EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant		**Respondent**
Mr A Lewis	**v**	**Amicus Trust Ltd**

Heard at: Cambridge Employment Tribunal

On: 2 October 2025

Before: Employment Judge King

Members: Ms M Harris
Ms K Omer

Appearances

For the Claimant: In person
For the Respondent: Mr Arnold (counsel)

JUDGMENT

1. The claimant's application for a reconsideration made on 5th May 2025 is refused.

REASONS

1. By application dated 5th May 2025 the claimant made an application for reconsideration of the Reserved Judgment sent to the parties 23rd April 2025. This is referred to as the original application for a reconsideration and had twelve grounds. The Claimant made a number of attempts to expand this further in his additional grounds document on 19th June 2025, supplementary evidence and submission dated the same day, further supplement dated the same day, supplementary submission made on the 28th June 2025, supplementary legal submission made on 29th June 2025 and the final legal submission on 30th June 2025, the supplementary legal

submission dated 30th June 2025 and the supplementary submissions on 1st July 2025.

2. He also made an application for a reconsideration of the specific disclosure request made twice during the hearing orally dated 20th June 2025 which was considerably out of time and was not considered. This in turn has supplementary submissions dated 28th June 2025 and the application for disclosure and directions on 29th June 2025 and the supplemental submission on the same date also in respect of this matter.

3. Given the level of correspondence received, the anonymity application and the costs application as well as the case being heard by a panel not a Judge sitting alone, the decision was taken to list for a hearing to determine all matters in accordance with the overriding objective. The Claimant raised 12 grounds but did not specifically refer to the part of the judgment under each ground it wanted the Tribunal to reconsider and this required further information.

4. The issue relevant to this reconsideration application was whether or not there was no reasonable prospect of the original decision being revoked or varied. It did not mean that the Claimant had passed the first hurdle of the reconsideration application but was the most efficient means of the panel considering all three applications and was listed this was in accordance with the overriding objective as per the correspondence to the parties dated 23rd September 2025. It followed the Tribunal's order of 7th July 2025 providing the parties with an opportunity to provide representations and dealing with orders related to the three applications for the Tribunal to consider.

5. As set out in that correspondence the Claimant made numerous additions and applications since the application for reconsideration but these were only considered if they expressly relate to the grounds in the original reconsideration application and no additional matters would be heard.

The Law

6. Schedule 1 of The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 contains the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013 contains Rule 70 of the Rules, (The Claimant made the application on this basis) the Employment Tribunal may, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. On reconsideration, the decision may be confirmed, varied or revoked.

7. The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 Rules now apply and the correct rule is Rule 69 of the 2024 Rules. Rule 69 provides that an application for reconsideration under Rule 69 must be made in writing (and copied to all other parties) within 14 days of the date on which the decision (or, if later, the written reasons) were sent to the parties.

8. The process by which the Tribunal considers an application for reconsideration is set out in Rule 70. Rule 70(2) provides that where the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked, the application shall be refused and the Tribunal shall inform the parties of the refusal. Rule 70(3) provides further information as to process and under Rule 70(4) if the application has not been refused the judgment must be considered at a hearing, unless the Tribunal considers having regard to any written representations that a hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice.

9. The Respondent provided written representations on 25th July 2025 in accordance with the ET Order which set out some legal principles to which we have had regard on the interest of justice point. The authorities referred to by the Respondent were *Outasight VB Ltd v Brown UKEAT/253/14*, *Newcastle upon Tyne City Council v Marsden [2010] ICR 743* and *Ministry of Justice v Burton [2016] EWCA Civ 714*. The Claimant's application contained reference to a number of authorities but these related to case law on the original decision such as the fairness of

the dismissal and not the specific issue for today which is whether there is any reasonable prospect of the decision being varied or revoked.

10. The Tribunal brought the case of In *Ebury Partners Ltd v Acton Davis [2023] EAT 40*, to the parties attention in so far as it requires a party seeking reconsideration to indicate why they do so and therefore an application should necessarily also include an indication of which decisions within a judgment a party is inviting the tribunal to reconsider. The scope of the Tribunal's reconsideration should be limited to these aspects of the judgment and this case also dealt with the proposition that is a central aspect of the interests of justice is finality in litigation. It is unusual for a litigant to be given a "second bite at the cherry" and the jurisdiction to reconsider should be exercised by employment tribunals with caution. Reconsideration should not be used to correct a supposed error made by the Tribunal after the parties have had a fair and proper opportunity to put their case.

Reasons

11. The Claimant's application was received within the relevant time limit in accordance with Rule 69. The application had also been copied to the Respondent.

12. At the outset of the hearing given there were 12 grounds for the reconsideration application, it was agreed that we would review the grounds in small groups considering the original application and submissions on both sides on that point or group of points before making a decision on those grounds. We would then review the position at the end of the matter and the impact of any decision on the judgment.

13. We raised with the Claimant at the outset that in relation to each of the points as we went through them, it was important for us to know whether the Claimant was saying we should reconsider the whole judgment or if there is a specific part of the judgment he was referring to for each of the

grounds. The Claimant confirmed that he wanted the whole judgment reconsidered under each ground. Firstly, we took grounds 1, 2 and 3.

14. **Ground One: Error of law undermining public confidence.** The Claimant says the Tribunal made a significant error in law affecting the fairness and credibility of the judgment, undermines the public's confidence in the application of justice. We went through this ground at length in the hearing and what the error of law was that the Claimant relied upon. The Claimant's position is in respect of the ACAS Code of Practice breaches and that Janet Prince was involved in the decision to dismiss.

15. We made as a finding a number of points on this within our judgment and today we are considering whether there are any reasonable prospects of our original decision being varied or revoked. And we do not believe this is the case. We remind ourselves throughout this that it is not for the Claimant to have a second bite of the cherry, but specifically to deal with matters where it was in the interest of justice for us to reconsider the judgment. So we specifically concluded that the legal position was that the ACAS Code of Practice did not apply in respect to SOSR dismissals. That is a decision that we made.

16. The Claimant has not provided us with any authority to say that that is an error of law or persuaded us that this is the case. We dealt with the matter at length in our judgment, revisiting our findings of fact this morning. In fact, we dealt with the involvement of Janet Prince in the process of paragraph 137, 138, 153-155 and 157-164 of the Judgment. We did not go on to look at whether an uplift was appropriate and whether the respondent acted reasonably or unreasonably in any breaches of the ACAS Code in detail because we did not make findings to that effect at the first stage.

17. We do not consider that there has been any error of law in respect to our decision making on that point concerning ACAS, of course, if the Claimant feels that we have made an error of law, the most appropriate way to deal with that would be an appeal to the EAT. The Claimant has also failed to

point out any specific part of the Judgment that we should reconsider and simply wants the whole judgment reconsidered.

18. **Ground two: failure to give weight to tangible evidence.** This was that we ignored or gave insufficient weight to numerous pieces of tangible evidence provided by the Claimant, including documentary complaints, emails and medical evidence. Again, we remind ourselves the test is whether there is any reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked and again and we remind ourselves that it is not for the Claimant to have a second bite of the cherry. So dealing with this ground, there are four aspects of this ground which we have considered.

19. The first relates to the boiler and the supplementary statement of Jackie Park and this does come later, I think in some of the other things we have dealt with under the ground of failure to give sufficient weight to it. We did not attach much weight to the supplementary statement of Jackie Park, namely because as the case progressed, it became apparent to us that it was not relevant to the issues. So we did not make specific findings on the boiler or who installed the boiler or any errors with regards to health and safety, etc for the boiler because that was not relevant for this Tribunal and it was not relevant to the agreed list of issues.

20. So the tangible evidence referred to is a point that the Claimant relies on in relation to credibility, however we did make around 171 paragraphs findings of fact and in relation to the conclusion the Tribunal only needs to make findings of fact on matters which are relevant to the issues. We gave a detailed consideration to credibility in particular of the witnesses in our opening paragraphs of the judgment. Turning to the point about Elaine Fisher and the statement that the Claimant was aggressive to her. We did not make that finding as a finding of fact. We set out what Elaine Fisher's findings were and we gave sufficient weight to the matter because we made reference to the transcripts within the judgment having access to those. However, the Claimant is asking us to reconsider the whole judgment because we did not make a finding that the Claimant was not aggressive towards Elaine Fisher. We set out what Elaine Fisher's position

was on those matters. So again, on that aspect of the ground, we do not think there is any reasonable prospect success of our original decision being varied or revoked.

21. We dealt with the transcripts and the Elaine Fisher meetings at length and with regard to the without prejudice emails in relation to the matters that arose after the hearing started. In particular, this issue did arise at the outset and the Claimant was invited to obtain evidence from his union representative even though that would have been late and the Claimant had a solicitor on record but that evidence did not materialise. We dealt with this in quite some detail in our judgment again at paragraphs 8-10 primarily. Not only did the Claimant's evidence arrive after the panel had finished hearing the evidence, but we invited the parties to provide submissions on how it was dealt with and the Claimant did not do so on those points. We also dealt with it at paragraph 13 of the judgment insofar as the Claimant now says that we have failed to give sufficient weight to the materialisation of those without prejudice emails.

22. The Tribunal was actually quite critical of the Respondent, in this regard in respect of Mr. Fleming's statement. We made some quite strong findings about Mr. Fleming's evidence and how this impacted the position. Therefore, we do not find that there is any reasonable prospect of us overturning our original decision or varying or revoking it. We did give it due consideration and made a number of findings in that regard. Turning to the medical evidence point, insofar as this was relevant evidence before the Employment Tribunal, it would have been evidence to potential injury to feelings that the Claimant had. It does not, however, help us in our conclusion as to whether to what the reasons for that suffering were. So we did give weight to the documents which we were taken to or referred to by the parties expressly before us. There were many documents in the multiple bundles not used in the hearing. We did, however, make no findings in respect of any of the discrimination elements or indeed the detriment elements, which would have allowed us to look at injury to

feelings in more detail. Therefore, we find that there is no prospect of revoking the decision or varying it.

23. **Ground Three – withholding of evidence by the Respondent.** This relates to the Charity Commission email and specifically what the Respondent said to the Charity Commission. As a Tribunal, we heard this application towards the end of the oral evidence around day eight or nine of the hearing. Aside from the lateness of that application by the Claimant, we did not consider (and we still do not consider) that it is relevant to the issues in the case. Despite being given an additional chance today, the Claimant cannot be any more specific and cannot draw our attention to how specifically this would have made his hearing unfair or how this breaches the principles of natural justice. Disclosure is an obligation that the parties need to comply with, however, this is disclosure relevant to the issues.

24. It is a fundamental point in this case in that what the Charity's Commission said, or indeed what the Respondent said about the content of the protected disclosures and whether they were true is not something this Employment Tribunal was ever going to determine. However, we did make that very clear from day one and in fact on repeated occasions that we would not make findings of fact about the contents of the protected disclosures and whether they were true. The protected disclosures were largely accepted by the Respondent at the outset as having been made. Therefore, the focus was in legal terminology on causation, but effectively the reasons why the things happened to the Claimant that he alleged and whether that was because of or on the grounds that he made those protected disclosures depending on the issue being considered. So again, on that ground, we do not find there are any reasonable prospects of the original decision being varied or revoked.

25. Having considered grounds one, two and three as there not being any reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked, we heard submissions on grounds four, five and six before adjourning to deliver our decision on those grounds.

26. **Ground Four: Dishonest witness statements by the Respondent.** There is some repetition on this ground with the supplementary witness statement of Jackie Park. There was a number of points to this ground. One related to the failure to challenge the false evidence of Elaine Fisher in particular to deal with conflicted evidence in terms of credibility and the Claimant said that not only did we fail to challenge Jackie Park's witness statement as false, we failed to assess credibility of witness evidence and that we went so far as to describe Jackie Park as Wonder Woman. There are a number of other submissions that the Claimant makes in relation to this.

27. So in relation to this, it is not the Tribunal's role to step into the arena and cross examine any witness in order to challenge anyone's witness statement whether we think it is false or not, that is the job of the parties during the hearing or their representatives. The Claimant had the opportunity to cross examine the witnesses of the Respondent. In terms of our findings, our role is effectively to make findings of fact relevant to the issues and reach conclusions on the issues.

28. Looking at the judgment, again, we did deal with the credibility of witnesses both in the opening paragraphs of the judgment and at various points during the findings of fact and our conclusions. So again, we did deal with the conflicting evidence and the credibility points. So we find that in that respect there is no reasonable prospect of changing or revoking the original decision because we have already considered those points. The Claimant does not get a second bit of the cherry to discredit the Respondent's witnesses.

29. In relation to the Wonder Woman comment, it is not a comment that the Tribunal used. In fact, it was one of the witnesses that used this term and that is dealt with paragraph 47 of our judgment. To say the Tribunal described her as Wonder Woman on record is seriously misrepresenting the reality of the judgment in black and white. We actually further dealt with this in our conclusions in relation to paragraph 189 in particular where

we expressed that we understood the Claimant's frustrations given that that is how the witness Jackie Park was described. So the tribunal did not describe her as that, as alleged. In fact, we merely relayed the evidence that we had heard before us and sympathised with the claimant in respect of how that may have made him feel in relation to those points.

30. Further, the Claimant misrepresents the Judgment again by saying that we found the Respondent's witness statement "were dishonest". We did make reference to the fact that we felt that in respect of Mr. Fleming, that we had some half truths this is not the same as finding all of the Respondent's witness evidence dishonest. Again, the Claimant believes that we should reconsider the whole judgment in light of this ground. We do not find that there is any reasonable prospect of us varying or revoking our original decision on this ground.

31. **Ground five: Misleading the Tribunal regarding without prejudice offer.** We have dealt with this already today in a different manner, but the ground here is that we allowed the Respondent to mislead the court and others under oath. Obviously, we dealt with this in our judgment but it is not a case of us allowing anything. It is a case of us having to deal with the case that is presented and this was done and findings of fact were made in respect of the without prejudice offers which are contained in our judgment. We find that there are no reasonable prospects of the original decision being varied or revoked with regards to this ground five.

32. **Ground six: Sustained Harassment by Senior Employee.** This is said to be the sustained harassment by a senior employee that we have failed to adequately consider or assess which relates to the long-standing harassment by Jackie Park in 2019 onwards, which contributed to the mental health deterioration supported by medical evidence. There was actually no claims of harassment that the Claimant brought before the Tribunal. We cannot consider claims the Claimant has not advanced.

33. There was however, a claim in respect of detriments, which we considered. So there were six detriments in respect to victimisation, which

are dealt with starting at paragraph 194 of our judgment. There were in fact also 26 detriments in relation to this case relied upon for the case as to protected disclosures. Again, we dealt with these extensively in our judgment covering paragraphs 238 right through to 310, where we dealt with each individual detriment and the material that was before us. So in terms of any failure to deal with evidence and emails and particular the claim mentioned now in submissions, anything that was relevant to the issues was considered and dealt with both within the findings of fact and the conclusions. If it was not specifically pleaded as a detriment, then we would not have considered it unless it was relevant to one of the issues or required a finding of fact. In terms of the list of issues, it is obviously not for us to formulate the Claimant's claim, he had the benefit of legal advice during the time of the claim.

34. So again, on grounds four, five and six, we find there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision will be varied or revoked. We then move onto consider grounds seven, eight and nine.

35. **Ground Seven: Failure to consider relevant legal principles.** The Claimant asserts for this ground that the Tribunal was silent on the laws regarding the unlawful disposal of commercial waste at local recycling centres, the Tribunal did not engage with health and safety duties under s7 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and that no findings were made on the respondent’s breach of duty of care.

36. The Tribunal dealt with this ground swiftly for the reconsideration application as it was a concern to the Tribunal that even at this stage that the Claimant misunderstand the duties of the Tribunal because the Tribunal explained this at the outset of the hearing and the Tribunal explained it time and time again throughout the hearing, that we will not make findings on the truth or not of the substance of the protected disclosures the Claimant made. So whether the Claimant was right or wrong about the Respondent's failings and health and safety, we would not make findings on that. We would make findings on whether the Claimant made a protected disclosure within the meaning of the legislation, whether

he had a reasonable belief that it was in public interest and then whether that led to a number of detriments.

37. As far as the commercial waste is concerned the Tribunal absolutely agree with the Claimant. The Tribunal did not make any findings on relation to the law of health safety duties or unlawful disposal of commercial waste. It is not this Tribunal's role to do that which the Respondents dealt with in their written submissions. The Tribunal would not make findings about whether the Respondent had failed in their health and safety duties. We are not a health and safety tribunal, we are an employment law tribunal. So we are looking at the whether protected disclosures were made and the detriments that flow from them. The Claimant clearly disagrees with the remit of the Tribunal but we see no reasonable prospect whatsoever of that decision being revoked or varied because it would not be part of the Tribunal's function.

38. If the Claimant disagrees with that and says that we have made a fundamental error in law by not addressing those things then the correct forum is the Employment Appeal Tribunal which the Claimant has already commenced. In relation to the breach of duty of care in terms of psychological harm to the Claiamnt, again we are not looking at breach of any standalone duty of care, we would only look at claims we had before us and actionable claims in the Tribunal. This sounds more like a negligence or personal injury claim. We would have addressed psychological harm at the remedy stage, if the relevant claims that attract such awards were upheld so we did not address what happened to the Claimant as a result because we did not find for the Claimant in his claims.

39. **Ground Eight: Failure to acknowledge whistleblowing motivated by resident safety.** For the majority of the protective disclosures, of course, it was not in dispute that the Claimant did make those disclosures in the public interest i.e that they were not based on the Claimant's own personal interest and met the statutory test. We did not go on to look at whether they were raised in good faith or the rationale behind making them,

because that, as the Respondent correctly points out, would be an issue for remedy and we did not get there. There is nothing in the Judgment that fails to acknowledge that the protected disclosures were made in the public interest. So on ground eight, we do not find that there is any reasonable prospect of us varying or revoking our original decision.

40. **Ground nine - Failure to address racism and victimisation evidence.** There were a number of elements to this ground, and the first was that we ignored email complaints made by the Claimant and staff about racism. The second that we failed to note that Jackie Park and Ronnie Neil were named in a separate tribunal case. And lastly, we failed make findings and deal with the Claimant's racial assault at work. Taking each of those individually but taking the judgment first because that is probably the easiest one to deal with. This was actually in the parties possession including the Claimant's and having sought legal advice he and his representative decided that it was not relevant and it was not inserted in the bundle for a document that the Tribunal needed to consider. Nevertheless, it came out in evidence, given orally by one of the Respondent's witnesses that there was a tribunal concerning race discrimination and therefore we paused the proceedings and the Respondent voluntarily disclosed the judgment, which we read because we were concerned that there may be parallel proceedings and that would be relevant. This would of course be the case if this involved allegations by others against the same perpetrators.

41. However, there were no allegations of racism against Jackie Park or Ronnie Neal that were raised in that tribunal judgment. So the parties discounted it as relevant to the issues initially and then we also did the same having read it. So we also dealt with this, at paragraph 12 of our reasons that we did look at it. Of course, the parties will be aware of that because we actually paused the case to deal with it. It is not correct for the Claimant to say that those individuals were named in the other case. This implies it was about them they were merely witnesses to matters and no allegations or findings against them were actually made. The Claimant

had the chance to introduce the Judgment in the bundle but did not and now seeks to make something out of nothing which is disingenuous.

42. In connection with the racial assault against the Claimant again to be clear this was not by any member of staff at the respondent but a third party. Obviously, there is the background to this in terms of body camera, but the issue itself, whilst understanding that it was traumatic for the Claimant, it is not a matter that is relevant to the issues in this case. The perpetrator was not one of the named witnesses in this case, but in fact, a resident, it is not for the tribunal to concern itself with what did and did not happen on that occasion. Even if the Claimant was assaulted and this was for racial reasons, if it was by a third party and not by the Respondent's staff or anyone they can be vicariously be liable for, it lacks credibility to seek to argue this assists the Claimant with his case against the Respondent. It relates to a resident, not to members of staff at work. So, it is not directly relevant to the issues in this case.

43. Concerning the emails, this is the emails concerning the complaints raised. Again, the suggestion is that we ignored them and we direct the Claimant to paragraphs 106, 107 and 212 to 213 where we expressly referenced these emails and dealt with them in relation to the contents and the allegation, which was detriment five expressly raised by the claimant that Janet Prince failed to deal with them. So, we did look at these emails in detail as part of those allegations. Insofar, as the emails relate to the allegations of race, we must remind ourselves of what the actual case was before us and that there were only two race allegations pleaded in this matter, the first related to the van/work vehicle and the second related to suspension. So in respect of racism, they were the only allegations of racism advanced by the Claimant.

44. There was not an allegation that all of the detriments (or indeed any of the other detriments) that happened to the Claimant were because of race, but the case advanced was that they occurred on the grounds that he made a protected disclosure. So even if as the Claimant now asserts Jackie Park

was racist and was behind those, it would not have been a relevant issue to the Tribunal because Jackie Park was not the person who allocated the vehicles and was not the person who suspended the Claimant. So, they would not be of any relevance to the issues in the case. The case the Claimant seeks to advance now is entirely different and he cannot relitigate the same case with new allegations.

45. For those reasons, we do not consider that there any reasonable prospects of the judgment in relation to ground nine of either being revoked or varied.

46. **Ground 10: Conflict of Interest – CEO Involvement in dismissal.** In relation to ground 10, the Claimant relies on this is really a reiteration of one of the earlier grounds, specifically ground one. Ground one was about the ACAS failure, conflict and the undermining of the process. So we have dealt with this already and the Claimant's position is that this makes the whole judgment unsafe. In terms of this, we set out the references to this in our judgment when considering ground one and the reasons for refusal. The fact that she was involved in the dismissal is something that the Claimant had previously advanced in the last hearing when we considered liability. We considered it and discounted it in terms of making the dismissal unfair. For those reasons the application for reconsideration on this ground does not give rise to any reasonable prospect that the original decision would be varied or revoked.

47. **Ground 11: Data Protection Breach – Public Identification.** This relates the Tribunal allowing the barrister for the Respondent to publicly identify someone in the room. Obviously, the liability hearing was a public hearing, so the parties cannot hide behind GDPR to deal with matters in the public hearing. This relates to Ms Crook and we already decided her anonymity application this morning and refused it. Again, the Claimant, seeks the reconsider the whole judgment for identification of someone in the hearing. In terms of how this impacts the Tribunal's judgment, it has no relevance to the issues in the case and no relevance to the decision

taken so her being named in the Judgment does not assist the Claimant in his grounds for a reconsideration. As such, we find that there is no prospect of the original decision being revoked or varied as it does not impact on the conclusions reached.

48. **Ground 12: Lack of Independence of external HR Consultants and false testimony.** Again, this ground has already been dealt with as it is essentially the same as grounds one and four. The lack of independence of external HR consultants and false testimony, the Claimant says relates to the evidence Elaine Fisher and the ACAS Code of Practice which we have already dealt with and for the reasons that we have already stated earlier there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked. The Claimant in the merits hearing took issue with the use of the word independent for the description of the HR people involved in this case. The Tribunal recognised the word "independent" was contentious and was at pains to ensure it did not use this in the hearing or the judgment but instead adopted a more neutral terminology but this does mean the Tribunal concurred with the Claimant's views as to independence just that this was a point the Claimant made during the hearing. It was aired, understood and dealt with in the Judgment in so far as it was relevant to the issues. There is no reasonable prospect of the decision being varied or revoked on this ground.

49. Having now considered grounds one to twelve and having devoted ¾ of a Tribunal day to ensuring that the parties had a chance to explain and make submissions on the grounds given that they lacked detail in some areas, we find that there are no reasonable prospects of the original decision being varied or revoked on any of the twelve grounds advanced whether taken individually or considered collectively.

50. The Claimant is a disappointed litigant and is seeking to have a further attempt to re-argue his position having had a full opportunity at the previous hearing. It is not the purpose of reconsideration to allow a party to the opportunity to rehearse the arguments that have already been made

and explored. It is a fundamental requirement of litigation there is certainty and finality.

51. If there was an error of law, this is a matter for appeal and not reconsideration. The claimant has not argued or identified a specific error of law that has any arguable ground.

52. This application does not raise any new information or which he could not have raised at the hearing which would make reconsideration necessary in the interests of justice.

53. In the circumstances the application for reconsideration is rejected on the basis there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked. Accordingly, the application for reconsideration is therefore refused.

Approved by:

Employment Judge King

Date: 30.11.25

Sent to the parties on:

5 December 2025

For the Tribunal:

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