



MOD-83-0000703-A

In the matter of an investigation into the deaths of Radhi Nama and Mousa Ali

Inspector: The Rt Hon Dame Anne Rafferty DBE

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF

[REDACTED] SO115

I, [REDACTED] SO115, state as follows:-

I make this statement for the purposes of the investigation into the deaths of Radhi Nama and Mousa Ali in response to the List of Questions provided by the investigation on 6 July 2023.

A. Background

- 1.1. I joined the Army in 1978 and went to 1 Black Watch in 1979. Since 1979 I have had what I would call a normal career as a soldier and was promoted from Lance Corporal up to Warrant Officer Class 1, before being commissioned in August 2003. I have remained with the Black Watch for the whole of my career.
- 1.2. Prior to deployment to Iraq on Op Telic 1 in 2003 I was stationed at [REDACTED], Germany employed in the role of Regimental Sgt Major. I was deployed in March 2003 and left there at the end of June 2003.
- 1.3. After I came back to the UK I went to Germany and then to Warminster for approximately 2 years. I went with my Battalion to TELIC 4 from [REDACTED] and I was then posted to Northern Ireland where I was a Quartermaster Technical for 18 months. I was then deployed on TELIC 1 0 and [REDACTED] I went to The Black Watch, the 3rd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Scotland as a Quartermaster.

- 1.4. In 2008-2012 I was stationed at [REDACTED] and during this time, supported 2 tours in Afghanistan. The first tour was in 2009 where my appointment was Officer Commanding Rear Operations Group. In 2012, I was back in Afghanistan as Officer Commanding Head Quarters (“HQ”) Company.
- 1.5. Following the tour in 2012, I moved [REDACTED] where I was Second in Command in the Personnel Recover Unit and in 2013, moved to [REDACTED]. In 2015 I moved to [REDACTED] and in 2016 [REDACTED].
- 1.6. I retired in July 2017 from the army and to the present date I have been living in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] working as a [REDACTED] in the corporate industry
- 1.7. I have provided previous statements:
- 6 July 2009 (to the Baha Mousa Inquiry)
 - 18 February 2010 (to the Baha Mousa Inquiry)
 - 22 May 2012
 - 14 September 2016

I seek to amend my 6 July 2009 statement given to the Baha Mousa Inquiry at the following paragraphs:

- Paragraph 5 I said, “I would be standing next to the CO almost all of the time, so I was in all his meetings”. I seek to amend this to confirm that I would not be standing next to my Commanding Officer all of the time, and there were many meetings that I was not invited to.
- Paragraph 10 I said, “There was also Captain Percy, who was the Operations Officer, but also became the Unit Internment Officer.” I am not sure if this was indeed Percy. I cannot recall who this was.
- Paragraph 14, I said of Sgt Gallagher that “He would then take them straight to the Medical Centre.” This is incorrect as this was not the case. Sgt Gallagher did not receive every detainee for a medical inspection.

- Paragraph 17 I said, “I would go to the detention facility twice daily to check on the soldiers guarding the detention facility to ensure that they were alert and that nothing untoward was happening”. This was not the case. I maybe went 2-3 times a week not twice daily and not every week. The number of times I visited was dependant how many detainees we had as sometimes we had none.
- Paragraph 18 I said, “The Internment Officer, Capt Percy, was responsible for forwarding the documents to Brigade and/or Division, when the prisoners were transferred on”. As I have stated above at paragraph 10, I do not think this was Percy and cannot recall the name of the Captain.
- Paragraph 23 I said, “In preparation for becoming RSM, I did a week's 'POW and Tactical Questioning Course' at Chicksands in February 2003.” This is not correct. I did the course in preparation for deployment, as I had already been the RSM for a year or so by this stage.
- Paragraph 26 I said that, “During the course, the 'conditioning' of prisoners for questioning was discussed informally”. This is not correct as anything discussed was part of the course and there were no informal discussions.
- Paragraph 38 (viii), I again refer to “Capt Percy was our Internment Officer..” The same correction applies as above in that this was not Percy, and I cannot recall the correct name of the Captain.

- 2.1. During Op Telic 1, in 2003 I was the Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) for 1 Black Watch, which is part of the Armoured Infantry Battle Group, itself part of 7 Armoured Brigade. We were the first invasion force into Iraq. My rank was Warrant Officer Class 1.
- 2.2. My main job as RSM was as an Infantry Adviser to the Commanding Officer (CO) of 1 Black Watch, who was Lieutenant Colonel SO114. I provided low-level advice on infantry tactics, particularly on how decisions in planning would affect soldiers on the ground. For example, if the CO asked the soldiers to do a 10-mile march in one hour, my job was to think how that would affect soldiers on the ground. The other part of my job was to advise the CO on prisoner handling.
- 2.3. The Chain of Command was as follows. I reported directly to the CO. The Provost Staff reported directly to me. The Provost Sergeant was Sergeant [REDACTED] and he had four

others on his team, one Private, one Lance Corporal, and two Corporals. We were the CO's protection team, so we all travelled in the same vehicle. I would say we were a close team and I spoke to them all the time.

2.4. Neither at that time in May 2003, could I speak Arabic, nor can I speak Arabic now.

B. Training and instruction

3.1. In my statement of 6 July 2009, I gave some detail about the pre-deployment training done by 1 Black Watch. Prior to and including May 2003, I did not have and have no recollection of having any training, briefing or instruction on the below:

- The Rules of Engagement in the post-war fighting phase of Operation TELIC;
- Maintaining law and order and prevention of looting;
- Detention of individuals;
- Use and dangers of water during detention;
- Use of restraint techniques;

For training on prisoner handling, this depends on what you define as prisoner as opposed to detainee handling. We had pre-deployment training for Prisoners of War handling but nothing specific to detainee handling.

We did not have any specific training on the processing of detainees and requirements for medical examination of them. Instead, we maintained a similar process to the one we were using for Prisoners of War rather than one specific to a detainee.

I received no training, briefing or instruction specific to my role. I was not located at Camp Stephen but at a sub-unit location.

C. Detainees at Camp Stephen

- 4.1. My role was to support receiving of detainees at our battle group HQ camp. Individuals would be detained for looting or for other non-related serious crimes. Additionally, individuals were detained if classed as a High Value Target (“HVT”).
- 4.2. Major [REDACTED] SO88 had the responsibility to direct his company personnel as to who should be detained, especially for normal criminal incidents. Major [REDACTED] SO88 was directed by the Battle Group Commanding Office and Brigade HQ to detain HVTs based on intelligence led operations.
- 4.3. Major [REDACTED] SO88 was supported by his second in command. WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 would be responsible for supervising the conduct of soldiers that guarded detainees up to the point that they were directed to transport the detainees to the battle group holding area.
- 4.4. HVTs were identified and listed by the Brigade Intelligence Staff and delegated to Unit Second in Command and Unit Operational Officers.
- 4.5. The process followed to seek an HVT, would have been led, directed and supervised by Brigade staff who would provide orders to battle groups.
- 4.6. At battle group level, there is a mission analysis planning session conducted and then relevant orders delivered to sub-units. However, this process could have been delegated to sub-unit commanders instead of battle group level. Their plans would however, have been agreed by battle group HQs prior to executing the mission.
- 5.1. The EPW area would have been a temporary site used by sub-units and the battle group level as a holding station pending onward transitions to an EPW cage. The area could range in its construction depending on what was available at the time e.g., a building, wire fencing, tents and hedgerows. The area would have to have sufficient security provided, depending on the threat.
- 5.2. The EPW cage would have been an adequately constructed facility within the Brigade or divisional level and would have expertise in its staffing. It would house all necessary facilities such as furniture, water supply, catering etc. Such was the EPW cage at Umm Qasr.
- 5.3. There was no hard timeline as to how long anyone could be detained at Camp Stephen. Detainees held would have been reported to HQ at the time of capture and then held at Camp Stephen until transferred to battle group the HQs area.

- 6.1. The prisoners were always fed and watered and given blankets if needed. This was also the standard operating practice and Sgt ██████████ would have been trained in this procedure, as I was.
- 6.2. My understanding was that detainees would not to be questioned at Camp Stephen unless an assigned tactical questioner (“TQ”) was sent to conduct questioning on site. I do not recall if any TQ's were sent to Camp Stephen. Usually, questioning was conducted at BG HQ camp.
- 6.3. I was trained on pre-deployment to conduct tactical questioning, but I was only permitted to do this if assigned to do so by a higher authority. If assigned, I would have been provided with a question set to seek information from a Prisoner of War and as such, I would be expected to gather details on unit identities, dispositions, locations, and armaments. I would not have been expected to tactically question detainees.
- 6.4. I was not aware of any tactical questioning carried out by C Coy staff and I would not have expected them to do any. WO2 ██████████ SO101 was the only one trained to conduct tactical training of Prisoners of War. He had attended the same training course as I had done, but to the best of my knowledge, he was not assigned to conduct any tactical questioning of detainees.
- 6.5. I have no knowledge of props being used in the battle group space by any of the sub-units.
- 6.6. I am not aware of procedures of notifying the next of kin of detainees that died, and I was not involved in that task.
- 7.1. In my statement of 14 September 2016, I said “I do remember going to Camp Stephen following the death in custody when the CO gave a briefing about the treatment of detainees...” I cannot recall when the CO gave briefings, how long briefings took or what information the CO addressed. In my mind, anyone in the Camp who was not on essential duty, attended the briefing. It may also have been the case that the CO spoke in private with the officers commanding at the various sub-unit locations about this issue.
- 7.2. To the best of my recollection Commanding Officer ██████████ SO114 gave 1 Black Watch two briefings about the treatment of detainees. One of these was following of death of a detainee, and the other following the treatment of detainees at the “breadbasket factory”. I am not sure when that was now. I cannot recall whether this was on our first or second tour. I also cannot recall who was present at these briefings.

- 7.3. In my statement of 14 September 2016, I said, “As per my previous statement I can confirm that I can only recollect one death of a detainee in Camp Stephen. I cannot recall an exact date, but I remember that the Rover Group were out on another task when Brigade HQ informed the CO of an untoward event at Camp Stephen. On receipt of the information the CO briefed us, and we redirected to Camp Stephen as he would have wanted a back brief from the Company Commander directly.” These conversations I believe were on the same day as the C Coy briefing from the CO following the death of a detainee in their custody.
- 7.4. I went to Camp Stephen to establish the basic facts of the incident. If my memory serves me right, as I am getting confused as to who died when, WO2 **SO101** explained to me that he had a detainee in a 9 by 9 tent who was believed to be having a cardiac arrest. Soldiers went to provide first aid and were unsuccessful. This was reported up to battle group HQ and then a subsequent investigation followed. But I do not have a firm recollection of the exact conversation or words used. I cannot recall if I advised CO **SO114** about this visit to Camp Stephen, or if I provided any feedback to the chain of command.
- 7.5. I do not recall having any further conversations with either Maj **SO88** or WO2 **SO101** about deaths at Camp Stephen. My belief was that it was under RMP or SIB investigation, so we were not permitted to talk about the incident. If we had had conversations, then they would not have gone into any detail as to jeopardise the RMP/SIB investigation. It is possible that the persons that attended the briefing were selected or involved as witnesses; however, I was never informed of the details of the RMP or SIB investigations.
- 7.6. In my statement of 22 May 2012 I am said to have said “As Regimental Sgt Major I would have been informed of the deaths at the out stations by the reporting process up to Battle Group HQ however I would not have been involved in the subsequent investigations as this would have been immediately handed over for higher information ie RMP/SIB the reason being so no evidence can be contaminated or persons involved as witnesses spoken to by the company.”
- 7.7. In 2012 and 2016 I was contacted and visited by two different sets of investigators from the IHAT asking for my permission to use the statement I had already provided in 2009. I cannot recall reading the statements that they then produced after interviewing me or signing any new statements. The 2012 and 2016 statements that I have been provided with by the IFI to review are not signed. I may well have signed them, I just cannot be sure. I also feel that I must have

skim read the statements produced as I cannot recall the detail of them or recall being told that these statements would be required for criminal proceedings. These statements reference the deaths of Nama and Ali, but I did not recall either specifically.

- 7.8. I have no recollection of more than one death. I am confused with the talk of three deaths which includes the death of Baha Mousa.
- 7.9. In my statement of 6 July 2009, I refer to the difference between Prisoners of War and detainees. After the war fighting phase, as I described in my oral evidence on 18 February 2010 at the Baha Mousa inquiry, civilian detainees initially were treated like Prisoners of War / internees when detained during Operation TELIC 1. This was because the distinction was not clear between the two. Initially civilian detainees were “bagged and tagged” as we would Prisoners of War. But as distinctions became clearer this changed and stopped.
- 7.10. I would expect a Common Capture Report to be completed if civilian detainees were held at detention facilities like Camp Stephen. The soldier or team commander would fill in the detail on a capture report at the time of capture. Those monitoring the detainees at each of the stages would maintain the report until the detainee was processed. Sgt [REDACTED] would do this at battle group holding area, and the sub-unit CSM would detail their own monitors. I would have expected the reports to be handed over when the detainee was received at the battle group holding area.
- 7.11. In my statement of 22 May 2012, I said, “There was a general practice of blindfolding POWs by putting sandbags over their heads for security purposes, namely, to prevent them gaining any intelligence in respect of our dispositions and escape routes. I cannot recall whether we were trained to do this or if it was just common and accepted practice passed down in the unit by word of mouth.” I do not recall who sanctioned use of sandbags as methods of sanctions for Prisoners of War, and who led for this message to be fed down to all by word of mouth. Over the years, Section Commanders, Platoon Sergeants and CSMs would have fed this message down this as they were responsible for training their soldiers. Sandbags were the only tool that they had to use to blindfold Prisoners of War, as we were never issued with blacked out goggles.

- 7.12. In my statement of 22 May 2012, I said “As I have previously stated during the war fighting phase of Op Telic 1 POWs were on occasion hooded with sandbags as explained, it was common practice, however when the war fighting phase ceased, the practices of hooding ceased to the best of my knowledge. 1BW did not hood detainees.” I assumed 1 Black Watch personnel were not hooding detainees as I did not witness the hooding of detainees. If I had become aware 1 Black Watch were hooding detainees after the war phase, I would have provided direction otherwise. At some time during our tour there was direction on this provided. Initially it was passed down our battle group HQs and a FRAGO was issued for higher information, that directed to stop hooding. If I had seen anything or knew about this issue, then I would have reported this behaviour up the chain of command.
- 7.13. I cannot recall any soldier informing me of any specific incidents of ill treatment of detainees. I do not recall reporting a discussion about ill treatment of detainees up the chain of command.

D. Culture at Camp Stephen

- 8.1. I was not stationed at Camp Stephen and therefore, not aware of the culture there. I accompanied the CO on visits to Camp Stephen on a few occasions and did not witness anything unusual. I do not recall any specific details of troops complaining about the ill treatment of detainees.
- 8.2. To my knowledge Camp Stephen was responsibility of Maj [REDACTED] SO88 and he would have assigned the treatment of detainees in the EPW area to WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 as he was trained in Prisoner of War handling. Prior to the death of a detainee at Camp Stephen, there was no indication that detainees were being treated other than expected. In fact, the information received about the death of a detainee was that the soldiers guarding him applied immediate first aid in attempt to save him. To the best of my knowledge, at the time WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 was conducting processes as expected.
- 8.3. The term “beasting” means when you are put through your paces physically. For example, when conducting fitness training and the physical trainers put you through your paces to make sure that the training was exhausting, you were given a “beasting”. The term “beasting” was also used if a soldier or group of soldiers were not performing well, they would be “beasted”,

to get them back on track. “Beasting” as a form of punishment was phased out in 90s and early 2000s and was not expected to be used as disciplinary process. Commanders were not permitted to conduct “beastings”. I am not aware of “beastings” occurring between May and October 2003 in my unit.

- 8.4. I did not see or hear of the mistreatment of detainees and / or civilians at Camp Stephen nor did I see or hear of threats to detainees. I was not aware of troops complaining about the treatment of detainees and / or civilians.
- 8.5. To my knowledge, the oversight by Commander of troops at Camp Stephen came from the Sub-Unit Commander who had delegated authority as to what occurred at the camp. He would report directly to the CO. Maj [REDACTED] SO88 would have been supported by WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 and would have the freedom to deal with issues concerning discipline and conduct. Within the sub-unit they are various ranks who are responsible for troops under their command e.g., OC are supported by their second in command and give orders. The CSM of each unit are all influential and they enforce policy and ensure the OCs orders and direction orders are followed. Camp Stephen has 3 Platoons with their own structures. There is a Platoon Commander, Warrant Officer and Sergeant who support to maintain standards and junior NCOs that supervise the other ranks. All the ranks structures have influence, but I am not aware that they would exert their influence and that they were not being properly supervised or managed by their prospective seniors.
- 8.6. WO2 [REDACTED] SO101’s role was to directly support his OC with maintaining standards and discipline. He ran a tight ship and commanded with an air of authority. He was responsible for detainees in Camp Stephen, but I am not aware of any involvement he had with any incidents involving detainees or their mistreatment, or of any relevant incidents of which he was involved with.
- 8.7. Cpl [REDACTED] SO102 was a junior NCO assigned to the mortar Platoon. I did not know him well. He was posted to our unit from the Royal Highland Fusiliers in 2000 when our unit took over from the Fusiliers in Fallingbostel, Germany. During Telic 1 his role would have been Section Commander of all aspects delegated to him by seniors. In my opinion, Cpl [REDACTED] SO102 did not seem

highly influential and seemed a bit of a grey man – in that he did not stand out from the crowd. I was not aware of his specific tasking on a daily basis and, did not have any oversight of his dealings with detainees. I was not aware of any incidents of mistreatment of detainees in which he was involved or any other incidents in which he was involved which might be relevant. I know he was involved in an incident at the early stages of the Unit's insertion into Iraq for which he received the Military Cross for his actions.

F. Deaths of Radhi Nama and Mousa Ali

9.

9.1 I cannot recall the details about the deaths of Radhi Nama or Mousa Ali specifically. In my statements of 2012 and 2016 there is reference to their deaths made. In my statement of 2012, I only add that I can recall one death but do not specify who died. In my 2016 statement I say:

“As per my previous statement I can confirm that I can only recollect one death of a detainee in Camp Stephen. I cannot recall an exact date but I remember that the Rover Group were out on another task when Brigade HQ informed the CO of an untoward event at Camp Stephen. On receipt of the information the CO briefed us and we redirected to Camp Stephen as he would have wanted a back brief from the Company Commander directly.

I do not recall exactly where we were when we redirected but it was immediately on being informed of the incident and we would have arrived a short time after that. I do not know if the body of the deceased was still at the camp upon our arrival but I definitely did not see a body nor did I attend the scene. From memory Lt Col [REDACTED] SO114 spoke with Major [REDACTED] SO88 in private whilst I spoke with the CSM [REDACTED] SO101. I did not enquire in any detail to the circumstances as the incident was now an RMP investigation and it was now left to their expertise. The CSM told me that he was aware there had been a detainee in the tent waiting for transport to BG Main and there was a guard outside the tent. The guard heard some noises coming from inside and believed the detainee was in some difficulty. The guard gave some resuscitation but failed and waited for the medical team to arrive. I believe the guard was a soldier in the Mortar platoon, approx. 6'2 of large build, approx 30 years of age. The soldier I'm thinking of, was originally from the Royal Scots and transferred in to the Black Watch

following our arrival at our base in Fallingbostal, Germany. I did not speak to the soldier but he would have been someone I knew at that time. I believe his name to be Cpl SO116 possibly first name of [REDACTED]

I did not record the content of that conversation anywhere and that is as best as I remember it. I did not conduct any further probing as to what had happened as the investigation was to be taken over by the RMP and as an RSM I have to take step back and allow the RMP to gather their evidence and conduct the investigation. I do not know how the person died but I believe I was told it was a suspected heart attack. I do not know why the person was detained but I think I was told that he was suspected as being one of the 'aces'. By 'aces' I mean high value subject closely related to the Saddam Hussain regime. I did not witness any RMP on camp at that time nor did I get any updates during the investigation or feedback as to the outcome of the investigation. I do recall that an RMP was embedded at BG Main but I do not know if any RMP were embedded at Camp Stephen. In relation to a second death in custody that I am told occurred around that same time I have no recollection whatsoever. Given my role I would have been informed of a death and the reaction would have been in much the same way as described above. However I cannot recall of being informed of any second death that occurred at Camp Stephen at any time I was deployed during Telic 1."

- 9.2 I quote this in full, from my statement of 2016 as I cannot recall this detail given by me. This statement will provide the detail needed as to my involvement and knowledge of these two deaths.
- 9.3 As I have already mentioned at paragraph 7.7 above, in 2012 and 2016 I was contacted and visited by two different sets of investigators from the IHAT asking for my permission to use the statement I had already provided in 2009. After re-reading these two statements I can see that in both, I reiterate that I knew about only one death at Camp Stephen. I cannot recall being told that the 2012 and 2016 statements were specific to other individuals.

G. Existence and awareness of 'wetting'

10 **‘Wetting’ generally**

- 10.1 I was not aware of wetting and had no experience of it. In all the 20 years since my time on Operation Telic 1, I had never known the term wetting or knew of any issue concerning the use of water. This is all new to me and my answers are therefore limited as to what I can comment on due to my lack of knowledge.
- 10.2 I never saw or became aware of detainees being: (i) placed into water, (ii) threatened with being placed into water, and / or (iii) transported to bodies of water (including canals, rivers, ditches, and pools). I was not aware of detainees being transported to or placed into bodies of water. I have never had any knowledge or heard that soldiers on patrol would put detainees into water or throw them into the Shat Al-Arab River. I was never made aware of any incidents in which restraining devices (such as plasticuffs) were put on detainees before they were placed into water. We did use plasticuffs, but I cannot comment on these being used on anyone being placed into water.
- 10.3 I was never made aware of incidents in which force was used on detainees whilst they were being placed into water and cannot comment if they were placed in danger when being placed into water. I was never aware of any such practice being used.
- 10.4 In my statement of 14 September 2016, I spoke of the “Bread basket incident”. “I recall at some stage, not exactly sure when, that during our time in Basra the ‘Bread basket incident’, which may have triggered conversation between myself and the CO and discuss his concerns over the mistreatment of detainees. This would have been reason to visit the companies and ensure they were treating detainees correctly.” I was not made aware at any time of allegations that detainees at Camp Breadbasket had jumped into water to escape soldiers and / or been made to roll into / enter a dirty ditch / stream.

11. **Reporting of ‘wetting’ incidents**

11.1 I would have expected incidents of detainees entering, or being placed into bodies of water, to be reported by soldiers on the ground but, I was not aware of any incidents of this nature. Depending on the rank of the soldier, this would determine who would receive the report of any such incident, i.e., this would be reported to their next level or someone in their chain of command. I never received such a report so I would not know the process that took place after such a report was received or if any de-briefing took place after receiving such a report. But if an incident was reported, I would expect feedback to be provided up to battle group HQ. But if there was not a requirement to report things people would not report them, I suspect.

12 **Chain of Command – Group Orders**

12.1 I attended Group Orders in May 2003. Battle group orders take place at various times during the day. Normal daily CO meetings are primarily with Battle group HQ staff and where practicable, sub-unit OC's. The meeting was used to back brief the CO on the past 12 hours of activity and a look forward at the next 12 hours activity. Another time Battle group orders may take place is when there is a specific order where prior planning by Battle group HQ staff is required, and these meetings are written up by the second in command. My role in these orders was to highlight any concerns or to provide any direction to discipline or standards issues.

12.2 Looters were discussed on numerous occasions, but I cannot recall the exact detail and as to what was said. I cannot recall the details of how troops were instructed to deal with detained looters other than if a looter was detained, they were to be treated as any other detainee and handed over to the RMP at the earliest opportunity. I was not aware that the use of water was ever identified as a practice to deal with detained looters, and it was not discussed that troops were putting looters into water. I was not aware of any orders or directions, including as I have already stated of any Group Orders, that were ever given to use water as a deterrent. I was also unaware of any Senior Commanders who were aware of the use of water on detainees and nor can I recall any directions from Senior Commanders on the same.

13. **'Wetting' at Camp Stephen**

- 13.1 I do not recall a stream outside Camp Stephen, so cannot describe it. I did not see or hear of any detainees put in, or going into, the stream.
- 13.2 I do not recognise or have knowledge of any occasion where Cpl [SO102] removed detainees from the EPW area and forcefully placed them into a ditch outside Camp Stephen, which was dark in colour and had sewage in it. I have no knowledge of one detainee being placed up to his chest in this water.
- 13.3 I do not recall CO, [SO114] or Maj [SO88] being required to put a stop to detainees being thrown into the stream near Camp Stephen. But it may well have been that the CO received various snippets of information and that he decided not to disclose to me and liaised directly with Sub-Unit Commanders and gave them separate direction to stop any action that was happening on the ground with their troops. This was a common practice and on numerous times the CO would not consult with me about higher level issues.

I believe that the facts stated are true.

[Redacted Signature]

Signed

Dated: [13 July 2023]