. A training analysis reviews current methods within an organisation and can pinpoint any knowledge or skills gaps amongst staff. This allows a business to create fit-for-purpose learning and development rather than investing excess time and money in areas where this isn't needed.
Voluntary, Community and Faith Sector (VCFS)	The phrase ‘voluntary, community and faith sector’ is not formally defined. It is often used to refer to a wide range of organisations

	that aim to fulfil a specific social purpose including charities and community groups, as well as paid and volunteer workforces.
Vulnerability	The quality or state of being more prone or susceptible to the impacts of hazards or threats. Vulnerability could affect individuals, communities, assets or a whole system and may be caused by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes.

Annex B: Reading list

Cabinet Office	Amber Book - Managing Crisis in Central Government
	Chronic Risk Analysis
	Devolution: Guidance for civil servants
	National Resilience Standards for Local Resilience Forums
	The Roles of Lead Government Departments, Devolved Administrations and Other Public Bodies
	Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) Guidance
Government Office for Science	Futures toolkit for policymakers and analysts
HM Government	Government Communication Service: Crisis Communications Operating Model
HM Treasury	The Green Book
	The Orange Book: Management of Risk – Principles and Concepts
	Spending in a Crisis
Information Commissioner's Office	Data sharing in an urgent situation or in an emergency.

Office for National Statistics	Data sharing for national crisis response
UK Resilience Academy	Exercising Best Practice Guidance
	Lessons Management Best Practice Guidance
	Organisational Resilience Guidance for UK Government Departments, Agencies and Arm's Length Bodies
UNICEF	Child Rights Impact Assessment