

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK

Last Updated: 28/08/2025

Status: Asset Freeze Targets

REGIME: Chemical Weapons

INDIVIDUALS

1. **Name 6:** AHMED 1: FIRAS 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

Name (non-Latin script): فراس أحمد

DOB: 21/01/1967. **a.k.a:** (1) AHMAD (2) AHMAD, Firas **Nationality:** Syria **Position:** Head of Security Office at Institute 1000 of the SSRC **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0001. Important employee at Scientific Studies and Research Centre (listed under the EU's Chemical Weapons and Syria sanctions regime). (UK Statement of Reasons): Colonel Firas Ahmed is the Director of the Security Office of Institute 1000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for developing and producing computer and electronic systems for Syria's chemical weapons programme. He was involved in transferring and concealing chemical weapons related materials following Syria's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Due to his senior position within Institute 1000 of the SSRC, he is associated with the SSRC. (Gender): Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13749.

2. **Name 6:** ALEXANDROV 1: ALEXEY 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

DOB: 16/06/1981. **a.k.a:** FROLOV, Alexey **Position:** FSB Operative attached to Criminalistics Institute **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0018. (UK Statement of Reasons): Alexey Alexandrov is an FSB operative in the Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435. Evidence including phone and travel records suggest that Alexey Alexandrov was one of the operatives involved in the use of a chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny during his August 2020 visit to Siberia. A chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Alexandrov was an operative of the Criminalistics Unit present in Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Alexey Alexandrov in his capacity as an operative in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was present in Tomsk at the time of the poisoning and was one of the key operatives responsible for the preparation and use of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. **Listed on:** 20/08/2021 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 20/08/2021 **Last Updated:** 20/08/2021 **Group ID:** 14132.

3. **Name 6:** ALEXSEYEV 1: VLADIMIR 2: STEPANOVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

Position: First Deputy Head of the GRU **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0007. Relatives/business associates or partners/links to listed individuals: Anatoliy Vladimirovich Chepiga; Igor Olegovich Kostyukov; Alexander Yevgeniyevich Mishkin. (UK Statement of Reasons): Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev is the First Deputy Head of the GRU (a.k.a. GU). Given his senior leadership role in the GRU, Alexseyev is responsible for the possession, transport and use in Salisbury during the weekend of 4 March 2018 of the toxic nerve agent "Novichok" by officers from the GRU. (Gender): Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** 16/06/2022 **Group ID:** 13747.

4. **Name 6:** BOGDANOV 1: VLADIMIR 2: MIKHAILOVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

Title: Major General **Position:** former Director of Criminalistics Institute. Head of FSB Special Technology Centre (parent entity of

Criminalistics Institute) **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0021. (UK Statement of Reasons):Vladimir Bogdanov is the head of the FSB's 'Special Technology Centre' (the parent entity of the FSB's Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435). There are reasonable grounds to suspect that the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was involved in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny using a toxic nerve agent and as head of the FSB's 'Special Technology Centre' Bogdanov has responsibility for, provided support for, or promoted the actions of the operatives who carried out the operation. Alternatively, he is associated with those who carried out the operation. Evidence suggests that Vladimir Bogdanov was in close contact with Stanislav Makshakov, the commander of the team of operatives involved in the use of a chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. This designation is part of a further package of designations targeting the FSB operatives directly involved in carrying out the operation. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 20/08/2021 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 20/08/2021 **Last Updated:** 16/06/2022 **Group ID:** 14135.

5. **Name 6:** BORTNIKOV 1: ALEKSANDR 2: VASILIEVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

DOB: 15/11/1951. **POB:** Perm, Russia **a.k.a:** BORTNIKOV, Alexander **Nationality:** Russia **Position:** Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0014. (UK Statement of Reasons):Alexander Bortnikov is the director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation and, therefore, responsible for the activities conducted by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the FSB, and the extent of surveillance, there are therefore reasonable grounds to suspect that the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was involved in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny using a toxic nerve agent. As director of the Federal Security Service, Alexander Bortnikov bears responsibility for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 04/01/2021 **Last Updated:** 08/01/2021 **Group ID:** 13972.

6. **Name 6:** CHEPIGA 1: ANATOLIY 2: VLADIMIROVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

Name (non-Latin script): Анатолий Владимирович ЧЕПИГА

Title: Colonel **DOB:** (1) 05/04/1979. (2) 12/04/1978. **POB:** (1) Nikolaevka, Amur Oblast (2) Dushanbe, (1) Russia (2)

Tajikistan **a.k.a:** BORISOV, Ruslan **Nationality:** Russia **Address:** Russia. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0008.

(UK Statement of Reasons):GRU Officer Anatoliy Chepiga (a.k.a. Ruslan Boshirov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent ("Novichok"). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Ruslan Boshirov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal; for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; for the use and possession of Novichok; and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13751.

7. **Name 6:** KIRILLOV 1: IGOR 2: ANATOLYEVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

Name (non-Latin script): Кириллов, Игорь Анатольевич

Title: Lieutenant General **DOB:** 13/07/1970. **POB:** Kostroma, Russia **a.k.a:** (1) KIRILLOV, Igor, Anatolievich (2) KIRILLOV, Ihor , Anatoliiovych **Passport Number:** 4415257657 **Address:** Russia. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0025. (UK Statement of Reasons):Igor KIRILLOV is an involved person under the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on the basis of the following grounds: (1) KIRILLOV is or has been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting prohibited activity related to chemical weapons; (2) KIRILLOV is a member of, or associated with, an entity, namely the Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, which is or has been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting prohibited activity related to chemical weapons. Specifically, KIRILLOV is Head of the Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops, which has been involved in the transfer and use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 08/10/2024 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 08/10/2024 **Last Updated:** 08/10/2024 **Group ID:** 16598.

8. **Name 6:** KIRIYENKO 1: SERGEI 2: VLADILENOVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

DOB: 26/07/1962. **POB:** Sukhumi **Nationality:** Russia **Position:** First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office **Other**

Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0012. (UK Statement of Reasons):As First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation, Sergei Kiriyenko is responsible for domestic affairs. The Presidential Office is a state body within Russia that provides support for the President's work, monitors the implementation of the President's decisions, and has responsibility for governmental policy and the regime's most important actions domestically. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. The activities and movements of Alexei Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020 were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the state within the attack, and the scale of the operation against Navalny, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexey Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 02/01/2021 **Last Updated:** 19/01/2021 **Group ID:** 13970.

9. **Name 6:** KOSTYUKOV **1:** IGOR **2:** OLEGOVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.
Name (non-Latin script): Игорь Олегович КОСТЮКОВ
DOB: (1) 21/02/1961. (2) 21/01/1961. **POB:** Amur Oblast **Nationality:** Russia **Position:** Head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU/GU). Head of the Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Department (GRU) of the Russian Federation **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0009 and CYB0011. Listed under the Chemical Weapons and Cyber sanctions regimes. (UK Statement of Reasons):Igor Olegovich Kostyukov, given his senior leadership role as First Deputy Head of the GRU (a.k.a. GU) at that time, is responsible for the possession, transport and use in Salisbury during the weekend of 4 March 2018 of the toxic nerve agent "Novichok" by officers from the GRU. Igor Kostyukov is the Head of the Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Department (GRU), and was previously First Deputy Head. In this capacity, Igor Kostyukov is responsible for cyber attacks carried out by the 85th Main Centre of Special Services (GTsSS), also referred to as Field Post Number 26165, APT28, Fancy Bear, Sofacy Group, Pawn Storm, Strontium. These attacks include the cyber attack against the German federal parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) in April and May 2015. The cyber attack against the German federal parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) targeted the parliament's information system and affected its operation for several days. A significant amount of data was stolen and e-mail accounts of several MPs as well as Chancellor Angela Merkel were affected. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13748.
10. **Name 6:** KRIVORUCHKO **1:** ALEKSEI **2:** YURIEVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.
DOB: 17/07/1975. **POB:** Stavropol, Russia **a.k.a:** (1) KRIVORUCHKO, Alexei, Yurievich (2) KRIVORUCHKO, Alexey, Yurievich **Nationality:** Russia **Position:** Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0016. (UK Statement of Reasons):Aleksei Krivoruchko is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. In this capacity, he has overall responsibility for armaments. This includes the oversight of the Ministry's stocks of weapons and military equipment. This includes the oversight of the Ministry's stocks of weapons and military equipment. The Russian Ministry of Defence took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed. The Russian Ministry of Defence has overall responsibility for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. Given the use of such chemical weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation and the evidence of the continued involvement of the Russian MoD in the Novichok programme, this could only be on account of intent by the Ministry of Defence and its political leadership. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given Aleksei Krivoruchko's senior role in the Russian military, the evidence suggests that he is responsible for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 05/01/2021 **Last Updated:** 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13974.
11. **Name 6:** MAKSHAKOV **1:** STANISLAV **2:** VALENTINOVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.
Title: Colonel **DOB:** --/--/1966. **Position:** Deputy Director, Criminalistics Institute, FSB. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0023. (UK Statement of Reasons):Stanislav Makshakov is a deputy director in the FSB's Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was involved in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny using a toxic nerve agent. Evidence including phone records suggest that Stanislav Makshakov was the commander of the team of operatives involved in the use of chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. As Deputy Director he is responsible for and/or engaged in, provided support for or promoted the activities conducted by this unit in the FSB. Alternatively, he is associated with those who did. This designation is part of a package of designations targeting the FSB team involved.

Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. **Listed on:** 20/08/2021 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 20/08/2021 **Last Updated:** 20/08/2021 **Group ID:** 14137.

12. **Name 6:** MARCHENKO **1:** ANDREI **2:** VIKTOROVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.

Title: Major General **DOB:** 11/12/1968. **POB:** Russia **Nationality:** Russia **Address:** Russia. **Position:** Deputy Head. Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0031. (UK Statement of Reasons):Andrei MARCHENKO is an involved person under the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on the basis of the following grounds: (1) MARCHENKO is or has been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting prohibited activity related to chemical weapons; (2) MARCHENKO is a member of, or associated with, an entity, namely the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, which is or has been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting prohibited activity related to chemical weapons. Specifically, MARCHENKO is Deputy Head of the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops, which has been involved in the transfer and use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 07/07/2025 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 07/07/2025 **Last Updated:** 28/08/2025 **Group ID:** 16978.

13. **Name 6:** MENYAILO **1:** SERGEI **2:** IVANOVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.

DOB: 22/08/1960. **POB:** Alagir, Russia **Nationality:** Russia **Position:** Head of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania (formerly Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Siberian Federal District) **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0013. (UK Statement of Reasons):Currently Head of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania. Sergei Menyailo was until April 2021 the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Siberian Federal District and, therefore, responsible for ensuring the implementation of the constitutional powers of the President, including the implementation by public authorities of domestic and foreign policy of the state in the federal district of Siberia. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August, were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation. The poisoning of Alexey Navalny took place at Tomsk Bogashevo airport in Siberia. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the scale of the operation involved, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Office. Given his senior leadership role in the Siberian Federal District, Sergei Menyailo bears responsibility for the providing support for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny in Tomsk, Siberia. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 03/01/2021 **Last Updated:** 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13971.

14. **Name 6:** MISHKIN **1:** ALEXANDER **2:** YEVGENIYEVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.

Name (non-Latin script): Александр Евгеньевич МИШКИН

Title: Colonel **DOB:** 13/07/1979. **POB:** (1) Loyga (2) Kotlas, (1) Russia (2) Russia **a.k.a:** PETROV, Alexander **Nationality:** Russia **Address:** Russia. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0010. (UK Statement of Reasons):GRU Officer Alexander Mishkin (a.k.a. Alexander Petrov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent ("Novichok"). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Alexander Petrov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal; for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; for the use and possession of Novichok contrary to the Chemical Weapons Act; and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey. **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 01/01/2021 **Last Updated:** 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13744.

15. **Name 6:** NASRI **1:** KHALED **2:** n/a **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.

Name (non-Latin script): خالد نصري

a.k.a: (1) NASRI, Haled (2) NASRI, Mohammed, Khaled (non-Latin script: 3) (محمد خالد نصري) NATSRI, Haled (4) NATSRI, Khaled (5) NATSRI, Mohammed, Khaled **Nationality:** Syria **Position:** Head of Institute 1000 of the SSRC **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0005. Important employee at Scientific Studies and Research Centre (listed under both the Syria sanctions regime and Chemical Weapons regime). Works under Anr Armanazi and Salam Tohme, both listed under the Syria sanctions regime. (UK Statement of Reasons):Khaled Nasri is the Director of Institute 1000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for developing and producing computer and electronic systems for Syria's chemical weapons programme. As a result of his senior role at SSRC, he is associated with the SSRC. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13745.

16. **Name 6:** OSIPOV 1: IVAN 2: VLADIMIROVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

DOB: 21/08/1976. **a.k.a:** SPIRIDINOV, Ivan **Position:** FSB Operative attached to Criminalistics Institute **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0020. (UK Statement of Reasons):Ivan Osipov is an FSB operative in the Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435. Evidence including phone and travel records suggest that Ivan Osipov was one of the operatives involved in the use of a chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny during his August 2020 visit to Siberia. A chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Osipov was an operative of the Criminalistics Unit present in Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Ivan Osipov, in his capacity as an operative in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was present in Tomsk at the time of the poisoning and was one of the key operatives responsible for the preparation and use of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. **Listed on:** 20/08/2021 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 20/08/2021 **Last Updated:** 20/08/2021 **Group ID:** 14134.

17. **Name 6:** PANYAEV 1: VLADIMIR 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

DOB: 25/11/1980. **POB:** Serdobsrk, Russia **Position:** FSB Member **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0019. (UK Statement of Reasons):Vladimir Panyaev is a member of the FSB. Evidence including phone and travel records suggest that Vladimir Panyaev was present during the use of a chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny during his August 2020 visit to Siberia. A chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Vladimir Panyaev was an FSB member who was present in Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Vladimir Panyaev in his capacity as a member of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was present in Tomsk at the time of the poisoning and was one of the key figures responsible for the preparation and use of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. **Listed on:** 20/08/2021 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 20/08/2021 **Last Updated:** 20/08/2021 **Group ID:** 14133.

18. **Name 6:** POPOV 1: PAVEL 2: ANATOLIEVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

DOB: 01/01/1957. **POB:** Krasnoyarsk, Russia **Nationality:** Russia **Position:** Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0015. (UK Statement of Reasons):Pavel Popov is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. In this capacity, he has overall responsibility for research activities. This includes the oversight and development of the Ministry's scientific and technical capabilities, including the development of potential weapons, and modernisation of existing weapons and military equipment. The Russian Ministry of Defence took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed. The Russian Ministry of Defence has overall responsibility for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. Given the use of such chemical weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation and the evidence of the continued involvement of the Russian MoD in the Novichok programme, this could only be on account of intent by the Ministry of Defence and its political leadership, which includes Pavel Popov. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given Pavel Popov's senior role in the Russian military, the evidence suggests that he is responsible for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 04/01/2021 **Last Updated:** 08/01/2021 **Group ID:** 13973.

19. **Name 6:** RTISHCHEV 1: ALEKSEY 2: VIKTOROVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

Title: Major General **POB:** Russia **a.k.a:** (1) RTISHCHEV, Aleksei, Viktorovich (2) RTISHCHEV, Alexei, Viktorovich (3) RTISHCHEV, Alexey, Viktorovich **Nationality:** Russia **Address:** Russia **Position:** Head. Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0030. (UK Statement of Reasons):Aleksey RTISHCHEV

is an involved person under the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on the basis of the following grounds: (1) RTISHCHEV is or has been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting prohibited activity related to chemical weapons; (2) RTISHCHEV is a member of, or associated with, an entity, namely the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, which is or has been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting prohibited activity related to chemical weapons. Specifically, RTISHCHEV has been Deputy Head, and is now Head, of the Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops, which has been involved in the transfer and use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 07/07/2025 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 07/07/2025 **Last Updated:** 07/07/2025 **Group ID:** 16977.

20. **Name 6:** SAID 1: SAID 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

Name (non-Latin script): سعيد سعيد

DOB: 11/12/1955. **a.k.a:** SA'ID, Saeed **Nationality:** Syria **Address:** (1) Jamraya, Damascus, Syria.(2) Barzeh, Damascus, Syria.**Position:** Head of Security, Institute 3000 of the SSRC (a.k.a. Institute 6000 of the SSRC) **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0004. Important employee at Scientific Studies and Research Centre (listed under both the Syria and Chemical Weapons regime). Works under Zuhair Fadhlun (listed under the Syria sanctions regime). (UK Statement of Reasons):Said Said is a member of Institute 3000 a.k.a Institute 6000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) that is responsible for developing and producing Syria's chemical weapons. As a result of his role at SSRC, he is associated with the SSRC. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13750.

21. **Name 6:** SEDOV 1: ALEXEI 2: SEMENOVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

DOB: --/--/1954. **Position:** Head of FSB 2nd Service **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0024. (UK Statement of Reasons):Alexei Sedov is the Head of the "2nd Service" Unit in the Federal Security of the Russian Federation (FSB). There is reasonable grounds to suspect that the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was involved in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny using a toxic nerve agent. As Head of the "2nd Service" Unit, Sedov is responsible for, engaged in, provided support for, or promoted the activities conducted by this unit in the FSB. Alternatively, he is associated with those who did. This designation is part of a further package of designations targeting the FSB operatives directly involved in carrying out the operation. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 20/08/2021 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 20/08/2021 **Last Updated:** 16/06/2022 **Group ID:** 14138.

22. **Name 6:** SERGEEV 1: DENIS 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

Name (non-Latin script): Денис Сергеев

DOB: 17/09/1973. **a.k.a:** FEDOTOV, Sergey **Nationality:** Russia **Passport Number:** 45 15257657 **Position:** An officer of senior rank, possibly Major General, serving in the Russian Military Intelligence Service (GRU) **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0029. (UK Statement of Reasons):Denis SERGEEV is an involved person under the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on the basis that he has been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting prohibited activity related to chemical weapons. Specifically, SERGEEV provided support in the preparation and use of the chemical weapon Novichok in Salisbury on 4 March 2018, and provided a coordinating role in London on the weekend of the attack. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 07/11/2024 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 07/11/2024 **Last Updated:** 07/11/2024 **Group ID:** 16680.

23. **Name 6:** VASILYEV 1: KIRILL 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

Title: General **Position:** Director of Criminalistics Institute, FSB **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0022. (UK Statement of Reasons):Kirill Vasilyev is the Director of the Criminalistics Institute of the FSB - Military Unit 34435. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was involved in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny using a toxic nerve agent. Evidence demonstrates that the Criminalistics Institute were the unit responsible for, provided support for and involved in the use of chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. As Director for the Criminalistics Institute Vasilyev was responsible for the actions of the unit responsible. Alternatively, he is associated with the operatives who did. This designation is part of a further package of designations targeting the FSB operatives directly involved in carrying out the operation. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents.

Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 20/08/2021 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 20/08/2021 **Last Updated:** 16/06/2022 **Group ID:** 14136.

24. **Name 6:** YARIN 1: ANDREI 2: VENIAMINOVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

DOB: 13/02/1970. **POB:** Nizhny Tagil, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Russia **Nationality:** Russia **Position:** Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0011. (UK Statement of Reasons):Andrei Veniaminovich Yarin is the Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate in the Presidential Executive Office. The Presidential Office is a state body providing support for the President's work and monitoring the implementation of the President's decisions and overall Governmental policies and most important action. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation, including the Federal Security Service (FSB). Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the state within the attack, and the scale of the operation against Navalny, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexey Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. As Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate in the Presidential Executive Office, Andrei Veniaminovich Yarin bears responsibility for the preparation, support for and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 01/01/2021 **Last Updated:** 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13969.

25. **Name 6:** YASMINA 1: TARIQ 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

Name (non-Latin script): طارق ياسمينة

Title: Brigadier General **a.k.a:** (1) YASMINA, Tareq (2) YASMINA, Tarq **Nationality:** Syria **Position:** Liaison officer between the SSRC and the Presidential Palace **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0003. Employee Works at Scientific Studies and Research Centre (listed under both the Syria and Chemical Weapons sanctions regimes) (UK Statement of Reasons):Brigadier General (previously Colonel) Tariq Yasmina acts as the liaison officer between the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and the Presidential Palace, and, as such, is involved in the use and preparations for the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. As a result of his senior role at SSRC, he is associated with the SSRC. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13743.

26. **Name 6:** ZUGHAIIB 1: WALID 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.

Name (non-Latin script): وليد زغيب

Title: Doctor **a.k.a:** (1) ZGHA'IB, Walid (2) ZUGHAYB, Walid (3) ZUGHIB, Walid **Nationality:** Syria **Position:** Head of Institute 2000 of the SSRC **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0002. Important employee at Scientific Studies and Research Centre (listed under both the Syria and Chemical Weapons sanctions regimes). Works under Anr Armanazi and Salam Tohme (both listed under the Syria sanctions regime). (UK Statement of Reasons):Walid Zughaiib is the Director of Institute 2000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for mechanical development and production for Syria's chemical weapons programme. As a result of his senior position within Institute 2000, he is also associated with the designated entity SSRC. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13746.

ENTITIES

1. **Organisation Name:** 33RD SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND TESTING INSTITUTE

a.k.a: (1) 33rd TsNIII (2) Federal State Budgetary Establishment 27 Scientific Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation **Address:** Ulitsa Krasnoznamennaya Street 1, Volk-18, Saratov Oblast, Shikhany, Russia, 412918. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0028. (UK Statement of Reasons):The Russian Ministry of Defence 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute is an involved person under the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on the basis of the following grounds: (1) the Russian Ministry of Defence 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute is a member of, or associated with, an entity, namely the Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, which is or has been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting prohibited activity related to chemical weapons. Specifically, the Russian Ministry of Defence 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute is subordinate to, acting on behalf of, and in support of the Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops, which have been involved in the transfer and use of chemical weapons in Ukraine; (2) The Russian Ministry of Defence 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute is or has been providing support for a prohibited activity related to chemical weapons. (Phone number):+7 343 2559988 (Website):<https://ens.mil.ru/science/SRI/information.htm?id=12027@morfOrgScience> (Email address):33cnii-zakupki@mil.ru (Type of entity):Military (Parent company):Russia Ministry of Defence **Listed on:** 08/10/2024 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 08/10/2024 **Last Updated:** 08/10/2024 **Group ID:** 16601.

2. **Organisation Name:** JOINT STOCK COMPANY FEDERAL SCIENTIFIC AND PRODUCTION CENTRE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF APPLIED CHEMISTRY

a.k.a: (1) AO FNPTS NII PRIKLADNOI KHIMII (2) FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTER "SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF APPLIED CHEMISTRY" JSC (3) FNPC NII APPLIED CHEMISTRY JSC (4) JSC FNPC Research Institute of Applied Chemistry (5) JSC Research Institute of Applied Chemistry (6) NIIPKH **Address:** 3 Akademika Silin Street, Sergiev Posad, Moscow Oblast, Russia, 141313. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0032. Incorporation dates: 1945, 1 August 2011 (UK Statement of Reasons):The Joint Stock Company Federal Scientific and Production Centre Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry is an involved person under the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, as it is or has been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting, a prohibited activity related to chemical weapons. Specifically, the Joint Stock Company Federal Scientific and Production Centre Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry provided RG-Vo riot control agent grenades to the Russian military which have been used as a method of warfare against Ukraine in contravention of the Chemical Weapons Convention. (Website):<https://niiph.ru/> (Email address):niiph@niiph.ru (Business Reg No):(1) Business registration number: 1115042005638 (2) Tax number: 5042120394 **Listed on:** 07/07/2025 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 07/07/2025 **Last Updated:** 07/07/2025 **Group ID:** 16979.

3. **Organisation Name:** RADIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENCE TROOPS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Name (non-Latin script): Войска Радиационной Химической И Биологической Защиты Министерства Обороны Российской Федерации

a.k.a: (1) CBR Defence Troops (2) Military Unit Number 52688 (non-Latin script: Войсковая Часть 52688) (3) Radiation Chemical and Biological Defense Troops (4) RCB Defense Troops (5) RChBD (6) RKhBZ **Address:** Corpus 2, Building 22, Frunze Embankment, Moscow, Russia, 119160. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0026. (UK Statement of Reasons):The Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation is an involved person under the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, as it is or has been being responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting, a prohibited activity related to chemical weapons. Specifically, the Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops have been involved in the transfer and use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. (Type of entity):Military organisation (Parent company):Russian Ministry of Defence (Business Reg No):1037739635890 (Russia) **Listed on:** 08/10/2024 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 08/10/2024 **Last Updated:** 08/10/2024 **Group ID:** 16599.

4. **Organisation Name:** RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 27TH SCIENTIFIC CENTRE

a.k.a: (1) 27th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (2) 27th NTs (3) 27th Scientific Centre (4) Federal State Budgetary Establishment 27 Scientific Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation **Address:** Brigadirskiy Pereulok 13, Moscow, Russia, 105005. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0027. (UK Statement of Reasons):The Russian Ministry of Defence 27th Scientific Centre is an involved person under the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on the basis of the following grounds: (1) the Russian Ministry of Defence 27th Scientific Centre is a member of, associated with, or acting on behalf of or at the direction of an entity, namely the Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, which is or has been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting prohibited activity related to chemical weapons. Specifically, the Russian Ministry of Defence 27th Scientific Centre is subordinate to the Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops, which have been involved in the transfer and use of chemical weapons in Ukraine; (2) The Russian Ministry of Defence 27th Scientific Centre is or has been providing support for a prohibited activity related to chemical weapons. (Type of entity):Military (Parent company):Russian Ministry of Defence **Listed on:** 08/10/2024 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 08/10/2024 **Last Updated:** 08/10/2024 **Group ID:** 16600.

5. **Organisation Name:** SCIENTIFIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH CENTRE (SSRC)

a.k.a: (1) Center for Scientific Studies and Research (SSRC) (2) Center for Study and Research (CERS) (3) Centre de Recherche de Kaboun (4) Centre d'Etude et de Recherche Scientifique (CERS) (5) Scientific Research Council (SRC) (6) Scientific Studies and Research Council (7) Syrian Scientific Research Council (SSRC) **Address:** (1) P.O. Box 31983, Barzeh.(2) Barzeh Street, PO Box 4470, Damascus, Syria. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0006 and SYR0286. Listed under the Chemical Weapons and Syria sanctions regimes. (UK Statement of Reasons):There are reasonable grounds to suspect that they are an involved person under the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 because they are or have been involved in activities carried out on behalf of the Assad regime, implementing, or connected to the repressive policies of that regime. In particular, carrying on prohibited activities related to chemical weapons in Syria. (Phone number):Telephone: 6668114/5 Telefax: 6620317 (Type of entity):Investment. Private (Subsidiaries):Bena Properties (subsidiary), Cham Holding Building, Daraa Highway, Ashrafiyat Sahnaya Rif Dimashq, Syria, P.O. Box 9525. Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology. HISAT. National Standards & Calibration Laboratory. NSCL **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** 25/04/2025 **Group ID:** 12426.

6. **Organisation Name:** STATE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR ORGANIC CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY (GOSNIIOKHT)

a.k.a: Federal State Unitary Enterprise "State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology" (GosNIIOKhT) **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0017. (UK Statement of Reasons):The Federal State Unitary Enterprise State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (Gosniokht) is a state research institute within Russia with responsibility for the destruction of chemical weapon stocks inherited from the Soviet Union. The institute in its original role, before 1994, was involved in the development and production of chemical weapons, including the toxic nerve agent now known as 'Novichok'. After 1994, the same family who owned the institute took part in the government's program for destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons inherited from the Soviet Union. The subsequent deployment of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group against Alexey Navalny would therefore only be possible because the institute had failed to carry out its responsibility to destroy the stockpiles of chemical weapons. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven

record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. As the institute responsible for the destruction of chemical weapons within the Russian Federation, Gosniokht bears responsibility for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Phone number):7+495+2732405 (Email address):DIR@GosNIIOKhT.mt.ru (Parent company):Russian Ministry of Defence **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 06/01/2021 **Last Updated:** 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13975.