



**Submission on Google’s general search services: proposed conduct requirements**  
**25 February 2026**

On behalf of Chamber of Progress – a tech industry association supporting public policies to build a more inclusive society in which all people benefit from technological advancements – I write in response to the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) Consultation on the Proposed Conduct Requirements (CR) for Google’s General Search Service under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCCA).<sup>1</sup>

In this response, Chamber of Progress approaches the proposed Conduct Requirements through the lens Parliament embedded in the DMCCA: proportionality, consumer benefit, and dynamic competition. We begin by highlighting the CMA’s comparative advantage under the UK regime, particularly its duty to weigh countervailing benefits and avoid unnecessary burdens. We then examine the evolving competitive landscape in search and AI-enabled information services, before turning to the individual CRs on User Choice, Publisher Content, Fair Ranking, and Data Portability. Across each section, our objective is constructive and consistent: to support measures that genuinely enhance consumer welfare, while ensuring that the regime does not inadvertently freeze innovation, distort ecosystem incentives, or impose costs on consumers in pursuit of largely speculative harms.

**1. The CMA’s Comparative Advantage Under the DMCCA**

Chamber of Progress welcomes the CMA’s careful articulation of its statutory framework under the DMCCA. As the consultation document makes clear, conduct requirements must pursue clearly defined statutory objectives, deliver consumer benefits, and meet a rigorous proportionality test. This framework is a comparative advantage.

Unlike more rigid ex ante regimes adopted elsewhere, the DMCCA:

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<sup>1</sup> <https://connect.cma.gov.uk/google-search-conduct-requirements>

- Requires the CMA to consider **consumer benefits**, including countervailing benefits;
- Imposes a structured **proportionality test**, including whether a measure is no more onerous than necessary;
- Requires the CMA to **keep conduct requirements under review**, with the ability to vary or revoke them as market conditions evolve.

These safeguards are particularly important in fast-moving digital markets, where product design, competitive dynamics, and consumer behaviour evolve rapidly. The DMCCA recognises that designation does not imply wrongdoing and does not mandate intervention in every case. This flexibility is essential.

The consultation rightly emphasises that conduct requirements must be effective, proportionate, and not produce disadvantages that are disproportionate to their aim. In practice, this means that:

1. **Intervention should target identifiable competition concerns**, not broader policy debates better addressed through other legislative processes.
2. **Remedies should preserve incentives to innovate**, particularly in markets characterised by product iteration and technological change.
3. **The CMA should remain alert to unintended consequences**, including user friction, degraded service quality, or spillovers into adjacent markets.

The experience of other jurisdictions demonstrates that well-intentioned digital regulation can impose material consumer costs where proportionality and countervailing benefits are not explicitly embedded in the framework. The DMCCA avoids that structural flaw, and it is under this framework which we provide our comments.

## **2. Dynamic Competition in Search and AI-Enabled Information Services**

The consultation acknowledges that AI assistants are an emerging competitive threat to Google's position in general search, while noting uncertainty about how their use will evolve. That uncertainty cuts both ways.

When the CMA completed its 2020 market study, generative AI services were not publicly available. Today, AI-driven interfaces are rapidly reshaping how users access and interact with information online. Services such as ChatGPT, Claude, Perplexity, DeepSeek, and others increasingly function as alternative gateways to information, commerce, and services. These tools compete not only on relevance,

but on format, conversational interaction, and integration into productivity environments.

This shift matters for remedy design.

Search is no longer defined solely by the traditional “ten blue links” model. It is evolving toward multimodal, AI-augmented experiences. Product iteration cycles are accelerating. User expectations are changing. And new entry is occurring not just from smaller general search engines, but from entirely different interface paradigms.

In such a context, static assumptions about durable market power risk overstating the stability of the competitive landscape. Furthermore, design-heavy or prescriptive remedies risk locking in legacy service models just as the market transitions to new ones.

None of this negates the CMA’s authority to address competition concerns where they arise. But it does underscore the importance of forward-looking analysis. Where markets are in transition, the risk of over-correction is real. Interventions designed for yesterday’s bottlenecks may become tomorrow’s constraints on innovation.

The DMCCA’s requirement to consider consumer benefits and proportionality is particularly valuable in this environment. The relevant question is not simply whether Google holds a strong position today. It is whether the proposed conduct requirements enhance competition and consumer welfare in a market that is visibly in flux.

Chamber of Progress encourages the CMA to ensure that its measures remain adaptable, technologically neutral, and responsive to the dynamic competitive pressures emerging from AI-enabled services.

### **3. User Choice in Search**

Chamber of Progress supports the CMA’s objective of ensuring that users are able to make informed and effective decisions about the search services they use. The aim of promoting “open choices” is squarely within the statutory objectives of the DMCCA, and the annex makes clear that the proposed conduct requirement is intended to empower users rather than to directly benefit rivals. That framing is important and welcome.

However, the effectiveness and proportionality of the proposed measures will depend heavily on design choices. The statutory test requires that any conduct requirement be effective, no more onerous than necessary, and not produce disadvantages that are disproportionate to its aim. In the context of user choice architecture, this means that the remedy must eliminate barriers to switching without attempting to engineer switching outcomes.

#### *A. Eligibility Criteria and Technological Neutrality*

The Consultation sets out proposed eligibility criteria for inclusion in the choice screen and seeks views on how these criteria should be defined and applied (**Consultation Question 6.1(a)(ii)**). While objective criteria are necessary for legal certainty, they must not freeze the market into legacy conceptions of “search.” We therefore appreciate the CMA’s confirmation that the eligibility criteria should be designed in light of the fact that offerings, user expectations, and behaviour, evolve.<sup>2</sup>

Search services are evolving rapidly, particularly as generative AI and hybrid interfaces reshape how users access information. Eligibility criteria that are overly prescriptive or tied to traditional general search functionality risk discouraging innovation or excluding emerging service models that do not fit neatly into existing categories. Conversely, criteria that effectively require providers to maintain a particular service configuration in order to remain eligible could distort product development.

To the extent the CMA seeks feedback on the appropriateness of its proposed eligibility criteria, we encourage an approach that is functional and future-facing. Criteria should focus on whether a service offers users a genuine alternative route to access and retrieve information, rather than mandating specific technical or business models. The purpose of the conduct requirement is to ensure users are aware of alternatives that offer similar functionalities, not to standardise how search must be delivered.

#### *B. Presentation, Ranking and User Expectations*

The Consultation considers how providers would be presented within the choice screen, including ordering and prominence (**Consultation Question 6.1(a)(v)**). In

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<sup>2</sup> See e.g. CMA “Consultation: User Choice Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 4.21.

this respect, it is essential that the design does not move from empowering user choice to predetermining user decisions.

The ultimate purpose of the DMCCA is to prevent the leveraging of strategic market status to foreclose rivals. It is not to compel users to switch away from Google, nor to reduce its visibility as a matter of policy. Design features that deliberately remove Google from prominent positions, artificially demote it, or otherwise attempt to neutralise its probability of user selection would exceed the objective of eliminating barriers and would instead attempt to shape market outcomes.

Experience in other jurisdictions demonstrates that when users are presented with choice screens, many continue to select Google as their preferred search provider. That persistence suggests that user preference plays a significant role. If, after being presented with alternatives, users continue to choose Google in large numbers, it would be difficult to conclude that switching constraints were the primary driver of its market position.

The Consultation also discusses the anticipated costs and implementation considerations associated with recurring choice screens in the tens of millions of pounds.<sup>3</sup> Those costs are said to be justified by the assumption that increased prompting would lead to meaningful switching. However, if a substantial share of users would ultimately reaffirm their existing preference, the incremental consumer benefit of repeated interventions may be limited. Imposing additional friction, device set-up time, or repeated prompts primarily to benefit rival providers risks failing the proportionality test.

The DMCCA does not require the CMA to maximise switching. It requires the CMA to protect competitive processes for the benefit of consumers. Measures that reduce friction are appropriate. Measures that seek to rebalance market shares are not.

### *C. Resurfacing of the Choice Screen and Finality of Decisions*

The Consultation proposes that the choice screen may resurface over the lifetime of a device, rather than being presented only once (**Consultation Question 6.1(a)(iv)**). While this may assist some users who later wish to reconsider their

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<sup>3</sup> CMA “Consultation: User Choice Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 5.20.

selection, repeated resurfacing also introduces the risk of ongoing friction with little added benefit.

Users who have made an informed selection should be able to treat that decision as final unless they actively decide to revisit it. If the CMA proceeds with a resurfacing mechanism, users should be able to confirm that they do not wish to be prompted again. Respect for autonomy requires that a user has the choice of an affirmative decision not to be continually reopened absent new information or a material change in circumstances.

It is also important to recognise that users already retain the ability to change their default search provider through established device settings pathways. The Consultation acknowledges the existence of such mechanisms. The incremental consumer benefit of repeated prompts should therefore be carefully assessed against the user experience costs.

To the extent the CMA invites views on the frequency and triggering of resurfacing, we encourage a model that preserves user control, avoids repetitive notifications, and recognises that ease of switching through settings remains available at any time.

#### *D. The Role of OEMs and the Allocation of Responsibility*

The Consultation identifies Android and Chrome as key access points and focuses on Google's role in default arrangements. However, it is important to distinguish between Google's conduct and the independent commercial decisions of original equipment manufacturers.

OEMs exercise significant discretion over device configuration, user interface design, and pre-installation choices. Default settings and screen placement are often the product of negotiated commercial agreements that reflect broader ecosystem economics. Interventions that constrain such arrangements may have implications that extend beyond search.

Payments associated with default placement have historically formed part of the Android ecosystem's commercial structure. These arrangements can support OEM revenues and contribute to device affordability. If regulatory design choices effectively eliminate or devalue default placements, which can equally benefit Google rivals, the resulting loss of revenue may be reflected in higher handset prices or reduced device subsidies.

The proportionality assessment should therefore account not only for potential competitive benefits, but also for possible downstream effects on device pricing and consumer access to affordable hardware.

#### *E. Consumer Benefit, Not Competitor Protection*

Finally, the Consultation frames the user choice conduct requirement as a means of empowering consumers and improving competition. That framing is correct and should remain the guiding principle.

The existence of strong user preference for a given service does not, in itself, establish competitive harm. If users are made aware of alternatives, are able to switch with minimal friction, and nevertheless choose to remain with the incumbent, the regulatory response should not be to engineer a different outcome.

The CMA explicitly seeks views on whether the proposed design is proportionate and effective in achieving its aims (**Consultation Question 6.3**). Chamber of Progress submits that effectiveness must be measured by the removal of unjustified barriers to switching, not by the rate of switching itself. A conduct requirement that increases user friction or disrupts ecosystem economics primarily to benefit rivals would risk exceeding what is necessary to achieve the statutory objective.

#### **4. Publisher Content Controls and Crawler Separation**

Chamber of Progress supports the CMA's provisional conclusion that mandatory crawler separation would be a more onerous and disproportionate intervention than improved publisher content controls.

The Consultation makes clear that the CMA has carefully considered crawler separation as an alternative remedy and assessed it against the statutory proportionality framework. In particular, the CMA concludes that "crawler separation would be the more onerous proposal" and that, since improved controls would be "an equally effective remedy," it does not intend to proceed with separation.<sup>4</sup>

We agree with that assessment.

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<sup>4</sup> CMA "Consultation: Publisher Conduct Requirement" (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 5.12.

### *A. Duplication, Infrastructure Costs and Systemic Inefficiencies*

The CMA’s analysis demonstrates that crawler separation would likely lead to duplication of crawling for traditional search functions and generative AI features. Under a single crawler, Google has no incentive to crawl multiple times where publishers permit use for both purposes. Under multiple crawlers, it would be forced to do so.

The CMA further notes that third parties would be likely to bear significantly greater costs under separate crawlers compared to improved publisher content controls.<sup>5</sup> Even if per-site impacts appear small, the overall impact across “hundreds of billions” of indexed pages would be significant. As the CMA notes, a 30 percent increase in crawling could imply incremental ongoing data transfer costs of at least £25–50 million annually to third parties alone.<sup>6</sup>

The costs to Google would also be substantial. The CMA records Google’s evidence that separation would entail significant upfront costs associated with developing a separate index, implementing complex data pipelines, enforcing access control policies, and maintaining a distinct crawler infrastructure, in addition to ongoing compute and storage costs, in the order of billions of pounds.<sup>7</sup> The CMA also references opportunity costs arising from diversion of resources away from model development and competition with AI assistants.<sup>8</sup>

Even if some stakeholders dispute the magnitude of these costs, the underlying facts are uncontroversial. Separation would require duplicative infrastructure and would impose systemic inefficiencies across the ecosystem. Under the DMCCA, where two remedies are equally effective, the CMA is required to adopt the least onerous option. The CMA’s provisional conclusion reflects precisely that discipline.

### *B. Proportionality and Ecosystem Effects*

The CMA’s proportionality framework requires consideration not only of effectiveness, but of whether a measure is no more onerous than necessary and

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<sup>5</sup> CMA “Consultation: Publisher Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 5.10.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> CMA “Consultation: Publisher Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 5.8.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

does not produce disproportionate disadvantages. Crawler separation would impose:

- Direct infrastructure and retraining costs on Google;
- Ongoing bandwidth and server load costs on publishers and content delivery networks;
- Broader inefficiencies from duplicative crawling activity;
- Potential innovation costs if resources are diverted from product development.

By contrast, improved controls operate largely within Google's existing system architecture. The CMA explicitly notes that a new control would largely build on existing infrastructure, such as granular controls already available (for example, nosnippet), whereas a separate crawler would require duplicating infrastructure that already exists for Googlebot.

Where an intervention would create duplication across the web's crawling architecture, increase system-wide costs, and risk chilling innovation, it would be difficult to characterise it as the least onerous effective option.

### *C. Avoiding Structural Remedies Where Behavioural Remedies Suffice*

Crawler separation would amount to a structural remedy in practice. It would require the creation of distinct technical systems for search and AI uses, altering the architecture of how the web is indexed. Such interventions should be reserved for circumstances where less intrusive measures cannot achieve the statutory aim.

Here, the CMA has provisionally found that improved controls are capable of delivering equivalent benefits. That finding is decisive in proportionality terms.

Chamber of Progress therefore supports the CMA's decision not to pursue crawler separation. The focus should instead remain on:

- Clarifying the scope and operation of publisher controls;
- Ensuring product-agnostic application;
- Enhancing transparency and granularity;
- Preserving innovation incentives and avoiding unnecessary duplication of web infrastructure.

In a market characterised by rapid evolution in AI and search functionality, remedies that embed structural rigidity into core internet architecture risk creating long-term distortions that exceed their intended benefits. The CMA’s current approach appropriately balances publisher autonomy with systemic efficiency and innovation.

## **5. Fair Ranking and the Evolution of Search: AI Overviews**

Chamber of Progress supports the CMA’s objective of ensuring that Google applies “non-discriminatory and objective criteria” in the ranking and presentation of organic search results (**Consultation Question 6.4**). We also recognise the CMA’s decision to include search generative AI features such as AI Overviews and AI Mode within the scope of the Fair Ranking CR.<sup>9</sup>

However, in applying the Fair Ranking CR to search generative AI features, it is essential that the CMA does not inadvertently freeze the competitive evolution of search.

### *A. AI Overviews as a Competitive Development*

The CMA acknowledges that Google routinely alters the “design and presentation of search features, most recently introducing AI Overviews and AI Mode”.<sup>10</sup> It further recognises that the introduction of new search features will require testing and development, and expressly states that nothing in paragraph 4 is intended to “reduce or undermine Google’s ability to introduce such new features”.<sup>11</sup>

That recognition is correct and should remain central to the application of the CR.

AI Overviews represent a shift from link-based retrieval to answer-based synthesis. For many queries, particularly informational queries, users derive more value from, and therefore prefer a concise, structured answer rather than a list of hyperlinks. Displaying results in an answer format can better meet consumer needs by:

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<sup>9</sup> CMA “Consultation: Fair Ranking Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 4.5.

<sup>10</sup> CMA “Consultation: Fair Ranking Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 1.5.

<sup>11</sup> CMA “Consultation: Fair Ranking Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), pg. 21.

- Reducing search time and friction;
- Synthesising information from multiple sources;
- Providing context that helps users decide whether to click through for more detail.

This is not a distortion of search. It is a competitive response to changing user expectations and to emerging AI-native interfaces.

The Fair Ranking CR is designed to ensure objectivity and fairness in ranking. It is not intended to mandate a particular interface paradigm. If applied in a way that constrains the development or prominence of AI Overviews simply because they alter traffic flows, the CR would risk preserving a legacy model of search at the expense of innovation.

### *B. Facts, Expression and the Limits of Copyright*

Some publishers have raised concerns that AI Overviews unfairly use their content. The CMA's focus in this CR, however, is ranking fairness, not intellectual property enforcement.

Copyright protects the particular expression of an idea. It does not confer a monopoly over facts, events, or underlying information. Reporting that a company's share price rose 5 percent, or that a public event occurred, does not grant exclusive control over that factual content. Nor does copyright prevent a third party from summarising a report in its own words, including through automated or AI-driven processes.

The Fair Ranking CR requires Google to apply objective and non-discriminatory criteria and not to take into account irrelevant considerations such as whether it has chosen to opt out of its content being used for Google's search generative AI features. It does not require Google to maintain any particular volume of referral traffic to individual publishers, nor to avoid synthesising factual information.

If the CR were interpreted to require Google to avoid presenting AI-generated summaries on the basis that they reduce click-throughs, it would effectively transform a competition remedy into a traffic allocation mechanism. That would go beyond the stated statutory objectives of fair dealing and transparency.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> CMA "Consultation: Fair Ranking Conduct Requirement" (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 2.4.

### *C. Ranking Versus Interface Design*

The CMA has carefully distinguished between ranking decisions and the design of search features. The interpretative notes clarify that while paragraph 4(b) requires objective treatment in ranking decisions, “the fact that a search feature (eg the Flights Module) might be designed and presented to only include Google inputs would not be relevant to paragraph 4.b., but Google’s decision on where that search feature is ranked on the page would be”.<sup>13</sup>

This distinction is crucial.

The Fair Ranking CR should regulate the criteria by which content is ranked or positioned relative to other results. It should not function as a constraint on Google’s ability to experiment with or introduce new formats such as AI Overviews, provided that the criteria used within those features are objective and non-discriminatory, and Google does not favour its own content on the basis of irrelevant commercial considerations.

Indeed, the CMA itself has recognised that search generative AI features are deeply embedded within Search infrastructure more broadly, and rapidly growing in importance. In such a dynamic environment, prescriptive interpretations risk undermining the very consumer benefits the CR is intended to protect.

### *D. Avoiding De Facto Product Design Regulation*

The Consultation identifies concerns that Google may not sufficiently consider the impact of its ranking and presentation policies on markets.<sup>14</sup> The complaints-led mechanism in paragraphs 6–8 is designed to address material distortions.

However, care should be taken to ensure that this mechanism does not become a vehicle for routine challenges to the existence or prominence of AI Overviews or other search display advancements. The appropriate question under paragraph 4 is whether ranking criteria are objective and non-discriminatory. It is not whether a new interface changes the distribution of traffic relative to the “blue link” model.

Markets evolve. New formats alter traffic patterns. That alone is not evidence of unfair discrimination or distortion. If every interface innovation that affects

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<sup>13</sup> CMA “Consultation: Fair Ranking Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), pg. 21.

<sup>14</sup> CMA “Consultation: Fair Ranking Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), paras. 1.16-1.19.

referral traffic were treated as presumptively suspect, the result would be regulatory inertia at a time of rapid technological change.

### *E. Consumer Benefit and Future-Proofing*

The CMA's consumer benefit analysis emphasises greater confidence in fair ranking and more effective functioning of markets. These benefits depend not only on fairness, but on continued innovation in how information is delivered.

AI Overviews are part of a broader competitive shift toward conversational and AI-mediated information retrieval. Preventing or unduly constraining that shift through the application of a fairness requirement would risk:

- Reducing incentives to invest in improved search functionality in the UK;
- Creating regulatory asymmetries with AI-native competitors;
- Delivering short-term traffic protection at the expense of long-term consumer welfare.

Chamber of Progress therefore encourages the CMA to further clarify, in final guidance or interpretative notes, that:

- The Fair Ranking CR does not prohibit answer-based formats such as AI Overviews;
- The CR focuses on objective and non-discriminatory criteria, not on preserving legacy traffic patterns; and
- Complaints about reduced click-through rates, absent evidence of discrimination or irrelevant considerations, do not in themselves establish non-compliance.

In doing so, the CMA would uphold its statutory objectives while ensuring that the UK's digital markets regime remains innovation-friendly and future-proof.

## **6. Data Portability**

Chamber of Progress recognises the CMA's objective of providing greater legal certainty around data portability for UK users of Google's general search services.<sup>15</sup> We also note that the proposed conduct requirement is expressly

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<sup>15</sup> CMA "Consultation: Data Portability Conduct Requirement" (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 2.1.

designed to mirror Google’s existing obligations under Article 6(9) of the DMA and to allow compliance through the existing DMA Data Portability API.

In our view, this alignment is both appropriate and proportionate.

#### *A. Limited Evidence of Latent Demand*

The CMA’s own evidence suggests that usage of the API remains modest. In its first year of availability in the EEA, Google received fewer than 20 requests from businesses to use the API.<sup>16</sup> As of August 2025, those businesses collectively served approximately 200,000–250,000 users in the UK.<sup>17</sup> While that represents growth from earlier figures, it remains small in comparison to the tens of millions of UK users of general search services.

Similarly, the CMA records mixed evidence regarding operational shortcomings and limited, if any, clear evidence of systemic failure requiring detailed intervention. The CMA has provisionally concluded that there is not sufficiently clear evidence of significant shortcomings in predictability, reliability or scalability to justify imposing a detailed service level requirement.<sup>18</sup>

Taken together, this suggests that data portability in search is, at present, an emerging and relatively niche use case rather than a high-volume switching mechanism. It is important that the conduct requirement reflects this practical reality. Data portability should not be treated as a structural solution to entrenched switching barriers unless and until there is clearer evidence of widespread consumer demand to port search data to third-party services.

#### *B. Alignment with the DMA Minimises Cost and Complexity*

The CMA has explicitly stated that the most effective approach is one that “maximises consistency with Google’s existing API under the DMA”,<sup>19</sup> and that expanding the data scope beyond the DMA baseline would materially increase costs and create divergence between UK and EEA regimes.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> CMA “Consultation: Data Portability Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 1.3.

<sup>17</sup> *Id.*

<sup>18</sup> CMA “Consultation: Data Portability Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 1.23.

<sup>19</sup> CMA “Consultation: Data Portability Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 4.2.

<sup>20</sup> CMA “Consultation: Data Portability Conduct Requirement” (28 January 2026), available [here](#), paras. 5.6-5.8.

We agree.

Divergence from the DMA model would impose:

- Additional engineering and compliance costs on Google;
- Duplicative authorisation and data management burdens on third parties operating across the UK and EEA;
- Regulatory fragmentation that could deter investment.

Where there is limited demonstrated demand for search data portability at scale, expanding scope beyond the DMA baseline or layering additional UK-specific requirements would risk imposing disproportionate costs relative to the likely incremental benefits.

The CMA's provisional assessment that the incremental costs of formalising the API are likely to be negligible, given it is already voluntarily provided in the UK,<sup>21</sup> further reinforces the case for a narrow and aligned approach. Legal certainty can be delivered without material additional burden by placing the existing API on a statutory footing.

### *C. A Measured and Future-Oriented Approach*

The proposed design appropriately avoids detailed service level prescriptions at this stage and instead relies on interpretative notes and monitoring. This flexible approach is well suited to a regime where uptake remains limited and the ecosystem is still evolving.

In our view, the key test under the proportionality framework is whether the CR is no more onerous than necessary and is the least onerous equally effective measure. By anchoring the obligation to the DMA Data Portability API and avoiding UK-specific expansion, the CMA has taken a measured approach that delivers certainty while minimising compliance and ecosystem costs.

Chamber of Progress therefore supports the CMA's decision to:

- Align the UK requirement with Article 6(9) of the DMA;
- Avoid expanding the data scope beyond the DMA baseline;
- Refrain, at this stage, from imposing detailed service level obligations.

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<sup>21</sup> CMA "Consultation: Data Portability Conduct Requirement" (28 January 2026), available [here](#), para. 5.13.

Should consumer demand for search data portability materially increase in the future, the CMA retains the ability to review and adjust the regime. For now, mirroring the EU approach strikes the right balance between enabling innovation and avoiding disproportionate regulatory intervention.

### **Concluding Remarks**


Chamber of Progress welcomes the CMA's careful and proportionate approach to the proposed Conduct Requirements. The consultation documents reflect a serious effort to apply the statutory framework as Parliament intended, weighing effectiveness, proportionality, and consumer benefit rather than assuming intervention is warranted simply because a firm holds Strategic Market Status.

That discipline is essential. Digital markets, particularly search and AI-enabled services, are evolving rapidly. Measures that go materially beyond what is necessary to address identified concerns risk unintended consequences: increased device costs, degraded user experience, reduced investment incentives, and regulatory fragmentation across jurisdictions. The strength of the DMCCA lies in its flexibility and its focus on outcomes for consumers, not in replicating more rigid ex ante regimes.

We encourage the CMA to preserve this measured approach as it finalises the Conduct Requirements. By targeting genuine barriers to competition while safeguarding innovation and ecosystem incentives, the CMA can advance consumer welfare and demonstrate that the UK's digital markets regime is both effective and economically grounded.

Chamber of Progress remains committed to supporting the CMA in this objective and to contributing constructively to the continued success of the DMCCA framework.

Sincerely,

A large black rectangular redaction box covering the signature of the Senior Director for Europe.  
Senior Director for Europe