

ORAL HEARING DECISION

06 January 2026



Date of open hearing:	18/12/2025		
Date of closed hearing:	22/12/2025		
Prisoner full name:	Oliver Lewin		
Date of birth		Age:	42
Prison number:			
Prison:			
Review number:	1st		

DECISION

Decision:	No direction for release
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CONTEXT AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Type of case:	Sentence of Particular Concern Review
Secretary of State referral:	Release
Outcome sought:	Release
Test:	Parole Board panels must consider and apply the codified public protection test as set out in the annex below when making a decision about release. The Board must not give a direction for release unless the Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined [in prison].
Reconsideration:	The case is eligible for reconsideration.

INDEX OFFENCE(S) AND SENTENCE INFORMATION

Index offence(s):	Engage in conduct in preparation of terrorist acts		
Sentence(s):	SOPC – 6 years and 6 months custody, 1-year extended licence		
Date of sentence:	20/01/2023	Age when sentenced:	39
Parole eligibility date:	30/12/2025		
Conditional release date:	29/02/2028		
Sentence expiry date:	28/02/2029		

ORAL HEARING ATTENDEES

Panel:	Robert McKeon (Chair)	Independent	R
	Noreen Shami	Psychologist	R
	Ifty Ahmed	Independent	R
Witnesses:	[POM]	Prison Offender Manager (POM)	R
	[Prison Psychologist]	Prison Psychologist – author of ERG-R	R
	[COM]	Community Offender Manager (COM)	R
Legal rep:	Alexa Thomson (Counsel) Rob Hill	Garden Court North Broudie Jackson Canter	R
Observers:	[Observers]		R V R
Was the Secretary of State represented by an advocate			No

T – Telephone V – Video R – in hearing room in prison (with prisoner)

VICTIM INFORMATION

Victim statement provided?	No
Is there a victim engaged in the victim contact scheme?	No

DOSSIER SUMMARY

Number of pages in dossier:	405 + non-disclosure and written closing submissions
Non-disclosure:	Yes, gist disclosed
Additional papers at the hearing:	No
Additional papers after the hearing:	Yes
Details:	Closing written submissions from Ms Thomson received after the hearing on 22 December 2025.

Any other information

The Secretary of State was not represented by an advocate at the hearing and did not submit a written view.

This was a public hearing. The open session of evidence took place in person at [Prison] on 18 December 2025. The closed session of evidence took place via a video link on 22 December 2025. Mr Lewin was represented by Alexa Thomson on 18 December 2025, with his legal representative (Mr Hill) also attending. Mr Hill represented Mr Lewin on 22 December 2025 as Ms Thomson was unable to attend.

On the morning of the second hearing date, the panel allowed time for Mr Hill to speak with Mr Lewin via the video link before the hearing commenced.

REASONS

1. Analysis of Offending Behaviour (The Past)

1.1. Mr Lewin has no previous convictions and was 39 years old at the time of sentencing for the index offence. In the panel's view, it is necessary to reflect the background to the index offence in some detail.

1.2. The sentencing judge described Mr Lewin as a complicated character with significant autistic traits. Mr Lewin subsequently received an ASD diagnosis during his sentence. He told the panel that he had '*studied the hell out of it*' and now knew more about how his neurodiversity was relevant to his life, including how he needs to monitor his energy levels, know when to seek help, and when to take time out. Mr Lewin said that '*autism is all or nothing*' and so he was at risk of '*burning [himself] out*'. He said that he experienced sensitivity to noise and light and found social communications to be difficult. He spoke of being able to cope in speaking with up to two people but if a third person appeared he would need to find reasons to get away.

1.3. Mr Lewin was convicted at trial and he disputes his conviction. He has lodged an application with the Criminal Case Review Commission. Mr Lewin believes that he was subject to entrapment by the police. His challenge of his conviction is not a barrier to consideration of release by the Parole Board, and the panel assesses his cases on the basis that he was properly convicted.

1.4. The sentencing judge said that at the time of his offending, Mr Lewin was socially isolated, depressed and lacking in self-worth. The judge said that these features led Mr Lewin to tell many lies about the extent of his terrorist activities. For example, several times he pretended that evening walks were planned reconnaissance of terrorist targets. He claimed to have been in the military when he had never served in the armed forces.

1.5. The judge said that Mr Lewin told lies for two reasons. He had wanted to portray himself in a knowledgeable and brave way, seeking attention and approval that he lacked in the real world. Mr Lewin had also wanted to portray himself as an effective leader to gain support for his intended terrorist agenda. In sentencing Mr Lewin, the judge said that he had to separate out what Mr Lewin intended from the many untruths and exaggerations.

1.6. In March 2020, the first Coronavirus lockdown was announced in the United Kingdom. The judge noted that Mr Lewin had been sceptical about the dangers of Coronavirus and viewed the government restrictions on movements and associations as an unjustified attack upon his civil liberties. Mr Lewin told the panel that the judge had got this wrong, although he said he had perhaps felt this way '*towards the end*'.

1.7. Mr Lewin said that six months before the first lockdown he had been through a transition in his life. He said that he '*quit everything that wasn't important*', didn't need the cars that he had and didn't want to carry on working

'100 hours a week'. He said that he '*couldn't do it ... I was killing myself*'. Mr Lewin said that he had his first home by the age of 16 but following '*several failed experiments*', including living with housemates, he moved back to live with his mother at the age of 38, which he said that he found hard.

1.8. He said that he had stopped watching television and preferred accessing information from the internet because television would be bound by a schedule whereas on the internet he could '*watch what you want when you want*'. He said that he mainly utilised YouTube, gaming and acquired new '*knowledge*'.

1.9. Mr Lewin told the panel that he had known the lockdown was going to happen around a month before other people did, '*through whispers, things that I'd seen floating about...*'. He said that this allowed him to prepare with extra food and he had been '*in preparation mode*'. He said that people had mocked him at the time but that he '*felt smug*' because he had '*correctly predicted it*'.

1.10. Mr Lewin said that lockdown was '*a chance to recover*', he said that it was like '*school holidays*' and he enjoyed the rules of the lockdown and going on walks. He said that it '*made me angry*' when he saw others who were not following the rules. Mr Lewin said that he '*knew conspiracy theories were out there*' but had '*ignored it*' and '*took Covid at face value*' but that '*sooner or later the novelty wore off ... and it was these vaccines ...*'.

1.11. Mr Lewin said that it had been a difficult time at home because his stepfather was '*big into conspiracy theories*', his mother was [details of her health redacted] and so it was hard for his family to cope with the '*Covid experience*'. He said that his parents were '*digging as much as me*' but that they only had access to YouTube and YouTube had been '*heavily censored*'.

1.12. By December 2020, the Covid vaccine had been approved and the rollout of it began across the United Kingdom. The sentencing judge noted that during the lockdown, Mr Lewin had immersed himself in videos promulgating conspiracy theories and by the early part of 2021 he had convinced himself that members of the UK government were complicit in a high-level conspiracy originating in Israel to cull the masses by injecting them with a deadly vaccine.

1.13. Mr Lewin told the panel that when the news about the vaccine came out, he '*went looking for answers*' via the internet. He said that '*the conspiracy behind them isn't new ... there was a prediction made ... probably in the late 90s ... that sometime in the future ... there's going to be some sort of pandemic and they're going to use that as an excuse to get these whatever it is ... into people ... it stuck with me ...*'. Mr Lewin said that then when the vaccine was announced, and was '*new technology*', he started to get suspicious.

1.14. He said that he went looking for what other information was available which went against what the authorities were telling people. He said that there was a lot of information online and he was mindful that a lot of things that people had spoken of being conspiracy theories in the past, '*all came true*'. He spoke of a story about '*Hunter Biden's laptop*' which he said was later shown to be true.

1.15. As early as January 2021, Mr Lewin spoke to a contact online about attacking an Amazon warehouse and bringing down the government. In his evidence to the panel, Mr Lewin admitted to this and told the panel that he had been speaking with his cousin. He said that the warehouse ran on compressed air, he had reviewed what he believed to be politically motivated stories, and he had spoken of turning the air compressors off at the warehouse.

1.16. In June and July 2021, Mr Lewin told an online contact that the vaccine was designed to kill anyone who took it. He expressed a view that Jewish politicians were running the country and he spoke about taking down a transmitter and going to war. Mr Lewin conducted online research on topics, including British Jews in power, transmitter masts, tactics and self-defence. He told the panel that everywhere he went there were '*people in the comments talking about Jews*' and then the '*undercover police officer*' said that '*everything went back to Israel*' which led him to explore that topic. The panel noted that Mr Lewin did not have contact with the undercover police officers until 25 July 2021.

1.17. The judge noted in the course of his messages, Mr Lewin expressed hostility towards Jewish people and considered this to be an aggravating feature. In his interview for the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), Mr Lewin had said that his views were not antisemitic and it was simply his view that the '*Ruling Elite*' were those with vast amounts of money who just happened to be Jewish. Mr Lewin told the panel that he did not hold antisemitic views. He said that he felt a '*healthy amount of respect*' for Jewish people and had read the Torah and the Old Testament and found his beliefs to align closer to Judaism.

1.18. On 20 July 2021, Mr Lewin told a contact online, '*this is a fight now, a proper one*'. He went on to say, '*I'm taking my rifle and my Burgan out, and going to fuck some shit up. Hopefully meet some fellow warriors on the way. I won't stop until we take this country and stop it all in its tracks.*'. The sentencing judge accepted that he never took a rifle from his home and concluded that this was an example of Mr Lewin expressing anger at what he viewed as the government's oppressive behaviour, and also him engaging in exaggeration to get attention and respect.

1.19. Mr Lewin told the panel that he had been '*angry ...*' being told that he wouldn't be able to get food unless he had the vaccine and he had questioned at the time why that would be a requirement unless it was because there was a desire to cause harm with it. He said that he had referenced a rifle to '*sound hard*' and also spoke of a need to protect himself because he had expected some catastrophe.

1.20. When Mr Lewin's home was searched after his arrest, the police recovered a large amount of military style equipment, including a lock knife, camping equipment, camouflage clothing and two air rifles. Both of the rifles were fitted with telescopic sights and one of them, when fully charged, was noted by the judge to have a power that was potentially lethal. Mr Lewin told the panel that the comment about the power of the rifle was wrong. He said that he and

others would have protected the perimeter of the property they were in if a catastrophe had developed, although he was clear that the air rifle '*wouldn't have killed people*'. In sentencing Mr Lewin, the judge accepted that he had a genuine and long-standing interest in military items and guns but considered it unlikely that Mr Lewin intended to use either of the rifles in his planned act of terrorism.

1.21. On 25 July 2021, Mr Lewin joined a Telegram group called '*Resistance UK*' which contained about 7000 members. Mr Lewin told the panel that the '*key is in the name*' and he had joined because he had needed to do something and would have a better chance of survival if he was not alone. His opening message to the group, included '*we are at war people. Make no mistake. You have to treat it like that. Peaceful marching has not and will not do anything*'. He went on to say that he had devised a strategy and was looking for men who wanted to take action. He spoke of it being '*... essentially a military approach...*' with plans to weaken communications and infrastructure, with a co-ordinated attack on things like fibre lines, exchanges, motorways and major routes.

1.22. The sentencing judge noted elements of exaggeration in the messages sent by Mr Lewin but said that by this time he had decided to take terrorist action and his trigger was going to be the introduction of what he viewed as Covid passports. He had told online contacts that his plan was to take action sometime in September 2021.

1.23. Following his message of 25 July 2021, two undercover police officers contacted Mr Lewin and purported to express support for his agenda. The sentencing judge said that there was no suggestion the officers acted improperly but as a necessary part of engagement with Mr Lewin they had expressed support and on occasion adoration of his expertise and military background. The judge said that this rationale, undoubtedly, led Mr Lewin into further exaggeration, including telling lies about the extent of the preparations he was undertaking. He communicated with the officers over the next four and a half weeks, telling them the detail of his plans. The judge said that those messages were permeated with truthful expressions of Mr Lewin's intentions and activities, but that they also contained outright lies.

1.24. Mr Lewin's position is that it was the undercover police officers who pressured him to provide more and more information, and his neurodiversity led him to act in ways that would please others as he would become desperate for social interaction and would be exploited as a result of this. He told the panel that he now had a '*strong enough view*' of Counter Terrorism Police that he wanted to prove his claims of entrapment to be true. He said that if his attempt with the Criminal Case Review Commission was unsuccessful, he would take matters to the European Courts and the United Nations. He said that he would '*not stop until someone says why they did what they did*'. Mr Lewin told the panel that if, ultimately, he was unsuccessful, it would '*ruin my trust*'. He said that he would then no longer want to live in the United Kingdom because he would consider it to have '*double standards*' about '*the rule of law*'. Mr

Lewin said that he would most likely go to the USA, although this is an unrealistic ambition because he would be unlikely to be allowed to enter the country given his conviction.

1.25. On 26 July 2021, Mr Lewin told the officers that he had conducted reconnaissance on various targets and that he was ready to act. The judge said in this respect that there was no doubt Mr Lewin had identified a number of local transmitters as potential targets, but he was clearly not ready to take action. Later, on 26 July 2021, Mr Lewin began to write a manual designed to provide instructions for potential supporters. He worked on the document for two days, completing four of the intended seventeen chapters. The judge said that the introduction set out Mr Lewin's objectives of disrupting communications and major infrastructure. Mr Lewin had indicated that his ideal primary objective would be to topple the government, install a civilian led alternative, and he had set out equipment people should obtain, including weapons.

1.26. On various occasions between 27 July 2021 and 25 August 2021, Mr Lewin told the officers that he was still working on the manual, although, as the judge noted, he had abandoned it on 27 July 2021. Witnesses at the oral hearing accepted that references to him sharing the manual with others were errors. Mr Lewin told the panel that he had been '*pestered to work on it*' by the officers and had only started the manual because the officers had asked for it.

1.27. The judge said that by the end of July 2021, Mr Lewin was conducting research on two transmitters in the Leicestershire area. He had discussed these with the officers and had encouraged them to target a major transmitter located in Sutton Coldfield, and to co-ordinate that attack with his action. Mr Lewin told the panel that he had not suggested the Sutton Coldfield site, that the officers had proposed the idea and he had said no. The judge said that at the same time as speaking with the officers, Mr Lewin was speaking to others online in an attempt to recruit them. As an example, the judge noted on 1 August 2021, Mr Lewin spoke to someone on Telegram and said '*I have a strategy that I think will work but it carries risk. It's a way of sending a strong message, but without using violence or causing injury as far as can be avoided*'. He went on to say, '*my idea is to disable vital communications and transport infrastructure to a point that has an impact on the country*'. He also said, '*I'm not alone either. There are guys thinking like me all over the country and we are ready to go*'. Four days later he told a different man, '*we are mobilising in September. If you fancy actually doing something that doesn't include sitting on your arse, here's your chance*'.

1.28. Mr Lewin sent the officers videos of what he claimed were reconnaissance he had carried out on 6 August and 7 August 2021 and which the judge noted was untrue – he had been out to buy beer. On 10 August 2021, he took photographs of three communication masts, sent images to the officers indicating proposed targets and said that he would be conducting a dry run in the near future. The judge noted that Mr Lewin also sought to recruit two of his friends to assist him, one of whom was 16 or 17 years old and that it was

reported the other had Asperger's. The judge said that both individuals were, to an extent, vulnerable.

1.29. On 17 August 2021, Mr Lewin sent messages to the officers of further reconnaissance of a nearby quarry when in fact he had not visited the quarry that day and had been at home. He later sent a video to the officers, claiming it was reconnaissance and the judge said that it was in all probability no more than an evening stroll.

1.30. On 18 August 2021, Mr Lewin began to build a dugout in a wooded area, spending about two hours on it and removing about 12 inches of soil. He sent videos to the officers and suggested he was digging close to the masts. The judge said he was in fact four miles away from the mast location and nowhere near any of the targets the Prosecution had relied upon.

1.31. The judge noted that Mr Lewin returned to the dugout, continued to suggest to officers that he was digging near to crucial targets and that this was demonstrably untrue. The judge noted that Mr Lewin also communicated with a Telegram contact on 18 August 2021 in an attempt to recruit them.

1.32. On 19 August 2021, Mr Lewin walked to a communication mast, located manhole covers which he believed had fibre cables beneath, took videos expressing an intention to return with a specialist tool to allow him to open the covers and sent the videos to the officers. Later that night, he looked online for a suitable key to open the covers, although he never bought or attempted to buy one.

1.33. On 23 August 2021, Mr Lewin sent images of two communication masts to the officers and on one image he had drawn a pair of scissors next to cabling. He sent a message saying, '*chop here, job done*'. He sent further images to the officers on 24 August 2021, and the judge said that the police then arrested him on 25 August 2021 because his real-world plans were accelerating.

1.34. In sentencing Mr Lewin, the judge said,

'In approaching the question of what you genuinely intended, the starting point is the jury's conclusion that between 24 July and 25 August 2021, you held an intention to commit an act of terror, and took at least some preparatory steps to bring that about. In this respect, and being faithful to the jury's verdict, I conclude that you intended to attack communication transmitters by cutting cables either on the masts or running underground. You told your online contacts that you were going to act when Covid passports were introduced, and you appear to have believed that this was likely to occur in September of 2021.'

1.35. The judge said that Mr Lewin had planned to cause significant and lasting damage to transmitters in the East Midlands, with two principle targets. He had consistently sought to encourage others to assist him and to engage in similar activities and, in particular, had sought to encourage undercover officers to attack a mast in the West Midlands. The judge noted that the West Midlands transmitter was a part of the UK critical national infrastructure, providing TV and Radio signals to 4.2 million homes. The judge said that all of the identified

masts provided mobile phone coverage and an outage would have caused disruption to the work of the emergency services and would have placed emergency service workers at risk because they would not have been able to contact colleagues.

1.36. The judge noted that Mr Lewin had believed that the time to act would have been as early as September 2021 but said that whether he would or could have done so was a different question. Mr Lewin had repeatedly told the officers that an essential part of the plan involved digging hideouts close to proposed targets. He had never constructed a hideout and the judge said that he had not visited a single potential target on more than one occasion and had never finalised a plan of action.

1.37. The judge said,

'In light of all of the evidence, I conclude that at the time of your arrest, your plans were far from complete, and your intended terrorist action was not imminent. In my judgment, you certainly did not intend to use violence or cause injury. In relation to potentially attacking a Colbert and/or fibre lines running along the motorway, these were ideas that you expressed in August of 2021, and in my judgment your state of mind fell short of amounting to an intention to target these things.'

'Turning to the particulars of the indictment, the prosecution allege that the preparatory steps you took involved four activities. First, engaging in reconnaissance of potential targets. In this respect, I am satisfied as a minimum your reconnaissance at Copt Oak and Bardon Hill was in preparation for intended terrorist act. Secondly, purchasing equipment and tools, you had a genuine fascination with military matters, and I accept that many of the items you purchased on eBay were initially bought for an innocent purpose. Thirdly, digging a hideout. You did not complete any hideout and I am not satisfied that the one you commenced on 18 August was connected to terrorism. Finally, seeking to recruit others. You did this on a consistent basis over the indictment period. Your objective was to influence the government although, in reality, the prospects of you successfully doing so were remote in the extreme.'

1.38. The author of the PSR noted that although Mr Lewin had since realised that his perception of the Covid vaccine was incorrect, if similar circumstances were to present themselves, he could become embroiled in the same behaviour once again should circumstances such as positive accommodation, structured routine, meaningful employment and improved social capital not be developed. Mr Lewin told the panel that he no longer believed that the Covid vaccine was designed to kill people. He said that it was not a vaccine because some people have had several Covid vaccines and still contract Coronavirus. He spoke of the vaccine being 'gene therapy' and 'a cure for cancer'.

1.39. Mr Lewin told the panel that he was not criminally minded, he enjoyed rules and said that this brings order to his day. He spoke of the difficulties he faces in custody, particularly due to his neurodiversity and that the risk of coming back to prison would be enough to stop anything happening again. Mr

Lewin also said that the likelihood of a similar situation to the Coronavirus emerging again was so remote that it could be considered to be '*impossible*' and so this further mitigated the risk of reoffending.

1.40. OASys identifies risk factors in this case as accommodation, employment & training, relationships, lifestyle & associates, alcohol misuse, thinking & behaviour and attitudes. The panel accepted these risk factors. The dossier references past issues with alcohol use, although Mr Lewin said that he had rules he had abided by, such as not drinking before 8pm and not drinking two days in a row. He said that he had imposed these rules even when he was not going to work during the Coronavirus lockdown. His evidence is at odds with the reports in the dossier.

1.41. In a psychiatric report produced on the instruction of his legal representatives in 2022 ahead of sentencing, the author noted that Mr Lewin '*... described consumption of alcohol to excess over the last decade. He described consumption of 20 cans of beer on a daily basis. He described consuming alcohol through the day when he was not at work. He stated that his consumption of alcohol had increased over the last 2 to 3 years during the COVID period. He described openly that he would be drunk through the day. He described consumption of alcohol to the exclusion of other activities. He described increasing tolerance to alcohol. He described feeling increasing craving for alcohol and withdrawal symptomatology from alcohol, including increasing craving for it and irritability when he did not consume alcohol ...*

1.42. Mr Lewin told the panel that the comments in the psychiatric report were not true and that his legal representatives had told him at the time that it was '*too late*' and there was '*no money to change it*'. It may be that Mr Lewin's account to the psychiatrist was an example of his tendency to tell untruths or to exaggerate. The panel considered, on the balance of probabilities, that the author had more likely than not produced an accurate account of the interview with Mr Lewin. In the panel's assessment, in fairness to Mr Lewin, it should not simply consider that the earlier account is the correct one. However, it does evidence a need for professionals to check and challenge accounts provided by Mr Lewin about his behaviours and the narrative of his life.

1.43. [Prison Psychologist] produced an ERG-R assessment dated 29 September 2025. She had noted that assessing risk had been difficult because Mr Lewin had not engaged with it. He had initially chosen to engage via written means but had wanted legal advice about some of the questions. It was reported that the response from his legal representatives did not come back in time and so Mr Lewin had politely declined to participate. The [Prison Psychologist]'s report was produced based on existing documents and conversations with other professionals who knew Mr Lewin. In her evidence to the panel, she said that Mr Lewin's risks would likely include social detachment, a need for belonging and identity, his ability to cope with life's challenges and his neurodiversity. The [Prison Psychologist] said that the risk linked to ideology was '*difficult to pin down*'.

1.44. In the panel's assessment, Mr Lewin's neurodiversity helps to explain some of his behaviours and thinking, although it is not in and of itself a risk factor. It is important that Mr Lewin has the support of professionals who can identify best ways of working with and helping him.

1.45. The panel accepted that social isolation, a need for belonging and identity, coping with life's challenges and social detachment would be risk factors. It also considered feelings of low self-esteem or self-worth to be further areas of risk. All or some of these elements would risk Mr Lewin becoming drawn to online activity and heavily focussed on conspiracy theories or a sense of injustice. Mr Lewin told the panel that his offending had been '*internet based*' when he '*went looking for conspiracy theories*', but he said he '*believed them for good reason...*'.

1.46. Ideological beliefs, particularly in terms of antisemitic views remain a relevant risk factor in this case. Mr Lewin expressed his views at the oral hearing, and the panel noted his comments in the PSR being more about the '*ruling elite*' rather than being specifically directed towards Jewish people. The POM had held extensive discussions with Mr Lewin and had noted in his report to the panel that Mr Lewin's comments about Jewish people '*was more in the context of "global elite" than anti-Semitic*'.

1.47. Ms Thomson's closing written submissions noted that Mr Lewin '*... was not convicted in connection with a hate-based offence. Rather, he was found guilty of an offence under s.5 Terrorism Act 2006, and this feature was taken into account in sentencing ...*'.

1.48. The sentencing judge noted hostility towards Jewish people expressed in his online activity and, in the panel's assessment, it is a relevant consideration when reviewing Mr Lewin's likely risk. The panel must consider the totality of his behaviour and attitudes, as set out in the sentencing remarks. The panel was mindful of the elements of exaggeration and untruths recorded and it focused on what the judge had recorded in the sentencing remarks about the case. There is yet to be any real exploration of Mr Lewin's attitudes through the completion of offence focussed work. The [Prison Psychologist] said that there '*... may be some elements of radicalisation*', but she did not know enough at this stage.

1.49. Given Mr Lewin's view of Counter Terrorism Police, his attitude towards authority/police should be kept under review. If he is unsuccessful in his hope of addressing his conviction, there is a potential that this could escalate his risk to others. The COM, in his report of 20 October 2025, noted that Mr Lewin had engaged '*to a degree*' with the allocated police officer who would be jointly managing him in the community. However, the COM noted that Mr Lewin had said that he would engage with the officer in the community.

2. Analysis of Evidence of Change (The Present)

2.1. In terms of custodial behaviour, there has been little of concern reported. The POM said that Mr Lewin had achieved Enhanced IEP status, and he accepted that there was an error in his report when he questioned why Mr Lewin had not been Enhanced before. Mr Lewin had reported that he had been Enhanced at a previous prison.

2.2. The POM confirmed that there had been no adjudications, no negative entries recorded against him, and no drug or alcohol issues. The POM said that he had known Mr Lewin since early 2023 and that he was seen as '*open and transparent*' in conversations. The POM also noted that he had witnessed other prisoners' discriminatory behaviour towards Mr Lewin, which he linked to his neurodiversity. Mr Lewin spoke about his work in the art department, which he welcomed because it offered him a regular routine.

2.3. Mr Lewin is yet to complete any structured offence focussed work to address his offending behaviour. The panel was mindful of the detailed discussions with professionals, particularly the POM and Mr Lewin's self-reflection. Risk reduction is not simply confined to accredited coursework and there may be other ways for Mr Lewin to show that his risk to the public has changed.

2.4. The Healthy Identity Intervention (HII) programme had been proposed, which is an accredited course designed to address extremist offending and ways of disengaging. The [Prison Psychologist]'s ERG-R report had noted that Mr Lewin had been frustrated about HII being proposed which he felt had an aim to change his political identity. She noted that Mr Lewin was more open to HII when told that the facilitator would work with his standpoint and not the standpoint of others.

2.5. Mr Lewin told the panel that he had not been opposed to HII and had never '*flatly rejected*' it, he said that he had wanted reassurance and had not wanted a '*soviet style re-education*'. He said that '*curiosity*' now meant that HII intrigued him '*to be enthusiastic about it*'. He said, '*it can't do any harm can it*'. The [Prison Psychologist] considered Mr Lewin's curiosity about HII to be a positive step.

3. Analysis of the Manageability of Risk (The Future)

3.1. OASys identifies a medium risk of serious harm towards the public and children, which the COM's report indicated was a risk of recruitment to terrorism.

3.2. In OASys it is indicated that, '*Risk is greatest when Mr Lewin is online, alone, and embroiled in deep conspiracy theories. Such risks are greatest when he is potentially struggling with his mental health, consuming alcohol which could disinhibit his actions, and when he perceives wrongdoing or injustice based on false narratives/conspiracies. Also greater when engaging with*

problematic individuals or materials, and when he feels justified in acting inappropriately online. Risks are not immediate, but could become more likely should Mr Lewin have unmonitored use of the internet, together with engaging with others of a similar mindset. Risks are not present in custody, and would be greater in public if monitoring measures are not present.'

3.3. The panel was mindful that the sentencing judge had considered that Mr Lewin had not intended to use violence or cause injury in the index offence. The judge had also considered that '*there was little prospect of [Mr Lewin's] actions causing serious harm to any individual*', although at the time of his arrest, Mr Lewin's plan was far from complete.

3.4. However, the judge noted that the plan was to cause significant damage to transmitters and that Mr Lewin had consistently attempted to recruit others, including vulnerable individuals, to assist him and to engage in similar activities. The judge noted the potential for serious disruption to the work of emergency services and that this would place emergency workers at risk.

3.5. Risk of serious harm extends beyond violence and includes psychological harm. The panel considered that there likely would have been a risk of serious harm to the public if Mr Lewin had been able to progress his plans.

3.6. In the panel's assessment, the risk of serious harm is underestimated in this case. The panel considered the risk of serious harm to be more likely high if an offence were to be committed, and particularly if Mr Lewin were to be successful on a future occasion in persuading others to follow his ideas.

3.7. However, the risk of serious harm to the public would only be high if Mr Lewin did commit a further offence. OASys identifies a low risk of further offending (general or violent offending) and a low risk of serious recidivism (RSR). The POM stated that RSR is a poor indicator of future risk in Terrorism Act (TACT) cases. The COM noted that Mr Lewin was yet to be tested in the community and therefore he considered the risk of further offending to be medium.

3.8. The panel accepted that OASys is not a useful assessment tool in considering likely further offending in TACT cases and the panel placed greater weight on the ERG-R assessment produced by [Prison Psychologist]. The ERG-R identified high engagement in extreme thinking and behaviour, with a moderate level of intent, capabilities and protective factors.

3.9. Ms Thomson's closing written submissions noted that the sentencing judge considered whether to make a finding that Mr Lewin was '*a dangerous offender and declined to do so*'. Ms Thomson also highlighted that Mr Lewin has no previous convictions and the panel was mindful that Mr Lewin was 36/37 years old at the time of his offending. Ms Thomson also submitted that, '*The offence took place in wholly exceptional and unprecedented circumstances in view of the Coronavirus pandemic and the stressors which caused a 'cognitive opening' for Mr Lewin ...*'.

3.10. In the panel's assessment, at first glance it might seem that the risk of further offending is reduced given the '*unprecedented circumstances*' of the Coronavirus pandemic and that prior to this Mr Lewin had not been convicted of any offending. However, much of the assessment of Mr Lewin's attitude, thinking and behaviour is based on a personal narrative of change. Mr Lewin is yet to have an opportunity to engage in constructive work that might challenge his thinking and attitudes. The [Prison Psychologist] was reliant on existing documentation and discussions with professionals in her assessment of Mr Lewin because he declined to participate in her completion of the ERG-R. The [Prison Psychologist] told the panel in oral evidence that she did not '*feel we have a full understanding of his risk*' and that there had not yet been an opportunity to explore '*internal drivers*' with Mr Lewin and his understanding of them.

3.11. In the panel's view, noting all available evidence, it would be reasonable to conclude that the risk of further serious offending would be at least medium at this stage. The panel has acknowledged potential mitigation of risk, but it agreed with the [Prison Psychologist] that not enough was yet known about Mr Lewin's risk. The panel was also concerned, when noting the obsession with conspiracy theories at the time of his offending, that risk of reoffending could escalate quickly. Those responsible for the case would need to be confident that warning signs could be spotted. The [Prison Psychologist] said that warning signs would be spotted because Mr Lewin is '*frank in discussions*'.

3.12. The panel was also mindful that Mr Lewin does not wish to return to prison ever again. If he truly understands his level of risk and the drivers for his offending, then his wish to avoid custody may act as a deterrent. If he does not understand his risk, there is the potential, in the panel's view, for him to avoid raising issues so as not to risk a recall to custody.

3.13. The POM and COM supported Mr Lewin's release on licence. The [Prison Psychologist] did not.

3.14. The [Prison Psychologist]'s view was that HII needed to be completed in custody, she considered this to be '*core work*' and she could not be confident that Mr Lewin's risk to others could be managed on release. The [Prison Psychologist] said that risk would not be imminent but that she believed the risk to the public to be greater than minimal. The [Prison Psychologist] said that the risk management plan would be robust but that it was reliant on external controls because she did not think that Mr Lewin understood his risk, and she needed to be sure that his internal controls were understood.

3.15. The [Prison Psychologist] said that HII was '*not a tick box*' and that people needed to meaningfully engage. She said that it was hard to say if Mr Lewin was '*treatment ready*', although she had seen some positive shift in his attitude towards HII in his oral evidence. The [Prison Psychologist] also recommended completion of the Desistance & Disengagement Programme (DDP). In her view, it would be usual to complete HII and then DDP, which

could commence in custody and continue in the community. However, she said that she was not '*fixed on sequencing*' and that '*DDP might open him up to HII*'.

3.16. The POM told the panel that he believed Mr Lewin could complete HII in the community. He had taken a view that the threshold of the risk of serious harm had not been crossed and so it was not necessary for Mr Lewin to remain in custody to complete offence focussed work. The POM also said that there was '*only one opportunity to complete the intervention*' and so he did not want Mr Lewin to undertake HII until it was to be beneficial. The POM said that Mr Lewin had agreed to start HII but had also said that if it tried to change his political beliefs, he would disengage. The [Prison Psychologist] said that it '*can be trickier*' if people complete HII before they are ready to do so, but she said that refresher work could be offered at a later time, if necessary.

3.17. The COM said that there would be a lot of reliance on the external controls of the proposed risk management plan, particularly in light of Mr Lewin's neurodiversity. However, he considered those controls to be robust and that Mr Lewin would be likely to engage with his licence. The COM said that there had been mistrust of him by Mr Lewin when they first met, having taken responsibility for the case in May 2025. The COM said that there had been '*improved trust*' following around four meetings with Mr Lewin.

3.18. The COM said that HII '*is work we would like him to do*', but he felt that this could be undertaken in the community and not in custody. Mr Lewin would have a licence condition to engage with offending behaviour work and the COM said that if he failed to engage with HII there would be a review of the case and consideration of whether risk remained manageable in the community.

3.19. The COM said that it would be wrong to say he had a full understanding of risk, but he considered that work could be done with Mr Lewin. Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) meetings had taken place in the lead up to the oral hearing and the COM said that there would be '*joined up working*' between Probation and Counter Terrorism Police. If released, Mr Lewin could commence HII '*imminently*'.

3.20. Any release would see Mr Lewin placed in a Probation Approved Premises and as a National Security Division (NSD) Probation case, he would be able to remain at the hostel for up to 12 months. The COM detailed the likely location of the Approved Premises and asked that a further exclusion zone be considered by the panel. The panel was satisfied that the additional zone would be proportionate and necessary. Mr Lewin confirmed that he had no issue with the additional exclusion zone.

3.21. A range of licence conditions were proposed to manage and supervise Mr Lewin in the community, including restrictions on internet access, the people he can contact and his mobile phone use. Mr Lewin would be subject to GPS tagging for 12 months, a curfew and sign-in time. A number of conditions were proposed and were designed to manage extremist offenders on licence.

3.22. The panel was not persuaded that a condition restricting places of worship Mr Lewin might attend would be proportionate and necessary. The COM stated that it had been included due to the risk of antisemitism, however, Mr Lewin's attitudes towards Jewish people had been expressed online and his targets as a part of his intended terrorist action did not include any places of worship. GPS tagging of Mr Lewin would be able to identify any concerns about his movements, and the condition could be revisited by way of an application to the Parole Board if it was later determined to be a necessary and proportionate addition.

3.23. The panel accepted that all the remaining proposed licence conditions would be proportionate and necessary. Mr Lewin told the panel that he would '*100% be open and honest*' with his COM. He said that '*rules are king*' and that he would be '*compelled*' to follow his licence conditions, which he said made sense to him.

3.24. Mr Lewin detailed his plans for the future, which he told the panel were '*multi-faceted*'. He said that he had hopes to secure a patent on an idea that he felt could '*be huge and make a difference*'. He is clearly an ambitious man, but he also noted other opportunities to pursue income and support himself while he worked on his longer-term plans. Mr Lewin spoke of the support he has from his father and stepmother. The COM and POM had spoken to them, and the panel was told that they are very supportive of Mr Lewin. The COM and Counter Terrorism Police had also met with Mr Lewin's father.

3.25. The panel considered the risk management plan to have been developed with care. It offered support for Mr Lewin in his resettlement and a level of monitoring of him in the community. The plan was largely reliant on external controls because Mr Lewin is yet to engage with any significant offence focussed work. The external risk management controls will only be effective if Mr Lewin complies with them. The COM and POM believed that there likely would be compliance. In assessing the likely effectiveness of the release plan, the panel was mindful that assessment of Mr Lewin's level of risk and his understanding of that risk has been limited on this sentence.

4. Conclusion

4.1. The panel considered all available evidence and the detailed closing written submissions from Ms Thomson. The panel also considered closing oral submissions from Mr Hill on the second day of the hearing.

4.2. Mr Hill asked the panel not to lose sight of the impact of the Coronavirus pandemic. He spoke of insight developed by Mr Lewin in custody and his better understanding of his neurodiversity. Mr Hill submitted that Mr Lewin welcomed rules and structure and said that he would be likely to comply with the terms of his release.

4.3. In her subsequent closing written submissions, Ms Thomson reiterated that the index offence had been in '*wholly exceptional and unprecedented*

circumstances'. She stated that Mr Lewin had, in many respects, been a model prisoner. Ms Thomson also submitted that it would be '*... inconsistent with Mr Lewin wanting to clear his name that he should be convicted for a further offence in the future...*'.

4.4. The Index Offence was a serious matter and, as identified by the panel, Mr Lewin's plan in the index offence, although far from complete at the time of his arrest, created a risk of serious harm given the significant damage and disruption that it could have led to.

4.5. It is reasonable to note that Mr Lewin has a better understanding of his neurodiversity and of himself, however, the panel was not persuaded that this, at this point, establishes that Mr Lewin has a better understanding of his risk factors and his offending behaviour. At times in his oral evidence, in the panel's assessment, Mr Lewin minimised responsibility for his behaviour and his actions, for example, he blamed the undercover officers for initially making comments about Jewish people. The chronology of the case, as detailed in the sentencing remarks, established that Mr Lewin had made comments about Jewish people before he joined Resistance UK and therefore before the officers had first been in contact with him.

4.6. Mr Lewin elected not to participate in the ERG-R assessment and the panel was concerned that much of the evaluations by professionals have been reliant on Mr Lewin's narrative of his life. He is not a reliable historian. He has admitted to telling lies in the past and exaggerating events in his life as a way to gain friends. The sentencing judge made a detailed reference to this.

4.7. It is reasonable to note that the Coronavirus pandemic was an unusual event, but the panel was not persuaded that this offered a definitive mitigation of likely future risk. Despite telling the panel that he no longer believed that the Covid vaccine had been designed to kill people, much of his oral evidence set out why he felt justified in his actions at the time of the index offence.

4.8. The panel was mindful of inconsistencies in Mr Lewin's narrative, for example, his use of alcohol which he had previously stated was excessive but in oral evidence stated that he had always adhered to strict rules. He also stated that the sentencing judge was wrong in his account that Mr Lewin had viewed government restrictions on his movements in the first lockdown as an unjustified attack on his civil liberties

4.9. Risk reduction can be evidenced in many ways, including self-reflection and completion of offending behaviour work. But, in this case, in the absence of accredited work, the panel was not persuaded that there had been sufficient challenge and evaluation of Mr Lewin. In noting the differing views of the case by the professional witnesses, the panel preferred the assessment by the [Prison Psychologist]. Put simply, not enough is yet known about Mr Lewin's risk and the drivers for his offending.

4.10. The panel recognised the positive behaviour in custody, but this has been in a carefully controlled environment, and it does not follow that Mr Lewin's

behaviour in the community would not be without issue. There is a need for those managing Mr Lewin's case and for Mr Lewin himself to have a better understanding of his offending behaviour so that there can be greater certainty that his risk to the public is reducing.

4.11. Presently, in the absence of effective risk reduction work, the panel identified a likely high risk of serious harm and a medium risk of a further serious offence. The risk management plan would be heavily reliant on external controls and even under the proposed plan, the panel considered that Mr Lewin's risk to the public would be greater than minimal if he were to be released.

4.12. Mr Lewin first needs to work with professionals to ensure that he is '*treatment ready*' to engage with HII. The [Prison Psychologist] set out that work on DDP might assist with this. Mr Lewin then needs to meaningfully engage with HII and the panel accepted that it would be necessary for this work to be completed in custody and not in the community. Following the completion of the work, there should be an updated ERG-R. If Mr Lewin wishes to evidence a change in risk, he should ensure that he engages with the assessment.

4.13. In its assessment of Mr Lewin's case, the panel determined that he does not meet the test for release. It remains necessary for the protection of the public that he be confined and the panel makes no direction as to release.

Annex A**The Codified Public Protection Test**

The codified public protection test (called a "public protection decision"), set out in section 28ZE of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 and section 237A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, reads as follows:

A "public protection decision", in relation to a prisoner, is a decision as to whether the decision-maker is satisfied that it is [not necessary, or no longer necessary,] for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined.

The decision-maker must not be so satisfied unless the decision-maker considers that there is no more than a minimal risk that, were the prisoner no longer confined, the prisoner would commit a further offence the commission of which would cause serious harm.

In making that assessment, the decision-maker must consider the risk that the prisoner would engage in conduct which would (or, if carried out in any particular part of the United Kingdom, would) constitute an offence specified in [Schedule 18B to the Criminal Justice Act 2003].

When making a public protection decision about a prisoner, the following matters must be taken into account by the decision-maker—

- (a) the nature and seriousness of the offence in respect of which the relevant sentence was imposed;*
- (b) the nature and seriousness of any other offence for which the prisoner has at any time been convicted;*
- (c) the conduct of the prisoner while serving the relevant sentence (whether in prison or on licence);*
- (d) the risk that the prisoner would commit a further offence (whether or not specified in [Schedule 18B to the Criminal Justice Act 2003]) if no longer confined;*
- (e) the risk that, if released on licence, the prisoner would fail to comply with one or more licence conditions;*

(f)any evidence of the effectiveness in reducing the risk the prisoner poses to the public of any treatment, education or training the prisoner has received or participated in while serving the relevant sentence;

(g)any submissions made by or on behalf of the prisoner or the Secretary of State (whether or not on a matter mentioned [above]).

When making a public protection decision about a prisoner, the decision-maker must in particular have regard to the protection of any victim of the prisoner.

For the purposes of [this test]:

a "victim" of a prisoner is a person who meets the definition of victim in section 1 of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 by reference to the conduct which constituted the offence for which the relevant sentence was imposed.

... "relevant sentence" means the sentence in respect of which the public protection decision is made.

This [test]does not limit the matters which the decision-maker must or may take into account when making a public protection decision.

Information Sheet

The decision in this case has now been issued.

Reconsideration

This case is eligible for Reconsideration under Rule 28 of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended). This means that the decision about release or a licence termination (where applicable) is provisional at this stage.

If a party wishes for this case to be reconsidered, then they must make an application setting out the basis on which they say the decision is 'irrational', 'procedurally unfair' and/or there has been an 'error of law'. Further guidance and an application form for prisoners (form CPD2) is provided on the Parole Board section of the Gov.uk Website.

[Routes of challenge - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk)

Under Rule 28 the time allowed for an application is 21 days from the date it is sent to the parties. Any application made after the 21-day time limit will not be accepted by the Parole Board. However, under Rule 9 of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended), the time limit may be reduced or extended by the panel chair or a duty member where it is necessary to do so for the effective management of the case, in the interests of justice or for any such purpose as the panel chair or duty member considers appropriate. Any request for an extension or reduction must also be made before the 21-day time limit expires.

If an application for reconsideration is not received within the 21 days (or any altered time limit), then the decision becomes final.

If an application is received, the party which has not made the application will have 7 days to submit their own representations, unless varied under Rule 9 by a panel chair or duty member. The application is then sent to the decision maker for consideration.

When a decision is made on any reconsideration application, both parties will be notified of the outcome. If reconsideration is directed, the decision will set out what happens next. If the application is rejected, the decision will then become final.

management of the case, in the interests of justice or for any such purpose as the panel chair or duty member considers appropriate. Any request for an extension or reduction must also be made before the 21-day time limit expires.

If an application is received, the party which has not made the application will have 7 days to submit their own representations, unless varied under Rule 9 by



3rd Floor, 10 South Colonnade, London E14 4PU



www.gov.uk/government/organisations/parole-board



info@paroleboard.gov.uk



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0203 880 0885

a panel chair or duty member. The application is then sent to the decision maker for consideration.

When a decision is made on any set aside application, both parties will be notified of the outcome. If the application is granted, the decision will set out what happens next. If the application is rejected, the decision remains final.