



EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: Mr R Thorpe

Respondent: Linde MH UK Limited

Heard at Leeds Employment Tribunal

ON: 20 and 21 May 2026

BEFORE: Employment Judge Wade

REPRESENTATION:

Claimant: Mr Y Lunat, Solicitor

Respondent: Ms L Wilson, Solicitor

Introduction: Summary reasons were provided orally in an extempore Judgment delivered on 21 May 2026, which explained the rules on summary and full written reasons. The short judgment was sent to the parties on 27 May 2026 and that judgment repeated the new rules on summary and full written reasons. A request for "written reasons" was received from the claimant's solicitor on 28 May 2026. I have exercised my discretion under Rule 4E to provide full reasons, because it is not clear that in fact, the full reasons are not desired and it creates disproportionate work to settle one and then the other, if full reasons are then requested. The reasons below are now provided in accordance with Rule 60 and in particular Rule 60(6) and (7) which provide: "the reasons given for any decision must be proportionate to the significance of the issue.." and "full reasons are reasons which identify the issues which the Tribunal has determined, state the findings of fact made in relation to those issues, concisely identify the relevant law, and state how the law has been applied to those findings in order to decide the issues". For convenience the Judgment given on 21 May 2026 is also repeated below

"The decision of the Tribunal is:

JUDGMENT

- 1 The claimant's complaint of unfair dismissal is not well founded.
- 2 The claimant's wrongful dismissal complaint is also dismissed.

FULL REASONS

Introduction

1. The claimant was dismissed from his post as a service engineer after long service with the respondent. He brought unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal complaints. The issues for the Tribunal were:
 - 1.1. What was the principal reason for dismissal? Did it relate to the claimant's conduct (there was no other reason argued by the claimant)?
 - 1.2. Did the respondent act reasonably in treating its reason as sufficient reason to dismiss the claimant in all the circumstances including equity and the substantial merits of the case including:
 - 1.2.1. Did the respondent hold a genuine belief on reasonable grounds after such investigation as was reasonable?
 - 1.2.2. Was dismissal within the band of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer to the conduct it believed?
 - 1.3. Did the claimant engage in conduct which was repudiatory? Was it conduct without reasonable and proper cause calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage trust and confidence? Was it deliberate and wilful gross misconduct?
2. The relevant law is in the Employment Rights Act: Section 94 (right not to be unfairly dismissed) and Section 98. In applying Section 98 the Tribunal directed itself in accordance with the principles most recently set out in Craig Lamb v Teva UK Limited EAT [2026] EAT 8 paragraphs 29 to 63.
3. As to wrongful dismissal the common law principles are clear: an employer is entitled to summarily dismiss by accepting the repudiatory conduct of its employee and electing to terminate the contract. Repudiatory conduct is conduct which goes to the heart of performance of the contract and indicates that the employee does not consider himself bound by it. Repudiatory conduct can include gross negligence – it is conduct after which an employer cannot be expected to continue the contract, even when not deliberate.
4. The Tribunal reminded itself that the two claims are fundamentally different and require some mental gymnastics.

Findings of Fact

Background

5. The claimant had worked for the respondent from 1998 until his dismissal on 23 January 2025. The respondent operates the servicing of forklift trucks and other mobile plant machinery such as cranes and other material handling equipment, cherry pickers, power pallets and the like. It employs roughly a thousand engineers across the country. It has in place a disciplinary policy, a drug and alcohol policy and a company van policy. Its engineers were allocated fleet vans, which were

leased. Some field service engineers were required to go from site to site, but in the claimant's case he was allocated to a customer site in Halifax, but from time to time there was a need to move parts between the customer's two sites and he therefore was allocated a fleet van.

6. The claimant had a long and unblemished record with the customer. He was trusted to open up the depot at the beginning of the day and was a keyholder. He was experiencing difficulties in his personal life in 2024 such that he was living with his acting team leader rather than with his partner.
7. The equipment which the claimant looked after could move weights of three or four tonnes and the customer's environment was "safety critical": large building materials were moved by the machinery for which he was responsible.
8. The company van policy provided, under the heading "alcohol and drug use", that employees must never drive if they have consumed alcohol or taken illegal drugs and should always check with their GP if it is safe to drive if prescribed any type of prescription drug. "It is recommended that those driving do not consume more than the legal limit of alcohol the evening before".
9. The policy was expressed to cover the use of commercial vehicles for strictly business purposes as well as while using such vehicles for private use. The recommendations about drug and alcohol use in driving came under a general heading of safe driving. Anyone convicted of, or with a pending prosecution for, driving under the influence of drink or drugs was excluded from driving the respondent's vehicles.
10. The respondent's drug and alcohol policy had been drawn up in consultation with trade union and employee forum representatives. Its purpose was to ensure the use of drugs or alcohol did not affect the efficient running of the company's business and set out rules and support for those who have a problem with drug or alcohol misuse. It provided that "no employee or contractor shall report or try to report for work when unfit due to alcohol or drugs (whether illegal or not or due to substance abuse)". It also provided that "contravening that rule would be dealt with under the disciplinary procedure albeit that could be suspended for a reasonable period pending investigation of whether the employee had a medical problem amenable to treatment"; and also provided for referrals to occupational health and testing saying: "any employee who presents themselves in an unfit state to work in the reasonable opinion of the manager will be asked to take a test as detailed in the following procedure" (even if they are already being provided with support). There was a detailed procedure for those testing arrangements. The policy explained that a "non-negative" test on site would result in a delay of 14 days while the test was sent away for further validation.

The incident

11. On 15 December, a Sunday, in 2024, the claimant was driving back to his home from Blackpool in the afternoon and was stopped by the police and tested for alcohol and tested for drugs and that roadside test tested positive for cocaine. He was arrested on suspicion of an offence and taken to a police station. He undertook a blood test which would take six to eight weeks for the results to come through (the claimant was told at the time). He was later released from custody that evening and drove back to his home. He then attended work again driving the company van at or around 6am on Monday, reporting to work as normal.

12. That afternoon (Monday 16 December) he came into the respondent's depot to let his team leader colleague know about the police stop. The previous day he felt burdened by the potential impact on his job and wanted to tell the company about it.
13. The next day an investigation meeting was convened with: Mr Lawson, the regional service manager, the claimant's trade union representative, an HR representative and the claimant's team leader colleague to whom he had first disclosed the police stop.
14. The claimant immediately offered to undertake regular drug testing on Fridays and Mondays and the meeting adjourned, the claimant having identified he did have some mental health issues; an occupational referral was arranged to be made in order for the claimant to see somebody in accordance with the respondent's policy.
15. The meeting re-convened the next day at around 9am. It was agreed - after an adjournment for the claimant to consult his union representative - that he would be tested the next day (Wednesday).
16. The claimant, in that second meeting on 18 December, confirmed that he had taken cocaine on the Saturday night and the claimant asked if he would lose his job if he lost his licence. He also said that he considered the cocaine was taken on the Saturday and should be out of his system in five days but the results would not be back from the police for some time. The claimant was suspended from work and the onsite test was explained and arranged and the details for the employer assistance provision were also given to the claimant.
17. The test took place on Thursday 19 December at 9am, conducted by a third party provider. The "onsite" test was not then clear in its results but when it was returned later it was a "non-negative" result. That is at page 85 of the hearing file. Further questions were asked of the provider who returned that non negative test on 6 January 2025.
18. The claimant had remained suspended over the Christmas period and had gone away considerably distressed and worried by these events. The testing provider was asked a number of questions and they replied as follows:

"there can be a number of reasons for the lateral flow test giving a non-negative result when the confirmation is negative. The commonest reason with cocaine is that the person had used cocaine but the level detected is not sufficient to give a positive result. While it may be tempting to think that an earlier sample or less diluted sample would have given a positive result this is not something that can ever been proven. Generally when a person uses cocaine the Benzoyllecgonine level will be in the tens or hundreds of thousands. It then drops away to negative over the next few days. The time taken to reach a negative depends on the metabolism, the amount taken and the amount of fluid consumed during this time.

In terms of driving we would expect that a person would be over the drug drive limit for between 12 to 36 hours after using cocaine. However the time during which they are measurably impaired that would have a noticeable effect on their driving would likely be less than this perhaps between four to 12 hours after using cocaine."

19. The request for that additional information from the provider came from human resources and they asked entirely sensible questions indicating an open mind, saying “potentially the engineer could be going to disciplinary so we want to ensure our facts are correct to make an informed decision.”
20. The claimant was then invited to a disciplinary hearing in a letter dated 17 January 2025. The hearing was delayed in order for him to be represented by the regional official. A further meeting had taken place in January after the test results were back and the claimant had been provided with the notes of that meeting. That meeting had taken place on Wednesday 15 January again with the regional service manager Mr Lawson and the HR representative Ms Furini.
21. The disciplinary hearing was to be undertaken by Mr Pollard and the charges were:
 - 21.1. potential damage to company reputation having being publicly stopped by police for a random drug and alcohol test which subsequently tested positive by the roadside for cocaine while driving a branded company van.
 - 21.2. potential breach of the company drug and alcohol policy due to a personal admission of positive roadside test for cocaine and admittance to taking an illegal substance the day prior to driving,
 - 21.3. potential breach of trust and confidence due to the reported events and the change in personal statement of the taking/not taking cocaine on Saturday/Sunday 14/15 December through the investigation.
22. That last charge related to the claimant saying in the meeting in January that the substance could have been paracetamol, having previously said he took cocaine.
23. An investigation report was provided by Ms Furini dated 16 January 2025. It provided a number of underlying documents including the test results and the drug and alcohol policy and the various meetings undertaken with the claimant. All of those documents were shared with him in the invitation letter to the disciplinary hearing, apart from the company van policy which was omitted by mistake.
24. The claimant was represented by the trade union representative and at no stage during the disciplinary hearing was it raised that he had not understood the provisions of the company van policy nor that he had not had access to it. The meeting was adjourned.
25. The meeting began in substance at 11am. The claimant again offered to undertake testing every week and Mr Pollard adjourned for around half an hour to deliberate with human resources.
26. He said this when giving his decision, which was to dismiss the claimant: “he had decided this is gross misconduct. You have taken an illegal substance and driven a company vehicle and there is a belief you may have been under the influence on Monday morning”.
27. That decision was confirmed in a letter subsequently which confirmed that the allegations discussed with the claimant were: the breach of the drugs and alcohol policy, taking illegal drugs in the course of employment which could impact safety and nature of work; and bringing the company into disrepute creating a lack of trust and confidence.

28. Those charges did not faithfully reproduce the charges in the invitation letter, because the matter of the change in statement was abandoned. The findings set out in the letter included the following.
29. "You admitted that you had taken a substance and that following a stop by police whilst driving the company van you tested positive at the roadside for cocaine. The company van policy is clear that you must never drive if you have consumed alcohol or taken illegal drugs".
30. The outcome letter also mentioned the claimant's openness and honesty regarding the use of cocaine, but found, "that was not sufficient mitigation for being under the influence whilst driving and then attending work within a timeframe that the drugs must still be in your body and not being cognitive of any impairment that may cause".
31. Mr Pollard also referred to the safety critical nature of the work and that being stopped in the company van had brought the company into dispute, that the conduct could damage trust and confidence and that there was a lack of confidence that the claimant would not repeat his behaviour.
32. The claimant exercised his right of appeal in relation to that summary dismissal on 23 January 2025. His initial reasons for appeal were that whilst he may have been arrested, "the police would not have released me if I had been under the influence. I do not have the [police] results back yet and there is a strong chance they could be negative".
33. As to a breach of trust and confidence he said he brought the matter to his team leader's attention and he did not feel properly supported in relation to his mental health.
34. He then when invited to an appeal hearing to take place on 19 February 2025 for which he provided further and detailed written grounds and these were discussed in the hearing with Mr Lawton, who was supported by Emma Black an HR business partner.
35. The regional officer of Unite the Union was the claimant's representative and the claimant provided a paper copy of a reference from the customer where he had worked for some time. The reference indicated that the claimant had been struggling. The claimant also made clear in the appeal that he had been struggling in his personal life and there was considerable discussion of that.
36. Mr Lawton then examined the claimant's grounds of appeal under various headings including in relation to the disciplinary process and sampling arrangements and the embarrassment the claimant had felt about those on 19 December.
37. He considered and partly upheld the appeal as to whether the claimant was, in fact, under the influence or impaired when he attended the customer on Monday morning.
38. As to the other grounds - bringing the matter to the company's attention and not considering the claimant's mental health - these were addressed by Mr Lawton in his analysis and he subsequently conducted further investigation into: the on site testing arrangements and the claimant's complaints about those; and when the matter had first been brought to the company's attention. w

39. The claimant had also stressed in his appeal that it had been 10 weeks since the incident and he had not yet been charged by the police.
40. Mr Lawton checked with Mr Lockwood, the claimant's team leader, when the claimant had told him about these events - which was on Monday 16 December.
41. He discussed the testing arrangements, and how they had proceeded with the regional service manager. Further, he investigated the occasions of the claimant's absence during 2024, and whether "return to work checks" had been conducted with him or not, and the reasons for his absences over that period. In investigating this he was addressing the part of the claimant's appeal on welfare and lack of support - that during 2024 in which he had four occasions of absence - three of one day and one of two days - and the employer should have known that he was at risk, as it were, or likely to do something unusual or out of character.
42. Mr Lawton's appeal decision was carefully set out on 20 February in a letter to him and the appeal was rejected.

Conclusions

43. This is a case where the claimant presented both unfair and wrongful dismissal claims albeit the wrongful dismissal was not pleaded to any great length, or addressed at all or in the grounds of resistance. The parties' focus, perhaps understandable in those circumstances, has very much been on the unfair dismissal.
44. We discussed the issues at the beginning of the case, what was the principal reason for dismissal, that was not in doubt in this case. My focus has been very much on the section 98(4) questions. Did the employer believe the claimant had engaged in misconduct, did it have reasonable grounds for that, were those reasonable grounds formed after a reasonable investigation, did it act reasonably in dismissing in all the circumstances of the case including equity and the substantial merits and was this a dismissal within the band of reasonable responses in all the circumstances.
45. The wrongful dismissal questions of course, did the claimant engage in deliberate and wilful serious misconduct justifying his summary dismissal or did he engage in conduct without reasonable and proper cause likely to destroy or seriously damage trust and confidence.
46. I have had oral evidence on behalf of the employer, from Mr Lawson, Mr Pollard and Mr Lawton. Mr Lawson was the claimant's service manager and the claimant described him as a friend or somebody who he formerly regarded as a friend. Mr Pollard dismissed the claimant and Mr Lawton addressed his appeal against dismissal. I have heard oral evidence from the claimant on his own behalf. I have given myself the directions that you would expect in terms of the law.
47. I have also recorded findings of fact outlining the chain of events in this case which are not in dispute.
48. This is a difficult case. It is one in which Mr Thorpe has said a number of times during his evidence that he is not an intelligent person - or words to that effect - and his job was everything to him since leaving school.
49. I want to pay tribute to someone who has been looking after complex and safety critical equipment, with an unblemished record over many years - achieving that

is not consistent with his self description - It requires considerable intelligence to do that job that well for that length of time.

50. In relationship to this case it was also to his considerable credit that he felt burdened by being stopped by the police on 15 December 2024. He felt it as an additional weight on his mind such that he felt he should tell his employer about it, given everything else that was going on in his life at that time. This was the last thing that he needed and it was so troubling for him, unbearably so, that he shared it with his employer. He was hopeful, perhaps, that his disclosure would enable him to maintain his employment.
51. His distress at that not being the outcome that he had wanted or hoped for, has been present throughout this case and certainly was evident in the way that he gave evidence.
52. Nobody reading the circumstances of this case could be blind to the harsh realities of life: at any time a mistake can be made which has very serious consequences for the person, their employment, their life and often others' lives. This is why this has been a difficult case.
53. I apply well settled law.
54. I am grateful for the authorities to which Mr Lunat has drawn my attention: Mr M McElroy v Cambridgeshire Community Services NHS Trust 2015 WL 4944449 which was an Employment Tribunal decision finding unfair dismissal in circumstances of suspected alcohol consumption; and Mr T Vincent t/a Shield Security Services v Mr G Hinder 2013 WL 6865170 - before His Honour Judge Hand in the Employment Appeal Tribunal upholding a decision of an Employment Tribunal that where it was found that there was no consideration of mitigating circumstances, it was not a misdirection for the Tribunal to find that dismissal outside the band of reasonable responses.
55. In both of those cases, as in this one, the Employment Tribunal comprised an Employment Judge sitting alone as an industrial jury. I, like those Employment Judges, am not helped by members in an assessment of the band of reasonable responses to the conduct in question.
56. Mr Thorpe has had the benefit of Mr Lunat's advocacy putting every possible point that could have been put on his behalf. He identified, for example, the difference in the invitation letters, the decision letter and in the pleaded case paragraph 9, submitting that the employer had pinned its reason to dismissal on it being likely the claimant attended work under the influence of drugs on Monday, when that was overturned on appeal, and there was insufficient investigation because the customer was not contacted about the claimant's attendance, demeanour or work on the Monday morning.
57. The direction I have given myself is that the reasonableness of an investigation is to be assessed from the beginning of the process - in this case from 17 December, through to the end of the employer's decision making - which is the determination on the appeal.
58. Across that timeframe the information that the employer had was evolving, not least because there were a number of meetings with Mr Thorpe in which information was discussed, and the matters that he considered needed investigating changed, and certainly that was the case in the appeal.

59. There were further investigations in relation to attendance and welfare, and the circumstances in which the testing had taken place, which he had said caused him embarrassment because others knew that he was being tested.
60. I have asked myself whether, in the context of the investigation which did take place from beginning to end, failing to contact the customer puts this investigation outside the band of reasonable investigations?
61. In all the circumstances of this case I have concluded it does not. The employer had third party advice from the testing unit (which it will have been apparent from my questions during the hearing that I was concerned about whether that had been fully disclosed during the course of the investigation and disciplinary process). We have learned today beyond doubt that it was - the relevant information about likelihood of being under the influence after taking a substance - that was available to Mr Thorpe and his union representatives and that confirmed the impression given by the documentation generally in this case – that the disciplinary process was scrupulously fair.
62. On appeal, Mr Lawton did not uphold the finding of “likely to have attended work with it still in his system”, in circumstances where he knew of the lack of evidence from the customer. There was nothing to prevent the claimant approaching the customer, not for a general reference, but to obtain specific comment from the customer of his performance that morning – he did not do that and in all the circumstances it does not put this investigation outside the band of reasonable investigations for the respondent to choose not to do so.
63. It also strikes me as indicating the van policy was well known and understood that it was not provided in the documents that were emailed to the claimant and his representative before the hearing. It did not trouble them and was not raised, because, no doubt, like the drug and alcohol policy, this was an environment in which there had been consultation with the unions about the policies and they were well known and well understood, reflecting common road sense, safety and good industrial relations practice.
64. In my judgment there was no prejudice or inherent unfairness in that particular copy of the policy not being included in the original pack that was sent to the disciplinary hearing. It could easily have been raised if there was any doubt and it was not raised by the claimant or his representative.
65. As to the natural justice point made on his behalf - that natural justice demands that Mr Thorpe knew the charges - although there was difference in the charges for which he was dismissed and those which he was invited to consider - it was clear that the one clear difference – the allegation of changing evidence during the course of the investigation - was abandoned. There was insufficient prejudice to the claimant, because it was clear that the focus was on the agreed and accepted conduct and there was every opportunity to address that conduct during the investigation and disciplinary proceedings. In the round, the procedure was reasonable and wholly aligned to natural justice.
66. The relevance of the claimant’s “paracetamol” comment, perhaps unsurprising given how stressful these events were, and the possible criminal proceedings to come, was the effect on the employer’s confidence in him.
67. Returning to the questions for me, it is very clear that the principal reason, the only reason, for Mr Thorpe’s dismissal and the maintenance of that dismissal on appeal,

was that he had engaged in conduct which had caused a loss of trust in and confidence in him, and despite his being up front about it, it was not trust which the employer thought could be recovered.

68. That took into account a number of matters, but it can be distilled to his choice to drive a company vehicle, contrary to policy, having knowingly taken cocaine on the Saturday night. That choice is the one that has undermined trust for all the reasons that were explained in the employer's evidence, but not least the potential for matters to have been even worse, the potential for damage to the brand, the potential for damage to the customer, the potential for damage to the health and safety of others and the general public, for which of course Mr Thorpe has paid the price in terms of the loss of his licence, about which we now know.
69. It is clear to me that the employer has established a reason related to conduct, albeit the pleaded case could have been clearer on the position at dismissal and at appeal. This Tribunal has to look at matters in the round and certainly it was very clear to Mr Thorpe and is reflected in the pleaded case that the loss of trust and confidence did not only arise from the attendance at work on the Monday morning. The loss of trust and confidence was, as I have described it above, and in that I accepted the sworn evidence on behalf of the respondent, which was compelling.
70. As to mitigation and alternatives to dismissal, Mr Thorpe was represented latterly by the area organiser and on several occasions he offered an alternative to dismissal, that is that regular testing to take place as an alternative to dismissal. That was considered by the employer, It follows from the offer that the claimant recognised that trust had been damaged and that there was risk for the employer in continuing to employ somebody in a safety critical role, who had engaged in behaviour which was ill advised and has had consequences.
71. Some employers in comparable circumstances may have taken up that offer, in circumstances of the very long and good service of the claimant, but I consider they would have been few, because the costs of the third party were considerable and it was an alternative which, from the way that the claimant discussed matters during his various meetings, did not demonstrate his recognition of the risk of a repeat of that behaviour and the cost of that risk management to this business.
72. In all these circumstances, bearing in mind the reasonable and fair procedure that was adopted, and reasonableness of the investigation, within the constraints dictated by the circumstances, I ask whether dismissal was in the range of reasonable responses.
73. Mr Thorpe's unblemished record and length of service were considered, and would weigh typically in his favour when making a decision such as this, but equally to be weighed were the adverse potential consequences for everyone if this behaviour were to be repeated and the cost of risk management mitigations. That is a decision for the employer to take, acting reasonably, and I can not say that dismissal in those circumstances was outside the band of reasonable decisions of a reasonable employer.
74. As to the wrongful dismissal case, I am not bound by considering what the employer knew, or had before it, I can make my own mind up. I heard oral evidence from Mr Thorpe and I accepted his oral evidence that he did not get into the vehicle believing that he was still under the influence of cocaine. He did not set out to

deliberately and wilfully disregard the respondent's car policy, which was an essential part of his contract of employment, given his allocation of a company vehicle including for private use. He waited until after noon, hoping or believing that he would be safe to drive. I recognise that his thinking may have been impaired. Nevertheless, in my mind deliberate and wilful gross misconduct is not proven.

75. He did, however, decide to take cocaine on a night when he had transported himself using the company vehicle, and he put himself in a position where he could not, in truth, know of the effect of that drug on his own functioning or whether the company would be caused reputational damage, or worse would ensue, or that he was complying with the respondent's rules.
76. Was this conduct with reasonable and proper cause? It was not. There cannot be reasonable and proper cause to take a Class A drug, as Mr Lawton described it, and then drive a company vehicle within a timeframe where you are cannot be sure that you are safe to do so. Was that conduct likely to seriously damage trust and confidence? It was. The respondent was entitled to accept that repudiatory conduct and terminate the contract summarily.
77. Finally and generally in this case, Mr Lunat made powerful submissions about comparisons to be drawn with alcohol and the advocates know that I have explored this in the evidence with Mr Lawton and Mr Pollard. The vehicle policy contained advice for people in relation to alcohol and what it is sensible to do the night before driving a company vehicle - it is not sensible to drink more than the permitted drink driving limit the night before driving a company vehicle.
78. I have reflected whether there is any sense in which the employer's policy could have been clearer, such that that would impact on my assessment of reasonableness of dismissal for driving after drug use. It was not a helpful experiment: imagine if the employer had sought to include in a safety/vehicle policy a "safe" amount of cocaine to take or a "sensible amount of time to elapse" before driving. The impression would be endorsement or tolerance of the taking Class A drugs and/or giving advice about matters which are, on the third party's information, inherently unknowable and individual dependent.
79. That illustrates one difference between this case and McElroy, but there are other significant differences. The difference between alcohol and drug use is a societal question and one for Parliament - policy approaches may not always be different, but in the current context it is not surprising and not unreasonable that an employer would conduct itself differently and have different mental processes in its approach to each. I should stress there was no exemplar of this employer tolerating or taking a different approach to alcohol use/driving by employees, but there was that additional policy advice.
80. For all these reasons I hope it will be apparent that much as there have been powerful submissions made, I am not with Mr Thorpe and Mr Lunat and the complaints of unfair dismissal and of wrongful dismissal are dismissed.
81. I should explain notwithstanding professional advocates on both sides that I will sign a short Judgment and it will be provided to the parties in due course. If either of the parties want the summary reasons they are entitled to ask for them within 14 days. Summary reasons are not published. They are for the parties to understand the basis on which the decision has been made.

82. If the parties then want the full written reasons they are also entitled to ask for them. That rule change is now impacting us on a daily basis and I just wanted to remind everybody of that, but for today I will sign a written Judgment and it will come to the parties in due course.

JM Wade

Employment Judge Wade

Date 28 July 2026

REASONS SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

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FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE

Public access to employment tribunal decisions

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