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Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance



Edition B Version 1

NATO STANDARD

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ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

Edition B, Version 1

AUGUST 2025



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

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Allied Joint Doctrine

for Security Force Assistance

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Head Doctrine and Analysis

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Summary of changes

Records of summary of changes for Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.16 (B)
• Harmonized with AJP-01 (F).
• Explains the linkage to projecting stability.
• Explains the linkage to military cooperation programmes.
• Applies security force assistance across the continuum of conflict.
• Updates security force assistance legal considerations
• Added protection of civilians considerations.
• Harmonized with AJP-3 (C) including unity of effort and aligning the security force assistance framework with the stages of a joint operation.
• Explains how the functions: governance, executive, generating and operating can be used to identify how a local force performs.
• Added a section on security force assistance and NATO cross-cutting topics.
• Reviewed Chapter 3 now entitled "Security force assistance activities"
• Reviewed all Figures included and harmonized with related contents

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Related documents

High-Level guidance and policy

C-M(2011)0022, *Political Guidance*, 14 Mar 2011

MC 0133, *NATO's Operations Planning*

MC 0326, *NATO Principles and Policies of Operational Medical Support*

MC 0327, *NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*

MC 0334, *NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support*

MC 0343, *NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations*

MC 400/4, *NATO Military Strategy*

MC 0411, *NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil Military Interaction (CMI)*

MC 0422, *NATO Military Policy for Information Operations*

MC 458/3, *NATO's Education Training Exercises and Evaluation (ETEE) Policy*, 03 Sep 2014

MC 0560, *Policy for Military Engineering*

MC 0586, *Military Committee Policy for the Military Instrument of Power and its Use for Operations, Missions and Activities*

MC 0628, *NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications*

MC 0656, *Military Committee Policy for the Force Protection of Alliance Forces*

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PO(2022)0251, *NATO's CBRN Defence Policy*

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AJP-2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security*

AJP-2.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures*

AJP-2.7, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)*

AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*

AJP-3.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*

AJP-3.24, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support*

AJP-3.25, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations*

AJP-3.28, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction*

AJP-3.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*

AJP-3.6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare

AJP-3.8, Allied Joint Doctrine for CBRN Defence

AJP-3.12, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering

AJP-3.14 Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection

AJP-3.15, Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices

AJP-3.18, Allied Joint Doctrine for Explosive Ordnance Disposal

AJP-3.19, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation

AJP-3.20, Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations

AJP-3.21, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police

AJP-3.22, Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing

AJP-3.26, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance

AJP-3.27, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Insurgency (COIN)

AJP-4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics

AJP-4.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support

AJP-4.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support

AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations

AJP-6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication & Information Systems

AJP-10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications

AJP-10.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations

AAP-47, Allied Joint Doctrine Development

AAP-77, NATO Terminology Manual

Allied tactical publications

ATP-3.2.1, Conduct of Land Tactical Operations

ATP-3.2.1.1, Conduct of Land Tactical Activities

ATP-3.2.1.2, *Conduct of Land Tactical Operations in the Urban Environment* (former ATP-99)

Directives

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Other

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NATO *Crisis Response System Manual* (NCRSM)

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Table of contents

Record of national reservations	iii
Record of specific reservations	v
Summary of changes	vii
Related document	ix
Preface	xvii
Chapter 1 – Concept and principles	1
Section 1 – Security force assistance applicability	1
Security force assistance responsibilities	2
Security force assistance applicability	3
Security force assistance legal considerations	3
Security force assistance protection of civilians considerations	3
Section 2 – Security force assistance principles	4
Political primacy	4
Comprehensive approach	4
Unity of effort	5
Understanding	5
Trust	5
Leadership	5
Legitimacy	5
Rule of Law	6
Strategic communications considerations	6
Transparency	7
Host-nation commitment	7
Support host nation ownership	7
Sustainability	8
Transition	9
Section 3 – Security force assistance for understanding	10
Understanding the local forces	11
Cultural awareness	12
Risks of cultural misunderstanding	12
Section 4 – Selection of training of NATO personnel for security force assistance	14
Chapter 2 – Security force assistance framework	17
Section 1 – Introduction	17
Section 2 – Planning considerations	18
Security force assistance coordination	20
Section 3 – Security force assistance as an operational activity	20
Organization	21
Section 4 – Assessment	21
Assessment of local forces	23
Considerations for planning and executing assessments	25

	Section 5 – Security force assistance transitions	27
	Assessing transition activities	28
	Effective transition activities	28
	Transitions risks	29
	Chapter 3 – Security force assistance activities	31
	Section 1 – Introduction	31
	Section 2 – Generate	32
	Section 3 – Organise	33
	Section 4 – Train	33
	Training and education	33
	Training for local forces	33
	Training assistance	35
	Security force assistance training	35
	Training plans	36
	Legal consistency of the training	37
	Section 5 – Enable	37
	Section 6 – Advise	38
	Principal adviser	39
	Process adviser	39
	Subject Matter Expert adviser	39
	Section 7 – Mentor	40
	Section 8 – Security force assistance and NATO cross-cutting topics	40
	Lexicon	LEX-1
	Part 1 – Acronyms, initialisms and abbreviations	LEX-1
	Part 2 – Terms and definitions	LEX-2
	List of figures	
1.1	NATO security force assistance across the Continuum of Competition	2
2.1	Stages of a joint operation aligned with SFA framework	17
2.2	Compartments of a local force assessment	23
3.1	Security force assistance activities	32
3.2	Interweaving cross cutting topics into SFA GOTEAM activities	42

Preface

Context

1. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.16, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance*, is intended for use by NATO and NATO-led forces. However, this doctrine can be used as a reference by other militaries or civilians. The requirement to train and develop local forces¹ capabilities, as part of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach,² is integral to the success of a broader strategy aimed at reinforcing the capacity of non-NATO nations within the broader framework of defence and related security capacity-building. This doctrine outlines the fundamental principles on how NATO provides security force assistance (SFA). SFA activities are applicable at all levels of operations: military strategic; operational; and tactical. NATO SFA activities require North Atlantic Council approval and should contribute towards a strategic end-state.

Scope

2. AJP-3.16, is the NATO doctrine for the military planning, execution and assessment of SFA in the context of Allied joint operations, with particular focus on transition. It is subordinate to and refers to AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* and AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*.

Purpose

3. AJP-3.16 provides commanders and staff with the principles and guidance to plan, conduct and assess SFA in joint operations. It does not restrict the authority of commanders; they are expected to organise assigned forces and to plan and execute appropriate operations to accomplish the mission. A commander's authority for assigned forces may be limited by national caveats.

Application

4. AJP-3.16 is intended primarily as guidance for NATO commanders and staffs. However, the doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for operations conducted by a coalition of NATO members, partners and non-NATO nations. It also provides a reference for NATO civilians and other governments and civilian entities.

¹ Local forces are indigenous, non-NATO, military security forces.

² For more on NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach, see AJP- 01 *Allied Joint Doctrine*.

Structure

5. AJP-3.16 comprises three chapters.
 - a. Chapter 1 defines SFA, its applicability and the principles upon which successful SFA action must be built;
 - b. Chapter 2 introduces the SFA framework from planning through to transition and exit;
 - c. Chapter 3 outlines SFA activities and introduces the “generate, organize, train, enable, advise and mentor” framework.

Linkages

6. SFA relates to, and its implementation impacts upon other NATO concepts and policies and operations, including the areas described below:
 - a. **Security sector reform.** Security sector reform (SSR) is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation (HN) provides safety, security and justice. SSR is a long-term effort conducted by the HN government requiring extensive resources and participation of many security sector actors. NATO contributes to a HN's SSR by engaging with foreign partners to help shape their policies and actions that build and sustain HN capability and capacity in the security sector. SSR contributes to stabilization and reconstruction and to establish conditions for meeting longer term governance and development, establishing a safe and secure environment and restoring public security. SFA may form, or be part of, NATO's contribution to SSR, which is led by the HN with the support of the international community. To ensure comparative advantages are levered, SFA activities should be planned and coordinated at all levels with the other SSR-involved actors. SFA directly contributes to defence reform which is the transformation or development of defence organizations and institutions, including the appropriate oversight and management bodies, so that they play an effective, legitimate and legally accountable role within the security sector. SFA is a key subset of defence reform.
 - b. **Stabilization.**³ Stabilization efforts address complex problems in fragile, conflict and post-conflict states. Such efforts contribute to a comprehensive approach to crisis management through the international community's efforts towards security, development and governance.⁴ A key aspect of stabilization is SSR which involves reforming security institutions so that they can play an effective and accountable role in providing internal and external security. Pivotal to NATO's contribution to SSR are SFA; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and stability policing (SP).

³ See AJP-3.28, 'Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization.'

⁴ PO(2010) 0140, *Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO's Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 06 October 2010.

c. **Military assistance is defined as:** A broad range of activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through training, advising, mentoring or the conduct of combined operations. Notes: The range of military assistance is considerable and includes, but is not limited to: capability building of friendly security forces; engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or organizations; and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population.

d. **Counter-insurgency operations.** The military contribution to counter-insurgency requires coordinated employment of the local military and police forces to defeat insurgent forces. Subsequently, SFA plays a key role in developing LF to conduct counter-insurgency operations.

e. **Stability policing.** SP⁵ consists of police-related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace indigenous police to enable the development of a sustainable peace. SFA and SP are complementary capabilities and activities that can support SSR efforts and are the two aspects of contribution to the development of security forces. As NATO military contribution to SSR, SP and SFA may have overlapping areas and can attain synergy when performing training, enabling advising and mentoring activities towards their respective counterparts. SP focuses its activities on the indigenous police forces.⁶

f. **Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.** DDR is a process that contributes to stabilization by disarming combatants, removing them from the military structures and integrating them into society. DDR activities may also involve removing individuals from unofficial military structures and integrating them into official structures. DDR programmes are part of other efforts to demilitarize and consolidate stability and are tightly linked with the SFA process in supporting the SSR. Planning for a successful DDR program requires an understanding of both the situation on the ground and the goals, political volition and resources of actors and other stabilization. Effective DDR planning relies on analysis of possible DDR beneficiaries, power dynamics and local society. Assessments have to be conducted in close consultation with relevant local / HN representatives and/or stakeholder agencies.

g. **Projecting stability.** Projecting stability is a set of activities to influence and shape the strategic environment in order to make it more secure. They encompass military and non-military efforts with a goal to make areas more stable and secure, and thus contributing to stability in the areas where the Alliance's borders are concerned. SFA, intended as a set of proactive activities aimed at developing/strengthening LF's capabilities could be considered a means of delivering the overarching NATO Projecting Stability strategy.

⁵ AJP 3.22, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing*.

⁶ Including gendarmerie-type forces, if present.

h. **Military cooperation programmes.** The promotion of military cooperation with countries and organizations around the globe makes a valid contribution to the enhancement of the cooperative security (recognized as one of the three NATO core tasks during the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 and reaffirmed by the Madrid Summit in June 2022) and to the concept of projecting stability. Strong cooperation with NATO partners will improve their military capabilities and capacities and strengthen interoperability, enabling their participation in NATO-led operations and missions and contributing to the security and stability of the international community. NATO programmes that support military cooperation include but not are limited to:

- courses, conferences, workshops, meetings and seminars;
- mobile training solutions, as mobile training team, mobile education training team and expert team visit;
- Operational Capabilities Concept, advisory visit;
- Operational Capabilities Concept evaluations;
- collective training and individual education and training; and
- key leader engagements to strengthen relationships at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Chapter 1 – Concept and principles

Section 1 – Security force assistance applicability

1.1 Security force assistance (SFA) includes all NATO activities that develop and improve, or directly support, the development of the capability⁷ and capacity⁸ of local forces (LF) and their associated institutions. LF comprise of indigenous security forces defined by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).⁹

1.2 While training non-military indigenous forces should be considered the primary responsibility of other relevant national or international stakeholders, there may be circumstances that preclude those stakeholders from immediately undertaking that responsibility. In such circumstances, NATO may be required to fill that gap until the conditions allow for the transfer of that responsibility to the appropriate actor. NATO may be required to establish a minimum standard of security in an initial phase of an operation to enable other non-military stakeholders to begin operations toward stabilization.

1.3 SFA assists a host nation (HN) in developing a sustainable capability that should enable its defence against threats to stability and security.

- SFA activities can be provided during any phase of an operation and across the full range of military operations (see Figure 1.1).
- SFA activities usually require a long-term political, financial commitment through supporting/enabling the development, planning, execution and validation of respective activities.
- transition of security responsibilities to LF – to be understood as a progressive transfer of security functions – is an essential part of SFA.
- while SFA normally occurs within a HN, NATO may conduct SFA outside the HN, such as a NATO owned training site.

1.4 This Allied joint publication outlines the doctrinal guidance and principles required to plan, execute and assess SFA within a joint and multinational framework. The *NATO 2022*

⁷ Capability is defined as the ability of someone or something to complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance. In this case, it would be the ability of LF or their supporting institutions to execute a given task under specified conditions.

⁸ Capacity is defined as the extent (scale, scope, and duration parameters) to which a task can be performed. Capacity is the measurable aspects of a capability. Such as, the extent to which LF or their supporting institutions can perform a task and sustain the effort

⁹ This may include border guards or other units performing military roles.

*Strategic Concept*¹⁰ outlines the need for Allies to assist in the development of LF, so that legitimate local authorities are able to maintain security without further international assistance. Furthermore, SFA provides NATO senior leaders with options for developing LF and the way these partners contribute to common security challenges across the NATO continuum of competition - see Figure 1.1.




Figure 1.1 - NATO security force assistance across the continuum of competition

1.5 SFA can be a key enabler in NATO operations by generating, organizing, training, enabling, advising and mentoring LF in support of a legitimate authority. NATO may not be the only stakeholder that provides assistance to develop LF or otherwise contributing to stabilization and reconstruction in the region. Therefore, commanders should ensure that coordination measures are in place to synchronize activities, mitigate gaps and reduce redundancies.

1.6 **Security force assistance responsibilities.** The NAC is the principal decision-making body within NATO. It brings together high-level representatives of each NATO nation to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions. Member nations have a responsibility to ensure that national capabilities intended to support combined/joint operations are developed in accordance with interoperability standards. SFA requires harmonization and synchronization of responsibilities among NATO commands and NATO

¹⁰ The *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept* defines the security challenges facing the Alliance and outlines the political and military tasks that NATO will carry out to address them. Madrid Summit, 2022.

nations, non-NATO nations, HNs and other stabilization actors involved in the joint operations area. To develop a coherent SFA concept, it is essential that guidelines are established to outline the responsibilities of each element as they relate to planning and conducting SFA. Responsibilities may be tailored to the specific circumstances of each operation, as agreed by the participating nations and commands involved. Nations equip their forces and ensure individually or by cooperative arrangements, the provision of required SFA resources to support their forces assigned to NATO during peace, crisis and conflict.

1.7 Security force assistance applicability. SFA activities support the overall mission and objectives as detailed by the NAC.

- Based on relevant military-political guidance and parameters, SFA activities can be conducted at all levels of operations (military strategic, operational and tactical).
- SFA applies only where a HN requests assistance from NATO to train and develop LF.
- SFA activities can be provided across the entire continuum of competition and all campaign themes. SFA could range from improving the LF of a HN that is facing a threat, to advising against immediate external and internal threats.
- SFA units do not replace the LF; SFA activities are tailored to render the LF capable of gaining control within their national territories and boundaries establishing and sustaining a safe and secure environment.

1.8 Security force assistance legal considerations. Any activity to develop, improve or directly support the development of LF has to be consistent with the legal framework pertaining to the operation. In addition, the legal status and jurisdiction of NATO forces or their civilian or contractor component should be established in a legally binding written agreement with the HN (e.g. a status of force agreement). Specifically, legal jurisdiction pertaining to the status of NATO personnel requires validation well before NATO personnel enter the HN territory.

1.9 Security force assistance and protection of civilians considerations. SFA activities should contribute to the protection of civilians (PoC) by strengthening the LF's abilities to mitigate harm to civilians. To that end, military commanders and their staffs should integrate PoC perspectives and remaining human security considerations into the planning process and in the execution of SFA activities. The delivery of international law and human rights training programmes to LF can contribute to ensure their understanding of the threat and effects of violence on the civilian population and foster the development of a PoC mindset.

Section 2 – Security force assistance principles

1.10 NATO has a long history of delivering SFA. The SFA principles¹¹ listed below are derived from NATO's collective experience and subsequent analysis. The list is not exhaustive, but captures the key SFA principles that a commander, planners, and those delivering SFA should consider. To be successful, commanders base SFA on solid, continuing assessment conducted jointly between military and political actors, and include generating, organizing, training and educating, enabling, advising and mentoring the forces involved. Commanders need to understand that the development of the local security institutions (e.g. ministries, service headquarters, operational forces) to sustain SFA should be coordinated across the institution. For example, development of operational forces often requires coordination at the service headquarters or ministry levels of the HN security force. Capability and capacity building typically involve long-term and complex processes necessitating the development of LF and infrastructure. While understanding its limits, commanders providing SFA should contribute to a comprehensive approach that considers how the LF complement the HN's instruments of national power.

1.11 **Political primacy.** Committing to security transition and allocating sufficient resources to conduct SFA activities are both political decisions. The main risks of SFA interventions are political, including but not limited to unintended altering of political and conflict dynamics, human rights abuses against civilians, corruption, and unsustainable institutional and conflict outcomes. Political primacy is the essential cornerstone for successful SFA. This is fundamental to effective and sustainable security transition.

1.12 **Comprehensive approach.** Commanders plan, execute and assess SFA in the context of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach. A comprehensive approach comprises the integrated activities from an appropriate range of civilians and military forces to achieve common objectives that are enabled by coordination and synchronization of NATO's military and political instruments with the other instruments of power.¹² SFA is only one part of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach by the international community. Therefore, those involved in providing SFA should consider and understand all aspects of the LF' capability and capacity, including their relationship with other institutions and processes. A comprehensive approach should:

- seek to stimulate a cooperative culture within a collaborative environment, while facilitating a shared understanding of the situation;
- invigorate existing processes and strengthen relationships at the joint, interagency and multinational levels; and

¹¹ For general principles of joint and multinational operations see Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*.

¹² For details see AJP-3.19, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*, and AJP-3.26, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*.

- consider the activities of all who may have an impact on the end state, while respecting their respective mandates and working modalities.

1.13 Unity of effort. In a multinational, multi-domain and interagency context, the recognition of a common purpose by all stakeholders operating in the joint operations area, increases the power of contribution exponentially, leads to the achievement of a shared vision and finally improves the chances for attaining the desired end state. Unity of effort becomes even more crucial where the unity of command is not achievable due to the heterogeneity and nature of the organizations involved. In a comprehensive approach, sharing the purpose facilitates the achievement of the unity of effort in order to coordinate and synchronize the development to optimize investments and maximize results. Note that in an increasingly competitive and multi-actor SFA environment globally, achieving unity of purpose in any given context can be difficult. The purpose of engagement from different actors may vary from supporting broader security sector reform (SSR) that may contribute to longer term stability, to simply undermining NATO efforts and influence, as part of geopolitical competition.

1.14 Understanding. An in-depth understanding of the environment, in particular its human aspect as well as the political, social, economic and security-related cultures of the HN, is critical to SFA planning, execution and assessment. It is also essential in informing the development and maintenance of comprehensive risk management strategies. Identifying concrete and specific key factors influencing the operating environment help define ends, ways and means for developing LF and their supporting institutions. To prioritize and focus the SFA effort, it is vital to understand the regional players and transnational actors who may influence the security environment. Further guidance on understanding is described in Section 3 of this chapter.

1.15 Trust. The successful delivery of SFA requires trust between all parties involved. Developing and maintaining trust assists all actors, and any breach of trust may affect the success of the entire operation. All actors involved in SFA activities should work to develop and maintain mutual trust.

1.16 Leadership. Leadership is especially important in the dynamic and complex environments associated with SFA. SFA requires personal interaction between NATO forces and their HN counterparts, which may include military and civilians, from the tactical level to the strategic level. Leadership on both sides, NATO and HN, should fully comprehend the operating environment and be prepared, engaged and supportive for SFA activities that contribute to a safe and secure environment and the PoC. Productively engaging the leadership on both sides requires extensive effort throughout the campaign. Continuity of NATO leaders and trainers/advisers should be maximised to the greatest extent possible, to allow the building of relationships, trust and influence.

1.17 Legitimacy. Legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legality, morality or rightness of a set of actions, and of the authority of the

relevant actors in taking them. This audience may be the HN population, the populations in the operational area, or the forces and agencies receiving SFA. If SFA activities are perceived as legitimate, the audience has a strong impulse to support them. Strengthening the legitimacy of the HN government in the eyes of the HN population is essential to SFA efforts; SFA activities conducted by NATO forces should maintain this focus. NATO and LF should be perceived as legitimate by the HN government and population, troop-contributing nations and the international community. Without legitimacy, SFA activities are undermined. Legitimacy comprises legal, cultural, historical, religious, social, technical, gender, moral and political aspects. Legitimacy is dependent upon the successful amalgamation and interplay of four factors.

- a. **Mandate.** The perceived legitimacy of the mandate governing SFA activities as well as the set of mandates establishing HN governance.
- b. **Manner.** The perceived legitimacy of the individual and collective conduct of those exercising the mandate.
- c. **Consent.** The extent to which factions, local populations and others consent to, comply with or resist the authority of those exercising the mandate. Consent, or its absence, may range from active resistance, through unwilling compliance, to freely given support.
- d. **Expectations.** The extent to which the beliefs and aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or are met by those exercising the mandate.

1.18 **Rule of law.** A country's security policies and practices should be founded upon the rule of law. SFA champions the rule of law by promoting its crucial importance as part of the development of the LF and their associated institutions. The rule of law refers to 'a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.'¹³

1.19 **Strategic communications considerations.** Strategic communications (StratCom) considerations should be integral to mission planning and execution.¹⁴ This contributes towards a shared understanding of SFA activities. The information strategy should align with the stated intent and agreed policies between the HN and other agencies. SFA objectives should be supported by the StratCom strategies of both NATO and the HN. Similarly, SFA activities should contribute to the achievement of NATO StratCom objectives and the promotion of the related StratCom themes. NATO's information strategy should promote

¹³ United Nations Security Council, S/2004/616, paragraph 6.

¹⁴ See AJP-10, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications*.

visible and credible results with the aim of building trust and transparency. Commanders should consider the following factors.

- a. An effective information strategy, articulated through a StratCom framework and subsequent implementation guidance will promote legitimacy and credibility and in reinforcing adherence to the law helping to create a positive perception of the SFA mission within the local, regional and international community.
- b. The importance of building and maintaining a cohesive narrative should not be underestimated. The ability to manage and employ information supports the diplomatic, military and economic activities, thus maintaining Allied freedom of action.
- c. Effective StratCom both enables, and underpins assistance activities in the information environment, and can counter misinformation and disinformation.
- d. Like other military activities, SFA contributes both to support NATO's narrative and to achieve the NATO StratCom objectives.

1.20 Transparency. SFA activities should be transparent and accountable; they should foster awareness of reform efforts among HN officials and the population, international community, including neighbouring countries, troop-contributing nations, and other stakeholders contributing to the end state. SFA activities should encourage open, accountable and transparent consultation with local and international actors.

1.21 Host nation commitment. Planning SFA requires the long-term commitment of the HN and all other actors involved. Commitment is built upon personal relationships and mutual trust, underpinned by strong leadership within a robust set of references. Nurturing and developing the commitment at all levels (for example, a HN's political, military and other government stabilization) is a two-way endeavour. To achieve common goals that benefit all, relationships should be built upon cooperation. HN's commitment should include the commitment to respect and ensure respect of human rights and other applicable aspects of international law. In the early stages of a SFA mission, commanders cannot expect to have commitment 'in place'. It is likely, therefore, that it will have to be developed and maintained. To engender strong relations (which are pivotal to securing commitment), troop rotations, particularly those in key leadership positions, should be carefully managed. Once committed, these relationships need to be consistent and dependable. Involving the HN from the very beginning of the planning process facilitates its commitment to accomplish the mission. Based on applicable agreements and proper coordination, the HN may have the responsibility to provide support and assistance to NATO forces operating on its territory. This support and assistance may entail medical personnel, supplies, facilities, decontamination and transportation.

1.22 Support host nation ownership. The HN's history, religion, culture, social structure, legal framework and institutions drive the principles, policies, laws and structures that form SFA activities. As a result, the needs, priorities and circumstances shaping SFA may differ

substantially from one country to another. Addressing the basic security concerns of the HN population is essential in attaining support and delivering SFA. To ensure the sustainability of reforms, assistance should be designed to meet the needs of the HN population and support HN agencies, processes and priorities. To accomplish this, SFA generally should be developed to serve long-term goals. In addition to the appropriate competencies and skills, SFA requires a specific mind-set focusing on supporting LF enabling them to:

- make their own decisions and be accountable for their own actions;
- learn from their successes and failure; and
- take ownership for their own stabilization, preparation, planning and execution of operations to ensure sustainability.

Commanders deliver SFA to support the attainment of the end state that is aligned to the HN government's wider political, economic and social needs. Commanders should avoid mirroring the development of LF, based on their own nation's norms that may not be achievable, sustainable, or desirable. However, all LF require functions such as executive (e.g. ministries), generating (e.g. service headquarters), and operating (e.g. operational units) functions enabled by governance (e.g. parliament) that provides oversight and accountability of the LF.

1.23 Sustainability. The effects of SFA should be sustainable beyond the transition and termination of a NATO military operation. Planning for SFA activities should consider HN capabilities in the long-term. Any SFA solution should be part of a larger security sector reform process taking into account the whole security sector¹⁵ and based on political, social and economic structures and processes. Commanders planning and delivering SFA should consider and review:

- the supporting diplomatic/economic structures and processes;
- the procurement and sustainment of the appropriate equipment;
- the sequencing of withdrawing enablers as the HN transitions towards self-sufficiency;
- requirements to sustain HN capacity and investment in specialist areas, e.g. aviation training; and
- any ongoing external defence requirements of the HN, brokered by either a treaty or other agreement.

¹⁵ Security sector actors include all institutions, groups and individuals (both state and non-state) that have a stake/vested interest in providing security. They include: core security actors, security management and oversight bodies, judicial and law enforcement institutions and security-focused civil society groups. Core security actors include: armed forces, police, military police, gendarmerie-type forces, paramilitary forces, intelligence stabilization, security services, coastguards, border forces, customs authorities and non-statutory security forces.

Long-term success depends on developing sustainable security governance frameworks and processes, which deliver effective day-to-day operations, management and oversight. These functions include:

- strategic resource and personnel planning;
- financial responsibility;
- logistic sustainment;
- building integrity (to counter corruption at all levels);
- legal accountability and compliance with applicable law; and
- the ability to analyse and modify the stabilization's aims, policies and doctrines that contribute to a broader national security strategy.

A state's institutions may take years to develop in societies where the foundations of security are absent. This is at odds with the common political desire for rapid progress. In security transitions, four aspects of sustainability are central to success.

- a. Any sustainable solution is based on an effective long-term political settlement. Security transitions should be designed and carried out with this in mind and should neither undermine nor unduly empower any political party, nor undermine the potential for future political progress.
- b. Sustainable security institutions need to develop with a balance between combat and combat support elements, and logistical, administrative support and broader governance, accountability and oversight arrangements.
- c. Processes are to be sustained by the HN and are impacted by elements including ownership, societal relevancy and effective resourcing.
- d. As security transitions are frequently resource-intensive periods for the HN, resources may need to be sustained post-transition, including the provision of financial support.

1.24 Transition. Effective security transition strategies contribute to sustaining security in the post-transition environment. Effective security transitions enable the HN to assume responsibility for its own security once NATO activities come to an end. The transition process is part of a longer-term reform and transformation process and should be considered from the beginning of the planning process and refined throughout the conduct of operations.¹⁶

¹⁶ See Chapter 3, Section 4

Section 3 – Security force assistance understanding

1.25 An understanding of the operating environment¹⁷ is critical to planning and conducting SFA activities. Understanding is the perception and interpretation of a particular situation to provide the context, insight (knowing why something has happened or is happening) and foresight (being able to identify and anticipate what may happen) required for effective decision-making. Gaining understanding enables commanders to:

- evaluate the context, leading to improved decision-making;
- support developing policy, strategy and plans;
- assist in developing alliances or agreements;
- have influence;
- focus on the critical facets of the operating environment;
- develop an appreciation of the actors within an environment;
- identify the causal relationship and interplay of factors;
- address causes as well as symptoms; and
- anticipate future operating environment conditions.

1.26 As the operating environment is dynamic, understanding needs to be constantly refreshed as NATO provides SFA. Commanders should understand that their actions have intended and unintended effects and these should be continuously analysed and understood. Investing in understanding may involve forgoing speed of action in the initial stages, but such investment enables progress later.

1.27 To achieve unity of effort within a comprehensive approach, SFA activities are coordinated across all stakeholders with a common understanding, or at least similar intentions/goals. Planning and resourcing to rebuild, stabilise or reconstruct a LF' capabilities requires a joint, inter-agency approach with the HN's full cooperation and commitment. Commanders cooperate with the HN to jointly identify what the local requirement is, and recognize (and be prepared to accept) that a local solution may be different to theirs.

1.28 By gathering information and consulting with subject matter experts (SMEs) and local partners, commanders should develop and, where possible, share an understanding of all factors that may influence the operating environment. They also have to be aware of all challenges which may impact SFA operations. These includes:

¹⁷ For more details see AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, AJP-2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security* and AJP-3.19, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*.

- factors that contribute to transforming the HN into a stable and secure state;
- how to influence relevant audiences;
- the military contribution within the overall strategy and how it links with a sustainable political solution;
- interoperability issues;
- capabilities and support of others in the area to increase the unity of effort;
- national caveats;
- how to match LF to the requirements of the HN to meet the challenges that they face;
- performing their tasks whilst complying with the rule of law and applicable international law; and
- the need to build self-reliance.

1.29 Understanding the local forces. Effective SFA demands that commanders understand LF. Amassing the information required to gain this understanding necessitates a sensitive approach: fact-finding enquiries also need to be conducted with both tact and balance. Developing an understanding of all key aspects of the LF assists both NATO and NATO-led forces to identify critical problem areas and priorities for further action.¹⁸

1.30 Commanders need to understand which frameworks, processes and structures work well within the local context. SFA activities that work within these frameworks, processes and structures are more likely to be both accepted by the LF and be sustainable. Understanding requires a commander's awareness of the smallest nuances of culture and norms that may be leveraged to achieve objectives.

1.31 An understanding of LF includes, but is not limited to an appreciation of:

- influencers and stakeholders, organizational structures, hierarchy, processes, accountability, policies and doctrine;¹⁹
- history, roles, tradition, moral and social mores;
- identified security threats;
- how they are perceived by the general population and their capacity to adhere to the law of armed conflict and humanitarian rights norms;
- links to the HN's laws and economy;

¹⁸ For more on operational analysis see AJP-5, *Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning*.

¹⁹ Commanders should note that stabilizational charts and structures may not fully reflect where power lies.

- history of political or ethnic/societal bias and influence;
- ethnicity and religion (and any tensions);
- gender of LF (percentage male/female);
- the stabilizing structures and culture as well as individuals' roles in society;
- relationships to other-government institutions and/organizations; and
- scale, drivers and form of corruption.

1.32 Cultural awareness. Culture consists of a broad range of factors including but not limited to the customs, ideas and social behaviour of particular people or a group. Moreover, shared concepts guide what people believe and how they behave. Cultural awareness is the ability to understand culture and to apply this knowledge to effectively engage in the environments in which NATO operates. Cultural awareness is employed at all levels and is vital to the conduct of SFA. Cultural awareness involves knowing:

- how people and their societies are organised;
- what their beliefs and values are; and
- the ways in which they interact with each other and outsiders.

NATO interacts with different cultures (including those within NATO) and works with those who may have different beliefs, political structures and approaches to operations. While a context of different cultures often presents challenges in affecting mutual understanding and trust, diversity may broaden the scope of SFA activities to engage with cultural niches, enhance understanding and refine product delivery. By showing cultural respect towards their partners, NATO creates mutual trust. Cultural practices of HN forces may break international and national laws/norms. Commanders should consider when this cultural norm breaks a bond of trust and undermines the values of NATO.

1.33 To be effective, commanders should understand HN forces and/or international non-governmental organizations and other institutional partners with whom they cooperate, and the context within which they and non-combatants operate. This demands understanding their institutions, culture, fears, perceptions, motivations and history. This includes appreciating the role of state (i.e. governments, government agencies, state-controlled industries) and non-government entities (i.e. civil society organizations, people, both individuals and groups) both locally and globally.

1.34 Risks of cultural misunderstanding. Understanding culture during the planning and execution of SFA activities decreases the risks to NATO's mission. Collectively, failure to understand can result in: risk to life, risk to mission and risk to legitimacy. Assessing the risks from cultural misunderstanding requires a likelihood and impact analysis and the

employment of measures to mitigate them. Commanders also ensure SFA planning, execution and assessment includes measures to address risks of cultural misunderstanding.

1.35 Mistakes made due to a poor understanding of culture (even if unintentional) can be difficult to correct. Cultural misunderstandings can result in friction, potentially leading to mistrust and tension. This occurs when one group interprets another group's behaviour against an inappropriate context, or their own cultural norms, or fail to consider sensitivities. Behaviour that appears irrational to one group, may be completely rational to another. Even at the tactical level, a lack of cultural understanding can have strategic implications, especially when an alleged incident is broadcasted by news agencies or social media platforms which are capable of influencing opinions worldwide. Cultural misunderstanding may:

- lead to security (escalation of force) incidents and harm to civilians when culturally unknown behaviours are misperceived as hostile;
- damage the legitimacy, credibility and public support of both NATO and the HN;
- unsettle the political narrative;
- fuel retaliation;
- create barriers to interaction with the HN, and
- lead to alienation of cultural groups, organizations or SFA troops.

1.36 In assembling the risks that cultural misunderstanding may expose, commanders should consider that:

- cultural norms and values that are 'taken for granted' in certain nations may be different elsewhere;
- while some (perceived) cultural similarities may be ignored or considered irreconcilable differences, there are often areas of common ground;
- the interpretation of concepts such as honesty, fairness, respect, and ownership can mean fundamentally different things to different cultures;
- superficial assessments, resulting in generalizations, are more likely when time is limited; an
- over-immersion can occur when individuals or groups become overly sympathetic or biased towards a different culture.

Local cultural experts or cultural specialists can assist NATO forces conducting SFA to help prevent cultural misunderstandings.

Section 4 – Selection and training of NATO personnel for security force assistance

1.37 Mentors, advisers and trainers are crucial to achieving sustainable success. They usually live and work with their counterparts, sharing common hardship, risks and experiences. Accomplishments are closely related to their level of preparation and competency. Therefore, they should be selected and trained to provide SFA prior to deploying regardless of whether it is in a training, advising or mentoring role.

1.38 Pre-deployment, advanced and follow-on training of own forces with a special focus on HN orientation is indispensable. The commander should consider the following aspects.

- a. Ensuring own forces are knowledgeable of NATO doctrines, concepts and requirements for cooperation in a partnership. Likewise, they need to understand national and multinational procedures as well as the international law applicable to the context.
- b. Information to enable them to develop an understanding of the theatre, politics and culture, language, customs and transitions.
- c. Lessons learned.
- d. Using standardized and common procedures within the structures and processes of LF.
- e. The structures and processes of LF and laws to prepare for common planning and consultations. This should include information about how HN forces operate in relation to aspects that affect the civilian population and by identifying any gaps in their ability or willingness to meet local and international law.
- f. Trust-based relationships with local partners. They should be familiar with current theoretical frameworks, the theoretical bases, for example, the sociological and psychological background aspects of training.
- g. The possibility that advisers could be isolated, captured and interrogated.²⁰
- h. Select and train suitable personnel for SFA.
- i. Information about the factor, root causes and dynamics of the crisis so to minimize risks that SFA activities aggravate the situation.

²⁰ AJP-3.7, *Allied joint Doctrine for the Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment*.

1.39 Specialist personnel (such as doctors, nurses, engineers, clergy or lawyers) with specific knowledge and language ability relating to the HN, should be identified, tracked, and encouraged to develop, grow, and maintain professional and academic contacts with local military and professional contacts, such that a cadre of prepared SMEs are available as needed to support NATO SFA efforts.

1.40 Troop-contributing nations should select personnel to ensure each individual possesses the required knowledge, skills, and temperament required to work closely with LF. Experience suggests that the following characteristics significantly enhance the ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture:

- rank, maturity, experience, aptitude for training and subject matter expertise;
- flexibility and perceptiveness;
- open-mindedness and tolerance for ambiguity;
- ability to withhold judgment and set realistic goals and tasks;
- ability to motivate oneself and others, and to project a strong ethos of self-reliance;
- ability to accept and learn from failure, and a tolerance of frustration to overcome setbacks and failures;
- the ability to work in a transactional environment;
- patience and knowing when it is right to step away; and
- cultural and religious affiliation and understanding.

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Chapter 2 – Security force assistance framework

Section 1 – Introduction

2.1 The security force assistance (SFA) framework illustrated in Figure 2.1 below is a collective application of SFA planning, execution and assessment, which includes transition by NATO forces to reach the end state.

2.2 SFA is about generating or reinforcing a host nation's (HN's) local force (LF) and their related institutions. Ideally, LF should be assessed, and new capabilities provided to them that enable them to perform mission/tasks. Following an assessment of a shared standard with the HN, the responsibility for the new capabilities should be transitioned to the HN. In some cases, a HN may work to sustain and employ its security forces in partnership with NATO to address shared security challenges.




Figure 2.1 – Stages of a joint operation²¹ aligned with the security force assistance framework

²¹ See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3 *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

Section 2 – Security force assistance planning considerations

2.3 At the operational level, SFA should be planned in accordance with the guidance and principles outlined in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations* and the *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive*, which describes in detail the operational-level planning process and its relationship with strategic-level planning. SFA subject matter experts (SMEs) support the commander, the staff and the joint operation planning group (JOPG) with their respective SFA expertise or advice during all phases of the process.

Specifically, SFA SMEs can support the JOPG in:

- the factor analysis with particular attention to LF;
- the analysis of LF centre of gravity;
- the analysis of operational risks and opportunities when dealing with LF;
- the definition of an operational design with a particular attention to operational actions, operational effects and decisive conditions impacting on LF;
- the process to estimate initial force/capability and command and control (C2) requirements focusing on the forces which have to perform SFA activities;
- supporting staff responsible for horizon scanning and updating the situational awareness with the proper instruments and mindset to monitor the status of LF (of a non-NATO nation) and to catch possible indicators of an emerging crisis.

2.4 To promote common understanding, cooperation and unity of effort among stakeholders, commanders should adopt a comprehensive approach for SFA planning. Planning should include HN and multinational stakeholders. Comprehensive planning processes facilitate:

- the delineation of NATO, multinational actors and HN roles/responsibilities;
- identifying the required resources;
- common understanding;
- shared assessment and transition strategies; and
- the sequencing and prioritizing of activities.

2.5 There is no fixed SFA solution however there are tools and templates which can be used to aid and support the planning process. Each plan should be contextual, specific to the HN's requirements and security situation and should reflect a balance between NATO's doctrine and established best practices, other international support, and the HN's needs, capabilities and traditions. A common understanding is built through sharing information and

conducting planning with all partners. Commanders should analyse lessons identified from NATO's previous exercises and operations.

2.6 When planning to integrate SFA into wider strategies and plans, commanders should consider the following.

- a. Maintaining HN primacy and building legitimacy. SFA activities cannot undermine, or be perceived to undermine, the primacy or legitimacy of the HN government.
- b. Understanding the strategic, long-term implications and sustainability of SFA before delivering action. This is especially important in building HN development and defence self-sufficiency, both of which may require large investments of time and materiel. Planning considerations include, but are not limited to, the:
 - understanding of NATO and the HN's required end state;
 - transitions and assessment strategies;
 - sustainability of LF and HN supporting institutions;
 - acceptability of outcomes by the HN's society;
 - impact on the distribution of resources within the HN;
 - likely relationship between improved military forces and existing civilian, regional, ethnic and religious divisions in society;
 - security situation within the HN and the risk to NATO and HN forces;
 - understanding the impact as well as identifying the planning, coordination and synchronization requirements of other missions, activities and tasks (such as stability policing reinforcement) conducted in parallel with SFA in order to maximize resources and effects;
 - impact of SFA activities on wider security sector reform programmes and on the regional and local balance of power; and
 - management of LF who receive or who may require extra training.
- c. Tailoring SFA provision within the operating environment and the specific needs of the HN. Choices in equipment and training provided during SFA activities may affect future interoperability and impact sustainability. This requires LF to be equipped and sized in ways that suit their infrastructure and which are not reliant on systems that may not be available to the HN in the long run.
- d. Ensuring unity of effort/unity of purpose. Commanders consider international, governmental and non-governmental organizations' programmes and objectives. Commanders should also, where possible, aim to integrate and coordinate NATO and HN capabilities.

2.7 **Security force assistance coordination.** It is likely that NATO is not the only organization providing assistance to develop LF. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that coordination measures are in place, such as liaison officers. Such measures promote visibility, deconfliction and cooperation among the different organizations.

Section 3 – Security force assistance as an operational activity

2.8 Providing SFA necessitates a methodical approach to create the desired effects within a given timeframe. Key to success is harnessing the relative advantage that each element (operating within their own environment) can bring as well as understanding their limitations. In order to achieve sustainable LF, the implementation of a functional-based SFA framework may be required. Functions may span across all levels (from tactical to strategic) and integrate HN systems and processes which have to be influenced by SFA activities. This allows NATO forces to enable the HN to solve problems within their own control and become self-sufficient.

2.9 Following North Atlantic Council mission approval, SFA can be a supporting effort within a wider NATO operational design. Therefore, SFA is to be considered throughout the strategic and operational concept of operations development processes.

2.10 The overarching aim of SFA activities is to develop legitimate LF capable of contributing to regional stability. Desired characteristics for LF include:

- **competency** – across all functions and levels, from the ministerial level to the individual soldier performing security functions;
- **capability and sustainability** – resourced within HN capacity, appropriately sized and effective enough to accomplish missions over time;
- **commitment** – to protecting institutions and the security of the population;
- **confidence** – in both NATO's ability to assist, and in themselves to increase their ability to secure their own country; and
- **accountability** – within the framework of the rule of law and accepted by the population.

2.11 With implications that extend well beyond the military mission and into issues such as public support and political cohesion, force protection in support of any NATO forces is a principal consideration in planning, decision-making and executing the mission. Providing SFA may expose NATO forces to a broad spectrum of security risks and threats (e.g. insider threats), specifically when conducting combined activities and may require NATO forces to work closely with LF across the whole spectrum of threats. Force protection issues should be addressed during all SFA activities.

2.12 Commanders should understand their force protection responsibilities and ensure that risks are managed. If a risk is deemed unacceptable by the commander, risk controls will be required.²²

2.13 Information sharing is of great importance as one organization's good intentions may have unintended consequences on another. Information sharing manifests in integrated planning and common understanding. NATO should also develop working relationships with other local and international organizations in shared areas of interest to help fill shortfalls. This may help make the operation more efficient by avoiding duplication of effort. Commanders should understand who holds primacy in any SFA effort and aim to coordinate their activities with other stakeholders.

2.14 **Organization.** Commanders may establish a network of SMEs to provide advice during SFA planning, execution, and assessment, which includes the transition process. While the NATO C2 structure remains independent, the NATO functional organization should reflect and complement the LF command framework.

Section 4 – Assessment

2.15 Assessment²³ informs the planning and execution of SFA the same as any other military operation. Commanders ensure harmonization of the assessment at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to inform senior leaders regarding SFA prioritization and resourcing decisions. Commanders apply assessment to NATO forces conducting SFA, and to LF that are recipients of the assistance to ascertain their capability and capacity.

2.16 Commanders identify organizations, individuals, materiel, systems, tasks, effects, and objectives, to include indicators they will appraise, then develop a plan that assigns responsibilities for collecting data, procedures for data handling and validation,²⁴ and how the appraisal supports the operation. Commanders assess throughout an operation, monitoring²⁵ all the critical indicators and evaluate²⁶ the results to adapt/modify their plans or operations as necessary.

2.17 Commanders inform decision-making at appropriate levels (e.g. inform higher/lower headquarters, make recommendations to the local force or other stakeholders) and/or modify their own plan or a specific generate, organize, train, enable, advise, mentor (GOTEAM) activity. As part of assessment, a commander should monitor and evaluate NATO forces conducting SFA.

²² See AJP-3.14, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection*.

²³ Assessment is defined as: 'the process of estimating the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals, materiel or systems'.

²⁴ Validation is defined as: 'the confirmation of the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals, materiel or systems to meet defined standards or criteria, through the provision of objective evidence'.

²⁵ Monitoring is defined as: 'activity comprised of observing, assessing and reporting on the performance, efficiency and working practices of an organization or part thereof'.

²⁶ Evaluation is defined as: 'the structured process of examining activities, capabilities and performance against defined standards or criteria'.

2.18 Commanders use assessment to determine capability gaps of LF and their supporting institutions to inform all aspects of SFA planning and execution. Commanders may conduct their assessment unilaterally and/or bilaterally with LF and/or in coordination with other stakeholders.

2.19 In order for a LF to function in a sustained and effective manner, it is useful to identify how the LF performs the following four functions: governance, executive, generating, and operating. How each LF is organized and structured to perform these functions varies, but if these functions are not performed, the LF capabilities will degrade over time.

Briefly the four functions can be described as.

- a. **Governance function of a local force.** Provides a means to organize, purpose, and fund LF by way of laws, policy, and strategic guidance. Typical entities within this function include legislative bodies (e.g. parliament) and forums (e.g. councils) that address national security and foreign policy matters.²⁷
- b. **Executive function of a local force.** This may occur as an extension of the chief executive (e.g. prime minister) of the supported nation that occurs within a ministry of defence or a ministry of interior. All LF require some level of executive function to inform the development of national laws and policy and provide for their implementation via processes like strategy and plans, human resource management, resource management, force management, acquisition and logistics, and inspector general.
- c. **Generating function of a local force.** Develops and sustains one or more capabilities of the operating forces as derived from doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities (DOTMLPF) framework analysis, which may include air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and special operations service headquarters like components. In NATO, the generating function occurs as a matter of standardisation (e.g., DOTMLPF-I) such as in military schools, training centres, and arsenals.
- d. **Operating function of a local force.** Employs strategic, operational, and tactical military capabilities through application of joint functions such as C2, intelligence, fires, manoeuvre, protection, sustainment, and information during actual operations. Operating forces are responsible for collective training and performing missions assigned to the unit.

²⁷ Typically, NATO military forces do not interact with elected officials in the governance function of a HN. However, NATO forces can expect to coordinate SFA as part of civil-military cooperation or in coordination with external organizations to address matters that relate to LF. In some cases, NATO forces may advise senior leaders of LF that perform roles within national security and foreign policy forums and or provides official advise/reports to the elected officials within the governance function.

2.20 Using the functions in paragraph 3.4.6, NATO forces can select SMEs (e.g. advisers as mentioned in Chapter 3) to conduct assessments to establish baselines in the capability and capacity of LF organizations. From this baseline, commanders determine to what extent (scale, scope, duration) one or more GOTEAM activities are required to develop organizations of LFs such as improving their ability to perform a given task.

2.21 Assessment of local forces




Figure 2.2 – Compartments of a local force assessment

Assessment activities of the LF can be logically compartmented and sequenced to establish a baseline, account for environmental factors in determining the LF capability end state, highlighting any gaps, and identifying underlying causes that were hindering the partner's development. Figure 2.2 illustrates these compartments and optimally sequences them to aid in assessment of the development of the LF. It is important to use the same indicators throughout, understanding they can be applied to all the functions of the partner. The compartments are identified here in order as the organizational, operational, environmental, and institutional assessments and explained in greater detail below.

- a. The organizational assessment:
 - determines the assigned mission, role, and function of a LF (or a part of it);
 - examines how a LF executes tasks/missions;

- determines the extent to which an organization is **organized, staffed, trained, equipped, led, and resourced**;
 - suggests states of readiness of LF organizations;²⁸ and
 - is informed by other LF assessment compartments.
- b. The operational assessment:
- identifies the strengths and weaknesses in the ability of LF's (or part of it) to plan, execute, and assess assigned tasks/mission, roles and/or functions.
 - requires NATO forces to monitor and evaluate LFs performing tasks/missions during an actual operation, exercise, and/or in a simulated environment;
 - is the primary means to determine capability and capacity of LFs (e.g., how well they can do something and to what extent – their level of performance); and
 - is used to inform the organizational assessment component (e.g., currency of training conducted during an exercise and/or experience of staff in the conduct of actual operations).
- c. The environmental assessment:
- examines how a condition/something in one or more variables of the operating environment impact LF organizations;²⁹
 - determines to what extent LFs should perform (level of performance) assigned tasks/mission;
 - establishes the suitability of assigned LF tasks/missions; and
 - informs the development of LFs measures of effectiveness for tasks/missions.
- d. The institutional assessment.
- (1) Determines the extent to which the LF develops and integrates solutions to **improve, sustain, and/or inform** the capability and capacity of an LF organization – What are the gaps?

²⁸ State of readiness is defined as: 'the level of readiness at a given point in time of a unit, formation, weapon system or item of materiel for operations or exercises'.

²⁹ Variables in the operating environment include political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. Analysis of these variables typically include using areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, and events.

- (2) Evaluates the outputs from each function for their contribution(s) to an LF organization's capability and capacity – regardless of the task/mission of the organization. Things to consider.
- (a) Judge the sufficiency of legal and funding matters relevant to specific LF organizations (e.g. an LF organization has the appropriate authorities and funding to perform tasks/mission) – enabling governance oversight and accountability.
 - (b) Gauge the outputs from policy processes that address specific issues within specific LF organizations (e.g. budget approvals, staff authorizations and/or the extent to which an LF organization will be developed and employed)
 - (c) Estimate the suitability of outputs from one or more local force DOTMLPF structures that resolve capability and capacity gaps in specific LF organizations that reside within the operating function (e.g. number of adequately trained and equipped formations and/or regeneration for combat losses).
 - (d) Assess the sufficiency of outputs from LF organizations (e.g. C2, intelligence, fires) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that inform/support LF organizations in other functions (e.g. provides lessons learned to LF organizations responsible for doctrine development and integration and/or updates senior leaders as to the progress of an operation).
- (3) Determines the extent (scale, scope, duration) of GOTEAM activities occurring in one or more functions so as to mitigate chances of NATO forces **supplanting** or **displacing** a task(s) that an LF organization has responsibility.

2.22 For the unit conducting SFA, assessment of the LF should focus on the development of the partner as well as mission accomplishment. The assignment of missions needs to take into consideration the development level of the LF so that they match their capabilities and push them to improve and can be used as a method of validating their proficiency. Regarding development, it is crucial to establish a baseline and an end state so that any areas needing improvement can be identified.

2.23 **Considerations for planning and executing assessments.** A well-executed assessment strategy assists senior leaders in making prioritization and resourcing decisions. Based on changing conditions, assessment facilitates opportunities for flexible responses via customization of one of more GOTEAM activities. Customization can include changes from embedded advisory teams to mobile training/advisory teams as part of assisting LFs.

2.24 Typically, the conduct of an assessment is resource intensive and can be difficult to achieve under ideal conditions. The interaction of NATO forces with the supported nation and other stakeholders that are not under the command of NATO forces typically faces a variety of challenges, including:

- ensuring that NATO standards are not mapped onto the LF;
- the complex and unpredictable nature of the operation;
- dealing with multiple groups with different priorities/time lines;
- the risk of being misled by competing subjective and measurable sources of information;
- understanding that progress is often non-linear and may reverse; and
- the difficulty, at times, to appreciate political imperatives.

2.25 During the conduct of SFA, ongoing assessment tracks measures of performance (MOP) for GOTEAM activities. Assessment also considers the presence of short-, mid-, and long-term outcomes/desired effects as measures of effectiveness (MOE) for GOTEAM activities.³⁰ Commanders identify and use indicators that infer the condition, state, or existence of issues, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness within each function. Generally, GOTEAM MOEs equate to LFs MOPs – the extent (scale, scope, duration) to which the LF can perform a given task.

2.26 Monitoring plans provide a logical way to observe specific indicators (inputs, activities, outputs) of an LF organizational processes (e.g. resource management, doctrine development, and/or C2) that exist in the functions. Monitoring requires collection (observation) of indicators, the analysis of this information, and integration of the analysed information to inform decision-making at appropriate levels.

Modes of collection are as follows.

- a. Passive collection seeks to discover, identify, and capture relevant and suitable information to support decision-making. Passive collection typically occurs via web searches and alert notifications; interviews and discussions; research and studying material; and the exchange of information with LF organizational stakeholders (e.g. principals, process owners).
- b. Active collection is a resource intensive activity (e.g. tasked organized SMEs) interacting with LF stakeholders in their operating environment. Active collection may include the conduct of formal surveys or studies, site visits, execution of exercises,

³⁰ Commanders should use caution when correlating the output of a given GOTEAM activity to a given outcome/desired effect – these activities may contribute to an outcome(s) but is not the only or even the main factor in bringing about an outcome or desired effect.

or the execution of formal working groups to capture and codify broader perspectives on a particular topic(s).

Section 5 – Security force assistance transitions

2.27 Transition activities comprise the progressive transfer of functions, supporting institutions, infrastructures and responsibilities between NATO and possibly other forces to reach an enduring level of capability for the HN so that it is not dependent on NATO. Transition activities are planned and conducted from the outset and regarded as an integral component of all activities. As a result, initial transition terms may be re-evaluated.

2.28 Transitions are negotiated processes, most importantly, with the HN. This makes them non-linear and dependent on HN political processes and interests, which change over time. Any long-term transition plan is therefore unlikely to proceed as expected. Flexibility is vital, requiring planners to identify the range and limits of acceptable outcomes and to work within those limits to develop potential options and courses of action.

2.29 It is rare for transition activities to be a bilateral process and is more likely to take place in a multilateral, multi-agency setting, with NATO being one of several involved. Hence, the ability of any single organization to manage transition activities as a whole, or to define its outcomes, is limited. There are three key aspects that shape any approach to transition activities.

a. **Transitions are a multinational and interagency process.** Transitions typically occur within multinational and interagency environments, with agencies working within a HN on security, governance and rule of law. This environment creates dependencies between all concerned. Therefore, no one has the freedom to plan and execute transition activities alone. In particular, NATO cooperates with those agencies involved in activities that outlast any significant military presence.

b. **Transitions are a negotiated process.** All, including the wider population, view the shape of any post-transition security environment differently – and such views may conflict. Negotiating the shape of this future security environment is more important than solely focusing on technical capability building. Commanders work towards a flexible, sustainable, technically sound and politically sensitive transition approach in a dynamic political environment that they cannot control. Simple, flexible plans should allow greater resilience to occasional shocks or setbacks and commanders should aim not for a single, fixed end state, but for an acceptable range of outcomes. Understanding what defines this acceptable range is a key element of any transition activities planning.

c. **Transitions are informed by assessment.** Monitoring and evaluating transition performance to include desired outcomes (e.g., perceptions, relationships and behaviours), is vital to enable commanders to identify whether they have

achieved their objectives, make recommendations, and/or adjust their activities to meet their objectives.

2.30 Assessing transition activities. Assessing transition activities, emphasizing continuous learning and analysis is required to adapt planning to the transition environment. Assessment frameworks allow progress to be tracked with risks and issues, including risks for the civilian population being recognized and addressed early. Security transition assessment comprehensively considers related HN systems in order to promote and facilitate synchronization, coordination and integration. Moreover, identifying decisive points and conditions should assist in setting assessment and transition activities.

2.31 Without a holistic approach to assessment, elements of transition may become uncoordinated, especially if multiple agencies are involved.

2.32 Engaging with HN, multinational and interagency, provides an effective means for building shared ownership and understanding of transition activities. Commanders consider (and review) if the transition and the way in which NATO engages in it accords with the key aspects of a successful transition.

2.33 Effective transition activities. Transition planning enables commanders to both track specific progress and monitor the way in which partners are behaving and engaging with one another. Specifically, commanders should consider the following.

a. **Political primacy and focus.** Those involved in transition should be politically astute, maintaining a political focus responsive to the internal politics of the HN while being embedded within the international environment and wider political context especially when founded on local cultural, political and social norms foundations.

(1) **Flexibility.** Transition plans should accommodate uncertainty and should be capable of flexible adaptation to a changing political context. Commanders should be prepared to react to change and remain flexible so that NATO can respond to opportunities or threats as they arise. Regardless of any changes to the plan, a clearly articulated end state should always be maintained.

(2) **Identifying and understanding what motivates actors.** Transitions incorporate multiple agencies and the HN, including their populace, and therefore may be contested. Commanders should consider the impact of transition initiatives in the context of motivations and interests of all concerned. Understanding the diversity of perspective across the HN, including religious and tribal affiliations, gender role, age groups and geographic areas provides a richer basis for planning and decision-making.

(3) **Balancing international and indigenous knowledge.** International experts can offer specific capability and technical knowledge while HN have a more nuanced knowledge of social structures, situational awareness and

appropriate local solutions. Locally influenced solutions, especially when founded on local cultural, political and social foundations are likely to be more durable than those designed solely by internationals.

b. **Legitimacy.** It is important to specify what legitimacy entails and in the eyes of whom; developing domestic legitimacy, notably through ensuring protection of the civilian population, provides long-term stability. Without legitimacy, transition:

- lacks popular support and the broader political process could be undermined; and
- is less likely to endure.

c. **Building comprehensive capacity.** Capacity to support transition activities goes beyond recruiting, training and equipping security personnel and forces. It requires creating a comprehensive capacity to plan, manage, oversee and sustain an acceptable level of security on a cross-government level.

d. **Sustainability.** Longer-term success relies on developing sustainable models and organizations that can provide effective day-to-day security. Sustainability is therefore examined with regards to politics, organizations, processes and resources.

e. **Communication strategy.** Effective transition activities should be supported by a communication strategy that creates an accurate understanding of NATO's actions and intentions among audiences in support of NATO's interests and objectives.

2.34 **Transition risks.** Transition is a risky endeavour with impact beyond the tactical and operational levels. Commanders at all levels should consider the following risks when planning and assessing transition activities and implement strategies to mitigate them.

a. **Timing.** Transitions may occur before LF are confident and capable. Commanders seek to balance the time required to develop capability and legitimacy with the risks that emerge from not accomplishing key security tasks. Transitioning too soon can lead to deterioration in security and, ultimately, strategic mission failure. Premature transition activities may lead to the need to re-engage. Delayed transition activities may result in increased dependency.

b. **State instability.** The political settlement and elements of the state may remain vulnerable for some time both during and after transition activities.

c. **Human rights abuses and violations of international law.** Where warring parties have been responsible for human rights abuses or other violations of international law, the risks of retributive violence should be carefully assessed and mitigated. Abuse within the security and justice system can further undermine the functions of governance and hamper the transition and recovery from conflict and crises. The risks are highest where integration of former combatants into the security

apparatus is taking place or where state institutions, as well as conflicting parties, behave in a predatory manner towards the civilian population.

d. **Conflict of interests.** Tensions may emerge regarding the scope and vision for transition among HN parties, neighbouring countries and those international actors engaged in the transition.

e. **Legitimacy.** If transition activities are not seen as legitimate, it is unlikely to endure. Those engaged in transition activities should therefore consider the implications of any choices they make on the legitimacy of their HN counterparts and support developing their legitimacy wherever possible.

f. **Political capture.** Powerful groups within the HN may seek to use the transition to further their own political purposes. This undermines the legitimacy of the HN government and the transition process, and may ultimately lead to a return to violence or, in extreme cases, security sector collapse.

Chapter 3 – The security force assistance activities

Section 1 – Introduction

3.1 NATO forces conducting security force assistance (SFA) may be required to develop local forces (LF) along either a single line of operation, multiple lines of effort, or through the execution of a combination of SFA activities. SFA activities can be summarized using the acronym 'GOTEAM':

- generate;
- organize;
- train;
- enable;
- advise; and
- mentor.




Figure 3.1 - Security force assistance activities

The initial assessment should be conducted together with political, governance and economic colleagues/counterparts, to ensure a comprehensive assessment of risks. An initial assessment of the local situation and forces is conducted to determine which activities

are most appropriate to the situation and are essential to achieving NATO and host nation (HN) objectives.

3.2 An initial assessment also informs commanders of the HN's capability and readiness to absorb SFA activities. All SFA activities should be decided based on the context and may be delivered concurrently. Commanders should ensure that each SFA activity is tailored to the situation, local conditions, and HN/NATO agreements. All SFA activity must adhere to international, HN and contributing nations' law as well as NATO policy and guidance.

3.3 While providing SFA, commanders should consider the following factors.

a. **Assessment.** Assessment includes monitoring and evaluation to:

- establish baselines of ability;
- inform prioritisation and resourcing;
- ensure progress is occurring and the LF meets the prescribed standards; and
- inform transition with an agreed standard.

b. **Transitional arrangements.** Planning for the transition of responsibility from NATO to the HN should be planned and considered within the comprehensive approach, and potential transition activities are to be considered from the beginning of the operations. Regardless of how much SFA is delivered, there is a transitional phase. A possible transition of responsibility to/from a different regional/international organization is to be considered. Transition and assessment should not be regarded as discrete: both are integral to all SFA activities.

Section 2 – Generate

3.4 Generating assists a HN to develop the systems, structures and workforce that are required to build a sustainable local force capability. Generating requires identification, resourcing and resolution of capability gaps. To ensure that both NATO and HN requirements are addressed, generating is planned and carried out in close collaboration with the HN. Generating ranges from standing up a whole institution to a discrete function or capability and may include recruiting, selecting and vetting local force personnel. Generating stretches across the political and military spectrum and may include assisting with developing budgets, timelines and sharing agreements.

3.5 Generating ensures that the correct balance of personnel, with a commensurate range of skillsets (for example, linguistic, literacy and numeracy skills) and competencies is achieved. Generating requires supporting infrastructure, including but not limited to: recruitment centres; supporting administrative processes (including information technology systems, if feasible); and assisting in designing terms and conditions of service. Commanders should note that:

- NATO does not necessarily lead the generation process;
- not all levels of command may need to be generated; and
- generating should be a planning consideration.

Section 3 – Organize

3.6 Organizing assists a HN to shape its LF. Considerations include measures taken to develop, implement and sustain joint functions, functional areas, support institutions and infrastructure.

3.7 Organizing a HN's personnel, structures and processes into a capable, sustainable force demands a thorough understanding of the initial conditions and the end state. The initial conditions are framed by the extant cultural, societal, structural, procedural and systemic norms that are already in place (or missing). The SFA objectives, derived from the end state established by the North Atlantic Council, should be agreed at the outset in conjunction with the HN. Commanders should articulate clear phases as this helps to frame the start and end of activity as it progresses. HN organizations and units should reflect their own unique requirements, interests and capabilities – they should not simply replicate NATO or troop-contributing nations' external institutions.

Section 4 – Train

3.8 Training is typically the most visible and recognized SFA activity. The aim of training and education is to teach a skill, or type of behaviour, through regular practice and instruction. Training may include the development and execution of programmes of instruction and training events. NATO may train and educate the LF and may also contribute towards establishing a sustainable HN training capability. Therefore, training provided by NATO should be planned and structured to enable NATO to transition these activities to the HN. Some specialized training may continue beyond transition by arrangement with the HN.

3.9 **Training and education.** Training and education involves developing leadership and management skills, as well as building confidence, ethos and professional pride. Trainers work with the HN leadership to set and evaluate training standards and they typically coach future HN trainers to facilitate eventual transition of responsibility to the HN. The main responsibilities of the training activity staff can be summarized as train, guide, coach, observe and evaluate.

3.10 **Training of local forces.** Training of LF is a key component in developing self-sustaining capabilities, building specialist/advanced capabilities and shaping HN forces. Prior NATO SFA activities demonstrates that training LF requires determination, cultural awareness, empathy and, above all, patience. Success is underpinned by carefully selecting and training those personnel chosen to provide training activities. Training should be an enduring function that is able to persist within the HN's own capabilities once NATO leaves.

3.11 Training can be delivered in, or out of, the HN and comprises all activities that develop, improve and integrate leader-development and education at individual, leader, collective and staff levels. In order to mitigate identified capability gaps in LF, and accelerate their independence from NATO, training should focus on the commander's priorities. This often includes:

- task analysis;
- developing and delivering programmes of instruction;
- implementing training events and assessment strategies; and
- leader-development activities.

3.12 Programmes should coordinate all aspects of multinational and national action and contribute towards, and connect with, a wider framework. This requires that commanders and those delivering SFA have an understanding of the wider comprehensive training programme and how they contribute within it. While each commander prioritizes action based on the situation and training assessment, two enduring focuses should be:

- activities conducted to train and educate the LF to fulfil their role; and
- activities conducted to train and educate HN instructors and educators to help ensure that capability is sustainable.

3.13 Training may need to be underpinned by developing training infrastructure. NATO forces can also conduct individual, leader and collective training programs for specific LF. NATO forces can provide training assistance in two ways:

- teams may provide training or give advice/assistance to LF; and
- individual personnel may be assigned or attached to perform training and advisory assistance duties on a temporary or enduring basis.

The commander's initial assessment should develop a training plan based on a full mission analysis.³¹

3.14 Training should be coordinated across all LF, irrespective of location. Inadvertently training differing techniques, procedures and processes that cannot be shared and integrated should be avoided. Commanders responsible for designing training frameworks have to consider:

³¹ Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*, outlines the process

- listing NATO and HN agreed training objectives at each echelon of LF;
- identifying units, commands and leadership personnel requiring training across each echelon;
- identifying resources required and how they will be provided; and
- providing written agreements between NATO and the HN identifying what will be provided by each party; and
- identifying the safeguards necessary to prevent the misuse of its improved military capabilities.

3.15 Training assistance. The agreement reached between NATO and HN officials (most likely outlined in a memorandum of understanding) provides the framework for the who, what, when, where, how and why of military training assistance. Most likely NATO's extant training processes can be adjusted to fit the requirements of the LF being trained and assessed to ensure that styles and techniques are appropriate for HN consumption. Procedures may vary, but fundamental training principles and processes still apply.³² Training assistance should consider the materiel, financial and logistical realities of the HN. Whilst the training philosophy should be to deliver the prescribed standard: that is, no more and no less than required, SFA should be aiming to exploit opportunities and deliver meaningful training when a shortcoming is identified by the training team. This enables the efficient use of resources and reduces the time taken to create credible LF.

3.16 The long-term goal of SFA training is to enable LF to conduct all instruction and training without assistance from NATO. That is why some LF should be identified as future trainers and operate very closely with NATO SFA forces. Initially, NATO may provide all, or most, of the instruction with as much HN assistance as is feasible. The 'train-the-trainer' concept should be integrated throughout all training programmes.

3.17 Training assistance comprises all formal training and instruction conducted by NATO forces. All NATO forces engaged in training assistance are to be prepared and conditioned for the level of scrutiny that their actions may be subjected to by the HN including the government, military, media and civilians. Part of preparing personnel for providing training assistance is making them aware that their actions can have a lasting impact. Their words and actions underpin NATO's commitment, legitimacy and professionalism. Training LF may have unintended effects, for example, shifts in power. Commanders should plan to include indicators of any unintended outcomes in their assessment strategies.

3.18 Security force assistance training. When providing SFA, there are a number of considerations that should be addressed:

³² Bi-SC Directive 75-2 *Education and Training Directive* provides strategic guidance on responsibilities, programming, planning and standard procedures for execution of education and training to ensure a coordinated approach throughout NATO in order to provide trained and ready forces for current and future operations

- what are the authorities, funding and timelines for SFA;
- who is receiving NATO training and what are their motivation, morale, ethnicity, gender, education (for example, literacy) and culture;
- what is the HN's track record, especially regarding the respect for human rights and international law;
- what should be taught;
- what is the best method to teach the topic which is culturally relevant;
- what is the appropriate level of assistance;
- what information is required to enable NATO to understand the operational training environment and required training activities;
- what cultural expertise does NATO have that could help training the LF;
- what enablers should have to be provided by NATO forces;
- what consideration is given to sustaining the training effort once NATO forces have left;
- what should be the assessment plan;
- how training activities integrate with broader strategic communications strategies; and
- what are the assumptions and limitations?

3.19 Training plans. Developing the HN training plan may require a survey to identify gaps between capabilities and needs. Those developing training plans should consider as a minimum:

- HN doctrine and training literature, including differences from NATO/ contributing nations' doctrine;
- constraints in HN resources (material and human) and funding;
- societal, religious, gender, human security training and military culture;
- current level of HN proficiency;
- relationship between civilian security/police/law enforcement forces and military forces;
- HN's ability (or inability) to field systems or equipment;
- potential training facilities and areas based on projected training (for example, urban terrain training sites);

- proficiency of HN's trainers;
- equipment availability (for example, radios, weapons, aircraft and vehicles);
- systems and procedures;
- logistics;
- existing cooperation levels with NATO, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and other agencies; and
- force protection.

3.20 Legal consistency of the training. The training assistance provided to LF should promote the knowledge of, and respect for the relevant law (local and international), including the law of armed conflict. This includes basic principles on the:

- main principles of the law of armed conflict addressing the treatment of armed combatants;
- main principles of international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians; and
- international criminal law and the legal consequences of breaches of this law (including reference to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity) before national or international courts with jurisdiction over LF.

NATO ensures that tailored legal training programs on human rights and the law of armed conflict are facilitated by all NATO training partners.

Section 5 – Enable

3.21 Enabling includes providing services (and potentially contributing toward developing the associated institutions) that underpin and facilitate other activities, particularly during transition activities. The HN needs to understand that support is limited in time and capacity. Enabling contributes towards empowering the HN and building a sustainable capability. In addition, enabling is coordinated across the full spectrum of the HN – this should ensure that activities are coherent, and resources are prioritized. Enabling may include, but is not limited to:

- developing policy, doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures;
- providing operational assistance such as explosive ordnance disposal, air or sea lift, basic medical treatment, route clearance, air support and joint intelligence and surveillance and reconnaissance;
- building or rebuilding facilities and infrastructure directly contributing to LF, such as training facilities and headquarters;
- managing equipment and materiel delivery;

- managing financial matters;
- sharing information on threats; and
- maintaining facilities, infrastructure and equipment.

3.22 Enabling is likely to change over time. In the initial stages of an assistance programme, the LF may be heavily reliant on external support. NATO (and/or contributing organizations as part of a comprehensive approach) should assist the HN to develop its LF in order to be self-reliant in all but niche capabilities that they may never own themselves. These capabilities may, on request, be provided post transition (for example, intelligence or special operations forces' assistance).

3.23 An important aspect of enabling is equipping. Providing LF with equipment may solve local issues in the short term but could generate management and sustainability issues in the long period. Equipment and its life cycle should be affordable, and it should not further hamper the logistic chain. Furthermore, equipment should be specific for the unit's institutional mission/task.

Section 6 – Advise

3.24 Advising comprises improving the performance of designated personnel to achieve objectives. An adviser can recommend a course of action, offer advice, or inform another party about a fact or situation and carry out a number of functions.

- a. Support formations, units and individuals that have reached an agreed standard of capability, competence and self-sufficiency, jointly decided by NATO and the HN.
- b. Provide advice on joint operations, how to improve their operating procedures, or how to obtain NATO provided operational assistance, such as air support, intelligence and/or logistics to accomplish their mission.
- c. Make recommendations through their chain of command; however, they cannot be enforced. Advisers can, for example, recommend courses of action, or inform about a fact or situation, but the final decision is made by the LF and their chain of command.
- d. Provide a liaison between NATO and the HN. Advising should be a two-way relationship and the adviser is the pivotal link in the exchange of information.
- e. Influence a target audience among LF through personal appeal, close collaboration, rational persuasion and team building.
- f. Provide advice on the integration of gender perspectives, in particular on the inclusion of women in, and their role within, LF.

3.25 It takes a unique skill set to be an adviser to LF. SFA is premised on:

- establishing trust with HN counterparts;
- culture; and
- the mission, and the operating environment.

This set largely defines the conditions under which advisers should develop relationships necessary to achieve mission success. Advisers use their influence, developed through trust and teamwork, to explain why their advice could be a viable alternative and is worthy of consideration. Once a course of action has been selected, advisers fulfil the functions of an observer, provider of capability support and official representative of their own chain of command.

3.26 An adviser is an individual (uniformed, civilian, or contractor) tasked to develop civilian and military institutions within a local security establishment with one or more principal or process owner counterparts. The responsibilities of an adviser are summarized as inform, recommend, liaise, observe, represent, and support. Depending on the position, echelon and responsibilities, advisers may be divided into three categories.

- a. **Principal adviser.** A principal adviser supports a principal counterpart. A principal is an elected or appointed official who is the primary leader. A principal derives authority from law or policy. Hence, a principal adviser should likely assist their counterpart in directing, controlling and resourcing one or more processes within a ministry, a LF component, or a LF organization at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. A principal adviser should be able to inform officials in the governance function.
- b. **Process adviser.** A process adviser supports a process owner counterpart. A process owner is an appointed official who is the primary leader of a process within a given function in a LF and/or its related institutions. Process owners derive their authority typically from principals. They have the primary responsibility for organizing, staffing, training, equipping, leading, and employing their processes to achieve objectives. Process advisers support their counterparts in organizing, staffing, training, equipping, leading, resourcing, and employing a particular process in a ministry of the HN, a component of a LF, or staffs within strategic, operational, and tactical organizations of a LF.
- c. **Subject matter expert adviser.** A subject matter expert adviser supports a subject matter counterpart. A subject matter counterpart is a LF subject matter individual who operates systems³³ or performs tasks within his/her process. A subject

³³ In this context, a system should be considered as any weapon, vehicle, aircraft, or equipment that fulfils a particular purpose.

matter expert adviser will support their counterpart in carrying out specific tasks or operating and maintaining systems in a specific ideal process.

Section 7 – Mentor

3.27 Mentoring is about leadership and relationships. A mentor focuses on developing and enabling personnel in leadership and command positions in order to achieve a sustainable capability.³⁴ A mentor is an experienced and trusted individual who provides counsel and leadership to another person, or organization, by agreement. Mentors develop relationships with individuals and teams whom they are mentoring, and these relationships are based on mutual respect and trust. Such relationships should be goal oriented, enable a common understanding between both parties and empower through knowledge and confidence.

3.28 Commanders choose and empower mentors carefully, and ensure that mentors fully understand their operating boundaries, responsibilities and function. Mentoring can be summarized as teaching, guiding, influencing and supporting.

3.29 During operations, the differences between mentoring and advising may be blurred and a clear distinction is not always possible. This depends on the capabilities and skills of the individual member of the LF' organizational elements.

Section 8 – Security force assistance and NATO cross-cutting topics³⁵

3.30 Whilst planning, conducting and assessing the required SFA activities, singularly or in coordination with each other, it is paramount to understand the operating environment and to include considerations on human security and the NATO cross-cutting topics (protection of civilians, children and armed conflict, cultural property protection, women, peace and security, conflict-related sexual violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, combating trafficking in human beings and building integrity). NATO includes the cross-cutting topics where relevant in order to achieve its overarching end state.

³⁴ Mentors may be given authority to take the initiative in a critical situation for a less experienced LF individual or group in a face-saving manner. Authority should be specifically given by higher command and should not be assumed.

³⁵ See AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*.




Figure 3.2 - Interweaving cross-cutting topics into security force assistance GOTEAM activities

3.31 A common effort and solid coordination with the relevant stakeholders in these areas (such as the International Criminal Court, International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations, other non-government organizations, international organizations and the HN) is crucial to successfully implement cross-cutting topics aspects into SFA activities.

3.32 NATO's principle is to prevent and respond to conflict related sexual violence and sexual exploitation and abuse. It is important to ensure a coherent and coordinated approach to enhance data collection and analysis of incidents, trends, and any form of gender-based violence. All these aspects have to be integrated into the education and training activities to reduce the risk of conflict related sexual violence. Gender perspective is an integral part of the above identified cross-cutting topics and is a way of assessing gender-based differences of men, women, boys and girls, reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and the access to resources. The overall implementation of a gender perspective should be included into planning, execution and assessment of SFA.

3.33 Building integrity and good governance is considered one of the functional areas that needs to be developed as part of a sustainable security framework which promotes the principles of integrity, transparency and accountability of the defence institutions which are considered essential for stability and international security cooperation. Corruption risk perception must be included in the planning of SFA operations to avoid inadvertent support of adversaries. Understanding the environment is key.

3.34 When invited to train and develop LF, NATO should ensure that children and armed conflict aspects within the framework of the United Nations Security Council Resolution

(UNSCR) 2225 and related resolutions, are considered in the planning, operations, education and training.

3.35 NATO is committed to advancing cultural property protection under international humanitarian law, particularly the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and UNSCRs such as UNSCR 2347(2017). Commanders should include relevant cultural property protection principles in SFA activities in order to strengthen the ability of LF to recognise and preserve cultural property. Protecting cultural property has a direct positive impact on the resilience of the population.

Lexicon

Part 1 – Acronyms, initialisms and abbreviations

ACO – Allied Command Operations

AJP –Allied joint publication

C2 - command and control

DDR – disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

DOTMLPF – doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel facilities

GOTEAM – generate, organise, train, enable, advise, mentor

HN – Host Nation

JOPG – Joint Operations Planning Group

LF – local force

NAC – North Atlantic Council

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PoC – protection of civilians

SFA – security force assistance

SME – subject matter expert

SP – stability policing

SSR – security sector reform

StratCom – strategic communications

UN – United Nations

Part 2 – Terms and definitions

course of action (COA)

In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed.
(NATO Agreed)

crisis management

The coordinated actions taken to defuse crises, prevent their escalation into an armed conflict and contain hostilities if they should result.
(NATO Agreed)

doctrine

Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.
(NATO Agreed)

capability

The ability to complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance.
(NATO Agreed)

capacity

The extent (scale, scope, and duration parameters) to which a task can be performed. Capacity is the measurable aspects of a capability.
(NATO Agreed)

end state

The political-strategic statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation to be attained at the end of a strategic engagement.
(NATO Agreed)

force protection (FP)

All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, operations, and to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force, thereby contributing to mission success.
(NATO Agreed)

host nation (HN)

A country that, by agreement:

- a. receives forces and materiel of NATO member states or other countries operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
 - b. allows materiel and/or NATO and other organizations to be located on its territory; and/or;
 - c. provides support for these purposes.
- (NATO Agreed)

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