



Ministry
of Justice

Government response to the Independent Review of Separation Centres by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation



Government of the United Kingdom

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Government response to the Independent Review of Separation Centres by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation

Presented to Parliament
by the Deputy Prime Minister, Lord Chancellor and
Secretary of State for Justice

February 2026



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Contents

Foreword	7
Background and context	10
Managing violent and terrorist risk behaviour	12
Strengthening system design and leadership accountability	15
Driving policy and legal reform for operational agility	17
Enhancing intelligence to strengthen risk management	19
Recommendations in full	21
Equality statement	22

Foreword

The threat from terrorism is enduring and evolving. It is more diverse, dynamic and complex now than in previous years, a trend likely to continue at pace. The UK's national terrorism threat level is currently set at substantial, meaning an attack is likely. This reflects the growing complexity of terrorist ideologies and the increasing risk posed by radicalised individuals.

Our prisons are not immune to this threat. As of 30 September 2025, there were 254 people in custody for terrorism and terrorism-connected offences in Great Britain, up from 252 the previous year.¹ Of those in custody, 60% were categorised as holding Islamist-extremist views, 30% as holding extreme right-wing ideologies, with the remaining 10% holding beliefs related to other ideologies.² This ideological diversity, in addition to the upward trend of the numbers of those in custody, exemplifies the challenges faced by the prison system in keeping both its staff and other prisoners safe from the threats posed by terrorist and terrorist-connected offenders.

Terrorist offenders are subject to stringent controls in prison. The most dangerous radicalisers are placed in Separation Centres, which are a vital part of our counter-terrorism strategy. These specialist units allow us to isolate the most ideologically dangerous offenders. By removing these offenders from the mainstream population, we disrupt their ability to radicalise and recruit, and we protect both staff and fellow prisoners.

I would like to express my gratitude to staff working on Separation Centres for their continued outstanding work and commitment, recognising the challenging conditions in which they operate.

However, despite these controls, the most pernicious and violent terrorists relentlessly seek to identify and exploit even the smallest vulnerability, as evidenced by the horrific and cowardly attack by convicted terrorist Hashem Abedi in the Separation Centre at HMP Frankland on 12 April 2025, in which three prison officers were seriously assaulted with makeshift weapons.

Following the attack at HMP Frankland, the then Lord Chancellor announced on 15 May that Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, would lead an independent review into how terrorists are placed onto Separation Centres, as well as the

¹ GOV.UK, 'Operation of police powers under TACT 2000, to September 2025', available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/operation-of-police-powers-under-tact-2000-to-september-2025>

² Ibid

operation of the Separation Centre system more generally.³ Mr Hall was asked to provide findings and recommendations that can be implemented to reduce the likelihood of any such incident occurring in the future.

I welcome Mr Hall's assessment of how these centres operate and how they can be improved. The principle behind Separation Centres is sound; however, we must ensure they remain fit for purpose, while ensuring staff safety. Mr Hall's recommendations provide a clear path forward, and I am committed to acting on them.

Before the review had concluded, we took immediate steps to strengthen staff safety. The Prison Service commissioned a snap review to assess whether protective body armour – also known as stab-proof vests – should be rolled out to staff. On 3 June 2025, the government confirmed that stab-proof vests would be made mandatory for officers working in Separation Centres and Close Supervision Centres. Staff in Separation Centres also have a range of other equipment to keep themselves safe including helmets, arm and leg protection, gloves, batons, shields, body worn video cameras and PAVA pepper spray for use as required.

Additionally, on 28 July 2025, a trial began to test the use of Conducted Energy Devices (also referred to as Tasers) by a specialist national unit trained to respond to complex and serious incidents in the male estate such as barricades and multi-perpetrator violence. As part of training up to 500 staff to carry a Taser, we will establish Local Response Teams in all Long Term and High Security prisons, providing enhanced protection for staff working in Separation Centres. This drastically scales up the access to Tasers from the 20 given to specialist staff when the initial trial started in July.

This independent review of Separation Centres builds on the findings of Mr Hall's 2022 report, 'Terrorism in Prisons', which identified the need for stronger intelligence capabilities and better support for frontline staff. In response to that report, a new counter-terrorism training package was introduced for prison and probation staff, intelligence-sharing protocols were enhanced, and the role of the Joint Counter Terrorism Prison and Probation Hub was strengthened. These reforms have improved our operational response and frontline capability.

The July 2023 Counter Terrorism Joint Inspection – led by HM Inspectorate of Probation, alongside HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services and HM Inspectorate of Prisons – confirmed that we are now working more effectively than ever to protect the public from terrorism. This progress is the result of close collaboration between

³ GOV.UK, 'Appointment of Jonathan Hall KC as independent reviewer', available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/appointment-of-jonathan-hall-kc-as-independent-reviewer>

prison, probation and the police, and reflects our ongoing commitment to staying ahead of evolving threats.

In response to this latest review, the government is launching a comprehensive programme of reform to transform how Separation Centres are governed, operated and supported. We will strengthen system leadership to drive accountability and consistency. We will streamline referral processes to ensure swift, risk-based decision-making and provide additional support to frontline staff. We will review the existing legal framework so that operational decisions are more proportionate, defensible and responsive to evolving threats. In addition, we will enhance risk-management capability across the system, ensuring that Separation Centres are supported by timely, actionable and robust intelligence.

These reforms are not just about improving systems, they are about protecting people. We are ensuring that frontline staff have the training, tools and support they need to manage terrorist risk with confidence. This work is part of a broader, determined effort to ensure our justice system remains resilient, responsive and robust in the face of evolving national security threats. Through targeted investment, operational reform and close collaboration with our security partners, we are strengthening our national response, providing victims and their families with the assurance that those guilty of the worst crimes will never harm anyone again.

The government remains resolute in its commitment to countering terrorism, protecting those who serve on the front line, and increasing public trust in the justice system.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'David', followed by a long horizontal stroke and a small loop at the end.

The Rt Hon. David Lammy MP

Deputy Prime Minister, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice

Background and context

- 1.1 Separation Centres were established in 2017 to manage prisoners who pose the most significant terrorist risk and seek to radicalise others or exert ideological control within the prison estate. These small, high-security units allow for the separation of individuals whose influence could undermine prison safety, disrupt rehabilitation or incite violence.
- 1.2 These issues are not confined to the prison walls. The ability to manage terrorist risk effectively in custody has direct implications for public safety. Separation Centres play a critical role in preventing radicalisation, disrupting terrorist networks and ensuring that dangerous individuals are not able to continue their ideological campaigns from within prison.
- 1.3 The attack at HMP Frankland on 12 April 2025 was a stark reminder of the enduring threat posed by terrorist offenders in custody. It demonstrated the need to reassess how Separation Centres operate and whether the current system remains fit for purpose. In response, the government commissioned an independent review, led by Mr Hall, the terms of which were as follows:
 - consider whether the facts of the incident, as established by HMPPS' internal review, reveal the need for any changes to how convicted terrorists are placed onto Separation Centres
 - consider whether the policies, operating procedures, legal framework and relationships with other agencies that underpin Separation Centres are fit for purpose, including whether an appropriate balance is being struck between security and long-term offender management
 - provide findings and recommendations on the basis of the above that can be implemented to reduce the likelihood of any such incident occurring in the future⁴
- 1.4 The government welcomes this review as an opportunity to take stock, learn lessons and ensure that our approach to managing terrorist offenders and other offenders that pose a terrorist risk remains forward-looking and robust.

⁴ GOV.UK, 'Appointment of Jonathan Hall KC as independent reviewer', available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/appointment-of-jonathan-hall-kc-as-independent-reviewer>

- 1.5 This document sets out the government's response to Mr Hall's independent review of Separation Centres. It outlines the key findings and recommendations of the review and details the actions we are taking to address them. The response is structured around four main themes:
- staff safety and risk management
 - system design and leadership
 - policy and legal reform
 - intelligence capability
- 1.6 For each theme, we have summarised the relevant recommendations and set out the government's commitments and next steps. We are committed to acting strongly and decisively to improve the operation of Separation Centres, and as a result **we accept all 13 of Mr Hall's recommendations** and in some areas commit to go further.

Managing violent and terrorist risk behaviour

- 2.1 Staff safety is at the heart of the government's approach to reforming Separation Centres, which house some of the most dangerous and ideologically motivated prisoners in the estate. Managing terrorist offenders in custody presents unique operational challenges. Staff need to navigate ideological hostility, complex group dynamics and legal constraints, all while maintaining safety and order and promoting the principles of rehabilitation.
- 2.2 A key theme of the review is the concept of latent risk. This refers to the potential for violence that is not immediately visible but remains present beneath the surface. Latent risk is particularly relevant for prisoners who have previously used violence or who hold deep ideological grievances. It is not eliminated by imprisonment. Instead, it can be intensified by group dynamics, long sentences and the psychological stress of confinement. Mr Hall notes that some prisoners may be quietly waiting for an opportunity to act, and that exposure to other radicalisers can reinforce violent tendencies or encourage future attacks. This highlights the need for staff to be equipped not only to respond to overt threats but also to detect and disrupt hidden or emerging risks before they escalate.
- 2.3 The review also identifies the dangers of collective prisoner behaviour where solidarity among Separation Centre inmates, often rooted in shared grievances or ideological hostility, can lead to intimidation of staff or regime disruption. Staff have reported incidents of prisoners crowding around officers, delegitimising prison Imams and referring to themselves as an 'army'. These behaviours undermine staff authority and increase the risk of violence.
- 2.4 Relevant recommendations in Mr Hall's report call for:
- a greater emphasis on understanding and managing group dynamics and latent risks among prisoners (**recommendation 1**)
 - ensuring that regimes are enforced clearly and fairly, with high standards of behaviour upheld (**recommendation 9**)
 - embedding proactive risk-management tactics into daily practice (**recommendation 10**)
 - providing staff with access to external advisory support to help identify and disrupt terrorist threats (**recommendation 11**)

- 2.5 Collectively, these recommendations aim to create a safer, more resilient environment for both staff and prisoners. The government recognises that some of the most dangerous terrorist offenders relentlessly seek to exploit vulnerabilities, making it essential that staff are equipped to identify and disrupt threats proactively. We will continue to invest in the tools, training and support that staff need to manage terrorist risk confidently and safely. **We accept recommendations 1, 9, 10 and 11.**
- 2.6 The government remains unequivocal in its commitment to protecting prison staff and has already taken decisive steps to address these risks. **We are delivering a comprehensive review of Separation Centre staff training, led by operational and clinical experts, and supported by specialist learning and development teams.** This review will ensure that all Separation Centre staff receive bespoke, evidence-based training tailored to the unique risks and challenges of managing terrorist offenders in high-security environments. In particular, training is being enhanced to equip staff with the skills and confidence needed to manage complex and dynamic risks. This work is already underway and will be completed within the next 12 months. Prison staff, including chaplaincy, are given counter-terrorism training so that they can spot terrorist risk behaviour and understand how to challenge, deter and stop it. In addition, chaplains of all faiths play an active and essential role in the management of terrorist risk in prisons. This includes using their expertise to help staff understand the differences between legitimate religious observance and behaviour that raises concerns and needs to be dealt with.
- 2.7 The group dynamic and latent risk of previous violence is already a consideration in our risk assessments; however, **we will review our risk-assessment and care-management processes to ensure that all relevant risks – individual, group, physical or environmental – are identified and managed proactively. We will also strengthen the translation of risk assessments into practical management strategies, so that staff are empowered to respond effectively to both immediate and latent threats. Furthermore, we will also ensure that staff in Separation Centres are empowered to uphold the rules, with more local decision making.** Through these measures, staff will be better equipped with the confidence and knowledge to identify and manage risks proactively, disrupt harmful group dynamics and maintain a safe environment for all.
- 2.8 Proactive risk-management tactics, such as dynamic unlocking, targeted cell searches and robust disciplinary procedures, continue to be embedded into daily practice through targeted training. These measures are supported by timely and actionable intelligence, which will help staff interpret and respond to risk indicators with confidence.

- 2.9 Mr Hall's review highlights a policy gap: that Separation Centre prisoners can communicate, subject to an individual assessment of risk, with other prisoners who are either located in other Separation Centres or other parts of the prison estate. **The government agrees that this gap needs to be closed, and we will bring in new policy to do so.**
- 2.10 Recognising the complexity of terrorist risk, **we are also exploring options for providing additional advisory support** to Separation Centre staff. This may include external advisers to complement existing internal expertise, helping staff manage complex risk profiles and disrupt harmful group dynamics.
- 2.11 Through these measures, we reaffirm our commitment to protecting staff from harm and ensuring that Separation Centres remain secure, resilient and fit for purpose. This further assures victims and their families of our determination to prevent those responsible for the most heinous acts of terrorism from ever harming anyone again.

Strengthening system design and leadership accountability

- 3.1 Despite the committed and sustained work of staff and leaders in Separation Centres, Mr Hall's review identifies a clear opportunity to transform the way Separation Centres are governed and operated. He highlights longstanding structural issues, including fragmented oversight, limited operational autonomy, and a disconnect between policy and frontline delivery. The review states that these issues have led to inconsistent decision-making, duplication of effort, and a disconnect between those setting policy and those responsible for day-to-day management of Separation Centre prisoners.
- 3.2 To address these challenges, recommendations in Mr Hall's report call for:
- a clear and unified command structure for operational management and policy development (**recommendation 2**)
 - the creation of a tiered Separation Centre system under unified leadership (**recommendation 3**)
 - dedicated expertise for drafting and analysing Separation Centre referrals (**recommendation 5**)
- 3.3 The government agrees that the current model must evolve. To achieve this, we will take forward a bold, ambitious and comprehensive redesign programme to consolidate operational control and enhance the quality of referrals. **We accept recommendations 2, 3 and 5.**
- 3.4 Central to our approach is **ensuring that the management of the Separation Centre system is supported by a clear and unified command structure, with responsibility for both operational delivery and policy.** This will enable more agile and consistent decision-making, reduce duplication and improve accountability across the system. Implementing this change will require structural reform, including careful consideration of how the new command aligns with existing roles.
- 3.5 **We are committed to creating a tiered Separation Centre system that enables prisoners to move between tiers based on robust evidence-led risk assessments** and will immediately begin designing this system. We will explore available options including 'supermax-style' higher-control units for the most dangerous and violent offenders at the next Spending Review. However, in our experience – including in the aftermath of the attack on officers at HMP Frankland – it is preferable for the safety, security and resilience of our prisons to have multiple

Separation Centre sites rather than concentrate Separation Centre prisoners in one place.

- 3.6 Drawing on international best practice and our existing approach to offences carried out with a terrorist connection, **we will also explore legislative options, when parliamentary time allows, to strengthen our ability to identify and manage those connected with serious and organised crime.** This will include tighter controls for those who pose an ongoing threat from within prison, helping us protect the public, safeguard staff and support rehabilitation.
- 3.7 We are also committed to improving the quality of referrals for Separation Centre placement. Separation Centre referrals are currently drafted by multidisciplinary teams across the prison estate with a Separation Centre central team that quality check these referrals. Moving forward, **we will ensure that there is a dedicated team with the required drafting and analytical expertise to produce high-quality, defensible referrals for Separation Centre placement.**
- 3.8 This redesign programme marks a step change in how Separation Centres are governed, ensuring stronger leadership, clearer accountability and more consistent delivery across the estate.

Driving policy and legal reform for operational agility

- 4.1 Mr Hall's review highlights that the policy and legal framework underpinning Separation Centres requires significant modernisation. He identifies that procedural and legislative requirements have constrained operational flexibility and exposed the system to unnecessary litigation. Among the most significant challenges Mr Hall highlights are the legacy of regime equivalence, the procedural burdens introduced by the *De Silva* judgment and the current application of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). He sets out that these factors have made it more difficult for staff to manage risk effectively and have also increased the administrative burden on those responsible for the safe and secure operation of Separation Centres.
- 4.2 Mr Hall's recommendations in relation to policy and legal reform call for:
- amendment of Prison Rule 46A so that Separation Centres are not required to provide regime equivalence with mainstream prison locations (**recommendation 4**)
 - legislation to reverse the effect of the *De Silva* judgment (**recommendation 6**)
 - reduced frequency of formal reviews for Separation Centre placements, with flexibility to respond to prisoner developments (**recommendation 7**)
 - steps to be taken to limit the application of Article 8 of the ECHR to placement and risk-management decisions within any part of the Separation Centre system (**recommendation 8**)
- 4.3 The government is committed to ensuring that the relevant policy frameworks that are relied upon by HMPPS staff support, rather than hinder, effective risk management. We have already made significant progress in improving the defensibility and clarity of our Separation Centre Policy Framework and guidance, and we will go further to ensure that Separation Centres operate within a framework that is robust, proportionate and responsive to operational realities. **We accept recommendations 4, 6, 7 and 8.**
- 4.4 **We will revise policy to clarify that regime equivalence is not required in the operation of Separation Centres.** While not a statutory requirement, regime equivalence has shaped policy and practice in ways that do not always reflect the operational realities or risks posed by offenders of terrorism concern. Tailoring regimes to risk and operational need will enable staff to manage risk more effectively and ensure that operational decisions are proportionate and defensible.

- 4.5 **We will act to ensure staff have the confidence and tools to manage the most acute terrorist risks in our prisons.** This includes seeking to **bring forward legislation, when parliamentary time allows, in response to the *De Silva* judgment** to restore a clear, efficient process for managing high-risk prisoners, based on professional operational assessments. As part of this, we shall ensure minimum safeguards are in place to ensure decisions remain lawful and proportionate and that our approach remains in keeping with our international obligations under the ECHR.
- 4.6 **We will streamline the review process for Separation Centre placements, moving to a less frequent review cycle supported by flexible, event-driven assessments.** This will reduce bureaucracy and ensure decisions are based on meaningful changes in behaviour and risk. We will continue to ensure that significant developments are always considered in a timely manner, making the review process more effective for both staff and prisoners. **We will further streamline the system and reduce unnecessary administrative burdens on staff by also reviewing and updating Prison Rule 46, which relates to Close Supervision Centres.**
- 4.7 We agree with the review's assessment of the challenges that Article 8 ECHR can create in the context of Separation Centre decision making. **We will strengthen internal processes so that they are clear, robust and resilient to challenge,** enabling staff to focus on assessing risk and protecting the public without unnecessary legal complexity. In parallel, and when parliamentary time allows, **we will seek to introduce legislation to better protect decisions taken by experienced staff in Separation Centres** from litigation on Article 8 grounds. We will explore the full range of options open to us to deliver this, rather than commit at this time to a specific legislative approach, and we are clear that any legislation brought forward in response to the report will be compliant with our obligations under the ECHR. As part of this work, **we will also explore strengthening the presumption against damages under the Human Rights Act and go further by considering this recommendation's applicability to other high-control settings,** such as Close Supervision Centres, which are also reserved for the most dangerous prisoners.
- 4.8 Through these reforms, we will strengthen the policy and legal foundations of the Separation Centre system, enabling staff to manage risk more effectively and ensuring that operational decisions are proportionate and defensible.

Enhancing intelligence to strengthen risk management

- 5.1 Mr Hall's review identifies a timely opportunity to strengthen the intelligence function within Separation Centres. His report found that current intelligence collection practices are overly bureaucratic and insufficiently focused. Mr Hall found that such a large amount of information is generated, including trivial matters, that it dilutes the pool of useful material and generates an enormous administrative burden for those responsible for analysing and disseminating it. This limits their operational value and makes it harder for staff to respond effectively to emerging risks.
- 5.2 The recommendations in this theme call for:
- more focused collection and use of intelligence in Separation Centres (**recommendation 12**)
 - a Protocol to be drawn up for securing MI5 'concurrence' for intrusive investigative measures when necessary (**recommendation 13**)
- 5.3 The government agrees that intelligence is central to effective risk management, and that more purposeful, proportionate and actionable intelligence is needed to support risk-based decision-making and ensure the safety and security of both staff and prisoners. **We accept recommendations 12 and 13.**
- 5.4 **We have already taken notable steps to improve how intelligence is gathered, analysed and used across the prison estate.** The launch of the new counter-terrorism training package in April 2025 marked a significant milestone in equipping staff with the skills to identify and report terrorist behaviours more effectively. The training package is already helping staff to recognise and report relevant behaviours.
- 5.5 **We have committed to reviewing and improving intelligence collection practices, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and ensuring that intelligence reporting is purposeful and directly supports operational decisions.** We are also improving how intelligence is integrated into referral and review processes, so that staff have timely and actionable information to inform their work. We will make changes to the way staff observations and PIN phone data are captured and used, ensuring that frontline insights are not lost in overly complex reporting systems. These changes will help create a more agile and responsive intelligence environment within Separation Centres.

- 5.6 In addition, **we are working with the Security Service to ensure that the most serious risks are managed using the full range of available tools**, including improving the process for practitioners in requesting them when necessary and proportionate to do so.
- 5.7 Collectively, these reforms represent a decisive step in reinforcing the UK's counter-terrorism infrastructure in prisons, ensuring that those who pose the greatest threat are securely managed and that our communities are better protected from harm.

Recommendations in full

Recommendation 1: When considering the risk of violence to Separation Centre staff, HMPPS should take account of (a) the group dynamic in Separation Centres and (b) the latent risk posed by prisoners who have previously used violence.

Recommendation 2: The reporting (management) line should go from the onsite governor of the Separation Centre system to a unit which is responsible for both operational management and policy development.

Recommendation 3: A tiered Separation Centre system, with all Separation Centre units brought within a single prison under the control of a governor responsible for the day-to-day management of all Separation Centre prisoners, should be created.

Recommendation 4: Rule 46A should be amended so that it does not require equivalence to the regime on mainstream location.

Recommendation 5: The function of drafting Separation Centre referrals should be moved from the team at Wakefield to a team with dedicated drafting and analytical skills.

Recommendation 6: The Ministry of Justice should bring forward legislation to reverse the effect of the decision in *De Silva* (2025).

Recommendation 7: There should be fewer formal reviews of Separation Centre placement but with flexibility to respond to prisoner developments.

Recommendation 8: The Ministry of Justice should take steps to limit the application of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights so that it does not apply to placement within a Separation Centre or to risk management decisions within any part of the Separation Centre system (including within the Close Supervision Centre part).

Recommendation 9: The regime for each unit within the Separation Centre system should be enforced clearly and fairly, and good standards of behaviour should be upheld.

Recommendation 10: Prison officers should use proactive risk management tactics in response to specific intelligence and latent risk.

Recommendation 11: Separation Centre staff should have external support from an adviser on identifying and disrupting terrorist risk.

Recommendation 12: There should be more focused collection and use of intelligence in Separation Centres.

Recommendation 13: A Protocol should be drawn up for securing MI5 'concurrence' for intrusive investigative measures when necessary.

Equality statement

Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 places a duty on Ministers and the Department, when exercising their functions, to have ‘due regard’ to the need to:

- eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other prohibited conduct under the Equality Act 2010
- advance equality of opportunity between different groups (those who share a relevant protected characteristic and those who do not)
- foster good relations between different groups (those who share a relevant protected characteristic and those who do not)

Paying due regard needs to be proportionately considered against the nine protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 – namely race, sex, disability, sexual orientation, religion and belief, age, marriage and civil partnership, gender reassignment, pregnancy and maternity.

This government response to Mr Hall’s independent review into Separation Centres explores ways in which the policies, operating procedures and legal framework of Separation Centres can be improved and strengthened. It responds to all 13 of the report’s recommendations.

These policy changes will affect Separation Centre prisoners, and risk disproportionately impacting Muslim and Asian men, on the protected characteristics of race and religion. Asian and Muslim men are currently, and have historically been, over-represented among Separation Centre prisoners compared to their representation in the general prison population. This is not because Separation Centres discriminate against religion and ethnicity but because a) the proportion of persons in custody for terrorism and terrorism-connected offences who have self-declared their religion as Muslim, and have self-declared their ethnicity as Asian or Asian British, are both an over representation when compared to the UK’s general population and b) Islamist Extremism is the most common ideology held by terrorist prisoners and presents the largest terrorist threat to the United Kingdom by volume.⁵ Separation Centre policy can apply to any prisoner posing any ideological threat and this will continue to apply no matter what the proposed policy changes are. The English and Welsh Prison Estate is comprised overwhelmingly of men, and Separation Centres do not currently operate or exist within the women’s or youth custody estate.

⁵ MI5, ‘Countering terrorism’, available at: <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/what-we-do/countering-terrorism>

HM Inspectorate of Prisons regularly inspects Separation Centres, and these inspections consider equalities issues. Within Separation Centres, sensitivities exist in relation to cultural and religious needs. The proposed policy changes would not impact prisoners' ability to access religious chaplains, religious texts or faith-based dietary requirements. Ensuring access to these things within Separation Centres seeks to mitigate any disproportionate impact of the proposed policy changes on Muslim and/or Asian prisoners.

We will commit to engaging stakeholders, such as faith groups, to monitor the impact of the implementation of this government response on prisoners with protected characteristics.

A number of the commitments within the government response that may have possible equalities implications will require further analysis and engagement before specific policy changes can be confirmed. As a result, a more detailed equalities analysis may be conducted as the policy develops.

Multiple recommendations also have cross-government implications, and we will ensure that relevant legal, operational and policy stakeholders are consulted and informed throughout as we action such recommendations. We will ensure that a detailed equality assessment is delivered prior to any substantive change in government policy.

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