

MOD-83-0000535-A

Dated 10,06,2022

**In the matter of an investigation into the deaths of Radhi Nama and Mousa Ali**  
**and**

**In the matter of an investigation into the death of Ahmed Jabbar Karim Ali**

Inspector: Baroness Heather Hallett PC DBE

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WITNESS STATEMENT OF

S084


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I, S084, state as follows:-

**A. Background**

1. I joined the Armed Forces on 11.01.1993. I completed basic training and went on to receive further training to earn the Class 2 Combat Medical qualification. I gained my Class 1 Combat Medical Technician qualification in July 1997 at the Defence Medical Training Establishment, Keogh Barracks, Aldershot.
2. During my time in the armed forces, I completed tours in Bosnia with the UN and then NATO. I have been deployed to Iraq twice and Afghanistan twice. I did suffer with some minor injuries during my time in the Armed Forces but nothing significant. I have suffered with mental health difficulties because of my experience in Iraq. I left Iraq in late May or early June 2003 when the fighting phase ended. I had some leave and then returned to work. I was put on notice that I would be deployed to Iraq again with my original regiment, the 1 Royal Regiment of Wales (1RRW). This made me feel rattled because of my previous experiences and I did not have sufficient time to recover. I saw a doctor and a psychiatrist who both decided that I was fit to be deployed. About 4 or 5 weeks into the deployment, the psychiatrist in Iraq diagnosed me with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. I was medically evacuated back to Germany. I felt I was mismanaged by the Army for sending me back to Iraq after such a short period of Rest and Recovery (R&R). I did return to Iraq, but this time I worked under the care of the Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) with the 1 Battalion Princess of Wales Royal Regiment (1PWRR). I was not based at a camp like before. I was well enough to go back but asked not to go on patrols and they did accommodate me with that request.

3.



4. I left the Armed Forces on 01.11.2019. My contract had ended. I declined an extension as I had built a family life in Germany and the German base was closing. I am currently studying for a degree in nursing. I continue to be prescribed medication to manage my PTSD symptoms, but I try to live my life as best I can.

5. I have made a number of statements in relation to the events of 08 and 13 May 2003. I confirm the contents of these statements except where I have explicitly stated otherwise.

*a. My role in 2003*

6. In November 2002, I was posted to 1 RRW (Royal Regiment of Wales) in Paderborn. In January 2003, I was detached to 1BW in Fallingbostal initially working in the medical centre getting things prepared for deployment. Whilst there I was sectioned off to C Coy 1BW knowing that I was to be their Company medic on Deployment. It was normal to be detached to a different regiment if they needed certain skills for the deployment.

7. In May 2003, I was attached to C Coy 1BW on Operation Telic. I held the role of C Coy Medic. My Cap badge was RAMC (Royal Army Medical Corp).   


8. My primary role was to give first aid to soldiers and to provide general medical support on operations.

9. My role also included some responsibility for environmental health. There were water tanks on the roofs of the buildings at Camp Stephen. I ensured the water was purified and available for use for showers and for cleaning. I ensured that there were burn pits to dispose of rubbish to avoid vermin problems. At this time, there were portaloos at Camp Stephen and there was a cess tank. A gully sucker regularly sucked it out. A local man provided this service but I oversaw this.

10. Among my duties within the Coy was the responsibility of giving a general medical check of any detainees entering the Coy location.

11. The Chain of Command at Camp Stephen was as follows: Major  (OC) was in charge at Camp Stephen. WO2  was next in the chain of command. He was responsible for the day-to-day running of the Camp. After WO2 , there were section commanders (colour sergeants, sergeants), then corporals and then soldiers. As a medic, I sat slightly outside of the usual structure. The first person I would report to was WO2 . I would also report to Captain  who was based at the Regimental Aid Post (RAP).

12. I have been asked whether I was able to speak Arabic in February 2003. I have never been able to speak Arabic.

**B. Training and Instruction**

13. I recall that I completed some pre-deployment training in Sennelager, I think mine was mainly medical based and I doubt if there was any POW handling training included. I am certain that nothing was said about sandbagging i.e. whether it was legal or not.
14. I do not recall receiving specific training in relation to the following areas:
  - a. The Rules of Engagement in the post-war fighting phase of Operation Telic;
  - b. Maintaining Law and Order and prevention of looting;
  - c. The use of restraint techniques;
  - d. Prisoner handling;
  - e. Processing of detainees and the requirements for medical examination. My training would have covered how to deal with likely injuries to soldiers. I cannot recall any specific training relating to dealing with civilians. The Iraqi medical system was still working; there were functioning hospitals open;
  - f. Guarding of detainees. I would not expect to receive training in relation to this as a medic; and
  - g. Training, briefing or instruction specific to your role at Camp Stephen. I can recall that I received training covering what to do if there was a chemical attack and that I was given numerous preventative medication. I cannot recall that I received any additional training.

**C. Detainees at Camp Stephen**

*a. Processing of Detainees*

15. My understanding in May 2003 was that detainees were only held in C Coy whilst they were being processed. If the detainee was to remain in custody, I believe that there were transported to HQ 1 BW.
16. I was not involved in the processing of detainees beyond carrying out a medical examination, which I have described below. I believe that there was a Slammer form, which was a detention form, but I have never seen one. I only became aware of this form in later interviews. I had no involvement in the identification of High Value Targets. I believe that the High Value Targets were sent away from Camp Stephen.
17. I would hope that the arrival of detainees would be reported up the Chain of Command. However, you would need to drive past HQ on the way to Camp Stephen and I do not know detainees were not taken there instead, where there was a proper holding facility.
18. My understanding is that the vast majority of detainees would have been detained for a few hours and then moved on. Some detainees may have stayed overnight but individuals were not held for days.

19. There was no process or procedure in place to notify a next of kin about the death of a detainee. Whilst I was deployed at Camp Stephen, there were 2 deaths – on 08 May 2003 and 13 May 2003.

*b. Decision-making in relation to detainees*

20. C Coy were involved in various operations, which resulted in Iraqi civilians being detained. My understanding was that WO2 [SO101] or Major [SO88] would decide whether detainees would be taken back to Camp Stephen.
21. They would have also decided whether to transfer detainees to HQ after being in communication with HQ about it. WO2 [SO101] and Major [SO88] would have been responsible for the detainees whilst they were at Camp Stephen. I believe that there were a mix of detainees, some High Value Targets and some looters.
22. Once detained the prisoners who were brought back to Camp Stephen were placed into a detainee compound known as the EPW area or EPW cage.
23. I believe that detainees were questioned to ascertain who they were and possibly to “soften” them before they were questioned at HQ. I cannot say who authorised or who (with the exception of the incidents described below) conducted the questioning as it was nothing to do with me. I believe that any questioning did take place inside the EPW area and I am not aware that any other location was used.
24. I have been asked what I understand by the term tactical questioning. Soldiers must complete a training course to be qualified to use tactical questioning. It includes techniques like calm and clear language and being nice to the detainee. I do not know if tactical questioning was used on the detainees. I do not know whether any member of C Coy was trained to conduct tactical questioning. I would expect someone in the regiment to have been trained, possibly WO2 [SO101] and CSgt [SO90].

*c. EPW area*

25. I cannot recall the specific location of the EPW area. In a previous interview, I was shown a map of Camp Stephen that I agreed was an accurate representation of the area. The EPW cage was constructed from cammo netting and pipes erected on dry, dusty and dirty ground. There was no furniture inside. The netting offered some shade, possibly reducing the temperature from 50C to 30C. Inside the EPW cage was plenty of bottled water.
26. I believe that there were also jerry cans inside the EPW cage. Although C Coy used jerry cans, they were not used to supply drinking water to either soldiers or detainees, as the litre bottles were available. The jerry cans were always with the vehicles. They were black plastic, holding up to 20 litres of fluid. They were NATO standard issue about 2 feet high by 12-18” wide, fastened by a wide cap for filling and a small cap for drinking – if ever needed for that reason.

*d. Guarding arrangements*

27. There were one or two guards in the EPW area but I cannot comment any further as I had nothing to do with the arrangements in my role as medic.

*e. Facilities*

28. There was no kitchen at Camp Stephen at this time. Soldiers were eating rations. I do not believe that there was food available for detainees. The portaloos were available for the detainees to use if needed.
29. There was bottled water, which was given to detainees to drink. Vast numbers of these bottles were supplied regularly to the camp in Basra.

*f. My role in relation to detainees*

30. Upon arrival of a detainee at Camp Stephen, I was called to examine each detainee in order to establish if there were any injuries or illness, which required treatment. It would be WO2 [REDACTED] SO101, and on one occasion CSgt [REDACTED] SO98, who requested my attendance although another soldier may have fetched me on his command.
31. This examination would always be carried out as soon as possible after the detainee arrived at Camp Stephen. Sometimes, I would be informed in advance that there were detainees on their way to Camp Stephen and I would go the EPW area to wait for them. It is possible that detainees were brought to Camp Stephen and processed or released without me being asked to assess them. I think that this was possible in relation to detainees who were brought in for looting and released as I have described below in Section G. I was the only medic who would carry out these checks.
32. My examination would include checking vital signs, checking for visible injuries of any kind and any other complaints or medical problems. If there were any such injury or illness, I would give the necessary treatment. My medical bag included a mask and ambi-bag, airways, fluids, neck collars and oxygen. I did not have any intravenous drugs. I only had morphine auto-injectors. Once the examination was done and the detainee was declared as fit for detention, he was handed back to whichever call sign was processing him.
33. The detainees would have not been asked to strip naked for the purpose of my examination. They may have been asked to move or remove outer layers of clothing. In general, I would take the person to one side and check them from head to toe. I would check for cuts and bruises to their face, teeth, eyes and body.
34. I had the benefit of an interpreter for my examinations. I would have asked whether they had any injuries and I may have asked if they had any other medical issues.
35. There was no requirement for me to complete any paperwork in relation to the detainees whom I examined. In hindsight, this was an error.

*g. Treatment of detainees*

36. I did see physical contact with the detainees. Firstly, to guide them into the EPW area as they were blindfolded. I cannot now recall if it was by hoods or blacked out goggles. This was done so that the location of the camp wasn't known to the detainee and possibly to make them feel scared. I do recall that plasticuffs were used and that I cut a few loose from detainees in the EPW area. The plasticuffs were a method of controlling prisoners to ensure that they could not cause harm whilst being transported to Camp Stephen. I would expect them to be removed when they arrived.
37. I also saw that the detainees were put into stress positions whilst in the EPW area. They were made to kneel with their hands behind their heads for a long time or sit back to back.
38. I saw detainees being kicked and slapped by soldiers. On one occasion, I saw WO2 [SO101] use a metal pole to prop up the head of a detainee. This incident is described in more detail below. I saw no other use of weapons of any sort.
39. I also heard WO2 [SO101] shout at detainees and be verbally abusive to them. I understand that there were "softening" techniques to persuade detainees to answer questions. It is possible that other soldiers treated detainees in a similar way, but I cannot recall names.
40. I do consider that the behaviours I have described above amounts to mistreatment of detainees.

**D. Death of Radhi Nama**

a. Events of 08 May 2003

41. I have made 4 witness statements and attended 1 interview in relation to the events of 08 May 2003. I have refreshed my memory from those accounts in order to produce this statement. Where there are material differences between my accounts, I have provided an explanation below.
42. At around 1140 hours on Thursday 08 May 2003, I was alerted that a detainee who had just been brought into our location had collapsed within the detention area. I was informed that there was a slight pulse. The runner who alerted me was LCpl [SO116] of C Coy. I assume that he was acting as a guard in the EPW area at the time.
43. I got my medical equipment and ran over to the detention area. I had not seen this detainee before as he had only just arrived at the location. I had therefore not given him a medical check.
44. In addition, present in the detention area when I arrived was WO2 [SO101] and LSgt [SO87] both of 1BW C Coy. I cannot recall if there were any other detainees in

the EPW area whilst I was dealing with him. It is likely that there were always 2 guards in the EPW area.

45. I am not aware that the detainee was hooded. I assume that he would have been initially as I understood that he was involved in a paedophile allegation. I think that I heard this from WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 after the man had died, although I cannot be sure about this. I certainly saw no evidence of hoods or sacks lying around where I attempted to treat the detainee.
46. I got into the cage and saw an elderly gentleman lying on his right side. He was unconscious and there was no response to any verbal prompts. I cannot recall my exact words, probably hello. I am not sure if I used the interpreter. I would describe him as dark-skinned, slim build. He had a black beard and moustache. He was wearing old tatty clothes; however, he had clean skin.
47. I checked his right radial pulse (wrist) and discovered no pulse present. I then turned him onto his back and checked his airway that was clear. I would have opened his mouth to check for an obstruction and I would have swept his tongue as part of the airway check. I then checked his pulse for a second time with the same result. I also noticed that both pupils were fixed. I then ripped open the man's shirt to expose his chest and saw that there was no rise and fall from it. I also heard no breathing sounds. I then listened to his heart using my stethoscope and discovered there wasn't any beat. I did not have a defibrillator as part of my kit.
48. Upon my examination of the detainee, I could see no visible injuries whatsoever. I had a clear view of his chest after I opened his shirt and I saw his legs as he was wearing a sarong that had fallen open. I would have noticed if the detainee had been stamped on. There was no deformity, boot marks, bruising or swelling. I do not think that water was poured on the detainee. I did not see anyone assault the detainee.
49. At this point, I informed WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 that I believe the detainee was dead. I then informed him that we needed to take him to the Czech Army Hospital in Basra to enable a medical officer to certify death. I didn't ask any personal details about the detainee.
50. We placed the detainee in the Land Rover and drove him to the Czech Hospital. Myself, Cpl [REDACTED] and Cpl [REDACTED] both of 1BW C Coy were in the Land Rover. The Land Rover was used because my two usual vehicles were VOR (Vehicle Off Road). The journey took about 15 minutes. During the journey, I did not resuscitate the detainee. This was mainly because my equipment was not sufficient for this type of resuscitation. Also, as there was absolutely no sign whatsoever of life, I decided that there was no possibility of resuscitation. I sat in the front of the Land Rover and the body was in the back.
51. My training was that, even if we know someone is has died, we cannot officially pronounce life extinct; we have to continue with some form of medical intervention. Although I did not strictly abide to this procedure, I did as much as possible with the equipment that I had. As I was aware, there was no pulse and the man was not

breathing, so the CPR procedure would have been fruitless and the conditions were not appropriate at the time. Any other intervention i.e. administering oxygen would have required the input of a doctor.

52. When we arrived at the Czech Hospital, I entered the location and requested a Doctor to attend the detainee. The Czech medical team then came out with me to the Land Rover. I stated that I believed him to be dead and I required a Doctor to examine him and certify life extinct. I asked this several times but all of the Czech medical staff refused to touch the body. I then believe that they passed the incident on to an Iraqi doctor who was present, who directed me round to a container area. I saw there were several caskets outside this container, which led me to believe that it was a morgue facility.
53. I then removed the detainee from the Land Rover to the floor next to the caskets. Unfortunately, Mr Nama's head hit the floor as we were moving him from the Land Rover to the floor. I then told the Iraqis at the scene that I was handing him over to them. We then left the Hospital. At no point did I see a Czech or Iraqi doctor examine the detainee in anyway. I am therefore unaware if there was any examination carried out to certify death.
54. In hindsight, there should have been at least a receipt for depositing the body or some sort of proof that the body had been put where it was. I do recall that time was a factor as it was a mental time of transition from war to peace and we did not feel safe.

*b. Decision to transfer to the Czech Hospital*

55. My usual British Army Medical Officer – Captain [SO82], who was based at the Regimental Aid Post (RAP) at Battalion HQ - was out of the area from 1000 to 1700 that day. This is why the Czech Hospital was to be utilised. I cannot specifically recall how I was told to use the Czech Hospital in Captain [SO82]'s absence.
56. To the best of my recollection, the Czech Army Hospital and the RAP were about the same distance although in opposite directions from Camp Stephen. If Captain [SO82] was present at Camp Stephen with the right equipment, the detainee would have had a better chance as he could perform duties expected with expert knowledge and procedures available to him. He may have been able to take steps to try to restart the man's heart e.g. with adrenaline or a defibrillator.
57. I am aware that my notebook contained the email address of Captain [REDACTED]. I cannot recall the circumstances that her email address came to be in there, or whether I was told that she was available instead of Captain [SO82]. Captain [REDACTED] was not at Camp Stephen. She would have been based at the RAP.

*c. Issues of clarification*

58. I cannot recall why, in my first statement taken on 08 May 2003, I described the detainee as laying upwards.

59. I cannot recall why in the same statement I said that the detainee was placed into a wooden coffin. That was not the case.

*d. Reporting of the Incident*

60. I would have relayed to superior officers that the body had been dropped off and usually it would have been the responsibility of the RMO to arrange a death certificate. However, I did not believe that Captain [REDACTED] SO82 would have been able to do this as he had not seen the detainee.
61. The only written record I made about this incident was in my personal notebook. I made entries in relation patients seen and treated by me. There was an entry on 08 May 2003 stating "1 x man dead EPW cage? Heart attack to Czech DS". DS stands for dressing station.
62. I was first interviewed about this incident on 08 May 2003. The interview took place at Camp Stephen and was informal and brief. It would have been someone from the Royal Military Police (RMP) or the Special Investigations Bureau (SIB). They returned the following day and took a second statement. I do not know how they were informed about the death of Mr Nama. I cannot recall if I was told not to discuss the matter with anyone else.

*e. Radhi Nama's family*

63. I had no contact with the family of Mr Nama.

**E. Death of Mousa Ali**

64. I have made 5 statements and attended 1 interview in relation to the events of 13 May 2003. Again, I have refreshed my memory from those accounts in order to produce this statement. Where there are material differences between my accounts, I have provided an explanation below.

*a. Detainees in the EPW area*

65. About 1700 hrs on Tuesday 13 May 2003 I was informed that three detainees had been brought into the compound. I cannot recall who informed me of this. All I knew at the time was that Coy had been involved in an operation including [REDACTED] SMU and that the three detainees had been picked up during this operation. I did not know at this stage who the men were. I never went on [REDACTED] SMU led operations. I can only assume that [REDACTED] SMU had their own medic but I don't know. I do not recall any briefing prior to the op.
66. Present at the EPW cage would have been the two guards, whose names I cannot recall, on duty, WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 and the interpreter. I am pretty sure the interpreter present would have been Wahlid. I can describe the three men as follows. There was an old man, about 60-65 years old. He was about 5'8" tall, thin build. He had thinning

hair, in a comb over style, grey in colour. He had a moustache, very dark skinned of Arabic appearance. He was dressed quite scruffily in an ankle length white shirt.

67. The second man was about 35 years old. He was about 5'8" tall, and was grossly overweight. He had dark curly black hair, short in style. I can't recall if he had a moustache or beard, but he was also of Arabic appearance, with very dark skin. I recall he had quite prominently bulging eyes. He was wearing a dark coloured t-shirt and a dark coloured all in one tunic.
68. The third man was about 20-25 years old, about 5'5" of thin appearance. He had dark skin of Arabic appearance, but I do not recall his hair or facial details. I also cannot recall what he wore. I do remember that he appeared very nervous, whimpering and crying.
69. In this case, I recall that as I got to the compound the detainees still had a sandbag over their heads. This was removed as I got to the compound. I think the three men were bound but I am unable to recall if they were bound to their front or back. I think that it was more likely that they would have been bound at the front by their thumbs. I would not have asked for the restraints to be removed for my examination as it would not have interfered with it.
70. I did not hear any briefing or instructions for the guards whilst I was in the EPW cage.

*b. Medical Check*

71. I could see that each man had been given a bottle of water; it would still have been possible for them to drink it if their thumbs were bound together.
72. The examination consisted of a physical look and feel from top to bottom. From the head, face and mouth down the front and back of the body and front and back of legs. In my statement of 13 August 2013, I stated that I did not strip them off because of the nature of their clothing, I would have been able to identify if there was any bleeding. With regards to the head, face and mouth which was not covered, I remember even putting on gloves and examining these areas thoroughly. No other soldier assisted me with the examination.
73. The old man had some blood on his clothing and I recall that he had a minor cut but where it was I do not remember. The cut was so minor it did not require any treatment. He had no other injuries.
74. The second man, who I now know to be Mousa Ali, had a minor cut to his lip. When I poured water on it to clean it, it was no longer bleeding and required no treatment. I would describe the cut as similar to a paper cut. I recall that he complained of some pain, by putting his hand to his left side. I examined the area he had indicated; however, I saw no physical evidence of bruising or injury. He had no other visible injuries.

75. I believe that I would have asked if they had any medical conditions but I cannot recall if he told the interpreter that he had heart problems. I do not actually know what WO2 [SO101] would have done if the man did have a heart condition.
76. The young man had no injuries at all.
77. Although all three men were in various degrees of mental stress due to their situation, there were no signs that they were in any form of physical stress or duress. Once I was happy that each man was in good physical health, each man put his clothes back on. I would say that the three medicals took all together no longer than 30 minutes, if that. At the time of my examination, it was probably around 30 degrees. If any of the detainees examined had been found to have sustained any injuries that required further investigation then they would have been sent immediately to the RAP to be seen by the RMO despite what anyone else said. This action I did not have cause to do.

*c. Questioning of the detainees*

78. After the examination, I did not have paperwork to complete regarding my findings but I reported them to WO2 [SO101], who then went to speak to each man assisted by an interpreter. I watched whilst he spoke to each man. He spoke to the old man showing him a photograph of a man in Iraqi military uniform. The old man admitted that the man in the picture was him and added that he was the commander of the Fedayeen in Basra. I think he then gave his name and details. WO2 [SO101] then spoke with the fat man who said that he was a teacher, giving no indication that he was related to the Iraqi regime. His name and address were recorded by WO2 [SO101]. The younger man also gave his name and address, giving no indication that he was involved in the Iraqi regime. No other questions were put to the three men. The three men were then made to kneel, with their hands behind their heads, with their backs straight.
79. I do not recall whether the men were hooded or if they were restrained the whole time. I do recall that they were moaning and struggling to maintain the stress positions. If they came out of the position, they would be shouted at and put back into the positions. Their moaning continued.
80. I stayed at the compound for about 2 hours or so on the orders of WO2 [SO101]. He gave the order after I had finished my examinations. I don't know why he felt it necessary for the medic to remain there but I remained whilst he questioned them one by one. What he did was up to him, he ruled Camp Stephen. I was not required to administer any treatment or do any further examinations of any of the detainees during that period of time. I remained there purely because I had been ordered to do so by WO2 [SO101]. During this period, I stood around watching the questioning.
81. About 20 minutes after being questioned by WO2 [SO101], the Intelligence Officer Csgt [SO90], 1BW came to the compound and took the old man away to question further, aided by an interpreter. I did not hear this interview as they were about 20 metres from me. He was not taken to another covered area or building but by the

perimeter fence. During this time, the other two men remained in the kneeling position. He spoke to the old man for about 15 minutes before CSgt [SO90] brought him back to the compound.

82. I don't know if WO2 [SO101] was using tactical questioning or if he was trained to do so. I think that it is possible that he was trying to extract useful information from detainees so that he would look good when he went to HQ. I believe that CSgt [SO90] was trained. I have been asked if SMU personnel were involved with the questioning, but I do not know what unit that refers to.
83. During the questioning by WO2 [SO101], he used a metal pole to prop up one of the prisoners who fell down during the questioning. He did not grievously hit him or any of them with the pole but used it to prop up his head. I mean that I was not aware that he assaulted anyone with it. He used the pole by holding it at either end to prop up the detainee so that it was held horizontally under his chin. I was not exactly sure which way he approached Mousa Ali but WO2 [SO101] held the metal pole in his hands and outstretched, placed it horizontally under the chin of Mousa Ali causing him to lift his head. I believe Mousa Ali was on either his knees or crouching down when WO2 [SO101] approached him. I was not aware of him causing the man any injury, only discomfort, by him moaning but I formed the impression that he just wanted to be left alone. If he had been injured, I would have attended to him straight away.
84. WO2 [SO101] ordered him to raise his head and was helping him in the process by use of the pole. There were other soldiers as well as detainees there at the time but nobody seemed to take any notice and I cannot recall whom they were. WO2 [SO101] held the man's head up for no more than a couple of seconds before taking the pole away. I had never seen him adopt this process before and did not see him do it again after. At no time was I aware of any signs of injury or marks caused by the use of the pole.
85. I was unaware of the reason why WO2 [SO101] used the pole in this manner. I do consider that this amounted to mistreatment of the detainees. My role was to deal with detainees in a medical capacity to ensure that they were not injured. I was certainly not aware of anybody being hurt or injured by the process. The pole was like the poles which hold up the cam net of the EPW cage. The pole was about a metre long and had the diameter of a 50 pence piece. I cannot recall if the pole was used before or after the old man was removed.
86. After questioning, I believe WO2 [SO101] stayed at the EPW area and was still there when I left. I was definitely not in the cage for longer than two hours and I know that I would have been back in my living quarters by approximately 7pm. It may not even have been as long as two hours but it certainly felt that long.

*d. General Conditions*

87. That evening was a warm normal evening but the men were under the shade of a cam net.

88. I do not believe that any of the detainees were offered food. At one point, I gave a cigarette to Mousa Ali.

*e. Mousa Ali's collapse*

89. About 2111 hrs that evening, I was informed that Mousa Ali had collapsed. I can't remember who came and told me. They could find no pulse. I don't know how long had elapsed between that and me being fetched, however, having said that, I would imagine that I was fetched for immediately and for me to get to the cage it would have only taken a couple of minutes, 5 minutes maximum.

90. I immediately went to the compound and saw that the fat man was lying on his back, face up, not moving at all. I think that there was someone else in the cage when I attended at 2111 hrs. I cannot remember if it was one of the people I had earlier medically examined or someone different. I do remember that someone said "look the other way".

91. I pulled him out from under the cam net where the lighting was better. I felt for a radial pulse but there was no pulse present. I got my stethoscope and listened to his chest, but could hear no breathing sounds in or out. I checked his airway, which was clear but not maintained, which means he could not prevent his tongue from falling back. I checked his pupils, both were dilated and fixed. I then put an airway in and put him on high-level oxygen. I felt for a radial pulse, but still none present. I then commenced CPR, which still elicited no response. I would say that Mousa Ali was lifeless and he was dead prior to my arrival, but I did the resuscitation techniques as described. I was focused on administering treatment and I didn't hear any threats or comments made to the other detainees.

92. I then spoke to CSgt [REDACTED] SO98 CQMS, C Coy, 1BW, who was present when I arrived at the EPW cage, telling him that I thought the patient may be dead. If WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 had been there at the time, I would have said this to him and not CSgt [REDACTED] SO98 because of his position. This was the first time that I had seen CSgt [REDACTED] SO98 in the EPW tent and I cannot recall seeing him there again.

93. I did not tell WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 that Mousa Ali had had a fit. I had no evidence to suggest at any time that he had suffered from any kind of fit. I have previously been shown an Op Slammer form with a handwritten note "had a fit at 2105". I had not seen the form before 29 May 2003 and I don't know who has written it on the form or why it has been stated. I can say that it was not my handwriting.

94. I do remember that Csgt [REDACTED] SO98 said to me "it doesn't stand very well". He knew that this was the second death in the camp involving detainees. It sticks in my mind that his reaction to my findings was to say words to the effect of "this is the second death in as many days and the shit is going to hit the fan". I told him to get my ambulance and crew to the compound. When they arrived, we placed the casualty on the stretcher and put him in the ambulance. It took at least four of us to lift him due to his excessive size and weight. I cannot recall who assisted me. The stretcher

remained on the floor of the ambulance. We then conveyed him to the RAP, 1BW. Because it was dark when we went to the RAP there would have definitely been a vehicle escorting us. The journey to the RAP took about 10-12 minutes. During this time the man was still given oxygen, however, no further treatment could be given because of the movement of the ambulance. The vehicle was jolting around, bumpy roads, only 6 or 7 bulbs in the rear of the vehicle so very little light and the main factor was that there was no doubt in my mind that he was dead. We arrived at the RAP at 2145 hrs. He was transferred to the emergency room. CPR was again started at 2147 hrs by the RAP team, consisting of LCpl [REDACTED] 1BW and Captain [REDACTED] SO82, RAMC, RMO, Cpl [REDACTED] RAMC.

95. The ambulance was a really old vehicle; it had tracks and was loud. It was not ideal for delivering treatment to a patient. I would have been bumping around in the back and the design meant that the lighting was really poor.
96. I believe that Capt. [REDACTED] SO82 may have said that he received a radio message stating "civilian casualty" on route from C Coy had seizure. I can offer no explanation if such a message was passed as to why a seizure was referred to. I would expect the RAP to have been informed of a casualty on route either by the Company Ops Room to Battalion Ops Room to the RAP or by the Vehicle Commander. Either way, I would not have been privy to this passing of information. I did not pass a message to the Ops room. As detailed above, I informed CSgt [REDACTED] SO98.
97. I believe that I told Capt. [REDACTED] SO82 that the detainee had been in the EPW cage when he had collapsed and that I believed he had had a heart attack. The reason I came to that conclusion was I had been given no previous medical history, his size being extremely obese, weather conditions i.e. hot and the fact that he had been put in the stress position and sandbagged to my knowledge on his arrest. It has been suggested that I said he had collapsed after being chased by [REDACTED] SMU. I would have no reason to have said it as this does not tally up with anything that I was aware of. From the size of the detainee and the weather conditions etc. I would even doubt that he was capable of being chased.
98. At 2148 hrs, the defibrillator was applied to the patient, however the monitor advised not to shock. So CPR was continued. IV access was obtained by the RMO. About 2149 hrs the doctor administered 1mg of adrenaline IV and for three minutes CPR was continued. At 2152, the defibrillator again advised not to shock the patient. He was given 1mg of Adrenaline IV, 3mg of Atropine IV and 3 minutes of CPR. At 2155 hrs, the defibrillator again advised not to shock. A further 1mg of adrenaline IV was given, 3 minutes of CPS. At 2158 hrs, resuscitation efforts were stopped and the RMO confirmed death. I was in the RAP throughout and I was there when life was pronounced extinct. However, I did not administer any treatment. I believe the above timings were taken from the paperwork completed by the RMO. I left the RAP after death was confirmed. I have no knowledge of any note that was made and left on the body.
99. I made an entry in my own notebook as follows: 13<sup>th</sup> May 03 "1 x EPW dead 2158 RAP heart attack, aneurism". Heart attack is what was said in the RAP - I mean it

was presumed that he died from a heart attack. Aneurism did not come from Captain SO82.

100. I want to say that nothing or no one could have bought him back; if he had been flown to RAP it would have made no difference. Mousa Ali was dead when I got to the EPW cage. The time between my first seeing the detainees at 1700 hrs and attending at 21.11 hrs is a gap of 4 hrs 11 minutes. In my opinion, if any of them had been sandbagged throughout that period of time they would have all collapsed. A sandbag over the head would limit breathing and in addition the excess heat and being arrested. I don't think that anyone would have been able to suffer that for very long without being affected.
101. I have no knowledge of Mousa Ali being made to do exercises with jerry cans of water. It most certainly did not occur during any of the time I was either in or by the cage. Neither of the guards present said anything to me about having made Mousa Ali exercise with jerry cans or anything else. If either of them had told me that any of the detainees had been mistreated or abused in any way then I would have reported it and moved the detainees to the RAP.
102. I really don't understand why all three prisoners were firstly bought to Camp Stephen which didn't have an official holding facility and secondly why all three prisoners were not transported together from Camp Stephen to Black Watch main detention facility.

*f. Allegations of Ill-treatment made by Bashar Ali*

103. I did not see the detainees arrive on 13 May 2003 and so I am unable to say whether they were hooded.
104. I have seen the account of Bashar Ali (pages 373 and 418). I did not see the behaviour that is described. When I examined the detainees, only one of them had an injury. That was Mousa Ali, who had a cut to his lip as I have described above. I did not participate in any such behaviour.
105. When I saw the detainees in the EPW, they were in the kneeling position. It was not my decision to put the detainees into that position. My understanding was that such positions were permitted to weaken a detainee and persuade them to answer questions.
106. I did not hear Mousa Ali making any crying noises and any sounds that I did hear are described above. I did not see any soldier put out their cigarette on Bashar Ali's foot. I did not see any water being poured over the detainees.
107. I was not aware that any of the detainees were placed into a pit or a hole. At paragraph 09 above, I have explained that there were burn pits and a cesspit at Camp Stephen. I did not witness, nor did I participate throwing stones at Bashar Ali.

108. There were tank tracks at Camp Stephen. I was not aware that the detainees were taken to the tank tracks or anyone else. I believe that they remained in the EPW cage.

*g. Reporting of the Incident*

109. I believe that paperwork was completed by the RMO as detailed at paragraph 98 above.

110. I remember 2, 3 or 4 days after this incident, I know it definitely was not the day after, three or four male Iraqis turned up at the gate of Camp Stephen. They said they were family members of Mousa Ali. Whoever was on the gate fetched me and asked if I would speak to them. I would have had an interpreter with me, although I cannot recall who that was. They wanted to know where he was and I told them that he had died and his body was at Battlegroup Main. I think I would have told them what I thought he had died of and therefore would have said possible heart attack. I would have told them that the body was taken to the main HQ and I believe that they would have known where that was. I did not report this interaction, but there were other soldiers present who may have done so.

*h. Mousa Ali's family*

111. It is possible that I was the first person who told the family about Mousa Ali's death. I cannot comment on whether there was any delay on the part of the RMP.

*i. Issues of Clarification*

112. I have previously stated that I got each man to strip before I examined each of them. However, I do not believe that that the detainees would have been naked at any time. They would not have been asked to remove their underwear at any time.

113. I have been asked why I did not mention WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 using a pole when I gave my first statement about the incident on 23 May 2003. I believe it is because I was not asked about this issue. I would have volunteered the information if asked and I did so 6 days later on 29 May 2003.

114. I have previously stated that there were no jerry cans in the EPW area. However, I do believe that this was a mistake and that there were jerry cans there.

**F. Culture at Camp Stephen**

115. Camp Stephen was a nice camp and 1BW were a good regiment.

116. I have been asked to comment on a number of previous statements I made about WO2 [REDACTED] SO101:

a. "WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 ran the camp and ruled what occurred in it."

- b. "I'm pretty sure the interpreter present would have been Wahlid, he was always alongside [WO2 SO101] and did everything [WO2 SO101] said."
  - c. "What [WO2 SO101] did was up to him, he ruled Camp Stephen."
117. WO2 SO101 was the person with the highest authority for the day-to-day running of the camp. He ran a strict camp. He was not a teddy bear. WO2 SO101 held the highest rank and the chain of command was followed. If he told me to do something, I would do it.
118. There was nothing untoward with Wahlid; he was the interpreter that WO2 SO101 used to do business with. Wahild was really helpful and had local contacts. He would interpret for me when the man came to drain the septic tank.
119. It was also common knowledge that WO2 SO101 and SO111 were in a relationship. Their relationship was already ongoing in Germany, before we were deployed to Iraq. She would often come to the camp, although her quarters were located elsewhere. WO2 SO101 had a double bed built in his quarters and she was known to stay over. I do not think that there were rules prohibiting their relationship because they were not in the same regiment and also they had different cap badges, however, the double bed and her staying over crossed the line of professionalism in my view. They were often seen together and it was thought that she was passing him information and tip-offs that resulted in 1BW carrying out operations. I came to this conclusion as there was often a short gap between SO111's visits and subsequent operations.
120. I would also add that Major SO88 would not have been allowed to just go out and carry out an operation. The Ops room would have been informed when anyone was going on an operation and the Main HQ would have known everything that was going on.
121. It is possible that WO2 SO101 was motivated as being perceived as a hero, that he wanted an award when he returned from Iraq for the work that he done there. He was very confident and cocky. He had the nickname of Taliban SO101 because of his reckless attitude and because of his gung-ho approach.
122. Things had previously gone badly for WO2 SO101. A chain gun had gone off and blew the leg off a sergeant. WO2 SO101 said that it was an electrical fault but no-one believed him. I don't know anything about the warrior vehicle so I couldn't comment on what happened.
123. There was another incident where WO2 SO101 had retrieved an AK47 on an operation and he tried to unload it back at Camp Stephen whilst me and other soldiers were standing around him but it fired a round.
124. I have described WO2 SO101's involvement in the incidents on 08 and 13 May above. I can recall another incident where we were driving through a compound and came across a large number of civilians stealing metal. He rounded up about 20

detainees and bought them back to Camp Stephen, shouting at them and verbally abusing them.

125. I have been asked to describe Corporal [SO102]’s influence with the Camp. He was an NCO – a patrol commander. I think that Corporal [SO102] was particularly influential within Camp Stephen. His personality was similar to WO2 [SO101]’s – he was also gung-ho and “slappy-dappy”. I believe that Corporal [SO102] won an award and it left a sour taste in people’s mouths.
126. I was asked about a boot mark that was on the body of Radha Nama. I believe that it was suggested to be that Corporal [SO102] was responsible for making that mark. However, I did not witness him doing that and I did not see a boot mark. I did not witness Corporal [SO102] carry out any other acts of mistreatment to detainees although I heard rumours.
127. In my view, Iraqi civilians were treated fairly and with respect at Camp Stephen. The Army employed some of the locals. I have explained above how the detainees were treated.
128. I have been asked to comment on my understanding of the term “beasting”. This is to put a person under stress to make them break. It can include slapping them, or putting them in stress positions to make them stressed. I would probably say that the treatment of the detainees on 13<sup>th</sup> May 2003 did amount to a beating.
129. I did not witness any threats being made to detainees that they would be made to get into water.
130. In my view, a blind eye was turned to the mistreatment of the detainees. There was a culture of them (those who were mistreating detainees) and us. I did not witness troops complaining about the treatment of the detainees.
131. I cannot comment on the degree of oversight that commanders had as I fell outside of this structure in my role as a medic. The degrees of freedom that NCOs had was up to WO2 [SO101].

## **G. Existence and Awareness of Wetting**

### *a. “wetting” generally*

132. I have never heard of the term wetting before.
133. I have witnessed detainees being placed into bodies of water. There was a stream outside of Camp Stephen. Detainees I understand had been picked up for looting were taken out of the vehicles and taken to the stream. They were told to get into the river and to swim to the other side where they would be free to go home. Some soldiers would throw stones at them whilst they were swimming. It was common knowledge amongst the local population that it wasn’t a place to end up if you were

caught for looting, stealing etc. It was known that you would get a slap across the ear, and made to cross the river.

134. I think that it was about 20 meters in width and detainees would be in the water for a couple of minutes until they swam to the other side. It was probably not possible to touch the floor of the stream without going underneath the water, but I am not sure.
135. Detainees would be told to get into the stream by words and actions i.e. pointing. I did not hear anyone making threats to force the detainees into the stream. They were not made to submerge themselves. If any detainees tried to get out of the water on the Camp Stephen side, they were made to get back in. I did not see any detainee enter the water whilst wearing a restraint. They were in the water for as long as it took them to swim to the other side. Once they reached the other side, they were free to go. I am not aware of the detainees being brought back into Camp Stephen after this had happened.
136. I believe that this capture and release process was used as a scare tactic to dissuade the Iraqi's from looting.
137. I was aware that detained civilians were driven to Camp Stephen to be made to cross the river. I was not aware that detainees were taken to any other bodies of water.
138. I do believe that detainees were in danger when they went into the water; if they couldn't swim, then they might have drowned. As far as I am aware, nobody drowned at Camp Stephen. The stream was visible from the Camp. Either from the watchtower, which was guarded, or from the roofs, where soldiers might sunbathe.
139. I saw this happen a couple of times when I had been out on operations and came back to Camp Stephen. I saw them being brought in at the same time. I did not participate in these incidents.
140. The practice of wetting continued until late May, early June when 1BW left Camp.
141. In general, I think that soldiers approved the use of the practice that I have described above. Civilians were being captured all of the time, for looting, and there were no facilities to keep them. It was approved, in my view, as a way of deterring people from looting. I don't know if it actually worked. The civilians may have preferred swimming across the stream to longer periods of detention.

*b. Reporting of wetting incidents*

142. As far as I am aware, there was no requirement to report these incidents.

*c. Chain of Command*

143. The Commanding Officer visited Camp Stephen from HQ and said enough is enough. I think that he meant that the general aggressiveness towards the local population had to be softened down a bit. I think that it got back too that two detainees had died in a short space of time and that is why he made the order. I

cannot recall if the CO ordered a stop to the practice of wetting at the same time. I do recall that it all stopped in late May – early June.

144. WO2 [REDACTED] SO101 was aware of the practice of wetting. He didn't do anything to stop it. It was well known inside Camp Stephen that this was happening. It was also well known amongst the civilians, that Camp Stephen is not a place that you want to be taken to.

d. Orders

145. I do not recall being given any directions about using water as a deterrent. I think that it was considered to be an easy option instead of interrogating every person who was looting or locking them up for a few hours.

146. I cannot recall Major [REDACTED] SO88 giving any specific order relating to wetting.

147. I cannot recall how he issued the order to stop; possibly it was through WO2 [REDACTED] SO101. It would not have been met with resistance as he was in charge of the Coy. His word is God. The troops carried out his orders.

I believe that facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed [REDACTED] SO84

Dated 10,06,2022