

Serious Incident

Aircraft Type and Registration:	Britten-Norman Islander, VP-MNI	
No & Type of Engines:	2 Lycoming O-540-EC45 piston engines	
Year of Manufacture:	1971 (Serial no: BN2A-27)	
Date & Time (UTC):	16 August 2025 at 1805 hrs	
Location:	John A. Osborne Airport, Montserrat	
Type of Flight:	Commercial Air Transport (Passenger)	
Persons on Board:	Crew - 1	Passengers - 2
Injuries:	Crew - None	Passengers - None
Nature of Damage:	Left aircraft mainwheel brake calliper damaged. Two airfield lights at Runway 10 threshold damaged	
Commander's Licence:	Commercial Pilot's Licence	
Commander's Age:	31 years	
Commander's Flying Experience:	1,868 hours (of which 49 were on type, 640 on class) Last 90 days - 49 hours Last 28 days - 36 hours	
Information Source:	Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot	

Synopsis

The aircraft struck runway lights at the Runway 10 threshold during a go-around from Runway 28. The left mainwheel brake calliper was damaged. The aircraft diverted to Antigua, where it landed safely. None of those on board were injured.

History of the flight

Due to challenging operating environment at Montserrat Airport, the Governor had issued special instructions for Air Operator Certificate (AOC) operators. Among these was a requirement to establish a crew training programme for all PIC to be completed before they operated from Montserrat. During his scheduled operations on 15 August 2025 the incident pilot was joined by a company training captain who flew with him on two approaches and landings on Runway 28 at Montserrat to satisfy the training requirement.

On 16 August 2025, the incident pilot was scheduled to operate two sectors from Montserrat to Antigua and return. Another BN2 Islander, which took off just ahead of the incident aircraft, made an airborne weather report cautioning windshear, turbulence and strong up and down drafts on the climb out path. The incident pilot recalled that the wind was between 10 and 15 kt and recalled his departure as being without incident. The pilot flew to Antigua without incident though he stated that on the approach, due to a strong crosswind, he "required full left aileron and right rudder all the way to touchdown."

Following the turnaround in Antigua the pilot flew back to Montserrat. Runway 28 was in use and ATC passed a wind of 240° at 7 kt, occasionally 240° at 14 kt gusting 26 kt. Another BN2 Islander ahead passed warnings of windshear, up and down drafts and turbulence on the approach path. The pilot described conditions on approach into Montserrat as “very bumpy and turbulent”. He described strong right drift from 7 nm out and stated that he used full left aileron and right rudder along with right rudder trim to track the runway centreline. The pilot recalled that, despite these control inputs, the aircraft was still drifting right and he decided to go around as the approach was unstable.

On the second approach to Montserrat the pilot described similar conditions. The pilot however, continued this approach and stated that he “was in a position to execute a good landing within the touchdown zone”. The pilot recalled that within a few feet of touchdown the aircraft was affected by a gust which caused the aircraft to float much further along the runway than he anticipated. The pilot believed that the aircraft did not touch down but that as he passed Taxiway Alpha (Figure 1) he initiated a go-around to avoid a long landing. The pilot carried out the go-around actions, applying full power and retracting the flaps from full to the take off setting. He stated, “I attempted to stay in ground effect for as long as possible to ensure full runway utilisation and attain maximum forward speed”.

In a video taken by the Airfield Fire and Rescue Service (AFRS), the aircraft was seen to touch down before Taxiway Alpha but bounce and then remain airborne until after Taxiway Alpha before touching down a second time with approximately 200 m of runway remaining. The pilot initially felt the aircraft had not touched down, and stated “the end of the runway was fast approaching and I attempted to lift off. I vividly remember my airspeed reading 75/80 kt. We should easily have rotated at the speed however, the plane would not lift off the runway.” The aircraft crossed the Runway 10 threshold striking two lights and was then seen to sink below the elevation of the runway before recovering.

The pilot then decided to divert to Antigua. When doing the landing checks prior to the approach there, he noticed there was no pressure on the left mainwheel brake. He looked through the window and saw the left brake calliper hanging from the hydraulic hose, and so he informed ATC that he would have no brakes during landing. The aircraft landed and decelerated safely, and the pilot was able to exit the runway using differential thrust. No one on board was injured.




Figure 1
Montserrat Airport Chart

Meteorology

The TAF for Montserrat issued at 1137 hrs gave a general wind from 210° at 9 kt. Over the period of the incident the forecast also indicated temporary conditions of wind from 210° at 15 kt, gusting 25 kt, visibility reducing to 4,000 m in thunderstorms and FEW CB at 1,400 ft aal. The METAR issued at 1800 hrs reported a wind of 270° at 12 kt, visibility greater than 10 km and FEW clouds at 1,900 ft aal. The full TAF and METAR are at Figure 2.

TAF TRPG 161137Z 1612/1712 21009KT 9999 SCT018 SCT036 TEMPO 1612/1624 21015G25KT 4000 TSRA FEW012CB BKN014 BKN036

METAR TRPG 161800Z 27012KT 9999 FEW019 SCT040 27/23 Q1010=

Figure 2
Montserrat TAF and METAR

Personnel

The pilot stated that he had 49 hours on type all of which were as PIC. The operator's training manual specifies the following for conversion to the BN2A:

'A Conversion/Differences course will include:

- a. Ground training and checking including aeroplane systems, normal and abnormal and emergency procedures including Multi-Crew Co-operation training where appropriate.*
- b. Contents of the Operations manual, self briefing and a minimum of 2 hours dual instruction plus test.'*

The pilot's licence was correctly endorsed with a Multi-Engine Piston (MEP) Class Rating. The BN2A falls within the MEP Class and no specific Type Rating is required.

The pilot had an FAA Licence and a Certificate of Validation for Montserrat. He therefore completed his logbook as per the requirements of FAR Part 61. The regulator was satisfied that the pilot had recorded his flight time appropriately.

Organisational information

Crosswind Operations

The company operations manual contained the following guidance for operating with a crosswind:

'The aeroplane is capable of taking off and landing with a 30 kts crosswind. On a contaminated runway the take off and landing is limited to 15 kts crosswind.

Note: *Runways reported as "water patches" or "Flooded" should be considered to be contaminated.*

Note: *Where conditions permit this operation is facilitated by setting flaps to T.O. or UP and increasing the airspeed accordingly.*

For landing in strong crosswinds, the wing down sideslipping technique is preferred.'

Although the note suggested using flap at T.O. or UP to facilitate handling in a crosswind, the Approved Flight Manual (AFM) for the BN2A contains no performance adjustments for landing in those configurations. The operator did not recommend such configurations to its crews.

The crosswind at Montserrat was within the prescribed operating limits for the aircraft.

Pilot Experience Requirements

The company operational manual detailed a minimum experience level for pilots operating to Montserrat as follows:

'Minimum qualifications and experience

1. *CPL or ATPL*
2. *Minimum total time of 500 hours*
3. *Minimum of 100 hours on type.'*

The pilot had a Commercial Pilot's Licence (CPL) but only 49 hours on type. He had 640 hours on MEP aircraft.

Note: For commercial flights, the Governor's instructions required a pilot to have a minimum of 100 hours PIC on the type or class of aeroplane being flown.

Stabilised Approach Criteria

The operator's manual defined the following as stabilised approach criteria to be achieved by 500 ft aal in VMC:

'An approach is stabilised when all of the following criteria are met:

- *The aircraft is on the correct flight path.*
- *Only small changes in heading/pitch are necessary to maintain the correct flight path.*
- *The airspeed is not more than VREF + 20kts indicated speed and not less than VREF.*
- *The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration.*
- *Sink rate is not greater than 1000 feet/minute; if an approach requires a sink rate greater than 1000 feet/minute a special briefing should be conducted.*
- *Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration and is not below the minimum power for the approach as defined by the operating manual.*
- *All briefings and checklists have been conducted.'*

No reference was made in these criteria to persistent full scale control deflections as described by the pilot for his approach.

Windshear

The operator's manual cautioned that: '*The greatest danger to aircraft of windshear is on Takeoff, initial climb, Approach to landing and Landing.*' In the event of windshear conditions being encountered the operator's manual stated:

'If windshear is encountered after lift off or on approach immediately take recovery action. If on approach DO NOT ATTEMPT TO LAND.'

If windshear conditions are suspected the manual also required stabilised approach criteria to be met by 1,000 ft aal rather than 500 ft.

Analysis

The possibility of challenging, inconsistent and unpredictable meteorological conditions was acknowledged by the Governor's Instructions and the training/experience requirements in the operator's manuals. The pilot had sufficient experience of MEP aircraft and had a valid Montserrat check in accordance with the Governor's Instructions. The company training requirement was 100 hours on type, but with 49 hours on the BN2A the pilot did not satisfy this requirement. However, the intent was that the manual should reflect the Governor's Instructions requirement of 100 hours on the type or class.

Just before the incident pilot's initial departure from Montserrat, the pilot of another departing aircraft gave an airborne weather report of windshear conditions. The VP-MNI pilot got airborne without incident and flew to Antigua. He described the approach as more '*turbulent than normal with a strong crosswind that required full left aileron and right rudder all the way to touch down.*' With full left roll control applied the aircraft would have no ability to correct any additional right roll and so full control of the aircraft was compromised. The aircraft landed without incident, however.

On return to Montserrat the pilot approached Runway 28 and ATC passed a wind of 240° at 7 kt, occasionally 240° at 14 kt gusting 26 kt. This would indicate a maximum crosswind of approximately 18 kt, well within the limit for the aircraft. An aircraft ahead passed warning of windshear, up and downdrafts and turbulence on the approach. Again, the pilot used full left aileron with right rudder to track the centreline but even with these control inputs the aircraft was still drifting to the right and the pilot decided the approach was unstable and executed a go-around. Full control of the aircraft was again compromised.

On the second approach the pilot encountered the same conditions but felt he was in a good position to execute a landing. His decision to land may have resulted from a continuation bias, leading him to continue the approach despite emergent cues suggesting it should have been rejected.

When it became clear that the aircraft would make a long landing the pilot initiated a go-around. It is probable that the aircraft's performance was affected by the uncertain wind conditions/downdrafts and it did not climb as the pilot expected. The aircraft overran the surface striking two lights at the Runway 10 threshold and sustaining damage to the

left mainwheel brakes. After passing the Runway 10 threshold the aircraft sank below the elevation of the airfield before recovering to a climb. The subsequent diversion to Antigua was uneventful.

Conclusion

The aircraft made an approach in challenging wind conditions including turbulence, windshear and downdrafts. Influenced by a gust late in the approach the aircraft “floated” along the runway and the pilot initiated a go-around to avoid a long landing. Performance was compromised by the conditions and the go-around performance expected by the pilot was not achieved. The aircraft struck lights at the Runway 10 threshold and sustained damage to the left mainwheel brakes. None of those aboard were injured.

Safety actions

The operator took the following Safety Action:

- The references to ‘type’ in the operator’s manuals were replaced with ‘class.’
- The operator amended its operations manual guidance for crosswind landing to emphasise use of the crab method, thus removing the need for sustained roll control input to track the runway centreline.