



HM Treasury

# Treasury Minutes

**Government Response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Sixty-second to the Sixty-seventh reports from Session 2024-26**





Government of the United Kingdom  
HM Treasury

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Government Response to the Committee of Public  
Accounts on the Sixty-second to the Sixty-seventh  
reports from Session 2024-26

Presented to Parliament by the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury  
by Command of His Majesty

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## Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts Session 2024-26

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# Sixty-second Report of Session 2024-26

## Department for Energy Security and Net Zero

### Faulty energy efficiency installations

#### Introduction from the Committee

The Energy Company Obligation (ECO) is a government scheme intended to tackle fuel poverty and reduce carbon emissions in Great Britain. ECO is funded from consumer bills rather than the Exchequer. Medium and large energy suppliers are obligated to achieve a minimum level of energy bill savings in homes through the installation of energy efficiency measures. The scheme is aimed at low-income households in homes with poor energy efficiency ratings.

There are currently two ECO schemes: ECO4 runs from April 2022 to March 2026 and the Great British Insulation Scheme (GBIS), which has broader eligibility, runs from March 2023 to March 2026. ECO4 focuses on multi-measure retrofits, in contrast with the single-measure retrofits offered under previous ECO schemes and GBIS. The Department expects each beneficiary household to save up to £450 on their annual energy bills under ECO4 and up to £230 on GBIS. To March 2025, 304,500 homes had been upgraded through the schemes, worth £4.2 billion, including 28,000 installations of external wall insulation and 45,200 installations of internal wall insulation.

Since we took evidence in November 2025, the government announced it would end ECO, with no levies on consumer bills from April 2026, but that it would continue to invest in tackling fuel poverty through its Warm Homes Plan. However, the Department explained in written evidence submitted after our session that it had not yet formally confirmed whether it would extend the period for suppliers to meet their existing ECO4 obligations beyond March 2026. The Department is responsible for the design of ECO and the wider quality assurance and consumer protection system. It introduced a new system in 2021, which included a single quality mark for retrofits and higher standards that consider multi-measure retrofits in the context of the whole home, both of which would be overseen by TrustMark, a not-for-profit company.

Many other organisations are involved. Ofgem is responsible for ECO's administration. The United Kingdom Accreditation Service (also a not-for-profit company) accredits the 'certification bodies' that certify that installers meet the required installation quality standards. A range of other private businesses are also involved in delivering the scheme.

In October 2024, TrustMark notified the Department of high levels of external wall insulation installations that were not compliant with quality standards. TrustMark highlighted similar issues with internal wall insulation early the following month. Non-compliance covers a wide range of severity, from major issues that pose immediate risks to the health and safety of the household or that will affect the insulations performance, and often lead to damp and mould, to minor issues such as missing paperwork. Since then, the Department, Ofgem, TrustMark and UKAS have taken action to understand the root causes of the problems, find-and-fix the affected homes, and limit any further faulty installations.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence on 13 November 2025 from the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero. The Committee published its report on 23 January 2026. This is the government's response to the Committee's report.

#### Relevant reports

- NAO report: [Energy efficiency installations under the Energy Company Obligation – Session 2024-26 \(HC 1334\)](#)

- PAC report: [Faulty energy efficiency installations](#) – Session 2024-25 (HC 1229)

## Government response to the Committee

**1. PAC conclusion: A clear and catastrophic failure with external and internal wall insulation installations under ECO4 and GBIS has left more than 30,000 homes with defects.**

**1. PAC recommendation: The Department should not allow any more external or internal wall insulation to be installed through its retrofit schemes unless it can ensure that every new project will be supervised and checked by someone who is independent, competent and accountable.**

1.1 The government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

1.2 The extent and scale of non-compliant external and internal wall insulation under the ECO4 scheme was unacceptable and must never be repeated. The department has greater confidence in the quality of installation and compliance in local authority delivered retrofit programmes and therefore disagree with the recommendation insofar as it relates to schemes other than ECO4 and GBIS.

1.3 Every household with external wall insulation (EWI) installed under ECO4 and GBIS is being and will be offered an on-site audit. Subject to the householder accepting the offer, all EWI installed under ECO4 and GBIS will be checked by an independent, trained and accountable auditor.

1.4 All households that received internal wall insulation (IWI) under ECO4 and GBIS are being written to and can raise concerns and request an audit via the Ofgem contact centre, which will be subject to triage. Where cases meet the threshold of risk factors, households are referred for an on-site audit by an independent, trained and accountable auditor. This includes all ongoing installations. This approach manages priorities and audit capacity in a practical way, taking account of the measured rates of non-compliance.

1.5 All EWI and IWI measures installed under ECO4 and GBIS schemes should have a guarantee that lasts for 25 years, meaning should issues be found in the future, the protections within the guarantee can be invoked within this timeframe.

1.6 The non-compliance rates found under ECO4 and GBIS for EWI and IWI are not replicated in government-funded capital schemes. In October 2025, the department published audit results for the Social Housing Decarbonisation Fund (SHDF) Wave 2 and the Home Upgrade Grant Phase 2 (HUG 2) showing a 0.7% category 1 and 9% major non-compliance rate for all measures and 0% category 1 and 11.7% major non-compliance for solid wall insulation. The system in place for these schemes is much more effective in managing compliance due to the additional controls from Local Authorities and Housing Associations, including mandatory audits from Grant Recipients, as well as separate independent audits by the delivery partner PWC. There is no evidence to require an onsite audit for all solid wall insulation installations under government-funded capital schemes. Where there are non-compliances, the Grant Recipients are responsible for resolving these issues through working with their supply chain as well as supporting residents through the IBG process if necessary. The department is confident that when non-compliance is identified it is swiftly resolved without intervention from the department due to existing checks and the department monitors this process directly when non-compliances are identified through our delivery partners.

1.7 In addition to the ongoing programme of onsite audits, the department continues to implement improvements to the current system of compliance, assurance and wider consumer protections. Improvements include:

- Updated standards to both require a higher level of qualification for retrofit designers and to require site visits from retrofit co-ordinators for all high-risk measures. This includes installations of EWI and IWI, giving an additional layer of on-site assurance.
- TrustMark and certification bodies using suspension as a penalty and therefore a deterrent.
- Enhanced checks and increased oversight of contractors by energy suppliers;
- Greater oversight by the department of TrustMark's operations;
- Frequent and regular focussed engagement between the department and all parties in the system of oversight and compliance;
- New restrictions preventing installers from evading accountability by operating through multiple certification bodies;
- Changes to the ECO4 legislation that gave Ofgem the ability to reject measures, installed after the date of the changes, found to be non-compliant with PAS2030/2035; and
- Measures found to be non-compliant can be rejected by Ofgem, if the lodgement has first been voided by TrustMark within the data warehouse.

**2. PAC conclusion: Nearly one year after the problems emerged, around 3,000 homes with defects had been found and fixed out of the more than 30,000 homes estimate to be affected.**

**2a. PAC recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response the department should set out:**

- **how it plans to scale-up its find-and-fix programme to meet the 15-month ambition; and ...**

2.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

### **Recommendation implemented**

2.2 Having completed a mobilisation phase, including recruitment of auditing capacity, TrustMark reached full operational delivery of the find-and-fix programme in late January 2026 and currently intend for the programme to complete by May 2027 in line with ECO4 closure timeframes. The department has seen a steady increase in the number of audits undertaken and the level of remediation being delivered. The department, TrustMark, Ofgem, certification bodies, guarantee providers and retrofit businesses are working to accelerate the rate of fixing non-compliances.

**2b. PAC recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response the department should set out:**

- **...how it will find all the faulty internal wall insulation.**

2.3 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

### **Target Implementation date: Spring 2027**

2.4 To supplement the PAS2030 and PAS2035 required audit regime, all households with IWI installed during the ECO4 scheme (that is, April 2022 to the end of December 2026) will receive a letter. These letters advise households to raise any concerns with their IWI with the Ofgem contact centre. The department is working with behavioural experts to review communication with households to ensure that messages are understood and appropriate support is provided.

2.5 All concerns raised are triaged, and where they meet the threshold of risk factors, households are referred for an independent audit. IWI measures installed under ECO4 and

GBIS schemes should have a guarantee that lasts for 25 years, meaning that, should issues be found in the future, the protections within the guarantee can be invoked within this timeframe. This approach manages priorities and audit capacity in a practical way, taking account of the measured rates of non-compliance. The department will keep this approach under review in light of future evidence.

2.6 No householder should have poor quality work in their home. Officials are continually pushing the responsible parties in the system to remediate all non-compliances that are identified. The department tracks progress and officials have frequent and regular meetings with TrustMark, certification bodies, United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) and energy suppliers.

**2c. PAC recommendation: Given the severity of the issue for residents of affected homes, the Department should be seeking to deliver the find-and-fix programme within a much shorter timeframe and should update the Committee in writing every six months on progress with the programme and the rate of remediation of all external and internal faults in its Treasury Minutes.**

2.7 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Target implementation date: June 2026**

2.8 The department will update the Committee in writing every six months on progress, with the first update, by letter, due in June 2026. Subsequent updates will be provided via the regular Treasury Minute cycle.

2.9 The timetable for the find-and-fix programme was developed based on assumptions about the rate of success in contacting households to book an audit balanced against the speed at which auditors can be deployed. Under the find-and-fix programme, TrustMark is required to make three attempts at contact using at least two methods. In addition, the department is supporting area-based engagement, which has been piloted in Luton, to facilitate increased uptake of audit offers.

2.10 Delivery is constrained by consumer uptake of audits, the limited availability of specialist auditors, and the geographical spread of consumers. The department has already supported TrustMark to increase auditor capacity for the find-and-fix programme and will continue to explore every avenue to increase capacity.

2.11 It is unlikely that the department will be able to deliver the find-and-fix programme on a significantly shorter timescale; however, officials are closely overseeing progress and will seek opportunities to reduce the timeframe wherever this is possible.

**3. PAC conclusion: Households do not have real assurance the government will protect them from unaffordable bills when the original installer or guarantees do not cover the cost of repairs.**

**3. PAC recommendation: Given the urgency of this matter, the Department should write to the Committee within two weeks of this report:**

- **with a credible plan for how it will ensure that no household will need to pay for the repairs—including for how many households it expects it will need to intervene to ensure their homes are repaired at no cost to them—how it will speed up the process for resolving disputes involving guarantees, and how it will ensure bespoke arrangements are agreed and implemented swiftly for repairs where costs exceed £20,000;**

- ***to confirm that it is now working with Companies House and The Insolvency Service to reduce the risk of incompetent and dishonest company directors closing and re-starting their businesses; and***
- ***to check that similar failings are not occurring in relation to other energy schemes.***

3.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

3.2 The department provided responses to the Committee's three requests by [letter on 6 February 2026](#).

***4. PAC conclusion: The Department's senior officials took two years to recognise the scale of the problems, which led to many faulty installations that could have been avoided. This is unacceptable and demonstrates very poor overall supervision.***

***4. PAC recommendation: The Department should review its risk management and internal escalation systems so that issues identified within specific schemes are escalated swiftly and appropriately. This should apply equally to schemes funded through consumer levies as well as those directly funded by the taxpayer.***

4.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

4.2 Risk management and associated escalation within DESNZ is managed through formal governance across projects, live schemes and portfolios. Each scheme has formal risk management in place with escalation of risks, as appropriate, to portfolio (Director General) level. While there are no further plans to introduce new levy schemes following the closure of ECO4 and GBIS, all new schemes will be subject to the same rigour of risk management processes.

4.3 As part of the risk management and escalation processes, officials have presented on four different occasions to the department's Audit, Risk and Assurance (ARAC) Committee about risks associated with the rates of non-compliance identified in ECO4 and GBIS.

4.4 All schemes are subject to scrutiny from the internal Design Authority, and any spend is subject to agreed approval processes culminating in the Investment Committee for spend over £265 million CDEL or £50 million RDEL. The delegated authority limits are subject to revision by HM Treasury. In addition, government funded-capital schemes (WH: Local Grant and WH: Social Housing Decarbonisation Fund) are subject to external scrutiny from the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA) and the Treasury because they are set up as a Government Major Programme (GMPP). Risk is an integral part of providing assurance to all these review bodies.

4.5 In responding to the issues with ECO4 and GBIS the department is committed to reform of our consumer protection system and has set up both an internal programme board to track progress which includes Treasury and NISTA representation, as well as an external expert panel. The department is committed to external input and challenge.

4.6 To manage progress on the find-and-fix programme and remediation of all identified non-compliance, the department has set up a project board with robust risk management processes to manage the heightened risks. In addition, a senior civil servant now sits as an observer on the TrustMark board.

**5. PAC conclusion: The Department's system of quality assurance and consumer protection was far too complicated, and organisations within it focused too much on their own tasks rather than whether the system was protecting consumers.**

**5. PAC recommendation: The Department should publish an annual report to Parliament on all its retrofit schemes, their level of non-compliance and estimated fraud, and whether the schemes are working as intended.**

5.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Autumn 2027**

5.2 The department will publish an annual report to Parliament on retrofit schemes, with the first publication before Autumn 2027. To align with the National Audit Office recommendation, this will be included in the department's Annual Report and Accounts. The department's Annual Report and Accounts sets out DESNZ's approach to managing fraud and error, including counter-fraud governance and capability, risk management across major schemes.

5.3 The department has assessed the quality assurance processes in use across retrofit schemes to establish which quality metrics are currently being measured and how frequently. Based on the lessons learned from ECO4 and GBIS, the department intends to establish a standard methodology for measuring and reporting on error and fraud, which will be used for all new schemes. Where it is feasible and represents value for money to do so, the department will assess existing retrofit schemes against this methodology.

**6. PAC conclusion: The Department did not give the risk of fraud appropriate priority, and it is likely that the known levels of fraud are a significant understatement of the true level of fraud.**

**6a. PAC recommendation: Given the likely role of fraud in the poor-quality installations, the Department should refer the issue to the Serious Fraud Office to investigate the extent of fraud across ECO and bring criminals to justice.**

6.1 The government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

6.2 Ofgem, as scheme administrator for ECO4 and GBIS, has the responsibility for exploring cases of suspected fraud for the purpose of approving or rejecting measures submitted by energy suppliers. It can and does make referrals to relevant bodies including the Serious Fraud Office where appropriate. Therefore, this recommendation relates to an existing ongoing responsibility of the regulator.

6.3 The department is aware that, as part of the administration of ECO4 and GBIS, referrals have been made to the Serious Fraud Office. It would not be appropriate for the government to comment on this any further at this time.

6.4 The role of the Serious Fraud Office is to investigate and prosecute specific cases of serious or complex fraud, bribery or corruption. It is not a regulator, nor does it conduct market reviews. As a matter of policy, the Serious Fraud Office does not comment on referrals and it neither confirms nor denies investigations until doing so would not prejudice law enforcement activity.

6.5 The department, Ofgem and law enforcement partners such as the Serious Fraud Office will continue to engage and work closely together.

6.6 Cross-government data is now used operationally to improve prevention and detection of fraud. TrustMark has developed tools to make good use of its data to identify risk factors thereby highlighting potential issues earlier.

**6b. PAC recommendation: HM Treasury should extend its requirement in *Managing Public Money* for a Fraud Risk Assessment on all new major areas of public spend to include levy-funded schemes instigated by the government, such as ECO.**

6.7 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Spring 2026**

6.8 The source of funds (be it general taxation, dedicated levy or other income) is not a factor in determining whether public money should be subject to the rules set out in [Managing Public Money](#). As such, the requirement for a Fraud Risk Assessment for new major areas of public spend already applies to levy-funded schemes instigated by central government bodies. Nevertheless, the government recognises the benefit in making this explicit. To avoid the need to wait for the next update of *Managing Public Money*, the Treasury Officer of Accounts will issue a Dear Accounting Officer letter to clarify this before Summer 2026.

**6c. PAC recommendation: In future schemes, the Department should ensure that one body is responsible for fraud prevention and detection at the system level, enabled by counter-fraud activities of and data from other organisations in the system.**

6.9 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Summer 2028**

6.10 The department notes the potential benefits with the suggestion of having one body responsible for fraud prevention and detection at the system level for government-run schemes. [The Warm Homes Plan](#) outlines the department's commitment to reform the consumer protection system for government retrofit programmes. This system will be simpler with stronger government oversight. The department expects to consult on the details of these plans and therefore does not wish to prejudice that consultation.

6.11 The Warm Homes Agency is stated as having oversight of this future reformed consumer protection system, enabled by data-led insights and analysis. Data sharing and exchange between relevant bodies will be fundamental to verifying the details of all retrofit work, assuring that standards have been met, and detecting any possible fraud. By having data joined up across the system, fraud may be detected at any point, and potentially by a number of different bodies, and shared with the relevant body responsible for investigation or enforcement.

6.12 As set out in [the Warm Homes Plan](#), the department's strategy is to reduce fraud in government retrofit schemes throughout, from the initial scheme design through all aspects of operational delivery and oversight. It is not enough to rely on retrospective enforcement. The department will prioritise deterrence and prevention, before harm is done. The department also recognises the need for consumer protection for the wider market that does not necessarily benefit from government subsidy but is still contributing towards net zero and energy efficiency outcomes. When future schemes are designed, the department will incorporate lessons learned from ECO4 which include having clearly assigned owners for fraud risks and strong system oversight.

**6d. PAC recommendation: HM Treasury should amend its guidance in Managing Public Money to recommend public bodies design fraud out of all new schemes as far as is sensible, and have one body responsible for fraud prevention and detection at the system level, enabled by counter-fraud activities of and data from other organisations in the system.**

6.13 The government agree with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Spring 2026**

6.14 [Managing Public Money](#) (specifically paragraph A4.9.1) and the Professional standards and guidance for fraud risk assessment in government both already set out that Accounting Officers are responsible for managing public sector organisation's risks, including fraud.

6.15 Where a central government department (including its arm's length bodies) is the scheme owner (that is, sets policy intent, scheme design and is accountable to Ministers and Parliament), it owns the fraud risk assessment, even if some or all of the scheme is delivered through other bodies. As well as designing out fraud at the early stages of scheme design, the accountability and ownership of fraud risk assessment should be agreed at the outset and align to Managing Public Money. The Initial Fraud Impact Assessment (IFIA) should capture how many different organisations are involved in the spend activity, which should encourage departments to think about how fraud risk assessment is going to be managed when multiple bodies are involved. HM Treasury will issue updated guidance before summer 2026 to clarify and expand the existing principles on accountability and fraud risk management when multiple bodies are involved.

**7. PAC conclusion: The serious failings to protect consumers on these schemes risk undermining confidence in all the Department's retrofit schemes.**

**7a. PAC recommendation: The Department should give high priority to ensuring - and indeed should guarantee that within a reasonable period as defined by the Department and communicated to the Committee in the Treasury Minute response - all defective homes are remediated even after the current scheme has ended.**

7.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented**

7.2 The government's approach to dealing with the non-compliance issues highlighted in the NAO and Committee's reports is set out in response to recommendation 2 above; and high priority is being given to the find-and-fix programme. The department's overall response of holding the system to account, set out in the letter to the Committee dated [6 February 2026](#) responding to recommendation 3, will continue after the ECO4 scheme has ended.

**7b. PAC recommendation: The Department should reform its system of consumer protection in a way that rebuilds the public's confidence in retrofits. This should address the issues highlighted by the ECO failures.**

7.3 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Summer 2028**

7.4 The government intends to consult on the design of the future system during summer 2026.

7.5 The Warm Homes Plan (WHP) outlines the department's commitment to reform the consumer protection system and lays out the three principles for the design of the future regime. These are:

- Work should be right first time. Consumers must be able to trust that work will be done right the first time in all but the rarest circumstances.
- Simplicity. People should not be expected to navigate a variety of organisations when they want to make changes to improve their homes. The installation process for low carbon heating and energy efficient home upgrades will be clear and straightforward.
- Swift remediation and a straightforward process for redress. In those rare cases where things do go wrong, there must be clear lines of accountability, so that consumers are guaranteed to get any problems fixed quickly.

7.6 The department will simplify and streamline oversight and subject to consultation and Ministerial decision may give the Warm Homes Agency a central coordinating role, strengthening quality assurance, and improving early detection of poor practice rather than relying on redress after harm has occurred.

7.7 The Warm Homes Plan also lays out a plan for clearer national routes for advice, complaints and support, including a digital service and helpline, and places greater emphasis on protecting low-income and vulnerable households throughout their journey. Together, these reforms are intended to restore consumer confidence, prevent repeat failures seen under previous schemes.

**7c. PAC recommendation: The Department should ensure that, in all future schemes, those tasked with checking the quality of design and installation are:**

- **entirely independent from those doing the design and installation,**

7.8 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Summer 2027**

7.9 The department endorses the need for independence between those conducting audits and the retrofit professionals involved in design and installation. The mechanisms for pursuing this independence are through revisions to the BSI owned PAS2035 and PAS2030 standards, the reform of government's consumer protection system being led by DESNZ in collaboration with MHCLG and the design of any future government retrofit scheme.

7.10 The department is continuing to sponsor the British Standards Institution (BSI) to facilitate the amendment of PAS 2035 and PAS 2030, including how the PASs should address the need for retrofit professionals to carry out their role in a way free from a conflict of interest and determine the best outcome for the consumer by providing objectivity within all retrofit projects. Decisions on the PAS are taken by the PAS Steering Group and not by government. Previous updates to PAS guidelines have taken c.9-12 months to complete.

**7d. PAC recommendation: The Department should ensure that, in all future schemes, those tasked with checking the quality of design and installation are:**

- **...are accountable,**

7.11 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Summer 2028**

7.12 The government has set out, in the Warm Homes Plan, plans for reform to the consumer protection, which includes oversight and compliance, and the intention is to consult on the design of the future system during summer 2026.

**7e. PAC recommendation: The Department should ensure that, in all future schemes, those tasked with checking the quality of design and installation are:**

- **and have the resources and competency to carry out this role.**

7.13 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation

**Target implementation date: December 2026**

7.14 Through the Warm Homes Plan, the government is approaching skills and workforce capacity and capability as a critical enabler of delivery, quality and consumer protection, and the department has explicitly recognised that recent scheme failures were driven in part by skills shortages, poor training and unstable pipelines of work.

7.15 In the Warm Homes Plan, the department committed to consider how competence under the PAS Retrofit Standards Framework could be broadened away from requiring specific qualifications to a more holistic assessment of skills, knowledge, experience and behaviour, in line with the approach set out under the Building Regulations.

7.16 To support this work, the department, working closely with the Retrofit Standards Task Group and the Building Safety Regulator's Industry Competence Committee. These regulatory and industry experts will support development of competency frameworks, including new skills, knowledge, experience and behaviour statements, for named retrofit roles under the PAS Retrofit Standards Framework. In developing these new frameworks, the department aims to support greater clarity and understanding of the competencies required to carry out named roles, new training routes into the sector, and improved oversight arrangements.

7.17 The department is also committed to working with the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) and the Building Safety Regulator (BSR) on their reviews of building professions and the competent person scheme conditions of authorisation as part of a reformed consumer protection system.

# Sixty-third Report of Session 2024-26

## Home Office

### Increasing police productivity

#### Introduction from the Committee

The role of the police is to maintain public safety and order, prevent crime and uphold the law. While the Home Office has overall responsibility for police forces, individual forces are operationally independent. The Home Office allocates the majority of police funding and maintains a system of local accountability, including intervening if chief constables or police and crime commissioners fail to carry out their duties.

The government is implementing the 'Safer Streets' mission, aiming to halve knife crime and violence against women and girls over the next decade and increase public confidence in the police. To achieve this, it has introduced the Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee, which aims to increase the number of police officers, police community support officers and special constables working in neighbourhood policing roles by 13,000 by 2029. The government also intends to deliver a programme of police reform and plans to publish a white paper early in 2026.

Policing received total funding of £19.9 billion in 2025–26. The government expects total police funding to increase by an average of 1.7% per year in real terms over 2025–26 to 2028–29. The Labour Party manifesto set out how the Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee would be paid for by tackling waste through a Police Efficiency and Collaboration Programme.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence on 24 November 2025 from the Home Office. The Committee published its report on 28 January 2026. This is the government's response to the Committee's report.

#### Relevant reports

- NAO report: [Police productivity](#) – Session 2024-26 (HC 1380)
- PAC report: [Increasing police productivity](#) – Session 2024-26 (HC 1239)

#### Government response to the Committee

**1. PAC conclusion: The Home Office does not have sufficient data on the financial resilience or performance of police forces.**

**1. PAC recommendation: By July 2026, the Home Office should write to us setting out the key metrics it will use to measure the financial resilience, productivity and performance of police forces. In doing so, it should set out how it will support greater transparency and strengthen accountability by publishing data on the performance of police forces.**

1.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### Target implementation date: July 2026

1.2 The government has now published the first iteration of the [Police Performance Framework](#), as part of wider reforms to the police performance system described in [From Local to National: A New Model for Policing](#), the Police Reform White Paper. The Framework sets out key metrics of police force performance. Analysis and reporting against the

framework will enable better assessment of how a force is performing in its delivery of policing priorities.

1.3 The Home Office has committed to developing the Framework iteratively with a specific commitment to incorporate measures of force productivity and financial resilience in future iterations. The Home Office will write to the Committee by July 2026 setting out the key metrics it will incorporate in future iterations and our plans for public reporting of performance data to support greater transparency and strengthen accountability by publishing data on the performance of police forces.

1.4 The Home Office is currently working to improve and standardise the way in which financial information is provided by forces and developing a proposal to build on the Office for National Statistics' forthcoming update on police productivity to provide a measure of force-level productivity. This work is being undertaken in collaboration with the policing sector and other external experts.

**2. PAC conclusion: The Home Office does not understand how wider policy changes affect the demand on police resources.**

**2. PAC recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, the Home Office should set out the arrangements it has established - across departments, local government and policing stakeholders - to identify and quantify the impact of policy changes affecting policing.**

2.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

2.2 The Police Reform White Paper sets out a bold and ambitious reform programme to improve the quality, consistency and efficiency of policing. As part of those reforms the Home Office will work closely with policing to fully understand the impact of any policy changes that affect policing.

2.3 Under Consolidated Budgeting Guidance, departments already have a responsibility to consider the impacts of their policies on Local Authorities, including Police and Fire Authorities. Any quantifiable financial burden should then be funded for the duration of either the policy or the remaining Spending Review period whichever is the sooner. The Home Office also considers the impacts of its own policies on police resources and provides appropriate funding if assessed to be necessary.

2.4 The Home Office is working with policing to identify whether processes already in place to help manage burdens are sufficient, and we are aware of instances where provisions made are not working as intended. The Home Office is working with policing and relevant departments to understand what changes are required to help policing meet these costs.

2.5 The Home Office has been working closely with the Ministry of Justice, the police and other partners to consider the requirements across criminal justice reform, including in the context of the Police Reform White Paper. This covers the implementation of the Sentencing Act measures.

**3. PAC conclusion: Police forces have limited flexibility to recruit people with the skills they need.**

**3. PAC recommendation: The Home Office should work with the National Police Chiefs' Council to assess the implications of the existing focus on maintaining police officer numbers, including identifying the impact on personnel and the operational efficiency of forces. Within six months, the Home Office should write to the Committee with the results of this assessment, including the options to improve workforce flexibility and the potential benefits for policing.**

3.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

3.2 The government has listened to policing's concerns about the financial and operational impacts of requiring forces to maintain a centrally set number of officers; and have assessed that the Police Officer Maintenance Grant has become a barrier to visible policing, sometimes leading to warranted officers being placed in support functions. As a result, the officer maintenance grant and the requirement to achieve officer headcount targets has been abolished from 1 April 2026.

3.3 The 2026-27 police funding settlement provides forces with the investment needed to strengthen neighbourhood policing and modernise frontline capability. Overall funding for the policing system in England and Wales will be up to £21.0 billion, an increase of £1.3 billion compared to 2025-26. Of this, total funding to police forces will be up to £18.4 billion, an increase of up to £796 million.

3.4 As part of that settlement, the government is focused on what officers are doing rather than purely on officer numbers. For 2026-27, the Home Office is introducing a neighbourhood policing grant and has allocated £363 million of ringfenced funding to incentivise forces to grow neighbourhood policing teams towards the aim of 13,000 additional personnel in neighbourhood roles across England and Wales by the end of this Parliament.

3.5 The expectation is that forces will prioritise redeploying officers from roles where their warranted powers are not required, into neighbourhood policing teams in 2026-27. This moves away from setting total officer headcount targets. Prioritising neighbourhood policing may place some limitations on workforce flexibility which the Home Office will keep under review.

3.6 Ensuring that policing has the right people and skills to deliver an efficient modern service aligned to current and future demand is important as the Home Office moves forward with our police reforms. The Police Reform White Paper outlines proposals to improve leadership, professional development and create a new national workforce strategy which will support this aim.

**4. PAC conclusion: The Home Office has not established how it will achieve the planned savings in its police efficiency and collaboration programme.**

**4a. PAC recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, the Home Office should set out by when it expects to achieve its planned efficiency savings. In doing so, it should:**

- **provide details on how it will achieve savings, including the areas in which it is seeking standardisation, which forces are using procurement frameworks, and the areas in which it is planning to mandate greater consistency across policing;**

4.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

4.2 The Police Efficiency and Collaboration Programme (PECP) has an annual cashable efficiencies target of £354 million by 2028-29 and a non-cashable efficiencies target of saving thousands of officer hours to support government priorities such as neighbourhood policing. In addition to PECP, more recent government announcements in the Police Reform White Paper on AI and automation in policing are anticipated to drive additional productivity benefits.

4.3 PECP will achieve savings through four workstreams: commercial including cost recovery, productivity, data and the enabling services of the National Police Service. PECP uses the government's collective buying power and leverages Crown Commercial Service frameworks. PECP is standardising and aggregating demand across the 43 police forces to achieve better value by buying once, buying well and buying better thus resolving the fragmented national capabilities landscape. It is funding the first national e-Commercial tool that will replace different systems (for example, contract management, pipeline management and e-tendering) and an unknown number of spreadsheets with one single commercial pipeline for policing. This, together with an increasing focus on national buying, will mean the police service becomes a better customer and will allow suppliers to reduce their whole lifecycle costs on policing services and contracts, driving better visibility and commercial relationships and delivering better value for all.

4.4 PECP is exploring what opportunities in Shared Services can be capitalised on to reduce administration burdens on forces, improve service provision and drive cost efficiencies. Although during the current spending review period (SR25) PECP expects modest gains from these areas as it will be establishing the foundations for Shared Services to enable efficiencies in future spending review periods.

4.5 The Home Office is planning greater consistency across policing in the following categories of spend: IT, fleet, and energy. The initial focus has been on energy (where 39 forces are now following the same national strategy with two more joining it this year), End User Devices (where PECP have held a pilot for centralised buying aggregating demand to a cross government standard with further aggregations this year), and fleet (where PECP have undertaken a first large scale aggregation event against common standards). Further categories of spend will be addressed in 2026-27 and beyond.

4.6 Mandating approaches to policing will be considered where there is a case to do so and where the use of Home Secretary powers is appropriate.

***4b. PAC recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, the Home Office should set out by when it expects to achieve its planned efficiency savings. In doing so, it should:***

- ***set out how it will ensure that claimed savings meet HM Treasury requirements.***

4.7 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

4.8 PECP has an annual cashable efficiencies target of £354 million by 2028-29 and has a plan for achieving those savings through commercial efficiencies, greater cost recovery, productivity improvements, shared services, capabilities reform and establishing the enabling services of the National Police Service. The overall savings and efficiencies target agreed at the Spending Review 2025, which included PECP savings, was agreed by the Treasury and assured by the Office for Value for Money. The benefits and savings will be reported in line with programme's Benefits Strategy which follows [the Government Efficiency Framework](#). PECP has a strong project delivery function with efficient governance structures ensuring financial accountability and targets for its workstreams and operating model.

**5. PAC conclusion: It is taking too long to identify and scale-up innovative practices and roll-out new technologies to improve police productivity.**

**5a. PAC recommendation: The Home Office should provide the Committee with an update in six months on the steps it has taken to speed up the adoption of new technologies and support police forces to improve their productivity. This should include setting out:**

- **the digital technologies with the greatest potential and how it is supporting their wider adoption;**
- **how it will support the College of Policing to identify innovations with the greatest potential;**
- **how it will simplify the arrangements for approving and rolling-out new technologies; and**
- **the results of using the new diagnostic tool to assess the scope for productivity improvements from streamlining police processes, including the potential benefits identified and plans for securing these.**

5.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: July 2027**

5.2 As set out in the Police Reform White Paper, the Home Office is already working to accelerate the adoption of new technologies to improve police productivity by increasing policing's ability to identify what works, prioritise resource and roll out initiatives.

5.3 To achieve this, the Home Office is providing financial and practical support to the College of Policing and its Centre for Police Productivity to strengthen the identification and development of innovations with the greatest potential to improve productivity. This includes leading the assessment of innovations and best practice. Complementary activity funded through the Office of the Police Chief Scientific Adviser is strengthening the science and innovation pipeline and improving links between policing, academia and industry.

5.4 The Home Office is agreeing a set of productivity priorities focused on technologies with the greatest potential to reduce administrative burden. These include data and analytics, artificial intelligence to support decision-making and investigations, and automation of routine processes. In its first year, the National Centre for AI in Policing will prioritise high-impact use cases aligned to these priorities, supporting forces to adopt proven tools at pace while avoiding duplication of effort.

5.5 Working with partners, the Home Office is streamlining arrangements for identifying, assuring clearer routes to national adoption and preparation for transition to the National Police Service and scaling new technologies. These include significant investments made in new secure national infrastructure with the Law Enforcement Capability Network, the Law Enforcement Data Service, the Law Enforcement Cloud Platform and the Law Enforcement National Identity and Access Management service. These core services provide the foundations for future secure and scalable modern IT services. To ensure policing can increase adopting and exploitation of new technology a Business Change Centre of Excellence has been established to provide guidance and blueprints on improved use of capabilities such as facial recognition and advanced analytics, as well as supporting the readiness of forces for new transformational capabilities such as the Emergency Services Network.

5.6 The Home Office is also working with the College of Policing to assess outputs from the new productivity diagnostic tool to identify opportunities to streamline processes and support forces to realise benefits.

**5b. PAC recommendation: In addition, the Home Office should:**

- **require each police force to develop a business case, quantifying how much resource is required and over what period, to adequately update their IT systems;**
- **work with the National Centre of Policing to develop a roadmap for upgrading the IT infrastructure across and within all police forces to enable interoperability, improve their resilience and ability to collaborate more effectively;**
- **identify and prioritise key legacy systems and provide the resources to enable them to be upgraded and consolidated across police forces;**
- **provide dedicated resources, based on the above work, to enable the upgrade of IT infrastructure and systems across and within all police forces according to the roadmap.**

5.7 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: December 2029**

5.8 The Home Office is already working closely with policing to modernise IT systems, implement a new IT strategy and ahead of the National Police Service being stood up by the Home Office scoping an Enterprise Architecture function for policing. Once established, the National Police Service is expected to set strategic direction to ensure consistent, interoperable IT systems and will consider these recommendations further then.

5.9 The Home Office is already addressing concerns through work on national data standards, a new National Data Integration and Exploitation Service, and more than 30 national programmes are upgrading or replacing legacy technology, with stronger cyber resilience and alignment to zero-trust security. The national programmes allow for data to be shared between forces without having to replace local IT.

5.10 This transformation is centred on the Law Enforcement Data Service (LEDS), built to replace the Police National Computer, and increasing the number of national and local services hosted on police assured cloud platforms. Officers will have faster access to information. It has Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), allowing national and force systems to interoperate without bespoke local integrations. LEDS is providing funding to local forces to allow them to onboard.

5.11 The Home Office is modernising other systems, including the National Strategic ANPR Platform, Police National Database, and Child Abuse Image Database, replacing ageing infrastructure and improving resilience. Productivity-enabling systems, including Robotic Process Automation, Digital Public Contact, Digital Case File, and automated audio-visual redaction, are being scaled nationally, freeing up officer time and standardising proven approaches.

5.12 Any further updates to force level IT systems must align with the implementation of the Police Reform White Paper in particular the commitment to force mergers, planning for which will be underpinned by the forthcoming Independent Review into Police Force Structures. The Home Office will consider the recommendations further as part of implementation of force mergers.

**6. PAC conclusion: The outdated and piecemeal approach to funding police forces is frustrating efforts to secure long-term productivity improvements.**

**6a. PAC recommendation: After the publication of the White Paper on police reforms, the Home Office should write to the Committee setting out how the new accountability arrangements will support it in leading the policing system to improve its productivity and deliver government's policy commitments. In doing so, it should:**

- **set out in detail the new governance arrangements that will replace police and crime commissioners in those areas where there is no regional mayor; and ...**

6.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

6.2 On 26 January 2026, the government published the Police Reform White Paper, setting out an ambitious programme to improve the quality, consistency and efficiency of policing. The reforms aim to reduce duplication and deliver £354 million in efficiency savings, supported by a new performance system and a modernised police workforce equipped to tackle modern crime using improved technology. The Police Reform White Paper proposes a new policing model comprising of a National Police Service for cross-border crime, strengthened regional forces for specialist investigations, and locally focused policing for community crime. A new Police Performance Framework will provide a consistent national picture of crime and policing activity across England and Wales.

6.3 The Police Reform White Paper sets out plans to abolish the Police and Crime Commissioner model at the end of their current term in May 2028. At this point, policing functions will transfer to Strategic Authority Mayors where possible, or to elected council leaders through new Policing and Crime Boards, which will be scalable to future force structures. Subject to Parliamentary time, the government intends to legislate through a Police Reform Bill to bring about these changes. The Home Office is working with partners to design a stronger governance system, with Boards appointing a Policing and Crime Lead and assuming responsibility for holding Chief Constables to account, setting priorities, agreeing the precept, and ensuring robust financial oversight. Tailored arrangements are being designed for Wales.

**6b. PAC recommendation: After the publication of the White Paper on police reforms, the Home Office should write to the Committee setting out how the new accountability arrangements will support it in leading the policing system to improve its productivity and deliver government's policy commitments. In doing so, it should:**

- **... explain how it will revise existing funding arrangements to provide police forces with an equitable and stable basis from which to manage their finances.**

6.4 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

6.5 Changes to police governance, force mergers and the creation of the National Police Service require a new way of allocating funding between forces, aligned with these new structures. The Police Reform White Paper confirmed that the Home Office will review the police funding formula once the implementation of police reform is underway so that the new formula reflects the new police force structures. The Home Office will launch an independent review into police force structures to consider the right model for local policing, which will report in the summer. The scope of any review of the funding formula will need to reflect the outcome of this independent process.

6.6 The Home Office [wrote to the Committee](#) on the 4 March with further details.

# Sixty-fourth Report of Session 2024-26

## Department of Health and Social Care

### Costs of clinical negligence

#### Introduction from the Committee

Clinical negligence is a breach of a legal duty of care which directly caused harm to the patient. If clinical negligence has occurred, a patient or their representative may claim for damages against the clinicians or their employers. NHS services are legally liable for any clinical negligence and must pay compensation to the claimant and cover their legal fees if the claim is proven. This report only considers the cost of clinical negligence in England.

NHS Resolution is responsible for administering seven clinical negligence indemnity schemes for general practice and secondary healthcare services in England. Members of NHS Resolution's indemnity schemes include NHS trusts, foundation trusts and general practitioners. Private contractors, such as dental practitioners, are generally legally liable for their own clinical negligence claims. The Department oversees NHS Resolution and develops policy to manage the costs of clinical negligence cases.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence on Thursday 20 November 2025 from the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England. The Committee published its report on Friday 30 January 2026. This is the government's response to the Committee's report.

#### Relevant reports

- PAC report: [Handling Clinical Negligence Claims in England](#) (2002)
- PAC report: [Managing the costs of clinical negligence in hospital trusts](#) – Session 2017-19 (HC 397)
- PAC report: [DHSC 2022–23 Annual Report and Accounts](#) – Session 2023-24 (HC 459)
- PAC report: [DHSC 2023 -24 Annual Report and Accounts](#) – Session 2024-26 (HC 639)
- NAO report: [Costs of clinical negligence](#) – Session 2024-26 (HC 1335)
- PAC report: [Costs of clinical negligence](#) – Session 2024-26 (HC 1234)

#### Government response to the Committee

**1. PAC conclusion: The Department has failed to tackle the rising costs of clinical negligence despite repeated warnings.**

**1a. PAC recommendation: Alongside its Treasury Minute response to this report the Department should write to the Committee explain its operational plan to tackle clinical negligence, including key milestones for achieving reductions in claim costs and volumes.**

1.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### Target implementation date: Autumn 2026

1.2 The rising cost of clinical negligence and experience of patients navigating the system are of great concern to government and ministers are committed to addressing this issue and to improving the experience of NHS patients who have been injured by negligent NHS care. Between 2006-07 and 2024-25, total payments for clinical negligence increased five-fold from approximately £0.6 billion to £3.1 billion (nominal) and are forecast to continue rising, putting further pressure on NHS finances. The government does not accept that ever increasing

levels of compensation is in the wider public interest and agrees that this issue should be tackled.

1.3 The government will write to the Committee by this Autumn to set out the case for change, and its workplan including to describe key milestones, and the likely areas of focus for reform. There is no one “quick fix” but instead a series of complex issues which together bring an upward cost pressure on clinical negligence budgets. The department is urgently examining how to best act swiftly to address some of the problems.

1.4 As the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) described in the Committee hearing in November, David Lock KC has been providing expert advice on addressing the rising costs and how to improve patients’ experience of clinical negligence claims.

**1b. PAC recommendation: The Department should also publish David Lock KC’s review of clinical negligence within six months of it being completed. This should include all supporting analysis and the Department’s response to any recommendations made by the review.**

1.5 The government disagrees with the Committee’s recommendation.

1.6 The government has no current plans to publish a separate report of David Lock KC’s work.

1.7 David Lock KC has been providing ongoing expert advice to Ministers and is working with officials in DHSC to develop policy proposals. This process has allowed the government to utilise David Lock KC’s depth of knowledge and experience in both the clinical negligence system and government policy. The department’s view is that ongoing expert advice to support its policymaking remains the right approach to achieving the best possible policy outcomes.

**2. PAC conclusion: The NHS has not done enough to tackle the underlying causes of harm to patients.**

**2a. PAC recommendation: The Department must set a national framework for improving patient safety with clear targets for annual improvement.**

2.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation.

### **Recommendation implemented**

2.2 The government is committed to improving patient safety across the NHS and tackling the underlying causes of harm to patients, and has implemented a national framework, detailed below.

2.3 The [NHS Patient Safety Strategy](#) (2019) sets a national framework for the NHS to improve patient safety continuously. The Strategy is clear that while it is not possible to set a single annual target for safety, it has demonstrated that identifying priority areas and focussing on effective improvement programmes can improve safety and reduce harm.

2.4 The Strategy has been in operation for over six years. NHS England estimate that it is now achieving the impact it estimated in 2019; saving around [1,000 lives and £100 million annually](#). Significant achievements across the Strategy’s national patient safety programmes include over 1500 neonatal lives saved, [over 500 cerebral palsy cases](#) in premature babies avoided, more than 1900 deaths prevented through medicines safety improvements and over 1700 potentially lifesaving interventions made following Martha’s Rule calls.

2.5 However, the government accepts there is much more to do, particularly in the current context of system pressures and demographic change. This means the ability to apply evidence-based, just and effective patient safety principles, as part of a wider approach to quality, is more important than ever.

2.6 The development of a [Quality Strategy](#) and a revitalised [National Quality Board](#) are key components of the government's [10 Year Health Plan](#). Once the Quality Strategy is published work will begin to develop a new, updated NHS Patient Safety Strategy later in 2026 to continue the focus on improving patient safety.

**2b. PAC recommendation: The Department must review the NHS complaints system and improve the number of cases that are resolved without recourse to litigation.**

2.7 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Target implementation date: Summer 2028**

2.8 The government wants the NHS to resolve concerns as early as possible, reducing the need for patients to pursue further action and ensuring the NHS learns from feedback and improves. DHSC notes the Committee's findings that the complaints system is confusing and unresponsive – reflecting what was heard during engagement for the [10 Year Health Plan](#), where patients and carers expressed confusion about where and how to complain and described their struggle to get responses to their concerns.

2.9 The 10 Year Health Plan emphasises the importance of a stronger patient voice, greater transparency, and a culture of learning from concerns. It sets out a commitment to improve how the NHS listens to and acts on patients' and carers' voices and experiences. In Chapter 6 of the 10 Year Health Plan, the government commits to significantly improve the complaints process within all NHS commissioner and provider organisations; and to set clear standards for both the timeliness and the quality of responses to complaints. The department will update [complaints regulations](#) and increase the use of AI tools to ensure complaints data is collected and responded to far more quickly.

2.10 The 10 Year Health Plan also commits to bringing patient voice in-house by abolishing Healthwatch England (subject to Parliamentary approval) and establishing a new Patient Experience Directorate within DHSC during 2026-27. This new Directorate, once introduced, will take responsibility for significantly improving the NHS complaint's function and delivery of complaints reform by summer 2028.

**2c. PAC recommendation: The Department should estimate and track the costs to the NHS of treating avoidable harm.**

2.11 The government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation

2.12 The wider question around the health economics of patient safety will be explored as part of the forthcoming update to the NHS Patient Safety Strategy by working with academics and health economists to better understand how to cost patient safety.

2.13 The department does not believe a system to track the costs to the NHS of treating avoidable harm would be financially or logistically feasible. Calculating costs of treating 'avoidable' harm would be very complex. There is no single, cost-effective mechanism for identifying 'avoidable' harm in healthcare. A methodology to calculate could be based on 'events prevented x average Healthcare Resource Group tariff price for the relevant admission type', however this does not represent the full economic or opportunity cost of care and estimation of 'events prevented' would be very challenging. Further, calculating this for all types of harm across the NHS would require significant investment in clinical review capacity, financial analytics and back-office support in NHS organisations to calculate costs associated

with incidents. This does not align with the government's 10 Year Health Plan and ongoing approach to workforce. However, the department can demonstrate costs avoided through the patient safety improvement work outlined in recommendation 2a above and in the evidence previously provided on progress made against the [NHS Patient Safety Strategy](#).

**2d. PAC recommendation: The Department should write to the Committee to set out progress in implementing the Dash Review and its assessment of the impact of abolishing the Health Services Safety Investigations Body (HSSIB) on patient safety.**

2.14 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation

**Target implementation date: Summer 2026**

2.15 [The Dash review](#) of patient safety across the health and care landscape was published in July 2025. The report contained nine recommendations which the government accepted in full and are reflected in the [10 Year Health Plan](#)). Progress is being made on implementing the recommendations.

2.16 The recommendation to abolish the Health Services Safety Investigations Body and transfer functions to a discrete investigation unit of the Care Quality Commission requires primary legislation to implement. The department is aiming to simplify the patient safety landscape to make it easier for patients to navigate and to be clear where responsibility and accountability sit at all levels of the system. Protecting patient safety functions is integral to this work. Alongside introducing the relevant primary legislation, the department will develop a detailed plan to ensure the patient safety functions of HSSIB are protected throughout the organisational transition. A full impact assessment in line with HM Treasury's Green Book standards and an equality impact assessment are being produced. These will be published on the government website when legislation is introduced in Parliament.

**2e. PAC recommendation: The Department and NHS England should have a clear system of accountability for patient safety, learning from mistakes and sharing what works, implementing best practice across the NHS streamlining patient safety alerts and recommendations from national bodies.**

2.17 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation

**Recommendation implemented**

2.18 NHS England is required to collect information about what goes wrong in the health service, using this to provide advice and guidance 'for the purposes of maintaining and improving the safety of the services provided by the health service' (Health and Social Care Act 2012). The Learn from Patient Safety Events service (LFPSE) now learns more from than 3 million patient safety incidents recorded each year through the development of machine learning and AI tools for analysis. LFPSE reviews hundreds of incidents weekly to look for new and under recognised risks that can be acted on including through issuing National Patient Safety Alerts, or developing national guidance in collaboration with partner organisations, such as royal colleges and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency. This saves an estimated 160 lives per year and £13.5 million in treatment costs per year through risk mitigation.

2.19 The way the NHS responds to patient safety incidents has been reformed through introducing the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF). The PSIRF is a contractual obligation for all Trusts, supporting safety learning with a reduction in bureaucracy, greater patient and family involvement and more effective, timely learning through proportionate responses focused on driving improvement.

2.20 The NHS has clear accountabilities for patient safety as set out in National Quality Board guidance. The changes the department is making as a consequence of the 10 Year Health Plan and Penny Dash's [review of patient safety across the health and care landscape](#) will improve quality and safety by clarifying where responsibility and accountability sit at all levels of the system.

**3. PAC conclusion: We are concerned there is far too little data on the factors behind clinical negligence, given its huge impact on people's lives and NHS finances.**

**3a. PAC recommendation: The Department should establish a national system for sharing data between trusts and analysing trends. If there are barriers to sharing protected data, it should develop analysis on an anonymised basis to pull out lessons and provide early warning alerts to trusts.**

3.1 The government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

3.2 The government disagrees with this recommendation as there is already data sharing arrangements in place.

3.3 NHS Resolution's (NHSR) Safety and Learning Team works with its members to interpret and triangulate claims data with other insights to inform local patient safety plans. It also publishes reports to highlight causes of harm to improve safety including from maternity claims.

3.4 The annual NHSR and NHS England [GIRFT](#) litigation data pack ensures that on the rare occasion where a claim has not been previously recorded as a patient safety event, organisations retrospectively review the case in line with their [Patient Safety Incident Response Plan](#). This ensures that no patient safety incidents are missed and enables any further insights from the claim to be incorporated into improvement work.

3.5 As noted in the NAO Report (3.27), there is a consensus that claims data is very partial and does not provide a 'live picture' of the NHS. The insights derived from patient safety data are therefore more useful for the purposes of learning and responding to harm than litigation data. As described above in response to recommendation 2e and in The National Director of Patient Safety's testimony to the Committee, there is an existing national system in place with around 3 million incidents reported per year. This data is used to derive and share learning, including through [National Patient Safety alerts](#) and national safety programmes.

**3b. PAC recommendation: The Department, NHS England and NHS Resolution should explore the use of artificial intelligence to analyse live data, detect discrepancies and outliers quickly, and improve the speed of early warning systems.**

3.6 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

3.7 This work is underway. NHS England is actively developing and evaluating AI models on [Learn from Patient Safety Events](#) (LFPSE) data, including topical analysis and novelty detection approaches, to identify discrepancies, emerging themes and unusual risk patterns earlier. This work will directly support a more responsive early warning capability across the NHS by enabling faster detection of outliers and strengthening human led safety assessment.

3.8 NHS England is also undertaking work to assess the feasibility of enabling secure, real-time analytics via the [Federated Data Platform](#) (FDP) to underpin a scalable national

infrastructure for AI assisted safety surveillance. This includes exploring market solutions capable of analysing largescale free text and incident data, with the aim of improving the speed and consistency of early warning systems and reducing manual burden.

3.9 NHSR is also looking at how AI can be used to analyse data to learn more about the underlying causes of claims. NHSR recognises that sharing its data with NHS England provides a full picture of potential harm.

**4. PAC conclusion: The Department's failure to address problems with maternity care in England has led to avoidable harm and unnecessary costs.**

**4a. PAC recommendation: The Department and the organisations it funds need to learn lessons from its failure to improve maternity care in England. Where problems arise the Department and the wider NHS should look for systemic failings in care and tackle these problems at their cause.**

4.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation

**Target implementation date: Winter 2026-27**

4.2 The Secretary of State announced a rapid, national, independent investigation into NHS maternity and neonatal care to help understand the systemic issues behind why so many women, babies and families experience unacceptable care. The Investigation will bring together the findings of past reviews into one clear national set of recommendations, including local investigations of maternity and neonatal services in selected trusts.

4.3 The [National Maternity and Neonatal Taskforce](#), chaired by Secretary of State, will transform the Investigation's recommendations into a new national action plan to drive real change.

4.4 DHSC is not waiting for the recommendations to improve services. [NHS England's Medium-Term Planning Framework](#) sets out the requirement for all Integrated Care Boards and providers to take immediate steps to improve care, ensuring that progress is already underway ahead of the national action plan.

4.5 The introduction of best practice resources, including the maternal care bundle, new approaches to avoiding brain injury, a new maternity triage specification and roll out of the [Perinatal Equity and Anti-Discrimination Programme](#), will help improve safety and consistency across services. [NHSR's Maternity Incentive Scheme](#) continues to work with trusts to deliver safer maternity care and reduce cases of brain injuries or other harm.

4.6 The [Maternity Outcomes Signal System](#), has been implemented across all trusts from November 2025, allowing near real time monitoring of key indicators and prompt timely safety reviews.

4.7 In January 2026 the [Maternity and Neonatal Inequalities Data Dashboard](#) was published, which will give leaders clearer insight into variation and emerging risks.

**4b. PAC recommendation: The Department should publish the Amos Review within two months alongside its response and set out how it plans to reduce the incidence of harm and the costs of claims in maternity care.**

4.8 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: To be advised**

4.9 Baroness Amos has confirmed to the Secretary of State that the independent National Maternity and Neonatal Investigation will publish its final report and national recommendations in June 2026. This investigation is independent of government.

4.10 Prior to publishing a final report and recommendations, Baroness Amos and her team need to evaluate the responses to their recent calls for evidence, which received more than 10,000 responses from women and families and more than 8,500 responses from staff. The investigation also needs to conclude their local reviews of maternity and neonatal services in twelve NHS Trusts, continue meeting with family members, representative groups and system leaders to gather evidence and hear about lived experiences.

4.11 The government agrees the need to move swiftly to translate the national investigation's recommendations into action. It has established a National Maternity and Neonatal Taskforce, chaired by the Secretary of State, which met for the first time on 24 March. The Taskforce will address the investigation's recommendations by developing a new national action plan to drive improvements across maternity and neonatal care. This will serve as the government's full response to the final report from the national investigation. A timeline for delivering the action plan will be announced once Baroness Amos' recommendations have been received.

4.12 The Taskforce will also consider interdependencies with other relevant areas, including delivery of the [10 Year Health Plan](#), the patient safety landscape, personalised care, and ongoing work on clinical negligence.

**5. PAC conclusion: Legal costs in clinical negligence claims are disproportionate for medium and low volume claims.**

**5a. PAC recommendation: The Department should:**

- **develop alternative dispute mechanisms to speed up decisions and reduce costs for less complex cases. As part of this, the Department should look at international examples (such as in New Zealand and Sweden) of non-adversarial and ombudsman models and assess how our ombudsman system could be improved; and ...**

5.1 The Committee's recommendation is under consideration by the government.

**Target implementation date: to be advised**

5.2 DHSC, working with David Lock KC, is considering alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and ways to reduce costs for less complex cases and speed up resolution. Disproportionate legal costs for low value claims is a key concern in this area of work. For the smallest/lowest value claims, payments to lawyers for processing claims can be over 10 times the compensation for the patient. For claims with a damages value under £50,000, a total of £184 million is spent on lawyers' fees each year and only £70 million goes to patients as compensation. DHSC is also taking account of international examples to see what lessons can be learned about resolving claims outside litigation, but it remains important to note that other countries' healthcare and legal systems are not directly analogous to the NHS in England and the English legal system.

5.3 The government will write to the Committee by this Autumn 2026 to set out the case for change and provide additional information on the department's intentions. However, specific policy proposals, like alternative dispute mechanisms, remain under consideration within government at this time.

**5b PAC recommendation: The department should:**

- ***...clarify its position on a fixed recoverable costs scheme for lower-value clinical negligence cases at the earliest opportunity.***

5.4 The Committee's recommendation is under consideration by the government.

**Target implementation date: to be advised**

5.5 The government is deeply conscious of the importance and benefit of ensuring that the costs of resolving all clinical negligence claims should be proportionate to the damages awarded, as well as the need to speed up resolution so as to mitigate the emotional impact of the process. As previously described, the disproportionate legal costs attached to lower-value claims is an area of focus for David Lock KC and DHSC, and DHSC is working through policy proposals, including fixed recoverable costs, to assess their impact and how the government can achieve the best outcome for the taxpayer and for those who have suffered harm.

5.6 The government will write to the Committee by this Autumn 2026 to set out the case for change and provide additional information on the department's intentions, including Fixed Recoverable Costs.

***6. PAC recommendation: Clinical negligence claims are settled on the basis of costs of care in the private sector and yet there is nothing to stop the claimant using the NHS or publicly funded social care in the future, potentially inflating the costs of claims.***

***6. PAC recommendation: The Department should develop, within six months, proper estimates of the impact of assuming health and social care for clinical negligence victims will be provided exclusively by the private sector. It should by the same deadline set out additional measures - including any requiring changes to legislation - which it judges would effectively guard against the risk of paying twice for the care of those it has harmed and an indicative timeline for their potential implementation.***

6.1 The government is keeping this under consideration.

**Target implementation date: to be advised.**

6.2 The existing system requires judges to disregard the availability of NHS services when assessing damages for personal injury. This means claimants are able to claim damages for future care costs (for example, including private care) and then go on to use state-funded NHS and social care services too. Double Recovery, or the instance of the state paying twice, once in terms of compensation calculated on the basis of private care, and again if the recipient of the compensation then goes on to use state-funded care, is a significant concern and an area that David Lock KC will focus on in his work.

6.3 As the NAO's [Costs of clinical negligence](#) report in October described, there is "no estimate of the extent to which clinical negligence claimants go on to use publicly funded health or social care services for their conditions, and little is known about how damages are used by claimants." Working with David Lock KC, DHSC has sought to identify potential data sources in order to make an informed calculation and continues to do so. However, data in this area is limited, partly because there is no legal obligation for a claimant to notify the relevant service providers of their past compensation payments. DHSC is, therefore, unable to commit to the timeframe specified in this recommendation to provide estimates of the scale of double recovery.

6.4 The government will write to the Committee by this Autumn 2026 on the case for change and provide additional information on the department's intentions, including Double Recovery.

# Sixty-fifth Report of Session 2024-26

## Ministry of Justice

### Efficiency and resilience of the Probation Service

#### Introduction from the Committee

HMPPS is an executive agency of MoJ and is responsible for the Probation Service in England and Wales. When people leave prison or receive community sentences, the Probation Service aims to protect the public by managing any risks offenders pose, and to reduce the chance of them reoffending by supporting their rehabilitation in the community. In 2024–25, HMPPS spent £1.34 billion on the Probation Service. MoJ estimates that the economic and social cost of reoffending across adult offenders is around £20.9 billion a year.

MoJ and HMPPS have implemented two major reorganisations of the Probation Service in the last 11 years. In 2014, MoJ divided the service into private sector-led Community Rehabilitation Companies and the National Probation Service. In June 2021, HMPPS unified probation services in England and Wales and brought them back under full public control (unification), aiming to reduce inefficiencies and reoffending through a sustainable model.

Since unification, the Probation Service has remained under significant strain, with staffing shortfalls, increasing pressures and continued poor performance. The 2025 Independent Sentencing Review (ISR)'s recommendations, which aim to free up prison capacity through greater use of alternatives to prison, will likely further increase pressure on the Probation Service.

To enable it to cope with increased demand and improve performance, HMPPS has set up a programme (called 'Our Future Probation Service') which is intended to further transform the service.<sup>5</sup> The 2025 Spending Review committed to increasing probation funding by up to £700 million by 2028–29, to cover additional costs from ISR recommendations, including tagging and monitoring more offenders.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence on 1 December 2025 from the Ministry of Justice. The Committee published its report on 4 February 2026. This is the government's response to the Committee's report.

#### Relevant reports

- NAO report: [Building an effective and resilient Probation Service](#) – Session 2024-26 (HC 1354)
- PAC report: [Efficiency and resilience of the Probation Service](#) – Session 2024-26 (HC 1235)

#### Government response to the Committee

**1. PAC conclusion: Since 2021, the Probation Service has failed to meet most of its performance targets.**

**1. PAC recommendation: HMPPS should, in its Treasury Minute response, set out a timeline for when it expects to see meaningful improvements in the performance of the Probation Service. This should include when it expects the service to meet all its performance targets.**

1.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

### **Recommendation implemented**

1.2 The government expects the Probation Service to demonstrate measurable and sustained improvements in performance over the current spending review period, concluding in March 2029.

1.3 In year 1 (to March 2027), delivery will focus on implementing the Sentencing Act and the recommendations arising from the independent sentencing review to establish a sustainable delivery model. HMPPS is refining how it measures performance to provide clearer direction and ensure system-wide focus on the areas most strongly linked to public protection and reduced reoffending. A revised performance framework, centred on a smaller number of priority metrics, will be introduced in April 2026. Improvement plans for each priority metric will be embedded at national, regional and area levels, supported by clear trajectories to track progress over time. This tighter focus is expected to strengthen operational delivery, including more consistent risk management, improved completion of key activities, and stronger compliance with core operating standards.

1.4 In year 2 (to March 2028) focus will be on embedding these reforms and accelerating measurable improvements against the priority metrics set in year one. Through this period, HMPPS would expect to see further improvements in the quality and timeliness of court and community assessments, strengthening case supervision, and increasing workforce stability and probation officer availability.

1.5 In year 3 (to March 2029), the government expects the Probation Service to be positioned to achieve the full set of probation performance ambitions.

1.6 Progress will continue to be monitored through established performance governance mechanisms.

**2. PAC conclusion: MoJ and HMPPS do not know how probation performance affects outcomes such as reoffending.**

**2. PAC recommendation: In their Treasury Minute response, MoJ and HMPPS should set out:**

- ***what more they could do to monitor and understand the impact of Probation Service changes on reoffending and recall; and***
- ***when they will be able to share their findings from their evaluation of the 'Reset' initiative, including its impact on recall rates.***

2.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

### **Recommendation implemented**

2.2 Work is underway to capture the data required to monitor the impact of changes to the probation service on key metrics. Work is also underway to develop a probation evaluation strategy for the changes being implemented later this year.

2.3 The department will continue to monitor reoffending and recall, and this will continue to be published via regular National Statistical publications in the usual way. The monitoring and evaluation plans being developed are considering how the department can better understand impacts on key outcomes such as these. However, as evidence to the hearing set out, it is very challenging to attribute changes in the reoffending measure to individual initiatives due to the large number of changes underway at a national level (due to the lack of a robust comparison group).

2.4 Evaluation of the changes introduced through ‘Reset’ will be published by July 2026 in line with standard Government Social Research publication protocols on GOV.UK.

**3. PAC conclusion: Longstanding staff shortages have left probation staff dealing with excessive and unmanageable workloads.**

**3a. PAC recommendation: HMPPS should, in its Treasury Minute response, set out:**

- **when and how it expects to be able to provide clarity to staff on when their workloads will reduce to acceptable levels; and ...**

3.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

3.2 HMPPS is committed to addressing the high workloads faced by probation staff. The “Our Future Probation Service Programme (OFPS)” was launched with the primary objective to reduce workloads by 25% by April 2027. OFPS is already delivering against that aim, with Justice Transcribe on track for national roll out by April 2026.

3.3 During March and April 2026, HMPPS plans to share more detail with staff and stakeholders, via internal communications channels, governance and stakeholder engagement forums, on the wider package of measures to improve productivity and reduce workloads.

**3b. PAC recommendation: HMPPS should, in its Treasury Minute response, set out:**

- **the volume of changes it expects staff will need to introduce and how it plans to make this manageable for staff.**

3.4 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

3.5 HMPPS recognises the significant volume of change that staff in probation face. OFPS implementation plans are being developed to sequence carefully when changes are introduced to make that manageable for staff. HMPPS has also identified wider changes and business-as-usual activities which can be paused or scaled back to free up time for frontline teams to prepare for and implement higher priority changes.

3.6 HMPPS works with trade unions, leaders and operational colleagues to refine sequencing, minimise disruption, and ensure that change enables - not hinders - the delivery of safe, high-quality services.

3.7 The change load is managed through the Gateway Management System (GMS) to allow space for independent sentencing review measure implementation and continuing to challenge on non-critical/non-priority work from entering the system. This provides visibility on the change load forecast over coming months, continuing to work with Regional Probation Directors and local teams to capture local change load and supports prioritisation decisions to smooth the impact for staff. HMPPS have introduced twice yearly change ‘freezes’ to provide staff with periods in which they can consolidate knowledge and focus on day-to-day delivery. Implementation of all OFPS changes will be sequenced via GMS.

**4. PAC conclusion: We are not confident that MoJ and HMPPS can successfully manage the risks associated with the new probation programme.**

**4a. PAC recommendation: HMPPS should set out, in its Treasury Minute response:**

- **how it will assess when digital tools are sufficiently developed to roll out to staff;**

4.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented**

4.2 The department delivers digital services in line with cross-government technology standards, including the Government Technology Code of Practice, Service Standard and Secure by Design principles. Digital teams follow established processes, including independent service assessments and iterative development alongside front-line colleagues, to ensure services are ready to be rolled out to staff.

4.3 On top of these core technical standards and processes, tool deployment is overseen by operational governance. A decision to roll out a service will only be made when it is confirmed that it is supported by effective communication and appropriate support models are in place to enable adoption.

**4b. PAC recommendation: HMPPS should set out, in its Treasury Minute response:**

- **its risk thresholds for rolling out digital and process changes/scope changes; and ...**

4.4 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented**

4.5 MoJ and HMPPS adhere to cross-government standards relating to risk management and digital delivery.

4.6 The established governance arrangements for OFPS ensures that the risk profile of all digital, process and scope deliverables is scrutinised by OFPS Board prior to implementation to ensure risk is manageable. OFPS governance includes Regional Probation Director representation to help assess front line risks and preferred options.

4.7 Any risks identified will be escalated through senior digital and operational boards which oversee implementation across operational, change and digital delivery.

**4c. PAC recommendation: HMPPS should set out, in its Treasury Minute response:**

- **how it will monitor if thresholds are breached.**

4.8 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented**

4.9 All changes, whether digital, process or scope are managed through appropriate governance arrangements. MoJ and HMPPS manage implementation risks through the fortnightly OFPS board. Risks that can't be mitigated or remain out of tolerance are escalated through governance to the Capacity Delivery Board or HMPPS Leadership Team.

4.10 In addition, HMPPS uses a range of secondary indicators and through established governance arrangements such as performance, staffing data, staff surveys to monitor wider organisational health.

**5. PAC conclusion: We are not satisfied that HMPPS's new programme will free up sufficient capacity to improve performance.**

**5a. PAC recommendation: HMPPS should, in its Treasury Minute response, set out:**

- **how it plans to keep the scale of the staffing shortfall in view following future policy decisions which may further increase demands on the service;**

5.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

5.2 HMPPS concluded its full review of all frontline probation work in March 2026, providing a baseline of workloads and an understanding of the workforce required to deliver policy expectations. HMPPS has created a dataset holding circa 7,000 activities, each with a typical timing provided by the frontline staff undertaking that work, alongside data on volumes.

5.3 HMPPS' approach to collecting activity timings data is still developing but will continue to improve the agency's ability to understand workload and workforce requirements. Accuracy of the data is maintained through real-time updates to policy and process, combined with biennial, practitioner-informed reviews. This sustainable and repeatable approach has been subject to robust scrutiny and quality assurance, ensuring HMPPS does not return to a position where its understanding of workload becomes outdated.

5.4 Activity timings data is continuously updated to reflect every change to policy or process. Prior to implementing any organisational change, an impact assessment will identify any increase or decrease in workload. This approach ensures for informed decision making that balances workloads demands and affordability.

5.5 MoJ and HMPPS model the current capacity gap (as evidenced through the activity timings data) and incorporate planned digital transformation and policy changes, alongside forecasted recruitment. This enables forward looking service design based on a consolidated and authoritative view of future capacity and demand.

**5b. PAC recommendation: HMPPS should, in its Treasury Minute response, set out:**

- **how it will ensure that staff will have capacity to undertake sufficient training to improve performance, including the number of training days factored into its modelling of staffing shortfalls; and ...**

5.6 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

5.7 HMPPS currently factors eight days of learning and development time into workforce modelling for qualified staff, with additional allowance built in for new staff undertaking qualifications. These provisions are included in broader capacity work, which considers the full range of workforce demand.

5.8 Learning and development requirements vary across Probation roles; however, HMPPS considers the current allocation of eight days to be sufficient for roles with the greatest centrally-mandated and role-specific training needs. However, the agency recognises that at present not all staff are able to fully utilise this allowance due to workload pressures.

5.9 Reducing workload demand through OFPS will have the additional benefit of ensuring capacity to undertake the eight days.

5.10 HMPPS will continue to review changes to probation training requirements as part of work on OFPS and the independent sentencing review.

**5c. PAC recommendation: HMPPS should, in its Treasury Minute response, set out:**

- **its contingency plans, if its programme does not reduce workloads sufficiently.**

5.11 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: April 2027**

5.12 HMPPS is fully committed to meeting OFPS target, progress towards the target is monitored through fortnightly ministerial meetings, OFPS and HMPPS governance arrangements.

5.13 If a gap becomes apparent, then further work will go into alternative options to close that gap and achieve the OFPS target. HMPPS will utilise the approach from previous prioritisation frameworks, ensuring transparency to enables the Chief Probation Officer, Area Executive Directors and Regional Probation Directors to take consistent, risk-based decisions when operational pressures increase.

**6. PAC conclusion: Sufficient third sector and private sector capacity is required to meet offender needs, but decisions around funding are still unclear.**

**6a. PAC recommendation: MoJ and HMPPS should write to the Committee within six months setting out how Serco is performing against its key performance indicators, with regard to the electronic monitoring service and fitting tags.**

6.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: August 2026**

6.2 MoJ and HMPPS will respond to the Committee within six months of the Committee's report to provide an update on Serco performance against its key performance indicators, regarding the electronic monitoring service and fitting tags.

**6b. PAC recommendation: Once MoJ and HMPPS have clarified the role that they intend third sector and private sector organisations to play in the future Probation Service they should write to the Committee setting out:**

- **estimates of the proportion of individuals who will need access to this support and how that will be funded;**
- **what assurance they have that those no longer supervised by the Probation Service will be sufficiently supported to reduce reoffending, including providing details about the assessments they have made; and ...**
- **what plans they have to ensure that its electronic monitoring contracts are set up to deal with a significant increase in the number of people electronically monitored in the community.**

6.3 The government agrees with the committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: October 2026**

6.4 MoJ and HMPPS will write to the Committee as requested to provide an update on the above points.

# Sixty-sixth Report of Session 2024-26

## Department for Work and Pensions

### Tackling fraud and error in benefit expenditure 2024-25

#### Introduction from the Committee

The department makes welfare payments to more than 23 million people across Great Britain. In 2024–25, it paid £290.8 billion in benefits (including State Pension) and spent £7.3 billion on running costs. Some of its customers have complex needs, for example due to poverty, age, health problems or disabilities.

The department is required to pay benefits and State Pension on time, in full and in accordance with legislation and the related regulations. Where fraud or error results in the payment of a benefit to an individual who is not entitled to that benefit, or a benefit is paid at a rate that differs from the amount specified in legislation, the overpayment or underpayment does not conform with Parliament’s intention and is irregular.

Fraud and error is one of the department’s most persistent and pressing risks. Due to the material level of fraud and error in benefit expenditure, successive C&AGs have qualified their audit opinions on the regularity of the department’s accounts for the past 37 years. State Pension is excluded from the qualification because it has a significantly lower level of fraud and error.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence on Thursday 4 December 2025 from the Department for Work and Pensions. The Committee published its report on 11 February 2026. This is the government’s response to the Committee’s report.

#### Relevant reports

- NAO report: [Tackling benefit overpayments due to fraud and error](#) – Session 2024-26 (HC 1336)
- PAC report: [Tackling fraud and error in benefit expenditure 2024-25](#) – Session 2024-26 (HC 1231)

#### Government response to the Committee

**1. PAC conclusion: The department has started to make progress in bringing down the level of benefit overpayments, but the current rate is still too high.**

**1. PAC recommendation: The department should set out in its Treasury Minute response to this report a more stretching ambition for reducing the overpayment rate, going beyond what is forecast to a level that indicates that it has cost-effective controls over benefit spending.**

1.1 The government disagrees with the Committee’s recommendation.

1.2 As part of a programme of work on lifting the Department for Work and Pension’s account qualification, alongside continued fraud and error reductions, the department is working with the National Audit Office (NAO) to agree what constitutes a cost-effective control environment. Until this position is agreed, the department is not yet able to accept this recommendation.

1.3 The department aims to reduce overall fraud and error levels to 2.8% by 2028-29. This represents an ambitious programme of work that has been scored by the Office for Budget

Responsibility (OBR). Achieving 2.8% would be the lowest cross-welfare overpayment rate since the introduction of tax credits in 2003-04 and is below the pre-pandemic level of 3.1%. This would be a remarkable achievement, well in excess of previous expectations of the Committee.

1.4 The department is committed to continuing to reduce fraud and error to deliver value for money for taxpayers within the policy framework and funding agreed by Parliament. The strategy is working, with the National Statistics of fraud and error in the benefit system showing the rate of fraud and error in Universal Credit falling by one fifth in 2024-25 over the previous year and total departmental fraud and error rate reduce from 3.6% to 3.3%.

1.5 The department will continue to track year-by-year progress towards 2.8% through the published fraud and error statistics and will report on the spring OBR-certified forecasts to demonstrate future deliverable reductions in fraud and error in the 2025-26 Annual Report and Accounts.

**2. PAC conclusion: Errors by the department or other parts of government caused £1.0 billion of overpayments and £1.2 billion of underpayments in 2024–25.**

**2. PAC recommendation: The department should set out what action it will take to address the root causes of official error, with the aim of publishing a progress update in its 2025–26 annual report and accounts.**

2.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

2.2 The department reports on its plans to improve payment accuracy and address the root causes of fraud and error each year in the Annual Report and Accounts (ARA). This includes official error overpayments and underpayments.

2.3 A core part of the department's reporting on overpayments focusses on reporting continuous improvement activity to improve payment accuracy alongside its Targeted Case Review teams that target inaccuracies at the earliest opportunity. The ARA also includes a chapter on correction exercises to address underpayments.

**3. PAC conclusion: The department has not made clear how it plans to spend the £3.5 billion of dedicated funding it has available to tackle fraud and error in the three years from 2026–27.**

**3. PAC recommendation: The department should set out in the Treasury Minute how it plans to spend the £3.5 billion of dedicated funding available from 2026–27, including how it will measure the cost-effectiveness and return on investment of the areas it funds.**

3.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

3.2 The department has secured £3.5 billion of dedicated funding from 2026-27. This funding enables the deployment of 5,930 agents into the Targeted Case Review programme and over 12,000 agents working in Counter-Fraud, Compliance and Debt, as well as investment in preventative activities and funding to deliver the savings commitments made over previous fiscal events.

3.3 Since Autumn Budget 2024, the department has committed to gross savings of £14.6 billion up to the end of 2030-31 from fraud, error and debt activity. Activities include:

- Improvements to the verification of self-employment income and expenses and of capital in claimants' bank accounts to prevent fraud and error.
- Introducing regular requests for Universal Credit claimants to confirm whether their circumstances have changed.
- Introducing legislation to require banks to share data with the department to identify potential overpayments.

3.4 The department demonstrates value for money in two ways: through external scrutiny of its costings by the OBR and the Treasury (HMT), and through transparent reporting of performance via published National Statistics and the Annual Report and Accounts. As part of the fiscal event process, the OBR and HMT scrutinise and challenge welfare spending measures, including new activities to reduce fraud, error and debt. Before funding is approved, the department must demonstrate value for money through business cases that outline costs, benefits, risks and delivery assurance, providing HMT with confidence that initiatives will deliver in line with expectations on return on investment.

***4. PAC conclusion: The department is not doing enough to share data with other government departments and thereby improve the accuracy of benefit payments.***

***4. PAC recommendation: The department should set out in the Treasury Minute how it plans to work directly with other departments on data sharing, including how it can work with the Department for Education to help verify household composition as part of its checks for Universal Credit.***

4.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

4.2 The department works closely with other departments on data sharing and assessing the value of different datasets. This is longstanding activity embedded in business-as-usual delivery, as demonstrated by the HMRC PAYE real time information feed, which has virtually eliminated fraud and error for employed earnings. Data sharing therefore remains a high departmental priority.

4.3 Underpinning this, the department has well-established cross-government mechanisms that support data sharing including regular engagement through our cross-government partnerships team. The team acts as a gateway between the department and partner organisations, supporting effective collaboration and data sharing for counter fraud activity.

4.4 The department also participates in cross-government initiatives on common data standards and the National Data Library Kick-starter initiative on household income, alongside close collaboration with departments such as HMRC and the Home Office to identify data sharing opportunities.

4.5 This work is ongoing and continues to evolve as the department transforms the benefits system. Whilst transparency is important, the department must ensure that information is not shared in ways that could assist fraudsters or that are inconsistent with our legal obligations under Data Protection law.

4.6 The department remains committed to strengthening its data capabilities and exploring new opportunities for cross government collaboration. Following engagement with industry data experts, the department is enhancing the use of both internal and external data earlier in

the claimant journey to support upfront eligibility verification. This includes assessing the potential value of data sets from the Department of Education alongside other cross government data sources to support fraud identification, prevention and detection.

**5. PAC conclusion: The department has not fully set out how it will use its new legal powers in a way that supports public trust.**

**5. PAC recommendation: The department should report annually, in its annual reports and accounts, on how often it has used the powers in the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Act 2025 and with what impact.**

5.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented**

5.2 The department already reports in its Annual Reports and Accounts, information on payment accuracy, investigations and debt recovery, which are the three areas relevant to the powers in the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Act 2025 (the Act). It is the department's intention to include proportionate and appropriate reporting on the powers in the Act as they are implemented, in the Annual Report and Accounts.

5.3 The information gathering, search and seizure and debt powers within the Act build on the department's existing powers to investigate fraud and collect overpayments and will be covered as part of annual reporting.

5.4 The Eligibility Verification Measure will additionally be subject to an annual independent review, as required in legislation. The Independent Reviewer will consider specifically whether the Eligibility Verification powers have been exercised correctly, and in line with its statutory Code of Practice, considering its impact and effectiveness. The Independent Reviewer will compile a report, annually, sharing this with the Secretary of State who is then required to publish this and lay a copy of it before Parliament.

5.5 All measures legislated for in the Act were taken along with substantial new safeguards to ensure that powers are used transparently and in a secure way. These safeguards are measure-specific but include independent inspection and oversight of use and delivery, the requirements to consult on and have key Codes of Practice in place to govern delivery as well as tightly defined parameters in primary legislation.

**6. PAC conclusion: Claimants not reporting changes in their circumstances remains a key cause of people not receiving the full amount of benefit they are entitled to.**

**6a. PAC recommendation: The department should evaluate the impact of its communications campaign to encourage claimants to report changes of circumstances and publish the results by the end of 2026.**

6.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Target implementation date: December 2026**

6.2 The department has established a comprehensive evaluation approach to assess the impact of the 'Tell DWP' communications campaign on claimant reporting behaviour. The department recognises a fully causal impact evaluation is not feasible due to national rollout and lack of control group. However, it has put in place performance, behavioural, and attitudinal measures to ensure meaningful assessment of the campaign's effectiveness.

6.3 Alongside the national evaluation, the department will evaluate locally targeted elements of the campaign to understand whether interventions further improve reporting behaviour.

6.4 The department will publish findings from these evaluation activities.

**6b. PAC recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response to this report the department should update us on how it plans to provide more information to update people who raise concerns with it about cases of potential fraud.**

6.5 The government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

6.6 Any individual can report suspected benefit fraud to the department by completing a Fraud Referral Form or contacting the National Benefit Fraud Hotline. The department takes allegations seriously and will take appropriate action following referral.

6.7 Upon receiving a fraud referral, the department issues an acknowledgment confirming receipt and advising that no details about the outcome can be shared. This is because there is generally no lawful basis to disclose investigation progress or results to third parties. The Data Protection Act 2018 and the General Data Protection Regulation place strict duties on the department as a data controller, and it must ensure that personal information is protected. Providing updates could also risk prejudicing any ongoing investigation.

6.8 However, the department recognises the concerns raised in the hearing and understand that members of the public want greater visibility of the work undertaken by its counter fraud teams. The department continues to review and where appropriate, publicise its counter fraud activities.

6.9 Increasing the visibility of the department's work will help show the impact of fraud referrals and reinforce the role the public plays in protecting the integrity of the benefit system. Publicising successful outcomes will also act as a deterrent to individuals who may otherwise consider claiming benefits they are not entitled to.

**7. PAC conclusion: Inaccurate operational guidance has led the department to incorrectly assess around 26,000 carers as having been overpaid Carer's Allowance.**

**7. PAC recommendation: Within six months, DWP should write to update the Committee on its progress with identifying and resolving the cases of carers affected by its inaccurate guidance.**

7.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented:** First of rolling 6 monthly updates in September 2026.

7.2 The department has accepted 38 of the 40 recommendations set out in the Sayce review and has appointed a Senior Responsible Owner to make sure it delivers on these. The department has already increased the weekly Carer's Allowance (CA) earnings limit by a record amount; changed some of its guidance; and are working with users and carers' organisations to make sure communications work for customers. Going forward, the government will be modernising the treatment of earnings in CA to help reduce the number of overpayments occurring in future. This is being explored through discovery work on the possibility of automating the calculation of earnings and potential solutions to reduce the impact of the current cliff edge, including exploring an earnings rule with a taper.

7.3 The department will continue putting things right by reassessing affected cases, and potentially reducing, cancelling, or refunding debts for an estimated 26,000 carers. More detail

on the reassessment exercise will be made public soon. In most cases, the department will contact people affected if it requires more information to conduct the reassessment.

7.4 The department will write to both the Public Accounts and Work and Pensions Committees every six months with a progress update. This will enable the Committees to scrutinise progress. The department will also include information in its Annual Report and Accounts.

# Sixty-seventh Report of Session 2024-26

## HM Treasury, NS&I

### NS&I transformation programme

#### Introduction from the Committee

National Savings and Investments (NS&I) borrows, on behalf of the government, from retail investors through the issue and sale of savings and investments products such as Premium Bonds. It is one of the largest savings organisations in the UK with some 25 million customers, who have collectively over £240 billion invested with NS&I. The Treasury sponsors NS&I and oversees its operations.

Since 1999, NS&I had outsourced much of its operations to Atos. NS&I formally launched its Business Transformation Programme, originally called Project Rainbow, in 2020 to replace this arrangement with multiple smaller contracts. Through the Programme, NS&I aims to reduce cost and make itself a self-service digital business. The Programme aimed to award five separate contracts, with most services transitioned by the end of Atos's contract in March 2024. These included a contract to operate the core banking system that manages all NS&I products including Premium Bond prize draws.

The Programme is late and over budget. In 2022–23 and 2023–24, the programme was rated 'red' meaning successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable and NS&I reset the Programme in 2024. By March 2024, the date NS&I originally set for the Programme to end, none of the new services had been modernised or were live. Total costs for the Programme, including running costs, were estimated in December 2024 at £3.0 billion, an increase of £1.3 billion from 2020 estimates.

The National Audit Office (NAO) found that there were four main causes of why the Programme did not progress as intended: NS&I had a weak understanding of the highly integrated system it was seeking to replace; it did not have an integrated plan; it lacked the capability needed for this type of Programme; and it awarded contracts without a good enough understanding of the dependencies

Based on a report by the NAO, the Committee took evidence on 18 December 2025 from NS&I and HM Treasury. The Committee published its report on 13 February 2026. This is the government's response to the Committee's report.

#### Relevant reports

- NAO report: [National Savings & Investment's Business Transformation Programme](#) – Session 2024-26 (HC 1379)
- PAC report: [NS&I's transformation programme](#) – Session 2024-26 (HC 1237)

#### Government response to the Committee

**1. PAC conclusion: NS&I is over-confident about its ability to deliver its Business Transformation Programme (the Programme), has no workable plan, and no idea of eventual cost.**

**1a. PAC recommendation: NS&I should stop trying to compress work to deliver the Programme by March 2028. It should prepare a realistic bottom-up integrated plan with a timetable and associated estimated costs and budget, to be reviewed by its non-executives, Mr Goldstone and the Treasury for realism.**

1.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Summer 2026**

1.2 NS&I is developing several costed options for the Programme and the Treasury to identify a ministerial recommendation for submission to Ministers. These build on the options set out to the committee during the inquiry. NS&I will set out a clear view on what is deliverable within its Spending Review settlement alongside two further options: delivering the full scope of the Programme as quickly as possible; and also delivering along an elongated delivery timeline and aiming to minimise any increase to the Spending Review settlement. The options will also identify possible areas where scope could be reduced or delayed further. Each option will be costed with realistic plans, impacts, risks and contingency. This will form the basis of a revised Full Business Case in the second quarter of 2026-27, subject to Treasury and Ministerial process timings.

1.3 The Committee will want to note the announcement to Parliament by the Minister for Pensions of 26 March 2026. This sets out the government's response to the operational failures NS&I has faced in comprehensively tracing accounts for some customers who passed away. This includes the appointment of Sir Jim Harra as an interim CEO, who will also review and report on the lessons to be learnt for NS&I going forward that will have read across to the wider issues for NS&I covered in this report.

**1b. PAC recommendation: Within six months, NS&I should write to the Committee setting out the details of the integrated plan including timelines, and a revised estimated cost of the Programme.**

1.4 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: August 2026**

1.5 NS&I will write to the Committee within six months to set out the details of the integrated plan, including timelines and a revised estimated cost, as requested.

**2. PAC conclusion: NS&I's positive news culture has meant it has not learned lessons, which has affected its ability to deliver the programme**

**2. PAC recommendation: NS&I should seek positive attestation from NS&I non-executive directors and from the Treasury, that:**

- **NS&I has implemented recommendations from the culture review and other recent reviews; and that**
- **NS&I's leadership has demonstrably learned lessons as the Programme has progressed.**

2.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Autumn 2026**

2.2 NS&I's Communications & Strategy Director will develop and implement a programme of business-wide cultural change activity to respond to the findings of the culture review and other sources of colleague / supplier / stakeholder feedback. An initial plan will be presented to the Board / the Treasury in early Summer 2026 for rolling implementation over the coming 12-18 months.

2.3 The Programme has increased its capacity and capability, including its leadership, notably through the introduction of a Programme Director and Systems Integration Partner who have demonstrated their ability and willingness to challenge NS&I and its ability to learn

the lessons from its mistakes, as well as encouraging a culture of transparency and challenge from staff, stakeholders and suppliers. The Programme is revising its governance, incorporating requirements and recommendations from non-executive directors and the Treasury's advisor (David Goldstone) as well as introducing a "Quarterly Value Cadence" which will require specific, documented approvals for deliveries as they proceed through each of the design, development and deployment phases. The replanning options have included numerous collaborative workshops with suppliers and stakeholders to ensure that all views are captured and considered when developing a more credible, deliverable programme plan.

**3. PAC conclusion: It has taken NS&I far too long to develop a risk management framework, which has left the taxpayer exposed to unacceptable risks.**

**3a. PAC recommendation: NS&I should ask Mr Goldstone to review how the Programme is applying the new risk management framework, and identify what additional support is needed.**

3.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Summer 2026**

3.2 NS&I will undertake a review of the implementation of the risk management framework and identify any required supporting activity. This review will consider any feedback from David Goldstone on risk management following his overall review of the Programme.

**3b. PAC recommendation: By June 2026, NS&I should write to the Committee setting out the progress implementing its risk management framework, and how NS&I will strengthen and fully embed the framework in its operations.**

3.3 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: June 2026**

3.4 The government will provide the Committee with a written update on the progress of implementation and embedding the risk management framework in its operations by June 2026

**4. PAC conclusion: NS&I has failed to support the Programme with the skills and expertise it needs to deliver successfully.**

**4. PAC recommendation: Within six months, NS&I should write to the Committee setting out its resource management strategy, including use of consultants, and how it will ensure that it manages consultants effectively. NS&I should also set out more clearly how it will manage suppliers and contracts, to manage risks in moving to the multi-supplier model.**

4.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Summer 2026**

4.2 NS&I will provide the Committee with an update on its resource management strategy, encompassing civil service roles and how it uses and effectively manages consultants. The strategy will set out how NS&I intends to develop additional capability and capacity to ensure clarity on how it will manage supplier contracts and the risk profile of the multi-supplier model.

**5. PAC conclusion: NS&I's governance structures still do not have the performance metrics and information needed to hold the Programme to account.**

**5. PAC recommendation: NS&I should set out how it will amend its overall reporting, both internally and externally, to include additional metrics around the Programme including its cost and progress.**

5.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Summer 2026**

5.2 Improved reporting, as well as supporting tooling, is in the process of being identified and implemented. This will feed into wider governance improvements and non-executive directors' assurance through the Quarterly Review Point process.

5.3 Programme Finance monthly reporting now includes a monthly metric showing Delivery progress vs Spend to Date, with associated assumptions. The government is looking to refine this metric once it has a new Full Business Case baseline agreed.

5.4 A full audit of monthly spend by supplier from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2024 to current date will be completed by the end of the first quarter of 2026-27, after which ongoing monthly reporting will take place. Work on agreeing and mapping Programme Finance reporting requirements across governance forums, which includes the Treasury, has started, in readiness for 2026-27 monthly reporting. This will also include enhanced capturing and reporting of financial risks, opportunities and assumptions to forecast.

**6. PAC conclusion: The programme had suffered several serious setbacks before the Treasury gave it the attention it deserved.**

**6a. PAC recommendation: The Treasury should report to the Committee setting out more clearly how it will assess NS&I agreed integrated plan, including the sufficiency of its budget for the Programme.**

6.1 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Autumn 2026**

6.2 The Treasury will evaluate NS&I's agreed integrated plan through a full Treasury Approval Panel (TAP) process, requiring a new Full Business Case with updated strategic, economic, management, financial and commercial cases. TAP panels include senior officials from NISTA and Cabinet Office, ensuring all elements of the plan are scrutinised. In advance of this plan being submitted, the Treasury is requiring NS&I provides a realistic delivery plan within its Spending Review 2025 settlement, and to improve the robustness of its planning by seeking external assurance - by an accredited assessor - of the assumptions underpinning its plan. The Treasury will consider, alongside this, the advice from David Goldstone on NS&I's development of its plans.

**6b. PAC recommendation: The Treasury should set out what it has learned from its oversight of NS&I's Programme, and examples of what it has changed in how it looks at government activities more generally.**

6.3 The government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: Autumn 2026**

6.4 The Treasury will continue to enhance its supervision and engagement of NS&I, having already bolstered its representation on the Board and engaged skilled capability and support, including from NISTA and NS&I's Systems Integration partner. The Treasury will keenly consider the advice of David Goldstone, due this Spring, and will write to the Committee in the Autumn outlining its lessons learned, and how it intends to apply learnings to the Programme. It will also ensure it applies these lessons to its wider ALB support network and wider government bodies going forward.

## Treasury Minutes Archive<sup>1</sup>

Treasury Minutes are the Government's response to reports from the Committee of Public Accounts. Treasury Minutes are Command Papers laid in Parliament.

### Session 2024-26

Committee Recommendations: 548  
Recommendations agreed: 512 (93%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 36

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
April 2025	Government response to PAC reports 1-4, 6-9	CP 1306
May 2025	Government response to PAC reports 5,10-17	CP 1328
June 2025	Government response to PAC reports 18-22	CP 1341
July 2025	Government response to PAC reports 23-26	CP 1367
August 2025	Government response to PAC reports 27-34	CP 1382
September 2025	Government response to PAC reports 35-42	CP 1404
December 2025	Government response to PAC reports 43-46 48 and 49	CP 1469
January 2026	Government response to PAC reports 50-55 (and 56 BBC)	CP 1488
March 2026	Government response to PAC reports 57-61	CP 1533
April 2026	Government response to PAC reports 62-67	CP 1522

### Session 2023-24

Committee Recommendations: 271  
Recommendations agreed: 252 (93%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 19

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
February 2024	Government response to PAC reports 1-6 [80 Session 22-23]	CP 1029
March 2024	Government response to PAC reports 7-11	CP 1057
April 2024	Government response to PAC reports 12-18	CP 1070
May 2024	Government response to PAC reports 19-24	CP 1085
September 2024	Government response to PAC reports 26-29, 31, 33-38	CP 1151
October 2024	Government response to PAC reports 25, 26, 30 and 32	CP 1174

### Session 2022-23

Committee Recommendations: 551  
Recommendations agreed: 489 (89%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 62

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
July 2022	Government response to PAC reports 1, 3 & 10	CP 722
August 2022	Government response to PAC reports 2, 4-8	CP 708
September 2022	Government response to PAC reports 9, 13-16	CP 745
November 2022	Government response to PAC reports 11, 12, 17	CP 755
December 2022	Government response to PAC reports 18-22	CP 774

<sup>1</sup> List of Treasury Minutes responses for Sessions 2010-15 are annexed in the government's response to PAC Report 52

<b>Publication Date</b>	<b>PAC Reports</b>	<b>Ref Number</b>
January 2023	Government response to PAC reports 23-26	CP 781
February 2023	Government response to PAC reports 27-31	CP 802
March 2023	Government response to PAC reports 32-36	CP 828
May 2023	Government response to PAC reports 37-41	CP 845
June 2023	Government response to PAC reports 42-47	CP 847
July 2023	Government response to PAC reports 48-54	CP 902
August 2023	Government response to PAC reports 55-60	CP 921
September 2023	Government response to PAC reports 62-67	CP 941
November 2023	Government response to PAC reports 68-71	CP 968
January 2024	Government response to PAC reports 72-79	CP 1000
February 2024	Government response to PAC reports 80 [1-6 Session 23-24]	CP 1029

### **Session 2021-22**

Committee Recommendations: 362  
Recommendations agreed: 333 (92%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 29

<b>Publication Date</b>	<b>PAC Reports</b>	<b>Ref Number</b>
August 2021	Government response to PAC reports 1-6	CP 510
September 2021	Government response to PAC reports 8-11	CP 520
November 2021	Government response to PAC reports 7,13-16 (and TM2 BBC)	CP 550
December 2021	Government response to PAC reports 12, 17-21	CP 583
January 2022	Government response to PAC reports 22-26	CP 603
February 2022	Government response to PAC reports 27-31	CP 631
April 2022	Government response to PAC reports 32-35	CP 649
April 2022	Government response to PAC reports 36-42	CP 667
July 2022	Government response to PAC reports 49-52	CP 722

### **Session 2019-21**

Committee Recommendations: 233  
Recommendations agreed: 208 (89%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 25

<b>Publication Date</b>	<b>PAC Reports</b>	<b>Ref Number</b>
July 2020	Government responses to PAC reports 1-6	CP 270
September 2020	Government responses to PAC reports 7-13	CP 291
November 2020	Government responses to PAC reports 14-17 and 19	CP 316
January 2021	Government responses to PAC reports 18, 20-24	CP 363
February 2021	Government responses to PAC reports 25-29	CP 376
February 2021	Government responses to PAC reports 30-34	CP 389
March 2021	Government responses to PAC reports 35-39	CP 409
April 2021	Government responses to PAC reports 40- 44	CP 420
May 2021	Government responses to PAC reports 45-51	CP 434
June 2021	Government responses to PAC reports 52-56	CP 456

## Session 2019

Committee Recommendations: 11  
Recommendations agreed: 11 (100%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 0

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
January 2020	Government response to PAC report [112-119] 1 and 2	CP 210

## Session 2017-19

Committee Recommendations: 747  
Recommendations agreed: 675 (90%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 72 (10%)

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
December 2017	Government response to PAC report 1	Cm 9549
January 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 2 and 3	Cm 9565
March 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 4-11	Cm 9575
March 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 12-19	Cm 9596
May 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 20-30	Cm 9618
June 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 31-37	Cm 9643
July 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 38-42	Cm 9667
October 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 43-58	Cm 9702
December 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 59-63	Cm 9740
January 2019	Government responses to PAC reports 64-68	CP 18
March 2019	Government responses to PAC reports 69-71	CP 56
April 2019	Government responses to PAC reports 72-77	CP 79
May 2019	Government responses to PAC reports 78-81 and 83-85	CP 97
June 2019	Government responses to PAC reports 82, 86-92	CP 113
July 2019	Government responses to PAC reports 93-94 and 96-98	CP 151
October 2019	Government responses to PAC reports 95, 99-111	CP 176
January 2020	Government response to PAC reports 112-119 [1 and 2]	CP 210

## Session 2016-17

Committee Recommendations: 393  
Recommendations agreed: 356 (91%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 37 (9%)

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
November 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 1-13	Cm 9351
December 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 14-21	Cm 9389
February 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 22-25 and 28	Cm 9413
March 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 26-27 and 29-34	Cm 9429
March 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 35-41	Cm 9433
October 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 42-44 and 46-64	Cm 9505

## Session 2015-16

Committee Recommendations: 262  
Recommendations agreed: 225 (86%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 37 (14%)

<b>Publication Date</b>	<b>PAC Reports</b>	<b>Ref Number</b>
December 2015	Government responses to PAC reports 1 to 3	Cm 9170
January 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 4 to 8	Cm 9190
March 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 9 to 14	Cm 9220
March 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 15-20	Cm 9237
April 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 21-26	Cm 9260
May 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 27-33	Cm 9270
July 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 34-36; 38; and 40-42	Cm 9323
November 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 37 and 39 (part 1)	Cm 9351
December 2016	Government response to PAC report 39 (part 2)	Cm 9389

## Treasury Minutes Progress Reports Archive

Treasury Minute Progress Reports provide government updates towards the implementation of recommendations from the Committee of Public Accounts. These reports are Command Papers laid in Parliament.

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
December 2025	Session 2017-19: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2019-21: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2021-22: updates on 5 PAC reports Session 2022-23: updates on 24 PAC reports Session 2023-24: updates on 30 PAC reports Session 2024-26: updates to 25 PAC reports	CP 1453
March 2025	Session 2017-19: updates on 3 PAC reports Session 2019-21: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2021-22: updates on 9 PAC reports Session 2022-23: updates on 41 PAC reports Session 2023-24: updates on 36 PAC reports	CP 1284
May 2024	Session 2017-19: updates on 5 PAC reports Session 2019-21: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2021-22: updates on 10 PAC reports Session 2022-23: updates on 53 PAC reports Session 2023-24: updates on 6 PAC reports	CP 1102
December 2023	Session 2017-19: updates on 9 PAC reports Session 2019-21: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2021-22: updates on 18 PAC reports Session 2022-23: updates on 48 PAC reports	CP 987
June 2023	Session 2013-14: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2017-19: updates on 11 PAC reports Session 2019-21: updates on 5 PAC reports Session 2021-22: updates on 29 PAC reports Session 2022-23: updates on 27 PAC reports	CP 847
December 2022	Session 2013-14: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2017-19: updates on 16 PAC reports Session 2019-21: updates on 14 PAC reports Session 2021-22: updates on 38 PAC reports Session 2022-23: updates on 8 PAC reports	CP 765
June 2022	Session 2013-14: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2017-19: updates on 27 PAC reports Session 2019-21: updates on 34 PAC reports Session 2021-22: updates on 30 PAC reports	CP 691
November 2021	Session 2013-14: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2016-17: updates on 3 PAC reports Session 2017-19: updates on 33 PAC reports Session 2019: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2019-21: updates on 47 PAC reports Session 2021-22: updates on 5 PAC reports	CP 549
May 2021	Session 2010-12: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2013-14: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2016-17: updates on 4 PAC reports Session 2017-19: updates on 47 PAC reports Session 2019: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2019-21: updates on 28 PAC reports	CP 424

<b>Publication Date</b>	<b>PAC Reports</b>	<b>Ref Number</b>
November 2020	Session 2010-12: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2013-14: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2016-17: updates on 7 PAC reports Session 2017-19: updates on 73 PAC reports Session 2019: updates on 2 reports	CP 313
February 2020	Session 2010-12: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2015-16: updates on 3 PAC reports Session 2016-17: updates on 14 PAC reports Session 2017-19: updates on 71 PAC reports	CP 221
March 2019	Session 2010-12: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 4 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 7 PAC reports Session 2016-17: updates on 22 PAC reports Session 2017-19: updates on 46 PAC reports	CP 70
July 2018	Session 2010-12: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 4 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 9 PAC reports Session 2016-17: updates on 38 PAC reports Session 2017-19: updates on 17 PAC reports	Cm 9668
January 2018	Session 2010-12: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 5 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 4 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 14 PAC reports Session 2016-17: updates on 52 PAC reports	Cm 9566
October 2017	Session 2010-12: updates on 3 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 7 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 12 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 26 PAC reports Session 2016-17: updates on 39 PAC reports	Cm 9506
January 2017	Session 2010-12: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2013-14: updates on 5 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 7 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 18 PAC reports	Cm 9407
July 2016	Session 2010-12: updates on 6 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 15 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 22 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 6 PAC reports	Cm 9320
February 2016	Session 2010-12: updates on 8 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 7 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 22 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 27 PAC reports	Cm 9202
March 2015	Session 2010-12: updates on 26 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 17 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 43 PAC reports	Cm 9034
July 2014	Session 2010-12: updates on 60 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 37 PAC reports	Cm 8899
February 2013	Session 2010-12: updates on 31 PAC reports	Cm 8539



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