



EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Heard at: London South
On: 1 to 3 July 2026
Claimant: Ms E Satchell
Respondent: APX Estate Agents Limited
Before: Employment Judge Ramsden
Representation:
Claimant In person
Respondent Non-attending

JUDGMENT

1. The Claimant's complaints that:
 - a) She was wrongfully dismissed;
 - b) She was unfairly dismissed; and
 - c) She was treated unfavourably because she was on maternity leave by the manner in which she was dismissed (being notified of her dismissal when her P45 was sent to her by email),succeed.
2. The Respondent is Ordered to pay damages to the Claimant in the following sums:
 - a) **£1,234.40** for wrongful dismissal, being two months' gross wages;
 - b) **£2,636.46** for unfair dismissal, comprising a basic award of £ (the Claimant was aged 35 when she was dismissed on 30 April 2024 after three complete years' service, when she was paid a gross weekly wage of

£142.43. She was therefore entitled to three weeks' wages by way of basic award) and a compensatory award of £2,209.17; and

- c) **£10,666.67** by way of compensation for injury to feelings, comprising an award of £9,000 plus interest on that sum at the rate of 8% per annum from 28 May 2024 to the date of this hearing, being £1,666.67.
3. The total compensation payable to the Claimant is therefore **£14,537.53**.

REASONS

4. The Employment Judge has produced written reasons for her decision, in light of the Respondent's failure to attend, so the Respondent can understand the conclusions reached and the reasons for them.

Background

- 5. The Claimant worked for the Respondent from 4 May 2021, and commenced maternity leave on 8 August 2024. She was dismissed on 30 April 2024.
- 6. The Claimant was paid appropriately for that maternity leave until 30 April 2024.
- 7. On 28 May 2024, she was sent a P45 by the Respondent, dated 30 April 2024.
- 8. After a period of ACAS Early Conciliation that began on 3 July 2024 and ended on 14 August 2024, the Claimant presented a Claim to the Employment Tribunal on 27 August 2024. In that Claim, the Claimant said that:
 - a) She had been unfairly dismissed;
 - b) She had been treated unfavourably by the Respondent for a reason connected to her maternity leave when it dismissed her by email on 28 May 2024; and
 - c) She had been wrongfully dismissed (dismissed without notice or payment in lieu of notice).
- 9. In the Claim Form, the Claimant stated that her employment ended on 30 April 2024.
- 10. The Respondent filed a Response to the Claim in time, resisting each of the Claimant's complaints, but agreeing with the dates given by the Claimant for the start and end of her employment. In that Response, the Respondent said that:
 - a) Financial constraints meant that the Respondent could no longer afford to continue to employ the Claimant, and that it reached a verbal agreement with her to bring her employment to an end in return for payment of £1,500 (two months' compensation);
 - b) It was financial constraints, not pregnancy or maternity, that was the reason for terminating the Claimant's employment; and

- c) She was given three months' verbal notice to terminate her employment.
11. At the time that it filed the Response on 26 September 2024, the Respondent was professionally represented.
 12. The Tribunal sent the Respondent notice of the Preliminary Hearing for Case Management (to be held on 23 September 2025) and notice of this hearing, both on 9 January 2025. These documents were sent by post to the Respondent's representative, and by email to the Respondent directly, at arber@apxproperties.co.uk – the email address identified as the Respondent's email address in the Response Form, which also stated that the Respondent's preferred mode of contact was email.
 13. The Tribunal wrote to the Parties proposing to change the Respondent name from the name identified by the Claimant on the Claim Form to the name in the Response of APX Estate Agents Limited.
 14. On 10 January 2025, the Respondent's representative wrote to the Tribunal to inform it that that representative was no longer instructed in the matter.
 15. A Preliminary Hearing for Case Management was held on 23 September 2025 before EJ Harrington. The Respondent did not attend, but the Claim, and the complaints it comprises, were discussed by the Claimant with the Employment Judge, and those were set out in Orders of the same date. The Respondent name was amended to "APX Estate Agents Limited" in that hearing. Those Orders were sent by the Tribunal to the Parties on 10 October 2025.
 16. The Tribunal sent a letter to check that the Parties were ready for this hearing on 20 May 2026, requiring a response from each of the Parties on or before 3 June 2026. The letter warned the Parties that failure to respond to the questions within it may result in the Claim, or the Response, being struck-out for non-pursuit. The Claimant replied to say that this hearing was still needed, the Respondent did not reply.

Complaints

17. The Claimant's complaints, as defined in a Preliminary Hearing for Case Management before Employment Judge Harrington on 23 September 2025, are that:
 - a) She was unfairly dismissed, as described in section 99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, for a reason relating to pregnancy, childbirth and maternity (the **1996 Act**);
 - b) She was wrongfully dismissed when she was dismissed with no notice or pay in lieu of notice; and
 - c) She was treated unfavourably because of pregnancy when, during the protected period of additional maternity leave, she was dismissed by email

on 28 May 2024, contrary to section 18 of the Equality Act 2010 (the **2010 Act**).

18. The Respondent resisted those complaints in its Response, but has in effect not done anything to advance its resistance of the Claim since.

This hearing

Non-attendance by the Respondent

19. The Employment Judge made some enquiries on Companies House webcheck, and could see that the Respondent still exists on Companies House, and that Arber Panxha is still identified as a statutory director of that entity. It is this person with whom the Claimant says she had contact about the subject matter of her Claim.
20. The Employment Judge considered that the Respondent remained the correct respondent, and that there is no evidence to suggest that the Respondent has attempted to change its contact details registered with the Tribunal in respect of the Claim. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Respondent's representative and the Respondent were informed of this hearing with plenty of notice to prepare for it.
21. The Tribunal also made efforts yesterday afternoon to remind the Respondent via the email address it provided of this hearing, given that the Tribunal had not received any bundle of evidence or any witness statements from either Party. No telephone number had been provided by the Respondent to the Tribunal, and so we could not try those means.
22. Given the lack of attendance by the Respondent, the Employment Judge asked the Claimant more about her complaints, and the compensation she seeks in respect of them.

Adjustments

23. No adjustments were sought by the Claimant. The Respondent did not attend.

Representation

24. The Claimant appeared in person. The Respondent did not attend.

Documentary evidence

25. The Claimant told the Employment Judge that she did not have a copy of her contract of employment, but she sent to the Tribunal:
 - a) An email which supports her contention that she was sent a P45 by the Respondent on 28 May 2024 and that that was a surprise to the Claimant;
 - b) WhatsApp messages between the Claimant and the Respondent's Accountant, Ambi, which show the Claimant saying in June 2024 that there

was no consultation about the termination of her employment, and no notice monies paid to her;

- c) WhatsApp messages between the Claimant and the Respondent's director, Arber, where the Claimant refers to the fact that she was sent a P45 with no notice, that Arber had said she cannot return to work as the Respondent couldn't pay her, and that she has been left with no income and no valid reason for dismissal;
 - d) A copy of her P45 from the Respondent; and
 - e) A copy of her April 2024 payslip.
26. The Claimant also sent some documentary evidence about subsequent employment she has undertaken since her employment with the Respondent terminated, the first of which she informed the Employment Judge commenced in October 2024.
27. No documentary evidence was received from the Respondent.

The Claimant's position articulated in the hearing

28. The Claimant had emailed a witness statement to the Tribunal the day before the hearing. That witness statement contained a statement of truth.
29. The Employment Judge spoke to the Claimant about what happened, and received a basic timeline of events.
30. The Claimant described to the Employment Judge about how she felt about her employment being terminated when no one else's was. The Claimant told the Employment Judge that she believed the reason her employment was terminated was because of her maternity leave. She spoke about how that made her feel, including:
- a) How she was left feeling anxious about the financial situation she found herself in with two young children and no income;
 - b) How upset she was that the people she felt she had a good working relationship with had told her of her dismissal by email;
 - c) How the loss of her job, and in that way, had robbed her of a sense of self. How motherhood is precious, but "Emily" was taken away by her loss of working relationships, and the manner of her treatment; and
 - d) Her mother passed away very shortly afterwards. Her dismissal, and the loss of her mother, made what should have been a joyful time of life (having two young children) feel very, very different, when people she thought of as friends as well as colleagues dismissed her by emailing her P45.
31. None of this was challenged, because the Respondent did not attend.

32. The Employment Judge spoke to the Claimant about the “Vento” bands for degree of injury to feelings, and sent her the Seventh Addendum to the Presidential Guidance (applicable to her Claim, given the date it was presented). The Claimant said that she did not think her injury was in the top band, and it was low middle band, or high lower band. In the end, she said she thought it was high lower band.

Law

Automatic unfair dismissal where the reason or principal reason for dismissal is the pregnancy of the employee

33. Section 94(1) of the 1996 Act provides that:
“An employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer”.
34. Section 99 of the 1996 Act concerns leave for family reasons:
“(1) An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if-
...
(b) the dismissal takes place in prescribed circumstances.
...
(3) A reason or set of circumstances prescribed under this section must relate to-
(a) pregnancy, childbirth or maternity...”
35. Regulation 20 of the Maternity and Parental Leave etc Regulations 1999 sets out that:
“(1) An employee who is dismissed is entitled under section 99 of the 1996 Act to be regarded for the purposes of Part X of that Act as unfairly dismissed if-
(a) the reason or principal reason for the dismissal is of a kind specified in paragraph (3)...
(3) The kinds of reasons referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) are reasons connected with-
(a) the pregnancy of the employee...”
36. The words in Regulation 20(1)(a), referring to the “reason or principal reason” for dismissal, points the tribunal to examine the motivation of the decision maker to act as they did (*Kong v Gulf International Bank UK Ltd* [2022] IRLR 854).
37. The motivation of the employer is a question of fact for the tribunal to determine, on a consideration of all the evidence in the case (*Kuzel v Roche Products Limited* [2008] IRLR 530, CA).

Unfair dismissal: remedy

38. Section 112(2) of the 1996 Act provides that, where an employment tribunal finds a complaint of unfair dismissal to be well-founded, it should consider whether to make an Order for reinstatement (an Order that the claimant is to be treated as if they had not been dismissed) or re-engagement (an Order that the claimant be employed by the respondent, or by an associated employer, in comparable or other suitable employment).
39. Where the Tribunal does not consider it appropriate to make an award for reinstatement or re-engagement,
40. Compensation for unfair dismissal comprises a basic award, and a compensatory award.
41. The basic award is calculated using a formula prescribed in section 119 of the 1996 Act (it is a function of the claimant's age, length of service and week's pay).
42. The compensatory element of unfair dismissal compensation is designed to assess the net remuneration the claimant would have received had the dismissal not occurred.
43. Section 123 of the 1996 Act describes the compensatory award:

"(1) ... the amount of the compensatory award shall be such amount as the tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to the loss sustained by the complainant in consequence of the dismissal in so far as that loss is attributable to action taken by the employer.

(2) The loss referred to in subsection (1) shall be taken to include—

(a) any expenses reasonably incurred by the complainant in consequence of the dismissal, and

(b) subject to subsection (3), loss of any benefit which he might reasonably be expected to have had but for the dismissal...

(4) In ascertaining the loss referred to in subsection (1) the tribunal shall apply the same rule concerning the duty of a person to mitigate his loss as applies to damages recoverable under the common law of England and Wales or (as the case may be) Scotland..."
44. The guiding principle in determining the compensatory award is what is "*just and equitable in all the circumstances*", i.e., it is compensatory, not punitive (*Morgans v Alpha Plus Security Ltd* [2005] IRLR 234).

Unlawful discrimination: remedies generally

45. Section 124(2) of the 2010 Act applies where a tribunal has found that there has been a contravention of the work provisions in the 2010 Act. That provides that the tribunal may:

- a) Make a declaration as to the rights of the complainant and the respondent in relation to the matters to which the proceedings relate;
 - b) Order the respondent to pay compensation to the complainant; and/or
 - c) Make an appropriate recommendation.
46. The heads of compensation for unlawful discrimination could potentially include:
- a) Financial loss, such as bonuses not paid for discriminatory reasons;
 - b) Injury to feelings;
 - c) Personal injury where that injury has been caused by the discrimination;
 - d) Aggravated damages; and
 - e) Exemplary damages.
47. The legislative provisions concerning compensating claimants for unlawful discrimination or victimisation appear at section 119 and 124 of the 2010 Act.
48. Section 119 includes the following:
- “(4) An award of damages may include compensation for injured feelings (whether or not it includes compensation on any other basis).”*
49. The task for the Tribunal, if an award of compensation for injury to feelings is appropriate, is to assess *the degree* to which the claimant’s feelings have been injured by the unlawful discrimination or victimisation, i.e., the effect of the discriminatory act upon the particular claimant (*Eddie Stobart Ltd v Graham* [2025] EAT 14), not the gravity of the acts of the respondent (see *Komeng v Creative Support Ltd* UKEAT/0275/18/JOJ).
50. There has to be some evidence of injury to feelings before an award could be made to compensate for that injury (*Ministry of Defence v Cannock* [1994] IRLR 509), and the burden of demonstrating that injury and the degree of it sits with the claimant (*Graham*), but the EAT has recognised that it is usual that some injury to feelings in every kind of discrimination case (*London Borough of Hackney v Adams* [2003] IRLR 402).
51. The purpose of an injury to feelings to award is to compensate for the degree of injury to feelings, not to punish the discriminator or deter them from repeating the conduct in future (*Cannock*).
52. The EAT in the *Johnson* case summarised the legal principles relevant to attributing a value to an injury to feelings occasioned by unlawful discrimination as follows:
- a) Awards for injury to feelings are compensatory. They should be just to both parties. They should compensate fully without punishing the tortfeasor. Feelings of indignation at the tortfeasor’s conduct should not be allowed to inflate the award;

- b) Awards should not be too low, as that would diminish respect for the policy of the anti-discrimination legislation, but nor should they be excessive;
 - c) Awards should bear some broad general similarity to the range of awards in personal injury cases;
 - d) In exercising their discretion in assessing a sum, tribunals should remind themselves of the value in everyday life of the sum they have in mind. This may be done by reference to purchasing power or by reference to earnings; and
 - e) Tribunals should bear in mind the need for public respect for the level of awards made.
53. Some guidance as to degree of injury relative to the range of degrees of injury seen by the Employment Tribunal is provided by the *Vento* case itself, and by the Presidential Guidance entitled “*Employment Tribunal awards for injury to feelings and psychiatric injury following De Souza v Vinci Constructions (UK) Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 879*” from 5 September 2017, as supplemented by annual addenda thereafter. The upshot of those documents is that they set out “bands” of injury to feelings, and value ranges of compensation attaching to those bands. For a Claim Form presented on 27 August 2024, the bands (taken from the Seventh Addendum to the Presidential Guidance) are:
- a) The lower band (less serious cases) (in *Vento*, guidance as to the type of cases that would fall within this band was where the act of discrimination is an isolated or one off occurrence): £1,200 to £11,700;
 - b) The middle band (serious cases that do not merit an award in the upper band): £11,700 to £35,200;
 - c) The upper band (most serious cases): £35,200 to 358,700 (in *Vento*, this band was said to be appropriate for cases such as where there has been *a lengthy campaign of discriminatory harassment* on the ground of sex or race); and
54. Other considerations that may be relevant to inferring the degree of injury on a claimant include:
- a) The duration of the injury to the claimant’s feelings (*Graham*);
 - b) The effect of the injury on the claimant’s past, current and future work (*Graham*);
 - c) The effect of the injury on the claimant’s personal life or quality of life (*Graham*);
 - d) Whether the discrimination can be described as “overt”, as that is more likely to cause distress and humiliation (*Taylor v XLN Telecom Ltd [2010] IRLR 499*);

- e) Whether the discrimination was played out in front of colleagues or others (*Graham*);
 - f) If the discrimination is manifested in a way that depends on an asymmetry of power, influence or information, for example if it is expressed in disciplinary threats that create worry, or in exclusion which causes isolation (*Graham*); and
 - g) The timing of the discrimination, which may add to its seriousness or impose additional stress, for example, in the case of pregnancy discrimination which may create stress for an expectant mother, or detract from the joy associated with the birth (*Gilbank v Miles* [2006] IRLR 538). Similarly, age discrimination affecting a claimant approaching retirement may taint their perception of their career and the worth of their working life.
55. Regulation 2(1) of the Employment Tribunals (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) Regulations 1996 obliges the Tribunal, when making an award of damages for pregnancy/maternity discrimination (among certain other kinds of awards) to consider whether to include interest on the sums awarded, without the need for any application by a party to the proceedings. The methodology for calculating any such interest awarded is set out in those Regulations.
56. In particular, Regulation 6 provides:
- “(1) Subject to the following paragraphs of this regulation-*
- a) in the case if any sum for injury to feelings, interest shall be for the period beginning on the date of the contravention or act of discrimination complained of and ending on the day of calculation;*
 - b) in the case of all other sums of damages or compensation... interest shall be for the period beginning on the mid-point date and ending on the day of calculation...*
- (3) Where the tribunal considers that in the circumstances, whether relating to the case as a whole or to a particular sum in an award, serious injustice would be caused if interest were to be awarded in respect of the period or periods in paragraphs (1) or (2), it may-*
- (a) calculate interest, or as the case may be interest on the particular sum, for such different period, or*
 - (b) calculate interest for such different periods in respect of various sums in the award,*
- as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, having regard to the provisions of these Regulations.”*
57. The statutory rate of interest is 8% at present, and has been in the period since the Claimant's dismissal and the date of the hearing.

Facts and Conclusions

58. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Claimant was dismissed on 30 April 2024 – that is a matter that both Parties agree on (from the Claim Form and Response Form).
59. The Claimant therefore had three complete years' of service.

Wrongful dismissal

60. The Claimant said that she believed she was entitled to two months' notice from the Respondent. While there was no documentary evidence to support this, the Claimant's position was unchallenged by the Respondent. The Tribunal therefore finds that the Claimant was wrongfully dismissed.
61. It is clear from the WhatsApp messages shown to the Tribunal between the Claimant and each of Ambi and Arber that the Claimant had no notice of the termination of her employment.

Unfair dismissal

62. The Claimant's position, that she was the only person who was dismissed, was not challenged by the Respondent given its non-attendance. The Tribunal accepted what she said about that. The WhatsApp messages also support the Claimant's contention that there had been no consultation or discussion about it. The Tribunal finds that her dismissal was unfair.
63. It was clear from the Claim Form that the Claimant did not wish to be reinstated or re-engaged, she sought compensation only.
64. The Claimant was dismissed on 30 April 2024, after three complete years' service, aged 35, and her gross weekly wage at the time of her dismissal was £142.43. The basic award payable to her is therefore **£427.29**.
65. The Claimant said her earnings were such that she was below the threshold for income tax and employee's National Insurance contributions, and that is supported by the April 2024 payslip. Her net weekly wage was therefore £142.43.
66. The Tribunal accepts that the loss of income put the Claimant in a tough financial position when it came to funding childcare to enable her to take up a new job, but considers that it was reasonable for the Claimant to obtain employment at the same level of remuneration in a 12-week period. This part of the compensatory award payable to her is therefore 12 x £142.43, so £1,709.16.
67. The Claimant's dismissal meant that she lost her accrued statutory rights, and for this the Tribunal awards her £500.
68. The total compensatory award payable to the Claimant is therefore £1,709.16 plus £500, so **£2,209.16**.

Discrimination: the manner of informing the Claimant of her dismissal

69. It is clear from the WhatsApp messages between the Claimant and each of Ambi and Arber that the Claimant's dismissal came out of the blue, and that she was notified of it when she was sent her P45. While the Respondent's Response said that there had been a discussion and consultation, the Claimant disputed that, and the Respondent did not attend to proffer any evidence in that regard. The Tribunal therefore accepted the Claimant's account.
70. The Claimant also said that she believed she had been informed of her dismissal in the way she was – by her P45 being emailed to her – because she was on maternity leave. She described how this upset her deeply, and how she felt her identity as "Emily" was taken away by this, as she could not understand how the people she regarded as colleagues and friends from work could treat her in that way.
71. The financial loss from her dismissal is already compensated by the compensatory award for unfair dismissal. There is no assertion from the Claimant that she suffered personal injury, nor that aggravated or exemplary damages are appropriate. The focus here is therefore on the degree of injury to the Claimant's feelings, and whether and how that should be recognised in compensation.
72. The Tribunal is called upon to assess the degree to which the Claimant's feelings were injured by the manner in which she was told of her dismissal, and to compensate the Claimant appropriately for that injury, without punishing the Respondent.
73. The Employment Judge considered the Claimant's position on the degree of injury to her feelings to be a reasonable one. She accepted that her injury was not the most serious of cases, nor did it sit in the middle band, but it was significant, coming at a time in her life that added stress, feelings of loss of confidence and anxiety about whether she would be treated similarly by a future employer (when the Respondent, whom she regarded as colleagues and friends could treat her in this way) at a time that should have been joyful with her young children. Instead, the Claimant felt a loss of her non-mother identity, and guilt about feeling that way when she loves her children. It has been more than two years since that dismissal, and the Claimant still wept in the Tribunal hearing – the injury is still being felt.
74. The Tribunal therefore thinks that this injury rightly sits in the lower band, but towards the top of that band. The Employment Judge awards the Claimant £9,000 which, with interest, increases to £10,666.67.

Employment Judge Ramsden

Date: 1 July 2026

JUDGMENT AND REASONS SENT TO THE PARTIES ON
6 July 2026

For the Tribunal Office
P Wing

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Recording and Transcription

Please note that if a Tribunal hearing has been recorded you may request a transcript of the recording, for which a charge may be payable. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings, and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:

<https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/>

Appendix: List of issues from the Orders of EJ Harrington on 23 September 2025

1. Unfair dismissal

- 1.1 Was the Claimant dismissed?
- 1.2 If the Claimant was dismissed, what was the reason or principal reason for dismissal?
- 1.3 Was it a potentially fair reason?
- 1.4 Was the reason or principal reason for dismissal connected with the Claimant's pregnancy?

If so, the Claimant will be regarded as unfairly dismissed.

- 1.5 Was the reason or principal reason for dismissal redundancy?
- 1.6 If the reason was redundancy, did the Respondent act reasonably or unreasonably in all the circumstances, including the respondent's size and administrative resources, in treating that as a sufficient reason to dismiss the Claimant? The Tribunal's determination whether the dismissal was fair or unfair must be in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case. It will usually decide, in particular, whether:
 - 1.6.1 the Respondent adequately warned and consulted the Claimant;
The Claimant will say that there was absolutely no warning or consultation.
 - 1.6.2 the Respondent adopted a reasonable selection decision, including its approach to a selection pool;
The Claimant will say that she was never informed of any selection criteria or process that was followed.
 - 1.6.3 the Respondent took reasonable steps to find the Claimant suitable alternative employment;
A redundancy will be automatically unfair if there was redundancy during maternity leave and the person was not offered a suitable available vacancy.
 - 1.6.4 dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses.

2. Remedy for unfair dismissal

- 2.1 Does the Claimant wish to be reinstated to their previous employment?
- 2.2 Does the Claimant wish to be re-engaged to comparable employment or other suitable employment?

- 2.3 Should the Tribunal order reinstatement? The Tribunal will consider in particular whether reinstatement is practicable and, if the claimant caused or contributed to dismissal, whether it would be just.
 - 2.4 Should the Tribunal order re-engagement? The Tribunal will consider in particular whether re-engagement is practicable and, if the claimant caused or contributed to dismissal, whether it would be just.
 - 2.5 What should the terms of the re-engagement order be?
 - 2.6 If there is a compensatory award, how much should it be? The Tribunal will decide:
 - 2.6.1 What financial losses has the dismissal caused the claimant?
 - 2.6.2 Has the respondent proven that the claimant failed to take reasonable steps to replace their lost earnings, such as by failing to take reasonable steps to find another job?
 - 2.6.3 For what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?
 - 2.6.4 Is there a chance that the claimant would have been fairly dismissed anyway if a fair procedure had been followed, or for some other reason?
 - 2.6.5 If so, should the claimant's compensation be reduced? By how much?
 - 2.6.6 Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply?
 - 2.6.7 Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it by [specify alleged breach]?
 - 2.6.8 If so is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant? By what proportion, up to 25%?
 - 2.6.9 If the claimant was unfairly dismissed, did they cause or contribute to dismissal by blameworthy conduct?
 - 2.6.10 If so, would it be just and equitable to reduce the claimant's compensatory award? By what proportion?
 - 2.6.11 Does the statutory cap of fifty-two weeks' pay or [£105,707] apply?
 - 2.7 What basic award is payable to the claimant, if any?
 - 2.8 Would it be just and equitable to reduce the basic award because of any conduct of the claimant before the dismissal? If so, to what extent?
3. **Wrongful dismissal / Notice pay**
- 3.1 What was the Claimant's notice period?
 - 3.2 Was the Claimant paid for that notice period?
 - 3.3 If not, did the Claimant do something so serious that the respondent was entitled to dismiss without notice?

4. Pregnancy and Maternity Discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 18)

- 4.1 Did the Respondent treat the Claimant unfavourably by doing the following things:
 - 4.1.1 Dismissing her by email on 28 May 2024?
- 4.2 Did the unfavourable treatment take place in the protected period?
- 4.3 If not, did it take place after the protected period?
- 4.4 Was the unfavourable treatment because of the pregnancy?
- 4.5 Was the unfavourable treatment because the Claimant was on compulsory maternity leave or equivalent compulsory maternity leave/ the Claimant was exercising or seeking to exercise, or had exercised or sought to exercise, the right to ordinary or additional maternity leave or equivalent maternity leave?

5. Remedy for discrimination

- 5.1 Should the Tribunal make a recommendation that the respondent take steps to reduce any adverse effect on the claimant? What should it recommend?
- 5.2 What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant?
- 5.3 Has the respondent proven that the claimant failed to take reasonable steps to replace any lost earnings, such as by failing to take reasonable steps to find another job?
- 5.4 For what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?
- 5.5 What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?
- 5.6 Is there a chance that the claimant's employment would have ended in any event? Should their compensation be reduced as a result?
- 5.7 Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply?
- 5.8 Did the Respondent unreasonably fail to comply with it by [specify breach?
- 5.9 If so is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant?
- 5.10 By what proportion, up to 25%?
- 5.11 Should interest be awarded? How much?