Chapter 1: Strategic Direction & Guidance

Version 8.1 (Oct 26)

Table of contents

1 Strategic Direction and Guidance 2

Strategic Defence Review 2025 2

Defence Reform 3

The Integrated Force 4

2 Intent 7

3 Governance 8

Strategic Governance Structures 8

Military Command Governance 10

4 Management 11

Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT) 11

NATO and Allies Systems Approaches to Training 14

Alternative Means of Documentation 15

4.2 Training Continuum 15

4.3 Risk Management 16

4.4 Systems Risk 17

4.5 Safety Risk Balance 18

4.6 Cumulative Risk 19

5 Assurance 19

6 Enabling Capabilities 20

6.2 Defence Learning and Management Capability (DLMC) 20

6.3 Managed Learning Services (MLS) 20

6.4 Artificial Intelligence (AI) 21

Chapter 1: Strategic Direction & Guidance

Version 8.1 (Oct 26)

1 Strategic Direction and Guidance

Strategic Defence Review 2025

This policy has been significantly rewritten in direct response to the findings and recommendations of Strategic Defence Review 2025. SDR highlighted that the globe is at a strategic inflection point, with a changing and dynamic nature to the threat the UK and its allies now face. With state-on-state war returning to Europe, Defence **must** fundamentally change how it fights and how it supports that fight: rapidly increasing the Armed Forces' lethality and enhancing their ability to fight at the leading edge of technology. The speed of change in UK Defence has not kept pace with the threat or the scale of the challenge. The strategic context to 2040 suggests an environment that is shaped by growing multipolarity and intensifying strategic competition between states – and with non-state actors – for political, military, economic, and technological power. At the same time, rapid and unpredictable technological progress is helping drive strategic competition, as well as continually changing how armed forces **must** be organised, equipped, trained, and fight.

1.1.1 The essential task set out within the SDR is to transform the Armed Forces, restore their readiness to fight, and reverse the 'hollowing out' of foundational capabilities without which they cannot endure in protracted, high-intensity conflict. Key to this transformation are three fundamental changes in approach. Defence **must** be:

- **Integrated by design**. For the Armed Forces to be more lethal than the sum of their parts, they must complete the journey from 'joint' to 'integrated': designed and directed as one force under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff and delivered according to this design by the Military Commands.

- **Innovation-led**. Defence must embrace its role in seeding innovation and growth, rapidly adopting new technology to keep the Integrated Force at the forefront of warfare.

- **Industry-backed**. Defence must create a new partnership with industry; developing a thriving, resilient and innovative industrial base that can scale innovation and production in support of the Integrated Force. Defence should more purposefully use its market power to create economic growth – prioritising UK-based businesses without losing the benefits of competition – while also delivering for the warfighter.

Defence Reform

1.1.2 A key factor in the success of Defence's efforts to transform will be the leveraging of Defence Reform – the ongoing programme of organisational and cultural change – as a driver for reform across the Department of State and the Armed Forces. Where the SDR states what Defence must do in the next decade and beyond, Defence Reform will ultimately determine how and how successfully, it is delivered.

1.1.3 The purpose of Defence Reform is to establish robust and streamlined governance, clear accountabilities, and faster decision-making processes across the MoD and the Armed Forces. It will improve how Defence operates by developing a new model that brings together systems, ways of working, cultures, team structures, and accountabilities across the organisation. Defence Reform has established four areas (referred to as "the Quad") across Defence (as shown in Figure 1 below):




Fig 1 – the Defence Reform "Quad"

1.1.4 In transforming the organisation and cultures within the MoD and Armed Forces, Defence Reform will contribute to delivering the Defence outcomes set by the Secretary of State for Defence:

- A **warfighting force** ready and able to win today and in the future.

- An organisation that delivers its **commitments to NATO** and extends our influence beyond the ability to fight, through **diplomacy** and development of other nations' capacity to defend themselves.

- A thriving **UK defence industry** that is resilient and scalable and provides growth, jobs and innovation to our national economy.

- An organisation that delivers **value for money** for the UK taxpayer, delivers capabilities faster, and is **adaptable to future change**.

- A highly engaged organisation that **values its people**, enables everyone to fulfil their potential and contribute

1.1.5 Defence Reform will enable the MoD and the Armed Forces to deliver these outcomes by the four areas working effectively together, driven by leadership behaviours that enable clear prioritisation of actions and a willingness to take appropriate risk. There will be clarity on who can say yes and who can say no, utilising processes that enable delivery, with no duplication, empowering teams to get on with the most important tasks. Decisions will be informed by accurate, consistent, digitised and joined up management information about resources, spend and readiness. All of which will ensure a clear line of sight from what we do each day to the frontline effects and collective Defence outcomes, creating accountability for delivery and deadlines.

1.1.6 As part of Defence Reform, the establishment of the Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ), led by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), as the UK Armed Forces senior commander, will support even greater collaboration by removing any processes or systems that get in the way of shared endeavours. CDS will now command the Service Chiefs with the new MSHQ as the single point of design and delivery of the Armed Forces. This new structure will support the journey from a 'joint' to an 'integrated' force that better harnesses all five domains of maritime, air, land, cyber and space. The Chiefs, including the CDS, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Service Chiefs and Commander Cyber and Specialist Operations Command (CSOC), will have collective responsibility for leading and directing the Armed Forces to achieve policy outcomes through an empowered Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The Integrated Force

1.1.7 The Integrated Force Model is central to Defence's response to global challenges, and we **must** move from a 'joint' to an 'integrated' force. Historically, the UK's Armed Forces have operated in siloes, only joining up on the battlefield. The Integrated Force unifies design, equipment, training, and operations under a single military authority, supported by a shared digital foundation and data. The Military Commands **must** be integrated in planning, readiness, deployment, and procurement, and the Integrated Force will be underpinned by a common digital foundation and shared data that are central to today's software-defined warfare, and support to that warfare. Key Features of the Integrated Force:

- **A common set of foundational enablers**. The full range of supporting activity and capabilities, such as training, exercises, infrastructure, logistics, medical services, intelligence, stockpiles, and munitions, are delivered according to a single scheme set by CDS and the MSHQ. Delivery of this design is directed by CDS and led by the Service Chiefs. It is supported by the National Armaments Director Group (NADG), whose remit incorporates defence innovation, procurement, support, infrastructure, and Defence Digital.

- **Digital enablement at its core**. A common digital foundation of data, Artificial Intelligence (AI), synthetic environments, and networks connects people and platforms across all domains, and with allies and partners, as well as providing performance management to support continuous improvement.

- **Collaboration with other Government departments in real time**, not least the UK Intelligence Community to achieve maximum effect in response to national security challenges.

1.1.8 The Integrated Force must operate in various configurations:

- **NATO Integration**: Designed to function within NATO Component Commands while leveraging UK enablers.

- **Coalition Operations**: Capable of leading or contributing to coalitions.

- **Sovereign Operations**: Able to act independently as a unified force.

1.1.9 The Integrated Force is expected to be a model of **constant innovation at wartime pace**, delivered through a new partnership with industry. In terms of innovation and adaptability, the Integrated Force will prioritise:

- **NATO First**. Using NATO's exercise programme, doctrine, and planning process as the basis for UK training and education. Where there is a valid argument for exceptionalism, the UK should seek to influence NATO to adopt its own approach.

- **Adapt at pace of changing warfare and technology**, applying innovations and lessons from operations to education, doctrine, and concepts.

1.1.10 The SDR has also stated that training policy **must** ensure sensible, managed risk can be taken in military training, so that they are not unduly taken on the battlefield instead, reversing a recent trend towards safety at all costs. Furthermore, the SDR

recommends that Defence **should** only run training and education itself when it cannot be obtained externally at suitable quality and cost. This shift in approach **should** be aided by adopting civilian qualifications and standards where there is a suitable equivalent in common use.[1] This would improve skills development and the entire people ecosystem: recruitment and retention; employment for veterans; zig-zag careers between Defence and other sectors; integration with industry; and mobilization of the Reserves in the event of war.

1 "Adopt civilian qualifications and standards where possible and use civilian providers for education and training where it is available at a similar cost or less." SDR25 Recommendation 19c, Page 71

2 Intent

2.1.1 The SDR highlighted that there is a genuine and increasingly significant threat to the UK and its allies, that requires Defence to respond within a war-fighting mindset. The purpose of this revision of JSP 822 therefore is to support the delivery and continuous evolution of the Integrated Force, and the Armed Forces, through Collective and Individual Training. As part of delivering against this purpose, within the strategic warfighting mindset, is the potential need to take sensible, managed risks within training so they are not unduly felt on the frontline. As such, the intent of this revision of JSP 822 is to reverse the cumulative effect of the numerous, but well-intentioned, iterative changes to policy and practice that has created a significant bureaucratic burden that will hinder the Armed Forces' ability to meet the strategic direction set out in the SDR.

2.1.2 In line with the SDR findings above and the organisational change laid out in Defence Reform, this revised policy will remove excessive bureaucracy, aiming to shift the mindset within the overall training system so that strategic requirement outweighs tactical compliance. To achieve this, this revised version of JSP 822 will:

- **Increase flexibility**. The SDR highlighted that the whole of Defence **must** change how it supports the Armed Forces as part of a more flexible policy response. For Defence training and education, policy **must** become more adaptive to operational lessons, innovation, and research. Previously, the weight of effort within the policy was on bureaucratic process that slowed the system, reduced agility, and failed to keep up with the pace of change necessary to support the Integrated Force. However, this revised policy will simplify processes and increase the flexibility within the system.

- **Focus on Outcomes**. The SDR emphasised that Defence **must** more systematically ensure that its efforts deliver operationally, improving the lethality of the Armed Forces. For training and education, this means that it **must** mirror the step-change in approach as the Armed Forces complete the journey from 'joint' to 'integrated'. To do this, training and education **must** move away from a bottom-up logic of training progression but instead focus on a top-down approach; from understanding the needs of the Defence Tasks and operational requirements, down through the tiers of Collective Training and the levels of Individual Training. This approach will provide a clear line of sight from what we do each day to the frontline effects and collective Defence outcomes, creating accountability for delivery and deadlines.

- **Clarify decision-making**. A key element of Defence Reform is to provide clarity on who can say yes and who can say no. As stated above, there is a recognition of the inherent paradoxes within Defence, but that these are not problems to be solved, rather dualities to be managed. Within training and education, these dualities **must** be managed by the Training System owner (usually the TRA at OF6/OF7 level), who is to provide effective decision-making against complex and often conflicting requirements. As warfare is a business of adaptation, it is critical that training and education also adapts (and often at pace), but in guiding the Training System owner in their decision-making, they **must** consider whether decisions are coherent with the delivery and continuous improvement of the Integrated Force.

3 Governance

3.1.1 Governance is the framework by which Defence will be directed and controlled. It sets out who has accountability for its performance and delivery, it identifies who can make decisions, and the roles and responsibilities that support good governance across the organisation. Governance provides the structure within which boards and management can run the various elements of the Defence enterprise. Within Defence Reform, CDS has overall responsibility for training across the Armed Forces.

3.1.2 Good governance within training provides a framework for aligning output with Defence's strategic objectives and financial controls, encourages better decision-making, increases scrutiny of performance and drives better planning in support of the Integrated Force. Governance permeates every level of the Defence training enterprise and ensures that it is operating in line with the 'single force design' vision that lies at the heart of the Integrated Force and is the responsibility of the MSHQ

Strategic Governance Structures

3.1.3 CDS has overall responsibility for the Integrated Force design, including training and standards.[2] The MSHQ enables CDS to command and direct the Armed Forces. The MSHQ governance system will enable strategic decision-making and direction to the Military Commands, supporting Armed Forces performance and risk management. The top-level decision board will be the **Chiefs of Staff Committee** (COS Ctte) chaired by CDS. Below this, the **MSHQ Board** will direct and guide the interfaces with other Defence Reform areas (the 'Quad), aligning the outputs of the 3* chaired **Defence Activities Approvals Board** (DAAB) and the **Integrated Force Authorities Board** (IFAB):

[2] Armed Forces Plan 2025




Fig 2 – The Four MSHQ Boards

3.1.4 The IFAB is chaired by Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Force Design) (DCDS (FD)) and will deliver an Integrated Force design for a warfighting force for now, next and the future; coordinating with NAD-G to design and set prioritised capability portfolios and assure delivery by the NAD-G. DCDS (FD) has been given delegated responsibility from CDS for the delivery of the UK Armed Forces with the right skills, values and behaviours, through the delivery of training and education. The IFAB is therefore the primary route for Training issues to be raised into the higher governance of the MSHQ as illustrated above. The IFAB will consider both Collective and Individual Training, with a focus on outcomes achieved for the Integrated Force. The IFAB is supported by the following governance structures to input evidence from across the Defence training enterprise:

- The 2* **Integrated Warfare Development Board** (IWDB) coordinates the integration of warfare development across the Armed Forces and with the other areas of the Defence Reform 'Quad'. A key purpose of the IWDB is governance of capability integration across the domains and therefore from a Training perspective focuses primarily on Collective Training but also considers the interface between Collective and Individual Training. At the time of publication, the IWDB has not been confirmed as the Board responsible for Collective Training governance within the MSHQ.

- The 2* **Integrated Individual Training and Education Board** (IITEB) is chaired by MSHQ ACDS People Capability, with attendance from 2* Training and Education stakeholders from across the Armed Forces and additional attendance from across the Defence Reform 'Quad'. The IITEB's primary purpose is governance of Individual Training and Education but will also consider the interface/s between Collective and Individual Training to ensure that Individual Training and Education effectively delivers and supports the needs of the Collective Training area. The IITEB works collaboratively with the IWDB to ensure governance across the full spectrum of Training, cohering input and escalation into the IFAB where necessary.

- The 1* **Training & Education Steering Group** (TESG) is chaired by Hd Talent, Skills, Learning and Development (TSLD), with attendance from across the 'Quad' and the Military Commands. Its purpose is to govern the effectiveness of Training & Education policy across both Collective and Individual Training areas. It assures that Training & Education is meeting both specific measures of performance, as well as measures of effectiveness in delivery for the Integrated Force. It considers whether policy should be revised to improve either the performance, or the effectiveness of Training & Education across Defence. The TESG is the first level of governance where Military Commands can escalate System Risk being taken for MSHQ awareness, oversight and/or further escalation. Military Commands will also run their own internal Training & Education forums.

- Various TSLD OF4 **Working Groups** provide a collaborative approach across the Quad and between MSHQ and the Military Commands to consider the effectiveness of policy, escalating issues as necessary to the TESG.

Military Command Governance

3.1.5 The Military Commands and those elements of the Quad that provide operational training will undertake the following governance for their training systems:

- **Military Command Training HQ** – Each MC **should** manage the totality of its training, providing strategic direction, and organizational planning. Any supporting Boards **should** provide governance of training, supporting individual CEBs in cohering their training activities across the MC and with other MCs.

- **Customer Executive Boards (CEB)** – For all training, CEBs **must** form part of the Management of the Training System (MTS) but can be specific to the needs of that Training System. The purpose of a CEB is to provide a mechanism for stakeholders to oversee the management and assurance of the training system, ensuring it has been developed to meet the scale and content of the Defence requirement, within the available resources and in accordance with policy. CEBs **must** also consider their training system as part of the whole system. This requires

CEB Chairs to not view and assess training purely on its own terms, but as part of achieving something larger – the delivery of operational output as part of the Integrated Force. CEB Chairs need to be particularly alive to transferring risk into later phases or tiers of training, or into frontline operational units, that do not have resources or skills to manage and mitigate the risk.

- **CEB Working Groups** (WG) – To support the effectiveness of the CEB, CEB Chairs **should** establish subordinate WGs to bring together desk-level input from Training Requirement Authorities (TRA), Training Delivery Authorities (TDA) and Training Providers (TP). WGs **should** focus on delivering the most effective and efficient training output that is ALARP and tolerable.

4 Management

4.1.1 For training across Defence, this means the systems management of the enterprise-wide administration and delivery of the Training System. Its purpose is to ensure that the organisation complies with policy, improves effectiveness and efficiency, and ensures timely and smooth delivery across the outputs.

Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT)

4.1.2 The Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT) is a structured, logical process for identifying, developing, delivering and continuously improving training and education for Defence. It is focused on the delivery of military effect via the Integrated Force (including the UK's nuclear force) and/or organisational delivery across the Armed Forces, encompassing both Collective and Individual Training. Therefore, DSAT **must** be applied to all training and education that supports the delivery of the Integrated Force and the Armed Forces, as directed by the MSHQ. The training designed within the DSAT process may be delivered by and to the Whole Force, but its purpose is to support the organisational outputs of Defence; as such, Learning and Development training sourced through the pan-Governmental 'Civil Service Learning / Government Campus' is not subject to DSAT (although is likely to have been designed using a similar systematic process).

4.1.3 At its heart, DSAT is a cyclical continuous improvement system, designed so that training and education can be responsive to performance and effectiveness, operational outcomes, changing organisational outputs, and innovation both in the delivery of training and importantly on the front line. As DSAT is cyclical, it aligns with the Integrated Force which also has no end state; training will continue to evolve as the performance, design and capabilities of the Integrated Force and Defence do.

4.1.4 In its simplest form, DSAT comprises the Analysis, Design, Delivery and Evaluation elements of the cycle, supported by the Governance, Management and Assurance across the entirety of the system. Together, these elements combine to create a Management of Training System (MTS):

Management of Training System (MTS)




Fig 3 – DSAT Cycle and Management of Training System

4.1.5 The elements of the DSAT loop are as follows:

- **Analysis**: What is the requirement; is new or amended training activity needed; and, if so what kind?

- **Design**: What the training activity looks like; who will deliver it; and with what resources?

- **Delivery:** The delivery of the training activity and management and support of individuals, or Units undertaking the training.

- **Evaluation**[3]: Is the training activity being delivered correctly; is it meeting the operational or organisational requirement.

4.1.6 The 4 elements in the DSAT loop are supported by the elements below to form an MTS:

- **Governance**: Providing the structure for the training enterprise and individual Training System's leadership; defining who has decision-making authority and is accountable to ensure performance meets the Quality Management Standard (QMS) (see para 1.24 below).

- **Management**: The process of organising and planning the Training System to achieve its objectives through the coordination of people, resources and tasks.

- **Assurance:** The approach undertaken to provide confidence and credibility in the outputs of the Training System to deliver in line with policy.

4.1.7 The purpose of these elements is to ensure that the training of our people, units and formations contribute directly to Defence outputs, helping to mitigate for risk felt on the front line, reduce the inherent risk in the conduct of military training, and ensure that training is cost-effective in delivering the capabilities required by Defence. When all elements of the MTS are delivered effectively, the result is a Training System that meets the required DSAT Quality Management Standard (QMS) by being:

- **Effective**. Training that continuously improves to meet the operational needs of the Integrated Force, and/or the organisational needs of the Armed Forces. It should be responsive to performance within and across the continuum of Collective and Individual Training, operational lessons and risks, and technological and military innovation.

- **Safe**. Training that accepts and accommodates the inherent risks of delivering in hazardous environments, under stressful conditions, whilst conducting activities that may present danger to our people. Effective management ensures training risk is be maintained at As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and to a tolerable level. Safety **must** be an inherent consideration across all training delivery that **must** be balanced by the operational risks felt on the frontline.

- **Efficient**. Training needs to be effective in meeting the requirements of the Integrated Force and the Armed Forces, but it **must** also be efficient, ensuring that costs are contained where appropriate, and Defence can deliver Value for Money (VfM). Efficiency **should** be considered across the Military Commands, with the

3 In a change from previous policy, this fourth stage of the DSAT loop has reverted to being Evaluation, rather than Assurance. This is because evaluation is focused on the output of the training to support continuous improvement, where assurance is focused on ensuring the system is working effectively against the Quality Management System.

MSHQ prioritising where necessary, and where training can be rationalised for delivery to the Whole Force it **should** be.

- **Accountable**. A Training System that has a single point of accountability with the authority to direct and govern the management of training to best deliver to the needs of the Integrated Force and the Armed Forces. The accountable Training System owner will be held to account (H2A) and supported by the MSHQ to ensure that decisions made are effective in delivering against the prioritised requirement, safely delivered balanced against the risk felt on the frontline, and efficient in meeting the priorities of Defence.

4.1.8 As illustrated above, the DSAT process is cyclical and continuous, meaning that it is flexible and can be applied intelligently, rather than followed dogmatically. Whilst each individual element (Analysis, Design, Deliver, Evaluation, Governance, Management and Assurance) of the DSAT MTS is mandated and **must** be carried out for all Collective and Individual Training, the many activities within each element **should** be delivered, but are not necessarily mandated. This means that System Owners only have increased flexibility, allowing for agility in meeting the DSAT QMS, contextualised to their Training System.

4.1.9 System Owners are accountable for the application of the DSAT MTS and any adaptations that they direct in delivering the DSAT activities laid out in policy to meet each element. The MSHQ **must** provide the governance over the Military Commands' Training Systems to ensure that the decisions taken by System Owners do not have a cumulatively negative effect on the Integrated Force but remain coherent with the delivery of it.

NATO and Allies Systems Approaches to Training

4.1.10 The NATO Systems Approach to Training (NATO SAT) utilises a similar systematic approach to training as UK Defence, based on a 5-phase continuous improvement cycle: Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation and Evaluation (ADDIE). The ADDIE model aims to achieve similar outcomes to DSAT and therefore where appropriate training developed for NATO may be transferable to UK Defence without rewriting documentation to DSAT standards. Where organisations look to transfer training documentation, the Training Requirements Authority (TRA) **must** determine that the UK requirement is sufficiently met and any gap in training output is clearly articulated and either achieved elsewhere, or risk transferred to and understood by gaining units. Training documentation that has been transferred in this manner is still bound by meeting timelines for review as set down within this policy.

4.1.11 Allies, both within and beyond NATO use similar systematic approaches to training to ensure operational requirements are achieved through the training system. For example, the Australian Defence Force use the Systems Approach to Defence Learning (SADL) which employs a similar 5-phase ADDIE cycle to support trainings

input into capability development. Similarly to NATO SAT, these models aim to achieve similar outputs to DSAT and therefore where appropriate training developed for allied nations may be transferable to UK Defence without rewriting documentation to DSAT standards. Where organisations look to transfer training documentation, the Training Requirements Authority (TRA) must determine that the UK requirement is sufficiently met and any gap in training output is clearly articulated and either achieved elsewhere, or risk transferred to and understood by gaining units. Training documentation that has been transferred in this manner is still bound by meeting timelines for review as set down within DSAT.

Alternative Means of Documentation

4.1.12 In some circumstances it may be appropriate to accept alternative means of documentation[4] to reduce the burden on training delivery organisations in rewriting documents to meet DSAT guidance. For example, this **could** be to recognise another government department or agency's primacy in a specific field of training or expertise, such as the Health and Care Professions Council which sets the standards of practice and training for Biomedical Scientists in the UK. Similarly, for non-elective educational requirements (e.g. ACSC, HCSC, RCDS), accepting external University documentation may avoid unnecessary duplication. Where organisations seek to use alternative means of documentation, they **must** gain TRA agreement that it effectively meets the requirement, and CEB endorsement to do so.

4.1.13 Where organisations have gained TRA agreement and CEB endorsement, assurance will note the use of an alternative means of documentation as an 'observation' for monitoring, but not as a 'non-compliance' for resolving. If organisations cannot prove TRA agreement and/or CEB endorsement, then any use of an alternative means of documentation **must** be recorded as a 'non-compliance'.

4.2 Training Continuum

4.2.1 The SDR called for a cultural shift across Defence to focus more clearly on operational outcomes and delivering for the warfighter. The organisational restructuring of Defence Reform and the establishment of the Integrated Force aim to support this objective by inverting the model so that the authority for design and delivery flow top-down from a single-point of military authority within the MSHQ. For the Integrated Force, this means a single force design, that provides a coherent combat force which trains and fights across all domains under a single vision.

4.2.2 To support this cultural shift across Defence, JSP 822 has revised its definition of the Training Continuum - the spectrum of training that supports the delivery of operational capability. Previously, the policy saw the Training Continuum as a bottom-up, or building block, approach, from initial recruit training to Tier 4 strategic-level training. However, in line with Defence Reform and the establishment of the MSHQ, this policy inverts this understanding to a top-down approach with the

4 Policy supports responses to Service Inquiries regarding training documentation.

golden-thread of the requirements of the Integrated Force flowing down through all training delivery across the spectrum of the Training Continuum.

4.2.3 Whilst it is likely that an individual will move through the Training Continuum bottom-up[5], the importance of a top-down approach is that it focuses the spectrum of training on the operational outcomes required. The Training Continuum is therefore best articulated as:




Fig 4 – the Training Continuum

4.3 Risk Management

4.3.1 In successful organisations, risk management enhances strategic planning and prioritisation, assists in achieving objectives and strengthens the ability to be agile to respond to the opportunities and challenges faced. For training to successfully

5 This policy recognises that lateral entry opportunities exist, that may mean individuals do not follow the normal linear progression of training.

support the Defence outcomes, to improve output for the Integrated Force and the Armed Forces, whilst delivering safely and achieving value for money, risk management **must** be an essential and integral part of planning and decision-making, collectively and within each training system.

4.3.2 Training cannot be risk averse if it is to be successful in meeting the needs of the Integrated Force and the Armed Forces. Risk is inherent in every element of activity across the Defence training system. Effective and meaningful risk management, both across individual training systems and collectively across all training is vital in taking a balanced view in managing opportunities and risk. Risk Management **must** be an integral part of informed decision-making across the training environment.

4.3.3 At its most effective, risk management is as much about evaluating the uncertainties and implications within options as it is about managing the impacts once choices have been made. It is about being realistic in the assessment of the risks to individual training systems, the risks across the broader capability development, the consideration of the cumulative impact on the Integrated Force and the effectiveness of the actions taken to manage these risks. This is not about adding new processes; it is about ensuring that effective risk management is integrated in the way we lead, direct, manage and operate across the training enterprise.

4.4 Systems Risk

4.4.1 The management of system risk is fundamental to this revision of JSP 822. The SDR noted that previous versions of JSP 822 were not geared towards adaptation or innovation at the pace of change necessary. Instead, it was found to promote risk-averse behaviours where individuals throughout the training system felt bound by process compliance rather than outcomes delivery. This new version of JSP 822 aims to re-balance these behaviours by providing greater flexibility to adapt, within the simplified boundaries of the MTS (see figure 3, page 12).

4.4.2 To achieve this, the latest version of JSP 822 has reduced a significant number of **must** directives, to **should** guidance, where system owners can decide to adapt the process where the contextual situation, outcomes, or innovative opportunities justify the risk. The primary driver for introducing risk into the training system is to better support the delivery and output of the Integrated Force. Any adaptation that undermines, makes more difficult, or brings incoherency, into the Integrated Force **must** not be undertaken.

4.4.3 System risk may be taken to seize opportunities, whether that is to ensure operational lessons are introduced at pace, to drive innovation and support technological and tactical development, reduce the cost to Defence and hence the taxpayer, exploit collaboration within NATO and with Allies, increase the use of external suppliers, or to break down cultural barriers that slow down the process to an extent that impacts outcomes. Whilst this gives significant breadth to training system owners, adaptation from policy **must** not be used as a default and **must** be

managed as part of an informed risk-management approach and governed accordingly.

4.4.4 Where system risk is introduced, system owners should manage that risk by utilising the cyclical nature of the DSAT loop, which is focused on Continuous Improvement and is supportive to iterative change, as a method for limiting the impact that the risk may have. For example, where a decision has been made for rapid, or spiral development of a capability, the analysis of the training requirement may not be able to follow the processes set out in this policy. To mitigate for this risk, the addition of increased levels of evaluation from individuals and gaining units will assist in further analysis to refine the training needed and the course delivery.

4.5 Safety Risk Balance

4.5.1 The SDR highlighted that training activity had become constrained by a safety-first culture that was failing to consider the operational risk that would be felt by limiting the risk accepted within training. This new version of JSP 822 does not intend to undermine the vital importance of safety, but rather to re-balance it, considering the risk felt within both the operational and training domains. To achieve this, the Training System Owner **must** scrutinise the safety risk presented within the training environment against the operational requirements, identifying where risk is being transferred to the frontline, and challenging where risk has been reduced to the detriment of the operational outcomes.

4.5.2 To support the Training System Owner in their scrutiny, a Safe System of Training (SST) **must** be employed within all training environments. The SST consists of the following 4 key elements:

- **Safe Persons – who we train** and who delivers/support training: Ensure those undertaking, delivering, supervising or supporting training have the necessary competent and supervision, and that training is appropriate to the capability of participants.

- **Safe Equipment – what we train with:** Ensure equipment used for training is appropriate for the activity, operated and maintained in accordance with relevant instructions, and only used by competent personnel or those under appropriate supervision.

- **Safe Place – where we train**: Ensure that all training-specific controls required to conduct authorised training safely at the chosen location are identified, implemented, and clearly communicated to both trainers and trainees.

- **Safe Practice – how we train**: Ensure training is delivered, supervised and monitored by competent personnel in accordance with authorised drills, procedures and instructions, with relevant risks, controls, warnings and protective measures communicated to participants.

4.5.3 The SST sets the conditions under which training is to be conducted, ensuring personnel are provided with the appropriate information, instruction, and supervision. The SST enables Defence to maintain training risks at As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and to a tolerable level, whilst ensuring that training remains focused on delivering the operational requirement.

4.5.4 CEBs may escalate risk where necessary to the MSHQ for consideration or ownership.

4.6 Cumulative Risk

4.6.1 In determining risk, both the MSHQ and individual training commands/organisations **must** consider the possible cumulative impact/effect of multiple risks that individually can be tolerated, but in combination may be intolerable, or undermine the outcomes of the whole system.

5 Assurance

5.1.1 Within the training system, assurance focusses on the continuous activity of monitoring, evaluating, maintaining, and improving all training and training activity and processes, and is provided by a variety of activities including but not limited to audits and inspections. These activities are conducted by those internal to the training system as well as by bodies external to it. The assurance of Defence training provides stakeholders with the knowledge that training is effective, safe, efficient, and accountable, and training is delivered to the right people at the right time and to the right standards.

5.1.2 There are 3 Lines of Defence Assurance (LoDA) for training:

- **1 LoDA**. The management control and internal control measures that provide the first level of assurance, conducted as part of quality/performance and Continuous Improvement activity (such as an audit), internal to an organisation. This will form the basis of an organisation's self-declaration of compliance/conformity and will inform further assurance work. 1 LoDA **must** be conducted annually.

- **2 LoDA**. Assurance activity that monitors compliance and effectiveness, conducted by organisations, usually higher commands, external to, but with accountability for, the activities that are within scope of the audit or inspection. 2 LoDA **must** audit or inspect the entirety of a Training System and not be limited to just Training Delivery. A 2 LoDA **should** be carried out at least every 3 years but **must** not be more than 5 years.

- **3 LoDA**. Assurance activity conducted by an organisation external to the management and Command of the activities but still within Defence. The 3 LoDA

will commission, support, and cohere responses to independent inspections from third-party organisations such as Ofsted, National Audit Office (NAO), governing and awarding bodies, or regulatory bodies external to Defence. These external inspection activities will not always provide assurance for the whole training system, usually only inspecting or auditing a specific area of interest or concern. However, output from these activities **should** be considered by the 3 LoDA in driving the overall continuous improvement of the training system as a whole.

6 Enabling Capabilities

6.1.1 To support Defence in meeting its governance, management and assurance responsibilities, Defence continues to invest and direct the use of several enabling capabilities.

6.2 Defence Learning and Management Capability (DLMC)

6.2.1 The DLMC is a pan-Defence, digitally enabled, modern and integrated learning management and delivery capability. At its core, the DLMC will support improved data-exploitation that will allow greater scrutiny of training performance and outputs, which in turn will result in improved utilisation of the Defence workforce to meet operational requirements. To achieve this the DLMC will:

- Enable a cohesive, effective, resource-efficient Defence Learning (Training & Education) System.

- Provide coherent, timely pan-Defence learning management information services that enable improved Defence decision-making on workforce planning and structures, workforce exploitation and development, and investment in learning.

- Enable the Pan Defence Skills Framework (PDSF) by capturing and tracking relevant workforce skills gained through Training/Education.

- Enable governance and assurance of Defence Learning (Training and Education), and assurance of compliance with policy frameworks.

6.2.2 Whilst the DLMC is primarily aimed at supporting Individual Training, its outputs will support Collective Training with greater awareness and assurance of the inputs into Collective Training have been met.

6.3 Managed Learning Services (MLS)

6.3.1 The MOD Managed Learning Services (MLS) contract, delivered by TSLD, is a centralised pan-MOD call-off contract via which individual tasking orders for bespoke training requirements may be procured for customers Defence-wide,

including other MOD agencies such as Arm's Length Bodies (ALBs) and Enabling Organisations (EOs).

6.3.2 Both military training and Civil Service L&D requirements are in scope, including the whole range of DSAT activities. For example, MLS has proven to be a particularly useful route to market for Training Needs Analysis (TNA) and course design work where TRAs and TDAs lack training analyst or course designer resource. MLS is also regularly used to deliver specialist training for Training Providers (TPs) where they lack the capability or capacity to deliver it with internal resource.

6.3.3 In accordance with previous direction from the PUS, use of the centralised MLS contract **must** be considered prior to local procurement of military training or L&D requirements. Full detail on how to access the MLS contract is routinely published via Defence Instructions and Notices (DINs).

6.4 Artificial Intelligence (AI)

6.4.1 Many potential applications for AI across the MTS for Defence training are rapidly emerging. Whilst experimentation and innovation within military commands is encouraged, details of such experimentation **must** be shared via the TSLD DSAT AI Coherence Working Group (DACWG) to inform potential future pan-Defence solutions and associated training policy. All application of AI within Defence training must also be aligned to JSP 936 v1.1 – Dependable Artificial Intelligence(AI) in Defence Part 1: Directive.

6.4.2 The future iterative development of DLMC is expected to include the adoption of AI-enabled tools and applications. In the interim, any local procurement of AI-enabled applications or software by military commands in direct support of training **must** be conducted in consultation with the DLMC Programme Management Office to ensure compatibility and interoperability with planned DLMC services.

6.4.3 Direction on the use of AI in military training, including detail on the composition and purpose of the DACWG can be found in Annex C (The Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Defence Training) of this JSP.