



Home Office

Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: unaccompanied children

Version 5.0

May 2026

Executive summary

Unaccompanied (lone) children in Afghanistan form a particular social group (PSG). However, simply being a child in Afghanistan does not create a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.

Depending on their individual circumstances and the place of return, unaccompanied children may face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the Taliban or from non-state actors.

The Taliban control Afghanistan but apply policies unevenly across provinces.

The population is young, with more than half under 18. Family and community networks are central to caring for children and to accessing documentation and services.

Child protection and welfare issues include: the recruitment and use of boys by the Taliban and other armed groups, uneven access to civil documentation, including inconsistent birth registration and subjective age assessment, and widespread child labour, including hazardous work, partly linked to household coping strategies.

Child marriage continues, including where families face economic pressure and where girls cannot access education beyond grade 6.

Corporal punishment occurs, including under provisions in the Taliban's criminal procedure code for courts and through reported judicial corporal punishment.

Sexual violence affects women and girls. Sexual abuse of boys, including bacha bazi, also occurs. Children are trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation.

Access to education and healthcare remains limited. Girls cannot access education beyond grade 6. Barriers to healthcare include cost, uneven availability of services, and restrictions affecting women caregivers and female health staff.

Where the risk of harm comes from the Taliban, effective protection is unlikely to be available.

Where the risk comes from non-state actors, effective protection is also unlikely because the Taliban are generally unwilling or unable to provide it.

Internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable for an unaccompanied child who has no family to return to.

Where a child has family in Afghanistan, internal relocation may be reasonable, depending on the child's circumstances and the proposed place of return.

If a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as clearly unfounded.

Decision-makers must consider each case on its individual facts. The onus is on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

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Assessment

Section updated: 8 May 2026

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the [country information](#), refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of **whether, in general**:

- a person faces a real risk of persecution/serious harm Taliban or non-state actors due to their vulnerability as an unaccompanied child
- the state (or quasi state bodies) can provide effective protection
- internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution/serious harm
- a claim, if refused, is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under [section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002](#).

Decision makers **must**, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

This CPIN has been developed with assistance from Artificial Intelligence (AI). Where AI has been used, it has been reviewed by a human editor.

Sources cited in the [country information](#) may refer interchangeably to the Taliban (Taleban), Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), the Islamic Emirate, the interim government or the de facto authorities or government. Within this assessment, they are referred to as ‘the Taliban’ and, since 15 August 2021, are considered the controlling party of the state (for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention).

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1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

- 1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the Asylum Instructions on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#) and [Processing children's asylum claims](#).
- 1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the [Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants](#)).
- 1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check, when one has not already been undertaken (see [Biometric data-sharing process \(Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process\)](#)).
- 1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the [Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis](#)).

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1.2 Exclusion

- 1.2.1 Members of the Taliban, and non-state armed groups including the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), National Resistance Front (NRF), and Islamic State in the Khorasan Province (ISKP), have been responsible for serious human rights abuses.
- 1.2.2 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons to apply one (or more) of the exclusion clauses. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.
- 1.2.3 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).
- 1.2.4 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the instructions on [Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33\(2\) of the Refugee Convention](#), [Humanitarian Protection](#) and [Restricted Leave](#).

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1.3 Family tracing and links with Afghanistan

- 1.3.1 In the reported case [JS \(Former unaccompanied child – durable solution\) \(Afghanistan\) \[2013\] UKUT 568 \(IAC\)](#), heard on 14 March 2013 and 25 June 2013, and promulgated on 29 August 2013, the Upper Tribunal (UT) held that ‘...in practice, where the appellant has positively stated he does not want his family to be traced, has every incentive to mislead about his family history if advancing a false picture of events, and where in the absence of reliable data from the appellant the respondent would have no information with which to make tracing inquiries in Afghanistan, that it is improbable that a failure of the tracing duty is likely to be material’ (paragraph 39).
- 1.3.2 The England and Wales Court of Appeal (EWCA), in [EU \(Afghanistan\) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department \[2013\] EWCA Civ 32](#), heard on 17 December 2012 and promulgated on 31 January 2013, held that ‘Unaccompanied children who arrive in this country from Afghanistan have done so as a result of someone, presumably their families, paying for their fare ... The costs incurred by the family will have been considerable, relative

to the wealth of the average Afghan family ... [the family] are unlikely to be happy to cooperate with an agent of the Secretary of State for the return of their child to Afghanistan ...' (paragraph 10). The Court dismissed EU's appeal on the grounds that there was no link between the Secretary of State's breach of duty to endeavour to trace his family and EU's claim to remain in this country (paragraph 22).

- 1.3.3 Afghan migrants usually maintain contact with their families in their home country but the quality of the contact may depend on how long the person has been abroad, if they lived elsewhere before they left the region, for example in Iran or Pakistan, and whether their family still lives in Afghanistan (see section 10 of the [archived Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Unaccompanied children \(Version 3.0\)](#)).
- 1.3.4 For further guidance on tracing the family members of unaccompanied asylum seeking children see the Asylum Instructions on [Family tracing](#) and [Processing children's asylum claims](#).

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2. Convention reason(s)

- 2.1.1 Actual or imputed particular social group (PSG).
- 2.1.2 Establishing a convention reason is not sufficient to be recognised as a refugee. The question is whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of an actual or imputed Refugee Convention reason.
- 2.1.3 In the reported determination of [LQ \(Age: immutable characteristic\) Afghanistan \[2008\] UKAIT 00005](#), heard 6 October 2006 and promulgated on 15 March 2007, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) held that 'A person's age is an immutable characteristic' (headnote), and therefore children from Afghanistan constituted 'a particular social group' for the purposes of the Refugee Convention (paragraph 7).
- 2.1.4 In the country guidance case [HK & Ors \(minors, indiscriminate violence, forced recruitment by Taliban, contact with family members\) Afghanistan CG \[2010\] UKUT 378 \(IAC\)](#), heard on 15 July 2010 and promulgated 23 November 2010, the UT found that [LQ](#) is not to be regarded as any form of country guidance nor precedent for any general proposition that all children in Afghanistan form a PSG irrespective of their particular family circumstances (paragraph 42).
- 2.1.5 The EWCA, in [HK \(Afghanistan\) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department \[2012\] EWCA Civ 315](#), heard on 9 February 2012 and promulgated 16 March 2012, concurred with the findings in [HK & Ors](#), noting that the UT held that if the unaccompanied child has family to whom they can return, then [LQ](#) will be inapplicable (paragraph 8).
- 2.1.6 Unaccompanied (lone) children in Afghanistan form a PSG within the meaning of the Refugee Convention because they share an innate characteristic or a common background that cannot be changed (their age) **and** have a distinct identity in Afghanistan because they are outside of the traditional familial structure and are perceived as being different by the surrounding society.
- 2.1.7 Although unaccompanied (lone) children in Afghanistan form a PSG, this does not mean that establishing such membership is sufficient to be

recognised as a refugee. The question to be addressed in each case is whether the child has a well-founded fear of persecution on return on account of their membership of such a group.

- 2.1.8 For guidance on other convention reasons which may be relevant to children in Afghanistan see the relevant [country policy and information note](#).
- 2.1.9 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instructions on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#) and [Processing children's asylum claims](#).

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3. Risk

3.1 Risk based on being a child

- 3.1.1 Simply being a child in Afghanistan does not, on its own, give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.
- 3.1.2 Girls in Afghanistan are subject to widespread and systematic discrimination, which in general amounts to persecution (see the Country Policy and Information Note, [Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban](#)).
- 3.1.3 The EWCA considered unaccompanied children in [HK \(Afghanistan\) \[2012\]](#) and held that 'The onus is on the asylum seeker to make good the asylum claim, and that applies to children as it does to adults' (paragraph 34).
- 3.1.4 In [LQ](#), the AIT held that 'At the date when the appellant's status has to be assessed he is a child and although, assuming he survives, he will in due course cease to be a child, he is immutably a child at the time of assessment. (That is not, of course, to say that he would be entitled indefinitely to refugee status acquired while, and because of, his minority. **He would be a refugee only whilst the risk to him as a child remained**)' (paragraph 6 – emphasis added).
- 3.1.5 The EWCA, in [KA \(Afghanistan\) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department \[2012\] EWCA Civ 1014 \(25 July 2012\)](#), considered 'the eighteenth birthday point':

'Although the duty to endeavour to trace does not endure beyond the date when an applicant reaches that age [of 18 years], it cannot be the case that the assessment of risk on return is subject to such a bright line rule. The relevance of this relates to the definition of a "particular social group" for asylum purposes. In [DS](#), Lloyd LJ considered [LQ](#) (Age: immutable characteristic) Afghanistan [2008] UKAIT 00005 in which the AIT held that "for these purposes age is immutable", in the sense that, although one's age is constantly changing, one is powerless to change it oneself. Lloyd LJ said (at paragraph 54):

"that leaves a degree of uncertainty as to the definition of a particular social group. Does membership cease on the day of the person's eighteenth birthday? It is not easy to see that risks of the relevant kind to who as a child would continue until the eve of that birthday, and cease at once the next day."

'Given that the kinds of risk in issue include the forced recruitment or the sexual exploitation of vulnerable young males, persecution is not respectful

of birthdays – apparent or assumed age is more important than chronological age. Indeed, as submissions developed there seemed to be a degree of common ground derived from the observation of Lloyd LJ.’ (paragraph 18).

- 3.1.6 In the case of [ZH \(Afghanistan\) v Secretary of State for the Home Department \[2009\] EWCA Civ 470 \(07 April 2009\)](#), on eligibility for UASC Discretionary Leave, the EWCA held that:

‘The mere fact that a child applicant for asylum falls within the policy of the Secretary of State is not in my judgment of itself sufficient to discharge the burden on the child applicant to demonstrate that he is at real risk, or there is a serious possibility that he will be persecuted if returned. The threshold for what amounts to persecution is relatively high, the policy sidesteps that difficulty by being broader in scope. The unaccompanied child does not have to demonstrate that he would be at real risk of persecution if returned to fall within the Secretary of State’s policy. All he has to demonstrate is that he is unaccompanied, that his parents cannot be traced and that adequate reception arrangements cannot be made for him. Thus the policy is plainly broader in scope for perfectly understandable policy reasons than the narrower definition of what amounts to refugee status. Thus it does not follow automatically, simply from the fact that a child falls within the Secretary of State’s broader policy, that there is a real risk or a serious possibility that that particular child’s basic human rights will be so severely violated that he will suffer what amounts to persecution’ (paragraph 10).

- 3.1.7 For guidance on the UASC leave policy see the Asylum Instruction on [Processing children’s asylum claims](#).

- 3.1.8 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instructions on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#) and [Processing children’s asylum claims](#).

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3.2 Risk based on being an unaccompanied (lone) child in Afghanistan

- 3.2.1 Unaccompanied (lone) children, depending on their individual circumstances and the location to which they are returned, may be at real risk of persecution or serious harm from the Taliban and/or non-state actors.

- 3.2.2 For a general overview of ‘at risk groups’, which assesses those likely or unlikely to be at risk from the Taliban, see the Country Policy and Information Note, [Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban](#).

- 3.2.3 The Taliban’s definition of a child is based on physical signs of puberty rather than a person below the age of 18 (see [Definition of a child](#)). Access to civil documentation is uneven. Birth registration is inconsistent across the country and, where age is not documented, authorities and service providers can rely on subjective assessment based on appearance (see [Birth registration](#)).

- 3.2.4 Tazkiras are the key identity document for access to many services (including school registration). Children’s documentation is commonly linked to their father’s documentation so, in their absence, access is more difficult. Errors in dates of birth and personal details are more common in tazkiras where the applicant is without a birth certificate (see [Tazkiras](#)).

- 3.2.5 In the country guidance case of [HK and others \(minors- indiscriminate violence – forced recruitment by Taliban – contact with family members\) Afghanistan CG \[2010\] UKUT 378 \(IAC\)](#), heard 15 July 2010 and promulgated on 23 November 2010, the UT held that ‘While forcible recruitment by the Taliban cannot be discounted as a risk, particularly in areas of high militant activity or militant control, evidence is required to show that it is a real risk for the particular child concerned and not a mere possibility’ (headnote 2).
- 3.2.6 Although [HK and others](#) pre-dates the Taliban’s assumption of control over all of Afghanistan, available country information does not indicate that there are ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to depart from its main findings on risk to minors, including that forcible recruitment cannot be discounted but evidence is required to show it is a real risk for the particular child concerned.
- 3.2.7 The Taliban typically recruit boys aged 14 to 17, including through coercion, false promises or fraudulent circumstances. There is no formalised age verification mechanism to prevent underage recruitment into security forces. The UN verified cases of recruitment and use of boys by the Taliban including in combat and support roles, though far fewer in 2024 (11 cases) than in 2023 (342 cases), alongside reports of releases following engagement with the UN. Other armed groups, including ISIS-Khorasan (ISKP) and the National Resistance Front (NRF), target children and use them in direct hostilities. There are reports that the Taliban recruit children from schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan for enrolment in ‘jihadi madrassas’ linked to military training and indoctrination, although other research does not find evidence that public madrassas generally engage in militarised training (see [Forced recruitment](#)).
- 3.2.8 Regarding unaccompanied children, in the CG case of [AA \(unattended children\) Afghanistan CG \[2012\] UKUT 16 \(IAC\)](#), heard on 28 October 2010 and 23 May 2011, and promulgated on 1 February 2012, the UT held ‘... the background evidence demonstrates that unattached children returned to Afghanistan, depending upon their individual circumstances and the location to which they are returned, may be exposed to risk of serious harm, inter alia from indiscriminate violence, forced recruitment, sexual violence, trafficking and a lack of adequate arrangements for child protection’ (paragraph 93ii).
- 3.2.9 As held by the UT in [AA \(unattended children\)](#), decision makers must take into account such risks ‘when addressing the question of whether a return is in the child’s best interests, a primary consideration when determining a claim to humanitarian protection’ (paragraph 93ii).
- 3.2.10 Although [AA \(unattended children\)](#) pre-dates the Taliban’s assumption of control over all of Afghanistan, available country information does not indicate that there are ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to depart from the Tribunal’s finding that unattached children may be exposed to serious harm (including from forced recruitment, sexual violence, trafficking and lack of adequate child protection arrangements), depending on their circumstances and where they are returned. The risk factors identified in [AA \(unattended children\)](#) remain relevant to conditions described in the country information, including risks linked to documentation and age assessment, child labour, child marriage, corporal punishment,

sexual violence (including bacha bazi) and trafficking (see [Definition of a child](#), [Documentation](#) and [Violence against children](#)).

- 3.2.11 Child labour is widespread, including hazardous work. Some households use 'negative coping strategies' that include taking children out of school and engaging them in labour. Data indicates an increase in children sent to work outside the home between 2024 and 2025. Boys are primarily engaged in agricultural work and collecting firewood, and girls engage in domestic tasks such as cooking, fetching water and cleaning (see [Child labour](#)).
- 3.2.12 Child marriage continues despite a Taliban decree in December 2021 aimed at preventing forced marriage. Incidence of child marriage is linked to economic pressures and loss of income, and to restrictions on girls' education beyond grade 6, with some accounts describing families arranging marriages following education closures. Data indicates an increase in reported child marriage between 2024 and 2025 (from 323 to 746 respectively), and cases of families 'selling' girls into marriage, including to Taliban members (see [Child marriage](#)).
- 3.2.13 The Taliban's Criminal Procedure Code for Courts, issued in January 2026, includes provisions relating to violence against children, including a prohibition on some forms of physical violence by teachers that result in serious injury, while also allowing a father to punish a 10-year-old child in certain circumstances. The Code prescribes flogging extensively and without clear limitations. UNAMA reporting documents judicial corporal punishment against at least 943 individuals during 2025, including against 5 boys and 6 girls (see [Corporal punishment](#)).
- 3.2.14 Incidents of gender-based violence against women and girls, including rape, is reported by the UN between October 2024 and December 2025. The Taliban's Criminal Procedure Code for Courts does not specifically prohibit sexual violence against women and girls. Although outlawed, there continues to be a pattern of sexual slavery involving bacha bazi (the sexual exploitation of boys), with constraints on victim identification and access to protection services. Victims often do not report exploitation due to fear of punishment and stigma (see [Sexual violence, including bacha bazi](#)).
- 3.2.15 While the Taliban issued a decree in December 2024 to combat human trafficking, reporting indicates limited evidence of investigations, prosecutions, victim identification or protection. Children are exploited across a wide range of sectors, including forced labour, sex trafficking (including bacha bazi), domestic servitude, begging and other activities. Boys aged between 13 and 18, are forced to migrate for work, internally and abroad, to support their families (see [Trafficking](#)).
- 3.2.16 Girls are prevented from accessing education beyond grade 6 and are barred from secondary and higher education, while boys continue to access schooling at higher rates. Some girls may be forced to leave primary school earlier if they show physical signs of puberty. Some families turn to religious institutions, including madrassas, as an alternative, although reporting indicates increasing barriers for girls' access to Islamic education in some madrassas. Challenges affecting education quality, include shortages of trained (particularly female) teachers, insufficient materials, weak monitoring and gaps in school infrastructure, as well as closures of some education centres (see [Access to education, including religious schools \(madrassas\)](#)).

- 3.2.17 There are significant barriers to accessing healthcare, including affordability constraints, uneven availability of services (particularly in rural areas), and barriers affecting women and girls linked to movement restrictions and the limited availability of female staff. Reporting also describes monitoring and enforcement activity by the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (MPVPV) at healthcare facilities, including instructions affecting women's access in some locations, which can have direct and indirect implications for children (see [Access to healthcare](#)).
- 3.2.18 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instructions on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#) and [Processing children's asylum claims](#).

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3.3 Return and reception arrangements

- 3.3.1 In [HK \(Afghanistan\) \[2012\]](#), the EWCA held that it would not, in all cases, be appropriate to draw an adverse inference that the child would be safely received merely from the failure of the child to try to make contact with his or her family (paragraph 35). Conversely, nor did it necessarily follow that a child with no family to receive them in Afghanistan could not safely be returned (paragraph 36).
- 3.3.2 In the reported case of [ST \(Child asylum seekers\) Sri Lanka \[2013\] UKUT 00292 \(IAC\)](#), heard 30 April 2013 and promulgated on 31 May 2013, the UT confirmed that an assessment of risk (of conditions on return) is required on the hypothesis that the child will be removed at the time of decision (paragraph 29).
- 3.3.3 Therefore, decision makers must assess the risk of persecution or serious harm using the hypothetical scenario that the unaccompanied child will return to Afghanistan at the time of the decision, considering that return of the child would only take place where:
- family contact is established and ongoing
 - adequate reception arrangements are in place
 - it is in the best interests of the child, as a primary consideration, to leave the UK, return to their home country and reunite with their family members
 - safe and practical return arrangements are confirmed
- 3.3.4 UNICEF supports and documents large numbers of unaccompanied and separated children during returns from neighbouring countries and reunifies many children with family members through border and transit programmes. Family tracing and reunification are operated by humanitarian organisations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Afghan Red Crescent Society, using initiatives intended to reconnect separated families (see [Migration and return](#)). However, gaps in civil documentation among returnees and practical barriers to obtaining or replacing identity documents, can affect access to services and reintegration (see [Documentation](#)).
- 3.3.5 National social protection systems and child protection institutions remain under-resourced. Available services for children, adolescents and youth

include a nationwide Youth Help Line, supported by UNFPA, which provides confidential, toll-free information and counselling by trained male and female counsellors. Humanitarian planning for 2026 includes child protection case management, psychosocial support, parenting sessions, awareness and community mobilisation, training for humanitarian actors and coordination to strengthen referral pathways, with the scale of delivery dependent on funding levels (see [Adolescent and youth services](#)).

- 3.3.6 There are an estimated 1.6 million orphaned children in the country, with some living on the streets. Reporting describes Taliban closures of some private children's homes and the transfer of children, including orphans, to state-run facilities, with differing accounts about oversight, resources and purpose (see [Orphans and unaccompanied children](#)).
- 3.3.7 In the case of [Ravichandran \[1995\] EWCA Civ 16](#), the EWCA held that '... in asylum cases the appellate structure... is to be regarded as an extension of the decision-making process'. Thus, applying the general principle that the tribunal must consider asylum cases based on the latest evidence when considering return, including any which postdates the original decision. It must also take into account the hypothetical scenario, utilised in [ST \[2013\]](#), that return and reception arrangements are in place.
- 3.3.8 If adequate and sustainable reception arrangements with family members cannot be made, and there is no current prospect of them being made, and but for this it would be reasonable for the child to return, decision makers must consider granting UASC leave under paragraphs [352ZC to 352ZF of the Immigration Rules](#).
- 3.3.9 The EWCA held in [EU \(Afghanistan\)](#) that '... to grant leave to remain to someone who has no risk on return, whose Convention rights will not be infringed by his return, and who has no other independent claim to remain here ... is to use the power to grant leave to remain for a purpose other than that for which it is conferred' (paragraph 6).
- 3.3.10 For further guidance on reception arrangements for the return of unaccompanied children, see the Asylum Instruction on [Processing children's asylum claims](#).

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4. Protection

- 4.1.1 Where an unaccompanied (lone) child has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the Taliban, they are unlikely to be able to obtain protection.
- 4.1.2 An unaccompanied (lone) child who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from a non-state actor is unlikely to obtain protection from the Taliban. This is because in general, the Taliban is neither willing nor able to offer effective protection.
- 4.1.3 Following the repeal of child protection laws and the elimination of juvenile courts by the Taliban, there are limited specialised child protection mechanisms. Cases involving children are commonly handled under the Taliban's interpretation of sharia and relevant directives, with practice varying by province and court and some matters resolved outside formal court processes. There are reported instances where juveniles are held in

settings linked to adult detention, and cases where child victims (including trafficking victims) are placed in detention (see [Child rights and accountability](#) and [Juvenile justice](#)).

- 4.1.4 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instructions on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#) and [Processing children's asylum claims](#).

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5. Internal relocation

- 5.1.1 Internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable for an unaccompanied (lone) child without family to return to.
- 5.1.2 A child who has family in Afghanistan may be able to internally relocate, depending on their individual circumstances and the proposed return location. Each case must be considered on its facts.
- 5.1.3 In assessing the reasonableness of internal relocation for a child, decision makers should consider that access to documentation and essential services is uneven across Afghanistan, including urban-rural disparities. Country information indicates uneven availability of healthcare services (particularly in rural areas), and that some specialised services (for example, rehabilitation and assistive-device services for people with disabilities) are concentrated in a few urban centres. Where a child lacks family or community support and/or lacks documentation, these location-based disparities may make it more difficult to access shelter, healthcare and education in a proposed place of relocation (see [Documentation](#) and [Socio-economic rights](#)).
- 5.1.4 For additional factors to consider, see [Return and reception arrangements](#), and the [Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Humanitarian situation](#).
- 5.1.5 For further guidance on internal relocation and factors to consider, see the Asylum Instructions on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#) and [Processing children's asylum claims](#).

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6. Certification

- 6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
- 6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see [Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 \(clearly unfounded claims\)](#).

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Country information

About the country information

This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the [research methodology](#). It provides the evidence base for the assessment which, as stated in the [About the assessment](#), is the guide to the current objective conditions.

The structure and content follow a [terms of reference](#) which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

The COI included was published or made publicly available on or before 30 April 2026. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions. Where information is limited or absent, this may reflect constraints on monitoring, data collection and reporting in Afghanistan, including restrictions on civic space and media freedom and risks of retaliation. Decision makers should therefore treat an absence of reporting with caution and should not automatically draw adverse inferences from a lack of information.

Some sources refer to the general population rather than children specifically. They are included where they have direct or indirect implications for children.

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7. Taliban governance and rule of law

7.1 Overview

- 7.1.1 Sources described a highly centralised decision-making structure within the Taliban, the de facto government, with policies and directives issued from central leadership but implementation varied by locality^{1 2}. The January 2026 European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) report, Afghanistan Country Focus (covering October 2024 to November 2025), based on multiple sources, described the Taliban progressively consolidating rule and enforcing a strict interpretation of sharia that restricted personal rights and freedoms³.
- 7.1.2 UN reporting and other sources continued to describe extensive restrictions on women and girls in public life^{4 5}. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) update covering October to December 2025 described enforcement activity in Herat affecting women's freedom of movement and access to services, including instances where women not wearing chadors (a combination head covering, veil, and shawl) were prevented from accessing public transportation and markets, and where women not wearing burqas (a loose garment that covers the face and body)

¹ UK House of Commons, [Research Briefing: Recent developments in Afghanistan](#), 18 March 2025

² UNSC, [16th report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring ...](#) (para 5), 8 December 2025

³ EUAA, [Afghanistan Country Focus](#) (pages 16, 24), 22 January 2026

⁴ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan Oct to Dec 2025](#) (page 2), 8 February 2026

⁵ HRW, [World Report 2026: Afghanistan](#) (Women's and girls' rights), 2026

were prevented from accessing hospitals and healthcare clinics (before the burqa requirement was reportedly relaxed)⁶.

- 7.1.3 For further information on Taliban governance, rule of law, and restrictions on civilian rights, see the [Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban](#).

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8. Demography

8.1 Population

- 8.1.1 The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) estimated Afghanistan's population to be 43.8 million (2025 estimate), over half of whom were under 18⁷. Kabul's total population (children and adults) was estimated to be 5 to 6 million⁸.

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8.2 Family structure

- 8.2.1 Afghan society was described as family and community-centred, with many households including extended family members. A traditional patriarchal age hierarchy was commonly described, with decision-making authority frequently resting with the eldest male in the household^{9 10}.
- 8.2.2 Men were commonly expected to carry the primary economic responsibility for the household and boys were also expected to contribute economically and to help protect 'family honour' and discipline misbehaviour¹¹.
- 8.2.3 Survey data cited by UNICEF indicated comparatively large household sizes. One UNICEF source cited 2017 survey data stating that households had an average of 7.7 members and 3.7 children under 15, with more than half of the population living in households with 9 persons or more¹². More than a quarter of households were estimated to be headed by women^{13 14}.

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9. Legal framework

9.1 Definition of a child

- 9.1.1 The Taliban did not recognise people below 18 years as children¹⁵. Sources reported that the Taliban's definition of a child was not strictly age-based and could refer to physical signs of puberty^{16 17 18}.

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⁶ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan Oct to Dec 2025](#) (page 2), 8 February 2026

⁷ UNFPA, [Afghanistan Population 2025](#), 2025

⁸ EUAA, [Afghanistan: Country Focus](#) (page 91), 22 January 2026

⁹ Evason, N, Cultural Atlas, [Afghan Culture](#) (Family), 2019

¹⁰ UNICEF, [Child Notice Afghanistan](#) (page 21), 2018

¹¹ Evason, N, Cultural Atlas, [Afghan Culture](#) (Family), 2019

¹² UNICEF, [Child Notice Afghanistan](#) (page 21), 2018

¹³ UNHCR, [Afghanistan Monthly Protection Update As of October 2024](#), 2 December 2024

¹⁴ UNHCR, [Afghanistan Monthly Protection Update As of December 2024](#), 13 January 2025

¹⁵ UNHRC, [Study on the so-called law on the promotion of virtue ...](#) (paragraph 39), 12 March 2025.

¹⁶ UNSC, [Children and armed conflict in Afghanistan...](#) (paragraph 11), 21 November 2023

¹⁷ UNSC, [Children and armed conflict: report of the Secretary-General](#) (paragraph 24), 2 June 2024

¹⁸ UNHRC, [Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: report ...](#) (paragraph 54), 20 February 2025

9.2 Child rights and accountability

- 9.2.1 The USSD Trafficking in Persons (TiP) Report 2025, covering the period from 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025, noted that observers reported that the Taliban revoked Afghanistan’s constitution and criminal code, including child protection laws, and now based judicial processes on their interpretations of religious jurisprudence. Enforcement was inconsistent, with local leaders issuing varying edicts following the dismantling of specialised institutions, and lawyers were barred from citing the pre-August 2021 penal code, leaving vulnerable groups without effective legal protection¹⁹. This was the same assertion made in the USSD TiP Report 2024²⁰.
- 9.2.2 In 2023, human rights group, Rawadari, described limited specialised child protection mechanisms following the repeal of child protection laws and the elimination of juvenile courts by the Taliban²¹. The UN Special Rapporteur noted in 2024 that crimes against children were often handled through non-judicial mechanisms and gender-based discrimination affected girls in particular²².

See also [Juvenile justice](#)

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10. Documentation

10.1 General accessibility

- 10.1.1 Access to civil documentation was uneven, with barriers including cost, travel distance, administrative capacity constraints and inconsistent procedures²³. Children’s access to documentation was often tied to their parents’ documentation, which could create additional barriers for unaccompanied children and child-headed households²⁴.

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10.2 Birth registration

- 10.2.1 In a report dated August 2023, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) cited persistent weaknesses in civil registration and uneven birth registration, including urban–rural and income disparities and additional barriers faced by some nomadic and semi-nomadic groups²⁵. The same report noted that where age was not documented, authorities and service providers relied on subjective age assessment based on the person’s appearance²⁶. The 2022/2023 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) by UNICEF indicated that having proof of age and identity was one form of protection against ‘... entering into marriage or the labour market, or being conscripted into the armed forces, before the legal age.’²⁷
- 10.2.2 The 2022/2023 MICS reported that 47.8% of nearly 33,000 children under

¹⁹ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Prosecution), 2025

²⁰ USSD, [2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Prosecution), 24 June 2024

²¹ Rawadari, [The Human Rights Situation of Children...](#) (page 21), November 2023

²² UNHRC, [Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: report ...](#) (paragraph 33), 23 February 2024

²³ IOM, [Documentation and legal identification in Afghanistan](#) (page 15), August 2023

²⁴ Samuel Hall, [Documentation & Legal ID ...](#) (page 5), December 2023

²⁵ IOM, [Documentation and legal identification in Afghanistan](#) (page 11), August 2023

²⁶ IOM, [Documentation and legal identification in Afghanistan](#) (page 51), August 2023

²⁷ UNICEF, [Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey \(MICS\) 2022–23](#) (page 201), May 2023

five (covered by the survey) had their births registered²⁸, and 54.6% were without a birth certificate²⁹.

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10.3 Tazkiras

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- 10.3.1 In their August 2023 report, tazkiras (paper and biometric e-tazkiras) were described by the IOM as ‘the most important document for Afghans’ under the Taliban, as they were required for access to a wide range of services, including school registration, humanitarian and government aid, banking, legal processes, travel, and obtaining a passport³⁰. The same source estimated that around 60% of the population held a tazkira and reported that older versions generally continued to be accepted under the Taliban, although availability and the type issued varied by province³¹. Access had become more difficult since August 2021 due to increased costs, office closures, reduced staffing and unequal geographic coverage³².
- 10.3.2 IOM reported that a child’s legal identity was usually linked to their father’s documentation, stating that ‘if their parents lack documentation, this typically means their children will also lack it.’³³ Children were generally required to obtain their own tazkira from around the age of 7 in order to enrol in school³⁴. Unaccompanied minors and child heads of household were more likely to lack documentation, particularly where no male relative was available to confirm identity³⁵. IOM also noted that errors in dates of birth and personal details were more common for tazkira applicants without birth certificates³⁶.
- 10.3.3 Barriers in obtaining tazkiras were compounded for children from female-headed households or if they were unaccompanied. IOM reported that mothers’ documentation was generally not accepted, and that where fathers were absent or deceased, children often depended on other male relatives who were not always willing to assist, creating a ‘domino effect when parents do not have any form of identification.’³⁷ A subsequent Samuel Hall research brief, dated December 2023, similarly found that ‘Unaccompanied minors and children who are heads of households in Afghanistan often struggle to access assistance if they lack any form of documentation, as they are unable to rely upon other relatives to confirm their identity’, adding that while community leaders might vouch for identity in

²⁸ UNICEF, [Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey \(MICS\) 2022–23](#) (page 203), May 2023

²⁹ UNICEF, [Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey \(MICS\) 2022–23](#) (page 338), May 2023

³⁰ IOM, [Documentation and legal identification in Afghanistan](#) (pages 33 and 34), August 2023

³¹ IOM, [Documentation and legal identification in Afghanistan](#) (page 12), August 2023

³² IOM, [Documentation and legal identification in Afghanistan](#) (page 15), August 2023

³³ IOM, [Documentation and legal identification in Afghanistan](#) (pages 21 and 25), August 2023

³⁴ IOM, [Documentation and legal identification in Afghanistan](#) (page 21), August 2023

³⁵ IOM, [Documentation and legal identification in Afghanistan](#) (page 25), August 2023

³⁶ IOM, [Documentation and legal identification in Afghanistan](#) (page 17), August 2023

³⁷ IOM, [Documentation and legal identification in Afghanistan](#) (page 25), August 2023

areas of origin, enrolment and access to services in new locations were even more difficult³⁸.

- 10.3.4 In the context of continued returns and displacement, a September 2025 briefing by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) highlighted a significant civil documentation gap among returnees and the practical barriers to obtaining or replacing tazkiras, which could impede reintegration and legal protection, such as the ability to access essential services, like healthcare, education and employment³⁹.

See also [Migration and return](#)

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11. Socio-economic rights

11.1 Access to education, including religious schools (madrassas)

- 11.1.1 As reported in March 2026, girls continued to be prevented from accessing education beyond grade 6 for the fifth year. Restrictions on girls' education was later extended to higher education (universities)^{40 41}. At least 2.2 million girls were unable to attend school^{42 43}. While no girls aged 13 to 17 years were attending secondary school, 81% of boys were enrolled in school⁴⁴, with only slightly more than half of those in secondary education⁴⁵.

- 11.1.2 The UN Secretary-General reported in June 2024 that the Taliban encouraged people to send children to madrassas, which focussed on Islamic education⁴⁶. UNESCO's Afghanistan Education Situation Report 2025 stated that, 'In the absence of access to public schooling beyond Grade 6 for girls, some families have turned to religious institutions, particularly madrasas, as the only remaining option for girls to continue learning.'⁴⁷ However, it noted that, 'As of August 2025, girls in madrasas are also facing growing barriers to accessing Islamic education.'⁴⁸

- 11.1.3 The UNESCO report noted the continued decline of the 'overall quality and relevance of education ...', which was compounded by the '... acute shortages of trained teachers (especially female educators), insufficient teaching and learning materials, weak assessment and monitoring systems and widespread gaps in school infrastructure.'⁴⁹

- 11.1.4 Freedom House reported that, in December 2024, '... the Ministry of Health issued instructions banning women from participating in midwifery, nursing and other health-related education.'⁵⁰

- 11.1.5 UNAMA stated that women were banned from studying at medical institutes since 2 December 2024, adding that on 14 November 2025 the Taliban's

³⁸ Samuel Hall, [Documentation & Legal ID ...](#) (page 5), December 2023

³⁹ NRC, [Tackling the Tazkira \(National ID\) Documentation Gap ...](#) (pages 1, 2), September 2025

⁴⁰ Kabul Now, [Taliban Starts New School Year, Girls Above Sixth Grade Remain Barred](#), March 2026

⁴¹ Amu TV, [Afghanistan starts fifth school year without girls above sixth grade](#), 23 March 2026

⁴² UNESCO, [Afghanistan Education Situation Report 2025](#) (page 9), October 2025

⁴³ UNICEF, [Statement by UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell ...](#), 17 September 2025

⁴⁴ OCHA, [Afghanistan: HNRP 2026](#) (page 42), 30 December 2025

⁴⁵ WHO, [Afghanistan: Public Health Situation Analysis \(PHSA\)](#) (page 18), 4 March 2026

⁴⁶ UNGA, [The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for ...](#) (paragraph 3), 13 June 2024

⁴⁷ UNESCO, [Afghanistan Education Situation Report 2025](#) (page 23), October 2025

⁴⁸ UNESCO, [Afghanistan Education Situation Report 2025](#) (page 44, endnote 8), October 2025

⁴⁹ UNESCO, [Afghanistan Education Situation Report 2025](#) (pages 8 and 12), October 2025

⁵⁰ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2025: Afghanistan](#), 2025

National Examination Authority held the 2025 medical student graduation examinations and that ‘No women were permitted to take part in the examination.’⁵¹

- 11.1.6 In its annual report covering 2024, Rawadari reported that in October 2024 the Taliban shut down an education centre in Kandahar that had provided education to ‘orphaned and abandoned children’ for over 10 years and reassigned the premises to a madrassa, telling students who did not want religious education to leave⁵².
- 11.1.7 Rawadari’s annual human rights report for 2025 (published March 2026) stated that the Taliban ‘continued to deprive women of fundamental rights such as education’ and that, during 2025, they adopted a ‘more stringent policy’ on women and girls’ education, including by ‘identifying and shutting down clandestine educational centres’ and prohibiting the teaching of ‘modern subjects’ that had previously been offered in some religious schools⁵³. The same source stated that the Taliban intended to convert some girls’ schools into madrassas and that 2 girls’ schools in Kandahar city had already been converted⁵⁴.
- 11.1.8 Rawadari reported that, following the enforcement of the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (PVPV) law, restrictions were ‘significantly intensified’ for girls below grade 6 (described as ‘children younger than 12 years’)⁵⁵. It stated that these measures included compulsory larger scarves and full-length clothing, compulsory face masks in a number of provinces, and prohibitions on cosmetics and jewellery. It also reported that girls who did not comply were subjected to ‘punishment, humiliation, and verbal abuse’ and, in some cases, had their clothing torn or were expelled from school⁵⁶. The same source stated that officials of the MPVPV maintained a ‘continuous presence’ in state and private schools to monitor compliance⁵⁷.
- 11.1.9 For further information on the PVPV law, see the [Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban](#).
- 11.1.10 Rawadari reported that in Kandahar the PVPV department distributed ‘mahram cards’ to girls below grade 6, including 9-year-olds, requiring them to be accompanied by a male guardian when travelling to and from school⁵⁸. It also stated that, in some schools in Helmand and Ghazni, girls who were aged 9 and ‘physically tall or of a bigger build’ had been barred from attending classes⁵⁹. Rawadari commented that, because many children begin school at age 7, this could mean ‘a great number of girls will only be able to continue their education up to Grade Three.’⁶⁰
- 11.1.11 Rawadari reported that during 2025 the Taliban shut down at least 15 private educational centres, 41 English language classes and 11 computer classes that provided education to girls and women and detained at least 13

⁵¹ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan: Oct to Dec 2025](#) (page 2), 8 February 2026

⁵² Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2024](#) (page 32), March 2025

⁵³ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 59), March 2026

⁵⁴ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 59), March 2026

⁵⁵ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 60), March 2026

⁵⁶ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 60), March 2026

⁵⁷ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 60), March 2026

⁵⁸ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 60), March 2026

⁵⁹ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 60), March 2026

⁶⁰ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 60), March 2026

teachers (including 8 women). It also reported closures in Paktika province of at least 267 classes with more than 800 girl students enrolled⁶¹.

- 11.1.12 UNICEF reported that in 2025 it ‘... supported over 4 million children in public schools, Community-Based education (CBe) and emergency settings with teaching and learning materials.’⁶²

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11.2 Access to healthcare

- 11.2.1 Sources reported significant barriers to accessing healthcare for all Afghans, including affordability constraints, uneven availability of services (particularly in rural areas), and barriers affecting women and girls linked to movement restrictions and the limited availability of female staff^{63 64 65}. UNAMA’s update covering October to December 2025 described unannounced visits by MPVPV officials to healthcare facilities in Kandahar and Uruzgan, relaying instructions that women (including healthcare workers) without mahrams should not be allowed access to hospitals or clinics⁶⁶.

- 11.2.2 For further information on healthcare services see the [Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Healthcare and medical treatment](#).

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11.3 Children with disabilities

- 11.3.1 According to UNAMA (cited in the media in 2024 and 2025), an estimated 1.5 million Afghans lived with ‘significant’ disabilities. Remnants of war were the leading cause, and children were among those most affected^{67 68}.

- 11.3.2 The World Health Organization (WHO) Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA), dated March 2026, noted that, ‘Decades of conflict have left an estimated 800 000 Afghans (2.7% of the population) with a range of severe disabilities. The main categories of disability are physical (37%), sensory (26%) and multiple disabilities (46%). Between 60-80% of people with disabilities live in rural and informal urban settlements. Women with disabilities face discrimination, accessibility constraints, and insufficient specialized services.’⁶⁹

- 11.3.3 Regarding rehabilitation facilities, the PHSA stated ‘Clinics frequently lack accessibility features, adapted examination facilities, or sign language support. Essential services such as physiotherapy, assistive devices, and rehabilitation are concentrated in a few urban centres leaving rural residents and those with limited mobility particularly vulnerable.’⁷⁰

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⁶¹ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 62), March 2026

⁶² UNICEF, [UNICEF in Afghanistan Annual Report 2025](#) (page 26), 2025

⁶³ OCHA, [Afghanistan: HNRP 2026](#) (page 52), 30 December 2025

⁶⁴ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan Oct to Dec 2025](#) (page 3), 8 February 2026

⁶⁵ HRW, [World Report 2026 Afghanistan](#), 2026

⁶⁶ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan Oct to Dec 2025](#) (page 3), 8 February 2026

⁶⁷ UN Web TV, [Persons with Disabilities in Afghanistan](#), 3 December 2024

⁶⁸ Pajhwok, [UNAMA estimates 1.5m Afghans living with disabilities](#), 3 December 2025

⁶⁹ WHO, [Afghanistan: Public Health Situation Analysis \(PHSA\)](#) (page 7), 4 March 2026

⁷⁰ WHO, [Afghanistan: Public Health Situation Analysis \(PHSA\)](#) (page 11), 4 March 2026

12. Juvenile justice

12.1 Judicial process

- 12.1.1 Since August 2021 there was no clear, consistently applied legal framework specifically setting out children's rights in the justice system, and proceedings involving children were commonly handled under the Taliban's interpretation of sharia and relevant directives^{71 72}. Rawadari indicated in 2023 that practice varied by province and by court, and that only a limited number of cases involving child offenders were formally addressed in court (including some 'moral' cases), with many other matters resolved through non-judicial mechanisms⁷³.
- 12.1.2 In their 2025 annual report, Rawadari stated that Taliban judicial bodies 'deny defendants access to legal counsel' and relied on confessions obtained through torture⁷⁴.
- 12.1.3 The UN Special Rapporteur stated in March 2025 that the Taliban's failure to recognise people below 18 years as children, '... has created significant legal and protection gaps. Under Taliban rule, children can be subjected to the same punishments as adults, including corporal punishments.'⁷⁵
- 12.1.4 Rawadari reported that, in 2025, a primary urban court in Daikundi province issued a sentence of 'amputation of the hand' against a 15-year-old child on a theft charge, but that this was reduced on appeal and the child was sentenced instead to detention at a 'youth rehabilitation and training centre.'⁷⁶
- 12.1.5 For general information on the justice system and administration of justice, see the [Country Policy and Information Note: Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban](#).

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12.2 Juvenile detention

- 12.2.1 Rawadari stated in their 2024 annual report that 'there is currently no law governing the conditions of detention and the duration of custody' and described how some Taliban entities operated their own detention facilities and, in many cases, punished detainees outside the judicial process⁷⁷.
- 12.2.2 The same source stated that in some provinces, juvenile rehabilitation centres were transferred to public prisons, resulting in young girls being detained alongside adult female prisoners. It stated that this practice 'exposes the young girls to the risk of sexual abuse'.⁷⁸ The USSD TiP Report 2025 also indicated that authorities have, in some cases, placed child trafficking victims in detention alongside adults⁷⁹.
- 12.2.3 Rawadari reported in 2025 that, more generally, intelligence forces detained people 'without presenting any official documentation, issuing formal

⁷¹ Rawadari, [The Human Rights Situation of Children...](#) (page 21), November 2023

⁷² USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Prosecution), 2025

⁷³ Rawadari, [The Human Rights Situation of Children...](#) (page 21), November 2023

⁷⁴ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 51), March 2026

⁷⁵ UNHRC, [Study on the so-called law on the promotion of virtue ...](#) (paragraph 39), 12 March 2025.

⁷⁶ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (pages 52 to 53), March 2026

⁷⁷ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2024](#) (page 17), March 2025

⁷⁸ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2024](#) (page 28), March 2025

⁷⁹ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Protection), 2025

charges, or observing human rights standards and the principles of a fair trial', and that during detention individuals were deprived of rights including being informed promptly of the reasons for arrest and 'access to legal counsel.'⁸⁰

- 12.2.4 UNAMA reported on the role of the MPVPV in enforcement activity, including that MPVPV inspectors had discretionary powers which included detention for short periods⁸¹.

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13. Child soldiers

13.1 Forced recruitment

- 13.1.1 According to the US Department of Labor (USDOL) 2024 report on child labour, 'The Taliban typically recruit boys between the ages of 14 and 17, and 97 percent of these recruits become part of the Taliban's security forces. Some children were coerced or recruited under false promises or fraudulent circumstances. The Taliban do not have a formalized age verification mechanism to ensure that children are not being recruited into their security forces.'⁸² The USDOL made the same assertions in its 2023 report⁸³.
- 13.1.2 The UN confirmed the recruitment and use of 11 boys by the Taliban in 2024 – 4 in combat and 7 in support roles⁸⁴ – compared to 342 boys recruited the previous year, most of whom were released⁸⁵. Following engagement between the Taliban and the UN in the 2024, 58 children were released and reintegrated⁸⁶. According to an Afghan analyst, cited in the January 2026 EUAA Country Focus, '... many children have been removed from armed forces in this process, and young boys are not present among Taliban fighters in the same manner as directly after the takeover – although it was not a very common sight back then either.'⁸⁷
- 13.1.3 The USSD TiP Report 2025 repeated the same information as its 2024 TiP report⁸⁸, stating that although the Taliban denied recruiting child soldiers, there were continued allegations of recruitment and use of child soldiers by the Taliban 'through coercion and fraud', including in support roles, and reported claims that some local officials recruited children by falsifying ages on identification cards⁸⁹.
- 13.1.4 The USSD TiP Report 2025 also described armed groups recruiting children from schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan and enrolling them in 'jihadi madrassas' providing military training and religious indoctrination⁹⁰. However, according to a research paper cited in the January 2026 EUAA Country Focus, no support was found to indicate public madrassas were 'engaging in militarised training or education', though it could not be ruled out

⁸⁰ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 34), March 2026

⁸¹ UNAMA, [Report on the Implementation, Enforcement and Impact of the ...](#) (page 9), 10 April 2025

⁸² USDOL, [2024 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor](#) (page 2), 2025

⁸³ USDOL, [2023 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor](#) (page 1), September 2024

⁸⁴ UNSC, [Children and armed conflict: report of the Secretary-General](#) (paragraph 14), 17 June 2025

⁸⁵ UNSC, [Children and armed conflict: report of the Secretary-General](#) (paragraph 16), 2 June 2024

⁸⁶ UNSC, [Children and armed conflict: report of the Secretary-General](#) (paragraph 21), 17 June 2025

⁸⁷ EUAA, [Afghanistan Country Focus](#) (page 72), 22 January 2026

⁸⁸ USSD, [2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Trafficking profile and Prosecution), 2024

⁸⁹ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Trafficking profile and Prosecution), 2025

⁹⁰ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Trafficking profile), 2025

that ‘madrassas were being used for recruitment into the de facto administration.’⁹¹ One of the researchers, Rahimi, later told the EUAA that ‘although public jihadi madrassas may be used to identify suitable future de facto officials, it may take many years to complete such an education.’⁹²

- 13.1.5 According to the USSD TiP Report 2025, other armed groups, including the ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K or ISKP) and the National Resistance Front (NRF), used children in ‘direct hostilities’, targeting children from ‘impoverished and rural areas.’⁹³ Whilst the 2026 EUAA Country Focus cited a 2023 research study which suggested that ‘the ISKP sought to recruit university students’, and a UN report also reported on the recruitment of ‘more educated individuals.’⁹⁴

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14. Violence against children

14.1 Child labour

- 14.1.1 The USDOL 2024 report indicated widespread child labour in Afghanistan, including hazardous work and worst forms of child labour. The USDOL assessed the country as making ‘no advancement’ in its efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labour during the reporting period, and that it was complicit in the use of forced child labour⁹⁵. The report stated that ‘the humanitarian crisis following the Taliban takeover in August 2021 resulted in an increase in the prevalence of child labor and exacerbated existing risks for girls’, and that the Taliban ‘demonstrated complicity in the forced recruitment of children for use in armed conflict.’⁹⁶
- 14.1.2 The 2026 EUAA Country Focus stated that some households adopted ‘negative coping strategies’, including ‘taking children out of school and engaging them in child labour’, in response to economic hardship⁹⁷.
- 14.1.3 The USSD TiP Report 2025 described trafficking-related exploitation of children across a wide range of sectors and noted that some children, predominantly boys in early- to late-adolescence, were ‘forced by families to migrate unaccompanied’ for work in Afghanistan or abroad to support their families⁹⁸.
- 14.1.4 A comparative analysis of the 2024 and 2025 Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (WoAA) showed an increase in child labour, finding that children sent to work outside the home ‘rose from 1,977 in 2024 to 4,938 in 2025.’⁹⁹
- 14.1.5 A UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report on the security situation and protection in 2025, noted that:
- ‘Child engagement in income-generating activities remained a significant protection concern throughout 2025. Overall, 23% of households reported

⁹¹ EUAA, [Afghanistan Country Focus](#) (page 73), 22 January 2026

⁹² EUAA, [Afghanistan Country Focus](#) (page 73), 22 January 2026

⁹³ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Trafficking profile), 2025

⁹⁴ EUAA, [Afghanistan Country Focus](#) (page 73), 22 January 2026

⁹⁵ USDOL, [2024 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor](#) (page 1), 2025

⁹⁶ USDOL, [2024 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor](#) (page 1), 2025

⁹⁷ EUAA, [Afghanistan Country Focus](#) (page 78), 22 January 2026

⁹⁸ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Trafficking profile), 2025

⁹⁹ OCHA, [Afghanistan: HNRP 2026](#) (page 9), 30 December 2025

that their children were involved in income-generating or labour-related tasks during the year. Boys were primarily engaged in agricultural work and collecting firewood, while girls were mostly involved in cooking, fetching water, and cleaning. Of particular concern, 20% of households reported that children performed income-generating or labour-related activities during school hours, directly affecting their school attendance and limiting their access to education.¹⁰⁰

See also [Trafficking](#)

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14.2 Child marriage

- 14.2.1 Despite a December 2021 decree preventing forced marriage, the practice continued^{101 102 103}. Prevalence of child marriage was linked to economic pressures and loss of income, particularly in areas in the south which saw high returns¹⁰⁴. A 2025 academic paper noted that ‘Rural areas are particularly vulnerable to increased levels of child marriage as poverty and illiteracy are more dominant.’¹⁰⁵
- 14.2.2 Reporting also commonly linked the continued restriction of girls’ education beyond grade 6 to increased vulnerability to early marriage^{106 107}. Reported cases of child marriage rose from 323 in 2024 to 746 in 2025, according to a comparative analysis of the 2024 and 2025 Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (WoAA)¹⁰⁸.
- 14.2.3 Rawadari’s 2024 annual report included accounts linking restrictions on girls’ education to child/forced marriage. In one example relating to the December 2024 closure of medical institutes to women and girls, it quoted a student who said that after the closure her father ‘forcibly married me to the son of one of his friends.’¹⁰⁹
- 14.2.4 Rawadari reported an example it described as a ‘serious case’ of human rights violations against women, in which, in June 2025, a man gave his 7-year-old daughter in marriage to a man aged over 50 in settlement of a debt. According to Rawadari, after public reaction the de facto authorities detained both parties and the case was referred to a Taliban court, which ruled that the girl ‘should be given in marriage to this man once she reaches the age of nine.’¹¹⁰
- 14.2.5 The USSD TiP Report 2025 stated that ‘According to an international organization, the dire economic and security situation, political instability, and other factors such as drought in several provinces exacerbate the problem of families “selling” girls into marriages, including in cases involving Taliban members. Some women and girls are forced into marriage to escape

¹⁰⁰ UNHCR, [UNHCR Afghanistan; Protection Monitoring Summary 2025](#) (page 7), April 2026

¹⁰¹ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan: April to June 2025](#) (page 4), 10 August 2025.

¹⁰² USSD, [2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices](#) (section 3b), 12 August 2025

¹⁰³ OCHA, [Afghanistan: HNRP 2026](#) (page 9), 30 December 2025

¹⁰⁴ OCHA, [Afghanistan: HNRP 2026](#) (pages 6 and 9), 30 December 2025

¹⁰⁵ Anon and others, [The Impact of Afghanistan’s Policies on Early Child Marriage ...](#), October 2025

¹⁰⁶ UNICEF, [As new school year starts in Afghanistan, almost 400,000 more girls ...](#), 22 March 2025

¹⁰⁷ IPS, [Afghanistan: Ban on Girls’ Education Linked to Rise in Forced and Child ...](#), 3 October 2025

¹⁰⁸ OCHA, [Afghanistan: HNRP 2026](#) (page 9), 30 December 2025

¹⁰⁹ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2024](#) (page 31), March 2025

¹¹⁰ Rawadari, [Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025](#) (page 73), March 2026

Afghanistan.¹¹¹

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14.3 Children of former government officials

- 14.3.1 For information on the treatment of family members, including children, within the civilian and security personnel of the former government, see the Country Policy and Information Note, [Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban](#).

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14.4 Corporal punishment

- 14.4.1 In January 2026, the Taliban issued the ‘Criminal Procedure Code for Courts’¹¹², of which the policy and research organisation, Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), published an English translation¹¹³. Rawadari noted regarding corporal (physical) punishment that, ‘In Article 18 and other articles, the punishment of flogging has been prescribed very extensively and without clear limitations. This punishment, constitutes corporal punishment and degrading treatment, which conflicts with the principle of human dignity and the absolute prohibition of torture and cruel punishment.’¹¹⁴

- 14.4.2 The Code included articles on violence against children, namely:

- Article 30, which prohibits physical forms of violence against children by teachers that result in bone fracture, bleeding, or bruising ‘black and blue’
- Article 48, which allows a father, ‘out of a sense of expediency’ to ‘punish his ten-year-old child due to the neglect of his prayer, and other such instances.’^{115 116}

- 14.4.3 Rawadari noted that the Code ‘... indirectly legitimises the perpetration of other forms of abuse, maltreatment, and punishment of children.’¹¹⁷

- 14.4.4 Between 1 January and 31 December 2025, UNAMA documented judicial corporal punishment against at least 943 individuals, including 5 boys and 6 girls^{118 119 120 121}.

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14.5 Sexual violence, including bacha bazi

- 14.5.1 In its October to December 2024 human rights update, UNAMA stated that it documented cases of gender-based violence against women and girls, including rape¹²². In reports covering periods between January and December 2025, UNAMA also noted that it had documented cases of

¹¹¹ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Trafficking profile), 2025

¹¹² Rawadari, [Press Release Regarding the Implications of the ...](#) (page 4), 21 January 2026

¹¹³ AAN, [AAN’s unofficial translation of the Penal Code for Courts](#), 26 February 2026

¹¹⁴ Rawadari, [Press Release Regarding the Implications of the ...](#) (page 4), 21 January 2026

¹¹⁵ Rawadari, [Press Release Regarding the Implications of the ...](#) (pages 4, 5), 21 January 2026

¹¹⁶ AAN, [AAN’s unofficial translation of the Penal Code for Courts](#), 26 February 2026

¹¹⁷ Rawadari, [Press Release Regarding the Implications of the ...](#) (page 5), 21 January 2026

¹¹⁸ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan: January to March 2025](#) (page 5), 1 May 2025

¹¹⁹ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan: July to Sept 2025](#) (page 5), 27 October 2025

¹²⁰ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan: April to June 2025](#) (page 5), 10 August 2025.

¹²¹ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan Oct to Dec 2025](#) (page 4), 8 February 2026

¹²² UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan Oct to Dec 2024](#) (page 4), January 2025

gender-based violence against women and girls^{123 124 125}. The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts, issued in January 2026, did not specifically prohibit sexual violence against women and girls^{126 127}.

- 14.5.2 The USSD TiP Report 2025 described a pattern of sexual slavery (bacha bazi) during the reporting period, alongside significant constraints on victim identification and access to protection services¹²⁸. Bacha bazi (literally, ‘boy play’) was described by AAN as ‘... the practice of an adult man enslaving and exploiting a boy for sexual abuse, typically also forcing him to wear female clothing.’¹²⁹
- 14.5.3 Although the practice was outlawed under the previous administration¹³⁰, and was also criminalised by the Taliban¹³¹, the USDOL 2024 report noted that it ‘... reportedly continued among influential local leaders, Taliban leaders, and military commanders.’¹³² The USSD TiP Report 2025 noted ‘Observers report cases of bacha bazi by the Taliban and nearly all armed groups.’¹³³ The same report stated that some families with large debt ‘knowingly “sell” their children into sex trafficking, including bacha bazi.’¹³⁴
- 14.5.4 According to UN Women, research into bacha bazi was very difficult¹³⁵, and the USSD TiP Report 2025 noted that ‘Observers reported bacha bazi victims often did not report their exploitation out of fear of punishment from the Taliban and social stigma.’¹³⁶ AAN noted in a June 2025 report that the practice was ‘a social taboo for many years, despite being an open secret.’¹³⁷

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14.6 Trafficking

- 14.6.1 The USSD TiP Report 2025 maintained Afghanistan at Tier 3¹³⁸, which means a country’s government does not fully meet the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TPVA) and is not making significant efforts to do so¹³⁹. The TiP Report 2025 referred to a December 2024 Taliban decree to combat human trafficking, declaring it illegal and directing relevant ministries to manage anti-trafficking efforts, investigate human-trafficking crimes and raise public awareness¹⁴⁰. However, there was limited evidence of meaningful investigations, prosecutions, victim identification or

¹²³ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan: January to March 2025](#) (page 3), 1 May 2025

¹²⁴ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan: April to June 2025](#) (page 4), 10 August 2025.

¹²⁵ UNAMA, [Human rights situation in Afghanistan Oct to Dec 2025](#) (page 3), 8 February 2026

¹²⁶ Rawadari, [Press Release Regarding the Implications of the ...](#) (page 5), 21 January 2026

¹²⁷ WHO, [Afghanistan: Public Health Situation Analysis \(PHSA\)](#) (page 17), 4 March 2026

¹²⁸ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Intro), 2025

¹²⁹ AAN, [Law, Control, Fear – and some Defiance ...](#) (page 39, footnote 20), December 2025

¹³⁰ UN Women, [Afghanistan: Gender Country Profile 2024](#) (page 30), 2024

¹³¹ UNHCR, [Guidance Note on Afghanistan - Update II](#) (paragraph 40), September 2025

¹³² USDOL, [2024 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor](#) (page 1), 2025

¹³³ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Trafficking profile), 2025

¹³⁴ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Trafficking profile), 2025

¹³⁵ UN Women, [Afghanistan: Gender Country Profile 2024](#) (page 30), 2024

¹³⁶ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Protection), 2025

¹³⁷ AAN, [Manoeuvring through the cracks: The Afghan human rights ...](#) (page 40), June 2025

¹³⁸ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Intro), 2025

¹³⁹ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report](#) (A guide to the tiers), 2025

¹⁴⁰ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Prevention), 2025

protection during the reporting period¹⁴¹.

14.6.2 Regarding protection, the USSD TiP Report 2025 stated:

‘An NGO reported operating two shelters for child victims of crime and children who were homeless in Kabul, which could also assist child victims of trafficking ... The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) operated an orphanage for boys, which could assist victims of crime, including human trafficking ... Civil society representatives reported significant challenges maintaining or receiving approval to provide protection services, a lack of capacity, and limited funding continued to hinder efforts to combat trafficking. Observers reported the Taliban resisted discussing sex trafficking or allowing protection services for victims, particularly women and girls.’¹⁴²

14.6.3 According to the USSD TiP Report 2025:

‘Most Afghan trafficking victims are children forced to work in carpet making, brick kilns, domestic servitude, sex trafficking (including bacha bazi), domestic work, herding livestock, agriculture, workshops, construction, mining, begging, low-skilled labor, poppy cultivation and harvesting, salt mining, petty crime, drug smuggling, weapons trafficking, truck driving, and in the transportation and hotel sectors. Civil society experts indicate boys are more vulnerable to trafficking than girls, especially in bacha bazi. Children, predominantly boys between the ages of 13 and 18, are forced by their families to migrate unaccompanied for work to other parts of Afghanistan or abroad to Türkiye, Iran, or Pakistan to support their families.’¹⁴³

14.6.4 The same report noted:

‘Afghan boys and men are subjected to forced labor and debt bondage in agriculture and construction, primarily in Iran, Pakistan, Greece, Türkiye, and the Gulf states. Observers reported since August 15, 2021, some Afghan refugees in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Türkiye, Europe, and Central Asia are afraid to report exploitation for fear of deportation back to Afghanistan. Traffickers in Iran, including Iranian criminal groups, exploit Afghan children in forced labor as beggars and street vendors and in forced criminality, including drug trafficking and the smuggling of fuel and tobacco. Iranian police sometimes detain, torture, and extort Afghan child trafficking victims before deportation. The Iranian government and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps compel Afghan migrants, including children as young as 12 years old, to fight in Iran-aligned militia groups deployed to Syria, including through force and by threatening them with arrest and deportation to Afghanistan.’¹⁴⁴

See also [Child labour](#) and [Sexual violence, including bacha bazi](#)

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15. Childcare and protection

15.1 Adolescent and youth services

15.1.1 A Youth Help Line (YHL), supported by UNFPA, operating in Afghanistan since 2012, was described as:

¹⁴¹ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Prosecution and Protection), 2025

¹⁴² USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Protection), 2025

¹⁴³ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Trafficking profile), 2025

¹⁴⁴ USSD, [2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan](#) (Trafficking profile), 2025

‘... a nationwide, youth friendly health service to provide information and counseling for adolescents and youth on issues related to their health and reproductive health. The YHL is providing a vital service to young people around the country who are dialing the toll-free number “120” from any phone to speak to a professionally trained youth health counselor. These conversations are confidential, free of judgment, and do not require parental consent. The average reach of the YHL per year is 120,000 adolescents and youth served by full-time male and female counselors.’¹⁴⁵

15.1.2 Data from 2018 to 2025 showed that over 1.3 million people accessed the YHL service, which was aimed primarily at young people aged between 10 and 24 years. The highest number of youths accessing the service were aged between 17 and 19 years. The majority were single and just over half were female¹⁴⁶.

15.1.3 Regarding help provided in 2025, UNICEF noted in its 2025 annual report that ‘Through UN-to-UN partnership with UNESCO, more than 2,100 adolescents and youth gained literacy and skills in agriculture, textiles and manufacturing.’¹⁴⁷

15.1.4 The same report noted:

‘A total of 329,000 people received structured mental health and psychosocial services delivered through child-friendly spaces, multi-purpose centres, schools and health facilities ...

‘... more the 400 child-friendly spaces across Afghanistan provided children with safe and structured environments aiming to restore a sense of normalcy, offer psychosocial support, and provide opportunities for play, education, and social interaction.’¹⁴⁸

15.1.5 Global Protection Cluster (GPC) noted in March 2026 that ‘National social protection systems and child protection institutions remain under-resourced and unable to deliver long-term protective services at scale.’¹⁴⁹

15.1.6 The USDOL 2024 report noted that, under the previous government, Child Protection Units existed to ensure children were not recruited by armed groups. However, the report added that, ‘Prior to the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan did not have sufficient Child Protection Unit reporting channels to identify children, prevent them from joining the security forces, or provide shelter, services, and family reintegration. Research was unable to determine whether Child Protection Units have continued to function after the Taliban takeover.’¹⁵⁰

15.1.7 For more information on shelter needs, see the [Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Humanitarian situation](#).

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¹⁴⁵ UNFPA, [Youth Health Line Standard Operating Procedure](#), 5 March 2024

¹⁴⁶ UNFPA, [Youth Health Line](#), no date

¹⁴⁷ UNICEF, [UNICEF in Afghanistan Annual Report 2025](#) (page 39), 2025

¹⁴⁸ UNICEF, [UNICEF in Afghanistan Annual Report 2025](#) (page 30), 2025

¹⁴⁹ GPC, [Afghanistan; Protection Analysis Update; February 2026 ...](#) (page 6), March 2026

¹⁵⁰ USDOL, [2024 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor](#) (page 6), 2025

15.2 Orphans and unaccompanied children

- 15.2.1 Islamic Relief, a faith-based relief and development agency, reported in November 2024 that there were an estimated 1.6 million orphaned children in Afghanistan, ‘... many of whom find themselves living on the streets ...’¹⁵¹
- 15.2.2 UNICEF reported that at the peak of returns in 2025 it had ‘... supported more than 8,000 unaccompanied and separated children from Iran and Pakistan.’¹⁵² During large-scale returns from Iran in June 2025, UNICEF Australia reported that around 5,000 children were unaccompanied among approximately 250,000 returnees that month¹⁵³.
- 15.2.3 Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (RFERL) reported in January 2026 that the Taliban forcibly closed down several private children’s homes and transferred the children, many of whom were orphans, to state-run facilities. Whilst the Taliban claimed the change was to improve oversight and care, critics argued that ‘government-run children’s homes lack resources’ and that they could be used to ‘spread the Taliban’s extremist worldview and ideology.’¹⁵⁴ According to a Taliban spokesman, 60 children’s homes were run by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, housing 10,000 boys and girls, where they receive ‘education and care.’¹⁵⁵
- 15.2.4 The most recent quantitative Child Protection Area of Responsibility (CP AoR) output data available was up to end of 2024 (published in May 2025), which reported that:
- ‘Between January and December 2024, child protection area of responsibility (CP AOR) partners reached 4,103,597 children (36%) and caregivers (64%) to provide among other services, risk mitigation and response child protection, case management, capacity building, mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) key information messaging and structured MHPSS through child-friendly spaces, health facilities, transitional care centres and schools. Among the people reached 13,000 had disabilities. CP AOR achievements in 2024 were reached with only 54% funding of the USD 42.9M budget. The limited funding of only 54%, the ban on female staff and other de facto authorities (DFA) impediments, surfaced as main challenges.’¹⁵⁶
- 15.2.5 According to Humanitarian Action’s narrative on the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) 2026, which described planned humanitarian action:
- ‘Mental health and psychosocial support services will be offered through child-friendly spaces and community-based services, along with referrals to specialized care. Awareness campaigns and community mobilization will raise awareness of child protection issues, through dialogues, media, and limited virtual support through child call centres. The CP AoR will train humanitarian actors and community volunteers on child protection

¹⁵¹ Islamic Relief, [From loss to hope: The resilience of Afghanistan’s orphaned ...](#), 26 November 2024

¹⁵² UNICEF, [Afghan children returning from Iran face uncertainty and rising ...](#), 10 March 2026

¹⁵³ UNICEF Australia, [Nowhere to turn: Afghan families forced to return](#), 14 July 2025

¹⁵⁴ RFERL, [Taliban Cracks Down On Private Children’s Homes In Afghanistan](#), 25 January 2026

¹⁵⁵ RFERL, [Taliban Cracks Down On Private Children’s Homes In Afghanistan](#), 25 January 2026

¹⁵⁶ CP AoR, [Child Protection Area of Responsibility Response Afghanistan Response Monitoring Dashboard - Jan-Dec 2024](#), 19 May 2025

standards, as well as strengthen coordination at the national and sub-national levels to improve service delivery, integration and referral pathways. Centrality of protection will be supported by integrating with other clusters and working groups such as education, health, GBV [gender-based violence], adolescent and youth, mine action, nutrition and WASH [water, sanitation and hygiene] ...

'If only 50 per cent of funding is received, CP AoR will focus on lifesaving case management services for 35,000 children, structured psychosocial support (PSS) for 135,000 children, and parenting sessions for 312,500 caregivers, while training 225 humanitarian workers. With 25 per cent funding, 28,000 children will receive case management services and 67,500 will receive PSS, while 187,500 caregivers will receive parenting sessions.'

¹⁵⁷ At the time of writing this CPIN there were no reports that quantified outputs on the number of children reached.

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16. Migration and return

16.1 Family contact and support networks

16.1.1 UNICEF stated that it reunified about 17,400 unaccompanied children with their families in 2024 through its border and transit programmes¹⁵⁸. And, by the end of 2025, 'UNICEF had documented and supported more than 6,000 unaccompanied and separated children and reunited them with their families and relatives.'¹⁵⁹

16.1.2 In an article dated September 2025, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported on the reunion of 2 families in Afghanistan through the ICRC's [Trace the Face](#) website, which 'helps migrants and their families reconnect.'¹⁶⁰

16.1.3 Atlas Press News Agency reported in December 2025 that the ICRC, working alongside the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS), '... has launched a program to help reconnect families separated in Afghanistan ... The "Family Reunification" program seeks to establish safe communication channels to reconnect separated individuals with their families.'¹⁶¹

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16.2 Treatment of returnees

16.2.1 For information on returnees, see the [Country Policy and Information Note: Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban](#).

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¹⁵⁷ Humanitarian Action, [HNRP 2026 Protection: Child Protection](#), 14 January 2026

¹⁵⁸ UNICEF USA, [Children Returning to Afghanistan Need Urgent Support](#), 13 August 2025

¹⁵⁹ UNICEF USA, [Children Returning to Afghanistan Need Urgent Support](#), 13 August 2025

¹⁶⁰ ICRC, [Afghanistan: Families reconnected through Restoring Family Links ...](#), 23 September 2025

¹⁶¹ Atlas Press, [Red Cross Launches Program to Reunite Separated Families ...](#), 21 December 2025

Research methodology

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the [Common EU \[European Union\] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information \(COI\)](#), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation's (ACCORD), [Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual](#), 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI's relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

- the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
- how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
- the currency and detail of information
- whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the [bibliography](#).

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Terms of Reference

The 'Terms of Reference' (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the [country information](#).

The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

- Taliban governance and rule of law (including restrictions affecting women and girls and implications for children)
- Demography and family/social norms (including role of extended family networks)
- Legal framework (including definition of a child and child protection/accountability mechanisms)
- Documentation (birth registration/age documentation, tazkira access and replacement)
- Socio-economic rights (education, including madrassas, healthcare, disability)
- Juvenile justice (process and detention, including detention of child victims)
- Child soldiers (recruitment and use; vulnerabilities and reported recruitment linked to schools/madrassas)
- Violence against children (child labour; child marriage, corporal punishment, sexual violence/exploitation including bacha bazi, trafficking)
- Childcare and protection (youth services; orphans, care arrangements and risks)
- Migration and return (family contact/support networks)

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Version control and feedback

Clearance

Below is information on when this note was cleared:

- version **5.0**
- valid from **11 May 2026**

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section

The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section

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Changes from last version of this note

Updated country information and refreshed assessment.

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Feedback to the Home Office

Our goal is to provide accurate, reliable and up-to-date COI and clear guidance. We welcome feedback on how to improve our products. If you would like to comment on this note, please email the [Country Policy and Information Team](#).

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The [Independent Advisory Group on Country Information](#) (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to support them in reviewing the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of approach of COI produced by the Home Office.

The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office's COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. The IAGCI may be contacted at:

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Information about the IAGCI's work and a list of the documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector's pages of the [gov.uk website](#).

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