



Home Office

Country Policy and Information Note

Egypt: Opposition to the State

Version 5.0

March 2026

Executive summary

Egypt's political system remains highly centralised under President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, whose rule has been reinforced by constitutional changes, tightly controlled elections, and broad executive authority over policymaking.

Political parties, civil society organisations and media companies, as well as individual bloggers, human rights lawyers and activists, are allowed to form and operate under strict rules and conditions. However, those that are considered to be undertaking activities deemed a risk to national security by the Egyptian authorities can face closure, harassment, arrest and detention.

Authorities continue to target, arrest and detain political opponents, activists and commentators. The press and social media are closely monitored by the authorities. Political and human rights activists, journalists, bloggers and social media users can be placed under surveillance. Authorities can use charges such as spreading false news, supporting a banned group, incitement of violence, insults to religion, insults to public figures and institutions or abuse of public morals, to investigate, detain and prosecute individuals for expressing political views or criticism.

While the law allows for the right to protest, this right is limited in practice. The security forces prohibit gatherings, marches and demonstrations which haven't obtained the required permissions, and have responded forcefully to disperse peaceful demonstrations alongside mass arrests and detentions. Those arrested can be subjected to enforced disappearance and held in pretrial detention for prolonged periods of time.

Whilst the law provides for the right to a fair trial, it is reported that the judiciary often fails to uphold this right in cases connected to perceived opposition to the state and individuals can face proceedings that violate basic due process rights.

A person who is openly critical of the government is likely to be at real risk of persecution or serious harm. This will depend on a range of factors including but not limited to: their profile, group they belong to (if any), their role within the group (if any), the nature of their activities, and whether the person has come to the adverse attention of the authorities.

Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution from the state they will not, in general, be able to obtain protection from the authorities or internally relocate.

Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

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Assessment

Section updated: 24 February 2026

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the [country information](#), refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of **whether, in general**:

- a person faces a real risk of persecution/serious harm by the state because of their actual or imputed political opinion.
- the state (or quasi state bodies) can provide effective protection
- internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution/serious harm
- a claim, if refused, is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under [section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002](#).

Decision makers **must**, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

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1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

- 1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).
- 1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the [Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants](#)).
- 1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check, when one has not already been undertaken (see [Biometric data-sharing process \(Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process\)](#)).
- 1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the [Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis](#)).

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1.2 Exclusion

- 1.2.1 Some persons may claim to be linked to militant groups that have used or incited violence to achieve their political ends. Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts and merits.
- 1.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).
- 1.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on [Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33\(2\) of the Refugee Convention](#), [Humanitarian Protection](#) and the instruction on [Restricted Leave](#).

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2. Convention reason(s)

- 2.1.1 Actual or imputed political opinion.
- 2.1.2 Establishing a convention reason is not sufficient to be recognised as a refugee. The question is whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of an actual or imputed Refugee Convention reason.
- 2.1.3 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instruction, [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

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3. Risk

- 3.1.1 A person who is openly critical of the government is likely to be at real risk of persecution or serious harm. This will depend on a range of factors including but not limited to: their profile, group they belong to (if any), their role within the group (if any), the nature of their activities, and whether the person has come to the adverse attention of the authorities.
- 3.1.2 Additional factors to consider for media workers, including journalists and bloggers are:
 - subject matter, tone and language of their written or broadcast material
 - the profile of print, broadcast or online media which they work for and its position with regard to the state
 - reach and frequency of publication or broadcast
- 3.1.3 Each case must be considered on its facts, with the onus on the person to

demonstrate that they face such a risk.

- 3.1.4 Where the person claims to be linked to a group that is believed by the government to be linked to committing or inciting violence, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, decision makers will need give careful consideration as to whether the state is pursuing prosecution or persecution. This will be case specific, with the onus on the person to demonstrate that the treatment they face is persecutory.
- 3.1.5 However, prosecution may amount to persecution if it involves victimisation in its application by the authorities. For example, if it is the vehicle or excuse for persecution or if only certain groups are prosecuted for a particular offence and the consequences of that are excessively severe. Punishment which is cruel, inhumane or degrading (including that which is out of all proportion to the offence committed) may also amount to persecution.
- 3.1.6 President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi first took power in 2013 while serving as Egypt's defence minister and was first elected in 2014, before being re-elected in 2018 and 2023. Al-Sisi won 90% of the vote in 2023, with sources calling the elections unfair and uncompetitive following a campaign marred by the arrest of opponents and stringent eligibility requirements for other candidates. A 2019 amendment to the constitution added two years to presidential terms, theoretically allowing Al-Sisi to serve until 2030. Policymaking in Egypt is heavily centralised under the president and the security apparatus, with some laws drafted by the cabinet approved with minimal parliamentary debate or amendments (see [Political context](#)).
- 3.1.7 Political parties (with the exception of those based on religion, including the banned Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing the Freedom and Justice Party), civil society organisations and media companies, as well as individual bloggers, human rights lawyers and activists, are allowed to form and operate under strict rules and conditions. However, in practice, these restrictions significantly reduce meaningful political opposition or independent media. Organisations and individuals that are considered to be undertaking activities deemed a risk to national security by the Egyptian authorities can face closure, harassment, arrest and detention (see [Political and civil rights](#) and [State treatment](#)).
- 3.1.8 The law provides a broad definition of terrorism, to include 'any act harming national unity or social peace'. The Penal Code contains specific articles that prevent state institutions or public figures from being criticised in publications and online content, and there are multiple laws allowing websites and content deemed to be threats to national security to be censored or blocked. According to the 2024 Freedom House Freedom on the Net Report, as of June 2024, 132 of 562 websites that had been blocked in Egypt were news websites (see [Freedom of media and expression](#) and [Counter terrorism laws](#)).
- 3.1.9 Authorities continue to target, arrest and detain political opponents, activists and commentators. In February 2024, politician Ahmed Tantawy, his campaign advisor and 21 of his supporters were sentenced to a year in prison for alleged offences associated with his presidential challenge to Al-Sisi in the December 2023 election. Tantawy was released on 28 May 2025 after completing his sentence. In a mass trial that took place in March 2024, an Egyptian court sentenced 8 leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood

to death, with 50 other defendants given sentences ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment. Sources additionally reported on the continued detention of members of other political groups, including the Strong Egypt Party, the Alliance of Hope and the April 6 Youth Movement (see [Muslim Brotherhood](#) and [Political opposition groups](#)).

- 3.1.10 The press and social media are closely monitored by the authorities. Under Law no. 180 of 2018, the Supreme Council for Media Regulation (SCMR) has the power to block websites, blogs, or the personal social media of anyone with five thousand or more followers. Political and human rights activists, journalists, bloggers and social media users can be placed under surveillance, with private communications and correspondence, including emails, social media accounts and banking records all being monitored. Authorities can use charges such as spreading false news, supporting a banned group, incitement of violence, insults to religion, insults to public figures and institutions or abuse of public morals, to investigate, detain and prosecute individuals for expressing political views or criticism. As a result of the advanced censorship and surveillance by the state, self-censorship has been practiced by activists, journalists, academics and everyday internet users (see [State treatment, Actual or perceived government critics – general, Media workers, bloggers and social media users](#)).
- 3.1.11 A 2019 law gives the authorities powers to oversee the registration, activities and funding of all non-governmental organisations (NGOs). As a result of state monitoring and restrictions on permitted activities of NGOs that are deemed a threat to national security, public morals and public order, various organisations have been forced to close, while their members have faced arrest, asset freezes and travel bans (see [Non-governmental organisations](#)).
- 3.1.12 While the law allows for the right to protest, this right is limited in practice. The security forces prohibit gatherings, marches and demonstrations which haven't obtained the required permissions, and have responded forcefully to disperse demonstrations alongside mass arrests and detentions. Authorities reportedly carry out pre-emptive arrests of individuals linked to planned protests or demonstrations in order to prevent them from taking place. In October 2025, over 150 people were reportedly still in detention for taking part in demonstrations in October 2023 (see [Assembly and association rights](#) and [Protesters](#)).
- 3.1.13 The targeting, arrest and harassment of family members of government critics, journalists and human rights activists living abroad has also been documented, with sources suggesting the practice is used as a method of reprisal against their actions and a form of 'punishment by proxy' (see [Family members of human rights activists and political opponents](#)).
- 3.1.14 Exact numbers of bloggers and social media users who have been arrested cannot be determined. However, the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) report, covering events between February 2021 and January 2023, stated that hundreds of bloggers and social media users were detained during that time period. In June 2025, the International Federation of Journalists stated there were 22 journalists in prison, 15 of whom have been held in pre-trial detention for over 2 years, with some being held for as long as 7 years. Additionally, according to the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, the Egyptian Ministry of Interior stated that

between late July and August 2025, 29 people were arrested or prosecuted for online content, including 19 women and a child (see [Media workers, bloggers and social media users](#)).

- 3.1.15 Available evidence indicates that those arrested can be subject to enforced disappearance and held in pretrial detention for prolonged periods of time. Between January and April 2025, Geneva-based human rights organisation, Committee for Justice, monitored 621 cases of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and administrative detention, most of which were investigated under the pretext of national security and charges of spreading false news or joining a banned group (see [Enforced disappearance, arbitrary arrest and pre-trial detention](#)).
- 3.1.16 There is limited evidence regarding the number of people who are in detention. However, the BTI stated that Egypt had tens of thousands of political prisoners. Individuals who are detained can be subjected to a strategy known as ‘recycling’ or ‘rotation’, where the authorities bring new charges against them when they are nearing the end of their prison sentence or as they reach the maximum legal period of pretrial detention. These new charges prevent release and are usually similar to the ones they have already been charged with or convicted of. In April 2022, the Presidential Pardon Committee was founded to review cases of political prisoners to grant release orders where appropriate. The committee has facilitated the release of hundreds of political prisoners since its establishment; however, sources indicate that the number of new arrests has exceeded the number of releases (see [Actual or perceived government critics – general](#), [Case ‘recycling’](#) and [Pardoning/release of prisoners](#)).
- 3.1.17 Whilst the law provides for the right to a fair trial, it is reported that the judiciary often fails to uphold this right. Individuals can face proceedings that violate basic due process rights, and sources report that security and military tribunals frequently collaborate with executive authorities to secure convictions or extend detention. Law No.3 of 2024 provides military personnel involved in certain operations with the same judicial powers of arrest and seizure as the police and sources report civilians being tried in Military courts. While the 2014 constitution initially strengthened judicial autonomy, new laws and amendments have enabled the president to effectively appoint the heads of key judicial bodies (see [Judicial governance](#)).
- 3.1.18 The government and its agents have a legitimate interest in pursuing and arresting persons who are, or are suspected of being, involved with or supporting violence and pose a threat to society. Persons fleeing legitimate prosecution or punishment for such acts are not likely to be refugees. Being of interest to the state or being arrested may not amount to having a well-founded fear of persecution.
- 3.1.19 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

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4. Protection

- 4.1.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state, they are unlikely to be able to obtain protection.

- 4.1.2 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

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5. Internal relocation

- 5.1.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state, they are unlikely to be able to internally relocate to escape that risk.
- 5.1.2 For further guidance on internal relocation and factors to consider, see the Asylum Instruction on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

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6. Certification

- 6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
- 6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see [Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 \(clearly unfounded claims\)](#).

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Country information

About the country information

This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the [research methodology](#). It provides the evidence base for the assessment which, as stated in the [About the assessment](#), is the guide to the current objective conditions.

The structure and content follow a [terms of reference](#) which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

The COI included was published or made publicly available on or before 1 December 2025. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

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7. Political context

7.1.1 The UK Government House of Commons Library Egypt Country Profile, published in September 2024 and citing various sources stated that:

‘The President is the Head of State and is elected by popular vote. They nominate the Prime Minister (who must be approved by the Egyptian House of Representatives), some members of the legislature, and all judges to the supreme court. The 2014 constitution initially stated they serve for up to two, six-year, terms ...

‘First elected in 2014, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi is President. He was re-elected in 2018 and 2023. A 2019 referendum amended the constitution to extend his second term to six years and allow him to serve to 2030.

‘... Al-Sisi won the 2023 election with 90% of the vote on a turnout of 67%. In 2018 he had won 97% of the vote on a lower turnout of 41%.’¹

7.1.2 Freedom House (FH) in their Freedom in the World 2025 report, covering events in 2024 (FH 2025 report) stated:

‘President Sisi, who seized power in a 2013 coup while serving as Egypt’s defense minister and commander of the Egyptian Armed Forces, has remained in power through unfair and uncompetitive processes. Constitutional amendments adopted in 2019 added two years to Sisi’s existing term, extending it through 2024, though he secured a third term in the 2023 elections. Future presidents will be limited to two six-year terms.

‘In the December 2023 presidential election, the regime effectively barred any significant challengers from participating, and election authorities reported that Sisi won 89.6 percent of the vote. His victory came after a campaign marked by the arrest of opponents, intimidation, and stringent

¹ House of Commons Library, [Egypt Country Profile](#), 11 September 2024

eligibility requirements for candidates, which collectively obstructed any meaningful competition.²

7.1.3 Regarding the structure of the Egyptian Parliament, the House of Commons Country Profile 2024 stated:

‘The Parliament is bicameral (two-chambers) consisting of the 300-member Senate, and the 596-member lower chamber, the House of Representatives.

‘In the Senate, 200 members are elected and 100 appointed by the President. In the lower house, all but 28 (5%) are elected by popular vote.

‘The lower chamber holds legislative powers, and the upper chamber acts as an advisory body on constitutional amendments, foreign policy issues referred to it by the president, and other issues specified in the constitution. All members serve five-year terms, and quotas are in place for at least 10% of seats in the Senate and 25% of seats in House of Representatives to be occupied by women.’³

7.1.4 The FH 2025 report stated:

‘The 2019 amendments to the 2014 constitution reestablished the Egyptian parliament as a bicameral body in which members serve five-year terms. The upper house, the Senate, consists of 300 seats and has no significant legislative competencies. Two-thirds of senators are elected (half through closed party lists and half to individual seats), and one-third are appointed by the president.

‘... Egypt has not held elections for local councils since 2008, and the last elected local councils were dissolved in 2011.’⁴

7.1.5 The same source stated that ‘President Sisi and the security apparatus dominate the policymaking process. Parliament does not have a significant role in forming and debating laws and also lacks the ability to provide a meaningful check on executive power. Laws originating in Sisi’s cabinet receive parliamentary approval without meaningful contestation or deliberation.’⁵

7.1.6 The Egyptian parliament does engage in debate regarding new and changing laws, evidenced in October 2025 ahead of the ratification of a new Code of Criminal Procedures in December 2025⁶ (see paragraph 8.3.4) and in January 2026 regarding the regulation of children’s use of social media⁷.

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8. Political and civil rights

8.1 Assembly and association rights

8.1.1 The US State Department (USSD) in their 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices (USSD 2023 human rights report) stated:

‘The constitution provided for freedom of assembly “according to notification regulated by law.” The law included an expansive list of prohibited activities,

² FH, [Freedom in the World 2025: Egypt](#) (Section A1), 7 April 2025

³ House of Commons Library, [Egypt Country Profile](#), 11 September 2024

⁴ FH, [Freedom in the World 2025: Egypt](#) (Section A2), 7 April 2025

⁵ FH, [Freedom in the World 2025: Egypt](#) (Section C1), 7 April 2025

⁶ The New Arab, [Egypt MPs to debate rights bill after rare presidential reversal](#), 1 October 2025

⁷ Egypt, [State Information Service - Parl’t debates legislation ...](#), 25 January 2026

authorizing the Ministry of Interior to prohibit or curtail planned demonstrations. Domestic and international human rights organizations asserted the law did not meet international standards regarding freedom of assembly. A government-imposed exclusion zone prohibited protests within 2,600 feet (790 meters) of vital governmental institutions.

‘The law prevented the conditional release of those convicted of crimes relating to freedom of assembly, among other crimes.’⁸

Similar information was not included in the USSD 2024 human rights report⁹. All USSD reports on human rights practices for 2024 were reduced in size and scope compared to previous years’ reports¹⁰.

8.1.2 The same source stated:

‘The constitution provided for freedom of association, but the law significantly restricted this right.

‘... On April 11 [2023], a new law governing NGO registration went into effect requiring all NGOs doing “civic work” to register and provide extensive data to authorities, including information on founders and planned activities. All NGOs required the approval of the Ministry of Social Solidarity to register, receive funding, or conduct activities. International NGOs required additional approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to register. Rights groups criticized the approval process and stated the law stripped civil society organizations of the right to work independently and monitor human rights violations.’¹¹

Information on NGO registration was not included in the USSD 2024 human rights report¹².

8.1.3 The FH 2025 report stated that ‘A 2019 law constrains the activities of NGOs deemed threatening to national security, public morals, and public order and imposes onerous reporting requirements and intrusive monitoring systems. Punishments for violating the law are severe.’¹³

8.1.4 The same source stated that ‘Though the constitution guarantees the right to free assembly, the Interior Ministry can legally ban, postpone, or relocate protests with a court’s approval. Unauthorized gatherings of 10 or more people can be dispersed forcefully. Thousands of protesters have been arrested since these strict laws were introduced in 2013, and some jailed protesters have received death sentences. Because of this crackdown, protests are rare.’¹⁴

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8.2 Political participation

8.2.1 Article 74 of the Egyptian constitution states that ‘All citizens shall have the right to form political parties by notification as regulated by Law. No political activity may be practiced and no political parties may be formed on the basis

⁸ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 2b), 23 April 2024

⁹ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#), 16 August 2025

¹⁰ USSD, [2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices](#), 12 August 2025

¹¹ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 2b), 23 April 2024

¹² USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#), 16 August 2025

¹³ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section E2), 7 April 2025

¹⁴ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section E1), 7 April 2025

of religion or discrimination based on sex, or origin, or on sectarian basis or geographic location. No activity that is hostile to democratic principles, secretive, or of military or quasi-military nature may be practiced.¹⁵

8.2.2 The USSD 2023 human rights report stated:

‘The constitution provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage, but significant constraints on freedom of expression, association, and assembly limited their ability to do so. Domestic and international organizations expressed concern [regarding] government limitations on freedoms of association, peaceful assembly, and expression severely constrained broad participation in the political process.’¹⁶

Information on the electoral freedom and process was not included in the USSD 2024 human rights report¹⁷.

8.2.3 The same source stated:

‘The constitution granted citizens the ability to form, register, and operate political parties. The law required new parties to have a minimum of 5,000 members from each of at least 10 governorates. The constitution also stated political activity could not be practiced nor a political party formed on the basis of religion or discrimination based on gender or origin. No activity “hostile to democratic principles, secretive, or of military or quasi-military nature” was permitted.’¹⁸

Information on political parties was not included in the USSD 2024 human rights report¹⁹.

8.2.4 Bertelsmann Stiftung, a German private foundation that supports evidence based non-profit projects, publishes the [Transformation Index](#) (BTI). The BTI report 2024 is based on country expert analysis of Egypt’s progress towards democracy and a market economy, covering events in 2023. The BTI report 2024 stated:

‘In recent years, the party landscape has been increasingly dominated by parties founded by civilians loyal to the regime, often with close ties to or even receiving direct instruction from the military or the security apparatus – such as the Republican People’s Party and the Homeland Defenders Party.

‘The most prominent and important of these, however, is the Nation’s Future Party (NFP), founded in 2014 by regime-loyal civilians reportedly with the support of military intelligence. It is a socially conservative, pro-neoliberalist party that fully supports al-Sisi and the military.’²⁰

8.2.5 The FH 2025 report stated that political parties are legally allowed to form and operate, however parties formed based on religion are forbidden²¹. The same source stated:

¹⁵ Egypt, [State Information Service – Political parties in Egypt](#), 25 September 2025

¹⁶ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 3a), 23 April 2024

¹⁷ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#), 16 August 2025

¹⁸ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 3a), 23 April 2024

¹⁹ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#), 16 August 2025

²⁰ BTI, [Country report 2024: Egypt](#) (Section 5), 19 March 2024

²¹ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section B1), 7 April 2025

‘While electoral laws provide an ostensible basis for credible elections, electoral authorities fail to ensure an open and competitive campaign environment. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) board consists of senior judges from some of Egypt’s highest courts, serving six-year terms.

‘To qualify for the presidential election, a potential candidate is required to obtain support from either 20 members of parliament or 25,000 voters spanning at least 15 governorates. In the 2023 presidential elections, authorities exploited this requirement to disqualify the only serious competitor.’²²

8.2.6 The same source stated that:

‘The constitution and Egyptian laws grant political rights to all citizens regardless of religion, gender, race, ethnicity, or any other such distinction. However, Christians, Shiite Muslims, people of color, and LGBT+ people face discrimination, which affects their ability to participate in political life. Sisi and the security apparatus’s increasing control of elections and other aspects of society only permit these groups to represent their interests within the narrow scope of officially sanctioned politics or risk harsh penalties for transgressing stated and unstated red lines. The diminishing power of the legislature further undercuts avenues for meaningful representation.

‘Gender quotas are meant to help elevate women to national office, and women held 27.5 percent of seats in the House of Representatives as of 2021.’²³

8.2.7 The US [CIA World Factbook](#) provides a list of political parties in Egypt.

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8.3 Freedom of media and expression

8.3.1 The USSD 2023 human rights report stated:

‘The constitution prohibited the government from “arbitrarily” interrupting, disconnecting, or blocking citizens’ use of all forms of internet communications, but the government regularly engaged in these activities.

‘The government tightly controlled internet infrastructure and fiber-optic cables and monitored social media accounts and internet usage. While the law tasked the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, a government agency, with regulating telecommunications services and internet service providers, law enforcement agencies also acted to restrict or disrupt individuals’ access to the internet.’²⁴

Information on the governments control of the internet was not included in the USSD 2024 human rights report²⁵.

8.3.2 The same source stated:

‘The law criminalized the use of the internet to “promote ideas or beliefs that call for terrorist acts” or to “broadcast what is intended to mislead security authorities or influence the course of justice in relation to any terrorist crime.” The law also authorized the public prosecutor and investigators to monitor

²² FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section A3), 7 April 2025

²³ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section B4), 7 April 2025

²⁴ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 2a), 23 April 2024

²⁵ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#), 16 August 2025

and record online communications among suspects in terrorism cases for a period of 30 days, renewable in 30-day increments. The law did not specify a maximum period for this surveillance.

‘The law broadly empowered investigating authorities to order the blocking of any website whose content they determined was unlawful or “poses a threat to national security or endangers the security or economy of the country.”²⁶

Information on internet surveillance was not included in the USSD 2024 human rights report²⁷.

- 8.3.3 In April 2024, the Library of Congress (LOC), published an article entitled ‘Egypt: New Draft Law to Enhance Penalty for Insulting Public Officials’ which stated:

‘On February 22, 2024, The Egyptian Cabinet submitted to the parliament a draft law to modify some provisions of the penal code related to the crime of insulting public officials, judges, members of the public prosecution, and those who provide public services.

‘In its explanatory memorandum submitted to the parliament, the Cabinet noted that some of the penalties prescribed in the penal code for insulting public officials are no longer sufficient to achieve deterrence and that incidents of insulting public officials performing their official duties are on the rise. Accordingly, there is a need to enhance the penalty for this crime.

‘... In accordance with the proposed amendment of article 133 of Law No. 58 of 1937 on the Penal Code, as amended, whoever by gesture, speech, or threat insulted a public official, police officer, or person entrusted with a public service during the performance of their duties or because of performing their official duties would be punishable by one to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 to 50,000 Egyptian pounds [£317 - £794 GBP²⁸] ... , or one of the two penalties. The current applicable punishment under the penal code is at least six months’ imprisonment and a fine not exceeding 200 pounds [£3.17 GBP²⁹]’³⁰

- 8.3.4 CPIT was unable to find any additional information regarding the changes to the Penal Code in the sources consulted. However, a new Code of Criminal Procedures was ratified by President Al-Sisi in December 2025 and is scheduled to take effect on 1 October 2026³¹. CPIT was unable to find an English translation of the new law at the time of writing.

- 8.3.5 FH, in their Freedom on the Net 2024 report, covering events between 1 June 2023 and 31 May 2024 stated:

‘The state continued to block independent news websites during the coverage period as part of a wider crackdown on freedom of expression. Through Article 7 of the Law on Combating Information Technology Crimes, the National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (NTRA) can order telecommunications companies to block websites. As of June 2024, 562

²⁶ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 2a), 23 April 2024

²⁷ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#), 16 August 2025

²⁸ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

²⁹ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

³⁰ LOC, [Egypt: New Draft Law to Enhance Penalty for Insulting Public Officials](#), 10 April 2024

³¹ LOC, [Egypt: President Ratifies New Code of Criminal Procedures](#), 17 December 2025

websites have been blocked in Egypt, including approximately 132 news websites.

‘Several independent news websites were blocked during the coverage period. In June 2023, Egyptian authorities blocked both political news site Soulta 4 and Masr 360, which documents human rights violations. Both blockings were reportedly due to licensing issues; however, rights groups have speculated that the two sites were blocked due to their published content, which at times was critical of the Egyptian government and its policies.’³²

8.3.6 The Atlantic Council, an international think tank³³, in their publication ‘Intentionally vague: How Saudi Arabia and Egypt abuse legal systems to suppress online speech’ (the Atlantic Council 2024 report) from 12 June 2024 stated that:

‘Law No. 180 of 2018 Regulating the Press, Media, and the Supreme Council for Media Regulation, known as the media law, entered into force following several attempts to pass the legislation dating back to 2014. In parallel, Egypt formed three media bodies in 2017 to supervise and regulate public media, which were incorporated into the law. These entities are the Supreme Council for Media Regulation (SCMR), the National Press Authority (NPA), and the National Media Authority (NMA), with the SCMR granted the most authority under the media law.

‘... The media law also increased administrative requirements for media entities, which made it more difficult for independent outlets to gain legal status. While the SCMR is technically independent, digital-rights organization Article 19 noted that it is strongly associated with the government given that the head of the SCMR and several of its members are appointed by the country’s president and “picked without parliamentary oversight.” The government’s overarching power is further highlighted by the significant control and ownership of media outlets in the country by businesspeople linked to the government and Egypt’s intelligence services.

‘... Under Article 19 of the media law, the SCMR has the power to block websites, blogs, or the personal social media account of anyone with five thousand or more followers - as they are deemed media entities - for various reasons, including publishing false news.’³⁴

8.3.7 The FH 2025 report stated:

‘The Egyptian media sector is dominated by progovernment outlets; most critical or opposition-oriented outlets have been shut down since 2013. Private media outlets are generally owned by businesspeople linked to the military and intelligence services.

‘... Independent reporting is suppressed through restrictive laws and intimidation, and foreign journalists face obstruction by the state.

‘... Multiple laws allow authorities to censor and block online content considered threatening to national security without judicial approval. This broad stipulation is vulnerable to abuse, and has resulted in the blocking of

³² FH, [Freedom on the Net 2024](#) (Section B1), 16 October 2024

³³ Atlantic Council, [About](#), no date

³⁴ Atlantic Council, [Intentionally vague: How Saudi Arabia and Egypt ...](#) (Pages 8,9), 12 June 2024

hundreds of websites, including news platforms. Penal code amendments passed in 2021 increased punishments for journalists who cover criminal trial sessions without prior approval. They also toughened penalties for disclosing classified information, increasing potential fines and allowing for prison terms of up to five years.³⁵

- 8.3.8 Regarding [Law No. 175 of the 2018 Law on Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes](#), known as the Cybercrime Law, Atlantic Council stated that ‘Rights groups have heavily criticized the law and described it as unconstitutional on the basis of several articles limiting online content and effectively legalizing censorship.’³⁶ For more information see an unofficial translation of the [Cybercrime Law](#).
- 8.3.9 On 17 December 2024, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), an ‘independent regional human rights organization’³⁷, published a joint report by 12 Egyptian human rights organisations (see the report for information regarding these organisations) which was submitted to the UN ahead of the 48th Session of the Universal Periodic Review in January 2025 (the CIHRS joint report). The report stated:
- ‘On 16 February 2020, executive regulations were issued for the Media Regulation Law (180/ 2018), which imposed strict administrative requirements on journalists and media licensing. The law also prohibits creating or managing any website, in or outside Egypt, without licensing from the Supreme Council for Media Regulation.
- ‘... Penal Code articles (80 D), (102 Bis), and (188) penalizes publication of “false news” with up to 5 years imprisonment and fines.
- ‘Penal Code article 184 shields public figures and institutions from criticism, for which persons can be penalized with imprisonment and fines. Article 178 Bis imposes fines for publishing images that may tarnish the country’s reputation, while Article 178 criminalizes publications vaguely deemed offensive to public morality, thereby curtailing artistic and creative expression. [Note: This refers to the extant Penal Code at the time of writing, not the one due to come into effect in October 2026 – see paragraph 8.3.4]
- ‘... Articles 25 and 26 of the same law [The Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law’s (175/2018)] criminalize acts that “violate family values” without specification, facilitating the imprisonment and prosecution of content creators. Activists and [Human rights defenders] HRDs can be charged with managing websites and accounts for the purpose of committing a legally punishable crime, under the law’s article 27.’³⁸
- 8.3.10 The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), a MENA policy nonprofit based in the US³⁹, in the joint report ‘The Erosion of the Independence of the Legal Profession and Fair Trial Guarantees in Egypt: Joint UPR Alternate Report’ (TIMEP joint report 2025) from January 2025 stated that ‘Law No. 180 of 2018 contains provisions preventing “press entities” from publicising content seen as in violation of the Constitution, professional ethics, public morals, public order, or considered to be “fake news”. It also provides

³⁵ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section D1), 7 April 2025

³⁶ Atlantic Council, [Intentionally vague: How Saudi Arabia and Egypt abuse...](#) (Page 6), 12 June 2024

³⁷ CIHRS, [About us](#), no date

³⁸ CIHRS, [Joint report on the Human Rights Situation in Egypt...](#) (Page 8), 17 December 2024

³⁹ TIMEP, [About](#), no date

authorities wide discretion in censoring content deemed in violation of the law and imposes financial requirements for licensing and oversight, restricting the work and independence of the country's media.¹⁴⁰

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8.4 Counter terrorism laws

8.4.1 Following the lifting of the state of emergency in October 2021⁴¹, CIHRS reported in November 2021 that the House of Representatives introduced a number of amendments to counter terrorism laws and stated:

'The amendments introduced Article 32(bis) to the counterterrorism law, which is more draconian than the corresponding section of the emergency law (Law No. 162 of 1958). Whereas the latter provides for a fine of 4,000 Egyptian pounds [£63 GBP⁴²], the new article provides for imprisonment and a fine of up to 100,000 pounds [£1588 GBP⁴³] for any person who violates counterterrorism measures taken by the president. The article further provides for prison and/or a fine of at least 20,000 [£317 GBP⁴⁴] to no more than 50,000 pounds [£794 GBP⁴⁵] for violating presidential measures with no specified penalty ...

'Article 36 of the law was amended to increase the fine for reporting on terrorism trials without the permission of the presiding judge from 100,000 to 300,000 LE [Egyptian pounds] [£1588-4767 GBP⁴⁶]. This contravenes the principle of public trials enshrined in Article 187 of Egypt's constitution. Moreover, it gives improper license to make already exceptional court proceedings secret, infringing upon the press and the public's right to know about these proceedings and thus exercise oversight over the judiciary.

'... Due process violations and flaws have become increasingly common with the formation of specialized terrorism circuits and the use of military courts to enact reprisals on those whose exercise of free speech is perceived as critical of the president or state.¹⁴⁷

8.4.2 CIHRS in the article 'A Crisis by Design: The Systemic Nature of Human Rights Violations in Egypt' from January 2023 stated:

'The Terrorist Entities Law (8/2015) has been used to obstruct the work of activists and independent organizations by adding them to terrorist lists, on the basis of security investigations absent any credible or impartial investigative process. In February 2020, parliament approved the amendment of the Terrorist Entities Law, which allows for the inclusion of companies, unions, associations, organizations and other entities on the terrorist lists and the consequent procedures, such as the freezing of funds or assets owned by the entity or its members or shared in joint ownership.¹⁴⁸

8.4.3 For more information, see the translated version of the [Terrorist Entities Law](#).

⁴⁰ TIMEP, [The Erosion of the Independence of the Legal Profession...](#), 6 January 2025

⁴¹ LOC, [Egypt: President Sisi Lifts State of Emergency ...](#), 11 November 2021

⁴² XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

⁴³ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

⁴⁴ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

⁴⁵ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

⁴⁶ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

⁴⁷ CIHRS, [Egypt: New amendments ratified by president entrench ...](#) (Section 1), 24 November 2021

⁴⁸ CIHRS, [A Crisis by Design: The Systemic Nature of Human Rights...](#) (Paragraph 41) January 2023

8.4.4 MENA Rights Group (MRG), a ‘Geneva-based legal advocacy NGO defending and promoting fundamental rights and freedoms in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region’⁴⁹, in the article ‘Counter-terrorism practices incompatible with human rights in the MENA region’(MRG Counter-terrorism practices article) from 1 May 2025 stated:

‘Egypt’s 2015 Anti-Terrorism Law and Terrorist Entities Law impose harsh penalties and contain overly vague definitions, which have been broadened further through successive amendments. The Human Rights Committee criticised the use of excessively broad and vague definitions of terrorism such as “harming national unity” and “disturbing public order”, and UN Special Procedures found that the counter-terrorism provisions “go beyond the scope necessary to counter-terrorism and severely limit civic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms in Egypt.”

‘... The Human Rights Committee also expressed concern over Egyptian authorities’ use of administrative counter-terrorism measures, including the listing of human rights defenders, activists, and political dissidents as terrorists without due process; as well as the imposition of lengthy travel bans, asset freezes, and dismissals from public employment.’⁵⁰

8.4.5 On 1 May 2025, The Committee for Justice (CFJ), an independent Geneva based human rights organisation⁵¹, published a country briefing report on human rights violations in Egypt (the CFJ country briefing report 2025). The report, covering events between October 2024 and April 2025, was submitted to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), an organisation that protects and promotes human rights in Africa⁵², and stated: ‘Under the Counter-Terrorism Law No. 94 of 2015, security authorities may hold suspects in secret detention facilities for up to 28 days with only minimal prosecutorial oversight, by postponing their formal registration or presentation to a judge.’⁵³

8.4.6 The USSD 2024 human rights report stated that ‘The law provided a broad definition of terrorism, to include “any act harming national unity or social peace.” Human rights observers noted authorities regularly used the ambiguous definition to stifle nonviolent speech and nonviolent opposition activity through criminal investigations and prosecutions.’⁵⁴

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9. State treatment

9.1 Actual or perceived government critics - general

9.1.1 The information in this section refers to critics in general, which may include members of the political opposition, civil society, lawyers (defending opponents in court), journalists and other media workers, and bloggers/online influencers. Where sources refer to specific groups, this information has been placed in the relevant sections below.

⁴⁹ MRG, [Who we are](#), no date

⁵⁰ MRG, [Counter-terrorism practices incompatible with human ...](#) (Section 3.2), 1 May 2025

⁵¹ CFJ, [Who are we](#), no date

⁵² ACHPR, [About](#), no date

⁵³ CFJ, [Egypt: ACHPR Country Briefing Report ...](#) (Page 7), 1 May 2025

⁵⁴ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 2a), 16 August 2025

9.1.2 The BTI report 2024 stated that ‘Civil society faced harsh repression, and the regime targeted not only political opponents but also ... citizens who simply shared the “wrong” content on social media. Egypt has tens of thousands of political prisoners, and the practices of forced disappearance and torture are widespread.’⁵⁵

9.1.3 The USSD 2023 human rights report stated:

‘The law imposed penalties on individuals designated by a court as terrorists, even without criminal convictions, including travel bans, asset freezes, passport cancellation, and loss of professional credentials and political rights. The government prosecuted individuals for alleged membership in or support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which it designated a terrorist group in 2013. Individuals could appeal their terrorist designation directly to the country’s highest appeals court.’⁵⁶

Information on penalties for individuals convicted on terrorism charges was not included in the USSD 2024 human rights report⁵⁷.

9.1.4 The same source stated:

‘The constitution prohibited arbitrary or unlawful interference with the privacy of the home, correspondence, telephone calls, and other means of communication, but there were widespread reports the government regularly failed to respect these protections. Security agencies regularly placed human rights defenders, political activists, journalists, foreigners, writers, and others under surveillance; monitored their private communications; screened their correspondence, including email and social media accounts; examined their bank records; searched their persons and homes without judicial authorization; and extrajudicially confiscated personal property.’⁵⁸

Information on unlawful interference was not included in the USSD 2024 human rights report⁵⁹.

9.1.5 The same source stated that ‘The law criminalized libel, slander, and defamation. Rights groups accused government authorities of weaponizing libel and slander laws to silence critics and activists. ... Rights groups decried a rising trend of authorities and courts relying on citizens’ allegations of insults, slander, or other vaguely worded charges to target political opponents and critics of the government.’⁶⁰

Information on slander defamation and blasphemy laws was not included in the USSD 2024 human rights report⁶¹.

9.1.6 The USSD 2024 human rights report stated:

‘Citizens expressed their views on a wide range of political and social topics, but the government regularly investigated, detained, and prosecuted individuals for expressing political views or criticism, using charges such as “spreading false news,” supporting a banned group, incitement of violence, insults to religion, insults to public figures and institutions such as the

⁵⁵ BTI, [Country report 2024: Egypt](#) (Executive summary), 19 March 2024

⁵⁶ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 1e), 23 April 2024

⁵⁷ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#), 16 August 2025

⁵⁸ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 1e), 23 April 2024

⁵⁹ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 1h), 16 August 2025

⁶⁰ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 2a), 23 April 2024

⁶¹ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#), 16 August 2025

judiciary and the military, or “abuse of public morals.” The government used social media posts as evidence in many cases, according to multiple human rights lawyers.’⁶²

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9.2 Muslim Brotherhood

- 9.2.1 In March 2024, Middle East Eye (MEE), an online news organisation⁶³, reported that after a 3-year trial involving 79 defendants, the Supreme State Security Court sentenced 8 leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood to death. The MEE article explained that the 8 included ‘... Mohamed Badie; the group’s acting leader Mahmoud Ezzat; former MPs Mohamed El-Beltagy and Amr Mohamed Zaki; former minister Osama Yassin Abdel Wahab; Salafi preacher Safwat Hamouda Hegazy; Assem Abdel-Majid; and Mohamed Abdel-Maqsoud Mohamed’ and pointed out that the move had been ‘... decried as “politically-motivated” by rights groups.’ The same article added that ‘... the court also sentenced 37 others to life imprisonment, six defendants to 15 years of rigorous imprisonment, and seven defendants to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.’⁶⁴
- 9.2.2 The FH 2025 report stated that ‘Between January and December 2024, close to 400 defendants were sentenced to death, including Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood Mohamed Badie and seven of the group’s other senior leaders.’⁶⁵

The source did not specify if the 400 defendants had charges relating to political opposition or if they were sentenced for criminal charges.

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9.3 Political opposition groups

- 9.3.1 The USSD 2023 human rights report stated:

‘The Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the banned Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamist Building and Development Party remained banned. The leadership of the Strong Egypt Party, including former head Abou Fotouh and deputy Mohamed al-Qassas, remained in prison at year’s end. In January [2023], a local rights organization condemned the trial of Abou Fotouh, al-Qassas, and student leader Moaz al-Sharqawi before an emergency court, alleging the men were subjected to torture and violations of due process and fair trial procedures.’⁶⁶

Information on Political Parties was not included in in the USSD 2024 human rights report⁶⁷.

- 9.3.2 The same source stated:

‘In August [2023], authorities released economist Omar al-Shenety, detained in connection with the “Hope Cell” case in 2019 following a meeting to form the Alliance of Hope political group to run in parliamentary elections. While several prominent members of the group received presidential pardons in

⁶² USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 2a), 16 August 2025

⁶³ Middle East Eye, [About us](#), no date

⁶⁴ Middle East Eye, [Egypt confirms death penalty for eight ... after mass trial](#), 5 March 2024

⁶⁵ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section F3), 7 April 2025

⁶⁶ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 3a), 23 April 2024

⁶⁷ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#), 16 August 2025

2022, a number of others remained in pretrial detention, including Mohamed Ahmed Saad. Authorities detained Saad in May 2019 and he faced charges of joining and financing a terrorist group, “spreading false news,” and “misuse of social media” in the case.⁶⁸

- 9.3.3 The New Arab, a London-based news website⁶⁹, in the article ‘Egyptian authorities arrest activist and former government official Yehia Hussein Abdel Hady’ from August 2024 stated:

‘Egyptian authorities arrested political activist and the former spokesperson of the Civil Democratic Movement Yehia Hussein Abdel Hady early on Thursday [1 August 2024] for a social media post, his lawyer Khaled Ali said.

‘Security personnel in civilian clothing arrested him while he was in a car with the former coordinator of the National Association for Change, Abdel Galil Mostafa.

‘According to Mostafa, they were in the car together on their way to an event at the headquarters of the opposition Karama Party when a car stopped next to them at a traffic light to arrest Abdel Hady.

‘Abdel Hady was brought before the State Security Prosecution and was handed a 15-day detention, pending further investigations ... The charges against him included "joining a terrorist organisation", "misusing social media platforms" and "broadcasting and publishing false news" and "financing and inciting terrorism".

‘Abdel Hady’s post on Facebook on 23 July [2024] read "for how long will the army remain silent?" and also included criticism of the state, political opposition and leaders of the Armed Forces.

‘The prosecution quizzed Abdel Hady over his posts before transferring him to the 10th of Ramadan detention facility.

‘... This is not the first time Abdel Hady has been sentenced to prison. In January [2024], the Nasr City Misdemeanour Court gave him a one year sentence on charges of spreading false news inside and outside the country.⁷⁰

- 9.3.4 In June 2025, the Arab Organisation for Human Rights in UK, a non-governmental organisation established to advocate for Arab citizens human rights⁷¹, published an article entitled ‘Egypt Escalates Judicial Action Against Opposition Figure Yehia Hussein Abdel Hadi’ which stated:

‘The Egyptian authorities have intensified their legal campaign against prominent politician and opposition figure Yehia Hussein Abdel Hadi. On Tuesday [24 June 2025], the Supreme State Security Prosecution brought a new set of politically motivated charges against him in case no. 3916 of 2024 (Supreme State Security Case), coinciding with his continued pretrial detention in the 10th of Ramadan Prison.

‘The charges levelled against Abdel Hadi include: joining a terrorist group, spreading false news, financing terrorism, incitement to commit terrorist acts,

⁶⁸ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 1e), 23 April 2024

⁶⁹ The New Arab, [About us](#), no date

⁷⁰ The New Arab, [Egyptian authorities arrest activist and former government ...](#), 4 August 2024

⁷¹ Arab Organisation for Human Rights in the UK, [About us](#), no date

and misuse of social media platforms; charges that have become standard in opinion-related cases in Egypt in recent years.

‘The prosecution expanded the list of accusations to include “inciting the use of force and violence against state institutions, promoting a terrorist crime, and using the internet to commit a terrorist offence,” according to the official investigation records.

‘Abdel Hadi was confronted by the prosecution with his articles and social media posts, particularly those on his personal Facebook page, which were presented as evidence of “incitement” and “spreading rumours.”⁷²

CPIT was unable to find any further additional information regarding Yehia Hussein Abdel Hadi within the sources consulted (see [Bibliography](#)).

9.3.5 The CIHRS joint report stated:

‘Former MP Ahmed Tantawi’s family was targeted by authorities in May 2023 shortly after announcing his presidential bid from abroad. 194 supporters and members of Tantawi’s campaign were arrested, some on unsubstantiated terrorism charges while more broadly those who would openly support Tantawi faced threats and intimidation, to the extent that employees at notary offices declined to register endorsements for him.

‘Tantawi and his campaign manager, along with several supporters, were prosecuted under Case 16336/2023. Not summoned for investigation, they were instead referred to trial without notification, accused of handling election documents without proper authorization. On 6 February 2024, Tantawi and his campaign manager were sentenced to one year in prison.⁷³

9.3.6 Human Rights Watch in their World Report 2025, covering events of 2024, (HRW World Report 2025) stated:

‘In February [2024], an Egyptian court sentenced prominent politician Ahmed Tantawy, along with his campaign advisor and 21 of his detained supporters, to a year in prison for alleged offenses associated with his presidential challenge to President Sisi in the December 2023 election. The court also barred Tantawy from running for national elections for five years. The court ruling was entirely based on Tantawy’s peaceful political activism and the efforts of Tantawy’s campaign to collect support statements ahead of the election.

‘On May 27 [2024], authorities imprisoned Tantawy after an appeals court upheld the one-year sentence against him and nearly two dozen of his supporters and confirmed the ban on running in national elections.⁷⁴

Ahmed Tantawy was released on 28 May 2025⁷⁵.

9.3.7 The FH 2025 report stated:

‘[I]n practice [political] activists, opposition parties, and political movements that criticize the regime face arrests, harsh prison terms, death sentences, extrajudicial violence, and other forms of pressure. Former political prisoners have also been threatened with rearrest for their criticism of the regime. The

⁷² Arab Organisation for Human Rights in UK, [Egypt Escalates Judicial Action ...](#), 25 June 2025

⁷³ CIHRS, [Joint report on the Human Rights Situation in Egypt...](#) (Page 10), 17 December 2024

⁷⁴ HRW, [World Report: Egypt 2025](#), 16 January 2025

⁷⁵ ICJ, [Authorities must stop persecuting political opponent Ahmad Tantawi and his wife](#), 3 June 2025

Egypt-based families of exiled activists have faced persecution by state authorities.

'In 2023, after five years in pretrial detention, April 6 Youth Movement spokesperson Mohamed Adel was sentenced to four years in prison for spreading false news. In July 2024, he began a hunger strike to protest his unlawful detention and harsh conditions.

'... While some Islamist parties still operate in a precarious legal position, the Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed in 2013 as a terrorist organization, and its political party was banned.'⁷⁶

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9.4 Media workers, bloggers and social media users

9.4.1 The BTI report 2024 stated:

'Hundreds of bloggers and social media users have been detained during the period under review [1 February 2021 to 31 January 2023] for comments criticizing the ruling elite, sharing atheist views or defending homosexuality, among other issues. These detentions often occur due to violations of the very vague cybercrime law. For example, in the summer of 2021, several young female TikTok content creators were sentenced to prison on charges of human trafficking and violating family values.'⁷⁷

9.4.2 Amnesty International (AI), in article entitled 'Egypt: Halt crackdown on people voicing concerns over economic crisis' from 13 May 2024 stated:

'Between January and March 2024, Amnesty International documented four cases of arbitrary arrest and detention of individuals in three governorates who complained about price hikes in comments on social media. Authorities also questioned dozens of workers from a public sector company who participated in a strike in February demanding to be paid the minimum wage; with two still arbitrarily detained.

'... Egyptian security forces arrested four people from their homes or workplaces in al-Dakhliya, al-Sharkia, and Giza governorates. The Supreme State Security Prosecution (SSSP) opened investigations against them into ... terrorism-related charges and publishing "false news". All four remained in pretrial detention at the time of writing [of the Amnesty International article].

'... Security forces arrested one of the men on 11 February [2024] from his house in al-Dakhliya, then subjected him to torture and other ill-treatment while he was forcibly disappeared at an [National Security Agency] NSA office, according to EFHR [Egyptian Front for Human Rights]. Amnesty International reviewed the TikTok videos that led to his detention. In one of these videos, he criticized President al-Sisi's national projects, blamed him for people's hunger, and criticized the continuously rising prices in supermarkets. The man told the prosecution that NSA officials beat him and gave him electric shocks. However, the prosecution has not investigated his complaint nor referred him for forensic examination.'⁷⁸

9.4.3 The Atlantic Council 2024 report stated:

⁷⁶ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section B1), 7 April 2025

⁷⁷ BTI, [Country report 2024: Egypt](#) (Section 2), 19 March 2024

⁷⁸ AI, [Egypt: Halt crackdown on people voicing concerns over economic crisis](#), 13 May 2024

‘Hassan, who is the director and co-founder of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, was sentenced to fifteen years in prison [in 2020] over tweets critical of the Egyptian public prosecutors; he was charged with “disseminating false news”. and “insulting the judiciary.” Hassan’s sentence was rooted in several laws, including Article 27 of the cybercrime law.

‘In a similar case in 2021, leading human rights defender and investigative journalist Hossam Bahgat, who is the founder and executive director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Freedoms (EIPR), was accused of using social media to spread false news in a tweet alleging electoral fraud and supposedly insulting Egypt’s election authority. ... Bahgat’s sentence was also based on several laws, including Article 27 of the cybercrime law.’⁷⁹

9.4.4 The same source stated:

‘In what appears to be the first use of the open-to-interpretation morality charges stated in Articles 25 and 26 of the cybercrime law, in April 2020, Egypt targeted female social media influencers in what later became known as the “TikTok girls case.” The prosecutor general behind the case proclaimed himself to be “a guardian of social norms” who is not focused only on prosecuting criminals. The case, spurred on by complaints from other social media users, set a new precedent in Egypt’s criminalization of social media activity. Overall, nine women were arrested and charged with “violating family principles of Egyptian society.”’⁸⁰

9.4.5 Amnesty International (AI), in the article ‘Egypt: More than 100 arbitrarily detained over calls for anti-government protests’ from July 2024 stated:

‘Since the beginning of July [2024], Egyptian security forces have arbitrarily detained 119 individuals, including at least seven women and one child, in at least six governorates, in connection to online calls for a “Dignity Revolution” on 12 July. Detainees posted on their social media accounts calling for protests and for the ousting of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s government due to price hikes and the year-long power cuts. The protests eventually did not materialize.

‘... Eight of the detainees, aged from their thirties to their sixties, do not have a history of political activism and come from divergent backgrounds and professions. Seven posted content on Facebook and X (formerly Twitter) under the hashtag “Dignity Revolution” calling for anti-government protests. One posted a video calling the parliament to impeach President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

‘Security forces detained the eight at their houses and workplaces in Cairo, Giza, Al Gharbia, Beni Souif, Red Sea, Alexandria and Menoufia governorates, before transferring them to police stations or National Security Agency (NSA) facilities. They kept seven of the eight incommunicado for periods ranging between two to five days. NSA agents questioned them while being blindfolded, which amounts to ill-treatment, and without the presence of a lawyer.

‘Authorities later transferred the detainees to the SSSP which opened investigations against them over charges of “joining a terrorist group”, “publishing false news” and “misuse of social media.” The prosecution

⁷⁹ Atlantic Council, [Intentionally vague: How Saudi Arabia and Egypt...](#) (Page 12-13), 12 June 2024

⁸⁰ Atlantic Council, [Intentionally vague: How Saudi Arabia and Egypt...](#) (Page 15), 12 June 2024

ordered the pretrial detention of the eight along with 111 others who faced similar charges, for 15 days pending investigations. The evidence against the eight individuals detained was screenshots from their social media accounts in addition to their personal mobiles.’⁸¹

9.4.6 AI in their article ‘Egypt: Authorities escalate attacks on media freedom rounding up a journalist and a cartoonist’, from July 2024 stated:

‘On 22 July [2024], police arbitrarily arrested Ashraf Omar, a satirical cartoonist who publishes political caricatures for Al-Manassa, one of the few remaining independent media outlets, from his house in Giza. He was targeted days after police also arbitrarily arrested Khaled Mamdouh, a journalist at the news website Arabic Post, from his house in Cairo on 16 July. Authorities subjected both men to enforced disappearance for periods ranging from two to five days before bringing them before the prosecution.

‘... After two days of enforced disappearance, on 24 July, authorities brought Ashraf Omar before the Supreme State Security Prosecution (SSSP) which investigated him on charges of joining a terrorist group, publishing false news, and misusing social media, according to Hassan El-Azhary, Al Manassa’s lawyer. Prosecutors ordered his detention for 15 days pending investigations.

‘Most recently, Ashraf Omar published a cartoon critical of the government’s recent plan to sell state assets, including to investors from countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The drawing depicted a man dressed as a thief offering a map of Egypt to another man dressed in traditional Gulf attire and with a shopping trolley.

‘... On 21 July, after more than five days of enforced disappearance in an unknown place, the authorities brought Khaled Mamdouh in front of the SSSP which interrogated him on charges of joining and funding a terrorist group and publishing false news.’⁸²

9.4.7 FH, in their Freedom on the Net 2024 report stated:

‘Repressive criminal laws and the rising number of arrests for social media posts have had a chilling effect on online speech. Advanced censorship and surveillance also incentivize users to self-censor and curtail political opposition on digital platforms. Online journalists are often reluctant to publish on sensitive topics, including sectarian tensions, sexuality, the Muslim Brotherhood, political detainees, military operations in the Sinai, and the military’s outsized role in the national economy.

‘... Authorities have used legal means and blocking orders to intimidate news outlets into self-censoring.

‘... Recently, self-censorship has been practiced by everyday internet users, not just activists. Academics have refrained from sharing their critical opinions on social media for fear of digital surveillance or intimidation. As a result, some university professors have started educating their students on the risks of tackling certain topics on social media.’⁸³

⁸¹ AI, [Egypt: More than 100 arbitrarily detained over calls for anti-government protests](#), 18 July 2024

⁸² AI, [Egypt: Authorities escalate attacks on media freedom rounding up...cartoonist](#), 25 July 2024

⁸³ FH, [Freedom on the Net 2024](#) (Section B4), 16 October 2024

9.4.8 The CIHRS joint report stated that ‘At least 32 journalists were arrested between 2019 and 2023.’⁸⁴

9.4.9 The HRW World Report 2025 stated:

‘In early July [2024], the SSSP [Supreme State Security Prosecution] arbitrarily referred Abdelrahman Mahmoud Abdou, a researcher and journalist also known as Abdelrahman Ayyash, to a criminal court. The indictment charged Ayyash alongside four others with “leadership of a terrorist group,” while 41 others were charged with joining or financing the unnamed group. Ayyash, who is living in exile, said he did not receive formal notice of the charges.

‘... In July [2024], authorities arbitrarily detained more than 100 individuals amid online calls for protests in response to price hikes and power cuts. The protests did not materialize, and authorities preemptively detained people based on online posts. Authorities have also continued to renew the pretrial detention of protesters including those detained in Palestine solidarity protests in 2023.’⁸⁵

9.4.10 The FH 2025 report stated that ‘In 2024, the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate reported that there were more than 20 journalists in pretrial detention. Charges like terrorism affiliation or spreading false news, often unsupported by evidence, are used to silence dissent.’⁸⁶

9.4.11 The same source stated:

‘Criticism of the president online or in public can result in imprisonment. Security agencies extensively surveil and tightly regulate social media companies and users, as well as mobile phone applications. Arrests of activists over social media posts and other activities are common.

‘Authorities have continued targeting content creators on social media platforms, most notably TikTok. Many cases are directed at women, accusing them of spurious crimes, including “inciting debauchery.”’⁸⁷

The source however did not quantify how ‘common’ arrests were nor provide further details of arrests.

9.4.12 The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), a Brussels based international journalist organization⁸⁸, in their article ‘Egypt: IFJ calls for immediate release of 22 jailed journalists’ from June 2025 stated:

‘Twenty-two journalists are currently jailed in Egypt, with most of them held in prolonged pre-trial detention exceeding the limits allowed under national law, the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate (EJS), an affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), reported on 10 May [2025].

‘... [M]ore than 15 of the detained journalists have been held in pre-trial detention for over two years and some have remained in prison for as long as seven years, exceeding the maximum legal limit.’⁸⁹

⁸⁴ CIHRS, [Joint report on the Human Rights Situation in Egypt...](#), (Page 8), 17 December 2024

⁸⁵ HRW, [World Report 2025: Egypt](#), February 2025

⁸⁶ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section D1), 7 April 2025

⁸⁷ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section D4), 7 April 2025

⁸⁸ IFJ, [About](#), no date

⁸⁹ IFJ, [Egypt: IFJ calls for immediate release of 22 jailed journalists](#), 6 June 2025

9.4.13 Reporters without Borders also known as Reporter Sans Frontiers (RSF), a human rights defence organisation⁹⁰, in their article ‘Egypt: RSF condemns the authorities’ persecution of Mada Masr and its journalists’ from August 2025 stated:

‘Mada Masr [an Egypt-based media organisation⁹¹] editor-in-chief Lina Attalah was questioned on 4 August by the Supreme State Security Prosecutor, a counterterrorism court regularly used against journalists, after being accused of spreading “false information.” This is the fifth prosecution in five years of journalists from the media outlet Mada Masr, whose license application and website are blocked in Egypt.

- August 2025: Mada Masr founder and editor-in-chief Lina Attalah was questioned on 4 August, by the Supreme State Security Prosecutor. Accused of spreading “false information” following an article on alleged prisoner abuses, this internationally renowned journalist, winner of the RSF Prize for Independence in 2020, has been released on bail of 30,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately 530 euros) [£472 GBP⁹²]. She currently faces a fine and a prison sentence of six months to five years, according to the Egyptian Penal Code. Lina Attalah is also accused of operating a website without authorization, as the authorities have still not responded to Mada Masr's license applications.
- March 2024: Investigative journalist Rana Mamdouh was arrested while reporting near Ras el-Hikma, the site of a mega real estate project on Egypt's Mediterranean coast. The journalist was subsequently held for nearly ten hours in a police station after being accused of conducting interviews without authorization. Rana Mamdouh was released on bail of 5,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately 90 euros)[£78 GBP⁹³].
- February 2024: Lina Attalah was questioned by the Cairo Appeals Prosecution for “spreading false information” and operating an “unlicensed website”, before being released on bail of 5,000 Egyptian pounds [£78 GBP⁹⁴]. This summons followed a complaint from the Supreme Council of Media regarding an article Mada Masr published in October 2023 on secret negotiations regarding the forced displacement of the Palestinian population from Gaza to Egypt.
- September 2022: Lina Attalah, Rana Mamdouh, along with reporter Beesan Kassab and economic journalist Sara Seif Eddin were summoned by the Cairo General Prosecutor on 7 September on charges of “disseminating false information likely to disrupt public order and harm the public interest.” They were indicted for an article on alleged corruption within Egypt's presidential party. Lina Attalah was released on bail of 20,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately €990 at the time [£315 GBP⁹⁵], and the other three journalists were released on bail of 5,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately €250 at the time) [£78 GBP⁹⁶] each.

⁹⁰ RSF, [About](#), no date

⁹¹ Mada Masr, [About Us](#), 9 October 2019

⁹² XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

⁹³ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

⁹⁴ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

⁹⁵ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

⁹⁶ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

- May 2020: Lina Attalah was arrested near Tora Prison in Cairo while attempting to interview Leila Soueif, the mother of imprisoned Egyptian-British blogger Alaa Abdel-Fattah, outside the prison where he was being held. The journalist was accused of “filming a military facility without obtaining a license from the competent authorities,” before being released on bail of 2,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately €120 at the time) [£21 GBP⁹⁷].⁹⁸

9.4.14 The USSD 2024 human rights report stated ‘In May [2023], 80 local and international human rights groups called for the release of blogger and activist Mohamed Adel following his 2023 conviction for “spreading false news” on social media. Adel undertook a hunger strike from August until October [2023] to protest authorities’ refusal to subtract from his sentence the five years he spent in pretrial detention on prior charges for the same accusation.’⁹⁹

9.4.15 The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), an investigative journalism organisation¹⁰⁰, stated in their article entitled ‘Egypt Expands Crackdown, Casting Online Creators as Threats to State Morality’ from 11 September 2025:

‘... [A]uthorities have since July 2025 been targeting social media influencers, including TikTokers, vloggers, belly dancers, and tattoo artists, citing “family values” and “public morals.”

‘... According to the Interior Ministry, between late July and late August [2025], at least 29 people were arrested or prosecuted for online content, including 19 women and a child. Egypt-based independent media outlet Mada Masr recorded eight additional cases, bringing the total to 37.

‘All face charges of violating public morals, some for allegedly using “indecent language.” The arrests disproportionately target women, with four belly dancers cited for their clothing.

‘... With no transparency from the government, families of the detained and forcibly disappeared are too intimidated to report cases or seek help from human rights lawyers. Many fear that doing so could further complicate their situation, especially amid a wider crackdown on rights lawyers and organizations.’¹⁰¹

9.4.16 CFJ in their article ‘Human rights organizations condemn the arrest of researcher Ismail Alexandrani and his detention on charges of “spreading false news”’, from September 2025 stated:

‘Alexandrani was stopped at a Marsa Matrouh checkpoint while returning from Siwa, during which all contact with him was cut off for more than 12 hours. He was then transferred to Cairo and brought before the State Security Prosecution, which interrogated him for hours before issuing its detention order.

‘According to Alexandrani’s defense team, his arrest was carried out pursuant to a warrant, and the prosecution subsequently added him to Case

⁹⁷ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

⁹⁸ RSF, [Egypt: RSF condemns the authorities’ persecution of Mada Masr...](#), 13 August 2025

⁹⁹ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 2a), 16 August 2025

¹⁰⁰ OCCRP, [About us](#), no date

¹⁰¹ OCCRP, [Egypt Expands Crackdown, Casting Online Creators...](#), 11 September 2025

No. 6469 of 2025 on charges of “spreading false news,” “joining a terrorist group,” and “using a website to promote terrorist ideas.” During interrogation, he was presented with 18 posts from his personal Facebook account, which he admitted to authoring but maintained contained no false information or rumors, only his personal opinions. He also affirmed that he is not affiliated with any political group, party, or organization.¹⁰²

- 9.4.17 MEE stated that Alexandrani is ‘one of Egypt’s best-known researchers, specialising in the conflict in Sinai and the rights of marginalised groups there’ and that ‘he previously served seven years in prison between 2015 and 2022 in what rights groups said was an arbitrary detention linked to his work on the Sinai Peninsula.’¹⁰³

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9.5 Non-governmental organisations

- 9.5.1 The AI article ‘Egypt: Independent civil society organizations at risk of closure after NGO deadline passes’ from 12 April 2023 stated:

‘On 5 April 2023, Nevine al-Kabaj, Egypt’s Minister of Social Solidarity, said NGOs that have not registered under the 2019 NGO law by 12 April 2023 risk being dissolved.

‘... The 2019 NGO law gives the authorities overbroad powers to oversee the registration, activities, funding and dissolution of NGOs. It restricts the activities of NGOs by limiting their work to “societal development”, a vaguely defined concept which could be used to effectively ban human rights work. It further prohibits NGOs from conducting research and publishing their findings without prior authorization from the government. The Arab Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), one of Egypt’s oldest human rights organizations, suspended its operations in January 2022 after 18 years, citing the repressive environment and its inability to carry out human rights work under the draconian law.

‘... In the decade-long criminal investigation into the legitimate work of civil society organizations in Case 173/2011, known as the “foreign funding case”, at least 15 NGO workers remain under investigation, including Mohamed Zaree, Egypt Programme Director at the Cairo Institute of Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), Aida Seif al-Dawla, Magda Adly and Suzan Fayad from the al-Nadeem Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture, Hossam Bahgat, director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), and Gamal Eid, director of the now-closed ANHRI. They remained banned from travelling overseas, and their assets have been frozen.

‘... Most prominent human rights NGOs in Egypt, including those that provide pro-bono legal aid to victims of human rights violations, operate as not-for-profit companies or law firms and risk dissolution for failing to register under the 2019 NGO law. Those registered under the NGO law have consistently reported that the authorities have either delayed or refused to approve their funding and projects.’¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² CFJ, [Human rights organizations condemn the arrest of researcher...](#), 26 September 2025

¹⁰³ MEE, [Egypt detains top Sinai expert and journalist Ismail Alexandrani...](#), 25 September 2025

¹⁰⁴ AI, [Egypt: Independent civil society organizations at risk of closure...](#), 12 April 2023

In March 2024, after 13 years of investigations, the charges against the NGOs accused of receiving foreign funding in Case 173/2011 were dropped due to a lack of evidence¹⁰⁵.

9.5.2 The BTI report 2024 stated:

‘... [C]ivic engagement has never been free and independent. The state has always closely monitored and, to varying degrees, restricted activities. In recent years, the regime has closed many NGOs, infiltrated syndicates and clamped down on independent unions. Repressive legislation has been passed since the military coup in 2013, such as the NGO law from 2017, which further extended state control and granted state authorities far-reaching rights to control NGOs.’¹⁰⁶

9.5.3 The FH 2025 report noted that NGOs have faced widespread closures, office raids, arrests of members, lengthy legal cases and restrictions on travel and stated that ‘A 2019 law constrains the activities of NGOs deemed threatening to national security, public morals, and public order and imposes onerous reporting requirements and intrusive monitoring systems. Punishments for violating the law are severe. These policies have significantly weakened the infrastructure of human rights organizations and civil society groups.’¹⁰⁷

9.5.4 AI in the report “Egypt: “Whatever security says must be done”: Independent NGOs’ freedom of association restricted in Egypt’ from November 2025 stated:

‘The 2019 associations law is incompatible with international human rights law and standards. It grants powers to the Ministry of Social Solidarity to interfere in associations’ work, activities and access to funding. It also allows authorities to enter premises without notice and inspect documents, among other restrictive measures. In effect, the law strips associations of their independence and prevents them from monitoring human rights abuses and holding officials accountable. The legislation further undermines associations’ ability to cooperate with local, regional or foreign entities, including international NGOs; treats their assets as public funds; and imposes excessive and onerous fines for violating its provisions. In the 12 cases studied, Amnesty International found that the authorities have imposed undue restrictions on independent associations operating in various fields, including human rights, social development, media and digital rights. These restrictions relate to the associations’ ability to register, freely choose their name and select their staff and board members, determine their activities, and access funding.’¹⁰⁸

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9.6 Human rights activists

9.6.1 The USSD 2023 human rights report stated:

‘In March [2023], an emergency court sentenced members of the organization Egyptian Coordination for Rights and Freedoms to sentences ranging from five years to life in prison on terrorism-related charges,

¹⁰⁵ Mada Masr, [Judge says NGO foreign funding case concluded ...](#), 20 March 2024

¹⁰⁶ BTI, [Country report 2024: Egypt](#) (Section 6), 19 March 2024

¹⁰⁷ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section E2), 7 April 2025

¹⁰⁸ AI, [Egypt: “Whatever security says must be done...”](#), 24 November 2025

including joining, financing, leading, and supporting a terrorist group. A group of nine leading human rights groups denounced the convictions for Ezzat Ghoneim, Hoda Abdel Moneim, Mohamed Abu Hariarah, and Aisha al-Shater, among others, as falling short of fair trial standards, subjecting the defendants to torture or abusive treatment, and being politically motivated due to the activists' human rights work.¹⁰⁹

9.6.2 The Atlantic Council 2024 report stated:

'In March 2023, an emergency court issued sentences, ranging from five years to life, for lawyers and activists belonging to the now-disbanded independent human rights organization Egyptian Coordination for Rights and Freedoms (ECRF). The detainees said they were subjected to torture and forced disappearances for their peaceful activism. The group was charged with "using websites to promote ideas inciting the commission of terror acts, by using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube under the name of the Egyptian Coordination for Human Rights to spread" news critical of the government.'¹¹⁰

9.6.3 MEE in the article 'Hoda Abdelmoneim: Egyptian rights lawyer and revolutionary facing slow death in prison' from January 2025 stated:

'Abdelmoneim, who turns 66 this month, was detained during a dawn raid on her home in Cairo on 1 November 2018 by security forces, who took her away blindfolded.

'For three weeks, her family had no idea where she was.

'... Abdelmoneim, a prominent figure during the January 2011 revolution and Egypt's pro-democracy movement, was among the first demonstrators to challenge security officers and enter Tahrir Square, protesting there for 18 days until the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak.

'She went on to become a member of the National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) and of the Egyptian Lawyers Syndicate, as well as volunteering as a consultant for the Egyptian Coordination for Rights and Freedoms (ECRF).

'On 5 March 2023, Abdelmoneim, along with her colleague and ECRF founder Ezzat Ghoniem and dozens of other human rights defenders, was convicted by an Emergency State Security Court (ESSC) on a raft of charges relating to her human rights work, including membership of a terrorist group and disseminating false news, and was handed a five-year sentence.

'Abdelmoneim was also placed on a "terrorism list", which entails asset freezes and travel bans as well as police probation for five years after prison.'¹¹¹

9.6.4 CFJ in the article 'Egypt: The CFJ Condemns Detention of Human Rights Activist Marwa Samy Abu Zeid and Calls for Her Immediate Release' from April 2025 stated:

'The Committee for Justice (CFJ) has documented the detention of human rights activist Marwa Samy Abu Zeid (42 years old) for 15 days pending

¹⁰⁹ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 1e), 23 April 2024

¹¹⁰ Atlantic Council, [Intentionally vague: How Saudi Arabia and Egypt ...](#) (Page 14), 12 June 2024

¹¹¹ MEE, [Hoda Abdelmoneim: Egyptian rights lawyer and revolutionary facing...](#), 24 January 2025

investigations in case number 7887 of 2024, High State Security Prosecution, on Monday, April 7, 2025.

'The committee reported that the High State Security Prosecution issued the renewal decision on Monday, April 7, 2025, based on accusations related to spreading false news and financing banned entities.

'Security forces arrested Marwa at Cairo International Airport while she was completing procedures to travel to Saudi Arabia to perform the Umrah pilgrimage, without providing any reasons. She was then subjected to enforced disappearance for two days before being brought before the prosecution, which ordered her detention.

'It is worth noting that Marwa Abu Zeid is the wife of detained activist Abdel Rahman Mohamed Hassan Dabi, who has been imprisoned since April 2014 and sentenced to life imprisonment in a protest-related case.'¹¹²

9.6.5 The CFJ country briefing report 2025 stated:

'Between October 2024 and April 2025, we documented at least 119 violations committed against human rights defenders (HRDs) and lawyers in Egypt. These violations include arbitrary detention, repeated and prolonged pretrial detention, "recycling" into new cases, enforced disappearance, torture, denial of medical care, denial of access to medical records, poor detention conditions, confiscation of personal items, solitary confinement, and deprivation of family visits. Such practices reflect a deliberate and sustained policy of reprisals targeting those engaged in human rights advocacy and legal defense work ...

'Marwa Arafa, a translator and WHRD [Women Human Rights Defender], has spent over five years in detention since her arrest in April 2020 for her solidarity with families of political detainees. She forcibly disappeared for two weeks following her arrest on 20 April 2020 and was later charged with spreading false news, misusing social media, and supporting a terrorist group in case No. 570/2020. Despite exceeding the legal maximum for pretrial detention under Egyptian law, she was referred to trial only recently, in January 2025, after being detained for almost 5 years. Throughout her detention, Marwa has been denied appropriate medical care and contact with her young daughter, who was less than 18 months old at the time of her arrest.

'In November 2024, Ibrahim Metwally Hegazy, a 61-year-old lawyer and coordinator of the Association of the Families of the Disappeared in Egypt, was referred to trial in case No. 900/2017 after over six years in detention.

'... These cases illustrate a lived reality for hundreds of HRDs in Egypt, a pattern in which human rights defenders - especially women are punished not for any criminal conduct, but for their lawful and legitimate work in defense of human rights.'¹¹³

9.6.6 In November 2025, CFJ published its periodic report for the third quarter of 2025. The report covers the period between July and September 2025 and contains details cases of arbitrary arrest and detention of human rights activists on grounds such as 'joining a terrorist group', 'spreading false

¹¹² CFJ, [Egypt: The CFJ Condemns Detention of Human Rights Activist...](#), 29 April 2025

¹¹³ CFJ, [Egypt: ACHPR Country Briefing Report ...](#) (Page 11), 1 May 2025

news', 'broadcasting false news', 'operating an unlicensed website'. It also details recent cases of prolonged pretrial detention and 'case recycling'¹¹⁴. For more information see the [full report](#).

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9.7 Protesters

9.7.1 The BTI report 2024 stated that '... [N]o large-scale demonstrations took place during the period under review, and security forces have reacted harshly to the slightest possibility. For instance, when rumors emerged about demonstrations planned for November 11, 2022, security forces arbitrarily detained at least 500 citizens and strictly controlled public spaces.'¹¹⁵

9.7.2 The USSD 2023 human rights report stated:

'In most cases, the government rigorously enforced the law restricting demonstrations, in some instances using force, including in cases of small groups of peaceful protesters.

'... In October [2023], demonstrations in support of Palestinians in Gaza following the October 7 Hamas attack took place throughout the country and were widely reported initially to have had government approval. More than 100 persons were reportedly arrested for taking part in other unauthorized protests, including in Cairo's Tahrir Square and in Alexandria, according to local and international media.'¹¹⁶

9.7.3 The same source stated:

'On May 30 [2023], the Court of Cassation ruled defendants convicted for participating in illegal demonstrations could be dismissed from their jobs for cause. Lawyers and rights groups objected to the ruling, noting authorities rarely issued permits for public demonstrations, rendering participation in lawful protests and the exercise of freedom of peaceful assembly all but impossible.

'... Ahead of planned protests or demonstrations, police reportedly stopped young persons in public places and searched their mobile phones for evidence of involvement in political activities or criticism of the government.'¹¹⁷

9.7.4 The AI article 'Egypt: Halt crackdown on people voicing concerns over economic crisis' from 13 May 2024 stated:

'On 15 March [2024], police dispersed dozens of peaceful protesters demonstrating in al-Dakhilah, Alexandria governorate, over the rising cost of living, arresting an unknown number according to local media. ... Police transferred the detainees to an NSA office in Alexandria, according to Ahmed Al Attar, executive director of the Egyptian Network for Human Rights, an independent rights group.

'Among those arrested was a non-commissioned army officer who was forcibly disappeared for at least five days before being referred to Alexandria military court. On 23 April, the court sentenced him to eight years in prison

¹¹⁴ CFJ, [Third Quarter Bulletin 2025 Justice for Human Rights Defenders...](#), 10 November 2025

¹¹⁵ BTI, [Country report 2024: Egypt](#) (Section 2), 19 March 2024

¹¹⁶ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 2b), 23 April 2024

¹¹⁷ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 2b, 3a), 23 April 2024

and ordered his dismissal from the army, according to informed sources. The charges against him have not been publicly disclosed. Human rights lawyers told Amnesty International that they have no information as to whether the rest of the arrested protesters were prosecuted or released without charge.¹¹⁸

9.7.5 The FH 2025 report stated: ‘... [In] October [2023], at least 100 individuals were arrested for participating in pro-Palestinian protests following the Israeli military campaign in Gaza. Since then, over 100 additional individuals, including minors, have been arrested for participating in either protests against government policies or pro-Palestinian demonstrations.’¹¹⁹

9.7.6 In April 2025, AI published its State of the World’s Human Rights 2025 report (the AI report 2025), covering events in 2024, which stated:

‘Authorities carried out arrests prior to planned anti-government protests to prevent them from materializing and forcibly dispersed the few small peaceful protests that took place. In March [2024], security forces forcibly dispersed a small demonstration in Alexandria and arbitrarily arrested protesters who raised signs blaming President al-Sisi for “starving” the poor.

‘In July [2024] the authorities arbitrarily arrested dozens of men, at least seven women and one child in connection with online calls for protests and for the ousting of President al-Sisi’s government due to price increases. Dozens remained in detention for expressing solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza by peacefully protesting, posting comments online, hanging signs or writing slogans on walls.’¹²⁰

9.7.7 The CIHRS joint report stated that ‘120 people were arrested following demonstrations against Israel’s war in Gaza. Of these, 67 individuals remain in pretrial detention, accused of terrorism, unlawful assembly, and spreading false news, while six have been disappeared.’¹²¹

9.7.8 Drop Site, an independent news site on politics and war¹²², in the article ‘Dozens Remain Imprisoned in Egypt for Palestine Solidarity While Sisi is Hailed as a Gaza Ceasefire Broker’ from 15 October 2025 stated:

‘Over 150 people are currently detained in Egypt for demonstrating, organizing, or even donating to support Palestine ... according to the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) [an Egyptian human rights advocacy organisation¹²³].

‘... [O]n October 20, 2023, state-aligned political parties and groups called for marches in solidarity with Palestinians. Crowds poured out of mosques after Friday prayers in Cairo, Alexandria, and cities across the country. In the capital, marchers reached Tahrir square, the symbolic heart of the 2011 revolution.

“People started shouting ‘Bread, Freedom, Social Justice,” recalled Ahmed Douma, a prominent activist and key figure of the 2011 uprising who was

¹¹⁸ AI, [Egypt: Halt crackdown on people voicing concerns over economic crisis](#), 13 May 2024

¹¹⁹ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section E1), 7 April 2025

¹²⁰ AI, [The State of the Worlds Human Rights: Egypt 2025](#) (page 155), 29 April 2025

¹²¹ CIHRS, [Joint report on the Human Rights Situation in Egypt...](#) (page 7), 17 December 2024

¹²² Drop Site, [About](#), no date

¹²³ EIPR, [Who we are](#), no date

released from prison in August 2023 after a decade behind bars. “Suddenly the slogans were not only for Gaza, but against the regime itself.”

‘What had begun as a state-managed demonstration for Gaza had grown into an anti-government protest, prompting security forces to respond with overwhelming force. Riot police stormed the square using batons and tear gas to disperse demonstrators. Dozens were arrested, according to human rights groups. Two years later, at least 120 remain in pretrial detention on charges of “spreading false news” and “joining an illegal gathering.” No major demonstrations have been held in Egypt since.

‘Lawyers with EIPR told Drop Site that dozens of others have been arrested for social media activity expressing solidarity with Gaza. “People have been detained for sharing a post or changing their profile photo to the Palestinian flag,” said a defense attorney who asked to remain anonymous for security reasons. “It’s enough to accuse someone of belonging to a terrorist organization.”

‘In one case, two minors from Cairo’s Dar al-Salam district were detained in March 2024 after painting graffiti reading “Free Gaza.” They remain behind bars today, held in a prison for adults in pretrial detention on charges of “spreading false information.”

‘... In June [2025], hundreds of international activists arrived in Egypt to take part in a planned march to the Rafah border crossing and call for an end to Israel’s siege of Gaza. The grassroots movement, called the Global March to Gaza, made repeated requests for permission at Egyptian embassies abroad in the days and weeks leading up to the planned action to cross into Sinai and gather in al-Arish for the march. Yet Egyptian authorities refused, and participants from 80 countries arriving in Cairo were instead subject to hotel raids, harassment, arrests, and deportations.¹²⁴

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9.8 Family members of human rights activists and political opponents

9.8.1 The CIHRS joint report stated that ‘Retaliatory practices continue against HRDs and activists abroad. In June 2020, Salah Sultan was detained incommunicado in retribution for his son Mohamed Sultan’s human rights activism abroad (founder of the Freedom Initiative). Similarly, the family of journalist and advocate Ahmed Gamal Ziada was targeted, with his father arrested and interrogated about his journalist son’s activities abroad.’¹²⁵

9.8.2 MEE in their article ‘Egypt: Wife of detained cartoonist Ashraf Omar arrested after podcast appearance’ from January 2025 stated:

‘Nada Mougheeth, the wife of detained Egyptian cartoonist Ashraf Omar, was arrested by the country’s security forces on Monday, according to lawyer Khaled Ali.

‘Mougheeth’s abduction comes a month following a podcast interview in which she revealed details of her husband’s arrest.

‘Her interviewer was also arrested, according to Zat Masr, the platform where the podcast was aired.

¹²⁴ Drop Site, [Dozens Remain Imprisoned in Egypt for Palestine...](#), 15 October 2025

¹²⁵ CIHRS, [Joint report on the Human Rights Situation in Egypt...](#), (Page 10), 17 December 2024

'... It was later revealed that Mougheeth was taken to the Supreme State Security Prosecution in Cairo's Fifth District neighbourhood, and that her defence team were waiting to be allowed entry and attend the investigation with her.'¹²⁶

Nada Mougheeth was released on a 5,000 Egyptian Pound [£78 GBP¹²⁷] bail pending investigation¹²⁸.

- 9.8.3 The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), a non-governmental organization of judges and lawyers from around the world¹²⁹, in the article 'Egypt: Authorities must stop persecuting political opponent Ahmad Tantawi and his wife' from June 2025 stated:

'While welcoming the release of political opponent Ahmad Tantawi on 28 May 2025, after he served in full an unjust one-year prison sentence, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) is profoundly concerned by the Egyptian authorities' persecutory threats against him and his wife.

'... In addition, on 26 May 2025, two days before her husband's release, Tantawi's wife, Rasha Qandeel, a prominent journalist, was interrogated for eight hours in case No. 4196 of 2025 State Security in relation to charges of "spreading and broadcasting false news and information that could harm the public interest both inside and outside the country". She was questioned on her social media posts related to political activist Alaa Abdel Fattah and lawyer Hoda Abdelmoneim, as well as on several of her articles.

'... While the proceedings against Qandeel blatantly violate her rights to freedom of expression and opinion, the timing of her interrogation seems to be another attempt by the Egyptian authorities to further target her husband and dissuade him from any continued involvement in politics.'¹³⁰

- 9.8.4 Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights, a human rights law organization¹³¹ later stated that she had been released on bail and opined that 'Her arrest was a clear attempt to intimidate her into silence concerning her husband ...'¹³²

- 9.8.5 OCCRP in the report 'Dozens of Arrests, One Message: Human Rights Advocacy Is a Crime in Egypt' from 27 August 2025 stated:

'... [A] case, in 2019, targeted Oqba Alaa Labib Hashad ... Rights groups say he was abducted, disappeared for months, and tortured before facing fabricated charges. A U.N. Human Rights Council [report](#) details how he was hung naked from the ceiling, beaten, verbally abused, and electrocuted on his amputated leg and genitals. An officer allegedly dragged him by a rope tied around his neck.

'Hashad's torture was intended to pressure a relative - a prominent human rights lawyer now living abroad - to stop exposing abuses in Egyptian prisons, according to the report.

'This "illustrates a deliberate pattern by Egyptian authorities of targeting persons with disabilities and relatives of human rights defenders as a form of

¹²⁶ MEE, [Egypt: Wife of detained cartoonist Ashraf Omar arrested ...](#), 16 January 2025

¹²⁷ XE.com, [Egyptian pounds to British pounds](#), converted 5 December 2025

¹²⁸ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Egypt arrests ... wife of jailed cartoonist ...](#), 16 January 2025

¹²⁹ ICJ, [About us](#), no date

¹³⁰ ICJ, [Authorities must stop persecuting political opponent Ahmad Tantawi and his wife](#), 3 June 2025

¹³¹ RFK Human rights, [About](#), no date

¹³² RFK Human rights, [Statement on the One-Year Anniversary of the Unlawful...](#), 22 July 2025

reprisal,” said Usame Mehmetoglu, a spokesperson for the Geneva-based rights monitor Committee for Justice (CFJ).¹³³

9.8.6 The USSD 2024 human rights report stated that ‘Rights groups and media reports indicated the government regularly used threats, harassment, and surveillance of individuals outside the country as well as arrests and pressure on family members to temper the activities of critics based abroad.’¹³⁴

9.8.7 In November 2025, Egyptian Front for Human Rights (EFHR), an independent organisation that aims to improve the human rights situation in Egypt¹³⁵, published a joint statement with 16 other human rights organisations. The statement, entitled ‘Punishment by Proxy in Egypt: Families of Exiled Journalists, Activists and Human Rights Defenders Held Hostage by the Authorities’ stated:

‘The undersigned organizations [see the report for statement for details] express their deep concern over the escalating pattern of “punishment by proxy” employed by the Egyptian authorities, which has only intensified in recent months. This years-long practice involves targeting relatives inside Egypt of activists, writers, and dissidents living abroad through raids, arrests, and enforced disappearances, in an attempt to pressure or punish them for their peaceful opinions and activities.

‘... On 22 October 2025, National Security Agency officers arrested Sobhy Eid (63), the father of podcast host Seif al-Islam Eid, from his home in the Al-Mandara district of Alexandria. ... Eid was forcibly disappeared for three days before appearing on 25 October before the Supreme State Security Prosecution, which ordered his pretrial detention pending case no. 6468/2025 on charges of joining and financing a banned group, without allowing him access to his lawyer or family during the period of disappearance.

‘Seif al-Islam Eid hosts Anbar Kollo Yesma (“Everyone in the Cell Must Hear”), the first Egyptian podcast to document life inside the country’s prisons after 2013 through testimonies from former detainees. ... He believes that his father’s arrest was retaliation for a recent podcast episode featuring a former political prisoner detailing his experience of torture inside Egypt’s most secretive detention facility, Al-Azouly Prison.

‘... Eid had previously been arrested on 30 April 2025 and held for 18 days, during which he was questioned about his son’s activities abroad, before being released without charge.’¹³⁶

9.8.8 The same source stated:

‘In May 2025, Sayed Khamis appeared before the Public Prosecution after three weeks of enforced disappearance, following his arrest without legal basis due to the human-rights work of his brother living overseas. His other brother, Shaaban Khamis, was also briefly detained before being released on health grounds.

¹³³ OCCRP, [Dozens of Arrests, One Message: Human Rights...](#), 27 August 2025

¹³⁴ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 3e), 16 August 2025

¹³⁵ EFHR, [About](#), no date

¹³⁶ EFHR, [Punishment by Proxy in Egypt: Families of Exiled Journalists...](#), 10 November 2025

‘In an earlier incident, security forces arrested the father of journalist Ahmed Gamal Ziada in August 2023 and held him for several days before his release, in what rights groups described as a clear act of reprisal against his son’s journalistic work and outspoken criticism from abroad.

‘In a similar case, the Egyptian authorities targeted the relatives of human rights defender Mohamed Soltan, raiding family homes and arresting several members in 2020, in an apparent attempt to pressure him after he filed a lawsuit in U.S. courts against former Egyptian officials. In 2025, violations against his father, Dr Salah Soltan, who remains in detention in one of Egypt’s prisons, escalated as he was subjected to harsh treatment and deliberate medical neglect, believed to be in retaliation for his son’s human rights work abroad.

‘Similarly, journalist and researcher Abdelrahman Ayyash was referred to trial in absentia before terrorism circuits in September 2024, due to his journalistic and human rights work from exile. Several members of his family inside Egypt were also subjected to harassment and unlawful summonses linked to his activities, as part of a systematic policy of punishing activists through their relatives.

‘In 2020, security forces arrested four relatives of Egyptian TV presenter Hisham Abdallah, who has been living in exile in Turkey. Three of them are currently facing politically motivated charges before terrorism courts. Hassiba Mahsoub - the sister of a former Minister of Parliamentary Affairs under former President Mohamed Morsi - has remained in arbitrary detention since January 2020. Authorities recently referred her to trial on “terrorism” charges, after she had already exceeded the two-year legal limit for pretrial detention.

‘... These families continue to face repeated raids, confiscation of property, and arbitrary dismissals from public employment, as part of a broader pattern of systematic retaliation against the relatives of activists, journalists, and political opponents. Several women have also been banned from travel and had their passports confiscated as they attempted to leave the country...

‘... During 2024 and 2025, the Egyptian Human Rights Forum (EHRF) documented at least 12 cases of punishment by proxy against the relatives of Egyptian activists, journalists, and human rights defenders living abroad.’¹³⁷

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10. Enforced disappearance, arbitrary arrest and pre-trial detention

10.1.1 In January 2025, EFHR published a joint statement with 10 other human rights organisations entitled ‘Egyptian Government Sends Clear Message Ahead of UN Review: Human Rights Reform Off the Table’ (the EFHR January 2025 joint statement), which stated:

‘Some of those behind bars, like human rights defender Ibrahim Metwally who has been forcibly disappeared and then held in pretrial detention since 2017, have never been convicted by a court. Others remain detained despite serving their sentences, such as Alaa Abdelfattah, who spent most of the previous decade in prison and whose last five year sentence expired in

¹³⁷ EFHR, [Punishment by Proxy in Egypt: Families of Exiled Journalists...](#), 10 November 2025

September 2024. His 68-year-old mother Laila Soueif has been on a hunger strike for more than 115 days, to no avail. Others like Hoda Abdelmoniem have finished their sentences only to find out they've been added to new identical cases in order to keep them for more years behind bars. Abdelmoniem Aboufotouh, the 73-year-old head of a political party who spent the last seven years in solitary confinement serving a 15-year sentence that expires in 2033, similarly found himself facing a new fabricated case by the authorities in late December 2024, just to send a message that he will never leave prison alive. Hisham Kassem, a member of the opposition who served a six-month sentence for trumped up slander charges and was released in February 2024, has recently learned that he is being tried for essentially the same case again.¹³⁸

Alaa Abdel Fattah has since been pardoned and released in September 2025 (see [Pardoning/release of prisoners](#)).

10.1.2 HRW World Report 2025 stated:

'Interior Ministry police and National Security Agency (NSA) officers continued to arbitrarily detain, forcibly disappear, and torture critics and dissidents in official and unofficial places of detention.

'... [The] Supreme State Security Prosecution (SSSP), ... [a] branch of Egypt's public prosecution, is responsible for keeping thousands of peaceful activists and journalists in pretrial detention for months or years without evidence of wrongdoing.'¹³⁹

10.1.3 The CFJ country briefing report 2025 stated:

'Despite the constitutional prohibition of torture and assurances of fair trial rights, domestic criminal procedure laws - particularly the extensive use of pre-trial detention, rotation ("tadweer") of cases, incommunicado detention, and State Security Emergency Prosecution have undermined the effective protection of these rights. For instance, from January 2025 until April 2025 we monitored 621 cases of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, trials, and administrative detention. Most of them were investigated by the Supreme State Security Prosecution under the pretext of national security using counterterrorism law No.94 of 2015, and similar charges were used in most cases, such as spreading false news or joining a banned group.'¹⁴⁰

10.1.4 The same source stated:

'At CFJ, we have consistently documented a pervasive pattern of arbitrary arrests and detentions in Egypt, highlighting a systemic violation of both national and international legal standards. According to our monitoring and documentation in the past 6 months, these practices are not isolated incidents but part of a broader strategy employed by Egyptian authorities to suppress dissent, silence civil society, intimidate political opposition, and suppress human rights defenders. Individuals are frequently arrested under vague and overly broad charges such as "spreading false news," "belonging to banned groups," or "misusing social media." Arrests are often carried out without judicial warrants, and detainees are held in undisclosed locations for

¹³⁸ EFHR, [Egyptian Government Sends Clear Message Ahead of UN...](#), 20 January 2025

¹³⁹ HRW, [World Report 2025: Egypt](#), February 2025

¹⁴⁰ CFJ, [Egypt: ACHPR Country Briefing Report ...](#) (Page 4), 1 May 2025

prolonged periods, deprived of access to legal counsel or family contact, and subjected to incommunicado detention.’¹⁴¹

10.1.5 The same source stated that the Egyptian security apparatus often use enforced disappearance to:

‘... instil fear and eliminate opposition. Security forces – particularly the National Security Agency (NSA) of the Ministry of Interior – routinely abduct and hold individuals in secret detention, refusing to acknowledge their custody or reveal the person’s fate or whereabouts. Such disappearances often last weeks or months, during which detainees are cut off from the outside world and vulnerable to torture or extrajudicial killing. Reports by rights groups and UN experts show that these abuses are carried out in a systematic pattern: arbitrary arrest is followed by prolonged incommunicado detention or outright disappearance, frequently targeting those deemed political opponents or critical voices. Indeed, enforced disappearances remain a “preferred tool” of Egyptian law enforcement to attack political dissidents and human rights defenders. This pattern is not incidental – it reflects deliberate policy. Disappearances have been documented across various agencies (police, NSA, and military intelligence) and throughout the country, indicating an organized campaign rather than isolated misconduct.

‘... Instead of being an exceptional measure, such secret detentions have become routine in state security operations. Detainees are often moved to unofficial or undisclosed locations – for example, NSA-run facilities or military bases – where they are kept off the books, sometimes even after court orders demand their release on other charges.

‘... Far from one-off occurrences, cases number in the hundreds – if not more – each year. Egyptian human rights organizations have documented a steady stream of disappearances; for instance, the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms recorded hundreds of cases annually during the peak of the crackdown (2015–2019), and the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has transmitted numerous cases to the Egyptian government, many of which remain unresolved.’¹⁴²

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11. Case ‘recycling’

11.1.1 On 15 January 2025, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a press release entitled ‘Egypt: Special Rapporteur concerned about use of anti-terrorism legislation against human rights defenders’ which stated:

“Although there has been some progress with the release of some detainees and the development of a national human rights strategy, Egypt persists in routinely misusing counter-terrorism legislation and recycling criminal charges against human rights defenders,” said Mary Lawlor, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders.

“What is particularly striking is the continued detention of human rights defenders past their release date by repeatedly charging them with similar, if

¹⁴¹ CFJ, [Egypt: ACHPR Country Briefing Report ...](#) (Page 6), 1 May 2025

¹⁴² CFJ, [Egypt: ACHPR Country Briefing Report ...](#) (Page 7), 1 May 2025

not identical, terrorism-related accusations, in a practice commonly known as “rotation” or “recycling,” Lawlor said.

‘... In particular, the Special Rapporteur expressed concern over the use of this practice to detain three human rights defenders for lengthy periods of time.

“It is shocking that instead of being released at the end of her five-year sentence on 1 November 2023, human rights lawyer Ms. Hoda Abdel Moneim was detained again under new charges. And one year later, a third set of charges was brought against her. She is now facing two new trials, with one of the new charges – “joining an unnamed terrorist organisation” - being identical to that for which she had completed her sentence in 2023, in violation of the principle of double jeopardy”, Lawlor said.

‘In November 2024, the same terrorism-related charge was brought against another woman human rights defender, Aisha al-Shater, who was tried in the same case with Abdel Moneim. This charge is also identical to that for which she is currently serving a 10-year prison sentence.

‘In a third case, human rights defender and lawyer Ibrahim Metwally has been arbitrarily detained without trial for over four years. He was arrested in 2017 at Cairo Airport, while he was on his way to Geneva to meet with the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. Although the Cairo Criminal Court has ordered his conditional release twice, he was repeatedly charged with new terrorism-related offences, one of which he supposedly committed in prison.

‘... “It is outrageous that Mr Metwally is facing trial in three cases, including that of ‘conspiring with foreign entities’, which appear to be in relation to his cooperation with the UN and his peaceful human rights work in Egypt prior to his detention,” Lawlor said.’¹⁴³

11.1.2 The CFJ country briefing report 2025 stated that ‘In practice, many detainees remain imprisoned ... through the manipulation of procedures, including the practice of “case recycling,” whereby detainees nearing the end of their legal detention periods are charged in new cases with similar accusations to extend their imprisonment unlawfully. CFJ has also noted that such detentions are frequently renewed by prosecutors and courts without effective judicial review ...’¹⁴⁴

11.1.3 An OHCHR press release published on 26 August 2025 entitled ‘Türk calls on Egypt to end “rotation” practice that facilitates prolonged arbitrary detentions’ stated:

‘UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk on Tuesday [26 August 2025] called on Egyptian authorities to put an end to a practice that allows Government critics to be held arbitrarily and for prolonged periods, even after serving their sentences or completing maximum pretrial detention.

‘Human rights defenders, activists, lawyers, journalists, peaceful protesters and political opponents have been targeted by this strategy, which has come to be known as “rotation”. The practice entails the authorities bringing new charges against individuals when they are about to complete their prison

¹⁴³ OHCHR, [Egypt: Special Rapporteur concerned about use of...](#), 15 January 2025

¹⁴⁴ CFJ, [Egypt: ACHPR Country Briefing Report ...](#) (Page 6), 1 May 2025

sentences or as they reach the maximum legal period of pretrial detention, thus preventing their release. These fresh charges, often under counter-terrorism laws, are usually similar to those for which they had already been charged or convicted, and often lack substantive foundation.

'The latest case concerns poet Galal El-Behairy, who was arbitrarily detained after completing a prison term on 31 July 2021 for writing songs and poetry critical of the Government. Since then, he has faced similar charges in two different cases under the counter-terrorism law and the penal code. The latest charges were brought against him on 19 August 2025, when El-Behairy was questioned by the Supreme State Security Prosecution, extending his detention for at least 15 more days.

'... In addition to El-Behairy's case, this practice has been used in the case of writer and activist Alaa Abdel Fattah; lawyer and former member of the National Council for Human Rights, Hoda Abdel-Monei; lawyer and coordinator of the Association of the Families of the Forcibly Disappeared, Ebrahim Metwally Hegazy; and political activist and former spokesperson for the 6th of April Youth Movement, Mohammad Adel Fahmy Ali. All of them remain in arbitrary detention.'¹⁴⁵

Alaa Abdel Fattah has since been pardoned and released in September 2025 (see [Pardoning/release of prisoners](#)).

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12. Pardoning/release of prisoners

12.1.1 Fair Planet, a German global network of journalists reporting on Human rights¹⁴⁶, in the article 'Inside Egypt's illusory committee to pardon political prisoners' from 26 April 2023 stated that the Presidential Pardon Committee was created by President Al Sisi in April 2022 with the aim of '... reviewing cases of citizens detained for political reasons so that release orders could be granted when deemed appropriate.'¹⁴⁷

12.1.2 The BTI report 2024 stated that 'In April 2022, the Presidential Amnesty Committee was founded to facilitate the release of political prisoners. Since then, several hundred have indeed been released. However, some of them have been re-arrested, and new arrests have continued. In late 2022, oppositionists declared that they would not take part in the national dialogue initiated by al-Sisi if the promise to release prisoners of conscience was not followed more genuinely.'¹⁴⁸

12.1.3 The USSD 2023 human rights report stated:

'The government periodically issued pardons of prisoners on national and religious holidays, sometimes including individuals whose cases human rights organizations considered to be politically motivated. Government statements and local press reported authorities pardoned and released thousands of prisoners throughout the year, but only a small number of those pardoned were individuals detained on politically motivated charges. Several high-profile political prisoners received presidential pardons in July [2023] including Patrick Zaki (detained from February 2020 to December

¹⁴⁵ OHCHR, [Türk calls on Egypt to end "rotation" practice that facilitates...](#), 26 August 2025

¹⁴⁶ Fair Planet, [About](#), no date

¹⁴⁷ Fair Planet, [Inside Egypt's illusory committee to pardon political prisoners](#), 16 April 2023

¹⁴⁸ BTI, [Country report 2024: Egypt](#) (Section 3), 19 March 2024

2021, and again in July before release) and Mohamed al-Baqer (detained since 2019), and in August for Ahmed Douma (detained since 2013). The Presidential Pardon Committee announced releases of several hundred individuals, some of whom human rights organizations characterized as political prisoners, throughout the year. Rights groups reported many of these prisoners were being held in pretrial detention and had not yet been convicted.¹⁴⁹

Information regarding the pardoning and release of prisoners was not included in the USSD 2024 human rights report¹⁵⁰.

12.1.4 The EFHR January 2025 joint statement stated: ‘... [W]hile the Egyptian government repeatedly claims strides have been made in releasing political prisoners, it has arrested nearly three times as many people as they released over the last few years’¹⁵¹

12.1.5 The AI report 2025 stated:

‘Between January and October [2024] the authorities released at least 934 people detained for political reasons, mostly after they exceeded the two-year maximum limit for pretrial detention. During the same period, authorities arrested 1,594 people, including five children, on political grounds, according to the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, an independent NGO. Supreme State Security Prosecution (SSSP) prosecutors and judges routinely renewed pretrial detention orders for thousands of detainees without allowing them to meaningfully challenge the legality of their detention.’¹⁵²

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13. Judicial governance

13.1 Judicial system, due process and fair trial

13.1.1 The USSD 2023 human rights report stated:

‘The law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, but the judiciary often failed to uphold this right.

‘... Human rights lawyers and organizations stated defendants sometimes were not informed of the charges against them during interrogations and detentions. These groups also observed defendants were not always present during legal proceedings, particularly during renewal hearings for pretrial detention.

‘... Human rights groups stated detained or imprisoned defendants regularly were denied access to lawyers. Rights groups alleged routine violations of due process during trials as defendants were not permitted to call or question witnesses or present evidence, as the law required.’¹⁵³

Information on violations of the right to a fair and public trial were not included in the USSD 2024 human rights report¹⁵⁴.

¹⁴⁹ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 1e), 23 April 2024

¹⁵⁰ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#), 16 August 2025

¹⁵¹ EFHR, [Egyptian Government Sends Clear Message Ahead of UN...](#), 20 January 2025

¹⁵² AI, [The State of the Worlds Human Rights: Egypt 2025](#) (Page 155), 29 April 2025

¹⁵³ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 1e), 23 April 2024

¹⁵⁴ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#), 16 August 2025

13.1.2 HRW World Report 2025 stated:

“In January [2024], parliament swiftly approved new government-proposed laws which granted the military sweeping new authority to fully or partially replace functions of the police, civilian judiciary, and other civilian authorities, and to further expand the jurisdiction of military courts to prosecute civilians.

‘Law No. 3 of 2024 provides military personnel involved in certain operations with the same judicial powers of arrest and seizure as the police. It also stipulates that all offenses against or in relation to broadly worded “vital” public facilities and buildings are to be prosecuted in military courts. In recent years, abusive laws have been used to prosecute thousands of civilians, including children, in military courts.’¹⁵⁵

13.1.3 The FH 2025 report stated: ‘Since 2013, Egyptian authorities have increasingly imposed months-long or even years-long pretrial detentions on opposition members, journalists, and activists as retribution for their activities. These due process violations have effectively normalized the use of the justice system for political purposes.’¹⁵⁶

13.1.4 The CFJ country briefing report 2025 stated:

‘Fair trial guarantees in Egypt have been effectively hollowed out, especially in cases deemed politically sensitive. Individuals who are arrested (often arbitrarily ...) and eventually brought before a court face judicial proceedings that flagrantly violate basic due process rights. The right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal – as enshrined in Article 7 of the African Charter – is routinely disregarded. Egyptian courts and prosecutors, particularly in State Security and military tribunals, operate in tandem with executive authorities to engineer convictions or prolong detention rather than deliver justice. As a result, in contemporary Egypt, the right to a fair trial is essentially absent for those whom the regime perceives as opponents or critical of the government. This is especially true for cases involving allegations of “national security” or terrorism, which often simply means the accused is a journalist, activist, human rights defender, member of the political opposition, or even an ordinary citizen who expressed his views on social media.’¹⁵⁷

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13.2 Impartiality and accountability

13.2.1 The US Congressional Research Service (USCRS) paper, ‘Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations’, updated 2 May 2023, based on a range of sources, stated that ‘The amendments [to the constitution in April 2019] also granted the president the authority to appoint all chief justices of Egyptian judicial bodies and the public prosecutor.’¹⁵⁸

13.2.2 The BTI report 2024 stated:

‘[T]he independence of the judiciary is severely restricted, and the executive has gradually extended its control over the judicial branch.

¹⁵⁵ HRW, [World Report 2025: Egypt](#), February 2025

¹⁵⁶ FH, [Freedom in the World: Egypt](#) (Section F2), 7 April 2025

¹⁵⁷ CFJ, [Egypt: ACHPR Country Briefing Report ...](#) (Page 8), 1 May 2025

¹⁵⁸ USCRS, [Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations](#) (Page 12-13), 2 May 2023

'... The judiciary has long enjoyed a degree of independence, with the 2014 constitution entailing further improvements. Since then, however, the regime has gradually brought the judiciary under tighter control through new laws and constitutional amendments. Now, the president effectively appoints the heads of the main judicial bodies.'¹⁵⁹

13.2.3 The same source stated:

'The government does not address or investigate most acts of past injustice perpetrated by the military, intelligence agencies or police forces ... [T]he forced disappearance and unjust imprisonment of tens of thousands of Egyptians on political grounds since 2013, the large number of extrajudicial killings in the name of fighting terrorism, and the frequent usage of torture and harsh prison conditions ... remain unaddressed.'¹⁶⁰

13.2.4 AI in the article 'Egypt: Reject draft Criminal Procedure Code' from 2 October 2024 stated:

'The Egyptian authorities have amended the CPC [Criminal Procedure Code] on numerous occasions in recent decades - including under the current government - to undermine judicial independence, the rule of law, and to further erode international fair trial standards and increase their repression of political dissent. Since 2013, the Egyptian authorities have politicized the judiciary and dismantled judicial independence guarantees, the rule of law and fair trial guarantees to use the judiciary in a nationwide campaign to crackdown on peaceful dissent.'¹⁶¹

13.2.5 The CIHRS joint report stated: 'The 2018 constitutional amendments and Law 77/2019 authorizes the President to appoint judicial body heads, undermining judicial independence. ... In December 2021, the Justice Ministry implemented remote pretrial detention renewal through Decision 8901. Lawyers attend court sessions online with the judge, not in person with the defendant in custody, which undermines the defendant's right to a fair trial.'¹⁶²

13.2.6 The USSD 2024 human rights report stated:

'Despite the existence of mechanisms for investigating complaints of security force abuses, both through the Public Prosecutor's Office and the quasi-governmental National Council for Human Rights (NCHR), multiple groups reported investigations of deaths in custody [are] often either concluded that death occurred from natural causes or did not include a forensic examination. The Public Prosecutor's Office reported charging, prosecuting, and convicting perpetrators in a number of cases, but lack of accountability remained a serious problem.'¹⁶³

13.2.7 The TIMEP joint report 2025 stated:

'Judicial independence in Egypt has also been hampered by the recourse to military courts whose mandate has been extended to try non-military related offences. Under the Military Judiciary Law (Law No. 25 of 1966), military courts operate under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Defence which

¹⁵⁹ BTI, [Country report 2024: Egypt](#) (Section 3), 19 March 2024

¹⁶⁰ BTI, [Country report 2024: Egypt](#) (Section 16), 19 March 2024

¹⁶¹ AI, [Egypt: Reject draft Criminal Procedure Code](#), 2 October 2024

¹⁶² CIHRS, [Joint report on the Human Rights Situation in Egypt...](#) (Page 5-6), 17 December 2024

¹⁶³ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 1a), 16 August 2025

appoints judges based on recommendation from the Director of the military judiciary. Law No. 3 of 2024, which replaced and annulled Law No. 136 of 2014, retains the military’s jurisdiction over cases concerning “public and vital facilities” and extends such power to “acts and transgressions that undermine the work of the state’s public facilities, or the services it provides”.¹⁶⁴

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14. Transnational repression

14.1.1 The USSD 2023 human rights report stated:

‘There were credible reports the government misused international law enforcement tools for politically motivated purposes against individuals located outside the country. In May [2023], human rights groups denounced the arrest of blogger and activist Abdelrahman Tarek, known as “Moka,” in Lebanon. According to Tarek’s account of the brief detention, he was interrogated regarding the Egyptian government’s interest in him and his designation as a “terrorist.” Multiple rights groups asserted the arrest was at the behest of the Egyptian government as an attempt to silence critics based abroad.

‘In October [2023], a group of 18 human rights groups demanded Turkey (Türkiye) refrain from deporting activist Ghada Najibe following her arrest. In 2019, the Giza Criminal and Supreme State Security Emergency Court sentenced Najibe in absentia while living in Turkey to five years in prison for “spreading false news,” and in 2020 the government moved to revoke her nationality for “endangering national security from abroad.” In October, she was imprisoned in Turkey without access to her family or attorney for two weeks. According to Najibe’s family, Turkish security officials pressured her to stop criticizing the Egyptian government on social media prior to her arrest.’¹⁶⁵

14.1.2 The USSD 2024 human rights report also contained information regarding Ghada Najibe and stated:

‘There were credible reports the government exerted pressure on other countries for politically motivated purposes against individuals located outside the country. The family of activist Ghada Najibe criticized Turkish security officials for arresting her in April [2024] for the second time in six months, attributing her detention for approximately 10 days to pressure from the Egyptian government. Rights groups called for Najibe’s unconditional release.’¹⁶⁶

14.1.3 Ghada Naguib was stripped of her Egyptian nationality in December 2020¹⁶⁷. CPIT has not found any further incidents of activists abroad being stripped of their nationality in the sources consulted (see [Bibliography](#)).

14.1.4 The CIHRS joint report stated:

¹⁶⁴ TIMEP, [The Erosion of the Independence of the Legal Profession...](#), 6 January 2025

¹⁶⁵ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 1f), 23 April 2024

¹⁶⁶ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 3e), 16 August 2025

¹⁶⁷ HRW, [Egypt: Activist Stripped of Citizenship](#), 11 February 2021

'The Terrorist Entities Law is used to list as [sic] terrorist activists and HRDs abroad, subjecting them to deportation while restricting their free movement and financial transactions.

'Prosecuting HRDs abroad as defendants in new cases deprives them of their right to return to Egypt. They are pursued abroad by Egyptian authorities who aim for their deportation to Egypt where they would face imprisonment or disappearance. Sentences are issued in absentia against HRDs abroad.

'Many activists and HRDs abroad have been denied the right to have their identification documents issued or renewed, restricting their ability to travel, live, and work legally, and depriving them of basic medical care and educational services.

'The Egyptian Human Rights Forum has documented cases of defenders being tracked, surveilled, and having their residences searched by Egyptian security agents abroad.'¹⁶⁸

14.1.5 The USSD 2024 human rights report stated:

'In February [2024], 18 local and international rights groups issued a statement condemning a smear campaign and threats against the United Kingdom-based director of the Sinai Foundation for Human Rights, following the group's report alleging the government had constructed a fortified zone in North Sinai along the Gaza border to prepare for a potential influx of Palestinian refugees. The groups contended government and progovernment figures targeted the organization's director in media and social media statements, including reported threats of violence and forcible return to Egypt.

'There were reports the government denied consular services to or revoked identity documents of certain citizens abroad, jeopardizing their legal status. In September, two rights groups issued a report documenting the denial of applications for national identification cards, birth certificates, and passports for human rights defenders residing abroad.'¹⁶⁹

14.1.6 The New Arab in the article 'Egypt scrambles to respond, often with violence, to protests targeting its embassies over Gaza' from 22 August 2025 stated:

'Security personnel standing guard at the Egyptian mission at the United Nations in New York have beaten and dragged two teenagers into the mission's headquarters. The two men were part of a protest regarding the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip ...

'Akram Al-Sammak, a US citizen of Egyptian origin, told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, the Arabic-language sister publication to The New Arab, that his sons, Ali and Yassin, were demonstrating peacefully on Thursday to demand the opening of the Rafah crossing and to allow entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza. He alleged that members of the mission forcibly dragged the boys into the building, beat them with iron chains, and fabricated charges of vandalism against them.'¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ CIHRS, [Joint report on the Human Rights Situation in Egypt...](#) (Page 10), 17 December 2024

¹⁶⁹ USSD, [2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt](#) (Section 3e), 16 August 2025

¹⁷⁰ The New Arab, [Egypt scrambles to respond, often with violence...](#), 22 August 2025

14.1.7 The Middle East Democracy Center (MEDC), a U.S.-based nonprofit and nonpartisan advocacy organization¹⁷¹, in the report 'Egypt's Diplomatic Missions Weaponized as Transnational Repression Tool' from 8 September 2025 stated:

'We strongly condemn the unprecedented weaponization of Egyptian diplomatic missions as tools of transnational repression against peaceful protesters abroad. A recently leaked recording of Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty shows him instructing embassy staff to "grab them [protestors], tie them up, drag them inside, and make their lives hell".

'... While Egypt's diplomatic missions were targeting Egyptians abroad, the country's security forces were harassing and targeting the family members of exiled Egyptian journalists. At least one family member of an exiled journalist was arrested and subjected to enforced disappearance in retaliation for the journalist's work in exile. While the family member was later released, these actions are part of a broader pattern of tactics used to target exiled journalists, including arresting their relatives, blocking access to exile-based media, targeting journalists with spyware, and denying consular services and identity documents for those living abroad and their family members, including children.

'... These incidents signify a dangerous transformation in Egypt's global crackdown on dissent. While Egypt has long engaged in transnational repression - through intimidation and harassment, surveillance, smear campaigns, politically motivated extraditions, and arrests of family members - this represents a new and alarming phase:

- Weaponizing diplomatic missions as operational hubs to directly suppress dissent;
- Moving beyond digital and legal harassment to physical assaults on foreign soil;
- Exploiting diplomatic immunity to avoid accountability.
- State-enabled vigilantism: loyalist groups abroad used to silence critics
- Proxy punishment: punishing exiled activists/journalists by targeting their families back home as hostages.¹⁷²

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¹⁷¹ MEDC, [About](#), no date

¹⁷² MEDC, [Egypt's Diplomatic Missions Weaponized as Transnational ...](#), 8 September 2025

Research methodology

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the [Common EU \[European Union\] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information \(COI\)](#), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation's (ACCORD), [Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual](#), 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI's relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

- the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
- how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
- the currency and detail of information
- whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the [bibliography](#).

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Terms of Reference

The 'Terms of Reference' (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the [country information](#).

The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

- Political system
 - Political structure
 - Political parties
 - Elections
- Illegal political parties
 - Muslim Brotherhood
 - Other groups
- Legal context
 - Freedom of expression
 - Freedom of Assembly
 - Penal code
- Media workers, protesters and human rights activists
 - Ability to protest
 - Treatment of protesters
 - Ability to report and work freely
 - Treatment of journalists
 - NGOs
 - Monitoring of diaspora
- Internet, social media and bloggers
 - Censorship and monitoring
 - State treatment
 - Access to internet
- Arrest
 - Laws
 - Pre-trial and arbitrary detention
 - Treatment in detention
- Criminal justice system
 - Independence of judiciary
 - Oversight
 - Access to fair trial

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Version control and feedback

Clearance

Below is information on when this note was cleared:

- Version **5.0**
- valid from **3 March 2026**

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section

The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section

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Changes from last version of this note

Updated COI and assessment.

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Feedback to the Home Office

Our goal is to provide accurate, reliable and up-to-date COI and clear guidance. We welcome feedback on how to improve our products. If you would like to comment on this note, please email the [Country Policy and Information Team](#).

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Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

The [Independent Advisory Group on Country Information](#) (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to support them in reviewing the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of approach of COI produced by the Home Office.

The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office's COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. The IAGCI may be contacted at:

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Information about the IAGCI's work and a list of the documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector's pages of the [gov.uk website](#).

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