



EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: Mrs A Wozniak

Respondent: Nandha Property Group Limited

Heard at: Watford by CVP

On: 11, 12 & 13 August 2025

Before: Employment Judge Isabel Manley

Members: Mr D Sagar
Mr D Wharton

Representation

Claimant: In person

Respondent: Mr Nandha, Director

JUDGMENT having been sent to the parties on 10 September 2025 and written reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 60 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure, the following reasons are provided:

REASONS

Introduction and issues

1. This was a three-day hearing to determine the claimant's claims against the respondent. The tribunal wants to thank both the claimant and Mr Nandha, neither of whom had legal representation or training, for the way they have conducted themselves during this hearing, behaving respectfully and assisting the tribunal where they could.
2. The issues for the tribunal were decided at a case management preliminary hearing in August 2024. They appear later in our conclusions. In summary, the claimant is bringing claims for constructive unfair dismissal, indirect sex discrimination and harassment related to sex.

The hearing

3. Before the hearing we were sent a bundle of documents prepared by the respondent running to 99 pages, and we also had short statements from Mr Nandha and his wife, Mrs Nandha.
4. There was no witness statement for the claimant and we discussed that at the

beginning of the hearing. The claimant told us that she had not understood she needed to provide a witness statement although that information is clear from the case management summary, and she was, as we understand it, reminded by the respondent before this hearing that she needed to provide one.

5. In any event, we agreed it would be sensible to try and carry on and it was agreed that the claimant could rely on the information contained in her claim form and also the summary of her factual allegations as set out in the case management summary. She was then asked questions by way of cross examination by Mr Nandha and asked further questions by the tribunal. The respondent's witnesses gave evidence and were cross-examined by the claimant and, again, were asked questions by the tribunal. This led to the claimant asking whether she could "clarify" matters which we allowed her to do as long as the respondent had an opportunity to respond.
6. The parties made submissions. The claimant's submissions were in writing and Mr Nandha made oral submissions. We took them into account as we deliberated.
7. We gave oral judgment on the third day.

The facts

8. These are the facts upon which we have based our judgment. We do not repeat all the information we have been given; we have concentrated our attention on those facts we need for determination of the issues.
9. The claimant worked as a Post Office Assistant at Biggleswade Post Office, which is an independent franchise, from 1 August 2021. She resigned with her last working day being 8 December 2023.
10. Her written contract, which we have seen in the bundle, was for 10 hours a week and there is no further stipulation of times to be worked.
11. The claimant's evidence was that she applied for that job because the opening hours were up to 3.30pm and that fitted with her childcare responsibilities. The tribunal accepts that the claimant worked more than 10 hours per week from August 2021 until the respondent took over in September 2023, perhaps as many as 30 per week, although we have seen no documentary evidence of the earlier period.
12. In September 2023, Mr and Mrs Nandha bought the business. They agreed at their interview with Post Office Limited that Biggleswade Post Office would revert to their normal pre-Covid hours of 9am to 5.30pm, Monday to Friday. It was also open on Saturday.
13. There were three staff which transferred to the respondent under the TUPE Regulations; the claimant and another member of staff, Thomas, on a 10 hour per week contract, and another full-time member of staff. Mr and Mrs Nandha intended to work themselves in the post office and had training for that during September, including from existing members of staff.

14. Mr and Mrs Nandha were made aware by the claimant that she had childcare responsibilities and could only work beyond 3.30pm, as a general rule, on a Friday. They had no information about how many hours the claimant had worked before they took over. The claimant was asked in either September or in October, or possibly both, what days she could work until 5.30pm. She said Fridays.
15. The indirect discrimination provisions require identification of a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) and that identified at the preliminary hearing in this case appears at issue 4.1. This requires a tribunal to decide whether the respondent had a PCP that the respondent *"implemented a change to working hours requiring all post office assistants and or customer service assistants to work until 5.30pm on the days they worked between Monday to Saturday"*. The tribunal cannot find that that there was such a requirement. What did happen was that there was a change in the opening hours to 5.30pm and the requirement was that the post office be open and staffed until 5.30pm but that did not extend to requiring all individual staff to cover those hours. Staff were requested to work until 5.30pm if they could.
16. During September 2023 the claimant worked 99 hours, which are roughly 24 per week. During October she worked 96.25, that is roughly 23.5 per week. This dropped in November to 83.41, which is roughly 19.5 per week. These calculations are taken from Mr Nandha's statement and they are not in dispute. We have also seen rotas for December and the first week of January, although the claimant, as we will come to, had resigned by then. This does show a drop in hours in December but then what would have been an increase in the first week of January. The average per week for the whole time the claimant worked for the respondent until her resignation was a little over 23 per week.
17. Looking again at the list of issues, at 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, with respect to the claim for unfair dismissal, there is a factual dispute about whether Mrs Nandha told the claimant that her hours would massively drop and/or that she refused to acknowledge Mrs Wozniak's childcare responsibilities. These statements are denied by Mrs Nandha. The tribunal accepts Mrs Nandha's evidence that she did not make these comments. We have taken into account not just her evidence but all the other evidence, much of which is contained in WhatsApp messages which we come to, which would indicate no such comments having been made and that is our finding.
18. The system was that Mr or Mrs Nandha would prepare a rota which would be discussed with staff for the coming weeks. This might be as little as a week or two before the time to be worked or, in some cases, it could be more like one or two months before the relevant date. We have seen various rotas. Those from the claimant are a little hard to read but seem broadly to tally with the respondent's copies.
19. The respondent's evidence is that the claimant would be asked for her availability first and they would fit in with her. The claimant does not dispute this except perhaps for the very final rotas. The claimant agreed that every time she had requested flexibility or a change in her shift, it was agreed. She accepted that she had never worked outside her availability.

20. The claimant's main concern, which emerged during the hearing and is not really directly referred to in the list of issues, was about the rotas that she had received, it seems, for December and early January. The respondent's evidence was that those rotas would have been agreed with her. The important features of those rotas from the claimant's point of view are that, in at least one case, it shows her working to 17.35 (5.35pm) on a couple of days other than Friday. Secondly, it indicated a reduction in hours to, in some cases, 13 per week, although, as I have indicated, there is then an indication of an increase later.
21. The tribunal has seen several WhatsApp messages. In particular one on 7 November where the claimant indicated to Mrs Nandha the days she could not work in December and that may well account for the reduction in the hours put on the rota.
22. The evidence is that there was a discussion around 23 November between the claimant and Mr Nandha about when the claimant could work particularly over their busy time of Christmas. The claimant asked for a reduction in her Saturdays to one per month. Part of that discussion also included a reference to whether she could work to 5.30pm particularly as one member of staff was due to take holiday in January. The respondent was aware that the claimant wanted as many hours as possible within her availability and this may well have been mentioned at the meeting. There is a reference to it later in the response Mr Nandha made to the claimant's resignation which we will come to at page 90 of the bundle.
23. The respondent believes that the claimant had agreed working the hours shown on these rotas but that is denied by the claimant. The respondent may well be wrong. It seems to have led in part to her resignation but the tribunal notes, and it is accepted, that the claimant did not go back to them to make any comments about those rotas showing and that she was shown to be working after 3.30pm on the days other than Friday.
24. The respondent's evidence is also that claimant might have more availability in the school holidays but the claimant made no comment about this.
25. We need to deal with the issues raised under the unfair dismissal heading. These are at 2.1.1.3 which is the question about whether the respondent reduced the claimant's hours because she could not work after 3.30pm. As indicated, we have found that there was, as a matter of fact, an apparent reduction towards the end of November and December. That may well have been in part because she could not work beyond 3.30pm except on Fridays. But there were other factors in play here about holidays and her request to work fewer Saturdays, so the reduction did not only take place just because of her unavailability after 3.30pm, except on Fridays.
26. As far as issue 2.1.1.4 is concerned, this is the allegation that Mrs Nandha suggested the claimant should take her 11 year old in to work. Mrs Nandha, whose evidence we accept, said that there was a lighthearted conversation about their 11-year-old children working in the post office . She denied the suggestion that she said that the claimant should get her older child to look after the younger one. The tribunal accepts that there was some sort of conversation about 11-year-olds and what they could potentially do if they were at work but this is not a

serious suggestion about any alterations to the claimant's childcare arrangements. The light-hearted tone fits in with the WhatsApp messages which we have seen.

27. Turning then to issue 2.1.1.5, this is the allegation that the claimant says she was told that she needed to work beyond 5.30pm. The tribunal finds that this was not said. It was a request but it was not a requirement.
28. The tribunal had very little evidence in writing but we did see quite a few WhatsApp messages between Mrs Nandha and the claimant. It does not appear that these are disputed and the claimant did not refer us to anything else in writing. In summary, the tribunal has found those to be very friendly exchanges; they are open and there are no concerns raised by the claimant about any times she was showing on the rota. In large part they show concern by both parties about the health and wellbeing of the other. For instance, there is a message on 19 October from the claimant (page 67) where she said, *"I just like my job and people I'm lucky to work for and with"*.
29. Later, in late November, shortly before the apparent difficulties arose, the claimant sent birthday congratulations to Mrs Nandha. Those exchanges indicate to the tribunal that there was flexibility about the rota and, indeed, working hours and holidays.
30. The claimant also asked for holidays in December and January in those WhatsApp messages.
31. We are asked to decide at issue 5.1.5 whether the claimant's hours reduced from the beginning of November to around 19 per week whilst her colleagues (and the claimant told the tribunal this relates to Thomas), increased. As indicated, the tribunal does find that there was a reduction; it was not from the beginning of November but from later in November and December. But, as stated before, this is through a combination of factors not simply about working beyond 3.30pm.
32. Issue 5.1.6 asks the tribunal to decide whether Mr Nandha suggested the claimant could cover for colleague's holidays and Mr Nandha accepted that he may well have said that as a way of her increasing her hours and we find that that was said.
33. In any event, and rather suddenly, the claimant handed in a resignation letter on 1 December. The tribunal accepts that the respondent was very surprised to receive this letter. It is probably worth reading most of it aloud now as it covers what the claimant said at the time. This reads:-

"Dear M and Mrs Nandha,

I am writing to inform of my resignation as a Post Office Assistant at Biggleswade Post Office. As per terms of my contract I'm providing you with one weeks notice of my intention to leave the company and the 8/12/2023 is my last working day.

Whilst I thoroughly enjoyed my last two years I've spent at the post office

I cannot continue my employment here due to employer's lack of flexibility as it comes to my working hours. Despite many conversations my requests for equalize the number of hours with other team members was not taken into account. Despite my readiness and willingness to work the amount of my working hours massively dropped. The only reason being inability to work after 3.30pm due to lack of childcare for my youngest son. While other team members were given more hours myself being the only one with school age child was given the least amount offered holiday cover and weekend staff position with three weekdays off even though I already work few Saturdays per month. Whilst I understand the fact that post office operates on Saturdays I also explained how working every weekend negatively impacts my family life and why I am not able to work every weekend. I feel like my issues were ignored and the only solution to my struggles with lack of hours would be on my availability to work after my son's school time or every Saturday. Despite many assurances that I'm very skilled and valued employee I hardly felt appreciated.

I have exhibited my wide range of skills and expertise while working at the post office and have contributed much to its success in recent years. I also learnt a lot in the process. Nevertheless, I believe it is now time for me to depart.

Thank you for offering me the opportunity to work with you and the team. I wish you and the company every success in the future ventures."

34. Mr Nandha replied to that, and this appears at page 90 of the bundle, by letter of 4 December. Again, it is probably worth reading the majority of that. He replied:-

"Dear Mrs Wozniak,

We are writing to acknowledge receipt of your resignation which was delivered by hand on 1 December 2023 at the end of your shift. It is unfortunate we are not able to find any solution and therefore we will be accepting your resignation from your position as Post Office Assistant at Biggleswade Post Office.

Your request for more hours could not be accommodated by the business as the needs and demands of the post office requires flexibility from 9 to 17.30 Monday to Saturday due to the increase in opening times since the change of ownership. This did prevent a fantastic opportunity to secure further hours of work for staff. However we do appreciate that the lack of childcare available to you has meant that this was not possible."

He then dealt with a dispute about whether the length of notice should be a week or four weeks and then thanked the claimant.

35. So that, in essence, was the end of the claimant's employment. Her last day was 8 December although we understand that she did not attend that week because of sick leave.

36. The claimant told us that, after she left, she applied either in mid to late November for a job, was interviewed swiftly and she started that job on 4 January 2024, which we understand she is still carrying out.
37. The tribunal needs to consider why the claimant resigned and we have found that it was a combination of matters including those stated directly in her resignation letter which refers to the fact that she wanted to increase her hours and ask for equality, which we understand to be with Thomas.
38. From the evidence we heard at the tribunal we find that she believed there was some pressure to work beyond 3.30pm particularly in light what was seen on the December and January rotas. This was not directly stated by the claimant to the respondent or in these proceedings until this hearing. So, the combination of what she perceived to be pressure about working beyond 3.30pm but also wanting to work more hours, if possible, was what contributed to her deciding to resign. We do not believe she resigned because she had found new work or that she had any concerns about other matters.

Law and submissions

39. The first claim is for constructive unfair dismissal. The tribunal is first concerned to decide whether there has been a dismissal in accordance with Section 95(1) c) Employment Rights Act 1996(ERA) which states:-
40. *"For the purposes of this Part an employee is dismissed by his employer if (and, subject to subsection (2)....only if)-*
41. *a)-*
42. *b)-*
43. *c) the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of his employer's conduct"*
44. This is what has become known as "constructive dismissal". The leading case of Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] ICR 221 makes it clear that the employer's conduct has to amount to a repudiatory breach. The employee must show a fundamental breach of contract that caused them to resign and that they did so without delay. The test set out in Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1997] IRLR 462 for breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence is clear that such a breach only occurs where *"without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee"*. This is a demanding test requiring more than unreasonable behaviour on the part of the employer who must show an intention to no longer be bound by the employment contract.
45. There are also claims under Equality Act 2010 (EQA).
46. The relevant parts of the EQA sections for the indirect and harassment

complaints are as follows:

19 Indirect discrimination

“(1)A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's.

(2)For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if—

(a)A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic,

(b)it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it,

(c)it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and

(d)A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.

26 Harassment

“(1)A person (A) harasses another (B) if—

(a)A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and

(b)the conduct has the purpose or effect of—

(i)violating B's dignity, or

(ii)creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.

(2)-

(3) -

(4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account—

(a)the perception of B;

(b)the other circumstances of the case;

(c)whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect”.

47. Also relevant to determining EQA complaints are sections on time limits and the burden of proof. The relevant sections read:

123 Time limits

“(1)Proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of—

(a)the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or

(b)such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.

(2)Proceedings may not be brought in reliance on section 121(1) after the end of—

(a)the period of 6 months starting with the date of the act to which the proceedings relate, or

(b)such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.

(3)For the purposes of this section—

(a)conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period;

(b)failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it.

(4)In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something—

(a)when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or

(b)if P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it.

136 Burden of proof

(1)This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act.

(2)If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred.

(3)But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.

(4)-

(5)-

(6) *A reference to the court includes a reference to—*

(a) an employment tribunal;

48. The initial burden of proof is on the claimant to show facts from which we could conclude there had either been indirect sex discrimination, under section 19 EQA, or harassment, under section 26 EQA. For the indirect discrimination claim, as set out in the list of issues, following section 19 EQA above, the claimant must show that there was a PCP; that, in this case, it was applied to males; caused women generally a disadvantage and that it caused her disadvantage. If those tests are met, we look to the respondent to show a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. For the harassment claim she must show that there was unwanted conduct which related to sex and that it violated her dignity or created an intimidating etc environment. We assess whether that was the effect applying an objective and subjective test.
49. As far as submissions are concerned, the claimant asked for time to do hers in writing and that was granted. She did a short summary saying why her claims should succeed as she felt she had been forced to leave because of the pressure to work beyond 3.30pm. She pointed out that she was the only woman member of staff and the only one with childcare responsibilities.
50. Mr Nandha, for the respondent, made oral submissions stating that they had always accommodated the claimant's availability and never asked her to work when she was not able to. Any reduction in hours was because that is what the claimant had agreed. He asked us to consider the WhatsApp messages to show the sort of working relationship that existed. He urged us not to allow the claimant's claims to succeed.

Conclusions

51. First, we need to look at the time limit question which appears at issue 1 in the list of issues. This only arises for the Equality Act complaints as her unfair dismissal claim is clearly in time. This issue arises out of the provisions of section 123 EQA which says that a claim must be made within three months of the date of the act complained of. There are some circumstances in which there can be an extension of time, if it relates to conduct extending over a period or it would be just and equitable to allow the claims to proceed. The tribunal are quite satisfied that these claims were brought in time they are all close in time, they clearly relate to connected matters over a few months only. It is conduct extending over a period or, if it is not that, it would be just and equitable to allow the claims to proceed. So, we go on to decide all of the claimant's claims.
52. Looking at issue 2, this is the constructive unfair dismissal claim. The claimant has to show that she was dismissed and there are a number of matters under 2.1.1 to 2.1.1.5 which provide the reasons for which the claimant believes she

had to resign. For most part, we have already answered these in our findings of fact but just so the parties understand them they are set out again now.

53. The claimant has not been able to show that those matters 2.1.1.1, 2.1.1.2, 2.1.1.4 and 2.1.1.5 occurred at all. The respondent did not tell the claimant her hours would massively drop nor were they given to other staff; they did not refuse to acknowledge that she had childcare responsibilities; they did not suggest she brought her 11-year-old to work or ask the older child to look after her other child or that she needed to work until 5.30pm when a colleague worked mornings.
54. Issue 2.1.1. 3 is more complex. The tribunal does not accept that the respondent reduced the claimant's hours simply because she was unable to work beyond 3.30pm. We do find there was a reduction particularly in late November and December as appears on the rota, but we do find, as stated above, that this was for a combination of reasons. It did include the fact that she could not usually work beyond 3.30pm except on Friday, but it included other matters such as requests for holiday and her request for fewer Saturdays.
55. We then move on to answer issue 2.1.2 which is did that reduction in hours, in essence, amount to a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. It is clearly not a breach of the express term of the contract which is for 10 hours per week.
56. The tribunal also finds that it did not amount to a breach of the employment contract particularly taking into account the claimant's own evidence that she never worked outside her availability and the clear open working relationship confirmed in WhatsApp messages and orally before us. The tribunal really has no idea why the claimant did not approach the respondent before resigning to discuss the rotas which gave her concern.
57. We need to consider when we consider whether there was a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. This is at issues 2.1.2 with detail; at 2.1.2.1 and 2.1.2.2; the question being whether the respondent behaved in a way that was calculated or likely to destroy trust and confidence. The respondent did not behave in such a way. As we have indicated, based on all the evidence before us, there was no such calculation or likelihood of trust and confidence being destroyed before the claimant took the decision to resign. There was no dismissal. This was a resignation.
58. For completeness, although we do not need to because the claimant has been unable to show a dismissal, we will just answer issues 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 which are questions about the claimant's reasons for resigning which were touched on earlier.
59. The claimant did resign because she perceived that there were issues with her hours and we accept that she did so promptly. However, given that there was no breach of the employment contract, the claimant cannot show that she was dismissed and her claim for constructive unfair dismissal must therefore fail.
60. Turning then to the indirect discrimination, that is at issue 4, we have some difficulties because the provision, criterion or practice (PCP) which appears at

issue 4.1 is very difficult. The claimant cannot show this PCP set out there as made clear in our findings of fact at paragraph 15 above. Strictly speaking, we do not need to look any further because there was no requirement for all staff to work until 5.30pm. She has not been able to show that PCP.

61. However, we have taken account of the claimant's position as a litigant in person and we did think about whether an alternative PCP applied in this case. We accept that there was a PCP that there was a requirement for the post office to be open and staffed until 5.30pm and that all staff were requested to work until then if they were able to. If that is a PCP, and we are not sure it is, but if it is, and for completeness, we have decided to go on and consider the other issues under the indirect sex discrimination heading.
62. So, looking at issue 4.2, we consider whether that PCP applied to the claimant. It did apply to her as she was requested to work to 5.30pm if she could.
63. Issue 4.3 asks if it was also applied to male staff? Yes, we understood male members of staff were also requested to work until 5.30pm if they could.
64. As for issue 4.4, the tribunal accepts that making that request might have the potential to disadvantage women who still tend to bear more responsibility for childcare.
65. We then look at issue 4.5, the question is whether the claimant was put at that disadvantage. Here the tribunal has some difficulty because the tribunal are not convinced that the claimant was put at that disadvantage because on her evidence she never worked beyond her availability. However, the fact that she was requested to work could, possibly, be sufficient.
66. We decided that we should go on and consider whether the respondent, if that were the case, could show it had a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim and that is at issue 4.6.
67. We considered that with some care. In answering issue 4.7 the tribunal are satisfied that asking staff if they could work until 5.30pm was an appropriate and necessary way of achieving its legitimate aim, that is to keep the post office open.
68. In all the circumstances, the balance which was struck between the respondent's needs and the claimant's childcare responsibilities were proper and legitimate. This must mean that the claimant's claim for indirect sex discrimination must fail.
69. Turning finally to the harassment claim that is under issue 5, and it arises under section 26 of the Equality Act. Many of these matters have been answered before in this judgment but we summarise them now.
70. Issue 5.1 asks whether the respondent did the things set out between 5.1.1 And 5.1.6. Again, most of these are clear from our findings of fact.
71. Issue 5.1.1 is that the claimant was asked which day she could work until 5.30. The issue states 27 October, it might have been then but we accept that it might also have been earlier than that.

72. Issues 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 are taken together. We have already said that Mrs Nandha did not say that the claimant's hours would massively drop nor that other staff would be given those hours.
73. As for Issue 5.1.4, Mrs Nandha did not make the comment attributed to her about the claimant bringing her 11-year-old to work.
74. Again, at issue 5.1.5, the tribunal has already stated that the claimant's hours did seem to reduce in late November/early December but there was a great deal of fluctuation of hours particularly with Thomas where sometimes we can see the claimant has done more than him and sometimes fewer. Indeed, in the first week of January, if the claimant had worked, if she had not resigned, showed that she was on the rota for 28.25 hours.
75. In relation to issue 5.1.6, the tribunal accepts, as does Mr Nandha, that he did suggest that the claimant could increase her hours by covering colleagues' holidays.
76. So, at least to some degree, some of those matters are made out. So, we have to consider under issue 5.2 whether that amounted to unwanted conduct. We accept that the claimant seems to have perceived the reduction in her hours and the difficulty of not being able to work after 3.30pm and the request to do so, be unwanted conduct. So, we accept that element.
77. Then looking at issue 5.3 we have to be satisfied that that related to sex. The tribunal cannot find that those matters related to the claimant's sex. These are matters which were also asked of the other staff, the male staff, and they related entirely to the running of the post office and for the need for it to be staffed. They did not relate to her sex.
78. Again, this means we have no real need to answer issues 5.4 and 5.5 but, for completeness, we do say that the claimant's perception that it was unwanted conduct, even if it had related to sex, was not reasonable in all the circumstances of this case given the background as we have set out in our findings of fact and in these conclusions. This must mean that the claimant's harassment claims must also fail.
79. This means that all the claimant's claims must fail and are dismissed.
80. The tribunal just wants to make some very short closing remarks.
81. We do have sympathy for the claimant. It seems she resigned from a job that she enjoyed and had fitted in well with her other responsibilities. But we also have sympathy for the respondent, because Mr and Mrs Nandha were are put in a difficult position when she left so abruptly. The tribunal does think that it was very unfortunate that the parties could not have discussed this situation earlier and resolve it. This does not change the fact that the claimant has been unable to show most of the facts she needed to show for her claims of constructive unfair dismissal or indirect discrimination or harassment to succeed.
82. All these claims fail and are therefore dismissed.

Approved by:

Employment Judge Manley

12 October 2025

SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

16 October 2025

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FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE