



UK Government

HMG Counter-Terrorism Disruptive Powers Report 2025

October 2026



Government of the United Kingdom
Home Office

HMG Counter-Terrorism Disruptive Powers Report 2025

Presented to Parliament
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by
Command of His Majesty

October 2026



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Foreword

As Security Minister, my first duty is to secure our country and keep the public safe. Our ongoing work to counter-terrorism in all its forms is a critical part of that mission.

At the time of publication, the United Kingdom's terrorism threat level is SEVERE, meaning an attack is highly likely in the next six months. Terrorists are exploiting new technologies, operating across borders, and now draw on a range of ideologies to radicalise and inspire violence.

As terrorism continues to evolve, it is increasingly unpredictable and harder to detect. This means we must be equipped to respond to the threats we face today, while preparing for those that may emerge tomorrow. This requires constant vigilance, agility, and expertise from our world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Their commitment to keeping the public safe is non-stop, and I am forever grateful for their tireless work.

Disruptive powers are at the heart of this immense task and continue to deliver tangible results. This includes the removal of terrorist content from the internet, allowing us to disrupt online radicalisation and the spread of terrorist propaganda, as well as disrupting terrorist financing, denying them access to essential funds and resources.

The Government is also providing additional funding to sharpen our operational response. Over the Spending Review 2025 period, we will invest a further £300m into counter-terrorism policing and an extra £600m into the intelligence agencies – the largest level of funding for intelligence services in our country's history.

Though most counter-terrorism activity must, by necessity, remain out of public view, we also recognise how important transparency is. To strengthen accountability, this report details the range of powers used to maintain national security and protect the public.

Nothing matters more than the safety and security of our people. It is the core aim of our counter-terrorism strategy. That is why, alongside our partners, the Government will continue to do everything we can to face down the terrorist threat.

Rt Hon Dan Jarvis MBE MP
Security Minister
Cabinet Office and Home Office

1 - Introduction

The priority of any government is keeping the British public safe and secure. Our world-leading counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, works to reduce the risk to the UK, its citizens and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

The terrorist threat we see today is more diverse and more complex. Threats can come from a wide range of places and ideologies. In the UK and overseas, the threat from Islamist terrorism is the most prevalent and dangerous, but other threats, including extreme right-wing terrorists, threat from hostile states, and related challenges from violence-fixated individuals are of significant concern. CONTEST outlines the government's response to these threats and sets out the transformational improvements being made to our counter-terrorism system to meet the key challenges of current and future threats, and sets these in the national security context.¹

To counter terrorism and other national security threats, it is crucial that we have the necessary powers and that they are used appropriately and proportionately. This report includes data on the use of counter-terrorism disruptive powers in 2025. It explains their utility and outlines the legal frameworks that ensure they can only be used when necessary and proportionate, in accordance with the statutory functions of the relevant public authorities.

There are limitations concerning how much can be said publicly about the use of certain sensitive techniques. To go into too much detail may encourage terrorists to change their behaviour in an attempt to evade detection. However, it is important that the public are confident that the security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies have the powers they need to protect them and that these powers are used proportionately. The agencies rely on many members of the public to provide support to their work. If the public do not trust the police and security and intelligence agencies, that mistrust would result in a significant operational impact.

¹ More information at: [Counter-terrorism strategy \(CONTEST\) 2023 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/counter-terrorism-strategy)

2 – Terrorism Arrests and Outcomes

Conviction in a court is one of the most effective tools we have to stop terrorists. The government and operational partners are committed to pursuing convictions for terrorist offences where they have occurred. Terrorism-related arrests are made under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), or the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT) in circumstances where arresting officers require additional powers of detention or need to arrest a person suspected of terrorism-related activity without a warrant. Whether to arrest someone under PACE or TACT is an operational decision made by the police.

In the year ending 31 December 2025, 3,034 persons were arrested for terrorism-related activity in Great Britain, an increase of 1,114% from the 250² arrests in the previous year. Of the 3,034 arrests, 2,779 (92%) were linked to supporting Palestine Action, following its proscription on 5 July 2025. Once Palestine Action proscription related arrests are removed, there were 255 arrests, a 2% increase compared with the previous year.

Of the 3,034 arrests, 486 (16%) resulted in a charge, and of those charged, 469 were considered to be terrorism related. Many of these cases are ongoing, so the number of charges resulting from the 3,034 arrests can be expected to rise over time. Of the 469 people charged with terrorism-related offences, 15 have been prosecuted, 425 are awaiting prosecution, 3 were not proceeded against, and 26 received another outcome. Of the 15 cases which have been tried, all were convicted of an offence, all of which were for terrorism-related offences.

As of 31 December 2025, there were 267 persons in custody in Great Britain for terrorism-connected offences. This total was comprised of 155 persons (58%) in custody who held Islamist extremist views, 77 (29%) who held extreme right-wing views, and a further 35 (13%) individuals who subscribed to other ideologies.

Since the year ending September 2021 onwards, data has been collected and published on the number of persons detained and applications for extension of detention in Great Britain under Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Data has also been collected and published on the number of requests for access to a solicitor by persons detained in Great Britain under Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000.


Under Section 41 TACT, police officers have the power to arrest persons suspected of being a terrorist without a warrant. Under section 41 TACT, detention may be extended, from an initial period of 48 hours, to a maximum of 14 days. In the year ending 31 December 2025, of the 40 individuals arrested under section 41 TACT in Great Britain who were subsequently detained, there were 30 (multiple applications may be made for one individual) warrants of further detention granted by a judicial authority under Schedule 8 TACT.

² As cases progress over time, arrests figures are likely to be revised and updated. As such, figures quoted in this report may not match the figures in the latest published release of '[Operation of police powers under TACT 2000](#)'. The arrests figures within this report can be found at: [Operation of police powers under TACT 2000 statistics, to December 2025](#).

A person detained in police custody under section 41 is entitled to consult a solicitor. However, a police officer of at least the rank of superintendent can authorise a delay in permitting a detained person to consult a solicitor if they have reasonable grounds to believe that exercising this right at the time of chosen by the detainee will result in any of the consequences listed in paragraph 8(4) of Schedule 8 to the Act. In the year ending 31 December 2025, of the individuals arrested under section 41 TACT in Great Britain who were subsequently detained, there were 14 instances where a request for access to a solicitor was delayed.

Figure 1: Arrests linked to supporting Palestine Action, and outcomes in Great Britain¹ in the year ending 31 December 2025²

Figure 1 summarises how individuals who are arrested on suspicion of terrorism-related activity (linked to supporting Palestine Action) are dealt with through the criminal justice system. It follows the process from the point of arrest, through to charge (or other outcomes) and prosecution.



Source: Home Office, '[Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation, year to December 2025](#)'


Figure 1 notes:

1. Based on time of arrest, between 1 January 2025 and 31 December 2025.
2. Data presented is based on the latest position with each case as at the date of data provision from Counter-Terrorism Police Headquarters (CTPHQ) (02 February 2026).
3. 'Alternative action' includes a number of outcomes, such as cautions, detentions under international arrest warrant, transfer to immigration authorities etc. See the [annual data table A.03](#) for a complete list.
4. Terrorism-related charges and convictions include some charges and convictions under non-terrorism legislation, where the offence is considered to be terrorism-related.

5. The 'other' category includes other cases/outcomes such as cautions, transfers to Immigration Enforcement Agencies, the offender's details being circulated as wanted, and extraditions.
6. Cases that are 'awaiting prosecution' are not yet complete. As time passes, these cases will eventually lead to a prosecution, 'other' outcome, or it may be decided that the individual will not be proceeded against.
7. Excludes convictions that were later quashed on appeal.

Figure 2: Arrests without a link to supporting Palestine Action, and outcomes in Great Britain¹ in the year ending 31 December 2025²

Figure 2 summarises how other individuals arrested on suspicion of terrorism offences or being a terrorist (without a link to Palestine Action) are dealt with through the criminal justice system. It follows the process from the point of arrest, through to charge (or other outcomes) and prosecution.



Source: Home Office, '[Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation, year to December 2025](#)'

Figure 2 notes:

1. Based on time of arrest, between 1 January 2025 and 31 December 2025.
2. Data presented is based on the latest position with each case as at the date of data provision from Counter-Terrorism Police Headquarters (CTPHQ) (02 February 2026).
3. 'Alternative action' includes a number of outcomes, such as cautions, detentions under international arrest warrant, transfer to immigration authorities etc. See the [annual data table A.03](#) for a complete list.
4. Terrorism-related charges and convictions include some charges and convictions under non-terrorism legislation, where the offence is considered to be terrorism-related.
5. The 'other' category includes other cases/outcomes such as cautions, transfers to Immigration Enforcement Agencies, the offender's details being circulated as wanted, and extraditions.

6. Cases that are 'awaiting prosecution' are not yet complete. As time passes, these cases will eventually lead to a prosecution, 'other' outcome, or it may be decided that the individual will not be proceeded against.
7. Excludes convictions that were later quashed on appeal.

3 – Disruptive Powers

3.1 - Stops and Searches

Powers of search and seizure are vital in ensuring that the police can acquire evidence during the course of a criminal investigation and are powerful disruptive tools in the prevention of terrorism.

Section 47A of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT) enables a senior police officer to give an authorisation in relation to a specified area or place where they reasonably suspect that an act of terrorism will take place. Within that area and for the duration of the authorisation, a uniformed constable may stop and search any vehicle (including a driver or passenger) or pedestrian for the purpose of discovering any evidence – whether or not they have a reasonable suspicion that such evidence exists – that the person is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, or that the vehicle is being used for terrorist purposes.

The officer must reasonably consider the authorisation necessary to prevent the act of terrorism taking place, specifying an area and duration no greater than what is reasonably considered necessary to do so. The authorising officer must inform the Secretary of State (Home Secretary) of the authorisation as soon as is practicable, and the Secretary of State must confirm it. If the Secretary of State does not confirm the authorisation, it will expire 48 hours after being made. The Secretary of State may substitute a shorter period, or a smaller geographical area, than was specified in the original authorisation.

Until September 2017, this power had not been used in Great Britain since the threshold of authorisation was formally raised in 2011. This reflects the intention that the power should be reserved for exceptional circumstances, and the requirement that it only be used where necessary to prevent an act of terrorism that it is reasonably suspected is going to take place within a specified area and period. However, following the Parsons Green attack on 15 September 2017, the power was authorised for the first and only time to date, by four forces: British Transport Police (BTP), City of London Police, North Yorkshire Police, and West Yorkshire Police. There were a total of 128 stop and searches conducted (126 of which were conducted by BTP), which resulted in 4 arrests (all BTP).

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL), Jonathan Hall KC, recommended in the annual report on the operation of the terrorism acts in 2018 that CT Policing should consider providing national advice to forces on whether, in response to a raising of the national threat level to critical, authorisations under section 47A TACT should be made; and the Home Office and CT Policing should consider whether the 2012 Code of Practice on section 47A requires revision. The IRTL subsequently reported in the annual report on the operation of the terrorism acts in 2021 that CT Policing have developed a centralised advisory system, addressed to authorising officers and their tactical advisers, on the circumstances in which a section 47A authorisation should be considered. The IRTL further reported that under local response plans, police forces are not to consider section 47A as a default option in response to the raising of the national threat level to critical, and an

amended Code of Practice has been published which makes it clear that a general high threat from terrorism (including when the national threat level has been raised to critical) should not form the sole basis for authorising the use of section 47A.

Section 43 TACT permits a constable to stop and search a person they reasonably suspect of being a terrorist to discover whether the person has in their possession anything that that may constitute evidence that they are a terrorist.

In exercising the power to stop a person, the constable may stop a vehicle and, in doing so, may search the vehicle and anything in or on the vehicle in order to discover evidence that the person is a terrorist.

In the year ending 31 December 2025, 94 persons were stopped and searched by the Metropolitan Police Service under section 43 TACT. This represents a 32% increase from the previous year's total of 71. Over the longer term, there has been a 91% fall in the number of stops and searches, from 1,052 in the year ending 31 December 2011 (when data collection began). In the year ending 31 December 2025, there were 14 resultant arrests; the arrest rate of those stopped and searched under section 43 was 15%, up from 14% in the previous year.³

³ Full statistical releases on the operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, including stop and search powers, are available at: [Counter terrorism statistics - GOV.UK](#).

3.2 - Port and Border Controls

Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act (TACT) 2000 (Schedule 7) helps protect the public by allowing examining officers to stop, question and, when necessary, search and detain individuals travelling through ports, airports, international rail stations or the border area in Northern Ireland. The purpose of the examination is to determine whether that person appears to be someone who is, or has been, involved in the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism. Schedule 7 also allows examining officers to examine goods to determine whether they have been used in the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism.

An examining officer does not need to have grounds for suspecting that a person is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism before exercising the power. However, the selection of a person for examination must not be arbitrary or discriminatory and must be informed by considerations relevant to the threat from terrorism.

The Schedule 7 Code of Practice for Examining Officers provides guidance on the selection of individuals for examination. The most recent version of the Code, which came into effect in 2025⁴, is clear that selection of a person for examination must not be arbitrary and that protected characteristics must not be used as selection criteria except to the extent they are used in association with considerations relating to the threat from terrorism.

When an individual is examined under Schedule 7, they must be offered a Public Information Leaflet, which is available in multiple languages and outlines the purpose of Schedule 7 as well as any rights and obligations relating to use of the power. An examination may continue beyond one hour only if the person has been formally detained. The total period of examination, including any period of detention, must not exceed six hours.

Any person detained is entitled to consult a solicitor and have a named person informed of their detention. The Codes of Practice set out the requirements placed upon the 'review officer', to review the detention and consider if it remains necessary. The Public Information Leaflet and Code of Practice provide details of the appropriate complaints routes, which depend on where the examination took place and whether the examining officer was a police, immigration or customs officer. Additionally, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL) is responsible for reporting each year on the operation of the Schedule 7 power.

Statistics on the operation of Schedule 7 powers are published by the Home Office on a quarterly basis.⁵ In the year ending 31 December 2025, 2,654 examinations were made under Schedule 7 to TACT 2000 in the United Kingdom, an increase of 6% compared to the year ending 31 December 2024, when 2,501 examinations were

⁴ The full Schedule 7 Code of Practice is available at: [Codes of practice for officers using examination powers at ports - GOV.UK.](#)

⁵ Full statistical releases on the operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 are available at: [Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 statistics - GOV.UK.](#)

made. Of the 2,654 examinations made in the year ending 31 December 2025, 307 (12%) were intra-UK examinations, compared to 328 of 2,501 (13%) in the previous year.

Throughout the same period, 58% of examinations conducted in Great Britain resulted in detention. This figure represents a decline from the year ending 31 December 2024, which saw 63% of examinations resulting in detention.

Ethnicity was stated in 93% of cases where an individual was subject to a Schedule 7 examination in Great Britain. Of those individuals that were examined (excluding those who did not state their ethnicity), 41% identified as 'Chinese or Other', 26% identified as 'Asian or Asian British', and 19% identified as 'White'.

Since April 2016, the Home Office has collected additional data relating to the use of Schedule 7. This data includes the number of goods examinations (sea and air freight), the number of strip searches conducted, and the number of refusals following a request by an individual to postpone questioning. In the year ending 31 December 2025, a total of 837 air freight and 311 sea freight examinations were conducted in Great Britain. Regarding strip searches over the same period, there were 6 instances carried out under Schedule 7. There were no refusals to postpone questioning (usually to enable an individual to consult a solicitor). Access to a solicitor was delayed in two instances.

Since the year ending June 2021, data has also been collected and published on the number of persons where one or more biometric identifier was taken during an examination made under Schedule 7 in the United Kingdom. A biometric identifier (taken during an examination under Schedule 7) includes photographs, fingerprints and DNA samples. In the year ending 31 December 2025, 52% of examinations made under Schedule 7 resulted in at least one biometric identifier being taken from an individual 1,376 persons out of 2,654 examinations.

3.3 – Counter-Terrorism Sanctions in the UK

The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (the Sanctions Act), which came into force on 23 May 2018, provides the legal framework for the UK to impose, update, and lift sanctions both autonomously and in compliance with our UN obligations following exit from the EU.

There are three main counter-terrorism sanctions regimes in effect in the UK which are led by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and His Majesty's Treasury (HM Treasury). The FCDO is responsible for all international sanctions and designations and HM Treasury is responsible for the UK's domestic counter-terrorism sanctions regime and designations made under it. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), part of HM Treasury, is the competent authority for the implementation and enforcement of financial sanctions in the UK.

ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida (United Nations Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 ("CT1")

The ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida (United Nations Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019⁶ is an FCDO-led regime, implementing the UK's obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 2368, and designates individuals and entities named on the United Nations ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Resolution 1267's Sanctions List. Measures imposed against persons designated under these regulations include an asset freeze, arms embargo, and travel ban.

The Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 ("CT 2")

The Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019⁷ is also an FCDO-led regime. This set of regulations, relating to international counter-terrorism sanctions allows the UK to implement autonomous UK listings with an international focus related to counter-terrorism, including many that were previously made under the EU Common Position 931 regime. The regime (along with the domestic sanctions regime below) ensures the UK implements its international obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1373.

The Counter-Terrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 ("CT3")

The Counter-Terrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019⁸ is led by HM Treasury and is the UK's domestic counter-terrorism sanctions regime. The intention of CT3 is to further the prevention of terrorism in the UK or elsewhere and protect the UK national security interests through the designation of individuals, groups or

⁶ The ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida (United Nations Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 are available at: [The ISIL \(Da'esh\) and Al-Qaida \(United Nations Sanctions\) \(EU Exit\) Regulations 2019](#).

⁷ The Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 are available at: [The Counter-Terrorism \(International Sanctions\) \(EU Exit\) Regulations 2019](#).

⁸ More information can be found at: [The Counter-Terrorism \(Sanctions\) \(EU Exit\) Regulations 2019](#).

entities with a UK nexus including where UN financial sanctions are not available or deemed an appropriate tool to utilise.

Additionally, the CT3 regime enables HMG to continue to meet the UK's obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and designate those who have a domestic UK nexus. Meeting these obligations is also part of the 40 standards on anti-money laundering, counter-terrorist financing and counter-proliferation financing set out by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). FATF evaluated the UK's compliance with its standards in 2018 and has given the UK the highest possible ratings on the UK's system to combat terrorist financing, including through the UK's sanctions legislative framework. The full 2018 report can be found at: <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf>

Financial sanctions imposed by the UK's three counter-terrorism sanctions regimes operate to freeze any funds or economic resources owned, held, or controlled by a designated person⁹ (as such, persons are prohibited from dealing with such funds or economic resources if they know, or have reasonable cause to suspect, that they are dealing with such funds or economic resources).

Financial sanctions also make it an offence for any person to make funds or economic resources available (directly or indirectly) to, or for the benefit of, a designated person (including entity) where that person knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, the individual or entity is designated. The UK's counter-terrorism sanction regimes contain robust safeguards with the aim of keeping any restrictions proportionate to their purpose.

Under regulation 6(1)(a) and (2) of the Counter-Terrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and the Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, HM Treasury or FCDO may only designate persons where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is or has been involved in terrorist activity, or is owned, controlled (directly or indirectly) or acting on behalf of or at the direction of someone who is or has been involved in terrorist activity, or is a member of or associated with a person who is or has been so involved.

In addition, there are a number of other safeguards to ensure that the UK's counter-terrorism sanctions regimes operate fairly and proportionately:

- The Home Secretary may direct that exceptions are made to travel bans on individuals.
- HM Treasury may grant licences authorising certain activities or types of transaction that would otherwise be prohibited by sanctions legislation. In addition to issuing licences relating to a specific person, HM Treasury may also issue general licences, which authorise otherwise prohibited activity by a particular category of persons.
- The overall objective of the licensing system for terrorism designations is to strike an appropriate balance between minimising the risk of diversion of funds to terrorism and respecting the human rights of designated persons and

⁹ Under the Sanctions Act, "person" includes (in addition to an individual and a body of persons corporate or unincorporate) any organisation and any association or combination of persons.

other third parties. HM Treasury grants licences where there is a legitimate need for such activities or transactions to proceed. This helps to ensure that the sanctions regime remains effective, fair and proportionate in its application.

- Designations must generally be made public, along with the “statement of reasons”, which is a brief statement of the matters that the appropriate minister knows, or has reasonable grounds to suspect, in relation to the designated person which have led the appropriate minister to make the designation. Designations can be notified on a restricted basis and not be made public when one of the conditions in regulation 8(7) of the Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and the Counter-Terrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 is met. Those conditions are that:
 1. The Secretary of State or the Treasury believe that the designated person is under the age of 18; or
 2. The Secretary of State or the Treasury consider the disclosure of the designation should be restricted:
 - i. In the interests of national security or international relations;
 - ii. For reasons connected with the prevention or detection of serious crime in the United Kingdom or elsewhere; or
 - iii. In the interests of justice.

Where a designation is notified on a restricted basis, the Secretary of State and HM Treasury can specify that people informed of the designation treat the information as confidential.

- A designated person may request a variation or revocation of their designation under section 23 of the Sanctions Act, for instance, if they consider that they no longer satisfy the criteria for designation. The appropriate minister must then decide whether to vary or revoke the designation, or to take no action with respect to it. Section 25 of the Sanctions Act provides a right for persons designated by the UN to request that the Secretary of State uses their best endeavours to secure their removal from the relevant UN list.
- Following a review under section 23, a designated person has a right to apply to the High Court to request that the appropriate minister’s decision on that review be set aside (see section 38 of the Sanctions Act). Anyone affected by a licensing decision (including the designated person) can seek to challenge on judicial review grounds any licensing decisions of HM Treasury. If necessary, there is a closed material procedure available for such appeals or challenges using specially cleared advocates to protect closed material whilst ensuring a fair hearing for the claimant.
- The appropriate minister must without delay take such steps as are reasonably practicable to inform the designated person of the designation, variation or revocation under the Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 or the Counter-Terrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
- The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, has conducted a review and report on the operation of both the Counter-Terrorism

(Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and the Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. These were published on 15 December 2022 and 18 December 2023 respectively. Both reports and their responses can be found here:

- [Review of the operation of Counter-Terrorism \(Sanctions\) \(EU Exit\) Regulations 2019. - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-the-operation-of-counter-terrorism-sanctions-eu-exit-regulations-2019)
- [Review of the operation of the Counter-Terrorism \(International Sanctions\) \(EU Exit\) Regulations 2019 - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-the-operation-of-the-counter-terrorism-international-sanctions-eu-exit-regulations-2019)
- At the end of September 2024, frozen funds totalling £173,229.39 were reported to OFSI as frozen across the UK's three counter-terrorism sanctions regimes.¹⁰

The following table sets out the number of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies designated under the UK's counter-terrorism sanctions regimes as of 31 December 2025:

	ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida	Counter-Terrorism (International)	Counter-Terrorism (Domestic)
Total number of designations (at the end of the quarter)	341	63	12
Total number of designated individuals (at the end of the quarter)	252	40	7
Total number of designated groups and entities(at the end of the quarter)	89	23	5

Listings

1. List of all the individuals, entities and those that are designated or specified under regulations made under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-sanctions-list>
2. Consolidated list of all those subject to financial sanctions imposed by the UK: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-consolidated-list-of-targets>

Further information about the UK's autonomous counter-terrorism sanctions regimes can be found here:

- <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-on-isil-daesh-and-al->

¹⁰ An asset freeze does not result in a change of ownership of the assets and is not equivalent to HMG seizing assets..

[gaida](#)

- <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-international-counter-terrorism-sanctions>
- <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-counter-terrorism-sanctions>

3.4 – Counter-Terrorism Financing

The UK has a robust counter-terrorism financing toolkit. It aims to deter, detect, disrupt, and prevent the flow of terrorist finances into, out of and around the UK. The UK's counter-terrorism legislative framework criminalises terrorist financing in all its forms and provides the police with wide-ranging legal powers to disrupt and pursue terrorist property.

The Terrorism Act (TACT) 2000 provides both the legal definition of “terrorist property” and the terrorist financing offences. “Terrorist property” is a broad term which is defined under paragraph 14 of TACT 2000, as meaning:

- Money or other property which is likely to be used for the purposes of terrorism (including any resources of a proscribed organisation – see page 29 for the proscription section).
- Proceeds of the commission of acts of terrorism.
- Proceeds of acts carried out for the purposes of terrorism.

TACT 2000 sets out the terrorist financing offences in sections 15-18:

- **Fund-raising:** A person commits an offence if they invite another to provide, they receive, or they provide money and other property, and intends for it to be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it may be used, for the purposes of terrorism (section 15 of TACT 2000). The definition of terrorism, as set out in section 1 of TACT 2000 applies and therefore the term the “purposes of terrorism” includes a reference to “action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation”.
- **Use and possession:** A person commits an offence if they use money or other property for the purposes of terrorism, or if they possess money or other property, and intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it may be used, for the purposes of terrorism (section 16 of TACT 2000).
- **Funding arrangements:** A person commits an offence if they enter into or become concerned in an arrangement as a result of which, money or other property is made available, or is made available to another, and they know or have reasonable cause to suspect that it will, or may be used, for the purposes of terrorism (section 17 of TACT 2000).
- **Insurance against payments made in response to terrorist demands:** The insurer under an insurance contract commits an offence if the insurer makes a payment under the contract or purportedly under it, or the insurer or the person authorising the payment knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that the money or other property has been, or is to be, handed over in response to a demand made wholly or partly for the purposes of terrorism (section 17A of TACT 2000).
- **Money laundering:** A person commits an offence if they enter into or become concerned in an arrangement which facilitates the retention or control by, or on behalf of another person, of terrorist property (section 18 of TACT 2000).

The terrorist financing offences apply to the UK and have extra-territorial jurisdiction. This means that if a person does something outside of the UK which, had it been

carried out in the UK would have constituted the commission of an offence under any of sections 15 to 18, they shall be liable to prosecution as if it had been done in the UK (section 63 of the Act). Section 117 of TACT 2000 requires the Attorney General's consent for all extra-territorial jurisdiction prosecutions.

The UK also has wide-ranging legal powers for law enforcement to utilise in detecting, pursuing, disrupting, and preventing terrorist financing. Schedule 1 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 provides law enforcement with the powers of seizure, detention, or for applying to freeze and forfeit terrorist property.

This includes Schedule 1, Part 1 which provides the definition of "terrorist cash", which is cash that is intended to be used for the purposes of terrorism, consists of the resources of an organisation which is a proscribed organisation, or is property earmarked as terrorist property, and includes the following found at any place in the UK:

- Coins and notes in any currency
- Postal orders
- Cheques of any kind, including travellers' cheques
- Bankers' drafts
- Bearer bonds and bearer shares
- Gaming vouchers
- Fixed-value casino tokens
- Betting receipts

Schedule 1, Parts 2 to 4 apply to the seizure, detention and forfeiture of terrorist cash.

Schedule 1, Part 4A applies to the forfeiture of terrorist assets. These are "listed assets", which means an item of property that falls within one of the descriptions as stated below. This part also sets out the seizure, detention and safe keeping of these items, prior to forfeiture or release. Listed assets can be in the form of the following:

- Precious metals
- Precious stones
- Watches
- Artistic works
- Face-value vouchers
- Postage stamps

Schedule 1, Part 4B applies to the application for account freezing orders and the forfeiture of terrorist money that is held within an account maintained by a relevant financial institution.

The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (ECCTA) amended Schedule 1 to ATCSA 2001 to extend the then existing regimes to include crypto assets following an increase in their use in both criminal and terrorism investigations. This is now set out in ATCSA 2001 Schedule 1, Parts 4BA to 4BD.

Recoveries

The following tables set out cash forfeitures, confiscation orders, and account forfeitures over the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025:

	<i>Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001</i>	<i>Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002*</i>
Cash Forfeiture	£239.00	£89,890.69
	Total: £90,129.69	

* Counter-Terrorism Policing utilise POCA powers as a disruptive tool where the use of ATCSA is not appropriate

	<i>Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001</i>	<i>Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002*</i>
Value of Confiscation Orders Obtained	Total: £6,516.88	

* Counter-Terrorism Policing utilise POCA powers as a disruptive tool where the use of ATCSA is not appropriate

	<i>Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001</i>	<i>Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002*</i>
Account Forfeiture	£12,369.00	£482,350.00
	Total: £494,719	

* Counter-Terrorism Policing use POCA powers as a disruptive tool where the use of ATCSA is not appropriate

3.5 - Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) allow the Home Secretary to impose a powerful range of disruptive measures on a small number of people who pose a real threat to our security but who cannot be prosecuted or, in the case of foreign nationals, deported. These measures can include residence requirements (including relocation to another part of the UK), police reporting, an electronic monitoring tag, exclusion from specific places, limits on association, limits on the use of financial services, telephones and computers, and a ban on holding travel documents.

It is the government's assessment that, for the foreseeable future, there will remain a small number of individuals who pose a real threat to our security but who cannot be either prosecuted or deported, and there continues to be a need for powers to protect the public from the threat posed by these people.

The use of TPIMs is subject to stringent safeguards. Before the Secretary of State (Home Secretary) decides to impose a TPIM notice on an individual, she must be satisfied that five conditions are met, as set out at section 3 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act 2011.¹¹ The Secretary of State must apply to the court for permission to impose the TPIM notice on the individual (under section 6), except in cases of urgency where the Secretary of State may impose without prior permission, but immediately after serving the TPIM notice must refer the imposition of the measures to the court. The court considers whether the Secretary of State's relevant decisions were obviously flawed and either quashes or confirms the notice, subject to its powers concerning individual measures.

A TPIM notice is also subject to a review hearing under section 9 of the TPIM Act 2011, at which the court reviews the Secretary of State's decisions that conditions A to D were met and continue to be met. Section 16 also provides a right of appeal under section 16 of the Act in relation to specified decisions taken after imposition including a refusal of a request to vary a measure, a variation of a measure without consent, or the revival or extension of the TPIM notice. The Secretary of State must keep under review the necessity and proportionality of the TPIM notice and specified measures during the period that the notice is in force.

Under the TPIM Act 2011 the Secretary of State is required to report to Parliament, as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period, on the exercise of her TPIM powers. Copies of all the Written Ministerial Statements, which detail the number of cases per quarter, can be found at: <https://hansard.parliament.uk/>.

The total number of individuals who have been served a TPIM notice since the TPIM Act 2011 received Royal Assent (December 2011) up to 31 December 2025 is 33.

¹¹ The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 is available at: [Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011](#).

3.6 - Royal Prerogative

The Royal Prerogative comprises residual powers of the Crown and is exercised by Ministers in a number of contexts across government. The issue, refusal and withdrawal of British passports are exercises of the Royal Prerogative. The courts have recognised the existence of that prerogative power and that its exercise is amenable to judicial review.

HM Passport Office issues or refuses passports on behalf of the Home Secretary under the Royal Prerogative. There are a number of grounds on which a passport may be withdrawn or refused. The Home Secretary has discretion to refuse to issue or to withdraw a British passport on public interest grounds. This criterion supports the use of the Royal Prerogative in national security cases. In national security cases, the power can therefore be used to disrupt individuals who seek to travel on a British passport to engage in terrorism-related activity.

The public interest criteria to refuse or withdraw a passport were set out in a Written Ministerial Statement to Parliament on 25 April 2013.¹² The policy allows passports to be withdrawn, or applications for passports to be refused, where the Home Secretary is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so. This may include circumstances where:

“A person whose past, present or proposed activities, actual or suspected, are believed by the Home Secretary to be so undesirable that the grant or continued enjoyment of passport facilities is contrary to the public interest.” (Written Ministerial Statement to Parliament 25 April 2013)

A decision to refuse or withdraw a passport must be necessary and proportionate. The application of discretion by the Home Secretary will primarily focus on preventing overseas travel, but there may be cases in which the Home Secretary believes that the past, present or proposed activities (actual or suspected) of the applicant or passport holder should prevent their enjoyment of a passport facility whether or not overseas travel is a critical factor.

Under the public interest criterion, in relation to national security, the Royal Prerogative was exercised three times to withdraw or to deny access to British passport facilities in 2025. Since 2013, until 31 December 2025 the total number of individuals who have had their British passport facilities withdrawn under the public interest criteria is 104.

An individual may ask for a review of any decision to deny access to passport facilities or apply for a new passport at any time (prompting a review of the decision). Applying for a new passport automatically prompts a review of the decision if the Royal Prerogative was exercised to cancel the passport in the first place. In addition, if significant new information comes to light a case review may be triggered. In 2025,

¹² The full Written Ministerial Statement is available at: [The issuing, withdrawal or refusal of passports - GOV.UK](#).

there were eight reviews undertaken which led to eight individuals having their passport facilities restored.

3.7 – Seizure and Temporary Retention of Travel Documents

Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 enables police officers at ports to seize and temporarily retain travel documents to disrupt immediate travel, when they reasonably suspect that a person intends to travel to engage in terrorism-related activity outside the UK.

The temporary seizure of travel documents provides the authorities with time to investigate an individual further and consider taking longer term disruptive action such as prosecution, exercising the Royal Prerogative to withdraw a British passport, or serving an individual with a TPIM order.

Travel documents can only be retained for up to 14 days while investigations take place. The police may apply to the courts to extend the retention period, but this must not exceed 30 days in total.

The power was used 4 times in 2025.

Since 2015 until 31 December 2025 the total number of individuals who have had their passport and travel documents seized under Schedule 1 powers is 79.

3.8 - Serious Crime Prevention Orders in relation to terrorism

Serious Crime Prevention Orders (SCPOs) were introduced by the Serious Crime Act 2007. They are civil preventative orders which can impose tailored prohibitions, restrictions and requirements on an individual, bodies corporate, partnerships and unincorporated associations for a period of up to five years to prevent or disrupt their involvement in serious crime, including terrorism. The terms of an SCPO might relate to, for example: an individual's business and financial dealings, their use of premises or items, association with individuals, means of communication, or travel. SCPOs can be a powerful tool for preventing and disrupting the activities of the highest-harm criminals.

An SCPO can be made in the Crown Court following a conviction for a serious offence, or in the High Court in the absence of a conviction where the court is satisfied that a person has been "involved in serious crime" as defined at section 2(1) (England and Wales) and section 3 (Scotland and Northern Ireland) of the 2007 Act. Either court may only make an SCPO if it is both satisfied that a person has been involved in serious crime and it has reasonable grounds to believe that an order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting the person's involvement in serious crime. Breach of an SCPO is a criminal offence carrying a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. SCPOs are available UK-wide. For awareness, once commenced, changes made in the BSAI Act 2026 mean that the Crown Court will be able to impose an SCPO in the absence of a conviction.

Changes made through the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 ensured that SCPOs can be applied for in connection with terrorism offences through adding these to the list of 'serious offences' in Schedule 1 of the 2007 Act. Through the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act (CTSA) 2021, the 2007 Act was amended to enable chief police officers to apply directly to the High Court for an SCPO in terrorism-related cases. The government published a statutory review of the implementation of these powers on the 28 November 2024.¹³

Between 1 January and 31 December 2025:

- In England and Wales 13 SCPOs were granted by the Crown Court following applications by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), in relation to terrorism-related casework.
- In England and Wales, no (0 from CPS) SCPO applications were made to the High-Court by the CPS in relation to terrorism-related casework.
- In England and Wales, two applications were made by Chief Officers of Police for High-Court SCPOs in terrorism-related cases.
- In Scotland, no SCPOs were imposed by the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland in relation to a terrorism offence following application from the Lord Advocate.
- In Northern Ireland, no new SCPOs were imposed by the Crown Court.

¹³ More information can be found at: [Statutory review of police powers to apply for Serious Crime Prevention Orders in terrorism cases \(accessible\) - GOV.UK.](#)

3.9 – Exclusions

The Secretary of State (usually the Home Secretary) may decide to exclude a person if their exclusion from the UK is conducive to the public good. Exclusion is normally used in circumstances involving national security, unacceptable behaviour (such as extremism), international relations or foreign policy, and criminality.

The Secretary of State uses the exclusion power when justified and based on all available evidence. In all matters, the Secretary of State must act reasonably, proportionately and consistently.

In 2025, 10 individuals were excluded from the UK because their exclusion from the UK was considered conducive to the public good.

3.10 - Temporary Exclusion Orders

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 introduced Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs). This is a statutory power which allows the Secretary of State (usually the Home Secretary) to disrupt and control the return to the UK of a UK national who has been involved in terrorism-related activity outside of the UK. The tool is important in helping to protect the public from any risk posed by individuals involved in terrorism-related activity abroad, including those who travelled to Syria and Iraq.

A TEO makes it unlawful for the subject to return to the UK without engaging with the UK authorities. It is implemented by withdrawing the TEO subject's travel documents ensuring that when individuals do return, it is in a manner which the UK Government controls. The subject of a TEO commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, he or she re-enters the UK in breach of the terms of the order.

A TEO also allows for certain obligations to be imposed once the individual returns to the UK and during the validity of the order. These usually include reporting to a police station, notifying the police of any change of address, or attending appointments under the Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP). The subject of a TEO also commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, he or she breaches any of the conditions imposed.

There are two stages of judicial oversight for TEOs. The first is a court permission stage before a TEO is imposed by the Secretary of State. The second is an optional statutory review of the decision to impose a TEO and any in-country obligations after the individual has returned to the UK.

There were three TEOs imposed in 2025.

3.11 - Deprivation of British Citizenship

The British Nationality Act 1981 (BNA 1981) provides the Secretary of State (usually the Home Secretary) with the power to deprive an individual of their British citizenship in certain circumstances. Such action paves the way for possible immigration detention, deportation or exclusion from the UK and otherwise removes an individual's associated right of abode in the UK. The Secretary of State may deprive an individual of their British citizenship if satisfied that such action is 'conducive to the public good' (conducive grounds) or if the individual obtained their British citizenship by means of fraud, false representation or concealment of material fact.

The government considers that deprivation on 'conducive grounds' is an appropriate response to activities such as those involving:

- national security, including espionage and acts of terrorism directed at this country or an allied power;
- unacceptable behaviour of the kind mentioned in the then Home Secretary's statement of 24 August 2005 ('glorification' of terrorism etc)¹⁴;
- war crimes; and
- serious and organised crime.

A decision to deprive a person of their British citizenship on conducive grounds cannot be made if it would make a person stateless (no such requirement exists in cases where the citizenship was obtained fraudulently). In limited circumstances the Secretary of State may deprive a person of their British citizenship on the ground it is conducive to the public good even if it would leave them stateless. This action may only be taken where the person has conducted themselves in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK and there are reasonable grounds for believing the person is able to become a national of another country or territory. To date, this power has not been used since its introduction in 2014. David Anderson KC undertook the first statutory review of the additional element of the deprivation power, as required by the Immigration Act 2014. His report was published on 21 April 2016.¹⁵ A further review will be undertaken within 12 months of the power first being used.

The government considers removal of citizenship to be a serious step, one that is not taken lightly. This is reflected by the fact that the Secretary of State personally decides whether it is conducive to the public good to deprive an individual of British citizenship. Between 1 January 2015 and 31 December 2015, 7 people were deprived of British citizenship on the basis that to do so was 'conducive to the public good'.

¹⁴ Full statement can be found at: [Written questions and answers - Written questions, answers and statements - UK Parliament](#)

¹⁵ More information can be found at: [Citizenship removal resulting in statelessness - GOV.UK](#).

3.12 - Deportation with Assurances

Where prosecution is not possible, or following the completion of a prison sentence, the deportation of foreign nationals to their country of origin may be an effective means of disrupting terrorism-related activities. Where there are concerns for an individual's safety on return, government to government assurances may be used to achieve deportation in accordance with the UK's human rights obligations.

Deportation with Assurances (DWA) enables the UK to reduce the threat from terrorism by deporting foreign nationals who pose a risk to our national security, while still meeting our domestic and international human rights obligations. This includes Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. A total of 12 people have been removed from the UK under DWA arrangements. There have been no DWA removals since 2013, and new agreements would need to be negotiated for any future cases. DWA is a resource-intensive process.

Assurances in individual cases are the result of careful and detailed discussions, endorsed at senior government level, with countries with which we have working bilateral relationships. Arrangements must also be put in place – often including monitoring by a local human rights body – to ensure that the assurances can be independently verified. Any DWA arrangement is carefully scrutinised by the courts, though the practice has been upheld by the domestic and European courts as a viable means by which deportation of those involved in terrorism may be achieved, while still complying with the UK's obligations under international law.

3.13 - Proscription

Proscription is a powerful tool enabling the prosecution of individuals who are members or supporters of a terrorist organisation. It can also support other disruptive powers including prosecution for wider offences, immigration powers such as exclusion, and terrorist asset freezing. The resources of a proscribed organisation are terrorist property and are therefore liable to be seized.

Under the Terrorism Act (TACT) 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she reasonably believes it is currently concerned in terrorism. For the purposes of the Act, this means that the organisation:

- commits or participates in acts of terrorism;
- prepares for terrorism;
- promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism); or
- is otherwise concerned in terrorism.

“Terrorism” as defined in the Act means the use or threat of action which: involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person’s life (other than that of the person committing the act); creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or section of the public; or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. The use or threat of such action must be designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and be undertaken for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

An ‘organisation’ is ‘any association or combination of persons’. This broad description allows for proscription to be used against both decentralised organisations as well as groups with clear structures and leadership hierarchies.

If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary will consider whether to proscribe the organisation. They will take into account the five discretionary factors set out to Parliament during the passage of TACT 2000 as well as any other relevant factors or policy considerations. The five discretionary factors are:

- the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities;
- the specific threat that it poses to the UK;
- the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas;
- the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and
- the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism.

The proscribed organisations are list in Schedule 2 to TACT 2000 and proscription makes it a criminal offence for a person to:

- belong, or profess to belong, to a proscribed organisation in the UK or overseas (section 11 of the Act);

- invite support for a proscribed organisation (the support invited need not be material support, such as the provision of money or other property, and can also include moral support or approval) (section 12(1));
- express an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation, and, in doing so, be reckless as to whether a person to whom the expression is directed will be encouraged to support a proscribed organisation (section 12(1A));
- arrange, manage or assist in arranging or managing a meeting in the knowledge that the meeting is to support or further the activities of a proscribed organisation, or is to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation (section 12(2));
- address a meeting if the purpose of the address is to encourage support for, or further the activities of, a proscribed organisation (section 12(3));
- wear clothing or carry or display articles in public in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation (section 13(1));
- publish an image of an item of clothing or other article, such as a flag or logo, in the same circumstances (section 13(1A)); and
- wear clothing or carry or display articles on relevant premises (prisons etc) in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation (section 13(1ZA)).

The penalties for proscription offences under sections 11 and 12 are a maximum of 14 years and/or an unlimited fine. The maximum penalty for a section 13 offence is six months in prison and/or a fine not exceeding £5,000.

Section 3(6) of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows the Home Secretary to specify by order that an alternative name or alias is to be treated as another name for a proscribed organisation.

Under the Terrorism Act 2000, a proscribed organisation, or any other person affected by a proscription, may apply to the Secretary of State for the organisation to be removed from the list of proscribed organisations. The application must set out the grounds on which it is made. The precise requirements for an application are contained in the Proscribed Organisations (Applications for Deproscription etc) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/2299) as amended by the Proscribed Organisations (Applications for Deproscription etc.) (Amendment) Regulations 2022.

Under the Regulations, the Secretary of State is required to determine a deproscription application within 90 days from the day after it is received. If the deproscription application is refused, the applicant may appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission (POAC). POAC will allow an appeal if it considers that the decision to refuse deproscription was flawed, applying judicial review principles. Either party can seek leave to appeal POAC's decision at the Court of Appeal.

To deproscribe an organisation, the Secretary of State must lay an order before Parliament removing the organisation from the list of proscribed organisations in

Schedule 2. If POAC allows an appeal, it may make an order for Secretary of State to lay such a statutory instrument.

Proscription decisions in relation to Northern Ireland may be considered by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with deproscription applications relating to groups concerned in Northern Ireland-related terrorism sent to Northern Ireland Office. Other deproscription applications are required by the Regulations to be sent to the Home Office.

Since 2000, the following four groups have been deproscribed:

- the Mujaheddin e Khalq (MeK) also known as the People's Mujaheddin of Iran (PMOI) was removed from the list of proscribed groups in June 2008 as a result of judgments of POAC and the Court of Appeal;
- the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) was removed from the list of proscribed groups in March 2016 following receipt of an application to deproscribe the organisation;
- Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) was removed from the list of proscribed groups in December 2017 following receipt of an application to deproscribe the organisation; and
- Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was removed from the list of proscribed groups in November 2019 following receipt of an application to deproscribe the organisation.

As of December 2025, there were 84 terrorist organisations proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Of those organisations, there are 14 organisations in Northern Ireland that were already proscribed under previous legislation. Information about these groups' aims is given to Parliament at the time that the relevant Order is laid and is available at: [GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk).

In 2025, three organisations (Palestine Action, Maniacs Murder Cult, and the Russian Imperial Movement) were proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Palestine Action was proscribed on the basis that it commits and participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism, and promotes and encourages terrorism through publicising its attacks and celebrating those responsible.

The Maniacs Murder Cult (MMC) was proscribed on the basis that it commits and participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism by distributing instructional and guidance material, and promotes and encourages terrorism through the online dissemination of such material, alongside videos of violent attacks intended to encourage further acts of violence.

The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) was proscribed on the basis that it commits and participates in acts of terrorism. Through its paramilitary wing, the Russian Imperial Legion (RIL), the organisation has engaged in combat operations alongside Russian forces and other pro-Russian right-wing extremist groups during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. RIM also prepares for terrorism through its paramilitary training programme, Partizan, which enhances the capability of participants to carry out terrorist attacks.

A name change order was made in February 2025 under section 3(6) of the Terrorism Act 2000, specifying Majeed Brigade (MB) as an alternative name for the already proscribed Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA).

In October 2025, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was removed as an alternative name for Al Qa'ida.

3.14 – Tackling Online Terrorist Content

The open internet is a powerful tool which terrorists exploit to radicalise and recruit individuals, and to incite and provide information to enable terrorist attacks. Terrorist groups and individual actors make extensive use of the internet to spread their messages and continue to diversify their approach, using a broad range of platforms to host and disseminate content. The UK's dedicated police-led Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) refers content that they assess as contravening UK terrorism legislation to tech companies. If tech companies agree that content breaches their policies, they remove the content voluntarily. In 2025, the CTIRU has secured the removal of 316 pieces of terrorist content from 361 referrals made to platforms.

Online Safety Legislation

The Online Safety Act received Royal Assent in October 2023. This legislation holds tech companies to account for protecting their users, particularly children. The regulatory framework is overseen by an independent regulator, The Office of Communications (Ofcom).

Under their illegal content safety duties, in-scope companies must put in place measures that mitigate and manage the risks from terrorism as identified in their illegal content risk assessment. Ofcom published its first edition codes of practice and guidance on tackling illegal harms, including terrorism, in December 2024 and consulted on additional safety measures in late 2025. The codes of practice set out a range of measures that companies can take to mitigate the risks of harm posed by illegal terrorist content and activity. Companies must now complete assessments to understand the risks illegal content poses to children and adults on their platform and implement the measures in Ofcom's codes of practice or establish equally effective ones.

The 2023 Act also provides Ofcom with an express power to require a company to use automated technology to identify and remove illegal terrorist content from their public channels. This power will be used where this is the only effective and proportionate and necessary action available and will be subject to strict safeguards including the accuracy of the tools, prevalence of illegal terrorist activity on the public channels of a service and the regulator being clear that other measures could not be equally effective. In May 2026, Ofcom submitted advice to the Secretary of State on how to set minimum standards of accuracy for accredited technologies and also published guidance for companies on how it intends to exercise this power.

4 – Litigation Safeguards

4.1 - Closed Material Procedure

The Justice and Security Act 2013 extended the use of the Closed Material Procedure (CMP) to higher civil courts across the UK. Sections 6 to 11 of the Act make provision about the disclosure of sensitive material in civil proceedings. In particular, section 6 of the Act empowers senior courts (the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court (including in Northern Ireland), and the Court of Session (in Scotland)) to make a declaration that the case is one in which a closed material application may be made in relation to sensitive material, the disclosure of which would be damaging to national security, and that it is in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice in the proceedings to make such a declaration.¹⁶ CMPs ensure that government departments, the UK Intelligence Community, law enforcement bodies and any other party to proceedings have the opportunity to properly defend themselves, where sensitive national security material is considered by the court to be involved. CMPs allow the courts to scrutinise matters that were previously not heard because disclosing the relevant material publicly would have damaged national security.

A CMP application can be made by either party to the proceedings, or the court can make a CMP declaration of its own motion.

Where a Secretary of State makes the application, the court must first satisfy itself that the Secretary of State has considered making, or advising another person to make, an application for public interest immunity in relation to the material. The court must also be satisfied that material would otherwise have to be disclosed which would damage national security and that closed proceedings would be in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice. Should the court be satisfied that the above criteria are met, a declaration may be made. During this part of the proceedings, a Special Advocate may be appointed to act in the interests of parties excluded from proceedings. Generally, once the Special Advocate has seen the sensitive material, they are unable to consult further with the excluded party.

Once a declaration is made, the Act requires that the decision to proceed with a CMP is kept under review, and the CMP may be revoked by a judge at any stage of proceedings, if it is no longer in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice.

A further hearing, following a declaration, determines which parts of the case should be dealt with in closed proceedings and which should be released into open proceedings. The test being considered here remains whether the disclosure of such material would damage national security.

Section 12 of the Act requires the Secretary of State to prepare (and lay before Parliament) an annual report on the use of CMP under the Act. The reports are

¹⁶ The Justice and Security Act is available at: [Justice and Security Act 2013](#).

published on GOV.UK.¹⁷ In the first ten years of operation, between 25 June 2013 and 24 June 2023, there were:

- June 2013 to June 2014 – 5 Applications made, 2 Declarations made.
- June 2014 to June 2015 – 11 Applications made, 5 Declarations made.
- June 2015 to June 2016 – 12 Applications made, 7 Declarations made.
- June 2016 to June 2017 – 13 Applications made, 14 Declarations made.
- June 2017 to June 2018 – 13 Applications made, 5 Declarations made.
- June 2018 to June 2019 – 4 Applications made, 7 Declarations made.
- June 2019 to June 2020 – 6 Applications made, 4 Declarations made.
- June 2020 to June 2021 – 6 Applications made, 5 Declarations made.
- June 2021 to June 2022 – 22 Applications made, 21 Declarations made.
- June 2022 to June 2023 – 11 Applications made, 6 Declarations made.

Section 13 of the Act contains a requirement to review the first five years of operation of CMP under the Act, covering the period 25 June 2013 to 24 June 2018. On 25 February 2021, the then Lord Chancellor announced the appointment of an Independent Reviewer, Sir Duncan Ouseley. Sir Duncan Ouseley's final report was laid before Parliament and subsequently published on GOV.UK in November 2022. On 29 May 2024, the previous government published its response accepting 16 of the 20 recommendations. These are currently being implemented.

¹⁷ Reports can be found at: [Use of closed material procedure reports - GOV.UK.](#)

5 – Oversight

The activities of the UK intelligence and security agencies (SIS, GCHQ, and MI5) are governed by robust legal frameworks and oversight arrangements. Within HMG, there are internal oversight mechanisms such as the Home Secretary's statutory responsibilities to oversee MI5, as well as the independent oversight provided by various judicial and parliamentary bodies. Further information on the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL) and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) is provided below given their particular relevance to this report. For further information on other oversight bodies such as the Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC), and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office (IPCO), please see their public websites.

5.1 – The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation

The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL), Jonathan Hall KC, was appointed to the role in May 2019 and his current term lasts until November 2026. The IRTL is appointed by the Home Secretary through open competition in accordance with the Governance Code on Public Appointments.

The role of the IRTL is to keep under independent review the operation of a range of UK counter-terrorism legislation to ensure that it is effective, fair and proportionate. This helps to provide transparency, inform public and political debate, and maintain public and parliamentary confidence in the exercise of counter-terrorism powers as the legislative landscape and threat from terrorism evolve. To allow the IRTL to perform his duties, he is security cleared and has access to the most sensitive information relating to counter-terrorism, as well as access to government staff and operational partners working in this area.

The full remit of the IRTL includes:

- TACT 2000;
- Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Part 1, and Part 2 in so far as it relates to counter-terrorism);
- Part 1 of the TACT 2006;
- Counter-Terrorism Act 2008;
- Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011;
- Part 1 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015; and
- Section 69 of the Sentencing Code (including as it is applied by section 238(6) of the Armed Forces Act 2006), and Schedules A1 and 1 to that Code (terrorist connection).

The current IRTL, Jonathan Hall KC, is also separately appointed by the Foreign Secretary and His Majesty's Treasury to review the operation of regulations made under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 with a counter-terrorism purpose.

The IRTL's statutory duties include an annual report on the operation of the TACT and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. The IRTL's annual reports also review the operation of Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006.

The IRTL's annual reports are presented to the Home Secretary, who is required to lay them before Parliament. The reports are published and government also routinely publishes a formal response to each report.

The reports typically cover the following thematic areas:

- the definition of terrorism;
- proscribed organisations;
- terrorist property;
- terrorist investigations, including stop and search powers;
- arrest and detention;
- port and border controls;
- terrorism trials and sentencing; and
- special civil powers.

Beyond the statutory duties of the role, the IRTL has discretion to set his work programme and can also review a range of other legislation depending on where he feels he should focus his attention, or if requested to undertake ad hoc reviews by the Home Secretary or other ministers. At the beginning of every year the IRTL is required to provide the Home Secretary with a work programme that specifies what reviews they intend to conduct in that 12-month period.

The IRTL's annual reports and the government's response to the annual reports can be found on GOV.UK at: [Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation - GOV.UK](#).

All IRTL reports can also be found at:

<https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/category/reports/>.

6 – Recommended reading list

Legislation

- Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2000: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/contents>
- Counter-Terrorism Act 2008: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/28>
- Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/3/contents>
- Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/contents
- Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/11/contents>
- The Counter-Terrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/577/contents/made>
- The Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/573>
- Freedom of Information Act 2000: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/contents
- Human Rights Act 1998: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents
- Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules 2018: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2018/9780111173343/contents>
- Justice and Security Act 2013: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/contents
- Police Act 1997: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/50/contents
- Policing and Crime Act 2017: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/3/contents/enacted>
- Proscribed Organisations (Applications for Deproscription etc) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/2299): www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/2299/made
- Protection of Freedoms Act 2012: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/9/contents
- Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/13/contents>
- Terrorism Act 2000: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents
- Terrorism Act 2006: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents
- Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/23
- Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/38/contents
- Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2020/3/contents>

Government publications

- CONTEST 2023: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism: www.gov.uk/government/collections/contest
- Counter-Terrorism Statistics, Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-statistics>
- Exclusion Decisions and Exclusion Orders: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/exclusion-decisions-and-exclusion-orders>
- Police and Border Officials on Seizing Travel Documents Code of Practice: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/code-of-practice-for-police-and-border-officials-on-seizing-travel-documents>
- Royal Prerogative: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/royal-prerogative>
- OFSI Annual Review 2021-2022: [OFSI Annual Review 2021-22 10.11.22.pdf \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/10.11.22.pdf)
- Closed Material Procedures Review - government response: [Closed material procedure: government response - GOV.UK](https://gov.uk/closed-material-procedure)

Independent publications

- Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation reports: [Reports « Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation](https://www.independent.gov.uk/reports/)
- Intelligence and Security Committee, Publications: <https://isc.independent.gov.uk/publications/>

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