

# Security Standard – Domain Management (SS-031)



Chief Security Office

Date: 29/04/2026

This Domain Management Security Standard is part of a suite of standards, designed to promote consistency across the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), and supplier base with regards to the implementation and management of security controls. For the purposes of this standard, the term DWP and Department are used interchangeably.

Technical security standards form part of the DWP Digital Blueprint which is a living body of security principles, architectural patterns, code of practice, practices and radars, that aim to support Product Delivery Units (PDUs) and suppliers in delivering the DWP and HMG Digital Strategy. Security standards and policies considered appropriate for public viewing are published here:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dwp-procurement-security-policies-and-standards>

Technical security standards cross-refer to each other where needed, so can be confidently used together. They contain both mandatory and advisory elements, described in consistent language (see table below).

*Table 1 – Terms*

Term	Intention
<b>must</b>	denotes a requirement: a mandatory element.
<b>should</b>	denotes a recommendation: an advisory element.
<b>may</b>	denotes approval.
<b>might</b>	denotes a possibility.
<b>can</b>	denotes both capability and possibility.
<b>is/are</b>	denotes a description.

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## 2. Revision History

Version	Author	Description	Date
1.0		First published version	13/11/2017
1.1		<p>10.3.1 added - An alias defined in a CNAME RR MUST have no other resource records of other types (e.g. MX, A), except any DNSSEC-related records used to protect the integrity of the CNAME record. Domains that are used for e-mail must not have a CNAME record.</p> <p>10.3.2 changed the reporting email addresses</p> <p>10.3.4 updated the links and added - DKIM keys MUST be rotated at least every 12 months.</p>	17/12/2021
2.0		<p>Full update in line with current best practices and standards;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Updated Intro, purpose, audience, scope; added reference to CIS v8 security controls</li> <li>• Added NIST CSF references</li> <li>• Compliance changed to Security Assurance</li> </ul> <p>11.2.1 Clarified TTL value. 11.2.2 Added requirement that internal domains hosted in</p>	27/01/2023

		<p>cloud environments must not be publicly resolvable.</p> <p>11.2.3 Changed to 'allow' listed</p> <p>11.2.6 Requirement added for Certification Authority Authorisation</p> <p>11.2.7 Requirement added for MFA on DNS admin accounts</p>	
2.1		<p>All NIST references reviewed and updated to reflect NIST 2.0</p> <p>All security measures reviewed in line with risk and threat assessments</p> <p>Approval history - Review period changed to up to 2 years</p> <p>Scope – Internal and external domains</p> <p>11.1.1 Register similar domain names moved from 11.2.5</p> <p>11.1.4 UK Domain Registry; role-based email address</p> <p>11.1.5 Annual review; proxy registration service; decommissioning DNS records</p> <p>11.1.6 RFC-compliant configurations</p> <p>11.1.7 Sovereign/national trusted providers</p> <p>11.1.8 Annual review</p> <p>11.1.9 Two ADNS servers</p>	29/04/2026

		<p>11.2.1 load balancers and fail-over devices</p> <p>11.2.2 Must; IP allowlists, firewall rules, ACLs</p> <p>11.2.3 IXFR</p> <p>11.2.6 all; configurations; HOSTS files</p> <p>11.2.7 Patching protocol-level vulnerabilities</p> <p>11.2.8 RFC-compliant configurations</p> <p>11.2.9 DNS forwarders and packet reassembly</p> <p>11.3.2 including those without email services</p> <p>11.3.5 Enable DNSSEC</p> <p>11.3.8 DoT and DoH</p> <p>11.3.9 Platform agnostic DNS</p> <p>11.4 DNS Logging &amp; Monitoring</p> <p>Internal references – Patching Standard</p> <p>Abbreviations – RFCs;</p>	
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### 3. Approval History

Version	Name	Role	Date
1.0		Chief Security Officer	13/11/2017
2.0		Chief Security Officer	27/01/2023
2.1		Chief Security Officer	29/04/2026

This document is continually reviewed to ensure it is updated in line with risk, business requirements, and technology changes, and will be updated at least every 2 years - the current published version remains valid until superseded.

### 4. Compliance

Compliance with this standard will be verified through various methods, including but not limited to;

- controls tests performed by 1<sup>st</sup> line teams and by 2<sup>nd</sup> line activities (e.g. security testing teams)
- security assurance activities to ensure that Architectural Design and delivery are appropriate and aligned to applicable Authority Security Standards. [See Security Assurance Strategy – Ref. C].
- independent external audit

Results of these will be fed back to the appropriate Authority Risk and System Owners.

### 5. Exceptions Process

In this document the term “**must**” is used in bold letters to indicate a mandatory security measure. Any exceptions to the application of this standard, or where specific security measures cannot be adhered to, **must** be presented to the Authority. This **must** be carried out prior to deployment and managed through the design caveats or exception process.

Such exception requests will invoke the Risk Management process to clarify the potential impact of any deviation to the configuration detailed in this standard.

Exceptions to the standard **must** be maintained on a risk register for accountability, traceability, and security governance reporting to senior management.

## 6. Audience

This document is intended for, but not necessarily limited to, technical architects, engineers, developers, security teams, project teams, including suppliers engaged in the design, development, implementation and operation of systems, services and applications.

## 7. Accessibility Statement

Users of this standard **must** consider accessibility design requirements as appropriate. Further information on accessibility standards can be found in Appendix F.

## 8. Introduction

This Domain Management Security Standard defines the minimum technical security measures that **must** be implemented for use within the Authority.

As this standard only provides minimum measures, they **should** be exceeded as appropriate depending on the threats and risks that need to be addressed, the sensitivity of the data, and in keeping with latest security enhancements.

The security measures are derived from industry best practice i.e. guidance published by NIST, CIS and OWASP (see Appendix C for full list external references) and support the implementation of appropriate security controls as selected by the Authority or our third party providers, such as the CIS Critical Security Controls set. [see External References]

Every effort has been made to ensure the security measures are vendor and technology agnostic as far as possible; this is to ensure greater applicability of the standard regardless of the technologies used. The security measures **may** be implemented in different ways, depending on the technology choices and business requirements in question.

The aim of this standard is to:

- ensure security controls that are applicable to domain management are implemented consistently across the Authority and by third party providers where applicable.
- mitigate risks from common threats and vulnerabilities associated with domain management, to an acceptable level for operation.
- support the achievement of security outcomes described in Appendix A.

Technical security standards ultimately support the achievement of security outcomes sought by the Authority. They set the expectations for what needs to be done to achieve them and why, and provide an objective, measurable statement of the Authority's existing security posture in a number of important areas. The outcomes are based on the official NIST sub-categories where possible to ensure close alignment with the NIST Cyber Security Framework (CSF), and are enabled by the implementation of controls from the CIS Critical Security Controls set. [see External References]. Those relevant to the subject of each standard can be found in Appendix A of every technical security standard.

## **9. Purpose**

The purpose of this standard is to ensure that Authority systems and services are designed, configured, deployed, and managed consistently to protect against typical threats at the OFFICIAL tier.

This standard also serves to provide a baseline in which assurance and compliance activities can be carried out, so that the Authority can be assured that security obligations are being met or exceeded.

## **10. Scope**

This standard provides security measures that apply to all Authority owned or operated domain names (i.e. 'internal'), or those owned or managed by an Authority supplier or contracted third party as part of an Authority activity (i.e. 'external').

For internal domains, responsibility for domain resolution services lies with Digital teams, however the domain name itself and the destination it resolves to are the responsibility of individual business areas.

External domains support Authority business services being accessed over the Internet and provides requests to be routed to the appropriate network boundary controls either in on-premise or the Authority’s Cloud, although typically, all Internet facing services are Cloud hosted. Many externally facing domains are not utilised or ‘parked’, to prevent malicious phishing from taking place (see section 11.1.1).

Throughout this document, the term *domain* should be interpreted the same as the term *Internet domain name* – a hierarchical structure of human-readable names resolved by Domain Name System (DNS) servers.

Any queries regarding the security measures laid out in this standard **should** be sent the Authority.

## 11. Minimum Technical Security Measures

The following section defines the minimum security measures that **must** be implemented to achieve the security outcomes described in Appendix A. For ease of reference, the official NIST sub-category ID is provided against each security measure e.g. PR.PT-3, to indicate which outcome(s) it contributes towards. Refer to Appendix A for full description of outcomes.

### 11.1 Technical Security Requirements

Reference	Minimum Technical Security Measures	NIST ID
11.1.1	When registering a domain for the first time, that domain <b>must</b> be added to a central domain management asset register. The domain name registrant <b>must</b> also register similar domain names (including under different Top-Level Domains (TLDs)) to prevent phishing and potential embarrassment.	ID.AM-02 PR.IR-02
11.1.2	Central government guidance for naming and registering websites <b>must</b> be followed. [see Appendix C, External References]	GV.OC-03

11.1.3	Each domain <b>must</b> have a responsible and accountable owner. This owner <b>must</b> be named on the domain management asset register.	GV.RR-02
11.1.4	<p>The domain registrant contact details <b>must</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Be hidden from public view in the WHOIS repository using a by-proxy registration service; or</li> <li>b) Be populated with the details of a central asset management function.</li> <li>c) meet the requirements of the UK Domain Registry</li> <li>d) have a role-based email address to keep domains compliant with the Registry</li> </ul>	ID.AM-02
11.1.5	<p>Contact information in the central domain management asset register and in the WHOIS database <b>must</b> be kept up to date and reviewed at least annually or when any changes are made. The same requirement applies if a proxy registration service is used.</p> <p>When DNS services are decommissioned, the old or unused DNS records <b>must</b> be removed to prevent 'dangling' DNS records and zones. This may be achieved via the use of automated tooling.</p>	ID.AM-02 PR.PS-02
11.1.6	<p>The chosen DNS Provider(s) (DNSP(s)) <b>must</b> specify Service Level Agreements (SLAs) in a signed contract pertaining to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) The resolution time of any issues, technical or otherwise; and</li> <li>b) The completion time for any requested changes, including implementing RFC-compliant configurations; and</li> <li>c) The availability level of their nameservers.</li> </ul>	GV.SC-02 GV.SC-05

11.1.7	The chosen DNSP <b>must</b> provide a level of availability commensurate with the availability requirement for the system or service. Multiple DNSPs may be used where appropriate to provide redundancy. Sovereign or nationally trusted DNS infrastructure <b>should</b> be prioritised.	GV.SC-02
11.1.8	The domain itself and supporting services <b>must</b> be monitored for expiry at appropriate time intervals, at least annually or when any changes are made. The central asset management function should support this task through the issuance of automated alerts.	GV.SC-07 ID.AM-02
11.1.9	Ensure at least two Authoritative DNS Servers (ADNS) are implemented per domain, with geographic and network diversity.	GV.SC-07 PR.IR-03

## 11.2 General DNS

Reference	Minimum Technical Security Measures	NIST ID
11.2.1	Each DNS Resource Record (RR) <b>must</b> have an appropriate Time to Live (TTL) value. For the majority of cases, this should be 1 hour (3600s), except for records that rarely change such as TXT or MX records. Shorter TTL values <b>must</b> be considered for critical devices such as load balancers or fail-over devices.	PR.PS-01 PR.IR-01
11.2.2	Internal nameservers <b>must</b> only respond to queries originating from inside Authority networks. DNS zones for 'internal domains' hosted in cloud environments <b>must</b> not be publicly resolvable. This may be achieved by implementing IP allowlists, firewall rules or access control lists (ACLs).	PR.AA-05 PR.IR-01

11.2.3	Internal nameservers <b>must</b> restrict zone transfer using the Authoritative Transfer (AXFR) or Incremental Zone Transfer (IXFR) protocols to only 'allow listed' locations.	PR.AA-05 PR.IR-01
11.2.4	Results returned by nameservers <b>must not</b> bypass any necessary security enforcing devices. For example, MX records <b>must</b> point to mail scanning / spam filtering devices rather than the receiving Mail Transfer Agent (MTA).	PR.IR-01 DE.CM-09
11.2.5	Certification Authority Authorisation (CAA) DNS Resource Records <b>must</b> be implemented to allow DNS Domain Name holders to specify the Certification Authorities (CAs) authorised to issue certificates, and thus implement additional controls where required, as per RFC 8659 [see External References].	PR.AA-05
11.2.6	DNS management systems <b>must</b> enforce Multi Factor Authentication (MFA) for all accounts with the ability to modify DNS configurations, records or HOSTS files.	PR.AA-03
11.2.7	DNS management systems <b>must</b> be patched up to date in line with SS-033 Security Patching Standard [Ref. D] to fix protocol-level vulnerabilities and minimise the threat from DNS-altering malware.	ID.AM-08 PR.PS-02
11.2.8	RFC-compliant configurations <b>must</b> be implemented and enforced.	PR.PS-01
11.2.9	Secure DNS forwarders <b>must</b> be used, and packet reassembly logic <b>must</b> be validated.	PR.DS-02 PR.DS-10
11.2.10	DNS servers <b>must</b> implement redundancy across geographically separate locations.	PR.DS-02 PR.IR-04

### 11.3 Record-specific DNS

Reference	Minimum Technical Security Measures	NIST ID
11.3.1	<p>An alias defined in a CNAME RR <b>must</b> have no other resource records of other types (e.g. MX, A), except any DNSSEC-related records used to protect the integrity of the CNAME record.</p> <p>Domains that are used for e-mail <b>must not</b> have a CNAME record.</p>	PR.DS-10
11.3.2	<p>All Authority-registered domains (including those without email services) <b>must</b> implement Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC) as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The overarching policy and subdomain policy <b>must</b> be set to “reject”;</li> <li>• The forensic reporting mode <b>must</b> be set to generate reports upon both SPF and DKIM failures;</li> <li>• All domains implementing DMARC <b>must</b> forward aggregate (rua) reports to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="mailto:dmarc-rua@dmarc.service.gov.uk">dmarc-rua@dmarc.service.gov.uk</a>; and</li> <li>○ <a href="mailto:5spd6hq3@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com">5spd6hq3@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com</a></li> </ul> </li> <li>• All domains implementing DMARC <b>must</b> forward forensic (ruf) reports to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="mailto:dmarc.rua@dwp.gov.uk">dmarc.rua@dwp.gov.uk</a>; and</li> <li>○ <a href="mailto:5spd6hq3@fr.eu.dmarcadvisor.com">5spd6hq3@fr.eu.dmarcadvisor.com</a></li> </ul> </li> </ul>	PR.DS-02 PR.IR-01

11.3.3	<p>All Authority-registered domains <b>must</b> implement Sender Policy Framework (SPF) as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Domains not sending any email <b>must</b> implement an SPF record that returns a “fail” result for all email traffic. A DNS record of “v=spf1 -all” needs to be set to achieve this.</li> <li>• Other domains <b>must</b> identify all authorised mail-sending agents and explicitly identify these in the SPF record. Emails not matching the SPF criteria <b>must</b> result in a “softfail” or “fail” result.</li> </ul>	PR.DS-02 PR.IR-01
11.3.4	<p>All Authority-registered domains <b>must</b> implement DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asymmetric key pairs <b>MUST</b> use algorithms and key lengths defined in SS-007 Use of Cryptography Security Standard [Ref. A].</li> <li>• Cryptographic keys <b>must</b> be protected in accordance with SS-002 PKI &amp; Key Management Security Standard [Ref. B].</li> <li>• DKIM keys <b>must</b> be rotated at least every 12 months.</li> </ul>	PR.DS-02 PR.IR-01
11.3.5	DNSSEC <b>must</b> be enabled to authenticate DNS responses.	PR.AA-03
11.3.6	Registry locks <b>must</b> be used to prevent unauthorised changes.	PR.AA-01 PR.AA-05
11.3.7	Any fraudulent SSL certificates <b>must</b> be tracked and revoked.	PR.DS-02 DE.CM-09
11.3.8	DNS over TLS (DoT) or DNS over HTTPS (DoH) must be used wherever possible.	PR.DS-02
11.3.9	DNS records <b>must</b> be platform agnostic to ensure portability.	ID.AM-02

## 11.4 DNS Logging and Monitoring

Reference	Minimum Technical Security Measures	NIST ID
11.4.1	Changes to the following types of records <b>must</b> be monitored and alerted on; <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• A records (also known as IPv4 address records)</li><li>• NS records (nameserver)</li><li>• MX records (mail exchanger)</li><li>• DNS Query Audit Logs</li></ul>	ID.RA-07 DE.CM-09
11.4.2	Regular DNS audits <b>must</b> be conducted to identify and remove unused or abandoned records.	PR.PS-04
11.4.3	Subdomains <b>must</b> be monitored for unexpected activity.	DE.CM-09
11.4.4	Automated alerts <b>must</b> be implemented for changes in DNS configurations.	DE.CM-09
11.4.5	Domain access logs <b>must</b> be monitored for unauthorised subdomain creation.	DE.CM-09
11.4.6	Passive DNS monitoring may be used to detect anomalies.	DE.CM-09
11.4.7	Monitoring <b>must</b> be implemented for unusual DNS traffic patterns.	ID.AM-03 DE.CM-09
11.4.8	Continuous monitoring of delegation chains for resolution failures <b>must</b> be implemented.	DE.CM-09

## 12 Appendices

### Appendix A – Security Outcomes

The minimum security measures defined in this standard contribute to the achievement of security outcomes described in the table below. For consistency, the official NIST Sub-category IDs have been carried through to the standards.

Table 1 – List of Security Outcomes Mapping

NIST Ref	Security Outcome (sub-category)	Related Security measure
GV.OC-03	Legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements regarding cybersecurity - including privacy and civil liberties obligations - are understood and managed	11.1.2
GV.RR-02	Roles, responsibilities, and authorities related to cybersecurity risk management are established, communicated, understood, and enforced	11.1.3
GV.SC-02	Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for suppliers, customers, and partners are established, communicated, and coordinated internally and externally	11.1.6, 11.1.7
GV.SC-05	Requirements to address cybersecurity risks in supply chains are established, prioritised, and integrated into contracts and other types of agreements with suppliers and other relevant third parties	11.1.6
GV.SC-07	The risks posed by a supplier, their products and services, and other third parties are understood, recorded, prioritised, assessed, responded to, and monitored over the course of the relationship	11.1.8, 11.1.9

ID.AM-02	Inventories of software, services, and systems managed by the organisation are maintained	11.1.1, 11.1.4, 11.1.5, 11.1.8, 11.3.9
ID.AM-03	Representations of the organisation's authorised network communication and internal and external network data flows are maintained	11.4.7
ID.AM-08	Systems, hardware, software, services, and data are managed throughout their life cycles	11.2.7
ID.RA-07	Changes and exceptions are managed, assessed for risk impact, recorded, and tracked	11.4.1
PR.AA-01	Identities and credentials for authorised users, services, and hardware are managed by the organisation	11.3.6
PR.AA-03	Users, services, and hardware are authenticated	11.2.6, 11.3.5
PR.AA-05	Access permissions, entitlements, and authorisations are defined in a policy, managed, enforced, and reviewed, and incorporate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties	11.2.2, 11.2.3, 11.2.5, 11.3.6
PR.DS-02	The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected	11.2.9, 11.2.10, 11.3.2, 11.3.3, 11.3.4, 11.3.7, 11.3.8
PR.DS-10	The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-use are protected	11.2.9, 11.3.1
PR.PS-01	Configuration management practices are established and applied	11.2.1, 11.2.8
PR.PS-02	Software is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk	11.1.5, 11.2.7
PR.PS-04	Log records are generated and made available for continuous monitoring	11.4.2

PR.IR-01	Networks and environments are protected from unauthorised logical access and usage	11.2.1, 11.2.2, 11.2.3, 11.2.4, 11.3.2, 11.3.3, 11.3.4
PR.IR-02	The organisation's technology assets are protected from environmental threats	11.1.1
PR.IR-03	Mechanisms are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations	11.1.9
PR.IR-04	Adequate resource capacity to ensure availability is maintained	11.2.10
DE.CM-09	Computing hardware and software, runtime environments, and their data are monitored to find potentially adverse events	11.2.4, 11.3.7, 11.4.1, 11.4.3, 11.4.4, 11.4.5, 11.4.6, 11.4.7, 11.4.8

## Appendix B Internal References

Below, is a list of internal documents that **should** be read in conjunction with this standard.

*Table 2 – Internal References*

Ref	Document	Publicly Available*
A	SS-007 Use of Cryptography Security Standard	Yes
B	SS-002 PKI & Key Management Security Standard	Yes
C	Security Assurance Strategy	No
D	SS-033 Security Patching Standard	Yes

*\*Requests to access non-publicly available documents **should** be made to an Authority Contracts/Supplier Manager.*

## Appendix C External References

The following publications and guidance were considered in the development of this standard and **should** be referred to for further guidance.

Table 3 – External References

External Documents List
CIS Critical Security Controls v8 controls set
Central government guidance for naming and registering websites
<a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/terminology-its-not-black-and-white">https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/terminology-its-not-black-and-white</a>
RFC 8659: DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record (rfc-editor.org)

## Appendix D Abbreviations

Table 4 – Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Definition
<b>AXFR</b>	Authoritative Transfer
<b>CDN</b>	Content Delivery Network
<b>CNAME</b>	Canonical Name
<b>DDA</b>	Digital Design Authority
<b>DKIM</b>	DomainKeys Identified Mail
<b>DMARC</b>	Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance
<b>DNS</b>	Domain Name System
<b>DNSP</b>	DNS Provider
<b>DNSSEC</b>	Domain Name System Security Extensions
<b>FQDN</b>	Fully Qualified Domain Name
<b>MTA</b>	Mail Transfer Agent
<b>MX</b>	Mail Exchanger
<b>RFC</b>	Request for Comments
<b>RR</b>	Resource Record
<b>SLA</b>	Service Level Agreement
<b>SPF</b>	Sender Policy Framework
<b>TLD</b>	Top-level Domain
<b>TTL</b>	Time to Live

## Appendix E Definition of Terms

Table 5 – Glossary

Term	Definition
<b>WHOIS</b>	A query and response protocol used for querying databases that store registered users or assignees of an Internet resource, such as a domain name.
<b>A Record</b>	A DNS Resource Record (RR) which maps a domain name to an Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) address.
<b>AAAA Record</b>	A DNS Resource Record (RR) which maps a domain name to an Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) address.
<b>PTR Record</b>	A DNS Resource Record (RR) which maps an IP address to a hostname. Used in reverse DNS lookups.
<b>Nameserver</b>	A server component of the Domain Name System (DNS) which provides resolution of domain names and hostnames into Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.
<b>Authoritative Nameserver</b>	A nameserver which answers queries for a specified set of zones and satisfies queries from its own data without needing to reference another source.
<b>DNS Provider (DNSP)</b>	The entity which operates authoritative nameservers for a particular domain. This may also be a Content Delivery Network (CDN) provider (e.g. Akamai).
<b>Domain, Domain Name</b>	A hierarchical structure of human-readable names resolved by Domain Name System (DNS) servers.

## Appendix F Accessibility artefacts

A variety of accessibility guidance is available from the below URL, that includes:

DWP Digital Accessibility Policy | DWP Intranet

<https://accessibility-manual.dwp.gov.uk/>

<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/guidance-and-tools-for-digital-accessibility>

<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/accessibility-requirements-for-public-sector-websites-and-apps>