



Foreign, Commonwealth
& Development Office

FCDO - Early Market Engagement - Sudan Stability Programme (SSP) - 25th march 26 -10:00 UK Time

23 - 26 Mar 2026

Poll results

1. Is this programme feasible given the security situation, particularly the work on local governance and peacebuilding? Is the Theory of Change feasible?

(1/12)

- It will be important to address trauma and exposure to violence if you expect communities to be able to engage productively with one another and with authorities
- Yes - although the local governance and peacebuilding strand looks more feasible. The inclusive political settlement one feels more aspirational and rests on a number of key assumptions. And a key issue is whether the programme is expected across all of Sudan.
- Yes the program is feasible and necessary as local peacebuilding efforts have proven effective when adequately supported. It requires granular knowledge of the local context and linkages to national/international efforts
- This is certainly feasible as the political

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situation stands at presence. It will need an organisation(s) with a strong and existing presence in country and can't be administered from outside. It will be interesting to know more about the locations and anticipated geographic coverage to understand the ambition with the funds available.

- Can you explain further what this means? "Control over risk and delivery as determined by opportunities

available to measure and manage performance, and the scope to transfer delivery risk management from FCDO

- ToC seems feasible, but adaptation will be crucial
- Yes, but depending on requirement such as registration with local authorities. If FCDO is open to fund manager be located outside and take a

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neutral position (i.e., operating without local office and registration) this would be feasible.

This is already being done by more risk taking peace organisations

- Yes—feasible, but only with a deliberately “low access, high adaptation” delivery model and clear risk tolerances. The ToC is credible if it is treated as

adaptive (with frequent re scoping) and if SSP invests in the enabling conditions that make dialogue/governance work possible in conflict settings. What would make it feasible: • Area-based prioritisation: start where there is minimum operating space (e.g., relative stability, functioning local actors, manageable

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duty of care), then expand/contract as conditions change. • Partner-led delivery: rely on Sudanese CSOs, local peace committees, women/youth networks and local governance actors with context legitimacy; international partners focus on accompaniment, safeguarding/assurance, and technical support. • Conflict sensitivity + political economy: strong “thinking

and working politically” capability; real-time conflict analysis; do-no-harm checks before each intervention cycle. • Flexible instruments: short, modular grants with break clauses; rapid reprogramming windows; contingency budgets; remote accompaniment when travel is not possible. • Protection mainstreaming: integrate protection risk analysis

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into programme decisions (who benefits, who is exposed, how visibility is managed). Key caveat: results and timelines should be framed around influence and incremental gains (e.g., reduced local disputes, improved coordination, safer civic participation), not assumptions of linear progress toward settlement.

- It is feasible in several ways.
However, the assumptions must

be carefully considered and clearly stated, given the highly volatile context. We believe the proposed interventions will take different forms depending on the context/conflict dynamics. Otherwise, some will not be feasible in areas experiencing ongoing military confrontation and

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high levels of insecurity. And this relates to the response to 2 below. Also, the “mine action/bomb disposal/weapons collection doesn’t seem feasible before a political settlement and may not fit well into the intervention logic.

Furthermore, the focus on local dialogue and on strengthening local civil society and governance institutions appropriately recognizes the

need to restore the social fabric at all levels of society, particularly at the most local levels. We have indications from CRS’ previous reconciliation programming, which was ongoing in the early phases of the war, that such efforts were effective – up to a point – in bolstering local resilience to violence.

- It’s feasible but needs to be done with Conflict sensitivity and

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string understanding of the context and flexibility to adapt as needed.

- Will GEDSI be a core component of the TOR?
- Partially feasible but high-risk, and success will depend heavily on design realism and flexibility. The current conflict environment in Sudan makes direct delivery on local governance and peacebuilding extremely

constrained, particularly in contested urban areas and Darfur/Kordofan regions. However, locally-led, network-based, and remote-supported approaches remain viable; community groups, resistance committees, women's groups are still somewhat active, though under pressure.

- It may be feasible within specific target locations, however across Sudan likely not - given security

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- situation, current state of conflict, funding level and ability to receive clearance across East and West
- Yes, the programme is feasible despite the challenging security context. As a result of the conflict, many Sudanese civil society and political actors have relocated to neighbouring countries. In this context, initiatives to strengthen civil society, build skills for political dialogue, and facilitate engagement with multilateral institutions (including the AU, IGAD, and the UN) have already been successfully implemented at a regional level. This creates a strong foundation for the programme

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to adopt a constructive “politics in exile” approach. At the same time, careful programme design will be required to ensure this approach does not inadvertently marginalise civic actors who remain inside Sudan. The Theory of Change is feasible but ambitious. The UK’s intention to leverage its diplomatic influence and access to encourage warring parties to engage in dialogue is

welcome and strategically important. However, given the significant external drivers of the conflict, diplomatic engagement alone may not be sufficient to bring hostilities to an end. The UK may therefore need to expend diplomatic capital to call out

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external actors—including allies—who are contributing to the conflict.

In addition, in the context of multiple global crises, the programme should include measures that help sustain international attention and ensure Sudan remains a priority for the international community.

- The programme remains feasible provided that its design continues to take into account the high level of fragmentation

and the differing governance realities across Sudan. Local governance actors may be informal, displaced, or operating within fluid power structures, so identifying workable entry points will require a flexible, context specific approach.

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Peacebuilding opportunities also vary by location, and it will be important to allow for uneven progress and the possibility of needing to shift focus as dynamics evolve. The Theory of Change appears sound, and it could be strengthened by more explicitly acknowledging that change may be non-linear and shaped by both local political economy factors and shifting conflict patterns.

Emphasising adaptive learning, regionally tailored pathways, and ongoing political analysis would help ensure the ToC remains relevant even as conditions fluctuate. Overall, the approach is promising, particularly if flexibility and responsiveness remain central to delivery.

- Well done on the SSP Theory of Change. One immediate obstacle to

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ending violence and advancing inclusive peacemaking in Sudan is the cessation of domestic political opposition: civilian actors are currently focused on providing basic services and humanitarian support due to the absence of a functioning government, leaving little capacity to pursue political pathways. There is scope within programme design to consider

how to address this gap, including supporting the development of a political narrative. The Theory of Change could further reflect these constraints to better support civilian actors in navigating them

- yes, depending on level of ambition to go across all of Sudan. Must understand that Sudan is still in a highly volatile place, much less settled than Libya and Somalia.

2. Is the programme financially viable? Is our focus too broad given the financial constraints? Are suppliers willing to come together to deliver the full scope?

(1/12)

- With the continued uncertainty around FCDO budgets, the programme will be able to contribute to all these areas but the scale of that contribution will of course depend on the scale of the spend available. However, we would encourage FCDO to not overinvest in pre-procurement design. Stabilisation mechanisms such as this one are quite widely used, but the precise activities undertaken will always depend on the context at the point it starts at/ongoing opportunities. As such the SOR should remain broad, and maybe focus on flexibility and process, and be issued as quickly as possible so that the programme can start earlier.
- Demonstrate some quick wins early as possible and use

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2. Is the programme financially viable? Is our focus too broad given the financial constraints? Are suppliers willing to come together to deliver the full scope?

(2/12)

it to gain input from other donors or investors

- It is assumed that the FCDO will narrow down the thematic focus as the programme cannot cover everything. Yes, we would be willing to come together the full scope. Being able to operate in Sudan is critical, possibly without a full-time presence / office.
- If the funds are prioritized for local actors and civil society

active in peace building in their various layers this is viable.

- The programme appears viable, but focus and prioritisation will be critical given financial constraints. Suppliers are likely willing to collaborate, provided roles are clear and partnerships are well-structured
- Peacebuilding work in the context of Sudan is costly in terms of time and capacity input more than

2. Is the programme financially viable? Is our focus too broad given the financial constraints? Are suppliers willing to come together to deliver the full scope?

(3/12)

- that it requires managing large contracts. It requires flexibility in the sense of accepting organisational/staffing costs to be on the higher end, also for partner staff, versus costing for activities. Appreciation of things such as shuttle diplomacy etc taking more time and people and not really high event costs, for instance.
- The programme is financially viable but only if tightly scoped and geographically disciplined.
 - Determination of financial viability can be clarified by understanding the commercial evaluation criteria. For fund managers, a clear understanding of what are considered "core" costs vs. what is to come through the fund is crucial.
 - The programme is long enough to attempt to identify opportunities

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for further funding partnerships and donor engagements while in delivery

- We note that you're keen that the management should be done by the consortium lead, rather than FCDO. It will be interesting to see the admin costs of that, if there are a large number of consortium partners. But a good approach
- The focus can be disaggregated into thematic areas.
- Yes it is viable

given the geographical scope, but again it requires deep knowledge of the context, careful design and selection of partners, flexibility and adaptive management, financial controls and quality assurances

- Broadly yes, the programme is ambitious, partnerships could help achieve the goal.
- Consortium approach would seem critical rather than preferable,

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given the need for cohesion across the objectives

- The programme risks being overly ambitious relative to likely funding levels, especially if it aims to operate at national, sub-national, and local levels simultaneously. Cost drivers include duty of care and security, remote management system, high

transaction costs for small, sensitive grants, and compliance with FCDO fiduciary and safeguarding standards. Perhaps narrow initial scope (focus on priority geographies) or consider phased approach, starting with the inception phase (used by SDC, for example).

- A consortia approach will be critical to delivering across all components.
- Consortium approach would

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be advised for this program, given the broad scope - as well as cost effectiveness to be able to implement

- FCDO could be an active participant in consortium formation in the early stages, by documenting interested parties and their relative expertise and focus. in particular, local and macro/international actors may not all know each other
- Broadly viable at

£39m/5 years, provided the fund manager scope is tightly prioritised and sequencing is explicit. The “core” dialogue/peacebuilding component (~£7m/year from April 2027) is realistic for a grant-management model, but only if SSP avoids trying to do all things everywhere at once. Suggested focus/guardrails to strengthen viability: •

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2. Is the programme financially viable? Is our focus too broad given the financial constraints? Are suppliers willing to come together to deliver the full scope?

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Prioritise 2–3 outcomes per year (rather than equal spend across many themes) and keep a defined portion (e.g., 10–15%) for rapid response/adaptive pilots. •

Sequence investment: Year 1 set-up + portfolio design + partner due diligence;

Years 2–4 scale; Year 5 consolidate/transition. • Keep the core fund manager scope coherent:

grant-making + accompaniment + learning; avoid loading in large-scale service delivery that belongs in humanitarian/resilience portfolios. • Explicit resourcing for assurance: safeguarding, PSEA, financial controls, risk management and third-party monitoring are cost drivers in Sudan—budgeting must reflect this to avoid crowding out programme spend. Supplier appetite

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- / consortia: Likely yes, but suppliers will typically only commit to “full scope” delivery if: (i) roles are clear (fund manager vs. technical partners vs. local implementers), (ii) decision rights are defined, (iii) contracting allows onboarding/offboarding partners, and (iv) payment/overhead assumptions reflect low-access delivery costs.
- £7m per year is a meaningful budget, but covering civilian dialogue, peacebuilding, local governance, civil society strengthening, protection, counter-disinformation, and conflict analysis requires disciplined prioritisation.
 - The available resources appear sufficient to catalyse and incentivise meaningful progress towards the programme’s intended impact. While

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the proposed focus areas—such as civilian dialogue and local-level peacebuilding—are complementary, achieving value for money will require a clear prioritisation within each thematic area. For example, support to civil society should be tightly aligned with the programme's objectives (ending the conflict and enabling an inclusive political process), rather than broader or generic

institutional strengthening. With regard to supplier collaboration, the diversity of focus areas within the programme inherently requires a range of technical expertise. This creates a strong incentive for capable suppliers to form consortia

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and bring together complementary strengths. Furthermore, FCDO can play a clear convening role by incentivising collaboration, enabling suppliers to leverage their respective expertise, networks, and institutional resources to deliver the full scope effectively.

- - Resources to ambition are extremely low, but at local levels/settlements substantial

progress may be made. Must be noted that humanitarians will be investing heavily in 'peacebuilding' will need FCDO to forge collaboration and linkages with humanitarians for maximum effectiveness and mutual lesson learning / analysis sharing.

- Sudan is very expensive country to operate in - the scope of the program should be targeted to have the impact envisioned
- The financial parameters seem

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workable as long as there is continued clarity around prioritisation. Operating in a high risk, low access environment naturally requires significant investments in assurance, partner support, security, and adaptive management. A phased or modular structure could help ensure that resources remain aligned with the most achievable and strategically important outcomes. The proposed scope is

ambitious, and refining its sequencing or concentrating on specific thematic areas at different stages could help maintain balance between ambition and budget. We expect suppliers will be

2. Is the programme financially viable? Is our focus too broad given the financial constraints? Are suppliers willing to come together to deliver the full scope?

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(12/12)

open to collaborative consortia, especially if the delivery model is structured in a way that supports complementary roles among fund managers, technical specialists, and locally embedded organisations.

- A lot of this will depend on the anticipated geographic spread.
- Specifying the geographical focus will help fine-tune interventions and determine their financial viability.

3. Are there any existing platforms or similar programmes already doing this work?

(1/7)

0 1 8

- Saferworld engaged in this space – via ERRs, MAGs, and CBOs and CSOs at a mid or national level
- The proposed ToC doesn't duplicate but overlaps. There isn't a single entity that provide an integrated multi-track approach
- What's different here is an adaptive and politically informed approach which is critical and will not be sufficiently considered and responded to in the humanitarian interventions. This programme could add significant value to these interventions if FCDO are able to assist in forging robust linkages.
- There are likely no comparable programmes that would deliver the objectives that the UK has outlined here, give the UK the influence and leadership role that is highlighted or likely achieve the mix of results that a UK led programme can given the UK's particular

3. Are there any existing platforms or similar programmes already doing this work? (2/7)

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- advantages as donor. The UK also has a range of existing models of a similar nature that provide a model for this programme, whereas other donor models typically do not provide the same degree of political relevance, flexibility, quality or capability to take informed risks.
- CFI Media development, operator of the French MoFA, is implementing a peacebuilding project called "Revitalize and enhance media in Soudan" funded by the EU delegation, focusing on the support to independent media and fostering their collaboration with CSOs
 - And yes, local peacebuilding is underfunded although critical
 - DoS had a programme running via ACTED that is currently concluding. Worth looking into.
 - Yes, UNDP is already doing very similar work, including dialogue platforms, community-level peace infrastructure, and locally led mediation.

3. Are there any existing platforms or similar programmes already doing this work? (3/7)

0 1 8

- There are some Sudanese Civil Society platform doing some of the work on peace, political participation and GBV
- There is work done on local peacebuilding and connecting levels being done which can be expanded upon. This is currently underfunded, and therefore FCDO's initiative here is really important
- UNDP runs a local peacebuilding program with local partners, which can serve as a useful platform
- The Horn International Institute for Strategic studies is also already working on Sudan and the strategic players in peace building
- Yes, and likely across different donors and organizations so it is important this is considered to build synergies and avoid duplication and especially when funding Sudanese peace efforts to avoid support that could divide efforts and create competing bodies.
- For example, The Carter

3. Are there any existing platforms or similar programmes already doing this work? (4/7)

0 1 8

- Center "Visioning Process"
- Not really - although in the humanitarian sector there will be 'peacebuilding' programming.
 - My focus would be on the CCS. FCDO already heavily involved so can pull a lot of the learning from the consortium.
 - GIZ funding focuses on governance more than peacebuilding. This is more comprehensive
 - The Conflict Analysis Unit hosted by Mercy Corps is doing relevant conflict analysis work which could be integrated into this program
 - Yes, GIZ is working in this space also, Conflict Management Consulting (CMC) is doing TPM for their entire portfolio in Sudan.
 - Some UN/multilateral initiatives; some bilateral donors. A programme like this can fill such gaps as providing funding for civic engagement and linking local dialogue outputs to higher level political processes.
 - The Durable Solutions Consortium in Darfurs

3. Are there any existing platforms or similar programmes already doing this work? (5/7)

0 1 8

lead by DRC, with MC and SCI, has been doing some similar work which could be expanded on

- Yes, there are several existing initiatives that this programme could build upon or complement. These include efforts to support the participation of women and youth in political dialogue, as well as engagement with multilateral institutions attempting to facilitate dialogue (such as the AU and

the UN Office of the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy). However, coordination among these initiatives remains limited. The Sudan Stability Programme could add significant value by establishing coordination mechanisms or forums to align efforts, reduce duplication, and maximise collective impact among actors working toward similar outcomes.

- Yes but at very limited level and that can be a basis to build on
- There are adjacent platforms (UN,

3. Are there any existing platforms or similar programmes already doing this work?

(6/7)

0 1 8

INGO and donor-funded) supporting peacebuilding, local dialogue, civic space and governance in Sudan and across the region; SSP will add value if it is positioned as a flexible, politically informed grant facility that can reach local actors quickly and operate where traditional mechanisms struggle. How to avoid duplication (practical steps): • Map

relevant mechanisms early (UN peacebuilding/mediation support, protection-focused programmes, resilience portfolios, diaspora/civil society initiatives) and agree “division of labour”. • Establish a lightweight coordination & learning platform (not another parallel coordination burden) to share conflict analysis, lessons and partner pipelines. • Use the blended approach as a differentiator: reserve Accountable

3. Are there any existing platforms or similar programmes already doing this work? (7/7)

0 1 8

Grants/MoUs for highly sensitive or diplomatic-aligned work, while the fund manager runs a transparent grant window for broader civilian dialogue/peacebuilding. What suppliers will look for: clarity on how SSP will coordinate with other BOS/FCDO programmes and how partners can layer/follow-on funding rather than compete for the same local networks.

- The Cash consortium isn't the same thing but it would need to

harmonise well with that. Concordis International already has substantive peacebuilding work in South, Central and East Darfur as well as West Kordofan. There are comparable programmes with NRC, DRC, Non Violent Peace Force etc.

4. Are thematic areas coherent enough to fit neatly under one fund manager?

(1/10)

0 1 8

- Yes — appointing a single fund manager would provide the adaptability FCDO is seeking. This supports a more responsive, opportunity-driven approach and helps avoid continued investment in areas where results are limited.
- It would probably be a missed opportunity in terms of coherence to have different programmes running for the second intermediate outcome and the third and fourth ones. There would be obvious strategic advantages for the integration of the national and the local work.
- There may be risks to local organisations from being seen to be operating under the same 'umbrella fund' as the work on atrocity prevention, political settlement. Some separation of focus may reduce risks and allow more coherence across the local work.
- The thematic areas can sit under one fund manager if the fund

4. Are thematic areas coherent enough to fit neatly under one fund manager?

(2/10)

0 1 8

manager is multi-partner and deliberately structured. The ToC spans primarily three thematic areas with it's own distinct ecosystem. They can be integrated but not by default and not by every type of organisation

- The thematic areas can sit under one fund manager, but coherence will depend on how the role is structured rather

than on the themes themselves. Each area—local peacebuilding, governance strengthening, civil society support, political analysis, and countering misinformation—draws on different types of expertise and operates on different time horizons. In practice, this means that a

4. Are thematic areas coherent enough to fit neatly under one fund manager?

(3/10)

0 1 8

fund manager model works best when it focuses on providing the overall architecture: coordination, assurance, risk management, learning, and strategic guidance. Technical depth can then be brought in through specialist partners who deliver specific components. A hub-and-spoke approach may offer the strongest coherence: the fund manager maintains oversight of the full portfolio, while thematic partners lead on particular

strands where they bring comparative advantage. This can help align activities around shared outcome pathways without requiring one organisation to hold all expertise in-house. It also supports flexibility, as different regions may require different thematic emphases depending on political dynamics, access, and partner capacities.

- One fund manager is feasible, provided it has the

4. Are thematic areas coherent enough to fit neatly under one fund manager?

(4/10)

0 1 8

- necessary experience, networks and operational capacity. It is a complex program to implement, one that requires specific expertise, presence, agility and sound risk management
- Yes but it would need a fund manager that can bring together a wide range of actors and work very closely with the FCDO. The high risk areas will need careful attention.
 - yes, this is possible. it will also weed out the INGOs
- that do not really comprehend peacebuilding but do more development work.
- Yes - and a single fund manager will deliver the flexibility FCDO is looking for, allowing for a modality where not every area receives the same level of funding/attention at the same time (so a more opportunistic

4. Are thematic areas coherent enough to fit neatly under one fund manager?

(5/10)

0 1 8

approach which resists sunk cost fallacy issues where impact is challenging). The key will be the right design and the right access to expertise - allowing potential consortia to compete on this basis will be key.

- The main challenge of the TOC with humanitarian actors is the political dimension of SSP Program and the potential concerns that may arise
- From the slides, the thematic areas seem broadly related but not yet

clearly differentiated. How are you thinking about thematic coherence in practical delivery terms, and to what extent will community or local partner input help shape how those areas are defined and organized under the programme?

- It could be challenging especially when looking at the work of local peace efforts vs external civilian political dialogue which could not be done from within the country right now/
- Possible but with challenges;

4. Are thematic areas coherent enough to fit neatly under one fund manager?

(6/10)

0 1 8

slow decision making; difficult operating environment, need for agility and balancing with compliance. Maybe offer more flexibility through some longer term goals and support with more rapid response type of assistance based on the ongoing developments. Strong embedded political economy and conflict analysis will be essential.

- Yes, if the fund manager is framed as managing a

single portfolio logic: enabling civilian dialogue and locally led peacebuilding that strengthens inclusive participation and reduces protection risks. The themes are coherent when they are treated as mutually reinforcing building blocks rather than separate “pillars”.

Design

4. Are thematic areas coherent enough to fit neatly under one fund manager?

(7/10)

0 1 8

features that make “one fund manager” workable: • A clear portfolio architecture (e.g., 3 grant windows): (i) local dialogue/mediation and social cohesion, (ii) civic participation and inclusion (women/youth, marginalized groups), (iii) local governance interfaces and conflict-sensitive service coordination (only where feasible). • A single MEL/learning framework with shared indicators and contribution analysis (rather than

trying to attribute outcomes in a conflict setting). • Strong in-house capability (or retained advisors) across: conflict analysis, governance/political economy, safeguarding, grant assurance, and remote management/TPM. Boundary to keep coherence: avoid making the fund manager responsible for large humanitarian delivery or infrastructure; keep those linkages as coordination and influence rather than direct delivery.

4. Are thematic areas coherent enough to fit neatly under one fund manager?

(8/10)

0 1 8

- Yes, the thematic areas are sufficiently coherent to be managed under a single, experienced fund manager. With effective leadership, cross-thematic coordination and learning should be both feasible and beneficial. Progress in one thematic area—for example, strengthening civil society—can directly enable and reinforce outcomes in another, such as more cohesive and representative civilian dialogue. To achieve this, the fund manager will need to demonstrate robust monitoring, evaluation, and learning systems that actively promote cross-learning, adaptive management, and strategic coherence.
- The thematic areas are too broad to fit under one fund manager. We suggest to split between two funds – one focused on local work on governance building and

4. Are thematic areas coherent enough to fit neatly under one fund manager?

(9/10)

0 1 8

social cohesion and one focused on wider political work. • One program by one fund manager across West and East may be challenging to receive approvals to implement programming

- yes, but the controversial areas will have severe risk management implications for any partner seeking to maintain presence inside Sudan.
- We are proposing two fund managers for the two impact areas,

supported by one robust program steering committee that facilitates, among other things, joint planning, review, and learning across the two complementary program streams. Additionally, the steering committee can amplify advocacy efforts and lead/catalyze diplomatic efforts, especially when it is

4. Are thematic areas coherent enough to fit neatly under one fund manager? (10/10)

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constituted by individuals with political gravitas in Sudan/region. For example, the committee can lead formal and back-channel engagements to foster an inclusive political process and convene/persuade belligerents (RSF & SAF) to comply with International Humanitarian Law.

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

(1/12)

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- a change of government in UK, during the programme lifetime, to one significantly more hostile or sympathetic to external parties to the conflict
- The tensions amongst and high levels of politization of sudanese civil society is a risk. Actual peace actors are few and operate at very high risk. Any programming will need comprehensive package supporting actors at risk on the ground
- money transfer
- Since program will start in 2027 al' will depend
- Multiple challenges! Working in both SAF and RSF controlled areas (and others) and gaining the necessary permissions and trust to work across both areas. Access and understanding of Sudanese actors on the ground. Responding appropriately to the inevitable changes.
- risk of engineering civil society space rather than enabling it grow

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

0 2 4

(2/12)

- on its own terms - needs clear principles of engagement
- Sudan is effectively a patchwork of SAF and RSF controlled areas and contested zones. Access is unpredictable, bureaucratically blocked or militarily dangerous. LAs may also be hostile and fragmented. Mitigation - geographic triage, flexible budgeting and allocation of contingency funds for sudden access loss or relocation
- Some good questions
- about who is in on the multidoor funding and how that will affect the political neutrality of the programme.
- One major challenge is related to the fact that war has destroyed institutional and operational capacities of most of the potential local partners and displaced most of them within and outside Sudan.
- Working under multiple authorities and even regional

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

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with sensitive programming that could have confidential aspects needs deep context analysis and different perspectives to be part of the design to ensure inclusivity and representation. Likely will need to be managed both from within and outside the country with some firewalling.

- UK's positionality, in relation to its global allies who are parties to the conflict, could risk the safety and legitimacy of actors seen

to be working with them in particular areas. commitments from GoUK to integrating this risk in assessing practice would mitigate to some degree

- One of the main challenges is about operating in both East and West, but this can - and it is being done - though carefully selected local partners.

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

(4/12)

- Flexibility and adaptive management will be needed throughout. Again, this is a complex program and it will require very sound risk management and operational capacities on the ground.
- conflict parties' rejection of diplomacy, the exclusive nature of the Saudi/US mediation initiative in Jeddah, external interference, a lack of coherence among civil society actors, and a culture of impunity.
 - There are many risks, but one of the main one is the grant manager being so risk-averse leading to a disbalance in implementation and servicing population groups on areas of different control.
 - National Partners *MUST* be treated as equal partners to iNGOs. Resentment emerges quickly. Do not exclude them from the decision making process.
 - Ensure that digital technology underpins delivery

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

(5/12)

to minimise the use of layers of management and administration and to ensure money is spent locally.

- Access and security, duty of care for staff (mitigated via remote management, diaspora partnerships, limited expat presence and targeted "field" footprint); political sensitivity (mitigated through

strong alignment with diplomatic track, red lines, contingency plans); risk of "elite" CSO focus (mitigate by focusing more on women, young people, marginalized groups)

- The main challenges are access, partner capacity, fiduciary risk, and adaptive management. Each is manageable with the right design choices.
- Ensuring quality implementation at the local level, coordination

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

(6/12)

- with government, local authorities and sustainability of interventions
- In Sudan's highly volatile and unpredictable context, SSP will need a focused risk analysis to guide adaptive programming. Considering the potential scenarios for how the situation could evolve, with warring parties either escalating
 - or de-escalating, a combination of internal coordination and external lobbying will be essential to help Sudanese civilian actors influence outcomes, reduce protection risks, and ensure that locally-led initiatives remain credible and effective.
- Key challenge is volatility and lack of systems to really support agility and active risk management
- One current challenge is working on both,

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

(7/12)

- east and west sides of the country.
- continued polarisation, risk management, withheld permission to engage in both RSF and SAF held areas, sustaining local talent across all of Sudan (not just the Nile/elite circles that form most of the Sudan intelligencia). Also enough expertise inside Sudan, rather than the increasingly disconnected displaced elites.
- Likely challenges include varying levels of access, rapidly shifting frontlines, and differing political dynamics across the country. Local partners may operate under significant security risks, and the information environment can be heavily contested, making analysis and verification more difficult. Ensuring that civic actors can operate safely while maintaining credibility and neutrality will require careful thought.
- Likely challenges: •

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

(8/12)

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Access constraints & duty of care: travel restrictions, communication blackouts, and staff safety risks. • Partner risk/assurance: limited banking channels, rapidly changing local governance arrangements, fraud and diversion risks, safeguarding concerns. • Political sensitivity: perceived alignment, interference allegations, and risks to local partners' legitimacy/safety. • Measurement: attribution is hard; outcomes may be

non-linear and fragile. • Pipeline fragility: partner organisations may relocate, split, or lose capacity as conflict evolves. Mitigation to build into design now: • Adaptive management as a contract requirement: allow quarterly reprogramming, flexible

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

(9/12)

logframes, and decision-making that can move funds rapidly between locations/partners. • Risk-based grant-making: tiered due diligence; lighter-touch for small grants with strong safeguards; heavier assurance for larger awards; clear red lines. • Third-party monitoring (TPM) + triangulation: combine TPM, phone-based verification, remote sensing where appropriate, and community feedback mechanisms. •

Partner safeguarding package: minimum standards, rapid training, safe reporting channels, and proportionate compliance expectations for local CSOs. • Strong confidentiality and comms protocols: manage visibility to protect partners; “need-to-know” information handling. • Scenario planning: pre-agreed triggers for pause, pivot, or scale; maintain a reserve for surge support when windows open.

- Challenge: Repeated hostility

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

(10/12)

escalations thus prolonging the conflict and undermining stabilization efforts. Mitigation measures: Strong emphasis on regular context/conflict/security analysis and monitoring. Thinking and working politically. Conflict-sensitive approaches.

Organizations should have a robust conflict sensitivity strategy. Taking trauma-informed and trauma-responsive approaches can improve the effectiveness of design and implementation.

- One challenge I would anticipate is ensuring that, in a volatile context, the programme remains genuinely community-informed rather than relying on a narrow set of accessible intermediaries. Could you say more about the extent to which community input will shape programme design, and how that input will be gathered and incorporated to ensure inclusion across different groups and local realities?
- A key challenge is

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

(11/12)

the fragmented nature of past interventions, which has limited collective progress. In addition, some established political actors have historically declined to engage in dialogue processes convened by organisations such as the AU, often favouring alternative forums that better serve their interests. The programme should therefore aim to reduce opportunities for “forum shopping” by Sudanese civic and political

actors. The UK, leveraging its reach, access, and influence, could play a pivotal role in coordinating facilitation efforts (including those led by regional actors such as Egypt) and empowering an agreed-upon mediation framework that is recognised as legitimate and authoritative by all parties.

- You’ll need an organisation that’s already functioning well in both SAF and RSF controlled areas and, perhaps, SLA

5. What challenges do you foresee with implementation and how can we mitigate those in the programme design?

(12/12)

0 2 4

Abdul Wahid and SPLA-N Abdelaziz controlled areas, with a high level of existing acceptance. Registration with RSF, SAF, SLA etc is an ongoing challenge but one that some organisations are successfully managing for now. As some have said, it might be that we need two fund managers / sets of implementers if it becomes impossible for one organisation to operate in East and West concurrently.

A question for you: to what extent are you willing to engage on supporting / promoting governance of the RSF affiliated TESIS governance structures? We think that is possible at present, but isn't without political risk. Does FCDO have appetite for that as part of the Theory of Change?

018

7. Are there other areas of concern which we should be aware of for this programme? Please include any main concerns regarding your ability to bid.

(1/10)

- Being a medium sized consultancy firm with presence in three countries (Sudan, South Africa and UAE) with existing local presence and wide connections, we feel confident to deliver all components. What other eligibility criteria will FCDO look for?
- Does FCDO allow UN to bid for this call? Or preference for civil society?
- Could you please clarify whether the scope will allow for integrated, multi-sectoral interventions — for example WASH, nutrition, and health — where these contribute to addressing the underlying drivers of instability and supporting sustainable peace outcomes
- One concern I have is whether the subcontracting and grant-management process might become too heavy for

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7. Are there other areas of concern which we should be aware of for this programme? Please include any main concerns regarding your ability to bid.

(2/10)

- smaller grassroots groups. If the administrative burden is too high, there's a real risk that the programme ends up working mainly through the most formalized intermediaries rather than the actors with the deepest local legitimacy. I'd be interested in how you're thinking about mitigating that in the design.
- Thank you for the presentation. Could you provide more details about the eligibility criteria, particularly regarding the legal status of applicants and the consortium structure? Thank you
 - There should be appropriate risk sharing between FCDO and the Fund Manager, with risks allocated proportionately and not disproportionately transferred to the Fund Manager.
 - A key area where clarity would be helpful is whether the opportunity will

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7. Are there other areas of concern which we should be aware of for this programme? Please include any main concerns regarding your ability to bid.

(3/10)

- be open to non-UK bidders, including US-based firms, and how participation through consortia or subcontracting arrangements is expected to work. For a smaller specialist firm, that would be an important factor in determining the most realistic route to participate
- Are governmental organizations eligible for this call? If we have members of the French MoFa in our board, for instance.
 - Bidding opportunities. Such an opportunity should involve as much operational capacity as possible. Small organisation often already have strong connection and cooperation experience with local organisation involved with civil society, but tend to have difficulties in being involved in this type of bidding processes for information gatekeeping and consortia that already form behind closed doors

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7. Are there other areas of concern which we should be aware of for this programme? Please include any main concerns regarding your ability to bid.

(4/10)

- funding gaps are problematic, april 2027 is far away need to prioritise Sudanese ownership, FCDO might consider supporting an inclusive development process financially to ensure proper ownership.
- • Inception period: A programme of this complexity in this context needs a realistic inception period (6 months+) for partner mapping, due diligence, systems deployment, and staff recruitment. Although some early confidence building interventions will of course be possible, pressure to disburse grants too quickly risks compromising

7. Are there other areas of concern which we should be aware of for this programme? Please include any main concerns regarding your ability to bid.

(5/10)

the quality of the portfolio. • Risk appetite: FCDO should be clear in the ITT about its risk appetite for working with informal and community-based organisations. A mismatch between the localisation ambition and the fiduciary expectations will undermine the programme from the outset. • Multi-donor design: If FCDO is serious about multi-donor participation, the fund

architecture and governance structure should be designed for this from inception, not retrofitted later. This has implications for the contracting structure, reporting frameworks, and steering arrangements that should be reflected in the ITT.

- Given Sudan's changing and ever deteriorating situations, there is a risk as how the situation looks like in 2027 where implementation starts

018

7. Are there other areas of concern which we should be aware of for this programme? Please include any main concerns regarding your ability to bid.

(6/10)

- If the FCDO chooses a fund manager approach, we strongly recommend that the FCDO create thoughtful commercial evaluation criteria that clearly distinguishes what should be included as core costs and what should be funded through the fund to ensure an even playing field and clarity around what suppliers propose.
- Reputation risks particularly due to highly sensitive and dynamic context in Sudan and political dimension of programme
- Given the mass displacements concerns and the return mouvement , countering human trafficking should be integrated within the civilian protection
- Please allow for 2 months bid preparation once the bid goes live - as the volatile and complex situation in Sudan, requires sufficient time to plan budgets and prepare the technical offer.

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7. Are there other areas of concern which we should be aware of for this programme? Please include any main concerns regarding your ability to bid.

(7/10)

- If there is a requirement or strong preference for a UK-registered or UK-based supplier, this could affect our ability to participate in the bidding process.
- How is FCDO thinking about proportional due diligence so that smaller, locally legitimate organisations can participate safely and meaningfully?
- Short timelines vs. long-term nature of peacebuilding? Overly rigid compliance frameworks undermining locally-led approaches? Unclear integration with UK diplomatic strategy? Ability to bring funds into the country and disperse among the partners? Conduct due diligence on informal actors? Maintain audit trails

7. Are there other areas of concern which we should be aware of for this programme? Please include any main concerns regarding your ability to bid.

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(8/10)

in a cash-based economy?
Insurance and legal liabilities in high-risk environments? High cost of operations, security? FCDO's appetite to accept uncertainty and ability to work with implementor(s) to pivot as needed/often?

- risk management - particularly reputational. There's a high risk of being PNG'd from one or both

of SAF and RSF held areas. Huge protection risks for beneficiaries and delivery partners inside Sudan.

- Clarity on governance and decision rights: how FCDO, the fund manager, and any multi-donor steering arrangements will make prioritisation decisions—especially for sensitive activities. • Risk

7. Are there other areas of concern which we should be aware of for this programme? Please include any main concerns regarding your ability to bid.

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(9/10)

transfer expectations: what risks FCDO expects the fund manager to carry (fiduciary, safeguarding, security, reputational) and what is retained by HMG via Accountable Grants/MoUs. • Start date realism: April 2027 start is helpful; suppliers will still need adequate mobilisation time for partner mapping, due diligence, security set-up and systems. • Banking and payments: expectations on payment rails, FX

management, cash programming (if any), and audit evidence in a disrupted economy. • Local partner burden: avoid compliance designs that unintentionally exclude credible Sudanese organisations; build capacity support

7. Are there other areas of concern which we should be aware of for this programme? Please include any main concerns regarding your ability to bid.

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(10/10)

into the model. •

Safeguarding/PSEA in low-access areas: ensure survivor-centred referral pathways and community feedback mechanisms are realistic and resourced. Main bidding constraints (typical): • If the scope requires consistent in-country presence in areas where access/duty of care cannot be assured.

• If adaptive re-scoping is not

permitted contractually (rigid deliverables/outputs). • If assurance requirements are not matched with appropriate budget and realistic evidence expectations. • If consortium roles and liabilities are unclear (e.g., joint and several liability without clear control mechanisms).