

## Recommendation Status Report: Runaway of a trolley and subsequent collision at North Rode, Cheshire

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

### Key to Recommendation Status

<b>Open</b> (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
<b>Closed</b> (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
<b>Insufficient response:</b>	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
<b>Superseded:</b>	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
<b>Awaiting response:</b>	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

**Red** – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

**Blue** – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

**White** – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

# Recommendation Status Report



<b>Report Title</b>	Runaway of a trolley and subsequent collision at North Rode, Cheshire
<b>Report Number</b>	07/2025
<b>Date of Incident</b>	26/05/2024

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
07/2025/01	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the likelihood that the failsafe brake on trolleys of the type involved in this accident are modified by operators and rendered ineffective.</p> <p>Network Rail, working in conjunction with the Rail Safety and Standards Board and the M&amp;EE Networking Group, should assess the risk of trolley brakes being defeated in the manner seen during this accident and in other foreseeable ways. As part of this assessment of risk, Network Rail should, using current ergonomic design principles and good practice, consider appropriate control measures which will reduce or eliminate the risk of trolley brakes being defeated.</p> <p>This assessment should include specific consideration of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the appropriateness of the present design requirements and guidance for braking systems on trolleys</li> <li>• determining what retrospective action is required for trolleys already in service, including any ergonomic factors which might increase the likelihood of operators being encouraged to defeat braking systems</li> <li>• if any changes are required to the product acceptance process (including the management of historic rights) and the way it is implemented in order to ensure that trolleys are being reassessed at appropriate intervals once they have been approved.</li> </ul> <p>Once this assessment is complete, Network Rail should develop a timebound programme to implement any improvements identified (paragraph 139a and 140c).</p>	

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			This recommendation may apply to other types of rail-mounted maintenance equipment	
07/2025/02	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to increase the effectiveness of actions taken in response to incidents involving misuse and consequent runaway of plant.</p> <p>Network Rail, working with its contractors and other supply chain organisations, should review the processes by which they identify, share and implement safety learning associated with incidents of plant misuse.</p> <p>This review should consider legal requirements and good practice, such as that contained in Rail Industry Standard, RIS-3119-TOM, 'Accident and Incident Investigation, and that from other industries. The review should also consider how recommendations are implemented between Network Rail and the different organisations using its infrastructure and whether this results in an effective control of risk of plant runaway as a result of misuse. Following this review, Network Rail should develop a timebound plan to make any appropriate changes identified (paragraph 142c).</p>	