European Publishers Council

EPC's Response to the Competition and Markets Authority Consultation *Steering Conduct Requirement* *Google's Mobile Platform*

28 June 2026

About the European Publishers Council

The European Publishers Council ("the EPC") represents the chairmen and chief executives of European media groups whose newspapers, magazines and digital services reach readers in the United Kingdom and across Europe in print, online and through mobile applications. Our members distribute news applications to United Kingdom end-users through the Google Play Store. The terms on which that distribution takes place bear directly on the price at which news is sold to United Kingdom readers and on the resources available for professional journalism.

The EPC has engaged with the CMA on these matters previously; our response to the Invitation to Comment of 23 January 2025 is cited in the consultation document at footnote 15. The positions set out below are consistent with that response and with the positions the EPC has advanced in other jurisdictions in relation to application store terms.

Summary of our position

1. The EPC welcomes the work of the CMA to develop Steering Conduct Requirements which aims at bringing back competition in app payment solutions. For years, Google's various tactics to preserve its app distribution monopoly has limited publishers' commercial efforts to develop their readership on their apps, as such efforts would not be fairly remunerated (due their high fees). We welcome the CMA's view that any lowering of Google's revenue as a consequence of permitting steering should not be considered as a cost of intervention.

2. Permission alone will not deliver the aim. We agree with the CMA's finding at paragraph 4.2 that Google would retain the ability and incentive to neutralise the remedy through conditions, design requirements and commercial terms. That finding should govern the development of these Steering CR.

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3. The most useful benchmark available to the CMA is Google's own treatment of applications selling physical goods and services, which face no steering restrictions, no interstitial screen and no commission. Departures from that treatment should require an objective justification demonstrated to the CMA rather than asserted.
4. The steering fee should be anchored to cost. The value-based principle should be capable of reducing a cost-derived fee but not of increasing it, and paragraph 10 should specify the lower of the two results.
5. A platform charge should only be justified where the platform played a material part in bringing the paying end-user to the developer. Publishers should reap the benefits of their commercial efforts in acquiring paying users without being unduly charged by the gatekeepers. No acquisition fee would be owed when the user bought digital content as a result of the app developers' commercial efforts. Paragraph 9(b) should be restructured accordingly and paragraph 9(b)(ii) deleted.
6. No interstitial screen should be permitted as they end up taking the form of "scare screens'' or Ux restrictions which are entirely unnecessary. These restrictions should be removed to allow for optimised customer experience in competition with Google solutions. If the CMA retains the permission, we set out a cumulative package of limitations at question 6.7(b), without prejudice to that position.
7. Paragraph 9(a) establishes a reporting standard rather than an approval standard. The methodology and each fee should be approved before application, with no steering fee payable until approval, and with an operational review trigger under paragraph 4.79.

We address questions 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 (together with 6.6), 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9. Our proposed amendments to the CR are collected in Annex A.

Question 6.2 – Benefits and costs of the proposed Steering CR

The EPC welcomes the work of the CMA to develop Steering Conduct Requirements which aims at bringing back competition in app payment solutions. For years, Google's [redacted] has limited publishers' commercial efforts to develop their readership on their apps, as such efforts would not be fairly remunerated (due to Google's high fees). We welcome the CMA's view that any lowering of Google's revenue as a consequence of permitting steering should not be considered as a cost of intervention.

The principal action required being to extend to sellers of digital goods and services freedoms Google already affords to sellers of physical goods and services. We agree with paragraph 5.15 that a reduction in Google's revenues is not properly characterised as a cost of the intervention.

The benefit to United Kingdom readers is direct. Play Store commission on digital content is an additional cost of sale in a business operating on narrow margins. Our members have responded to the historic commission levels in one of two ways: by declining to sell subscriptions in-application at all, on the basis that it is not profitable to do so; or by selling in-application at a higher price than the same subscription costs on the publisher's own website, passing down the cost to consumers. Both outcomes are visible to United Kingdom readers today, either as the absence of a purchase route or as a higher price. A steering remedy set at a fee low enough to be commercially viable would allow that differential treatment to be reduced, and would allow publishers to hold a direct relationship with their subscribers, including for service, billing and refunds.

The costs of the remedy fall principally on developers who choose to adopt steering, and is incurred voluntarily. The CMA records fixed adoption costs ranging from approximately £10,000–£20,000 to £50,000–£300,000 (paragraph 4.96 and footnote 118). **Those costs are recoverable only if the fee, and the frictions attached to the steered journey, leave a margin worth pursuing.**

Question 6.3 – Scope of the proposed Steering CR

(a) Requiring steering links to direct users to a developer's own website

We do not object in principle to a requirement that steering links direct end-users to offers owned, operated or controlled by the developer, provided two qualifications appear on the face of the CR rather than only in the reasoning:

(i) the requirement **does not prevent developers from engaging third-party payment service providers**, whether through self-hosted or hosted payment pages, the qualification the CMA itself records at paragraphs 4.35 and 4.37; and

(ii) the requirement **does not exclude an offer which the publisher presents and participates in but does not solely own** – for example a joint or aggregated subscription offer, or a sale completed through a third-party subscription management platform.

We note the CMA has received very little evidence of demand for steering directly to destinations controlled by third parties (paragraph 4.36), and we do not press the point beyond (i) and (ii). Where Google asserts that a particular destination falls outside "owned, operated or controlled", it should bear the burden of justifying that position.

We ask that paragraph 5(a) state expressly that restrictions on the number of redirection mechanisms presented on a screen, and on the number of destination addresses within the developer's own properties, are prohibited. Our members' experience of comparable regimes elsewhere is that limits of this kind are the practical means by which a nominal right to link out is made commercially thin: a single permitted link prevents the presentation of package or bundled offers, and a single permitted destination prevents an end-user being taken directly to the relevant purchase or account page.

(b) Requiring steering links to be for the purposes of completing steered transactions

The CMA points to feedback from Google that steering link for purposes other than transaction, such as "for the purpose of downloading apps outside of the Play Store environment would present a significantly higher level of risk for Android" (paragraph 4.13). The EPC does not agree with that statement. The recently adopted Digital Markets in the EU includes a provision to prevent designated gatekeepers from preventing application Side Loading, leading to technological advancement to ensure user's safety. **These latest developments should be taken into consideration by the CMA to assess whether the current scope of the Steering CR remains adequate.**

Furthermore, related to the current scope of the Steering CR, we identify one drafting risk**. Paragraph 3(b) should not be read as permitting Google to police the content of communications protected by paragraph 3(a).** The two paragraphs address different subject matter: paragraph 3(a) concerns communication with end-users, paragraph 3(b) concerns the redirection mechanism. An express statement that the purpose limitation in paragraph 3(b) does not qualify paragraph 3(a) would remove the ambiguity.

Question 6.4 – The measures Google rolled out in the United Kingdom on 30 June 2026

In our view the measures do not resolve the concerns the CMA has identified, and in one respect deepen them. We make four points.

1. The fee levels are not reconcilable with the CMA's own cost analysis. The new terms provide for a service fee of 10 per cent on non-recurring steered transactions for the first $1 million of annual earnings and 20 percent above the first $1 million. (paragraph 1.14(d)(v) and (vi)), 15 per cent for participants in the new programmes App experience and Google Play Games Level Up (paragraph 1.14(d)(iv)), and 10 per cent on recurring subscriptions in all circumstances (paragraph 1.14(d)(iii)).

Each is a charge on a transaction Google does not host, does not process, does not support and for which it carries no liability. The CMA's provisional view is that the incremental cost of allowing steered transactions may be limited to link-out technology (paragraph 4.107(a)) and that a cost-based principle is likely to produce significantly lower fees (paragraph 4.111). We are not aware of any published explanation of the gap between the two. We note that Google was unable to provide the estimated cost of its 2025 Play developments (paragraph 4.93) and states that it cannot provide United Kingdom cost data for the Play Store (paragraph 4.109). This inability is not a reason to disapply the cost-based principle.

2. We welcome the unbundling of billing fees from store service fees (paragraph 1.14(d)(i)) and regard it as the correct structural direction. Unbundling is, however, only meaningful if it changes the level of the charge and not merely its presentation. To date it has reduced the stated billing component to 5 per cent while leaving the aggregate charge broadly unchanged. In our view unbundling requires that the steering fee be separately derived, separately stated and separately auditable; that a developer who does not use a service is not charged for it; and that recovery cannot be migrated between fee lines. More generally, **where a platform charges for services additional to distribution, our position is that those services must be clearly identifiable; the developer must be able to decline them;** declining must not require the approval of end-users; the application must continue to function if they are declined; and any service the developer retains must be priced on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. We invite the CMA to adjust paragraph 12(b) accordingly.

3. The new fee architecture differentiates between developers without published justification. It distinguishes new from existing installs (paragraph 1.14(d)(ii)), earnings above and below the $1 million threshold (paragraph 1.14(d)(v)) and programme participants from non-participants (paragraph 1.14(d)(iv)). The CR as drafted does not constrain differentiation of this kind, for the reasons given in our answer to question 6.5. We note that gaming developers were excluded from Google's User Choice Billing programme. Google must treat apps that sell digital content and apps that sell physical goods and services in the same way, as they use the exact same app store services. **Where a platform agrees bespoke terms with one developer, those terms should in our view be available to all developers using the same services unless the difference in treatment is objectively justified.**

4. A boundary point on scope. The June 2026 terms also permit developers to use their own payment systems within their applications (paragraph 1.14(b)). That freedom exists under Google's terms but not under the CR, which regulates redirection to external websites (paragraph 3(b); paragraph 4.11). It may therefore be withdrawn or re-priced. **We ask the CMA to extend the scope of the CR in this consultation to allow for publishers to use their own payment system should they wish to.**

Questions 6.5 and 6.6 – Whether the proposals achieve both objectives, and additional risks

We consider that the non-fee design largely achieves the balance the CMA describes, subject to the adjustment of five identified gaps below .

1. Free text is not protected in the operative text. Paragraph 4.26 sets out the provisional view that developers should be permitted to communicate through free text without restrictions beyond the general rules on illegal or harmful content, and without fees being charged. The operative text does not deliver this. Definition 2(i) captures "text prompts" and "non-interactive" elements that are "reasonably likely to encourage" an end-user to access an alternative destination, which describes free text. Because definitions 2(j) and 2(k) are built on 2(i), a sale following free text falls within the fee net. That is inconsistent with paragraph 4.26 and with the finding at paragraph 4.25 that attribution of such sales presents significant practical and evidential difficulties. **We ask that non-interactive text be excluded from definition 2(i), or that an express exclusion be added at paragraph 9.**

2. There is no free-standing obligation of equal treatment between developers. Paragraph 14 protects developers who use a redirection mechanism against retaliation by Google. It does not require equivalent treatment as between developers or categories of developer. The only category-level provisions, paragraphs 13(a) and 13(b), sit within the value-based pricing principle and are therefore engaged only when Google applies that principle. Given the precedent at paragraph 2.12 and footnote 41 and the tiering introduced in June 2026, we consider this a material gap. **We ask for a free-standing paragraph requiring steering rights, conditions and fees to apply on equivalent terms to all**

developers, with differentiation permitted only where Google has demonstrated an objective justification to the CMA in advance.

The comparison that matters most to our members is Google's treatment of applications selling physical goods and services, which face no steering restrictions, may select their own payment processor, may link out to provide information and pay no commission (paragraph 1.7 and footnote 11; paragraphs 4.20, 4.44(a) and 4.65). **Google must end such distinction or need to objectively justify why they treat digital content apps and apps selling physical goods and services differently.** Both categories of application are distributed by the same store, are subject to the same review process, use the same tools and interfaces and reach the same end-user base. We are not aware of a published justification for the distinction. In our view the burden of providing one rests with Google, and until it is discharged the distinction is a reason to align the treatment of the two categories rather than to calibrate the difference between them.

3. There is no anti-circumvention obligation framed on the total charge. Definition 2(k) reaches fees having equivalent effect, and paragraph 12(c) prevents the same costs being recovered twice. Neither prevents recovery being migrated – a reduction in the steering fee accompanied by the introduction or increase of other developer charges. The CMA's own monitoring metric at paragraph 4.152(d) is framed on total platform charges applied to purchases completed. **We ask that the obligation be framed the same way, and that Google be required to notify the CMA of any new or increased developer fee.**

4. Reporting and monitoring interfaces are addressed only in the reasoning. Paragraph 4.135 records developers' concerns that integration with reporting and monitoring interfaces may disclose commercially sensitive information and raise technical barriers to adoption, and records the CMA's provisional view that such interfaces should have fair and transparent terms. Neither the concern nor the view appears in the operative text. We ask it to be included, together with a data minimisation requirement and a prohibition on the use of steering telemetry for any purpose other than fee calculation and compliance.

5. The implementation period does not reflect what has already been built. Paragraph 4.148 proposes that the CR comes into force three months after the decision, with an implementation plan within one month. Google implemented steering globally, including in the United Kingdom, on 30 June 2026 (paragraph 1.14(c)). The engineering the CMA identifies as the incremental cost of steering (paragraph 4.107(a)) therefore exists. **We ask the CMA to shorten the period, or at least to require the implementation plan sooner.**

We identify one additional risk under question 6.6. First, application review is a covered means of restriction under paragraph 4 of the CR, but nothing in the monitoring proposals reports on it; **we ask that the compliance reports record steering implementations rejected or delayed in review, with reasons.**

Question 6.7 – A single neutral interstitial screen

(a) Whether an interstitial screen is appropriate

We do not consider it appropriate to permit an interstitial screen which, despite the safeguards foreseen by the CMA, would act as a deterrent for users while not providing any added value for them.

(i) Google does not require an interstitial screen for steered transactions in applications selling physical goods and services. Instead it should direct those applications to alternative payment methods (paragraph 4.65). The CMA infers from the prevalence of such transactions that end-users already have substantial experience with them. We are not aware of a principled basis on which the purchase of a digital newspaper copy or subscription requires an interruption that the purchase of a physical newspaper delivery does not.

(ii) In the United States, steering has operated without restriction since 30 April 2025 and without an interstitial screen, and developers did not observe an increase in end-user confusion (paragraph 4.61(c)).

(iii) The CMA has received no robust evidence that enabling steering in other jurisdictions has produced observed privacy or security harm (paragraph 5.21) and assesses the residual risk as very small (paragraph 5.27), noting among other things that Google's own payment systems use external payment service providers (paragraph 5.27(c)).

(iv) Developers estimate drop-off rates attributable to a single neutral screen range from 5 per cent to over 60 per cent (paragraph 4.62(b)). Even at the lower end of that range the effect is material when set against the fee differential the CR is intended to make meaningful.

(v) The informational objective is met without a screen. Side-by-side presentation (Interpretative Note 5), together with the right at paragraph 8(a) to display price and non-price information at the point of decision, gives the end-user what they need at the moment of choice. The CMA's own reasoning at paragraph 4.56 is that information presented earlier in the journey may not be recalled. An interstitial screen adds a step rather than necessary information.

(vi) Paragraph 7 permits a single interstitial screen per redirection, not per end-user. For subscription and repeat-purchase businesses this is an interruption on every transaction, and its cumulative effect is larger than the single-screen framing suggests.

Our members' experience in other jurisdictions where platforms have required a screen before a link-out or an alternative payment flow is that such screens are a source of lost conversions, and that the language used has tended to characterise the developer's own payment journey as less safe rather than merely different. That experience is one of the reasons why the link-out facilities made available in those jurisdictions have seen limited take-up.

(b) Reducing the friction, if an interstitial screen is retained

The EPC believes that an interstitial screen is not necessary. It is a mere protectionist measure directly impacting publishers ability to steer readers towards alternative payments methods. Nonetheless, if the CMA retains the permission, we ask that the following **cumulative limitations be placed in paragraph 7 of the CR rather than in interpretative notes, since Interpretative Note 1 records that it remains open to Google to take a different approach to the notes where it can demonstrate compliance with the CR itself.**

(i) Frequency: the screen may be shown on the first occasion only, per application, per end-user (paragraph 4.67 and footnote 90).

(ii) Defaults: any "do not show again" control must be selected by default (paragraph 4.67 and footnote 91). The illustrative figure at Interpretative Note 7 shows the control unselected, which, combined with a reading order placing "Cancel" before "Continue", creates an asymmetry between the two options of precisely the kind definition 2(h) prohibits.

(iii) Prominence: "Continue" must be presented as the primary action, with at least equal prominence to "Cancel".

(iv) Duration: the permission should sunset after a defined period from the CR coming into force unless the CMA extends it on evidence (paragraph 4.67 and footnote 89). The rationale for the screen is end-user unfamiliarity, which diminishes with exposure.

(v) Exclusions: no screen on a payment made under a recurring subscription, or where the end-user holds an existing authenticated account with the developer. Such an end-user is not being informed of anything they do not already know.

(vi) Content: the information "strictly necessary" under paragraph 7(a) should be defined by reference to a short prescribed form of words, so that the boundary is not set by Google.

(vii) Consequence: abandonment at the screen should be reported under paragraph 4.152(e) against a defined threshold, with the permission falling away if the threshold is exceeded.

Question 6.8 – Prohibiting steering to WebViews

We do not support permitting Google to prohibit steering to WebViews. WebViews allow publishers to develop content that load faster, involve fewer steps and reduce friction, with better conversion as a result.

Prohibiting steering on WebViews content would lead developers to duplicate functionality, already in operation and maintain two code bases. That is both an initial cost and a recurring one, since every subsequent change to the purchase journey must be made twice. It falls hardest on publishers with smaller development teams,

We ask the CMA to reconsider its views on the prohibition of steering in WebViews.

Question 6.9 – The approach to steering fees

(a) Whether the proposed principles are appropriate, and the relationship between them

1. We support a cost-based anchor. We agree with the provisional view at paragraph 4.107(a) that the incremental cost of allowing steered transactions may be limited to the provision of link-out technology, and that it is unlikely the costs of operating an application store would be specific to applications offering steered transactions. We agree with paragraph 4.111 that a cost-based principle is likely to result in significantly lower fees than those Google currently charges. We agree with paragraph 4.114 that Google's stated inability to identify United Kingdom costs cannot be a reason not to apply the principle, and that complexity arising from a firm's own choice of business model and management accounting cannot shield it from scrutiny.

2. The value-based principle should operate only as a downward cross-check. Interpretative Note 9 permits Google to begin from one principle and use the other as a cross-check, "adjusting the resultant Steering Fee downward or upward as applicable". In our view the words "or upward" convert the value-based principle from a constraint into a justification, and the CMA's own analysis explains why they should not: value-based approaches tend to be used where returns are subject to a high degree of risk and rights are time-limited, which does not describe an app store first introduced nearly twenty years ago (paragraph 4.129); Google has been unable to evidence the scale and cost of its investments in the Play Store, and the evidence on differentiation is mixed and none of Google's proposed benchmarks satisfies the three-part comparator test the CMA has set**. We ask that paragraph 10 specify that each steering fee shall be no higher than the lower of the fee derived under the cost-based principle and the fee derived under the value-based principle, and that "or upward" be deleted. Because Interpretative Note 1 records that the notes do not bind Google, this must be done in the CR itself.**

3. The adjustments required by paragraph 13 must be evidenced rather than asserted. Paragraphs 13(d) and 13(e) require the value assessment to adjust for the effects of Google's substantial and entrenched market power and to take account of the value contributed by developers in aggregate. The record-keeping obligation at paragraph 12(d), however, applies only to the cost-based principle. We ask that it be extended to the value-based assessment, and that the methodology be published in non-confidential form. The two-way exchange the CMA describes at paragraph 4.120(b) cannot be tested unless Google shows its working.

4. The headroom within the cost-based principle needs bounding. Paragraph 12(a)(iii) permits an allocation of common costs and paragraph 12(a)(iv) a reasonable rate of return, each qualified by a materiality test which, as drafted, Google applies to itself. Taken together they could reproduce a fee bearing little relation to the incremental cost identified at paragraph 4.107(a). We ask that the allocation methodology and the rate of return be reviewed by the CMA before a fee derived from them takes effect.

(b) Practical benefits and risks of the proposed principles

5. Paragraph 9(a) sets a reporting standard, not an approval standard. Under the proposed Steering CR, Google would set a fee, apply it, and report quarterly. publishers would bear the consequences of any error for at least a quarter, and would be required to price, staff and plan against a fee that might subsequently change. We ask that Google be required to submit its methodology and each proposed fee for approval before it applies, with a backstop until approval is given.

6. The review power at paragraph 4.79 should be made operational. The CMA records that adopting a principles-based approach now does not preclude more specific requirements later. We ask that this be given a trigger: if, after a defined period, the uptake of steering or the share of transactions completed through steering falls below stated thresholds, the CMA will consult on specifying a fee. This addresses directly the experience the CMA cites at paragraph 4.100(b), where permission coupled with high fees produced low adoption.

(c) Other views on the principles Google must apply

7. The attribution rule at paragraph 9(b)(i). Our position is that a platform charge on a transaction is justified only where the platform played a material part in the developer's acquisition of that paying end-user. Paragraph 9(b)(i) does not test that. Its clock starts when the end-user reaches an alternative purchasing mechanism – an event that occurs while the end-user is already using the developer's application, and therefore after acquisition has taken place. A reader who installed a news application some months ago, read it, responded to the publisher's own offer and then completed a subscription is not an end-user Google acquired for the publisher, whether the transaction completes within seven days of the redirection or within seven minutes.

The consequence is that, as drafted, a fee will attach to transactions that are the product of the publisher's own commercial effort: the conversion of a registered reader of free content into a subscriber; the conversion of a trial; the renewal, upgrade or reinstatement of an existing subscription; and the recovery of a lapsed subscriber. Retention and reactivation in particular are wholly the publisher's cost, comprising editorial investment, the construction of the offer, customer service, billing and collections. The CMA's own reasoning at paragraph 4.25, that attributing an online sale to a particular prompt presents significant practical and evidential difficulties, applies with equal force to a seven-day window measured from a tap.

We therefore ask, that **paragraph 9(b) be restructured so that a steering fee may be charged only where Google played a material part in the developer's acquisition of the paying end-user.** A workable proxy, which we have advanced in other fora, is that the end-user installed the application through the store and completed a first purchase within a short defined window measured from installation rather than from redirection, subject to exceptions where the end-user

searched for the developer's own brand in the store, or where the developer purchased search advertising – in the first case the developer brought the end-user to the store, and in the second the developer has already paid for the acquisition through advertising.

8. Recurring subscriptions – paragraph 9(b)(ii). This is, for a subscription publishing business, the most consequential provision in the CR. As drafted, the seven-day limit does not apply to payments made under a recurring subscription, and the only protection is for subscriptions entered into before the end-user reached an alternative purchasing mechanism. A subscription entered into after redirection may therefore carry a steering fee on every renewal for the life of the subscription. Our position is that **a platform charge should be considered only if the platform played a material part in the developer's acquisition of the paying end-user and in any case should not recur**. Whatever Google may contribute to the formation of a subscription, it contributes nothing further to its following year, while the publisher bears the entire cost of retaining the subscriber. Under the June 2026 terms, recurring subscriptions attract a 10 per cent fee in all circumstances (paragraph 1.14(d)(iii)). We ask that paragraph 9(b)(ii) be deleted and replaced with an express provision that no steering fee may be charged on a payment made under a recurring subscription. If the CMA is not minded to go that far, any fee should be confined to a defined initial period and should not exceed the rate applicable to a non-recurring transaction.

9. Fees should not vary by payment method or by type of digital product. A fee attributable to acquisition or to store services should not differ according to the payment method the developer selects, or according to whether the product sold is an auto-renewing subscription or another digital purchase. Payment processing is a distinct service and should be charged only where the platform actually processes the payment, which on a steered transaction it does not.

10. Administrative simplicity requires operative content. Paragraph 10(c) requires Google to put in place adequate safeguards to ensure its fee structure does not limit the effectiveness of steering. In substance, an obligation on Google to police its own complexity. Complexity is itself a deterrent (paragraph 4.88), and stakeholders have reported that fee structures in other jurisdictions have been overly complex (paragraph 4.134). We ask for a single published schedule of all charges applying to steered transactions, with a minimum notice period before any change takes effect.

11. Monitoring. We support the metrics proposed at paragraph 4.152, and in particular the reporting of total platform charges at 4.152(d) and of abandonment at mandatory information screens at 4.152(e). We propose four additions:

1. disaggregation by developer sector as well as by developer size;
2. publication of Google's fee methodology in non-confidential form;
3. reporting of steering implementations rejected or delayed in application review, with reasons; and
4. a standing channel through which developers may raise compliance concerns.

We also ask that the behavioural audits contemplated at paragraph 4.151 be conducted at defined intervals rather than only if considered necessary.

EPC European Publishers Council

Annex A – Proposed amendments to the draft Conduct Requirement

The following consolidates the drafting changes proposed in this response. Paragraph references in the first column are to the draft CR; references in the third column are to the consultation document unless otherwise stated.

Provision of the draft CR	EPC proposed amendment	Reason
Definition 2(i) — End-user Redirection Mechanism	Exclude non-interactive text from the definition, or add an express exclusion at paragraph 9 so that no Steering Fee may arise in respect of a transaction attributable only to free text.	The operative text does not deliver the provisional conclusion at paragraph 4.26; attribution of such sales is unreliable (paragraph 4.25).
Paragraph 3 - alternative in-app payment solutions		Paragraph 3 should include within its scope language to allow for developers to use alternative payment solution providers in-app.
Paragraph 3 - WebViews		Paragraph 3 should include within its scope language that allows for the use of WebViews for steering.
New paragraph — equal treatment between developers	Google must apply equivalent steering rights, conditions and fees to all developers. Differentiation is permitted only where Google has demonstrated an objective justification to the CMA in advance.	Paragraph 14 protects steering developers against retaliation only. The category-level hooks at 13(a)–(b) apply only when the value-based principle is applied. Precedent at paragraph 2.12 fn 41.
Paragraph 7 — interstitial screen	Delete. If retained, apply the cumulative limitations set out in our answer to question 6.7(b), placed in the CR itself rather than in interpretative notes.	No interstitial is required for physical goods (paragraph 4.65); no observed confusion in the US (paragraph 4.61(c)); drop-off estimates of 5% to over 60% (paragraph 4.62(b)). Interpretative notes are not binding (IN 1).
Paragraph 9(a) — compliance standard	Require Google to submit its methodology and each proposed Steering Fee for CMA approval before it takes effect, with no Steering Fee payable until approval.	As drafted this is a quarterly reporting standard (paragraphs 4.148–4.149), not an ex ante check.
Paragraph 9(b)(i) — attribution	Restructure so that a Steering Fee arises only where Google played a material part in the developer's acquisition of the paying end-user.	The clock runs from redirection, which post-dates acquisition. As drafted the fee attaches to conversions produced by the publisher's own commercial effort.
Paragraph 9(b)(ii) — recurring subscriptions	Delete, and provide that no Steering Fee may be charged on a payment made under a recurring subscription.	As drafted a subscription entered into after redirection may carry a fee on every renewal indefinitely. Retention is the publisher's cost.

Provision of the draft CR	EPC proposed amendment	Reason
Paragraph 10 — relationship between principles	Specify that each Steering Fee shall be no higher than the lower of the fee derived under the cost-based principle and the fee derived under the value-based principle. Delete "or upward" from Interpretative Note 9.	The chapeau is silent as between the principles. The CMA's findings at paragraphs 4.127, 4.129 and 4.130 do not support upward adjustment.
Paragraph 12(b) — exclusions	Provide that services additional to app distribution must be separately identified and separately priced; that a developer may decline them without end-user approval; that the app continues to function if they are declined; and that any retained service is priced on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.	Gives operative content to unbundling. Without it, unbundling changes the presentation of the charge but not its level.
Paragraph 12(d) — records	Extend the record-keeping and demonstration obligation to the value-based assessment, including the SEMP adjustment and the netting of value contributed by developers, and require publication in non-confidential form.	Paragraphs 13(d)–(e) impose obligations with no evidential discipline attached.
New paragraph — anti-circumvention	Frame the obligation on the total charge applied to a steered transaction, and require notification to the CMA of any new or increased developer fee.	Definition 2(k) and paragraph 12(c) do not prevent recovery migrating to other fee lines. The CMA's own metric at paragraph 4.152(d) is framed on total platform charges.
New paragraph — reporting and monitoring APIs	Require any reporting or monitoring API to be offered on fair and transparent terms, with data minimisation and a prohibition on use of steering telemetry for any purpose other than fee calculation and compliance.	Paragraph 4.135 records the concern and the CMA's provisional view; neither appears in the operative text.
Paragraph 10(c) — administrative simplicity	Require a single published schedule of all charges applying to steered transactions, with a minimum notice period before any change takes effect.	As drafted the paragraph asks Google to safeguard against its own complexity. Complexity is itself a deterrent (paragraphs 4.88 and 4.134).

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