

**National Report of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) Review Conference 2010
for the 11th NPT Review Conference**



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Ministerial introduction



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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been a vital pillar of international peace and security since its inception in 1968. It has been a remarkable success. The number of states possessing nuclear weapons remains in single figures. The NPT has paved the way for other critical elements of the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, including no fewer than five Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Across the world, increased access to nuclear power is providing clean and reliable energy and making a vital contribution to a net zero future. Other nuclear technologies are contributing to the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals on hunger, health, wellbeing and clean water.

In 2025, the UK published its Strategic Defence Review and its National Security Strategy. These reports set out an increasingly complex and challenging international order. The UK and its Allies must adapt to confront these new realities and safeguard international peace and security.

We are fully committed to the goals of the NPT, including the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. However, changes in the security environment have led to an increasing number of strategic security challenges for the UK and our Allies, including a range of nuclear threats. In the face of the development of novel nuclear weapons and the rapid and opaque expansion of nuclear arsenals, maintaining a minimum, credible, independent nuclear deterrent remains necessary for the defence of the UK and the security of our NATO Allies, until such obstacles to disarmament have been fully addressed. In an era of serious and unpredictable threats, and an increasing willingness of some states to use nuclear coercion, our nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of our security and of our commitment to NATO. The fundamental purpose of our nuclear weapons is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. Therefore, our approach is pragmatic and principled: advancing disarmament step-by-

step, with transparency, irreversibility and verifiability at its core – ensuring progress without compromising security.

The NPT is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation architecture and underpins the global civil nuclear industry. Global cooperation under its framework has strengthened nuclear safeguards, improved transparency, supported climate goals and fuelled economic growth.

The UK is proud of our contribution to global non-proliferation and the architecture that underpins the NPT. We stand up for the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and promote the standards it sets at home and around the world. We help states build their capacity to implement safeguards and export controls, enabling greater access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

The NPT is a global covenant that supports security and prosperity. Every state benefits from its provisions, and shares responsibility for its success. We will continue to work with all States parties to build stability, transparency and better mutual understanding, and to shape the conditions for achieving its full promise.



Participants at the UK National Report open consultation in Geneva, November 2025

Introduction

This report outlines the steps the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) has taken to implement its NPT obligations and commitments over the 2022-2026 review cycle. Previous reports¹ captured prior actions. It follows the standard reporting format adopted by the nuclear-weapon States in 2013, consistent with Action 21 of the 2010 Action Plan.

At a time of increasing instability, the UK, as a nuclear-weapon State, recognises the value of transparency in building confidence, understanding and trust. We have used this reporting process to engage widely and regularly on all aspects of our nuclear policy. As a democratic and accountable state, this report sets out how we engage – with our Parliament, civil society, academia and Non-Governmental Organisations, as well as with States parties – to invite scrutiny of our nuclear programme and to invite regular challenge of all aspects of our nuclear policy.

We have listened and carefully considered calls from many for greater transparency and engagement from nuclear-weapon States. This review cycle represents an evolution in the UK's approach. We shared a draft of this report at the 2024 Preparatory Committee and have held a series of consultations, including in New York, Vienna and Geneva to receive feedback on its content, to explain the rationale behind our policies and to foster open dialogue. This final report reflects the feedback we received during these consultations and provides updates on recent policy developments. We are grateful for the engagement and suggestions made throughout this process.

The UK continues to follow up commitments made at the Review Conferences in 2000 and 2010. In implementing those commitments, we have taken steps to contribute to international stability, peace and security, based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all. We have highlighted examples throughout this report, including through directly referencing where our activities contribute to fulfilment of actions in the 2010 Action Plan.

Looking ahead to the 2026 Review Conference we reaffirm these commitments and aspire to achieve consensus on how to strengthen transparency and accountability in the next review cycle.

¹ [National Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons \(NPT\) Review Conference 2010 for the 10th NPT Review Conference](#)

Section 1: Reporting on national measures relating to disarmament

The UK remains committed to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons and to its obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear disarmament is best achieved multilaterally through the NPT, and must be pursued in a step-by-step, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, with undiminished security for all.

The UK's approach to disarmament takes account of the realities of the security environment and our commitment to ensure the safety of our people and our Allies. The increasing reliance of some states on nuclear coercion and their disregard for international law will be a central challenge for the UK and its NATO Allies in the coming decades. A number of states are modernising and expanding their already extensive set of nuclear capabilities, which are designed for employment at multiple levels of warfare. This adds further complexity to the requirements for nuclear deterrence and strategic stability.

Nuclear deterrence cannot be considered separately from the wider strategic environment. There remains a risk that, in future crises or conflicts involving the UK, nuclear-armed or nuclear-aspiring states could employ nuclear rhetoric or threats as a means of coercion to influence UK and allied decision-making. Maintaining the UK's nuclear deterrent at a minimum credible level, taking into account the international environment, is consistent with the UK's obligations under Article VI of the Treaty.

While today's security context makes the goal of disarmament more challenging, it also underlines the necessity of this goal, and why we must lay the groundwork now for achieving it in the future.

The UK has made continued significant efforts and investments in pursuit of its obligations and commitments despite the current security context. This includes our approach to the three fundamental principles underpinning nuclear disarmament – transparency, irreversibility and verification. The UK is taking a comprehensive approach to understand, and unlock, the wide range of political, military, legal, institutional and technical elements necessary to make progress towards nuclear disarmament, when circumstances allow, and to ensure that we are in the best possible position to capitalise on opportunities when they arise.

Over this review cycle, we have continued to promote risk reduction measures to improve communication, predictability and understanding. We are committed to the P5 (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) Process as a forum for nuclear-weapon States to discuss doctrine and reduce nuclear risks. More broadly, the UK will continue to collaborate with international partners, civil society and academia to enhance mutual trust and confidence.

1.1 National security policies, doctrine, and activities associated with nuclear weapons

- **2010 Action Plan Actions 5, 8, 15, 17, and 18**

Nuclear Deterrence Policy

The foundation of the UK's approach to deterrence remains a minimum, credible, independent nuclear deterrent, assigned to the defence of NATO. The purpose of the UK's nuclear weapons is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. The UK's nuclear weapons are operationally independent. Only the Prime Minister can authorise their use, ensuring that political control is maintained at all times. The UK would consider using nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of its NATO Allies.

The UK faces both nuclear and non-nuclear strategic threats from some nuclear-weapon States, states pursuing new weapons programmes and state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. Our duty to the British public is to ensure that potential adversaries can never use their nuclear capabilities to threaten or coerce the UK or our NATO Allies. The UK is deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale it would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. The UK does not publicise figures for its operational stockpile, deployed warhead, or deployed missile numbers. This posture enhances its deterrent effect by complicating the calculations of potential aggressors and reduces the risk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage. We continue to publish our overall stockpile ceiling, which since 2021 has been no more than 260 warheads.

The UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT. This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those NPT non-proliferation obligations. The UK reserves the right to review this assurance if the future threat of other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact, makes it necessary.

To ensure that the deterrent is not vulnerable to pre-emptive action by potential adversaries, the UK maintains four Ballistic Missile Submarines, so that at least one is always on a Continuous At Sea Deterrent patrol. Our submarines on patrol are at several days' notice to fire and, since 1994, we do not target our missiles at any state. These initiatives lengthen the decision-making timeline and reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation, consistent with **Action 5(d) of 2010 Action Plan**. We are committed to maintaining the destructive power needed to guarantee that the UK's nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats from any direction. The UK continues to keep its nuclear posture under constant review in light of the international security environment and the actions of potential adversaries.

States' increasing reliance on nuclear coercion will be a central challenge for the UK and its Allies over the coming decades. Against this backdrop, it is essential that we futureproof our ability to defend ourselves and our Allies.

We are now undergoing a major transformation programme of our Defence Nuclear Enterprise to strengthen strategic stability and ensure that our nuclear capabilities can continue to deter the most extreme threats to our security and way of life.

This does not represent a change in the nuclear doctrine of the UK or NATO. Instead, it ensures that the UK's deterrent remains fit for purpose and contributes to a NATO nuclear capability which continues to preserve peace, deter coercion and deter aggression. We are also committed to ensuring the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture remains fit for purpose and able to address the threats and challenges of the evolving security context.

Our commitment to maintaining the UK's nuclear deterrent will ensure the delivery of our next generation submarines, will sustain our Continuous At Sea Deterrent posture, and will deliver the future upgrades necessary to maintain the safety and security of our nuclear capabilities. The UK is also delivering a replacement warhead to transition from the in-service Mk4A. This programme is led by the Atomic Weapons Establishment, which assures the safety and security of our warhead stockpile. The requirements, design and manufacture of our replacement warhead are sovereign to the UK, consistent with our obligations under the NPT.

We also engage in strategic dialogues with the P5, Allies and partners to build confidence and transparency around security ambitions, vital interests and military doctrine. We aim to build on these mechanisms to reduce the risk of miscalculation and support our steadfast commitment to transparency; this is in keeping with **Action 5(g) of the 2010 Action Plan**.

The UK takes its responsibilities for protecting its defence nuclear material extremely seriously. Arrangements to account for and control defence nuclear material are robust, and in line with defence policy requirements that seek to achieve equivalent security outcomes to those required for civil nuclear materials under UK legislation and industry best practice. The UK bases its security framework on the principle of no unauthorised access, through multi-layered, integrated, security arrangements that are designed to counter a range of threats, and which are kept under review. We maintain robust national security controls on personnel responsible for, or who have access to, defence nuclear material and associated information. The UK also has a well-established and on-going programme of activity to protect defence networks and the information they hold from unauthorised access and misuse.

The UK recognises the growing importance of Artificial Intelligence for defence and security, enabling greater levels of efficiency, unlocking new capabilities, improving decision advantage, and empowering the whole force. The UK's Defence AI Strategy highlighted that the future security, resilience, international standing and prosperity will be defined by our ability to comprehend, harness and adapt to rapid technological change. Defence aims to develop AI in an ambitious, safe, and responsible manner, delivering and operating world-class AI-enabled systems and platforms, whilst acknowledging concerns about fairness, bias, reliability, and the nature of human responsibility and accountability. The UK takes all these issues very seriously, particularly in the nuclear domain. We have made commitments to ensure that – regardless of any use of AI in our strategic systems – human political control of our

nuclear weapons is maintained at all times. This is consistent with our long-standing policy that only the Prime Minister can authorise the use of the UK's nuclear weapons.

NATO, the United States of America (US) and France

Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of NATO security and fundamental to the Alliance's overall strategy: preventing conflict and upholding the principles of democracy and the rule of law. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

As the current security situation demands, NATO remains committed to taking all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the Alliance's nuclear deterrence mission, including by modernising its nuclear capabilities, strengthening its nuclear planning capability, and adapting as necessary.

The UK's nuclear deterrent is declared to the defence of NATO to support the collective security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. Since declaring our capability to NATO in 1962, the UK's nuclear forces have made a substantial contribution to maintaining regional stability and reducing proliferation risk.

The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, and particularly those of the US, are the supreme guarantee of NATO's security. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the UK and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. These separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of any potential adversaries and making clear that the costs of an attack on the vital interests of the UK or her Allies would outweigh any potential gains.

In 2025, the UK announced it will purchase 12 new F-35A fighter jets and join NATO's nuclear mission to further strengthen our commitment to effective deterrence and our partnership with our NATO Allies.

NATO's nuclear arrangements have always been consistent with the NPT, with its nuclear-weapon States maintaining custody and control of their nuclear weapons. The Alliance continuously reaffirms its resolve to seek a safer world for all, and to take further practical steps and effective measures to create the security environment for further nuclear disarmament. NATO member states are committed to the NPT as the only credible path to nuclear disarmament, and to its universalisation and full implementation. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to make an essential contribution to achieving NATO's security objectives, and to ensuring strategic stability and our collective security.

The UK continues to work closely with the US and France on nuclear matters. UK and US nuclear defence cooperation is underpinned by the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement and the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement. The UK signed the Teutates Treaty with France in 2010, which underpins UK-France cooperation and information-sharing on the safety and security of nuclear weapons, stockpile certification and countering nuclear or radiological terrorism. The Northwood Declaration, made on 10 July 2025 by the Prime Minister and President of France commits the UK and France to deeper

collaboration across nuclear policy, capabilities and operations, including cooperating more closely to uphold and reinforce the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Our nuclear cooperation with NATO, the US and France is in line with our obligations under the NPT.

UK Nuclear Fuels Programme

The UK is exploring options to re-establish a nuclear fuel cycle for reactor fuel for defence purposes. The Government is committed to modernising defence nuclear fuel production under the Defence Nuclear Enterprise. We are commencing engagement with industry to develop options for how this requirement can be delivered.

This fuel production cycle will be consistent with the UK's international obligations, including the NPT. It will also be consistent with the UK's voluntary moratorium, established in 1995, on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The UK will continue to maintain the highest standards of safeguarding of civil nuclear materials, ensuring a separation from defence materials and complying with our obligations under the UK's [Voluntary Offer Agreement](#)² with the IAEA.

1.2 Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Arms Control (including Nuclear Disarmament) and Verification

- **2010 Action Plan Actions 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 19**

Pursuing nuclear disarmament needs to encompass the political, military, legal, institutional, technical and other elements that give all states confidence that they can maintain their security, and that a world without nuclear weapons will be more stable and secure. This cannot be done unilaterally or in a single leap; it requires incremental, mutually reinforcing steps with the active participation of the entire international community.

A fundamental priority must be to promote closer trust and understanding between the major nuclear powers. Permanently reducing or eliminating security tensions and increasing political and diplomatic alternatives to deter conflict would help lay the pathway to removing nuclear weapons. Unilateral disarmament or reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons without addressing the drivers of conflict between states could be dangerously destabilising.

Today, Russia is modernising and diversifying its weapons, including by introducing new and novel systems, has engaged in an illegal, unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in violation of the UN Charter, and routinely uses irresponsible nuclear rhetoric. China

² [UK/IAEA: Agreement for Application of Safeguards in Connection with Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons \[MS No.13/2018\] - GOV.UK](#)

is also rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. This security environment does not provide the confidence required for the UK to disarm now, but we are working on a range of disarmament measures to make progress where possible and ensure the UK is ready for such a time when progress is possible.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (Actions 10, 11, 12, 13, 14)

The UK views the CTBT and its universalisation as a vital part of the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament. We played a central role in the negotiation of the CTBT, being among the first states to sign it in 1996, before completing its ratification in 1998. The UK has not carried out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion since 1991 and we maintain our voluntary moratorium on conducting such activities.

The UK remains a vocal campaigner for the CTBT and its entry into force – consistent with our longstanding policy, we continue to call on the remaining states needed to secure the CTBT's entry into force to sign and ratify the CTBT, and for states to adhere to their voluntary moratoriums on conducting nuclear test explosions.

The UK is a member of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation and one of its largest financial contributors, providing over £4 million annually as well as extensive technical expertise and administrative support. The UK maintains its National Data Centre and hosts thirteen facilities globally which directly support the International Monitoring System (IMS), a unique global network of infrasound, hydroacoustic, radionuclide and seismic monitoring stations, and a radionuclide laboratory aimed at detecting signs of nuclear tests.

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) (Action 15)

The UK has set out publicly that nuclear disarmament requires a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty that bans the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This will need a cross-regional collective effort, and the UK will continue to press for negotiations on an FMCT in the UN Conference on Disarmament to begin immediately. The UK is actively working with other nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, to explore ways to progress towards negotiations. In 2013 the UK set out what it considers the scope of a future FMCT should be, and which is accessible on the UN's website ([Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty](#)).

The UK has maintained its voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices since 1995. In 1998, the UK declared the total size of its fissile material stockpiles and voluntarily placed all fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards. This material continues to be liable for inspection by the IAEA. Since then, all enrichment and reprocessing in the UK has been conducted under international safeguards. However, the UK retains the right to resume such activities outside safeguards, under

the terms of the UK's Voluntary Offer Agreement with the IAEA, until negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a proposed FMCT are concluded.

In 2024, the UK joined Japan's Friends of the FMCT initiative, which aims to facilitate political discussion of an FMCT, to increase momentum towards the early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.

Principle of Transparency

The UK continues to champion transparency as a means to improve trust and build confidence among and between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. To reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons, all NPT nuclear-weapon States and other states who possess nuclear weapons will need to be transparent about their nuclear weapons and relevant fissile materials holdings. The UK will continue to identify actions that increase transparency in a way that builds understanding and trust. We call on all other nuclear-weapon possessing States to do the same.

However, there must be limits to transparency. Transparency must not extend to sharing information that could enable proliferation. There are valid national security reasons for not exposing information that could be exploited by state or non-state adversaries. This is pertinent for some states, including the UK, where ambiguity about their capabilities is essential for their deterrent to be effective. Without that, states with smaller arsenals might have to change their postures or even arsenals to compensate.

Further information about UK work to promote transparency in this review cycle is in section 1.3.

Verification (Action 19)

An effective verification regime is essential for states to be confident others have eliminated their nuclear weapons, are meeting treaty obligations, and to ensure that any attempt to reverse elimination or retain a threshold nuclear weapon capability would be detected and prevented. Such a regime must not reveal sensitive or proliferative information.

The UK has been at the forefront of national and international verification research for over two decades, both domestically and in collaboration with a diverse group of countries. The UK will continue to support international initiatives to achieve wide-ranging technical goals and build trust among the international community. This includes playing an active role in initiatives such as the UN Group of Government Experts on nuclear disarmament verification, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership with Norway, Sweden and the US.

As part of the Quad Partnership, the UK concluded its latest exercise (TYPEWRITER) in late 2024. In IPNDV, our experts have co-chaired working groups in each of the partnership's three phases, as well as working papers and supported exercises.

All states have a valuable role to play in developing the verification tools and procedures vital for complete and lasting nuclear disarmament. We welcome and look forward to the newly established UN Group of Scientific and Technical Experts and welcome the efforts by Brazil and Norway to establish this group. We encourage all states to examine how they can best contribute to this important task with the support of existing international initiatives.

Case Study 1: Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership

Summary

The [Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership](#)³, founded in 2015, is a collaboration between the UK, Norway, Sweden and the US. For over ten years we have been working together to solve the challenges of verifying nuclear disarmament. This unique partnership blends the expertise of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States and builds on previous bilateral partnerships.




Figure 1. Map of the fictional 'Quadrivania' Nuclear Weapon Enterprise used in TYPEWRITER

³ [Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership | Collaborating to provide solutions to nuclear arms control and disarmament challenges.](#)



Figure 2. 'Host' facility staff applying an electronic seal to a container under the supervision of an 'Inspector'



Figure 3. Generation of cryptographic hash message for image verification (used to allow trustable review and redaction of image data)

Outcomes

In October 2017, the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership's first multilateral nuclear disarmament exercise (LETTERPRESS) explored the challenges associated with verifying nuclear weapon declarations that we anticipate will be required in future disarmament treaties. Following the success of this activity the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership developed and delivered a follow-on exercise, TYPEWRITER. The capstone activity, a field event held at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, assessed the implementation of a verification system as applied to a fictional nuclear site. TYPEWRITER aimed to provide tangible examples to further the work on nuclear disarmament verification and aid knowledge transfer of verification related activities. Specifically, TYPEWRITER succeeded in:

- Considering the scope of the whole nuclear weapon enterprise and full stockpile accounting regime;
- The use of a continuous monitoring system at processing and storage facilities and using live-play data for 'Inspector' evaluation; and
- Testing the verification system by inserting planned anomalies.

The learning from both LETTERPRESS and TYPEWRITER have been and will continue to be shared with the wider international community through reports and presentations at international fora.

Next Steps

In 2025, the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership celebrated its tenth anniversary, a significant milestone for the partnership. We continue to digest the results of our latest exercise, as well as actively preparing for future ones. Building upon lessons learnt, we are making significant progress in the research of nuclear verification, preparing the UK and other nuclear-weapon-possessor states for any future arms control treaties.

Irreversibility

Irreversibility is vital to lasting nuclear disarmament, but there is no common definition or unified understanding of the principle. The UK and Norway presented a working paper at the 2022 NPT Review Conference that sought to provide a definition in the context of the NPT. We understand irreversibility in nuclear disarmament as a spectrum. We cannot eliminate history, or knowledge, but we can ensure weapons stockpiles and programmes can be irreversibly eliminated in a verifiable and transparent manner.

The UK funds a series of projects to hold irreversibility dialogues to foster global participation in the irreversibility debate and pave the way for future irreversibility efforts. Through these discussions we have found that achieving and maintaining irreversibility will require a combination of legal, political, technical and social/normative elements. We will continue studying with partners what an

irreversibility framework should encompass in order to have the necessary tools to ensure effective and sustainable irreversibility when we can disarm.

Risk Reduction (Action 5)

Nuclear-weapon States have a responsibility to their people and the international community to reduce the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation, and thereby the risk of nuclear conflict. This is not a substitution for disarmament but is a vital step towards it. The UK has a strong record on such risk reduction measures. These include not targeting our missiles at any state since 1994; the creation of the P5 Process in 2009; a robust defence nuclear safety and security framework; strategic discussions with countries to improve communication and mutual understanding; and risk reduction agreements, such as the 1977 agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the prevention of accidental nuclear war, and the establishment of a direct communication link between 10 Downing Street and the Kremlin in 1967.

More recently, as set out in our joint P5 working paper to the 2022 Review Conference, risk reduction efforts should focus on three elements: i) building confidence and predictability through dialogue, ii) increasing clarity, communication and understanding and iii) effective crisis prevention and crisis management tools. These elements are reinforced by maintaining the safety and security of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material.

Alongside established multilateral engagement channels, the UK holds regular strategic dialogues with a number of countries on counter-proliferation, including with China. The UK also holds dialogues on strategic stability outside of the P5 process, including an annual Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Consultation with China. These seek to improve communication and mutual understanding of nuclear doctrine and build trust, in line with our commitment to Article VI of the NPT. An additional objective of this kind of dialogue is to strengthen global understanding around the drivers of risk. The UK works with academics, government and military representatives to increase understanding of regional security issues and to identify additional mechanisms to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict in the future.

The UK will continue to champion initiatives to reduce risk, build mutual trust and promote security dialogues. This includes engaging non-nuclear-weapon States, as integral actors in advancing risk reduction, because avoiding or resolving security challenges, and conflict generally, builds trust and reduces the need for deterrence.

Nuclear risks are rising due to the actions of some nuclear-weapon States. We have seen Russia ignore and flout international norms, including concerning the NPT with coercive nuclear signalling. Russia also continues to invest heavily in modernising its nuclear forces, including the development of novel and disruptive dual-capable weapons systems and sub-strategic nuclear systems. These include the nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable Burevestnik cruise missile and Poseidon underwater drone, potentially increasing the risk of dangerous miscalculation. This, along with Russia's updated nuclear doctrine, which lowers the threshold for nuclear use, and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric in the context of its war against Ukraine, is a blatant

attempt to manipulate nuclear risks in pursuit of a war that violates Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

China continues to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal and does not engage in meaningfully in transparency or risk reduction measures. China's rapid and opaque nuclear expansion is destabilising and increases risks; particularly given that it still fails to explain the rationale and intent behind its modernisation and how this aligns with its doctrine. Without this, one cannot draw comfort from its purported No First Use doctrine which, rather than reducing risk, is an unverifiable trust exercise. It is not credible that in extreme circumstances a state in possession of nuclear weapons would not be willing to use them and therefore does not diminish the coercive power of a nuclear weapon state expanding its arsenal looking to assert itself.

UN Disarmament Machinery (Actions 6, 7)

The UK engages actively across the UN's disarmament machinery.

We continue to advocate for the adoption of a Programme of Work in the Conference on Disarmament, including immediate commencement of negotiations on a FMCT. In the absence of such a Programme, we have shown consistent support for the creation of Subsidiary Bodies to work towards negotiating mandates on the Conference on Disarmament's core issues, alongside discussions on issues related to the improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

In the UN General Assembly First Committee, we have co-sponsored initiatives aimed at strengthening understanding of the challenges and opportunities around nuclear disarmament verification, and supported others in areas such as Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. We contributed experts to the UN Group of Government Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues pursuant to UNGA Resolution 74/50, and the Qualified Group of Experts to study the questions of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its aspects, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 79/241.

Our leadership within the UN on the concept of Responsible Space Behaviours includes consideration of how the international community can strengthen implementation of the Outer Space Treaty, including the prohibition of the placement of nuclear weapons in space.

1.3. Transparency and confidence-building measures

• 2010 Action Plan Actions 2, 5, 19, 20

As part of our responsibilities, nuclear-weapon States should identify actions to increase transparency in a way that improves understanding and trust, without creating proliferation or national security risks. Transparency is important to build trust and understanding with all States parties to the NPT. While there are limits to what we can share about our deterrent, we have sought to provide as much information as possible

to provide confidence in our intentions – engaging widely with our public and with the international community on our programmes and policy. We also engage in strategic dialogues with the P5, Allies and partners to build confidence and transparency around security ambitions, vital interests and military doctrine. Our transparency has universal benefit in furthering understanding of the UK approach and how we meet our commitments. The UK’s work on transparency during the 11th review cycle has included:

- Publication of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper (2024), which sets out, for the first time, what it takes to deliver the UK’s nuclear deterrent. This is the fullest account of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise the UK has ever provided;
- Discussions with nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States on strategic risk reduction, to develop our collective understanding – including via participation in Sweden’s initiative on reducing the risk of nuclear conflict;
- Hosting roundtables and strategic dialogues with a range of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to develop greater trust, confidence and transparency between states in relation to nuclear weapons, and foster a more self-reflective and constructive global dialogue on progressing nuclear disarmament; and
- Publishing our draft of this national report in advance and inviting comments and feedback via open sessions in New York (2 May 2025), Vienna (17 September 2025) and Geneva (21 November 2025). We also set up a dedicated and easily accessible feedback mailbox to receive written feedback.

The P5 Process

The five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to uphold the NPT and implement our obligations under it. The P5 Process, established by the UK in 2009, remains an important channel through which nuclear-weapon States discuss the Treaty’s implementation and progress towards disarmament. While Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric has limited opportunities for progress, the UK has continued to engage constructively. These conversations are valuable during times of heightened tension, to increase understanding and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. These exchanges can be challenging and frank, but a clear understanding of others’ strategic calculus – and an ability to explain our own – is critical to avoid miscalculation.

The UK assumed the role of Chair of the P5 Process in September 2025. We have convened two meetings under our chair, most recently in December 2025. As Chair we have supported substantive exchanges including nuclear doctrines, perceptions of strategic risk and practical steps that could reduce risk. We have also facilitated an accompanying non-governmental dialogue, the Young Professionals Network, which brings together a new generation of civil society and academic expertise from across the P5 to generate new ideas.

Engagement with Parliament, Civil Society, Academics and Non-Governmental Organisations

Engagement with Parliament, civil society, academia and Non-Governmental Organisations is an important contribution to the UK's commitment to transparency and the 2010 Action Plan.

We welcome dialogue with a diverse range of experts and invite ambitious ideas to enhance dialogue between civil society and government. The UK funds several projects through our Counter Proliferation Programme Fund (£4m in FY 2024/25) to explore how to defend and strengthen international counter-proliferation architecture and increase international action against the most acute proliferation threats. We host a range of workshops and conferences at Wilton Park, an executive agency of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), including on the implementation of the NPT and on irreversibility of nuclear disarmament. Senior UK officials from the FCDO, Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) regularly meet civil society groups to discuss our approach to the NPT, including through regular meetings convened by the British Red Cross throughout the Review Process.

As part the P5 process, the UK also facilitated, promoted UK participation in and funded an accompanying track II dialogue for civil society and academia from all P5 states. The purpose of these dialogues is to engage non-proliferation and disarmament experts from academia and think tanks in P5 countries, to support exchanges of understanding.

UK Parliamentary scrutiny enhances the UK's defence nuclear programme, and we engage regularly with Parliament via Parliamentary Questions, Select Committee Inquiries, debates and correspondence. We arrange additional engagement to help Parliamentarians understand UK deterrence and disarmament policy, the rationale for government decisions, and to foster dialogue. This includes scrutiny of the progress of the MOD's Defence Nuclear Enterprise programmes. The MOD's Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper was published in March 2024 setting out the full extent of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise's activity, and this was followed by a routine Annual Update to Parliament in May 2025. The next MOD Annual Update to Parliament will be published in 2026.

Section 2: Reporting on national measures relating to non-proliferation

The NPT is at the heart of the international non-proliferation architecture. The Treaty has kept the number of states possessing nuclear weapons to single figures, while the architecture of nuclear safeguards, security and export controls enables access to the benefits of nuclear technology while preventing diversion from its peaceful uses. The IAEA and its international safeguards system is critical in underpinning and extending these benefits. 190⁴ states already have safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

However, the NPT faces a complex set of challenges. Malign activity by some states undermines our collective achievements and weakens existing mechanisms. Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) continued expansion of its nuclear programme and Iran's non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations and related UN Security Council Resolutions all present significant challenges. New technologies present opportunities for growth and development but bring with them new risks. We will continue to address these challenges, working with likeminded states and the IAEA to ensure that the NPT and its underpinning non-proliferation architecture is sufficiently robust to respond to these emerging challenges.

Strong nuclear safeguards are a vital pillar of global non-proliferation. The UK will continue to champion the international safeguards system. Export controls facilitate the responsible exchange of civilian nuclear technology and minimise the risks of proliferation.

The UK is proud to play our part in strengthening non-proliferation, through active participation in export controls, capacity building, supporting the IAEA, and championing the creation of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.

2.1. Safeguards

- **2010 Action Plan Actions 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 46**

IAEA safeguards and their effective implementation are vital to the global non-proliferation system. They verify that states are complying with their international legal obligations, provide reassurance to the international community and, through independent IAEA monitoring and verification, play a critical role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

UK safeguards (Actions 30, 33, 46)

⁴ As per IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report, 2024

Under a Voluntary Offer Agreement, a nuclear-weapon state voluntarily offers nuclear material and / or facilities for the application of safeguards. The UK has a robust Voluntary Offer Agreement and an Additional Protocol under which the UK accepts the application of safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in civil facilities subject to exclusions for national security reasons only. The IAEA may select any civil facility (subject to exclusions for national security reasons only) for the application of safeguards.

For the past four years, the Office for Nuclear Regulation has continued to successfully operate the UK State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Material (UK SSAC), regulating safeguards in the UK through accountancy and system inspections, desktop assessments and measures to ensure compliance.

The IAEA continues to conduct independent inspections and verification activities in the UK, as agreed under our bilateral Voluntary Offer Agreement and has confirmed that we continue to meet all obligations, raising no significant issues, and providing positive feedback on the UK's SSAC. In 2022, a French authority peer review of the UK SSAC found the UK safeguards legal and regulatory frameworks to be structured, comprehensive and coherent, noting several areas of good practice.

International Implementation of safeguards (Actions 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34)

The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon States to enter into agreements with the IAEA for the application of safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities. We consider that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement plus an Additional Protocol best fulfils Article III of the NPT and should be the universal verification standard for countries that hold an amount of nuclear material above the threshold permitted for a modified Small Quantities Protocol. States with original, unmodified Small Quantities Protocols should amend them to the revised text or rescind them entirely if they no longer meet the criteria.

In this context, the UK welcomes that over this review cycle we have seen entry into force of Additional Protocols in Bolivia, Cabo Verde, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe and Timor Leste, and the adoption of modified Small Quantities Protocols in Cabo Verde, Cyprus, Fiji, Mongolia, Nauru, Oman, Sierra Leone, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Palestine, Tuvalu and Zambia. We regularly urge states that have not yet done so to bring an Additional Protocol or modified Small Quantities Protocol into force as soon as possible, in line with **Action 28 and 31 of the 2010 Action Plan**, and we have provided support to states interested in doing so, via IAEA initiatives and / or through direct bilateral engagement in conjunction with experts from the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, an independent, non-profit making charitable organisation.

The UK's commitment to the highest standard of nuclear safeguards is also important in light of wider international developments and growing interest in Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and civil nuclear propulsion. The potential growth of these new reactor types presents opportunities for states to improve energy security and meet

climate change goals but also presents new safeguards challenges. By providing programmatic support and expertise support to the IAEA's initiative 'Safeguards by Design for SMRs' and its work with SMR developers to ensure effective safeguards measures are incorporated into the design stage the UK is working to reduce the risk of proliferation and enable their smooth deployment. The UK looks forward to working with the IAEA on its Atomic Technologies Licensed for Applications at Sea (ATLAS) project, which aims to establish a framework for safe, secure and safeguarded deployment of civil maritime nuclear applications.

Strengthening IAEA safeguards (Actions 22, 26, 32, 33, 34)

Since 1981 the UK Safeguards Support Programme has provided practical assistance to help strengthen the implementation of NPT.

From 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2025, the UK Safeguards Support Programme provided just under £8m of in-kind and financial contributions to the IAEA's Department of Safeguards Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification. This support included this:

- Routine analysis of safeguards inspection samples through two IAEA accredited Networks of Analytical Laboratories;
- Provision of open-source information from two Regional Information Collection Centres and support to improving the analysis of trade data for safeguards-relevant proliferation activities;
- Delivery of training to IAEA inspectors, analysts and senior staff, including negotiation skills and leadership training, alongside a portfolio of courses utilising UK expertise and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle;
- Provision of expertise, including the provision of Cost-Free Experts to the IAEA;
- Promotion of UK technology solutions to meet current and future safeguards challenges identified in the Department of Safeguards' Instrumentation Technology Foresight project; and
- Provision of extra-budgetary financial contributions to key IAEA safeguards projects, including:
 - Keeping Safeguards IT Updated;
 - COMPASS to build state capacity on safeguards implementation;
 - Development of 3D models for critical nuclear facilities to enhance the IAEA's ability to effectively and efficiently capture and integrate safeguards relevant information related to selected facilities whilst maintaining a high level of readiness for potential challenges;
 - Financial and in-kind support to key IAEA safeguards events including the 2022 Safeguards Symposium; and
 - Support to the IAEA to promote engagement with UK developers of SMRs and promote safeguards measures and practices from the design stage.

Case Study: The UK Safeguard Support Programme Support to IAEA Safeguards by Design for SMRs Member State Support Programme Task

The UK is committed to supporting the IAEA to respond to current and potential safeguards challenges, including those posed by SMRs. The IAEA estimates that there are 80 SMR designs and concepts being considered for, or are currently in, active development globally. Without proper oversight and consideration of safeguards, the smooth deployment of this game-changing technology is put at risk as well as raising the possibility of proliferation.

To address these potential technical challenges, the IAEA established the 'Safeguards by Design for SMRs' IAEA Member State Support Programme. The Member State Support Programme seeks to facilitate engagement with Member State Developers, and to produce Safeguard Technical Reports for each SMR design.

In March 2024 the UK Safeguards Support Programme formally accepted the 'Safeguards by Design for SMRs' task with Rolls-Royce SMR agreeing to work with the IAEA. Under this task, Rolls-Royce SMR and the UK Government work closely with the IAEA to:

- provide information and expertise necessary for evaluating aspects of an SMR design that could impact safeguards;
- investigate safeguards implementation strategies; and
- to identify ways in which an SMR design may be modified to facilitate safeguards implementation.

Rolls-Royce and the IAEA have held several workshops and meetings since March 2024 with both parties developing positive and effective relationships to support compliance for the Rolls-Royce SMR design.

UK funding supports IAEA participation, with Rolls-Royce SMR independently financing their own costs for involvement.

The UK Government's support to this task, and the participation of Rolls-Royce SMR, demonstrates the UK's capabilities and leadership in enabling the safeguarded deployment of new nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes globally, and our commitment to the international safeguards system.

Cooperation on Naval Nuclear Propulsion under AUKUS (Action 26)

In 2021, the Prime Ministers of the UK and Australia and the President of the US announced the creation of an enhanced trilateral security partnership, known as "AUKUS". One line of effort under this partnership is the development of a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines capability for/in Australia. AUKUS partners are committed to setting the highest non-proliferation standard for Australia's acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines which will occur

within the framework of Australia's safeguards agreements with the IAEA, including its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

AUKUS partners' cooperation is in line with our respective international obligations, including under the NPT. Australia does not have, and will not seek to acquire, nuclear weapons, nor will the UK or the US provide any assistance, encouragement or inducement to do so.

In May 2023, bilateral negotiations between the IAEA and Australia began on a safeguards and verification arrangement under Article 14 of Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. This will enable the IAEA to continue fulfilling its technical objectives for Australia at all stages of the submarines' lifecycle, verifying that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material; no misuse of declared nuclear facilities; and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia. These discussions are ongoing.

All three AUKUS partners will continue to consult closely with the IAEA and fully support the Director General's prerogative to report on progress as appropriate. AUKUS partners remain committed to transparency and to regularly updating the IAEA Board of Governors, and international community, on major developments.

2.2. Export Controls

- **2010 Action Plan Actions 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39**

Export controls facilitate the safe transfer and use of civilian nuclear technology, supporting economic growth and sustainable development while minimising the risk of proliferation by securing assurance of end-use. The UK will continue to support proportionate export controls as a tool of non-proliferation and resist attempts to weaken existing export control regimes.

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540

UNSCR 1540 sets out that all states should refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes. Its full implementation by all states is vital for all of our security. As Vice Chair of the 1540 Committee, the UK will work with states and international organisations, including the IAEA, UNODA and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to monitor and assist implementation. We also support efforts to increase Committee outreach and development of key resources to support states with implementation, such as voluntary technical resource guidelines. This helps states meet their 1540 obligations, including to implement laws and regulations governing nuclear activities.

Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee (Action 35, 36)

The UK is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which has an important role in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. The UK applies national export controls on transfers of nuclear and nuclear-related material, dual-use material, equipment, software and technology for peaceful purposes, and adheres to the guidelines agreed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This complements effective safeguards and the protection of existing nuclear materials.

The UK will only license nuclear relevant exports if they comply with Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and the UK's commitments under the Zangger Committee. The Zangger Committee works alongside the Nuclear Suppliers Group to harmonise nuclear export controls through a 'Trigger List' of items, the export of which would require IAEA safeguards. The UK welcomes the publication in November 2025 of an update to the Zangger Committee's Trigger List. We recognise the right of states to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as set out in the NPT, and would only refuse an export licence application if the intended transfer would be inconsistent with our export licensing framework.

The UK provides standing secretarial support to the Zangger Committee and regular technical expertise to the Nuclear Suppliers Group through its Technical Experts Group. We participate fully in the Nuclear Suppliers Group's information exchange groups and use meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Consultative Group to share best practice and national experience in implementing the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

Government-to-Government Assurances and international outreach

Government-to-Government Assurances are used to establish assurances for the exports of certain nuclear-related items from the UK. Recipient parties must confirm that nuclear items will be used exclusively for peaceful, civil purposes, otherwise the UK will not issue an export licence.

The UK ran a successful industry training seminar in May 2024 for UK industry participants involved in nuclear exports, which provide information on our international obligations and commitments, nuclear safeguards and reporting, regulatory frameworks and how licensing works in practice. Such seminars promote the role of industry in helping to ensure that the UK meets its international commitments. Feedback confirmed that participants found the outreach valuable and that it substantially improved their understanding of the subject, and their role in upholding high non-proliferation standards.

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements are legally binding international treaties that provide a high-level framework for civil nuclear cooperation and can be used to provide assurances on, and ensure high standards of nuclear safety, security, safeguards and non-proliferation.

The UK currently has 11 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with Australia, Canada, China, Euratom, India, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Russia, United Arab Emirates and the US.

The UK regularly reviews its Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and negotiates amendments as needed to ensure they reflect our strong commitment to non-proliferation and remain aligned to international guidelines and best practices, particularly those set by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We consider new Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with other partners where it would be mutually beneficial.

We updated our guidance for the UK nuclear industry in February 2024 to set out the reporting requirements to ensure compliance with our Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and other safeguards obligations, as well as the import and export requirements for certain nuclear-related items.

2.3. Nuclear Security

- **2010 Action Plan Actions 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 60**

The UK believes that nuclear security is an essential pre-requisite for maximising the benefits of access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The UK is pleased to play an active role in international nuclear security efforts, demonstrating our commitment and sharing our expertise through funding programmatic activity, participation in international diplomatic efforts and supporting the IAEA. Given the importance of maintaining confidence in the security of nuclear technologies, it is essential that nuclear security guidance is regularly reviewed to ensure that they remain fit for purpose and up to date as new technologies are deployed.

International Nuclear Security

While states are principally responsible for nuclear security in their territory, international cooperation is essential to strengthen national security capabilities, build resilience and preserve public confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.

Nuclear security must evolve alongside new technologies, taking into account both their potential benefits and risks. We are committed to the continued implementation and universalisation of nuclear security conventions, sharing best practice and expertise with international partners, and supporting global nuclear security assistance.

Through the G7 Global Partnership, the UK supports a number of weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programmes including contributions to support nuclear security in Ukraine. In addition, the UK continues to engage with all states to strengthen transport security and promote a culture for nuclear security and support states with practical assistance through the UK's global nuclear security programme.

Sharing best practice in civil nuclear security

The UK shares expertise and best practice through a range of international fora including IAEA conferences and committees, the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism (FTPNT), the G7 Global Partnership and the Insider Threat Symposium. Through the UK's Global Nuclear Security Programme, we provide support and assistance to countries looking to develop and enhance their civil nuclear security. The UK supports the Nuclear Threat Initiative's Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security to further these aims. The UK's national legislation and the nuclear security objectives which the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation, our national nuclear regulator requires industry to meet, fully reflect the IAEA's Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225).

Universalisation of conventions

The UK was a committed participant in the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM) Review Conference in 2022, including depositing an updated Article 14 report that publishes all relevant domestic laws and regulations in place to ensure implementation of the ACPPNM in the UK.

The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), which the UK ratified in 2009 (Action 45 of the 2010 Action Plan) provides a legal basis for international cooperation to investigate, prosecute and extradite those connected to terrorist acts involving radioactive material or a nuclear device. We encourage all states to sign and ratify the ICSANT and the ACPPNM at the earliest opportunity. We look forward to a successful ACPPNM Review Conference in 2027.

Support for the IAEA

The UK was an active participant in the IAEA's fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security on 20-24 May 2024 and provided significant financial contribution to support the event. We hosted four side events to share UK expertise and best practice in the fields of nuclear transportation, SMRs, nuclear homeland security and nuclear regulation. While we were disappointed that consensus on a Ministerial Declaration on our collective commitment to Nuclear Security was not possible, the UK was pleased to endorse a Co-Presidents' statement that emphasised the centrality of nuclear security to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as to international peace and security.

The UK is the second largest Member State contributor to the IAEA's extra-budgetary Nuclear Security Fund, donating over £10 million to the fund over the past five years. The fund enables the IAEA to deliver its Nuclear Security Plan and assist Member States to strengthen their own domestic capabilities. Our funding supports a wide range of areas, including to specific states' efforts to enhance security, for IAEA staffing and training, including through funding for the IAEA's Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre.

We will continue to urge more Member States to contribute to the Nuclear Security Fund, and to support an increase in the share of the IAEA's Regular Budget allocated to nuclear security activities. We also encourage the IAEA to explore partnerships to diversify its donor base.

2.4. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

- **2010 Action Plan Action 9**

Against the backdrop of an increasingly complex global security environment, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones are successful non-proliferation tools, which greatly enhance regional and international security. They also provide a strong foundation for global disarmament when the security environment allows. The UK provides legally binding negative security assurances that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against members of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone by signing and ratifying protocols to the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaties.

Existing zones

The UK appreciates the commitment shown by Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone States parties to the creation and maintenance of the zones.

The UK has signed and ratified protocols to four Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaties, giving legally binding negative security assurances to more than 100 countries in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba) and Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk). In each of these instances, the UK has made a statement aligned with our national negative security assurance. Such statements are a standard and permitted part of international practice and do not undermine the objectives and principles of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaties. We also support the parallel political declarations adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia concerning that country's nuclear-weapon-free status.

The UK welcomes the establishment of the Qualified Group of Experts pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution 79/241, to study the questions of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its aspects. We are pleased to provide a UK expert to contribute to the Group's discussions and look forward to the successful completion of this study.

Treaty of Bangkok

The UK stands ready to sign and ratify the revised Protocol of the Treaty of Bangkok establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South-East Asia, with a statement aligned with our national negative security assurance that does not undermine the objectives and principles of the Treaty. We welcome ASEAN's commitment to engage all nuclear-weapon States, and we will work with ASEAN to find a route to UK signature and ratification of the Protocol soon.

Treaty of Tlatelolco

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) is the oldest Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. It prohibits the use or possession of nuclear weapons by Latin American and Caribbean states and prohibits other countries from storing and deploying nuclear weapons on their territories. The UK is a signatory to the two Additional Protocols to the Treaty and was the first nuclear-weapon state to sign and ratify them, which apply to states with overseas territories in the geographical area covered by the treaty, as well as nuclear-weapon States.

The UK was pleased to visit the Headquarters of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the organisation which oversees the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 2025. OPANAL's institutional framework has been central to the effective implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as well as the education of diplomats and young professionals on the importance of non-proliferation and disarmament for global peace and security.



(Deputy Director for Defence and International Security, Rebecca Sagar meeting with Secretary-General of OPANAL, Ambassador Flávio Roberto Bonzanini at OPANAL headquarters in Mexico City in March 2025)

We are working to conclude a bilateral safeguards agreement and modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA in respect of the UK's overseas territories within the zone of application under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We are working closely with our overseas territories to confirm the practical arrangements required to enable the successful implementation of these safeguards agreements.

Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ)

As one of the co-sponsors of the 1995 NPT Resolution on the Middle East, the UK recognises its responsibilities and remains fully committed to a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. The UK has

attended all MEWMDFZ Conferences since 2019 as an observer and welcomes the work of the Conference to address all weapons of mass destruction threats in the region. The UK will continue to work with partners towards realising this vision and is ready to support renewed regional dialogue aimed at bridging the differing views within the region.

For a zone to be fully effective in enhancing regional and international security, it must be achieved by the consensus of all states in the region (in line with the principles and guidelines for the establishment of future nuclear-weapons-free zones agreed by the UNDC in 1999).

2.5. Compliance and Other Related Issues/Concerns

- **2010 Action Plan Actions 23, 26 and 27**

The UK attaches great importance to the universalisation of the NPT. We regret that there are a very small number of states who continue to operate outside of the NPT framework. We continue to work to bring non-NPT states closer to the international non-proliferation mainstream and hold regular non-proliferation dialogues with India, Israel and Pakistan. We also remain concerned by actions taken by some NPT States parties that undermine the Treaty.

Iran

The UK's priority remains to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Iran must comply with its nuclear-related obligations and commitments, including all relevant UNSCRs, the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Since 2019 Iran has exceeded almost all limits on its nuclear programme that it had freely committed to under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and since 2021 has produced Highly Enriched Uranium enriched up to 60%, a level for which there is no credible civilian justification. The UK has long been committed to securing a diplomatic solution to prevent Iran developing a nuclear weapon. This included numerous attempts alongside E3 partners to bring all parties back into a deal. Iran's refusal to participate constructively in these efforts, alongside its significant non-performance of its JCPOA commitments, led the E3 to trigger the 'snapback' process in 2025.

Following the conclusion of the 30-day snapback process on 28 September 2025, six previously terminated UNSCRs were reinstated, reimposing: 121 UN designations on individuals and entities involved in Iran's nuclear and ballistic missiles programme; a UN arms embargo on transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran; and restrictions on dual-use goods and technology. All member states must ensure proper implementation of the reinstated measures. On 1 October 2025, the UK updated domestic legislation to reapply the designations and measures contained in these UNSCRs. The UK went further by applying sanctions to 71 individuals and entities linked to Iran's nuclear programme. The UK is also strengthening efforts to restrict Iran's

procurement of essential dual use components, including through the adoption in September 2024 of trade sanctions on items used in the production of ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and other weaponry.

Since 2020, the IAEA Board of Governors has passed seven resolutions, tabled by UK, France, Germany and the US, highlighting Iran's failure to co-operate with the IAEA on outstanding safeguards concerns. In its resolution of June 2025, the Board found Iran in noncompliance with its obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. IAEA reports from November 2025 confirmed that Iran had not allowed IAEA inspections to resume at all relevant nuclear facilities, nor provided any clarity regarding the status of its large stockpiles of enriched uranium (including over 440kg of Highly Enriched Uranium) which has remained unverified since the strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 and has no credible civilian justification. This is a matter of grave concern for the international community and one that is dangerous for regional and global security.

The UK supports the IAEA's mandate to provide professional, impartial and robust verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear programme and welcomed the November 2025 IAEA Board Resolution that clarifies and reinforces the IAEA's reporting mandate on Iran in light of relevant UNSCRs.

Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a gross breach of international law. Russia's illegal war has increased the risk to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. We support the IAEA's continuous presence at Ukraine's nuclear power plants and the IAEA Director General's regular reporting on the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine. These reports have exposed the threat to nuclear safety and security posed by Russia's occupation of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, including degradation of the fabric of the site, lack of maintenance plans, boron leaks, fragile supply chains, insufficient and underqualified staffing, a reduction in water supply to the cooling ponds, and disruption to the electricity supply to the plant. The IAEA has also reported that Russia's targeted attacks on Ukraine's energy grid further endangers nuclear safety. No nuclear power plant is designed to cope with such instability in the electricity grid.

The UK has supported nine successful IAEA Resolutions relating to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. The UK has also provided £18m to support Ukraine to maintain and improve nuclear material security. This includes support to enhance border detection capabilities, physical protection at nuclear sites and training on the detection and safe recovery of materials outside of regulatory control as well as funding via the Nuclear Security Fund for physical security enhancements and, equipment for nuclear sites across Ukraine. We have also funded an IAEA led mental health initiative to support Ukraine's nuclear power plant staff who do their jobs under the most difficult of circumstance.

Through the G7 Global Partnership, the UK has supported additional international efforts to help Ukraine to manage conflict related risks, such as repairing the damage wrought by Russian forces during their occupation of the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone,

and to help Ukraine develop its capacity to maintain and enhance nuclear and radiological material security. In 2025 the UK co-chaired the Radiological and Nuclear meetings of the Ukraine Information Sharing Initiative, a mechanism through which states can provide Ukraine with CBRN-related assistance. The only way to truly ensure nuclear safety and security in Ukraine is for Russia to withdraw from Ukraine's sovereign territory and end the war.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Diplomacy and dialogue are the only route to sustained peace on the Korean Peninsula. We regret that the DPRK has not undertaken meaningful steps to denuclearise. Instead, the DPRK continues to progress its nuclear programme with the stated aim of further strengthening the foundation for producing weapons-grade materials. We are deeply concerned by the expanded operations at the Kangson and Yongbyon uranium enrichment facilities noted in the August 2025 IAEA Board of Governors Report.

The DPRK's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes violates numerous UNSCRs. If the DPRK conducts a seventh nuclear test, it would be a clear, further violation of relevant UNSCRs and a threat to both regional and international peace and security. The UK actively works to ensure the comprehensive implementation of all UNSCRs relating to the DPRK. Any violation by the DPRK must be met with a firm and resolute response from the international community. The UK supported the renewal of the Panel of Experts, mandated by UNSCR 1718, and deeply regrets that this was vetoed by Russia in 2024.

The UK reiterates its condemnation of the DPRK's irresponsible and provocative behaviour. We remain committed to the complete denuclearization of the DPRK in accordance with relevant UNSCRs. The DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT, and we urge the DPRK to take steps to dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and engage in dialogue.

We welcome the IAEA's essential role in monitoring the DPRK's nuclear activities and its readiness to engage with the DPRK and welcome the IAEA's commitment to play a verification role in any future agreement.

Syria

We welcome the co-operation of the new Syrian Government with the IAEA. This is a crucial step forward and demonstrates the ongoing commitment of the Syrian Government to address the dark legacy of the former Assad regime.

The UK was deeply concerned by the former Assad regime's consistent non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement under the NPT, specifically its construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor at Deir ez-Zor, and its failure to provide the IAEA with necessary design information. The UK fully supports the IAEA's efforts to clarify and

resolve issues in Syria, including IAEA technical visits there in 2024 and Director General Grossi's visit to Damascus in June 2025.

2.6. Other contributions to Nuclear Weapons Non-proliferation

- **2010 Action Plan Actions 23 and 24**

Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS)

The Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) applies to certain foreign students and researchers who want to study or conduct research in specific sensitive technology-related fields in the UK.

ATAS is a counterproliferation vetting tool and an integral part of the UK government's efforts to stop the spread of knowledge and skills that could possibly be used in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The scheme is designed to prevent knowledge obtained through the study of certain sensitive subjects in the UK, including dual use research, from being used in weapons of mass destruction programmes of concern. It also forms an important part of the UK's implementation of weapons of mass destruction proliferation related sanctions regimes. ATAS is enforced by the UK visa system under Immigration Law.

Section 3: Reporting on national measures relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Pillar III of the NPT is the gateway to civil nuclear energy, including both power and a growing range of non-power applications.

As global energy needs increase, many more states are looking to incorporate nuclear into their energy mix to address energy security concerns and help meet climate change goals.

As a mature nuclear state, the UK recognises the importance of ensuring any expansion of civil nuclear power is delivered in a safe, secure and reliable way. We are committed to the highest standards of nuclear regulation and submit our nuclear security, safety, safeguards and emergency planning frameworks to continuous review, including by seeking peer review through the IAEA where we regularly share our experiences with countries considering the deployment of civil nuclear power.

The UK's own programme of new build civil nuclear power stations will help us deliver a more secure, low-carbon energy mix. Throughout the review cycle, we have been driving forward the largest expansion of nuclear energy in a generation, with landmark projects such as Hinkley Point C nearing completion, Sizewell C advancing in construction, an ambitious programme for deploying Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and the formulation of policies to foster the development of Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs). By investing in cutting-edge nuclear technology and furthering international collaboration, the UK is laying the foundations for a secure, sustainable and prosperous future, with civil nuclear power at the heart of our clean energy transformation.

Enabling global access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology has been an NPT success story with the number of countries benefiting from this access continuing to grow. Existing technologies are playing a positive role in tackling issues including global health, climate change and food security, and there is scope for further expansion as new, innovative technologies become available.

Throughout this review cycle we have worked to ensure that other countries benefit from the UK's nuclear expertise and experience, including through participating in multilateral fora such as the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and its Peaceful Uses Initiative, as well as through the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses, a national initiative in partnership with the US.

3.1 Promoting peaceful uses

- **2010 Action Plan Actions 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 56, 58, 62**

Key to the NPT's success is its promotion of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Over the review cycle, the UK has contributed to a range of 2010 Action Plan objectives, including by: supporting the right of all countries to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as set out in the NPT, facilitating the fullest possible exchange of technology and expertise; strengthening international cooperation for civil nuclear development; investing in the training of a skilled nuclear workforce; progressing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle; and ensuring the safe and secure transport of radioactive materials. Through UK initiatives, international partnerships and support for the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme, the UK continues to promote access to the benefits of nuclear technology in a safe and secure way for sustainable development worldwide.

Forthcoming civil nuclear projects (Action 49)

The UK is entering a golden age of nuclear energy, with Hinkley Point C nearing completion and construction of Sizewell C underway. Established in 2023, Great British Energy - Nuclear is responsible for driving delivery of new civil nuclear projects in the UK, including delivering on the UK's ambition to bring forward one of Europe's first Small Modular Reactor fleets. We are also investing in R&D of Advanced Modular Reactors and in the field of fusion energy. In February 2026, the UK published its *Statement on Civil Nuclear Fuel Use*⁵ to enable the nuclear industry to make long-term plans for their fuel provisions to meet the Government's expectations. As part of this announcement, the UK Government made clear its intention to ensure all civil nuclear fission reactors in the UK are fuelled by uranium, enriched to less than 20% U-235. In addition to maintaining the highest standards of nuclear security, this announcement provides a clear response to the recommendations of the UK's Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce by offering clarity for industry, helping to focus investment and skills for the next generation of civil nuclear projects in the UK. The announcement also emphasises the UK's expectations that credible proposals should be developed for effectively managing wastes and spent fuels.

With these renewed ambitions, and as the oldest commercial nuclear energy state, the UK will continue to play a leading role in international civil nuclear development. Given the high-capital costs and known risks of technologies, as well as the first-of-a-kind risks presented by SMRs and AMRs, we need a coordinated international approach to make the most of all that nuclear energy has to offer, to accelerate R&D, achieve economies of scale, unlock financing and build resilient supply chains.

⁵ [Statement on civil nuclear fuel use - GOV.UK](#)

Advanced Nuclear Technologies (Action 49)

Advanced Nuclear Technologies could play a key role in the UK's future energy mix as we transition to Net Zero in 2050 and support our energy security. In 2021, the UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero published guidance for Advanced Nuclear Technologies to enter the Generic Design Assessment, the first stage of the UK's nuclear regulatory process, fulfilling our 2020 Energy White Paper: Powering our net zero future, commitment. In February 2026 we published our Advanced Nuclear Technologies Framework, setting out a pathway for private sector participation in the delivery of advanced nuclear projects, specifically small modular reactors, advanced modular reactors and microreactors in the UK.

The UK is working with likeminded partners to develop the enabling environment for the safe and secure deployment of Advanced Nuclear Technologies and to unlock the full benefits of Small Modular Reactors. We are open to collaboration on new build deployment, regulation, financing, risk sharing, operator capability, fuel diversification and supply chains.

Nuclear Fuel Fund (Action 58)

The Nuclear Fuel Fund was launched in 2023. Through this, we have invested over £35m, match funded by industry, to establish new domestic fuel capabilities which can fuel the reactors of today and advanced reactors of the future. Funding was awarded to nine projects, including:

- £13m to Westinghouse, Springfields Fuels Ltd. to support the development of capability to convert freshly mined and recycled uranium at the Springfields site in Preston;
- Over £10.5 million to Westinghouse, Springfields Fuels Ltd. to upgrade their existing fuel manufacturing plant to enable them to manufacture more innovative types of nuclear fuel for GW reactors, SMRs and AMRs;
- Over £9.5 million to Urenco UK in Capenhurst Chester to produce new types of enriched uranium to fuel new advanced and AMR fuels, including Low Enriched Uranium + and high assay low enriched uranium (HALEU); and
- Over £10.5 million to Nuclear Transport Solutions, a subsidiary of the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, to develop transport solutions to facilitate a supply chain for HALEU in the UK and internationally.

The UK is working with partner countries under the Sapporo 5 initiative to identify potential areas of collaboration on nuclear fuels to: support the stable supply of fuels for the operating reactor fleets of today; enable the development and deployment of fuels for the advanced reactors of tomorrow; and help eliminate dependence on Russian supply chains. This multilateral effort aims to recognise and leverage the unique resources and capabilities possessed by each country's civil nuclear sectors to establish a global commercial nuclear fuel market.

UK High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) Programme

In late 2023, the UK announced up to £300m for the establishment of a domestic HALEU supply chain, reaffirming our commitment to develop full HALEU front-end fuel cycle capabilities in the UK by the early 2030s.

The first tranche of funding was announced in May 2024. Urenco was awarded £196m to deliver a first-of-a-kind HALEU enrichment capability on a commercial scale, targeting first operations in 2031. With co-funding from Urenco, the total investment is around £400m.

Remaining funding will be used for the development of a HALEU deconversion capability, with further funding being allocated to support the HALEU supply chain through awards to National Transport Solution on transportation prototypes (including testing and development of pilot transport packages for safely and securely moving HALEU), regulators in the UK and the UK National Nuclear Laboratory building our technical capabilities. This project will support building resilient nuclear supply chains and help eliminate global reliance on Russia.

Skills (Action 56)

The government published the National Nuclear Strategic Plan for Skills in May 2024, setting out targeted action the UK will take to deliver the required skills to support the UK's nuclear ambitions.

Work has already begun - industry has committed to plans to double the number of nuclear apprentices and graduates and quadruple the number of PhDs. "Destination Nuclear" is a national communications campaign to raise awareness of the importance of nuclear and highlights the variety of roles available across civil and defence nuclear organisations. An initiative launched in summer 2024 facilitates staff interchange and collaboration across the sector. The UK has recently joined the Nuclear Education, Skills, and Technology Framework – an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency initiative that facilitates international collaboration in nuclear technology education and training, develops expertise in nuclear science, and fosters the safe application of nuclear technologies.

The UK has provided funding throughout the review cycle to the IAEA Marie Skłodowska Curie Fellowship Programme aimed at increasing the number of women in the nuclear field, driving technological innovation and developing skills in the nuclear sector.

The UK has also supported international skills development through financial contributions to IAEA's Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre.

Sharing UK experience and expertise (Action 48, 49, 56, 60)

The UK promotes the exchange of experience and expertise through a number of multilateral organisations and initiatives including the IAEA, Nuclear Energy

Association, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, G7 and other ad hoc groupings.

The UK's aim within these organisations is to foster a productive and collaborative international environment – particularly on areas such as climate, nuclear safety, waste/decommissioning and skills.

We regularly support UK nuclear professionals' participation in international expert groups and forums and encourage UK academic institutions to participate in multilateral networks that facilitate international cooperation on peaceful uses. The UK hosts three IAEA collaborating centres: –

- The UK National Nuclear Laboratory - the only IAEA Collaborating Centre dedicated to advanced fuel cycles, addressing key issues such as the recycling of nuclear fuel for advanced and innovative reactors. Through a new four-year agreement with the IAEA, the UK National Nuclear Laboratory will develop work around future fuels and sustainable fuel cycles.
- The Institute for Global Food Security -working with the IAEA since 2021 to expand the scope of nuclear methods available to Member State laboratories to support food safety and authenticity, providing research to a range of stakeholders, including regulators, governments and multinational industries.
- The UK Atomic Energy Authority – an IAEA Collaborating Centre for fusion research working with the IAEA to accelerate innovation, build scientific capacity and advance the peaceful uses of fusion energy. This collaboration strengthens the international fusion community and supports the IAEA's mission to promote sustainable and secure energy solutions for the future.

Fusion Energy

We are excited by the potential of technologies such as fusion energy to provide near limitless power generation without using nuclear material or generating very long-lived waste. As fusion technology continues to rapidly progress towards commercialisation and deployment, the UK is committed to continuing to share our experience of implementing a proportionate approach to fusion safety with other NPT States parties. The UK hosted the 29th IAEA Fusion Energy Conference in London in October 2023, providing a unique forum for international participants to reflect the priorities of this new era in fusion energy research, technology development and preparation for industrial deployment. The conference launched the IAEA's World Fusion Outlook Publication and the World Fusion Energy Group, which aims to bring together scientists, policy makers, financiers, regulators and private companies.

Climate change

Central to UK energy policy is our view that the global transition away from fossil fuels cannot happen without nuclear power. The UK promotes the global pledge to triple nuclear energy capacity by 2050, launched at COP28 in Dubai. At COP30 in Belem, the

UK hosted one of the only nuclear-focussed events of the conference – “Fission Forward: the Global Move to Triple Nuclear Power” – and were pleased that more countries announced their endorsement of the pledge, bringing the total to 35.

Expanding access to peaceful uses (Actions 47, 50, 51)

Expanding access to peaceful nuclear technologies by fostering international collaboration and sharing expertise to benefit development, address health challenges like cancer, enhance food security and advance climate action is of benefit to us all. During this review cycle, the UK has focussed on efforts to remove barriers and enable wider use of nuclear technologies in support of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Launched at the 10th NPT Review Conference in 2022, the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses, a joint US/UK initiative, responded to calls, particularly from developing countries, to do more to improve access to nuclear science and technology. A series of UK-hosted consultations with states, international organisations and technical experts identified common challenges to the effective implementation of Article IV. These included: limited awareness of where nuclear technologies might offer a comparative advantage over other solutions to the problem being addressed; fragmented coordination across assistance providers, hindering the identification and implementation of efficient and effective solutions; the need for stronger coordination across national, regional and interregional levels to ensure desired outcomes are delivered; and the need for longer-term, sustainable approaches that prioritise local capacity. The Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses then sought to address these challenges by increasing awareness of, improving access to and promoting acceptance of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. The aspiration was to establish a model that could be replicated, empowering countries, regions and sectors to address a variety of challenges in pursuit of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses engaged nearly 1,500 participants from over 96 countries, complementing and amplifying the IAEA’s own efforts in areas such as health, agriculture and water security. This engagement has led to over 35 project concepts and multiple feasibility studies being taken forward. A key objective of the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses was to facilitate conversations and we welcome feedback from the participants and countries involved on how the Sustained Dialogue has helped them progress their ideas and projects.

Through UK funding, in March 2025, the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) launched the Nuclear for Good website⁶ containing the Nuclear Technology Database which will be a one-stop shop for global policy communities to access reliable information on peaceful nuclear technologies, their comparative advantages and disadvantages, the contexts in which they are most useful. It will enable policy

⁶ [Home - Nuclear for Good](#)

communities to make well-informed, evidence-based decisions about adopting available technologies.


We are continuing to explore opportunities to pursue constructive collaboration that strengthens the NPT regime by emphasising the value that Article IV brings to States parties and is aligned with the policy priorities of the UK.

We are also looking at ways that we can share the expertise that the UK has gained over 70 years in the development, deployment and operation of nuclear power plants in a safe and secure manner.

Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses Case Study

The initiative focussed on a range of activities including 6 regional events engaging more than 75 countries in the Global South.

The below graphic details some of the activities that the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses has hosted and contributed to over this review cycle, covering a range of development topics from food, healthcare, water, and energy



3.2 Technical assistance through the IAEA to its Member States

• 2010 Action Plan Actions 52-55

The IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme enables countries to benefit from the use of nuclear technologies in a safe, secure and effective way. Since 2023, the UK has contributed over £4m annually to the Technical Cooperation Fund. In addition, UK extra-budgetary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Programme have been used to continue to expand access to peaceful uses. Since 2022, the UK has contributed nearly £5m in extra-budgetary contributions to assist a range of projects and we encourage the IAEA and other partners to ensure that UK funding is directed to projects or research that prioritise the needs of Least Developed Countries.

The UK's world-leading research institutions provide technical expertise and assistance to the IAEA's research and development work through engagement in nearly 30 IAEA "Co-ordinated Research Projects" covering environmental issues, water resources, human health, medical research, food and agriculture. We will continue to work with the IAEA to direct UK expertise and support to advance the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.

Case study - UK contributions to IAEA Technical Co-operation Programme

The IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme helps to address key development priorities in areas such as health and nutrition, food and agriculture, water and the environment, all assisting in the pursuit of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The UK is proud to have supported the following projects during this review cycle:

Project	Contribution
<u>Marine Plastics: Tackling the Challenges Using Nuclear Applications</u>	Nearly £80,000 to the third Phase of the Marine Plastics initiative to assist the IAEA's Radioecology Laboratory's work on nuclear techniques to address the scourge of marine plastic pollution.
<u>Marie Skłodowska Curie Fellowship Programme (MSCFP)</u>	£200,000 to address the under-representation of women in the nuclear field and support an inclusive workforce of both men and women who contribute to and drive global scientific and technological innovation. This supported around 8 fellowships.
<u>Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL)</u>	£1,120,000 to complete the modernisation of the IAEA's Seibersdorf laboratories in Austria. These facilities are a critical part of the IAEA offer to Member States, supporting research, development, training and capacity building.
<u>Isotopic Fingerprinting Data Study</u>	£85,000 towards an Isotope Hydrology Information System Upgrade, launching a data hub at the 2023 UN Water Conference to enable users to upload, download and share, visualise and validate isotope data.
<u>Atoms4Food</u>	Nearly £2 million to IAEA/FAO Atoms4Food project since its launch in 2023. This included: £430,000 to projects

	<p>future proofing drylands crops against climate change; £150,000 to enhance research and development capabilities to monitor and control microplastics contamination in food and agriculture; £150,000 to help mitigate animal production related climate impact; and £85,000, as part of a joint effort with the USA to support partnership activities with Namibia, Zambia and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture for genetic improvement in cowpea, to ensure climate resilience.</p> <p>At the 2024 IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science, Technology & Applications, the UK announced nearly £1 million in funding, including £435,000 to a study to enhance biodiversity in annual and perennial crops and £500,000 for integrated strategies for managing antimicrobial resistance in Western & Central African aquaculture.</p>
<u>Measurement of Cosmogenic Radionuclides</u>	£260,000 to provide a capability at the IAEA's Terrestrial Environmental Radiochemistry Laboratory to a) analyse air filter samples collected at UK's CTBTO IMS stations and b) assess any changes in atmospheric processes and/or evidence of climate change.
<u>COP28</u>	£12,000 to the IAEA Pavilion at COP28, to demonstrate the contribution that nuclear technology can make to addressing global energy and climate needs.
<u>Global Network of Isotopes in Lakes (GNIL)</u>	£45,000 and £140,000 to Part 1 and Part 2 of the establishment of a global network of isotopes in lakes, complementing existing networks of isotopes in precipitation and rivers to monitor evaporation and understand its role in climate change.
<u>Mitigation of Greenhouse Gases with E-Beam Technology</u>	£130,000 to an existing Coordinated Research Project to advance the application of e-beam technology for greenhouse gas mitigation through experimental research, performance validation, upscaling and capacity building in e-beam technologies internationally.
<u>Water Isotope System for Electronic Retrieval (WISER) Capacity Upgrade</u>	£45,000 to update to the IAEA's WISER to improve the efficiency, accessibility and completeness of the isotope monitoring network databases to support work on SDG6.
<u>Water Isotope Innovation and Communication Lab (WisoINC)</u>	£160,000 for an interactive workshop to strengthen isotope hydrology communication between scientists and decision makers at a high level to improve outcomes in sustainable water management.
<u>Ocean Acidification</u>	£360,000 to strengthen capacity to effectively mitigate and adapt to the impacts of ocean acidification, through supporting training, research and action in both the

	scientific and local communities, with a focus on developing coastal States and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).
<u>Transforming Plastic Waste</u>	£565,000 over five years to address the challenges associated with radiation-assisted chemical recycling (of hard-to-recycle plastics) by investigating the use and safety of feedstocks that can replace the fossil-based inputs used in plastics manufacture.

3.3 Civil nuclear safety and civil nuclear liability

- **2010 Action Plan Actions 57, 58, 59, 60, 63**

Delivering high standards of safety and robust liability arrangements is key to the UK's civil nuclear programme and its international commitments.

Civil nuclear safety (Actions 57, 59, 60)

The UK is committed to achieving high nuclear safety standards and meeting our obligations as a Contracting Party to international nuclear safety instruments such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The UK routinely invites inward international peer reviews for nuclear safety, such as the Integrated Regulatory Review Service and Operational Safety Review Team, to enhance its own safety framework and to share learning and best practices with international parties.

The Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission

Nuclear safety is at the heart of the UK's civil nuclear policy and international engagement. The UK's commitment to continuous improvement in nuclear safety is demonstrated through engagement in IAEA peer review processes, such as the Integrated Regulatory Review Service missions.

The Integrated Regulatory Review Service is a comprehensive peer review of a state's regulatory infrastructure for safety against IAEA safety standards, carried out by a team of international experts. In January 2024, the UK hosted an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service follow up mission. The Mission's Team Leader concluded that "...the UK has made continuous improvements since the Integrated Regulatory Review Service 2019 mission to the highest standards of nuclear and radiation safety". As with all peer reviews, the Mission team provided new recommendations and suggestions for government and regulators to further enhance the UK's safety framework. We are now working to address these findings and will update the IAEA at the next Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission.

Operational Safety Review mission

From 2 to 19 October 2023, EDF Energy hosted an Operational Safety Review Team mission at Heysham 2 nuclear power station. The team identified nine good practices - areas of outstanding and proven performance, activity or equipment in use that contribute directly to operational safety and good performance. The Operational Safety Review Team also offered a number of recommendations and suggestions for further improvement.

In line with IAEA best practice, EDF is preparing for a follow-up Operational Safety Review Team mission to Heysham 2 in 2026, which will assess progress made against the 2023 mission's recommendations and suggestions. The follow-up mission will also identify any additional good practices resulting from the site's improvement initiatives, reinforcing the global sharing of operational excellence.

Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management (Action 59)

The UK is a Contracting Party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. These Conventions establish fundamental safety principles and drive safety standards globally. In delivering obligations under the Conventions, the UK demonstrates our commitment to high safety standards and helps maintain public support for the sector. The UK has also played an important role as part of a coalition of like-minded countries looking to improve the working practices of these conventions.

In March 2025, the UK participated in the 8th Review Meeting of the Joint Convention alongside 76 other Contracting Parties. UK officials submitted questions and comments on other countries' reports and UK delegates attended each national presentation to participate in the peer review process. The UK's own report and presentation were well received by other Contracting Parties, and two areas of work in the UK – regulation of AI and the UK strategy for nuclear skills - were recognised as good practices. Ahead of the 10th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in April 2026, the UK has submitted its national report. This report demonstrates the UK's continued compliance with its obligations under the Convention and details the application of modern safety standards across the civil nuclear programme. It covers existing operational power stations as well as new build design and licensing activities.

Civil nuclear liability (Action 63)

The UK is a Contracting Party to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention) and the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Brussels Supplementary Convention).

These Conventions are implemented in the UK in the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. During the review cycle, the UK amended the 1965 Act to give effect to two Protocols

amending the Paris and Brussels Conventions adopted in 2004 having worked through the legislative and ratification issues associated with making this change.

As of 1 January 2026, the UK is a Contracting Party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which works alongside the Paris and Brussels Conventions. This is also implemented domestically in the Nuclear Installations Act 1965.

Emergency preparedness and response (Action 62)

The UK is committed to providing the necessary reassurance that it uses nuclear technologies responsibly and is committed to ensuring public safety. We continuously improve our emergency preparedness and response requirements and incorporate international best practice. The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019 and the Carriage of Dangerous Goods (Amendment) Regulations 2019 were signed into law in March 2019. Both regulations require all hazards capable of causing a radiation emergency at a licensed nuclear site or in civil nuclear transport (by road, rail and inland waterway) to be identified, their consequences assessed, and commensurate emergency arrangements put in place.

The UK is a Party to several international agreements which demonstrate our commitment to cooperate with other states in the event of nuclear accidents and emergencies. We implement fully our obligations under:

- The Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, which commits the UK to sharing information with the international community in the event of a civil nuclear or radiological accident within UK jurisdiction which may impact on other states, and to voluntary notification for defence nuclear incidents.
- The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, under which the UK has agreed to notify the IAEA of assistance which might be provided in the case of an accident in another country.

3.4 Other related issues

Generation IV International Forum

The UK is a member of the Generation IV International Forum, a multilateral intergovernmental organisation involving the US, Japan, France and the Republic of Korea focused on carrying out the research and development needed to establish the feasibility and performance capabilities of the next generation of nuclear energy systems.

Six reactor technologies have been selected for further research and development by the Generation IV International Forum. These include Gas-cooled Fast Reactor, Lead-cooled Fast Reactor, Molten Salt Reactor, Supercritical Water-cooled Reactor, Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor and Very High Temperature Reactor. These are Generation IV

nuclear systems that can be safely licensed, built and operated, providing affordable and reliable energy. These systems will address key issues such as nuclear safety, waste management, non-proliferation and public perception. The UK has chosen to participate in the Very High Temperature Reactor and Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor Generation IV International Forum system groups. All collaboration under this agreement will be for peaceful purposes, adhering to non-proliferation goals and international obligations.

Membership provides access to cutting-edge research and development in Advanced Nuclear Technologies, such as SMRs and AMRs. By leveraging international expertise and collaborating on projects, partner countries can enhance their nuclear capacity, ensure energy security and drive innovation. This alignment with the Generation IV International Forum's objectives supports the goals of expanding nuclear capacity, promoting economic growth and achieving Net Zero goals.

Conclusion

55 years after coming into force, the NPT has brought profound benefit to the world and is a cornerstone of international security. It is more necessary than ever. That is why we continue to support its universalisation and why we are committed to a successful 11th Review Conference.

The UK is proud to honour its NPT obligations, be a vocal advocate for the Treaty and work with partners to make the most of its potential. In taking forward work to deliver on the 2010 Action plan, we have been cognisant of the importance of action across all three NPT pillars and are pleased to be able to present in this report and its annex the progress we have made to date.

There is more work to do to deliver on all of the Treaty's ambition, and it is important that all states recommit to continue their work in the years ahead. We remain committed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The first duty of this Government is to the security of the UK - protecting our people and our NATO Allies from the very real threats we face. The most fundamental work is needed to reduce threats and promote stability, such that nuclear-weapon States can disarm together. The UK is ready to play our part.

ANNEX: 2010 ACTION PLAN PROGRESS

ACTION 1	Report section
<i>All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.</i>	Throughout
UK PROGRESS	
The UK remains committed to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and ensures our policies uphold our obligations under the Treaty	
ACTION 2	Sections 1.2 and 1.3
<i>All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
<p>The UK is committed to these principles as a means to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons.</p> <p><u>Irreversibility:</u> the UK has submitted working papers to aid the establishment of a common understanding of the principle and funded civil society projects to promote engagement and understanding on irreversibility.</p> <p><u>Verifiability:</u> The UK actively supports through funding and participation international research and initiatives on verification including UN GSTE, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership.</p> <p><u>Transparency:</u> The UK commitment to transparency was evidenced over the 11th review cycle including through publication of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper, participating in discussions on risk reduction including the Swedish initiative on reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, hosting roundtables and dialogues to share details on our programme and doctrine, and publication and engagement on a draft copy of this report.</p>	
ACTION 3	Section 1
<i>In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and</i>	

<i>non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral measures.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK's stockpile ceiling is capped at 260 warheads. Our stockpile remains the smallest of any nuclear-weapon States and we maintain a minimum credible deterrent.	
ACTION 4	Section 1.1
<i>The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry-into-force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK remains supportive of bilateral initiatives to reduce nuclear stockpiles.	
ACTION 5	Section 1.1
<i>The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To this end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia... [see 5a-g]</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
We have continued to lay the groundwork for disarmament over the 11 th review cycle, including continuing to invest in disarmament verification, championing transparency and developing risk reduction measures.	
ACTION 5(a)	Section 1.1
<i>...rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in Action 3.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
Since the end of the Cold War, the UK has steadily reduced the size of its nuclear forces. We continue to publish our overall stockpile ceiling, which since 2021 has been no more than 260 warheads.	

ACTION 5(b)	Section 1.1
<i>...address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK views its nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent - they are a political tool rather than a war-fighting capability. As such, only the Prime Minister can authorise their use, ensuring that political control is maintained at all times. The UK would consider using nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence including the defence of its NATO Allies.	
ACTION 5(c)	Section 1.1
<i>...to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The purpose of our nuclear weapons is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. We maintain our nuclear deterrent at the minimum credible level and would consider using our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies. The Defence Nuclear Enterprise transformation programme does not present a change in the nuclear doctrine of the UK or NATO but is necessitated by the current security context. We will continue our efforts to fulfil our obligations and bring us closer to a world without nuclear weapons, including through our work on transparency, irreversibility and verification.	
ACTION 5(d)	Section 1.1 and 1.3
<i>...discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK continues to work to counter proliferation of nuclear weapons and to make progress on multilateral disarmament, to build trust and confidence between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States and to take tangible steps towards a safer and more stable world where countries with nuclear weapons feel able to relinquish them. This includes active engagement in the P5 Process and the reaffirmation of a Negative Security Assurance. The UK is also committed to reducing the risk of misinterpretation and	

<p>miscalculation, and thereby the risk of nuclear conflict, including through the P5 Process.</p> <p>The UK has continued to work with Norway over this review cycle to develop a shared, international understanding of irreversibility in nuclear disarmament, funding projects that foster dialogue on this issue.</p>	
ACTION 5(e)	Section 1.1
<i>... consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK's submarines on patrol are at several days' notice to fire and, since 1994, we do not target our missiles at any state.	
ACTION 5(f)	Section 1.1 and 1.2
<i>... reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK takes its responsibility to protect UK nuclear weapons and material very seriously. The security of the UK's strategic deterrent is given the very highest priority. To protect nuclear weapons and nuclear material the standing level of security at MOD nuclear establishments is maintained at the highest level and required to counter a range of threats.	
ACTION 5(g)	Section 1.3
<i>... further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK, in conjunction with the P5, developed a Reporting Framework designed to demonstrate progress across all three pillars. The UK has issued detailed national reports since 2014, including this one, as a demonstration of our commitment to furthering transparency. The UK makes public and routinely updates information about our nuclear deterrent ⁷ . The UK also continues to engage constructively in the P5 Process, including as chair from September 2025, supporting substantive exchanges on nuclear doctrines, perceptions of strategic risk and practical steps that could reduce risk. We have also facilitated an accompanying non-governmental dialogue, the Young	

⁷ [UK nuclear deterrent - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/682222/UK_nuclear_deterrent.pdf)

Professionals Network, which brings together a new generation of civil society and academic expertise from across the P5 to generate new ideas.	
ACTION 6	Section 1.2
<i>All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK continues to advocate for an agreed, comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work within the Conference on Disarmament. Absent this, we have consistently called for the establishment of Subsidiary Bodies to advance substantive work on all agenda items of the Conference, including nuclear disarmament.	
ACTION 7	Section 1.2
<i>All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
On the question of universal Negative Security Assurances, the UK has consistently stated in the Conference on Disarmament that we remain open to having discussions on such an instrument in an appropriate forum. We would not be able to accept NSAs without the caveat requiring that a state not be in material breach of its obligations under the NPT.	
ACTION 8	Section 1.1
<i>All nuclear-weapon States commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	

In our 2025 Strategic Defence Review the UK again provided the assurance that “the UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT”. This is valid for any state that is in compliance with its NPT obligations.	
ACTION 9	Section 2.4
<i>The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry-into-force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK has signed and ratified protocols to four Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones treaties, giving legally binding negative security assurances to more than 100 countries, and stands ready to sign and ratify the revised Protocol of the Treaty of Bangkok. As one of the co-sponsors of the 1995 NPT Resolution on the Middle East, the UK recognises its responsibilities and remains fully committed to a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned. Since 2019 the UK has attended all UN facilitated Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone Conferences as an observer. The UK is also actively engaging the Qualified Group of Experts on the question of nuclear weapon free zones, with a UK expert contributing to discussions.	
ACTION 10	Section 1.2
<i>All nuclear-weapons States undertake to ratify the CTBT with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of the CTBT, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries in particular those which have not acceded to the NPT and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	

<p>The UK ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1998 and is a member of the CTBT Preparatory Commission (CTBTO). The UK is a supporter of the CTBT, where we continue to campaign for the Treaty's entry-into-force by calling on relevant states to sign and ratify the Treaty. We provide over £4 million annually in financial contributions to the CTBTO and regularly contribute UK expertise and resources.</p>	
<p>ACTION 11</p>	<p>Section 1.2</p>
<p><i>Pending the entry-into-force of the CTBT, all States commit to refrain from nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT, and all existing moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions should be maintained.</i></p>	
<p>UK PROGRESS</p>	
<p>Prior to signing the CTBT in 1996 and ratifying it in 1998, the UK has maintained its commitment to its voluntary moratorium on conducting nuclear test explosions, noting that the UK ceased nuclear testing in 1991. The safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent is certified through appropriate stewardship activities that do not involve conducting nuclear weapon test explosions.</p>	
<p>ACTION 12</p>	<p>Section 1.2</p>
<p><i>All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty recognise the contribution of the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry-into-Force of the CTBT and of the measures adopted by consensus at the September 2009 Conference, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry-into-force of the CTBT.</i></p>	
<p>UK PROGRESS</p>	
<p>The UK fully supports the Article XIV Conferences on Facilitating the Entry-into-Force of the CTBT. We have attended all of the Conferences and shall continue to do so until the Treaty enters into force.</p>	
<p>ACTION 13</p>	<p>Section 1.2</p>
<p><i>All States that have ratified the CTBT undertake to promote the entry-into-force of, and implementation of, the CTBT at national, regional and global levels.</i></p>	
<p>UK PROGRESS</p>	

The UK regularly calls on all states yet to sign or ratify the CTBT to do so, through bilateral and multilateral channels.	
ACTION 14	Section 1.2
<i>The CTBTO Preparatory Commission is to be encouraged to fully develop the CTBT verification regime, including early completion and provisional operationalisation of the International Monitoring System in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, which should, upon entry-into-force of the CTBT, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with the CTBT.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK provides extensive technical support to the three pillars of the CTBTO's verification framework. The UK is actively engaged in relevant work streams aimed at improving the capabilities of the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre, alongside development of the On-Site Inspection methodology. Over 90% of UK-based International Monitoring System stations are complete and operational.	
ACTION 15	Section 1.1 and 1.2
<i>All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the Report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK has had a voluntary moratorium in place on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices since 1995. We remain committed to the pursuit of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty, negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, that bans the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.	

In 2024, the UK joined Japan's Friends of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) initiative, which aims to facilitate political discussion of an FMCT and increase momentum towards the early commencement of negotiations of an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.	
ACTION 16	Section 1.2
<i>The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK declared such fissile material in our 1998 Strategic Defence Review. We have placed excess nuclear material under UK safeguards and the terms of the UK-IAEA Voluntary Offer Agreement/Additional Protocol. The UK's nuclear regulator and operator of the UK's safeguards regime, the Office for Nuclear Regulation therefore inspects all of this material and reports on all civil material located in UK facilities are then provided to the IAEA.	
ACTION 17	Section 1.1
<i>In the context of Action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of the IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
As part of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the UK placed nuclear material excess to defence requirements under international safeguards. The IAEA therefore already has the legal right to verify excess materials.	
ACTION 18	Section 1.1
<i>All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</i>	

UK PROGRESS	
<p>The UK takes its nuclear responsibilities and obligations seriously. The UK is exploring options to re-establish a nuclear fuel cycle for reactor fuel for defence purposes. This fuel production cycle will be consistent with the UK's international obligations, including the NPT. It will also be consistent with the UK's voluntary moratorium, established in 1995, on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p>	
ACTION 19	
<p><i>All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organisations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency, and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.</i></p>	Section 1.2 and 1.3
UK PROGRESS	
<p>The UK has been working closely with Norway since 2007 (and the US since 2001) to explore the technical and procedural challenges of verifying nuclear disarmament. As part of the Quad Partnership, the UK hosted the first-ever multilateral nuclear disarmament verification exercise (LETTERPRESS) in 2017 and concluded its latest exercise (TYPEWRITER) in late 2024. The UK has also been an active supporter of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV).</p>	
ACTION 20 & 21	Throughout
<p><i>States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of this Action Plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.</i></p> <p><i>As a confidence building measure all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General is invited to establish a publicly-accessible repository which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.</i></p>	

UK PROGRESS	
The UK, in conjunction with the P5, developed a Reporting Framework designed to demonstrate progress across all three pillars. We have issued national reports at successive Review Conferences since 2014. The UK has led the way in consulting, seeking feedback from non-nuclear-weapon States and civil society by presenting our reports in draft, including in 2025 through dedicated open consultations in New York, Geneva and Vienna.	
ACTION 22	
<i>All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	Section 2.1
The UK actively supports education, training and research on disarmament and non-proliferation through engagement with Non-Governmental Organisations, academics, students and on digital outreach. For example, we have funded 45 nuclear non-proliferation related projects since 2021 through the FCDO's Counter Proliferation Fund, providing funding for projects which strengthen political will or technical capacity to tackle the threat of weapons proliferation. The UK Safeguards Support Programme supports education through training and the provision of expertise. The UK has co-sponsored the UN Resolution on "Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education" since 2008.	
ACTION 23	
<i>The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	Section 2
The UK attaches great importance to the universalisation of the NPT. We regret that there are a very small number of countries who continue to operate outside of the NPT framework, and we encourage all of them to sign and ratify the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.	
ACTION 24	

<i>Application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.</i>	Section 2.1 and 2.6
UK PROGRESS	
As a nuclear-weapon state, the NPT does not require the UK to have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. However, we do have a Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol. All civil nuclear material in the UK is subject to UK safeguards and to the terms of the UK/IAEA safeguards agreements.	
ACTION 25	Section 2.1
<i>The Conference, noting that States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
We encourage those States parties without a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to bring one into force as soon as possible. Wherever possible, we will continue to provide support and guidance to those countries that wish to agree a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.	
ACTION 26	Section 2.1 and 2.5
<i>The Conference underscores the importance of complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK asserts that compliance with non-proliferation obligations is fundamental to the success of the NPT and international security. We take matters of non-compliance seriously and are particularly concerned by Iran's non-compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement since June 2025. Iran has a long history of insufficient cooperation with the IAEA and in response, the UK, with France, Germany and the US, have tabled seven IAEA Board of Governors resolutions since 2020 urging Iran to resolve its outstanding safeguards issues. The UK works to ensure the comprehensive implementation of all UNSCRs relating to the DPRK and supports initiatives that move towards the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the DPRK. The UK continues to encourage both the IAEA and Syria to set out a considered, technical process for addressing Syria's outstanding non-compliance with its safeguards	

obligations that is cognisant of the constraints currently faced by Syria and achievable within a reasonable timeframe.	
ACTION 27	Section 2.3 and 2.5
<i>Underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and the respective legal obligations of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK provides strong support to the IAEA's safeguards implementation, including through the UK Safeguards Support Programme which, inter alia, provides training for IAEA inspectors, analysis of environmental samples and the provision of non-English open sources of information that could reveal indications of undeclared nuclear activities. The UK supports the resolution of safeguards non-compliance through its role on the IAEA Board of Governors, working to ensure states are fulfilling their safeguards obligations.	
ACTION 28	Section 2.1
<i>The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK welcomes the entry into force of Additional Protocols in Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Timor Leste since the last Review Conference. We take every opportunity to call upon states that have not yet done so to bring an Additional Protocol into force as soon as possible and have provided direct support to states interested in doing so. This has been delivered through direct support to IAEA initiatives or bilateral engagement in conjunction with experts from the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre. The UK also participates in the Vienna-based 'Group of Friends of the Additional Protocol' to encourage signing and ratification of these safeguards' agreements.	
ACTION 29	Section 2.1
<i>The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference</i>	

<i>calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK continues to support the work of the IAEA to assist States parties in bringing in Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols. Our support includes direct assistance to the IAEA's Department for Safeguards through our Member State Support Programme as well as bilateral assistance to any state seeking to sign, implement and ratify a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.	
ACTION 30	Section 2.1
<i>Calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
All civil nuclear material in the UK is currently subject to UK safeguards and to the terms of the UK/IAEA safeguards agreements. These safeguards agreements allow for the application of safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in facilities within the UK, subject to exclusions for national security reasons.	
ACTION 31	Section 2.1
<i>The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK welcomes the fact that many states have either amended their original Small Quantities Protocol to the modified Small Quantities Protocol, or brought a modified Small Quantities Protocol into force since the last Review Conference.	

ACTION 32	Section 2.1
<i>Recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK supports the IAEA's continued efforts to maintain and strengthen the effectiveness of the safeguards system. The UK Safeguards Support Programme has contributed to this effort. From 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2025, the UK Safeguards Support Programme provided just under £8m of in-kind and financial contributions to over 35 tasks within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification.	
ACTION 33	Section 2.1
<i>Ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK is a strong supporter of the IAEA, which is fundamental to supporting NPT non-proliferation objectives. The UK has provided a safeguards support programme to IAEA Department for Safeguards since 1981, providing technical and financial support to IAEA safeguards. Key areas of support include inspector training, network laboratories for the analysis of environmental sampling and the provision of open-source information relevant to safeguards, the provision of technical experts paid for by the support programme as well as a multitude of individual tasks to enable the IAEA to respond to potential future challenges (e.g. supporting the safe, secure and safeguarded deployment of new technology such as Small Modular Reactors).	
ACTION 34	Section 2.1
<i>Within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK Safeguards Support Programme includes provision of network laboratories for the analysis of environmental sampling, of open-	

source information relevant to safeguards and the provision of technical experts.	
ACTION 35	Section 2.2
<i>The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
By fulfilling its commitments under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, the UK contributes to minimising the risks of nuclear proliferation while ensuring that NPT States parties are able to access nuclear technology for peaceful uses.	
ACTION 36	Section 2.2
<i>The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK's national framework implements the control lists and guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, which are internationally recognised benchmarks for helping to prevent nuclear proliferation.	
ACTION 37	Section 2.2
<i>The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK had long been an exponent of universal adoption IAEA safeguards. The UK assesses all export licence applications fully and in accordance with Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines before a final decision is made for any licence application.	

ACTION 38 & 39	Section 2.2 and 3
<p><i>The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.</i></p> <p><i>Encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.</i></p>	
UK PROGRESS	
<p>The UK is an advocate for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and we recognise the inalienable right of NPT States parties to the development, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as set out in the NPT.</p> <p>The UK has a strong record of cooperation with other States parties, to support the exchange of civilian nuclear technology (for power and non-power related applications) which minimises the risks of proliferation.</p> <p>The UK continues to provide full support to the IAEA through our Regular Budget and Technical Cooperation (TC) Fund contributions and recognises the important work that the IAEA does in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology.</p>	
ACTION 40	Section 2.3
<i>To maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK's security regime for the civil nuclear industry is recognised as world leading – it is robust, effective and meets international standards. Our commitment to upholding these high standards is evidenced through sharing our expertise, funding programmatic activity and supporting the IAEA.	
ACTION 41	Section 2.3
<i>Apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities</i>	

<i>(INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK's own legislation on civil nuclear security, and the security objectives which the UK's nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, requires industry to meet, reflect the IAEA's Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225).	
ACTION 42	Section 2.3
<i>The Conference calls upon all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK deposited its instruments of ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM) in 2010. We welcome the fact that the amended Convention came into force in May 2016 and encourage states that have not yet ratified to do so. The UK was an active participant at the ACPPNM Review Conference in 2022. The UK also published a revised Article 14.1 report at that conference.	
ACTION 43	Section 2.3
<i>Implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK has made a full written political commitment with respect to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and with respect to the Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources. The UK also follows the principles set out in the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources	

ACTION 44	Section 2.3
<i>The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK has a number of tools at its disposal including a radiological and nuclear detection capability at its borders and inland, specialist response capabilities to protect and prepare against an attack using these materials. We also rigorously make use of export licences, CTSAs and implement a robust regulatory framework. We also work with international partners in this regard.	
ACTION 45	Section 2.3
<i>The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK deposited its instruments of ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) in 2009.	
ACTION 46	Section 2.1 and 2.3
<i>IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC), as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK is responsible for its own nuclear safeguards arrangements and has an established and robust nuclear safeguards regime (UK SSAC), designed to meet our international obligations on safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation. For the past four years, the Office for Nuclear Regulation has continued to successfully operate the UK	

SSAC; regulating safeguards in the UK through accountancy and system inspections, desktop assessments and measures to address non-compliance.	
ACTION 47	Section 3.1
<i>Respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK frequently reaffirms the inalienable right of NPT States parties to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as set out in the NPT. The UK supports States parties freedom to develop, produce and benefit from a range of power and non-power applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.	
ACTION 48	Section 3.1
<i>Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK has a strong record of cooperation with other States parties, to support the responsible exchange of civilian nuclear items (for power and non-power related applications) which minimises the risks of proliferation and ensures that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is implemented in a safe and secure manner. The UK continues to provide full support to the IAEA through our Regular Budget and Technical Cooperation (TC) Fund contributions and recognises the important work that the IAEA does in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The UK encourages and facilitates contributions by UK nationals to the IAEA's international training activities and is proud to host such activities when opportunities arise.	
ACTION 49	Section 3.1
<i>Cooperate with other States parties or international organisations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK has taken several steps to increase and promote cooperation with and between Member States to increase access to peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. This includes the Sustained Dialogue on	

Peaceful Uses, launched with the US in 2022, working in the Sapporo 5 to expand civil nuclear capabilities, taking a leadership role in the Nuclear Energy Association to protect, promote and further nuclear interests, and being a signatory to the Global Tripling Nuclear Pledge.	
ACTION 50	Section 3.1
<i>Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK contributes to and supports a number of initiatives and programmes, both bilaterally and multilaterally, which specifically support non-nuclear-weapon States and developing countries, including the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses.	
ACTION 51	Section 3.1
<i>Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK recognises the inalienable right of all Parties to the development, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as set out in the NPT, and remains committed to transfer of nuclear technology and materials in line with our international obligations.	
ACTION 52	Section 3.2
<i>Continue efforts, in the IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA's technical cooperation programme</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK is a keen supporter of the Technical Cooperation Programme of the IAEA and of the results-based management approach the IAEA is taking to ensure its effectiveness. The UK was pleased to attend the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science, Technology and	

Applications and the Technical Cooperation Programme in November 2024 and continues to encourage the IAEA to act on all 2024 Office of Internal Oversight Services Report recommendations.	
ACTION 53	Section 3.2
<i>Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK continues to provide full support to the IAEA through our Regular Budget and Technical Cooperation Fund contributions and recognises the important work that the IAEA does in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	
ACTION 54	Section 3.2
<i>Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that the IAEA's resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK has paid our IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund contributions in full and on time to ensure predictability of resources and we encourage other states to do the same. We encourage the IAEA to continue its efforts to increase effectiveness and efficiency of its Technical Co-operation Programme.	
ACTION 55	Section 3.2
<i>Encourage all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extra-budgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK is among the largest supporters of the IAEA through mechanisms such as UK Safeguards Support Programme, the Peaceful Uses Initiative and our contributions to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund. The UK is clear that the amount of money contributed to the fund is not the only priority. Programmes need to be run more effectively, efficiently and using robust monitoring and evaluation processes. We are encouraged by the steps already taken by the IAEA in this regard.	

ACTION 56	Section 3.1 and 3.2
<i>Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
Launched in May 2024, the UK's Nuclear Skills Plan exemplifies a collaborative effort between government and industry to address the skills gap in the nuclear sector with prime civil and defence nuclear organisations and their government counterparts contributing funding, people and time to deliver the Plan. We also support IAEA initiatives like the Marie Curie Sklodowska Fellowship Programme, and the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC), which improve skills and development in the nuclear sector.	
ACTION 57	Section 3.3
<i>Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK ensures that civil nuclear cooperation is used to encourage others to adhere to safeguards implementation. For example, when we discuss Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and MoUs with third countries, we raise the importance of the AP. We also encourage any countries who have not yet signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to enter into talks with the IAEA to do so.	
ACTION 58	Section 3.1 and 3.3
<i>Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional fora, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities to create mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including in this regard the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.</i>	

UK PROGRESS	
The UK welcomes the development of multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and notes that a UK-proposed approach to Nuclear Fuel Assurance was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2011. As members of the Sapporo 5, we have a shared commitment to develop secure and resilient fuel supply chains.	
ACTION 59	Section 3.3
<i>Consider to become party, if not yet have done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK is a Party to the international conventions listed in this action that place legally binding obligations on contracting parties to effectively manage their domestic safety regimes, and some require peer review to maintain international accountability. The UK was an early sponsor and signatory of the relevant international legal instruments relating to nuclear and radiological safety	
ACTION 60	Section 2.3 and 3.3
<i>Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK supports the sharing of best practice in the area of nuclear safety and security including through IAEA peer reviews and the publication of mission team reports. In 2019 the UK hosted the IAEA's Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission to assess the UK's adherences to the IAEA's safety standards. We hosted a follow up mission in 2024. The UK continues to support activity to enhance nuclear security globally through the Global Nuclear Security Programme. The UK supports the IAEA's work to improve nuclear	

security around the world including through regular voluntary contributions to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund	
ACTION 61	Section 3.1 and 3.3
Encourage states concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize Highly Enriched Uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible	
UK PROGRESS	
UK holdings of Highly Enriched Uranium (uranium enriched to 20% or higher - Highly Enriched Uranium) have fallen since 2017, according to the Highly Enriched Uranium figures on the UK's Office for Nuclear Regulation website: 2024 – 637kg, 2023 - 636kg, 2022 - 691kg, 2021 - 734kg, 2020 - 737kg, 2019 - 734kg, 2018 - 742kg, 2017 -1241kg	
ACTION 62	Section 3.1 and 3.3
<i>Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal states for the purpose of confidence building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness;</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
UK industry, regulators and Civil Nuclear Constabulary continue to be world leaders in the security of transport of nuclear material. The UK holds the presidency of the Coastal and Shipping States annual dialogue for 2025/26 and is currently planning an exercise scheduled to be held in Vienna in April 2026.	
ACTION 63	Section 3.3
<i>Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK is party to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention) and the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Brussels Supplementary Convention). These are implemented domestically via the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. The UK has recently acceded to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which came into force in respect	

of the UK on 1 January 2026. The enabling legislation is contained in the Energy Act 2023 and The Nuclear Installations (Compensation for Nuclear Damage) (Amendment) Regulations 2025, which update the Nuclear Installations Act 1965.	
ACTION 64	
<i>The Conference calls upon all states to abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on "Prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction".</i>	
UK PROGRESS	
The UK recognises the importance attached to safety, security and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. It is important that all states adhere to established international law, including International Humanitarian Law.	