



CIVIL NUCLEAR CONSTABULARY

The Executive Office
Civil Nuclear Constabulary
Building F6 Culham Science Centre
Abingdon
Oxon
OX14 3DB

Tel: 03303 135400

Website: <https://www.gov.uk/cnc>

19th June 2025

Dear Requester

I am writing in response to your request for information regarding the below. Your request has been handled under Section 1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. In accordance with Section 1(1) (a) of the Act I hereby confirm that the CNC/CNPA does hold information of the type specified.

Your Request:

Under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I am writing to request the following information:

- 1. How many multi-agency exercises have been conducted by your organisation within the last 3 years (1st May 2022 to 30th April 2025 inclusive).**
- 2. What proportion of these multi-agency exercises were:**
 - i. Tabletop / Scenario Based**
 - ii. Live Exercises**
 - iii. Other (please state).**
- 3. Please detail how post-exercise findings are fed back into the organisation and how any changes to policies and procedures are implemented as a result of this feedback.**
- 4. What proportion of multi-agency exercises in the last 3 years:**
 - i. Involved more than two CCA 2004 category one responder organisations (please detail)**
 - ii. Involved CCA 2004 category two**

responders (please detail) iii. Involved organisations from the voluntary and faith based sectors (please detail).

5. Please detail how the aims and objectives of the exercise are determined and communicated to the parties involved.

CNC Response:

1. 40

2. i. Tabletop / Scenario Based - 2

ii. Live Exercises - 31

iii. Other (please state) - 7

3. The Exercise and Resilience team report post exercise findings to senior management. Any identified areas for improvement are captured on the CNC risk management and action tracker system.

4. 27.5%

i, ii, iii This information is exempt under S24 National Security and S38(1) Health and Safety.

5. The Aims and Objectives for each exercise are agreed between the CNC and the Site Licensed companies, this will drive the scenario design which are approved by the Office of Nuclear Regulation. Communication is by means of operational Orders and Briefings

Exemption S24 National Security and S38(1) Health and Safety.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006 the UK Government has published the threat level based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently at “substantial”. The release of this level of detail into the public domain is likely to assist potential terrorists, thus seriously threatening national security. Members of the criminal fraternity are also likely to benefit from the disclosure as it will increase the publicly available knowledge of the capabilities of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, potentially making it easier to commit offences. Disclosure of the information would also assist with the disruption and avoidance of any police response to an unlawful activity, whether that activity is terrorist related or not.

The disclosure would therefore be likely to make it easier to commit offences and would also inevitably endanger the safety of those persons working at the sites, members of surrounding communities and also police officers.

Public Interest Test

Considerations favouring disclosure under Section 24

Disclosure of the information requested would enable the public to gauge the efficiency and effectiveness of the plans in place to prevent and detect potential terrorist activity. The public are entitled to know how the police service undertakes its duties to be reassured that forces are doing as much as possible to combat terrorism.

Factors favouring non-disclosure under Section 24

Disclosure of full information on exercises, could be of intelligence value to a person or persons with criminal or malicious intent. Full disclosure could provide and enable targeted malicious actions, be that some form of attack on an operational unit, or avoiding that unit for example where strengths and weakness may be perceived (whether incorrectly or not).

Such a disclosure would allow those with criminal intent the ability to build up a mosaic picture of force capabilities and resources and use this information to undermine national security. This places the community at increased unnecessary risk of harm and impacts on police resources if additional resources and tactics need to be put in place to counter any harm caused by an adverse FOIA disclosure.

Considerations favouring disclosure under Section 38

The public are entitled to know how the police service allocate public funds, therefore by disclosing this information would lead to better informed public awareness and debate. Disclosure of the information would assist communities to be more aware of the level of protection afforded to them as they would have a better understanding of our Capabilities to detect UAV/drones in the airspace of nuclear sites.

Considerations favouring non-disclosure under Section 38

Public safety is of paramount importance to the police service and its partner agencies. In this case the disclosure of information may assist terrorists to further their aims by violent means, thus putting the safety of members of the public and police officers at risk. Whilst wishing to embrace the ethos of information disclosure, this cannot take precedence over public safety.

The disclosure of information designed to safeguard the public is also likely to lead to a loss of confidence in the Constabulary's ability to protect the well-being of the community.

Balance Test

Whilst I acknowledge that there is a legitimate public interest in disclosing the information requested, the Police Service will not divulge information if to do so will prejudice national security or place the safety of any individual at risk. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed the risk of terrorism and other more common forms of criminality, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of the police in this highly sensitive area.

Having weighed up the competing arguments, I have concluded that on this occasion the public interest is best served by maintaining the exemptions afforded by Sections 24 and 38. I have therefore decided to refuse to release this information.

Context:

The Civil Nuclear Constabulary is a specialist armed police service dedicated to the civil nuclear industry, with Operational Policing Units based at 10 civil nuclear sites in England and Scotland and over 1600 police officers and staff. The Constabulary headquarters is at Culham in Oxfordshire. The civil nuclear industry forms part of the UK's critical national infrastructure and the role of the Constabulary contributes to the overall framework of national security.

The purpose of the Constabulary is to protect licensed civil nuclear sites and to safeguard nuclear material in transit. The Constabulary works in partnership with the appropriate Home Office Police Force or Police Scotland at each site. Policing services required at each site are agreed with nuclear operators in accordance with the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 and ratified by the UK regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). Armed policing services are required at most civil nuclear sites in the United Kingdom. The majority of officers in the Constabulary are Authorised Firearms Officers.

The Constabulary is recognised by the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS). Through the National Coordinated Policing Protocol, the Constabulary has established memorandums of understanding with the local police forces at all 10 Operational Policing Units. Mutual support and assistance enable the Constabulary to maintain focus on its core role.

We take our responsibilities under the Freedom of Information Act seriously. If you feel your request has not been properly handled or you are otherwise dissatisfied with the outcome of your request, you have the right to request an internal review. We will investigate the matter and aim to reply within 3 to 6 weeks. You should write, in the first instance to:

Kristina Keefe
Disclosures Officer
CNC
Culham Science Centre
Abingdon
Oxfordshire
OX14 3DB

E-mail: FOI@cnc.pnn.police.uk

If you are still dissatisfied following our internal review, you have the right, under section 50 of the Act, to complain directly to the Information Commissioner. Before considering your complaint, the Information Commissioner would expect you to have exhausted the internal review procedure provided by the CNPA.

The Information Commissioner can be contacted at:

FOI Compliance Team (complaints)
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF

If you require any further assistance in connection with this request, please contact us using the details provided above.

Yours sincerely

Kristina Keefe

Disclosures Officer