

Competition and Markets Authority

Review of the Effectiveness and Impact of the UK's Subsidy Control Act

Call for Inputs

15 April 2025

Subsidy Advice Unit

Part of the Competition and Markets Authority



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1. Purpose of this Call for Inputs

- 1.1 The Subsidy Advice Unit (SAU) of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is required by the Subsidy Control Act 2022 (the Act) to review the effectiveness of the operation of the Act, and the impact of the Act on competition and investment within the United Kingdom.¹ It must publish and lay its first report before Parliament as soon as is practicable after the end of the first reporting period (31 March 2026). We intend to do so by summer 2026.
- 1.2 The Call for Inputs is an important part of our evidence gathering to inform our report. The SAU will also carry out case studies, stakeholder interviews, roundtables and data analysis to collect views and generate insights about whether:
- (a) the Act is working as intended;
 - (b) the practical arrangements in place to support the delivery of the Act are working effectively and are sufficient; and
 - (c) the Act has impacted on competition and investment within the UK.
- 1.3 The Call for Inputs seeks views and evidence from all stakeholders – individuals and organisations – that have engaged with the subsidy control regime to date, including:
- (a) businesses who have received subsidies, or those who have seen subsidies being given to competitors or businesses in their sector;
 - (b) investors, including private investment or through public investment vehicles;
 - (c) public authorities from across the UK, including central, local and devolved governments, Arm's Length Bodies and others who deliver public financial assistance; and
 - (d) other stakeholders who are familiar with the regime and how it has been operating since it launched in January 2023.
- 1.4 When responding to this Call for Inputs, please support your views wherever possible with relevant evidence and explanation. This will help us evaluate the points you are making. We would also welcome your thoughts on any proposed changes to the regime that could make it more effective.

¹ Section 65, [Subsidy Control Act 2022](#).

- 1.5 Details of how to respond are at Section 5 and for ease of reference a list of collated questions is presented in Appendix A. We recognise that this is a legally technical area, so have also included a Glossary of terms at Appendix B.
- 1.6 We are interested in receiving your views on all the questions and areas we are interested in. However, you may find the following signposting helps direct you to relevant questions for your circumstances:
- (a) If you are a public authority: Q1-15; Q18-22
 - (b) If you are a beneficiary of subsidy: Q1-3; Q5; Q6-8; Q14-15Q18-22.
 - (c) If you are a third party or have been affected by the award of subsidy in your sector: Q1-11; Q14-22.
 - (d) For any party who has been to the Competition Appeal Tribunal or has considered making an appeal: Q16-17.

2. Introduction

- 2.1 The CMA is an independent non-ministerial UK government department and is the UK's principal competition and consumer protection authority. Its role is to help people, businesses, and the UK economy by promoting competitive markets, tackling unfair behaviour and supporting the government's renewed emphasis on growth.
- 2.2 A subsidy is where a public authority – for example central, devolved, or local government – provides financial assistance to a business or enterprise (the beneficiary) that gives them an economic advantage, and where equivalent support could not have been obtained on commercial terms. This can take multiple forms including grants, tax breaks, loans, guarantees, equity investment on favourable terms, or the use of facilities below market price. Subsidies in recent years have been given to a wide range of sectors, including manufacturing (steel, cars), energy intensive industries, new or advanced energy technologies, regeneration and housing, tourism and culture. A recent report by the CMA's Microeconomics Unit presented analysis on subsidies as an element of industrial policy.²
- 2.3 Subsidies can also be awarded through subsidy schemes. These provide individual subsidies for the same purpose to multiple beneficiaries, often, but not always, through a competitive process. For the rest of this consultation paper, references to subsidies should be taken to include both subsidies and schemes.
- 2.4 As noted, the award of a subsidy confers an economic advantage to the beneficiary. This advantage has the potential to affect competition and investment in the market in which that beneficiary operates. The UK has in place a subsidy control regime to empower public authorities to design and give subsidies to support policy priorities without creating distortive or harmful economic impacts. The Act has effect in all nations of the UK.³
- 2.5 Through this call for inputs, we are keen to understand your overall impression of how the Act and UK subsidy control regime is working and its impact on competition and investment in the UK, including whether you feel it is delivering against the aims set for it by Parliament.

² [Industrial policies: new evidence for the UK - GOV.UK](#)

³ In respect of Northern Ireland, guidance is available for public authorities to help them understand the limited circumstances where subsidies are in scope of the Windsor Framework – see [guidance-on-the-scope-and-application-of-article-10-of-the-windsor-framework](#)

3. The effectiveness of the Subsidy Control Act

Policy intentions

3.1 The Act is intended to:⁴

- (a) empower local authorities, public bodies, the UK Government and the devolved governments to design subsidies that deliver strong benefits for the UK taxpayer;
- (b) enable public authorities to deliver strategic interventions to support the UK's growth and other public policy priorities;
- (c) provide certainty and confidence to businesses investing in the UK, by protecting against subsidies that risk causing distortive or harmful economic impacts, including to the UK internal market; and
- (d) contribute to meeting the UK's international commitments on subsidy control, including its international commitments under the WTO's ASCM, the TCA, and in other free trade agreements.

Questions

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the operation of the Act is meeting its policy intentions.

- 1) Are public authorities able to design subsidies and deliver strategic interventions in compliance with the Act that deliver strong benefits for the UK taxpayer, support growth and deliver policy priorities or are there any factors which get in the way of achieving these objectives? Please give examples of relevant subsidies.
- 2) Do you know of any subsidies that have not progressed because of public authority concerns over compliance with the subsidy control requirements, including the nature of any such concerns.
- 3) Do businesses operating or investing in the UK have sufficient certainty and confidence that subsidies will not result in materially harmful distortions of competition or are there any factors which get in the way of achieving this objective?

⁴ See para 6 of [Explanatory Notes to Subsidy Control Act 2022](#) and paragraph 1.23, [UK subsidy control statutory guidance - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](#). The Statutory Guidance is published by the Government under section 79 of the Subsidy Control Act (2022).

- 4) Do you have any views on how the Act contributes to meeting the UK's international commitments on subsidy control?
- 5) In what ways could the UK subsidy control regime be improved to better meet its policy intentions?

Subsidy control requirements

- 3.2 Under the UK subsidy control regime, public authorities are responsible for ensuring compliance of their subsidy or scheme with the subsidy control requirements in the Act including, if required, undertaking an Assessment of Compliance with these requirements. Details of subsidies and schemes must be published in the Subsidy Database operated by the Department for Business and Trade (DBT).⁵
- 3.3 Different requirements apply to subsidies and schemes meeting certain criteria or thresholds. These include Services of Public Economic Interest (SPEI) financial assistance,⁶ Subsidies and Schemes of Interest (SSOI),⁷ and Subsidies and Schemes of Particular Interest (SSOPI)⁸ thresholds. There are different thresholds that apply to sensitive sectors, economic sectors the government has identified as more sensitive to competition distortions.⁹
- 3.4 There are exemptions from the need to carry out an assessment against the subsidy control principles, including where awards are categorised as Minimal Financial Assistance¹⁰ or given under Streamlined Routes.¹¹ At present, there are Streamlined Routes for Research, Development and Innovation, Energy Usage and Local Growth. Streamlined Routes offer pre-assessed routes for public authorities to award subsidies more quickly where government considers there is a

⁵ [View subsidies awarded by UK government - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk)

⁶ The Act provides an exemption from the majority of the subsidy control requirements for low value SPEI subsidies of less than £725,000 over the applicable period. Further details are in Chapter 7 of the [Guidance](#).

⁷ An SSOI is a subsidy that is valued between £5 million and the SSOPI threshold (either individually or cumulatively). These can be voluntarily referred to the SAU by the Public Authority giving the subsidy.

⁸ An SSOPI is a subsidy granted outside of sensitive sectors and are valued over £10 million, or over £1 million and cumulates to more than £10 million with other related subsidies given over the last 3 financial years. Note that on 7 April 2025, DBT announced that the SSOPI threshold will be raised to £25 million in the second half of 2025 (see [Consultation response: refining the UK subsidy control regime - GOV.UK](#)). In sensitive sectors, the SSOPI threshold starts at £5 million or cumulates to this (this figure is not affected by DBT's announcement on 7 April 2025). A subsidy scheme is a SSOPI if under the scheme there is potential to give the above to a single beneficiary. SSOPIs require mandatory referral to the SAU. For more information on what constitutes a SSOPI, please see Chapter 10 of the [Guidance](#).

⁹ Sensitive sectors are defined in the Act as: the manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro alloys; aluminium production; copper production; manufacture of motor vehicles; building of ships and floating structures; manufacture of motorcycles; manufacture of air and spacecraft related machinery; production of electricity.

¹⁰ Low value subsidies that do not reach the allowance threshold of £315,000, including cumulatively over that financial year and the two years prior. Further details are in Chapter 7 of the [Guidance](#).

¹¹ Further information on Streamlined Routes and their usage is available at [Streamlined Routes](#). Note that on 7 April 2025, DBT announced its intention to create additional streamlined routes focusing on arts and culture, and community regeneration.

low risk of causing market distortion and where UK strategic policy objectives are promoted. They do not need to be assessed against the subsidy control principles, providing they comply with the conditions set out in the relevant Streamlined Route. Public authorities are also allowed to make certain permitted modifications to existing subsidies, without triggering a further assessment.

- 3.5 The subsidy control regime prohibits specific kinds of subsidy and places conditions on the granting of others. Before giving a subsidy, a public authority must ensure that it is not prohibited and meet any specific requirements.¹²
- 3.6 We are interested in your experience of the practical arrangements which support the subsidy control regime and how well public authorities are equipped to operate under the regime. This can include, among other aspects, your views on:
- (a) whether public authorities have sufficient capacity and resources to carry out assessments of compliance effectively;
 - (b) the extent to which assessments of compliance are being carried out for smaller subsidies, such as those beneath the SSOI or SSOP1 referral thresholds;
 - (c) the extent to which outside parties, including recipients, are brought in to support public authorities in the self-assessment process; and
 - (d) whether the self-assessment process helps improve the design of subsidies.
- 3.7 We are also interested in whether the thresholds, streamlined routes, exemptions, prohibitions and SPEI procedures set out in the Act are clear, work as intended and are effective in ensuring transparency and scrutiny of the most distortive subsidies.

Questions

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the design of the subsidy control requirements supports the policy intentions of the regime.

- 6) Does the self-assessment process work effectively?
- 7) How well do the thresholds, exemptions and streamlined routes support the effective operation of the regime?

¹² Examples of prohibited subsidies include support related to unlimited guarantees, export performance or relocation. Further information and details can be found in Chapter 5 of the [Guidance](#).

8) Are there any aspects of the design of the subsidy control requirements that could be improved to better meet the policy intentions of the regime?

Transparency

- 3.8 Details of subsidies and schemes made must be published on the Subsidy Database operated by DBT.¹³ This is intended to provide transparency for those interested in the awards of subsidy by government, including those who may wish to challenge an award where they believe the subsidy may not meet subsidy control requirements.
- 3.9 For subsidies that are referred to the SAU (see below), additional transparency arrangements are applied. These include the publication of a non-confidential summary of the subsidy, prior to its being awarded, and the SAU's report of its evaluation of the public authority's Assessment of Compliance.
- 3.10 We are interested in how well the above arrangements are working, including whether they provide sufficient information about subsidies in general and to facilitate challenges where appropriate.

Questions

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the transparency arrangements are serving different users of the regime.

- 9) Does the Subsidy Database provide you with sufficient information about subsidies in a user-friendly format?
- 10) Do the additional transparency arrangements for those subsidies referred to the SAU provide sufficient information about these subsidies?
- 11) In what ways could the transparency of the subsidy control process be improved to better meet the policy intentions of the regime?

¹³ [View subsidies awarded by UK government - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](http://www.gov.uk)

Referrals to the SAU

3.11 The SAU is part of the CMA and is responsible for discharging the CMA's functions and powers under Part 4 of the Act.¹⁴ This gives the SAU two defined roles under the regime:

- (i) supporting public authorities in designing SSOPs/SSOs through advising them on their assessment of compliance with the subsidy control requirements¹⁵ (the SAU's referral role); and
- (ii) monitoring and reporting on the effectiveness and impact of the regime (the SAU's monitoring role).

3.12 Further information on the SAU's role can be found in the SAU's published guidance and the DBT Statutory Guidance.¹⁶

Questions

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the role of the SAU supports the policy intentions of the regime.

12) Does the SAU carry out its statutory role effectively to help achieve the objectives of the subsidy control regime?

13) In what ways could the statutory role and/or practical operation of the SAU be improved to better meet the policy intentions of the regime?

Guidance

3.13 DBT is the UK-wide policy owner for subsidy control. This means that it is responsible for the overall design and functioning of the regime. It is responsible for providing guidance to public authorities on compliance with the Act and fulfilling the UK's international obligations. This Statutory Guidance explains the legal obligations on public authorities under the subsidy control regime and provides a framework for designing and awarding subsidies in a compliant manner.

¹⁴ See [Subsidy Control Act 2022 \(Part 4\)](#)

¹⁵ The SAU provides a report setting out its evaluation of the public authority's Assessment of Compliance with the subsidy control requirements where the subsidy or scheme meets certain criteria, including SSOPs and SSOs. See Glossary (Appendix B).

¹⁶ [Guidance on the operation of the subsidy control functions of the Subsidy Advice Unit - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](#) and [UK subsidy control statutory guidance - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](#)

- 3.14 The SAU has also published guidance, which explains how the SAU will exercise its functions, to assist public authorities who refer their subsidies.¹⁷
- 3.15 We are interested in whether you consider that there is sufficient guidance and support to assist you (and other stakeholders) in understanding and making effective use of the subsidy control regime (including the SAU referral process). This includes the helpfulness of the published guidance, as well as how effective DBT and the SAU are at supporting public authorities.

Questions

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the guidance and advice provided by DBT, SAU and others are serving different users of the regime.

14) How effective and helpful is the assistance, guidance and other materials published by DBT and SAU?

15) In what ways could the guidance provided to public authorities or other stakeholders be improved to better increase understanding and meet the policy intentions of the regime?

Enforcement

- 3.16 An 'interested party' can challenge subsidy decisions at the Competition Appeal Tribunal (the Tribunal) which has jurisdiction to review subsidy decisions made by public authorities.¹⁸ An interested party is anyone whose interests may be affected by the giving of the subsidy or making of the scheme: this could include competitors or trade associations, or relevant public authorities for the area affected by the subsidy.
- 3.17 We are interested in, amongst other aspects, the effectiveness of the practical arrangements involved in challenging a subsidy decision.

Questions

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the role of the Tribunal supports the policy intentions of the regime.

¹⁷ [Guidance on the operation of the subsidy control functions of the Subsidy Advice Unit - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/guidance-on-the-operation-of-the-subsidy-control-functions-of-the-subsidy-advice-unit)

¹⁸ See [Subsidy Control Act 2022, section 70\(1\)](#)

16) Are there any barriers to bringing a challenge to the Tribunal and if so, what are they?

17) In what ways could the statutory role and/or practical operation of the Tribunal and the ability to challenge subsidies be improved to better meet the policy intentions of the subsidy control regime?

4. The impact of the operation of the Subsidy Control Act on competition and investment within the UK

- 4.1 Well-designed subsidies can help public authorities to deliver their policy objectives – for example, promoting economic growth, regenerating local areas, or safeguarding the environment – through remedying a market failure, or addressing an equity objective. Market failure occurs where market forces alone do not produce an efficient outcome. In such circumstances, businesses may make investments that are financially rational for themselves, but which are not socially desirable. Common market failures described include the existence of externalities, public goods or imperfect information. Equity objectives seek to address unequal or unfair outcomes resulting from the operation of market forces. The intention is to reduce disparities between different groups in society or geographic areas.¹⁹
- 4.2 However, poorly targeted or designed subsidies risk harming competition and investment in the UK. For example, subsidies may:
- (a) enhance the market power of beneficiaries and their ability to raise prices or reduce the quality of products and services;
 - (b) limit the rewards on offer to more efficient competitors;
 - (c) diminish beneficiaries' and competitors' incentives to innovate and invest;
 - (d) distort resource allocation through beneficiaries' interaction with suppliers in relevant input markets; and/or,
 - (e) displace the location of activity with no overall benefit to economic activity.
- 4.3 It is to be expected that the operation of the Act – e.g. the subsidy control requirements – may have had some impact on the effects or potential effects outlined above and we are interested in understanding what that impact that might have been. The operation of the Act may have prevented the giving of subsidies with the potential to materially distort competition and investment in the UK (or caused the subsidy to be redesigned to avoid them). Alternatively, the operation of the Act may have prevented subsidies being given with no or limited potential to materially distort competition and investment in the UK (or caused the subsidy to be redesigned to avoid them when it was not necessary to do so). We are interested in understanding whether this is the case and what impact it has had.

¹⁹ Further information on market failure and equity objectives can be found in Chapter 3 of the DBT [Statutory Guidance January 2025](#).

4.4 Isolating the effects of subsidies from other factors in the economy that have similar impacts is a challenge. We therefore welcome input from stakeholders on examples where subsidies may have had effects on competition and investment within the UK, for example:

- (a) short term effects on competition across the economy or particular industries (for example changes to market shares, entry/exit decisions, location, price, output or consumption, customer behaviour etc);
- (b) long term 'dynamic' effects on business incentives and decisions to invest and compete; and
- (c) effects on input markets (e.g. labour, land or raw materials) and choice of location for investment.

4.5 We are primarily interested in monitoring these impacts in relation to subsidies granted under the current subsidy control regime (i.e. from January 2023) and therefore subject to the subsidy control requirements. However, we recognise that there may be older subsidies and schemes that intersect with more recent subsidies and would also be interested in information and insight in respect of these.

Questions

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess the economic impact of the UK subsidy regime.

18) Are you aware of any examples where the operation of the Act has prevented the giving of subsidies which would have had the following impact on competition and investment:

- A material negative impact
- No/limited negative impact
- A positive impact

19) Are you aware of any examples of subsidies given by PAs which you consider had an impact – either positive and/or negative – on competition and investment in the UK? Please explain where possible the specific impact of the operation of the Act and what the relevant factors were (e.g. subsidy design).

20) Can you identify any other examples of effects on competition and investment either across the economy or in particular industries (including sensitive sectors) arising from the operation of the subsidy control regime?

21) In what ways could the UK subsidy control regime be improved to achieve a more beneficial impact on competition and innovation?

5. Next steps and outcomes

How to respond

- 5.1 The SAU is seeking views from interested parties to the issues and questions set out in this Call for Inputs.²⁰ Please note that submissions on matters outside the scope of this Call for Inputs will not be addressed.
- 5.2 We encourage those with an interest to [respond via the CMA Connect platform](#).²¹
- 5.3 When responding to this Call for Inputs, please state whether you are responding as an individual or are representing the views of a group or organisation. If the latter, please make clear who you are representing and their role or interest.
- 5.4 In line with our policy of openness and transparency we will publish a non-confidential version or summary of responses on our webpages.²² We may also refer to comments received in response to this consultation in future publications. If your response contains any information that you regard as sensitive and that you would not wish to be published (information which, if published, might significantly harm the individual's interests, or, as the case may be, the legitimate business interests of that business), please provide a non-confidential version for publication which omits that material, explaining why you regard it as sensitive and confidential.

Duration

- 5.5 The Call for Inputs will run for 10 weeks from 15 April 2025 to 24 June 2025. Responses should be submitted no later than 24 June 2025.

²⁰ We welcome responses from legal advisers to this Call for Inputs, but note that we would not expect or wish for any response to result in waiver of privilege.

²¹ Please note that on CMA Connect users can upload files (such as PDFs, Word Documents, screenshots) up to a maximum of 200 MB (although best practice is considered to be file sizes of 5Mb or less). If using PDFs, please ensure that they are searchable.

²² [Transparency and disclosure - statement of CMA's policy and approach: CMA6 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](#)

Statement about how we use information and personal data that is supplied in consultation responses

- 5.6 Any personal data that you supply in responding to this Call for Inputs will be processed by the SAU, as controller, in line with data protection legislation.²³ 'Personal data' is information which relates to a living individual who may be identifiable from it.
- 5.7 We are processing this personal data for the purposes of our work under Part 4 of the Subsidy Control Act 2022. This processing is necessary for the performance of our functions and is carried out in the public interest, in order to take consultation responses into account.
- 5.8 For more information about how the SAU processes personal data, your rights in relation to that personal data, how to contact us, details of the CMA's Data Protection Officer, and how long we retain personal data, see our Privacy Notice.²⁴
- 5.9 Our use of all information and personal data that we receive is also subject to Part 9 of the Enterprise Act 2002.²⁵
- 5.10 Please note that information and personal data provided in response to this Call for Inputs may be the subject of requests by members of the public under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. In responding to such requests, we will take fully into consideration representations made by you here in support of confidentiality. We will also be mindful of our responsibilities under the data protection legislation referred to above and under the Enterprise Act 2002.
- 5.11 If you are replying by email, this statement overrides any standard confidentiality disclaimer that may be generated by your organisation's IT system.

After the Call for Inputs

- 5.12 As noted above, we propose to publish non-confidential versions or summary of the responses received. These documents will be available on our webpages and respondents will be notified when they are available.

²³ The General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018. See [Data protection: The Data Protection Act - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/data-protection-the-data-protection-act)

²⁴ [Personal information charter - Competition and Markets Authority - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/personal-information-charter-competition-and-markets-authority)

²⁵ Part 9 of the EA02 imposes a general restriction on the disclosure of information which the CMA obtains during the exercise of any of its functions (referred to as 'specified information') to other persons. This will include the functions of the CMA under the Act, as exercised by the SAU. Guidance on the application of Part 9 EA02 and when disclosure of specified information may be permitted is set out in [Transparency and disclosure - statement of CMA's policy and approach: CMA6 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/transparency-and-disclosure-statement-of-cma-policy-and-approach).

- 5.13 We will reflect on the responses received and they will help inform the Monitoring Report which we will publish as soon as is practicable after the reporting period ends in March 2026.
- 5.14 The CMA will publish its Report in line with its statutory obligations as set out in the Subsidy Control Act.

Appendix A – List of Questions

The effectiveness of the Subsidy Control Act

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the operation of the Act is meeting its policy intentions.

- 1) Are public authorities able to design subsidies and deliver strategic interventions in compliance with the Act that deliver strong benefits for the UK taxpayer, support growth and deliver policy priorities or are there any factors which get in the way of achieving these objectives? Please give examples of relevant subsidies.
- 2) Do you know of any subsidies that have not progressed because of public authority concerns over compliance with the subsidy control requirements, including the nature of any such concerns.
- 3) Do businesses operating or investing in the UK have sufficient certainty and confidence that subsidies will not result in materially harmful distortions of competition or are there any factors which get in the way of achieving this objective?
- 4) Do you have any views on how the Act contributes to meeting the UK's international commitments on subsidy control?
- 5) In what ways could the UK subsidy control regime be improved to better meet its policy intentions?

Subsidy control requirements

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the design of the subsidy control requirements supports the policy intentions of the regime.

- 6) Does the self-assessment process work effectively?
- 7) How well do the thresholds, exemptions and streamlined routes support the effective operation of the regime?
- 8) Are there any aspects of the design of the subsidy control requirements that could be improved to better meet the policy intentions of the regime?

Transparency

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the transparency arrangements are serving different users of the regime.

- 9) Does the Subsidy Database provide you with sufficient information about subsidies in a user-friendly format?
- 10) Do the additional transparency arrangements for those subsidies referred to the SAU provide sufficient information about these subsidies?
- 11) In what ways could the transparency of the subsidy control process be improved to better meet the policy intentions of the regime?

Referrals to the SAU

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the role of the SAU supports the policy intentions of the regime.

- 12) Does the SAU carry out its statutory role effectively to help achieve the objectives of the subsidy control regime?
- 13) In what ways could the statutory role and/or practical operation of the SAU be improved to better meet the policy intentions of the regime?

Guidance

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the guidance provided by DBT, SAU and others are serving different users of the regime.

- 14) How effective and helpful is the assistance, guidance and other materials published by DBT and SAU?
- 15) In what ways could the guidance provided to public authorities or other stakeholders be improved to better increase understanding and meet the policy intentions of the regime?

Enforcement

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess how well the role of the Tribunal supports the policy intentions of the regime.

- 16) Are there barriers to bringing a challenge to the Tribunal and if so, what are they?
- 17) In what ways could the statutory role and/or practical operation of the Tribunal and the ability to challenge subsidies be improved to better meet the policy intentions of the subsidy control regime?

The impact of the operation of the Subsidy Control Act on competition and investment within the UK

Your responses to the following questions will help us assess the economic impact of the UK subsidy regime.

- 18) Are you aware of any examples where the operation of the Act has prevented the giving of subsidies which would have had on competition and investment:
 - A material negative impact
 - No/limited negative impact
 - A positive impact
- 19) Are there subsidies given by PAs which you consider may have had an impact – either positive or negative – on competition and investment in the UK this could include for example decisions on business location or decisions to invest/not invest in a particular business or sector?
- 20) Can you identify any other examples of effects on competition and investment either across the economy or in particular industries (including sensitive sectors) arising from the operation of the subsidy control regime?
- 21) In what ways could the UK subsidy control regime be improved to achieve a more beneficial impact on competition and innovation?

Appendix B - Glossary

Term	Definition
Act, the	The Subsidy Control Act 2022
Assessment of Compliance	The assessment carried out by the public authority as to whether the subsidy or scheme complies with the Subsidy Control principles and other requirements set out within the Act and the reasons for that conclusion
Beneficiary	Persons receiving a benefit or advantage (ie from a subsidy)
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)	The Competition and Markets Authority, the body responsible for ensuring that competition and markets work well for consumers
Competition Appeal Tribunal (the Tribunal)	A specialist judicial body with jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving competition or economic regulatory issues within the United Kingdom
DBT	Department for Business and Trade
Devolved Administrations	The governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
Local Authority	An administrative body in local government
Monitoring Function	The SAU's statutory responsibility, set out in s65(1) of the Act, to monitor and review the effectiveness of the operation of the Act and the impact of the Act on competition and investment within the UK
Public Authority	Any person who exercises functions of a public nature
Public Authority Portal	A dedicated, auditable communication channel that allows 2-way communications between the SAU and public authorities in relation to referrals
Office for National Statistics	The national statistical institute of the UK. It is responsible for collecting and publishing official statistics related to the economy, population and society at national, regional and local levels.
Rescue & Restructuring	Subsidies for rescuing ailing or insolvent enterprises
Streamlined Route	A type of subsidy scheme made by the UK Government for the use of any public authority in the UK
Subsidies or Schemes of Interest (SSoI) and of Particular Interest (SSoPI)	Subsidies or schemes that have greater potential to lead to undue distortion and negative effects on competition or investment within the United Kingdom or on international trade or investment. Defined in The Subsidy Control

	(Subsidies and Schemes of Interest or Particular Interest) Regulations 2022.
Subsidy Advice Unit (SAU)	Unit within the Competition and Markets Authority with responsibility for giving advice on certain subsidies
Subsidy Control Principles	The Subsidy Control Principles as set out in Schedule 1 of the Act
Subsidy Database	The database provided for in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act, where public authorities are required to enter certain information about subsidies they give or subsidy schemes they make
Subsidy Scheme	A scheme made by a public authority providing for the giving of subsidies
UK Internal Market	The trading relationships that exist between all parts of the UK in respect of labour, capital, goods, and services.