



**Policy name:** Management of Internal Security Procedures (Closed Prisons) Policy Framework

**Reference:** N/A

**Re-issue Date:** 26 June 2025

**Implementation Date:** 10<sup>th</sup> January 2025\*

\*Prisons can choose to implement the policy ahead of this date

**Replaces the following documents (e.g., PSIs, PSOs, Custodial Service Specs) which are hereby cancelled:**

By the implementation date the following PSI's will be cancelled and Governors<sup>1</sup> of public sector prisons and contracted prisons must ensure that their local procedures do not contain references to the following:

Management and security of gate services	14/2011
Management and security of communication/control rooms and internal movement	13/2011
Management and security of keys and locks	55/2011
Management and security of nights	24/2011
Management and security of tools and equipment	57/2011
NOMS service specification for the provision of secure operating environment: communication and control rooms	
NOMS service specification for nights	
NOMS service specification for the provision of a secure operating environment: gate services	
NOMS service specification for the provision of a secure operating environment: internal prisoner movement	

**Introduces amendments to the following documents:** None

### **LONG TERM HIGH SECURITY PRISONS AND RESTRICTED STATUS PRISONERS POLICY REQUIREMENTS**

Directions about the security and management of these prisoners must be in line with the following:

- The Identification, Initial Categorisation and Management of Potential and Provisional Category A/Restricted Status Prisoners
- The Review of Security Category - Category A/Restricted Status Prisoners
- Management and Security of Category A Prisoners - Internal
- Management and Security of Category A Prisoners - External Movements
- Management of Restricted Status Prisoners (awaiting publication)

<sup>1</sup> In this document the term Governor also applies to Directors of Contracted Prisons.

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### Action required by:

x	HMPPS HQ	x	Governors
x	Public Sector Prisons	X	Heads of Group
x	Contracted Prisons		The Probation Service
x	Under 18 Young Offender Institutions		Other providers of Probation and Community Services
	HMPPS Rehabilitation Contract Services Team		

**Mandatory Actions: All groups referenced above must adhere to the Requirements section of this Policy Framework, which contains all mandatory actions.**

### For Information:

Governors must ensure that any new local policies developed as a result of this Policy Framework are compliant with relevant legislation, including the Public-Sector Equality Duty (Equality Act, 2010).

Section 6 of the Policy Framework contains guidance to assist implementation of the requirements set out in Section 4. Any questions concerning departure from the guidance can be sent to the contact details below.

In this document the term Governor also applies to Directors of contracted prisons.

### How this policy framework will be audited/monitored:

In public sector prisons, Prison Group Directors (PGDs) will monitor compliance with requirements set out within the policy framework in their prisons using the auditing and monitoring tools described in this framework.

In contracted prisons monitoring of compliance will be through the standard contract management processes.

For areas in line with the Health and Safety Governance Strategy, Health and Safety (H&S) assurance and monitoring for public sector prisons is undertaken through H&S monitoring and assurance within the H&S function, using the H&S audit and reporting tool compliance checklist. The H&S processes may be different for contracted prisons and therefore, contracted prisons must have their own H&S arrangements which ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all employees.

Quality assurance for public sector prisons and contracted prisons is provided by HMPPS Performance Assurance and Risk (PAR) Group through the security audit.

Mandatory elements of instructions should be subject to management checks (and may be subject to self or peer audit by operational line management), as judged to be appropriate by the managers with responsibility for delivery.

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### **Resource Impact:**

The identified resource impact for this Policy Framework is staffing within the Security Department. The initial impact will be in terms of the time taken to update the Local Security Strategy (LSS). Prisons will also have to conduct a whole prison approach evidence-based risk assessment to identify their risks of escape and update their LSS to reflect these. Following the initial rewrite of the LSS in alignment with this Policy Framework, resource implication is not expected to be any different to current requirements.

It is expected that this Policy Framework will assist prisons in reducing the risk of escape. This in turn is expected to reduce financial costs to HMPPS and other partner agencies, as well as any reputational damage that results from escapes.

**Contact** : security.procedures@justice.gov.uk

**Deputy/Group Director sign-off:** Andy Rogers, Deputy Director, Operational Security Group, Directorate of Security

**Approved by OPS for publication:** Helen Judge, Joint Chair, Operational Policy Sub-board, July 2024.

### **Revisions**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Changes</b>
26 June 2025	Amendments to paras 4.79 - 4.82 and 6.42 - 6.44

# OFFICIAL

## Contents

Section	Title	Page
1	<b>Purpose</b>	5
2	<b>Evidence</b>	5
3	<b>Outcomes</b>	5
4	<b>Requirements</b>	5
	General	5
	Gate Procedures	7
	Internal Movement Procedures	14
	Keys, Locks, Tools and Equipment	17
	Night Procedures	32
5	<b>Constraints</b>	39
6	<b>Guidance</b>	40
	Support for Prisoners	40
	Gate Procedures	40
	Communications Room and Radio	43
	Internal Movement	44
	Roll Checks	44
	Members of the Public Filming	46
	Gates, Doors, Keys and Locks	47
	Tools and Equipment	51
7	<b>Annexes and Supporting Tools</b>	53

## OFFICIAL

### **1. Purpose**

- 1.1 Keeping prisons secure is fundamental to the role of HMPPS and forms an essential duty to the public. Escapes and breaches of security procedures undermines the core principles of the criminal justice system.
- 1.2 This Policy Framework provides all public and contracted closed prisons with the information and guidance needed to manage the risk of escape through internal security processes and procedures; ultimately contributing towards HMPPS outcomes to reduce reoffending and protect the public.

### **2. Evidence**

- 2.1 The HMPPS Annual Digest provides year on year data regarding escapes and can be accessed [here](#).

### **3. Outcomes**

- 3.1 Use of this Policy Framework and supporting documents will ensure that internal security procedures in closed prisons are conducted in a manner that reduces the risk of escape. This ultimately supports the successful maintenance of security and order in prisons.
- 3.2 By following the requirements and guidance in this Policy Framework, staff will be able to:
- Ensure gate procedures are secure.
  - Ensure internal movement, communications and radios are managed effectively.
  - Maintain security during nights.
  - Securely manage tools and equipment.
  - Securely use and maintain keys and locks.

### **4. Requirements** (see guidance for further information)

#### **Definition**

- 4.1 All within HMPPS are to understand and report escapes correctly as per the following definition:
- 4.2 An escape is defined as when a prisoner unlawfully gains their liberty by breaching the secure perimeter of a closed prison. An incident is deemed to be an escape and included in the reported annual total if the prisoner is at liberty for at least 15 minutes before recapture or an offence is committed during an escape lasting less than 15 minutes. A 'Category A escape' means the escape of a Category A prisoner. Category A prisoners are those whose escape would be highly dangerous to the public, the police or the security of the State. A prisoner escapes from an escort if they are able to pass beyond the control of escorting staff and leave the escort, the vehicle or the premises (such as a court or hospital).

#### **General**

- 4.3 Prisons must manage, update and assure their Local Security Strategy (LSS) in line with the [LSS Policy Framework](#).
- 4.4 Governors must check that all staff are aware of their role in managing security and that they are familiar with and where to find the prison's LSS including the guidance and associated supporting tools which have been produced to support this Policy Framework.

## OFFICIAL

- 4.5 Heads of Security must complete a physical security “self-audit”, appropriate to the security level of the prison. This must be completed annually for the High Security Estate, and every two years outside of the High Security Estate (HSE) for closed prisons. The audit should also include the fabric of the building, perimeter and the equipment that supports the security task. From the audit findings, an action plan should be compiled to detail improvements needed to be undertaken. The Physical Security Audit Template (Annex M) must be undertaken by the Area Property Operations Manager (or their delegate) supported by the Security Department and any other appropriate heads of function. All security systems must be properly maintained and supported by the CAFM system this includes (for HSE only) the requirements within the Security Systems Operations Testing Manual (SSOTM).
- 4.6 PGDs should also consider the information obtained from physical security self-audits to satisfy themselves that the physical security measures at each prison provides a degree of security appropriate for the role of the prison. Reports should be used to determine priorities in expenditure. In most cases where current standards of physical security cannot be met in full, an adequate standard will still be provided if procedures are adapted to compensate, for example by permitting a higher level of vigilance or supervision.
- 4.7 When completing the physical security self-audit, Heads of Security must consider:
- Overgrown trees and foliage around the perimeter.
  - Addition of razor wires in areas that have been identified as vulnerable to incident at height.
  - Use of anti-climb paint in vulnerable areas.
  - Removal of any equipment or items adjacent to the perimeter.
  - Ensuring waste recycling areas, compound areas etc remain secure.
- 4.8 The LSS must outline procedures for the following:
- Internal procedures to prevent escape.
  - External (escorts) procedures to prevent escape; and
  - Prevention of escape by management of escape list prisoners.
- 4.9 Governors must ensure they have local contingency plans as per [Incident Management Policy Framework \(Official Sensitive\)](#) detailing the actions to take in the event of any (attempted or actual) escape.
- 4.10 Governors must ensure that all security documentation including assurance records are retained in line with [Records, Information Management and Retention Policy](#).
- 4.11 All staff must know what action to take in case of escape, suspected escape, or attempted escape.
- 4.12 Staff must raise an alarm if an immediate response is needed. There are several ways to raise the alarm, these include:
- General Alarm.
  - Whistle.
  - ‘Urgent Message’ on the radio net.
  - Dial 222 from a landline.
  - Personal alarm on the radio.
  - Dial 999 if external to the prison.
  - Shouting for assistance.

## **Gate Procedures**

- 4.13 Governors must undertake an evidence-based risk assessment to identify the risk of escape and set out within the LSS agreed processes to be carried out on individuals, vehicles, and materials through the main gate.
- 4.14 The LSS must reflect the individual circumstances of the prison. Prisons must ensure that searching requirements within the LSS are also reflected in their Local Searching Policy for prisoners, staff, and visitors upon entry/exit of the gate (see the [Searching Policy Framework](#) for information and guidance).
- 4.15 Where a prison has more than one gate, these instructions apply to all gates, regardless of the nature of operations/function of the gate (e.g., delivery gate only). The specific risks posed by the operation of multiple gates must be considered in the LSS.
- 4.16 Many prisons have a vehicle lock or an inner and outer gate, at least one gate either the inner or outer gate must always be secured to provide a further line of defence from escape. For more information, please see the Guidance section 6.6.
- 4.17 Procedures within the LSS for the secure entry and exit of every person, vehicle and item through the gate must be effectively communicated to gate and comms/control room staff.
- 4.18 Many Prison Rules and Young Offender Institution (YOI) Rules have a bearing on gate functions. Prison Rules ([The Prison Rules 1999](#)) specific to the gate in relation to escape are:
- Prison Rule 41/YOI Rule 46 - Search (of prisoners).
  - Prison Rule 71/YOI Rule 75 - Control of persons and vehicles; (1) power to stop, examine or search people or vehicles; (2) power of removal from a prison.
  - Prison Act 1952 Section 39 ([Prison Act 1952](#)).
- 4.19 The duties of gate staff must include:
- Identifying, controlling and recording the authorised entry and exit of prisoners, people, vehicles and materials.
  - Ensuring that searching procedures are carried out for individuals, vehicles and materials in line with the [Searching Policy Framework](#).
  - Preventing key loss by controlling the storage, issue and receipt of security keys particularly for those prisons without TRAKA electronic key storage systems.
  - Ensuring staff are professional, consistent and contributes to a secure environment.

## **Enhanced Gate Security (EGS)**

- 4.20 Prisons with EGS are to refer to the [Conveyance Policy Framework \(Closed Prisons\)](#).

## **Staff/Visitors**

### **Vetting**

- 4.21 Governors must adhere to the requirements set out in [Security vetting: PSI 07/2014](#). There must be clear local arrangements for adhering to vetting set out in the LSS.
- 4.22 The level of security clearance varies according to the security category of the prison and the role of the person entering the prison. Governors must ensure that before being granted

## OFFICIAL

access to the prison to work, all Directly Employed (DE) and non-Directly Employed (NDE) staff have acquired the appropriate security clearance for the prison and their specific role. Professional or Official Visitors who do not work for us in either capacity, and do not go through our security vetting must be deemed as appropriate by the Governor to enter.

### Staff (directly and non-directly employed)

- 4.23 All staff should carry a valid form of identification (ID) specific to their role and employer. Some staff members may have locally made temporary ID whilst they are waiting for their ID to arrive.
- 4.24 On both arrival and exit of the prison, staff should show this ID to gate staff upon request. If they do not have ID on request and the gate staff do not recognise them as an employee, then they should not be allowed either entry or exit of the prison until their identification can be verified. This verification process should be conducted by a member of staff who is not with them at the time as this could be an escape attempt with staff members under duress.
- 4.25 Prisoners may use the opportunity of staff exiting the prison to disguise themselves as a staff member in a bid to 'walk out', to prevent this staff must show their ID before exiting the final locked gate/door of the prison.
- 4.26 All staff directly and non-directly employed who are given access to the prison must receive a comprehensive security induction covering:
- Security key talk.
  - Ways to raise the alarm.
  - Actions to take in the event of an emergency/incident.
  - Submission of intelligence reports.
  - Corruption prevention.
  - Radio etiquette/procedures.
  - LSS.

### Visitors/contractors for staff

- 4.27 Visitors/contractors for staff to the prison should provide in date photographic ID and should be accompanied by an appropriate escorting member of staff throughout.
- 4.28 The gate should have been informed of these arrangements in advance by the staff member they are visiting (Official Visitors Booking Form Template Annex C) it is further recommended that they are provided with a 'visitors ID card and lanyard' to display at all times.
- 4.29 Upon exit of the prison their identification must be verified prior to exiting the final door/gate.

## **Vehicles**

### Vehicles entering

- 4.30 Requirements around vehicle entry and escort (in both regular and emergency situations) must be read in conjunction with Health and Safety Arrangements: Management of Workplace Transport Policy Framework.



## OFFICIAL

- 4.31 Governors must ensure that staff working in the gate and those escorting vehicles have access to a copy of the published prison procedures (core day).
- 4.32 Those operating powered vehicle gates must be suitably trained to operate gates in both regular and emergency situations.
- 4.33 As a minimum, Governors must ensure that gate staff:
- Check the identification of all people entering the prison.
  - Record the names of delivery drivers and passengers.
  - Record the registration numbers of all vehicles entering/leaving the prison.
  - Record the time of arrival/departure of vehicles and visitors entering/leaving the prison.
  - Record in detail the next scheduled destination of vehicles.
  - Allow only authorised people, items, and vehicles in/out of the gate (the items which are not permitted are set out in the [Conveyance Policy Framework](#) List A, B and C items (Annex A) in addition to any local lists).
  - Record items leaving or being delivered to the gate.
- 4.34 Any surplus equipment in the vehicle (such as tools) that is not required in the prison must be secured at the gate and only returned to the vehicle when it is leaving.
- 4.35 Vehicles that contain built in cameras are authorised to enter the prison via a central authorisation. See [Conveyance Policy Framework](#) for further information.

### Vehicle exiting

- 4.36 When the vehicle has completed the delivery and is ready to leave, the vehicle must be searched on exit in accordance with the Searching Policy Framework. Any searching to be conducted on the driver and passengers is to be determined locally following a risk assessment. Details should be checked against the information provided on entry.

### Emergency vehicles

- 4.37 In an emergency such as a life-threatening situation, it may be necessary for an emergency vehicle to pass straight through the vehicle lock without stopping, this may be on both entry and exit. An ambulance exiting with a prisoner onboard will have staff members in attendance and a gate pass to aid with roll reconciliation will be brought to the gate shortly after. This decision will be directed by the manager on the scene of the incident (Duty Governor/Orderly Officer) and communicated to the gate via the radio net.
- 4.38 Relevant staff must be aware of the process to follow in emergency circumstances ensuring that no delays are caused. This must include the procedures for:
- Authority needed and process to open vehicle gates.
  - Escort departure with no escort assessment / Person Escort Record (PER).
  - Escort departure with no gate pass.
  - Returning of keys, radio and tactical aid equipment for escorting staff.
- 4.39 Governors must ensure there are clear instructions within the LSS about the admission of emergency vehicles and that internal escorts for emergency vehicles are available. The instructions must be in accordance with the Health and Safety Arrangements: Management

## OFFICIAL

of Workplace Transport Policy Framework and the [Searching Policy Framework](#) and include:

- Clearing the gate area of any vehicles.
- Procedures for gate staff in respect of any searching requirements.
- Procedures for gate staff in respect of any central or local authorisations.
- Process for identifying a vehicle escort and any additional gate staff to assist with opening of gates on route to the incident area.
- Process for escorting emergency vehicles during movement.

4.40 The preservation of life must always take precedence over local procedures in any life threatening situation. Arrangements must be in place for the processing and holding of delivery vehicles that have entered unsearched where otherwise the LSS outlines for that vehicle to be searched. A member of staff must remain with the vehicle if it can't be held in a secure area until it is searched. Delivery vehicles must not restrict access through the gate.

4.41 For more information on entry and exit of emergency vehicles, see the [Conveyance Policy Framework](#), Emergency Vehicles (Annex H).

### Vehicle searching and supervision

4.41 Governors must undertake an evidence-based risk assessment (to include escape and conveyance) to set out in their LSS the process for searching vehicles (including any content where applicable) on entry and exit, and the level of searching to be conducted on the driver and any passengers. Procedures set out in the [Searching Policy Framework](#) must be applied when searching.

4.42 Staff must be provided with adequate searching equipment for the search of vehicles (see [Searching Policy Framework](#) for details). Equipment must be regularly checked and replaced to ensure that staff always have access to appropriate searching equipment.

4.43 See the [Conveyance Policy Framework](#) for information on delivery items being decanted at the gate and escorted through the prison.

### Vehicle movement/escorting

4.44 Prisons must ensure that the movement of all vehicles in the prison is only done with prior knowledge and/or authorisation of the communication/ control room. The LSS must set out how movements into and around the prison will be managed by the communications/control room and the gate.

4.45 Governors must ensure that any circumstances in which a vehicle has been identified as requiring an escort is documented in the LSS. An evidence-based assessment must be used to determine the risks posed by vehicles. This must be completed in conjunction with the Transport Risk Assessment as described in the [Health and Safety Arrangements: Management of Workplace Transport Policy Framework – \(Annex A\)](#).

4.46 Vehicles identified as requiring an escort within the prison must not be allowed to enter until suitably trained escorting staff are available. It is the responsibility of the vehicle escort to always remain with the vehicle and never leave it unattended. Whilst escorting the vehicle to its location, staff must ensure the vehicle remains in sight. Local safe systems of work

## OFFICIAL

and PPE which comply with the requirements of [Health and Safety Arrangements: Management of Workplace Transport Policy Framework](#) must be available to and followed by suitably trained staff involved in supervising the movements of vehicles.

- 4.47 The responsibility to control and monitor the vehicles of visitors / contractors extends to the prison's own vehicles and Works Department vehicles.
- 4.48 All staff undertaking vehicle escorts must be trained to a competent level and be aware of the location and appropriate use of personal safety equipment clothing and methods of communication with the driver during the escort. A training programme for vehicle escorts and trainers is provided through Learning and Development. See [Health and Safety Arrangements: Management of Workplace Transport Policy Framework](#) for further information.
- 4.49 A short video on vehicle gate procedures with a focus on escape prevention can be found on the NSF intranet page.

### **Prisoners**

- 4.50 All prisoner movement through the gate area must be recorded and a running roll maintained, ensuring only authorised exit and entry.
- 4.51 The entry and exit of prisoners by vehicle must be in line with the individual risk assessment for those prisoners who are undergoing local escort or in line with other service provider agreements for the police, escort contractor services or immigration removal services.
- 4.52 Gate passes (gate pass books available via Branston NDC) must accompany all prisoners exiting the gate under escort.
- 4.53 All prisoners exiting the gate not under escort must have their identity confirmed. This may be via biometrics, a discharge checklist or photographic ID, this will be dependent on the prison and available technology at point of exit.
- 4.54 In an emergency, it may not always be appropriate to search emergency vehicles on entry to a prison as the preservation of life takes precedence over local procedures. Emergency vehicles include Ambulance Service, Fire and Rescue Service, and Police Service. In an incident, this may also include Operational Response and Resilient Unit (ORRU) staff vehicles & responding tornado staff. In life threatening situations emergency vehicles will be allowed to leave without the need of a search of the vehicle to take place unless instructed otherwise by the manager.
- 4.55 Relevant staff must be aware of the process to follow in emergency circumstances ensuring that no delays are caused. This must include the procedures for:
  - Authority needed and process to open both vehicle gates simultaneously.
  - Escort departure with no escort risk assessment or PER.
  - Escort departure with no gate pass.
  - Returning of keys, radio and tactical aids for escorting staff.

See the [External Escorts Policy Framework](#) and [Use of Force Policy Framework](#) for more information.

## OFFICIAL

- 4.56 All staff working in the gate must know that unlawfully at large (UAL) prisoners surrendering must not be given access to the prison until identification is confirmed and confirmation that they were UAL is received from either the police or the prison they escaped from. Until this is confirmed, the prisoner must be held securely in reception. Once this is confirmed normal reception procedures for the receiving prison must take place. For more information please see [PSI 07/2015 Early Days in Custody](#).

### **Discharge of prisoners**

- 4.57 Several checks must be made prior to the discharge of a prisoner at the necessary stages:

- 4.58 The following checks must be made:

#### Sentenced prisoners:

- Sentence calculations (14 and 2-day checks).
- Identification confirmed.
- No outstanding cases.
- Licences/restrictions issued confirmed and explained to prisoner.

#### Remand/Bail prisoners:

- Official confirmation received from the courts.
- Confirmation that all sureties are met.
- No outstanding cases.
- Identification confirmed.
- Restrictions upon release confirmed and explained to prisoner.

- 4.59 The staff conducting these checks must have received the appropriate training relevant to their role in the discharge process.
- 4.60 All prisoners attending the gate for any form of discharge must be accompanied by a member of staff with a gate pass and exit via the vehicle gate. The gate pass must include the reason for discharge and the prisoner's identity this will be handed to the gate staff at the time of the prisoner's discharge.
- 4.61 For more information, see [PSI 72/2011 Prison Discharge](#).

### **Communications Room and Radios**

#### **Communications Room**

- 4.62 For prisons with a communications room, the LSS must clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the communications room and those staff grades working within it.
- 4.63 The communications room must have responsibility for the following as a minimum:
- Controlling and authorising vehicle, prisoner and visitor movement within the prison with emphasis on E list, Category A prisoners and others who may be considered high risk.
  - Control of the radio net, maintaining secure practices and operating procedures.
  - Management of initial responses to incidents and emergencies.
  - Understanding and control of contingency plans.
  - Maintaining records of all occurrences.

## OFFICIAL

- Maintaining a running roll.
- 4.64 All E list and Category A prisoners must be allocated a book number, and this must be communicated to the communications room via the radio net when seeking permission to move these prisoners (e.g. 'permission to move book number 1 from \*\*\*\*\* to \*\*\*\*\*').
- 4.65 It is recommended that all staff who work in the control room complete: [CRFE: Control Room for Future Operatives eLearning \(mydevelopment.org.uk\)](#) and the face-to-face Prison Radio Control Room Procedure course, particularly if working in the comms room alone.
- 4.66 The facilities management team must maintain all security related equipment in line with contractual agreements.
- 4.67 The LSS must include details of maintenance contracts company details and emergency contact numbers for all technologies used for security purposes and for all essential security equipment.

### Radios

- 4.68 All staff must be made aware of the risks of transmissions being illegally scanned from outside the prison and the procedures taken to maintain radio discipline, which include:
- All staff are trained in the use of radios if in charge of individual or parties of prisoners or carry a radio (directly and non-directly employed).
  - Only nationally approved call signs are used see Radio Call Signs (Annex D).
  - At least two net test calls covering all callsigns are conducted per day (one day/one night) and faults investigated/reported.
  - A record of the identities of all outstations is maintained.
  - Every residential unit has at least one member of staff having drawn a radio and logged on.
  - All night staff must carry a radio and log onto the net.
  - Staff always use radio etiquette and professionalism.
- 4.69 Radio handsets must always be retained securely in the possession of staff or returned to the dedicated secure storage point. (This also includes all other tactical aid issued to staff including PAVA/body worn video camera (BWVC)/Batons/Rigid Cuffs/Fish Knives).
- 4.70 All operational staff supervising prisoners outside of residential units must draw a radio and join the network using dedicated call signs. Upon leaving the prison all staff must leave the network.
- 4.71 When drawing a radio staff must ensure that it is in full working order with sufficient battery.
- 4.72 All staff supervising prisoners (for example, education and substance misuse workers) without a radio or in an area out of range of the radio network must have means of raising the alarm in an emergency and know what actions to take. This should be outlined in the LSS.
- 4.73 It is important that staff are aware of 'blackspots' of the radio network which provide limited/nil reception. These areas when identified must be listed within the LSS and staff given instructions-on other steps to take in these areas including the use of whistles,

## OFFICIAL

emergency landlines etc. This is also applicable for those staff who are non-operational and do not carry a radio such as education, substance misuse workers etc.

- 4.74 All radios must be accounted for as soon as is practicable following the exit of day staff.
- 4.75 Radios must be securely stored and issued; the system used for this will be individual to each prison but must include a method of identifying the member of staff who drew the radio (outside of signing on the net).
- 4.76 Radios should never be left unattended and should always be retained securely in the possession of staff or returned to the dedicated storage point. If a radio is unaccounted for then the radio must be 'stunned' immediately by the communications room and 'tool loss' procedures followed. (Please see the section on tools and equipment for more information.)

### **Internal Movement Procedures**

#### **Prisoners**

#### **Roll Checks and Activity Supervision**

##### Roll Checks

- 4.77 There must be at least 4 routine roll checks per day. At least one of these roll checks must take place prior to unlock and one at final lock up. The LSS must describe the times of these roll checks and the actions to take in the event of an incorrect roll.
- 4.78 Roll checks must also take place at the following times:
  - Routine practice full prison standfast roll checks must take place at least once every month.
  - Standfast roll checks must take place in line with local contingency plans (see guidance for procedure).
  - A correct prisoner roll must be confirmed before any vehicle is permitted to leave the prison where it has been in an area where prisoners have been present. All vehicles and their contents must be subject to a thorough search as per [Searching Policy Framework](#).
  - Following free flow/mass movement to activity (unless a risk assessment is in place that mitigates the risk of escape and identifies what other control measures are in place).
- 4.79 When checking the roll, staff must assure themselves that prisoners are:
  - present in their cells and;
  - appear alive and well
- 4.80 This should be done by obtaining a clear view of their face, if necessary, by waking them.
- 4.81 Any blocked observation panels must be cleared immediately.
- 4.82 Consideration must be made when conducting roll checks during night state when prisoners are sleeping, however, preservation of life must take precedence and it may be necessary to attempt to wake a prisoner, or enter the cell if staff are concerned for their safety during the roll check. Please see guidance section 6.42-6.44 for more information.

## OFFICIAL

- 4.83 Full roll reconciliation must take place after mass movement contributing to a safe and secure environment by always knowing the whereabouts of prisoners who are unlocked.
- 4.84 Full roll reconciliation process:
- This is not a stand-fast roll check, provided that a prison has cleared their roll before a movement period commences.
  - There is no need to re-count areas where numbers have remained static.
  - Count prisoners in/out of areas, ensuring these movement figures match.
  - Add these to static numbers in all other areas to produce a total figure.
  - Provided the post-movement figure matches the pre-movement figure there is no need to physically re-count all areas.
- 4.85 The gate and reception (where operating) must always maintain a 'running roll'.
- 4.86 Staff in all areas must ensure:
- A written record of the number of prisoners in the area is kept up to date; and
  - They are always aware of and responsible for the location of their prisoners.
- 4.87 Residential Units must maintain an up to date running roll.
- 4.88 Staff visiting Residential Units who are collecting prisoners must update unit staff before and after the movement.
- 4.89 Residential units with classrooms and prisoners attending from other areas must ensure these prisoners are also accounted for, on the unit roll.
- 4.90 A Roll Check Template Form and guidance can be found at Roll Check Template Form and Procedures (Annex A).

### Activity supervision

- 4.91 Activity Areas must ensure that an up to date running roll is maintained for that area and prisoners are always supervised during work sessions.
- 4.92 Staff must regularly move around the work area to ensure prisoners are visible and accounted for.
- 4.93 Prisoners are not allowed unauthorised access to any office or sensitive area and must always be supervised when in an office or similar.
- 4.94 Staff supervising prisoners on the exercise yards or sports fields must ensure:
- They carry out a security check of the area before use, checking for damage to fences/gates, throw overs, weapons and any other Security/Health and Safety concerns.
  - They draw a radio join the net using the allocated call sign.
  - Always maintain a running roll.
  - Always monitor prisoners, be aware of blind spots and call for assistance if required.

### Internal movement



## OFFICIAL

- 4.95 Following a local risk assessment, the LSS must describe the control and supervision measures for internal movement of prisoners around the prison. Taking into consideration at least the following times:
- Mass movement.
  - Individual movement to appointments etc.
  - Group movement (to gym classes etc).
  - Movement and accommodation of those prisoners who are deemed a security risk (E List, Cat A, potential/provisional Cat A, restricted status).
- 4.96 Movements of E list, Cat A, Potential/Provisional Cat A, restricted status prisoners must be secure and recorded. They must not take place without prior authorisation from the communications room. The communications should always know the whereabouts of these prisoners.
- 4.97 All internal movement must consider Health & Safety requirements in line with Health and Safety policy documents and instructions.

### **Social and official visitors**

- 4.98 Following a local risk assessment, the LSS must describe the control and supervision measures for internal movement of social and official visitors, these measures must be prison specific taking into consideration:
- Numbers of visitors moved at a time.
  - Time of visits.
  - Other internal movement in the area.
  - Positioning of visits hall.
  - Safety of visitors.
  - Route to be taken.

### **Perimeter**

- 4.99 It is an offence under Section 40cb of the [Prison Act 1952](#) for a person who, without authorisation, throws any article or substance into a prison. "Any article" does not include a reference to a List A article, a List B article, or a List C article. "Throwing" an article or substance into a prison includes a reference to doing anything from outside the prison that results in the article or substance being projected or conveyed over or through a boundary of the prison so as to land inside the prison.
- 4.100 Under Section 39 of the Prison Act 1952 a person is guilty of an offence who,
- a) assists a prisoner in escaping or attempting to escape from a prison; or
  - b) intending to facilitate the escape of a prisoner:
    - i. brings, throws or otherwise conveys anything into a prison,
    - ii. causes another person to bring, throw or otherwise convey anything into a prison, or
    - iii. gives anything to a prisoner or leaves anything in any place (whether inside or outside a prison).
- 4.101 Internal and external perimeter checks/patrols must take place daily, however the times and quantities of these will differ between prisons. Utilising the local risk assessment process will aid prisons in identifying their specific need. The times and quantities must be recorded in the LSS (see also [Conveyance Policy Framework \(Closed Prisons\)](#)).



## OFFICIAL

- 4.102 Local contingency plans must be in place and outline the actions to take following the positive indication of a threat to the perimeter or a failure of any fitted security equipment.
- 4.103 If an officer, in the course of their duties, finds someone who they have reasonable belief has, or is about to throw an article into a prison (physically or via other means) or assist with an escape from a prison, then they may use the powers of a constable granted under the Prison Act 1952 and effect an arrest on prison grounds or around the perimeter of the prison.
- 4.104 Prior to using [Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984](#) (PACE) powers, an officer should consider personal and public safety as a priority and where they deem it unsafe to utilise PACE powers to stop the attempt, priority should be given to the following:
- Raising the alarm within the prison.
  - Recording information to assist police such as descriptions or perpetrators, types of vehicles or registrations, including any potential direction of travel to aid further intelligence development, post event or incident.
  - Following any local contingency plans available.
- 4.105 For more information please see the 'Perimeter' section of the Guidance.
- 4.106 If an Operational Support Grade (OSG), in the course of their duties, finds someone who they reasonably believe has, or is about to throw an article into a prison (physically or via other means) or assist with an escape from a prison then they must maintain their own safety and:
- Raise the alarm within the prison.
  - Record information to assist police such as descriptions or perpetrators, types of vehicles or registrations, including any potential direction of travel to aid further intelligence development, post event or incident.
  - Contact police.
  - Follow any local contingency plans available.

### **Keys, Locks, Tools and Equipment**

#### **Gates, doors, keys and locks**

- 4.107 All staff must take care when moving through gates and ensure gates and doors are always secured:
- A Class I gate and/or door being left unsecured and unattended could aid prisoners in escape or escape attempts.
  - Open Class II gates and doors can allow prisoners into unauthorised areas leading to several possible security breaches.
  - Unsecured gates and doors increase the risk of violence and disorder, including hostage incidents and concerted indiscipline.
  - Incidents and compromises may require additional roll checks. This impedes regime delivery and impacts the prison's state of security and stability.
- 4.108 All staff must 'prove before they move' after locking any gate or door, by attempting to push/pull open to ensure the lock is secured in the door/gate frame.

## OFFICIAL

- 4.109 All staff must be aware of the actions to take in relation to the actual or possible compromise of any a key or lock. This process must be reflected in local contingency plans and must include:
- Broken key/broken lock – individuals to always stay with the lock/broken key, asking for assistance over the radio net or waiting until another staff member passes by.
  - Loss or suspected loss of key/keys – report to the orderly office/duty manager immediately, orderly officer /duty manager to consider freezing the gate, using chains to secure areas and to consider carrying out a stand fast roll check, area search and checking CCTV; and
  - Keys exiting the prison – last key holder to be contacted immediately, either by telephone or in person if necessary, keys to be returned to the prison once located and sealed in an evidence bag whilst a decision is made on the need for forensic testing and further investigations.

For more information see Reporting a Key Lock Incident (ST16).

- 4.110 Any key/lock incident either actual or suspected must be reported via local reporting procedures and to:
- On the single incident line
  - NOMIS incident reporting system
  - [lockingorders@justice.gov.uk](mailto:lockingorders@justice.gov.uk)
  - The PGD.
  - Deputy Directors (DD) of the Long-Term High Security Estate (LTHSE) for those prisons in the LTHSE.
- 4.111 Incidents turning out to be false alarms must be re-submitted as a minor incident on the reporting system.
- 4.112 The decision to re-lock a prison in the event of a key or lock incident may only be made by the relevant PGD, or DD LTHSE.
- 4.113 All Class I, II and III security keys (and bunches of such, except handcuff keys) for use by staff must be given a number and stored in a key safe/electronic key management cabinet in a secure location. Each prison will have specific processes, these must be described in the LSS and include:
- Procedures for the secure storage, allocation, issue, return and safe keeping of keys.
  - Arrangements for the storage of spare security keys including access rights.
  - Storage and issue procedures for all keys including works, handcuff, and body belt keys.
  - Procedures for the secure use of key safes including access for auditors and senior managers.
- 4.114 If any member of staff arrives for duty with no key chain they must not be issued or draw keys, instead they must follow the specific instructions detailed in the LSS for reporting for duty with no key chain and replacement/loan of a key chain (if the key chain has been lost or stolen, this must also be reported via an intelligence report).
- 4.115 Staff must not procure their own key chains and must use prison-issued key chains only.
- 4.116 If operating a manual key safe, the safe must be locked overnight/when not in use.

## OFFICIAL

- 4.117 If operating a manual key safe the numbered positions in the key safe must never be empty (a one for one tally system must be used).
- 4.118 Arrangements must be in place to prevent key holders leaving the prison with their keys. This will vary in each prison due to installed technology; it is advised that all staff show their empty key chain to the gate staff on exit.
- 4.119 The LSS must set out:
- Procedures for the locations and use of Class I doubles keys and master suite keys (the numbers of these in circulation must be limited and carefully controlled).
  - The agreed frequency and type of daily key check to be made and by whom, (a minimum of one key check for the main key safe/electronic management key safe must take place after lock up per day must take place).
  - Procedures for the restricted use of keys in night state and application of doubles.
- 4.120 A full key audit must take place at least once every six months, and:
- Within one month of a new Governing Governor taking up post.
  - Within one month of a new Head of Security taking up post.
  - Within one month of a new Security Key Manager (usually a Band 5) taking up post.
- 4.121 Spare security keys must be kept and stored securely; these arrangements must be set out in the LSS. As a minimum these must be stored in a secure locked safe and recorded on the key ledger, with access only being given to the Security Key Manager, Head of Security and Deputy Governor.
- 4.122 A record of daily key check must be made in the Gate Occurrence Book or equivalent.
- 4.123 No security keys must be taken out of the prison, unless agreed by the Governor and the circumstances set out within the LSS (generally only court keys and a small selection of class III keys used for visitor's centres etc).
- 4.124 The LSS must set out the operational procedures for fully automated electronic key safes where they are installed.
- 4.125 Prisoners must not be allowed to handle or examine any key or lock.
- 4.126 Once drawn, keys must always be attached to the person by a chain. Prisons must also have systems in place for secure key storage when staff are using the gym/showers. Keys must not be taken into shower areas due to damage to the keys caused by rusting, options may include for prisons to have secure lockers, with individual keys issued to staff whilst showering (like that of public swimming pools) or a smaller electronic key management system located in the gymnasium.
- 4.127 Prisons must have systems in place for the storage of keys during times such as control and restraint (C&R) incidents in full PPE ensuring staff have somewhere safe and secure to store their keys, this could be a secure safe in the C&R kit room or similar. At no time should one member of staff take control of numerous key bunches on their key chain.

## OFFICIAL

- 4.128 Keys must be kept in pockets or key pouches when not in use, ensuring the key flag/bit is not visible.
- 4.129 Only issued Prison Service key chains should be used by staff and only one key chain used at a time to prevent entanglement, at times it may be necessary to have two clips on the key chain to assist with maintaining security of Orderly Officer key bunches or similar.
- 4.130 Keys must not be able to touch the floor when the key chain is fully extended (vertically down from the belt), this prevents damage to the keys if dropped.
- 4.131 Key rings must be sealed with tamper evident seals to prevent unauthorised removal or adding of keys to a bunch.
- 4.132 Excessive force must not be used to open any lock. Any difficulty in opening any lock must be reported immediately to the Facilities Management (FM) Services Site Manager and the Security Department/Orderly Officer.
- 4.133 The LSS must set out clear guidelines as to whom keys can be issued to, types of keys and management of gates, doors and electronic key management systems. This must include:
- Access to keys and training for the Fire Service in case of emergency.
  - Identifying who can draw keys and the type of keys they can hold.
  - Procedures and training that anyone issued with keys must complete to ensure that they are competent in the secure use of keys and locks.
  - Instruction that Class I and II locks must be locked back securely if left open.
  - Instruction that staff must not leave Class I & II locks (including wooden outer doors) unlocked or unattended; to prevent prisoners from tampering with the lock.
  - Instruction that Class I works locks must always be double locked when the lock is not in use.
  - Instruction that Class I locks must be double locked at night unless the PGD (or the DD of LTHSE) has exceptionally agreed otherwise.
  - Instruction that Class I locks must only be locked back in accordance with the procedures set out within the LSS.
  - Governors must have assurance (to prevent any data breach) that any person's details (biometrics, PIN number, name etc) that are stored on the electronic key management system are deleted from the system at the earliest opportunity, when they are no longer an authorised visitor, or a directly/non-directly employed member of staff.
- 4.134 Where a lock cannot physically be locked back, this must be highlighted in the LSS and measures in place to ensure that when unlocked it is supervised/ in sight of staff at all times. This must be justified and documented in the LSS.
- 4.135 Each prison must keep a ledger/record of all keys, including all types of handcuff/restraint keys. Please see the Key Ledger (Annex E).
- 4.136 The ledger/record of keys will include the following information:
- The running total for each type of key in stock including those not in use and stored securely in a safe.
  - The numbers of each type received from the National Locking Section and the date received.
  - The number of each type of key in use.
  - Information about individual keys not on main locking suites.

## OFFICIAL

- Information about when keys are returned to the National Locking Section for destruction.
- Gross total for each type of keys held.
- Crown Court keys (where appropriate).

- 4.137 There must be a complete and up to date set of locking schedules and floor plans for the prison held by the facilities manager.
- 4.138 No locks or alternative suiting may be installed, including padlocks and rim mounted locks, except those specified on the schedule.
- 4.139 Requests for changes to locking schedules must be made to the CAD (Computer Assisted Design) Manager at [PropertyComplianceTeam@justice.gov.uk](mailto:PropertyComplianceTeam@justice.gov.uk). Requests must be accompanied by a draft revised plan and schedule showing details of the changes requested.
- 4.140 Spare or replacement keys and locks must be ordered from the National Locking Section. Security keys must not be obtained from local sources or cut on key cutting machines. All keys must be ordered by the Head of Security or a designated member of security.
- 4.141 Obsolete or damaged keys and levers must be returned to the National Locking Section for safe disposal. They must be returned with the appropriate documentation that gives the quantity, type, code and suiting information and a Condemnation form A40 completed, Key and Locking Condemnation Form A40 (Annex F). Failure to adhere to this may result in the keys being returned to the prison.
- 4.142 Local arrangements must be in place for the acceptance of new keys from the National Locking Section. Keys must be counted immediately, and the total recorded in both the key ledger and the delivery documentation (which must be returned to National Locking Section).
- 4.143 Deliveries and collections to/from the National Locking Section must be made by two security cleared members of staff when collecting suited products. An acceptance of risk email to National Locking Section would be accepted from the Governing Governor or Head of Security stating only one member of staff will be collecting, due to staffing issues only.

### **KR (Key Restriction) Locking**

- 4.144 A KR lock is an additional lock on a Class II Lock. Keys to KR Locks must be stored as follows when not in use:
- 3 Keys in the Governing Governor's Safe;
  - 1 Key at the Gate in the inner safe in a sealed packet;
  - 1 Key in a sealed packet, held by day in the security manager's safe and by night in the Night Orderly Officer's office.

### **Crown Courts**

- 4.145 The National Locking Section at HMP Full Sutton will supply and issue the locks for Crown Court custody suites as required.
- 4.146 Suites of control locks will be provided in the following locations:

## OFFICIAL

- Doors on the perimeter of the secure area giving access to it.
- Female defendants' area; and
- All other areas excluding stores rooms, offices, rest rooms and interview rooms.

- 4.147 To ensure security, the method of keying "Control Locks" will follow current HMPPS policy for keying within prisons. All doors that permit access to the custody area from other parts of the court and the external entry points must be fitted with keyholes on the secure side only.
- 4.148 Existing Crown Court cells using gates in place of cell doors must have physical protection to the lock to prevent defendants reaching or tampering with the lock.
- 4.149 Keys must always be kept secure to maintain key and lock security and kept in a locked key safe when not in use.
- 4.150 Key bunches must not be taken by individual members of staff/contractor's staff outside of the Crown Court secure area which is bounded by the prisoner entrance, the dock entrance and the door between the visits waiting area and the secure area. Staff/contractors working within the visits area will require a single suited key.
- 4.151 All security locks in the custody area must be left in the unlocked and open condition when the secure area is not in use thereby removing the necessity to leave keys with the court administration.
- 4.152 The LSS must set out local agreements for those Crown Courts attached directly to a police station to allow the police to use the secure cells when the Court is not sitting (i.e., normally weekends and bank holidays). The control of any security keys designated for police use must be arranged so that signed receipts are obtained from any police officers issued with the keys to provide a complete audit trail of their use. When not in use the key bunch must be securely stored in a key safe which is under the control of the Senior Police Officer on duty.
- 4.153 It is the duty of the escort contractors nominated manager to ensure that key security and control are maintained in all parts of the custody area.
- 4.154 The security custody suite keys, where they exist, must be checked and counted at the beginning and end of each working day. A full key check of crown court keys must take place.
- 4.155 The escort contractor nominated manager must report immediately by telephone and in writing, any potential security deficiencies, to the prison responsible for the maintenance of the fabric of the court building and to the National Locking Section.
- 4.156 It is the duty of the nominated manager within the prison to ensure that key security and control are maintained in all parts of the custody area through regular visual and physical inspections of those parts of the Crown Court for which the escort contractors are responsible. The manager with this responsibility should be Band 5 or above and inspections should be conducted at least once every six months in line with the full prison key audit.

### Padlocks

## OFFICIAL

- 4.157 Only padlocks supplied by the National Locking Section must be used and identified where in use on the locking schedule. Where padlocks are in use, key staff including the Head of Security and Orderly Officer are to be made aware of where the keys are held. Authorised padlocks can be seen at ST18.
- 4.158 Chains are not sourced through The National Locking Section. They can be purchased locally but must meet this specification. The chain links must be of a hardened steel material and size 6cm long by 3cm wide.

### Disclosure

- 4.159 Disclosure of a lock or key occurs when it is considered beyond reasonable doubt that an individual (or individuals) has had enough opportunity to copy, manufacture or otherwise effect the means for operation of a lock or key.
- 4.160 Not all compromises result in disclosure, minor incidents will be dealt with locally and may result in the replacement of a lock or the condemnation of a key.
- 4.161 More serious security, complex breaches or intelligence threats/risks which would have an immediate effect on the physical security of the prison must be referred immediately by the prison to the National Locking Section.
- 4.162 Disclosure procedures and guidelines for the above circumstances are set out in Disclosure or Compromise Risk Assessment and Decision Tool (Annex G1) and Key and Lock Requisition and Disclosure Form (Annex G2). In all cases the Head of National Locking must be informed as soon as possible.

### Tools and equipment

- 4.163 Tools and equipment must be managed and stored appropriately to prevent the use of these items being used/fashioned into weapons, or for use as escape aids. This includes items in healthcare such as emergency response kits/grab bags or similar.
- 4.164 All staff must be aware of the actions to take in relation to identifying missing tool/s or equipment and this process must be reflected in the LSS and local contingency plans in line with [Incident Management Policy Framework \(Restricted\)](#).  
Initial actions to take are:
- Requesting remaining prisoners not to leave the area of the missing tool and supporting staff in finding the tool.
  - Asking prisoners if they know the whereabouts of the missing tool.
  - Report missing tool to the Orderly Officer/Duty Manager immediately with full details of when the tool was last seen, and who it was last issued to.
  - Awaiting further instruction from the Orderly Officer/Duty Manager.
  - The Orderly Officer/Duty manager utilising contingency plans and instructing all areas of necessary actions to take, for example searching of prisoners.

### Tools risk assessment

- 4.165 The Security Department will conduct a risk assessment (Tool Risk Assessment Template, Annex H) of all tools including those held by outside FM Departments and plant machinery,

## OFFICIAL

taking into consideration tool type, location, and who will have access/use of it to determine which items must be marked. The completed risk assessments must consider:

- The security category of the prison, age and profile of the population.
- The potential danger each tool, tool type/item of equipment would pose to the security of the prison if it were lost.
- The likelihood of the item being taken for unauthorised use (i.e., if it is a tool not issued or accessible to prisoners, or if it is used in an area to which prisoners may have access).
- Equipment (including cutlery or server tools) located in staff rest areas/kitchens which are adjacent to either prisoner accommodation or prisoner recreational areas.
- Tools and equipment used by healthcare staff/dentists/doctors and other visiting healthcare professionals must never be issued/used by prisoners.

4.166 There are no set timescales for tools to be re-risk assessed, however this must be done if a change of prison category, profile of the population takes place or if intelligence is received regarding certain tools being used as weapons/escape aids.

4.167 A central inventory and local inventories of all tools within the prison must be maintained and kept up to date. Local inventories should not obscure the view of the shadow boards when in place. The inventory must identify both the name of the tool and the unique code for that tool. An example tool inventory can be found at Annex L.

4.168 Tools must not be added or removed (physically or on the inventory), by anybody but the Security Department.

### Prisoner workplace risk assessment

4.169 Upon completion of tool risk assessments, no prisoner should be given access to tools until they have been approved to attend work/education via an individual prisoner workplace risk assessment in accordance with the guidance set out in the Activity Hub Toolkit. As a minimum, prisoner workplace risk assessments must include consideration of the following:

- Security category.
- Incentive level.
- Current offence details and offence history (to include any public protection concerns).
- Mental and physical health.
- Sentence length.
- Previous adjudications, in particular for violence and disorder.
- Custodial behaviour (last 12 months).
- Security concerns (to include links to organised crime and terrorist risk), summary of intelligence.
- Safer custody information to include gang affiliation, CSIP (Challenge, Support & Intervention Plan) details, viper score.

See template at Prisoner Workplace and Activity Allocation Risk Assessment Template (Annex I) for more information.

### Workplace Risk Assessment

4.170 All activity areas must have an individual workplace risk assessment (see Workplace and Activity Area Risk Assessment Template, Annex J), this must be reviewed on receipt of any



## OFFICIAL

specific intelligence to that area, following an incident or accident, or at least every 12 months.

- 4.171 Prisons may adapt the workplace risk assessments to suit their need, however this must include as a minimum all information included within the template, Workplace and Activity Area Risk Assessment Template (Annex J).
- 4.172 Workplace risk assessments are for work areas and are distinct from prisoner workplace risk assessments set out above. Both must be completed.

### Unique tool marking

- 4.173 Each prison will have a unique coding system for tools which will identify:
- The prison.
  - The area the tool is from.
  - The tool number.
- 4.174 For example: HOI-WKSHP6-1 relates to High Down (HOI) Workshop 6 (wkshp6) tool number 1 (1). This allows for each tool to be accounted for in the correct place and helps easily identify a tool of which there may be multiple of in different locations within a prison.
- 4.175 The LSS will identify which tools and equipment will be identified in this way and they must be marked in a non-erasable way such as etching. Small tools such as dentistry tools may be photographed and displayed alongside the relevant storage area. Other tools that cannot be etched should be colour coded. For example:
- Workshop 1 could be orange and workshop 2 could be blue, so tools could easily be identified as to where they originated from.
  - All 6" screwdriver handles could be blue and all 4" screwdriver handles could be green.

### Storage

- 4.176 Any tools that have been identified as posing a high risk to security and are used regularly must be stored in either a secure shadow board or secure cupboard, dependant on the size of the item. Items such as domestic irons do not always fit into a shadow board, these would then be in a secure cupboard but accounted for in the same way as if in a shadow board.
- 4.177 Mops and brooms are vital for prisoners and staff to maintain standards of cleanliness and decency and therefore there will be times when prisoners have these in their cells. All staff and prisoners must be aware and remain vigilant to the risk these could cause if fashioned into/used as a weapon or escape aid. Staff must remove and dispose of safely, any adapted or broken mops and brooms or handles with no head attached. Tools such as mops and brooms for example, which are assessed as posing a lower risk to the security of the prison may be stored in a cupboard that is locked when they are not in use, systems should be in place for accounting for these items.
- 4.178 Small tools, such as dentistry tools can be stored together as a kit, the kit should have a clear inventory attached to it to identify the tools in the kit. Items such as these should be secured when not in use (photographs of such tools rather than etching may be appropriate for accounting purposes).

## OFFICIAL

- 4.179 Stock control systems along with disposal records must also be in place for disposal of medical equipment such as needles, syringes, suture kits etc.
- 4.180 Stores, gate and Security Departments should have a system in place to identify the delivery of any new tools. This will enable the security department to take control of these prior to issue to any area, ensuring they have been risk assessed and etched/marked in the correct manner.
- 4.181 In all areas of the prison dependant on where prisoners work, they will routinely have access to several materials including cleaning materials, solvents, adhesives, chemicals, petrol or other products used in workplaces. The LSS must specify the procedure for securely storing these items in line with [Control of Substances Hazardous to Health \(COSHH\) Guidelines](#) and COSHH risk assessments and regular checks must be made to ensure they have not been misused or taken.
- 4.182 Due to the variety of different materials used, there are no set procedure for secure storage of these materials, however consideration should be made to:
- Chaining of containers.
  - Locking in appropriate storage cupboards.
  - Materials only being issued to prisoners by staff.

### Tool Issue/Receipt

- 4.183 Tools which are assessed as suitable for prisoner use, must be secured appropriately and the LSS must include a system for the secure issue/receipt of all tools and equipment given to prisoners. This system must include locations of tools within the prison and when and to which prisoner they were issued (please see Tool Issue and Receipt, ST2).
- 4.184 Prisoners should never be given direct access to shadow boards/tool cupboards, and they should never be left unlocked.
- 4.185 A replica system for issue of tools to staff must also be in place.
- 4.186 All tools/equipment must be accounted for at the end of each work, association or activity session. If a tool is identified as missing this must be reported immediately. Staff should not waste time looking for the tool prior to reporting as missing.
- 4.187 Fully plastic servery tools do not need to be etched or accounted for in the same way as other tools at the end of a session, however it is advised that an accountability system is put in place to ensure the smooth running of the servery each session.
- 4.188 Tools and equipment used by healthcare staff/doctors/dentists or other visiting healthcare professionals must always be stored securely.
- 4.189 Staff must not bring their own tools or equipment into the prison without first gaining authority from prison management as per [Conveyance Policy Framework](#).
- 4.190 Any tool or item of equipment that is brought into the prison must be listed and controlled so that it cannot be taken or misused by prisoners.

## OFFICIAL

- 4.191 Staff must always be aware of the potential security threats from any large and/or moveable item(s) in use around the prison which can be placed near or against a perimeter wall or fence.
- 4.192 If any items are found to be insecure or close to the perimeter then they must be moved immediately if possible and/or reported to the security and facilities management teams so that they can be secured/moved.
- 4.193 It may be appropriate, dependant on the circumstances, to report via the radio net and remain with the items until they are moved/secured. This will depend on several factors including access by prisoners and proximity to the perimeter, therefore the member of staff finding the items will be required to conduct a dynamic risk assessment in relation to the immediate risk they pose.

### Tool Disposal

- 4.194 Any broken tools including items such as hacksaw blades, must be disposed of promptly and securely, with records to show disposal point and date of disposal. Systems should be in place to identify missing tools (due to breakage) from shadow boards and tool inventories (Please see Tool Disposal, ST3).
- 4.195 The procedure for tool disposal must be detailed in the LSS.

### High risk items

- 4.196 Systems must be in place for storing, controlling, and positioning of high-risk items which could assist an attempted escape.
- 4.197 Where emergency response kits contain items such as scissors, suture kits or compressed gas, they must be treated as high-risk tools and therefore must be marked, stored securely and checked appropriately, ensuring that in an emergency staff are able to access them.

### Signage/TV aerials and similar

- 4.198 Whilst it is important to ensure appropriate signage is displayed and items such as TV aerials are vital for prisons to operate smoothly, care and consideration must be taken prior to fitting/installing these, as they could be used as climbing/escape aids and must only be fitted/installed with agreement of the security manager.
- 4.199 Consideration must be given to:
- Proximity to fence/wall.
  - Installation height.
  - Ease of access by prisoners to item.

### Skips

- 4.200 All skips and their locations must be thoroughly risk assessed and the risk assessments reviewed regularly as set out within the LSS. Skips must only be placed in locations approved by the security manager and adequate security measures put in place to manage any risks identified. It is good practice to keep an up-to-date map of the location of skips and skips should be checked/ searched on arrival and departure.

## OFFICIAL

- 4.201 All skips must be in a good sound condition. Access points to the interior of the skip must be lockable using a padlock and chain, or any other approved method. The keys used to secure the skip must always be in control of the member of staff, who oversees the skip. The member of staff must always open and secure the skip between uses whilst controlling prisoner access to the area/skip.
- 4.202 Prisoners must not have access to the security keys for skips under any circumstances.
- 4.203 Procedures for delivery/removal of any skips must be documented within the LSS taking into consideration restrictions for prisoner movement whilst skips are being collected/removed.
- 4.204 In prisons where prisoners are locked up over lunch, it is advised that skips are agreed to be collected/removed at these times once the lunch time roll has been reported as correct and prior to any further prisoner movement.
- 4.205 A correct prisoner roll must be confirmed before skips/skip lorries are permitted to leave the prison. All vehicles and their contents must be subject to a thorough search. See Management of Skips (ST4) for more information.

### Climbing aids

- 4.206 Climbing aids are items of equipment that are commonly found, and often operated by or in the vicinity of prisoners in closed prisons. Examples of possible climbing aids are step ladders, extendable ladders and scaffold towers/ platforms. Where in situ, climbing aids should not be left unattended unless local risk assessment allows for the equipment to be securely left in a way to restrict unauthorised access and be appropriately sectioned off.
- 4.207 Whilst climbing aids are in use, they must be closely supervised by a member of staff who has a radio and has joined the net. If possible, it is advised to train CCTV on to the area and monitor as an extra security measure.
- 4.208 All climbing aids must be locked in a secure store when not in use. Once work has been completed the communications room must be informed of this and the climbing aid returned to secure storage.
- 4.209 If a step or extendable ladder is in intermittent use during a job, it must be laid horizontal and locked securely to a fixed point within the immediate vicinity of the work site when it is not in use. Chains and padlocks should be used for this, if working near the perimeter fence the ladder should not be secured (even horizontal) near to the perimeter.
- 4.210 All scaffolding must be securely clad/sheeted to deter potential incidents at height or attempted escapes. Other security measures such as alarms and CCTV coverage should be considered. These considerations should have been made/agreed and documented at the 4:20 meeting (works/security pre work meeting). See 420 Meeting Example Template (Annex B) for further information.
- 4.211 Scaffolding poles and planks must be securely stored when not in use.

### Climbing aids used for prisoner tuition.

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- 4.212 Several prisons operate educational/vocational courses for prisoners which may include the use of ladders, scaffolding and other such items. These items must only be used under the supervision of instructors, always secured when not in use and only ever used in a controlled manner and never in the vicinity of the perimeter.

### Plant machinery

- 4.213 The term 'plant' refers to machinery, equipment and apparatus used for an industrial activity. Typically, in construction, 'plant' refers to heavy machinery and equipment used during construction works.
- 4.214 Security Departments must risk assess all internal and external vehicles and plant to establish the level of risk they pose to security. If the plant machinery is part of the prison's assets, then this must be risk assessed under the tools and equipment risk assessment process, ensuring procedures are in place for immobilisation and secure storage. This risk assessment must be undertaken before approval is given for its entry into the prison.
- 4.215 Any plant machinery that is required to enter the prison on a temporary basis must be agreed by the security and FM Departments and normal entry and exit procedures for vehicles followed.
- 4.216 Before any commencement of movement with a high-risk vehicle/plant the communications/control room must be informed to which location it will be going to, its route and that the route is suitable (if the route is wide enough, high enough etc). Movement of plant machinery should be done in line with the [Health and Safety Arrangements: Management of Workplace Transport Policy Framework](#) and risk assessment.
- 4.217 On completion of any work which required the use of a high-risk vehicle or plant, the vehicle must be immobilised and made secure as a minimum.

### Other available escape/climbing aids.

- 4.218 Use of the following equipment must be managed carefully, must not be near perimeters and must always be chained and padlocked to prevent it being moved to the perimeter edge. This list is not exhaustive, and all equipment must be risk assessed locally.
- storage of cabling.
  - wheelie bins.
  - storage of bed frames.
  - storage of wooden pallets.
  - storage of metal cages.
  - use of sports equipment.

### Sports equipment/Gyms

- 4.219 All gym equipment must be accounted for at the end of every session, this must include items such as ropes, wall bars, badminton nets, agility ladders and similar.

### Staff Uniform

- 4.220 Prisoners having access to staff uniforms can be a significant escape risk. Prisons must ensure that all staff uniforms are stored securely and when no longer required are returned

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in line with the [Staff Appearance, Uniform and Work Clothing Policy Framework.\(internal use only\)](#)

### Facilities management

- 4.221 A full and auditable inventory of all works tools must always be maintained by the facilities management team manager. They must have in place systems for disposal and replenishment of tools in the same way as all other tools in the prison. All tools must be stored in shadow boards/cupboards when not in use and the tally system used when taken out, see Tool and Issue Receipt (ST2).
- 4.222 Facilities management tools must not normally be issued to prisoners, but in circumstances where prisoners do have legitimate access a full workplace and prisoner workplace risk assessment must be undertaken in advance.
- 4.223 A full and auditable inventory of all work's tools always must be maintained by a responsible manager.
- 4.224 It will be necessary for facilities management teams to use their tools around the prison. They must always have an up-to-date inventory of tools they are carrying with them on their person which includes all items such as drill bits, saw blades, screwdriver heads and so on. Tools must be checked against this inventory when moving between workplaces (upon leaving and arriving at new destinations). See Tool Inventory Template, Annex L.

### Contractor's tools

- 4.225 Procedures must be in place for controlling tools that contractors use. These tools must not be issued to or used by any prisoners.
- 4.226 Prior to visiting, a list of tools required must be provided to the security department. This may be via a 420 meeting for bigger/longer term projects.
- 4.227 Upon arrival the escorting member of staff must make an inventory of all tools/equipment entering the prison. The use of an authorised polaroid camera or similar may be useful for this and will provide a means of checking tools without items being wrongly named/identified.
- 4.228 All tools/ equipment must be checked against the inventory by the escorting member of staff when moving between workplaces (upon leaving and arriving at new destinations) and on exit of the prison.

### Stores

- 4.229 All staff working within the stores must be sufficiently trained to search the accommodation, items within the stores, and the prisoners with access to the stores area. Staff must also be able to demonstrate that they are competent in the use of handheld metal detectors.
- 4.230 There must be a strategy in place for searching all prisoners with access to the stores.
- 4.231 Outgoing goods could provide an effective hiding place for prisoners who are attempting escape. All outgoing goods must be searched and remain sterile from prisoners once this search has taken place.

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- 4.232 The stores and its contents must be searched at unpredictable times. The Local Searching Policy must state the frequency of searches to be conducted in the stores.
- 4.233 To assist with maintaining the security of stores, staff working in stores must:
- Make thorough daily checks on all tools, items of equipment, or stored materials.
  - Maintain a stores log/register.
  - Be fully aware of everything held in stores and its exact location.
  - Take appropriate measures to prevent the compromise of security or good order of the prison and theft by prisoners.
  - The store's manager must undertake a physical security check of all doors, windows and, where appropriate, machinery. This must be carried out simultaneously with the fire check daily and signed for in the stores/log register.
- 4.234 A nominated manager is required to check and sign the stores log/register daily. Staff working within stores areas within prisons are contractor employed. Alongside a daily check and signature of the store's log/register by the nominated stores manager, the contractors site manager must also check and sign the stores log/register at least once every three months, identifying and reporting appropriately any discrepancies.

### Staff Tactical Aid

- 4.235 Tactical aids if left unattended or not secured properly could also be used as a weapon or as an escape aid and therefore must also be always accounted for by keeping an up-to-date equipment list.
- 4.236 Personal issue cut-down tools (big fish) and other tactical aids which may be issued to named individuals on a permanent basis must be marked/etched.
- 4.237 Batons:
- Each have a unique identification number, and these must be issued individually to members of staff and a central log maintained.
  - Must be stored in secure storage inside the prison (not outside locker rooms), they can be taken out of the prison for escorts/bedwatches and detached duty.
  - If they are to be carried in a personal vehicle (on-route to detached duty), then the governor must provide a covering letter to the member of staff to produce to the police if stopped (see Detached Duty Authorisation Template, Annex K).
  - If the staff member is carrying out bedwatch duties for another prison, then that prison should provide a baton for the staff member when reporting for duty.
- 4.238 Rigid bar handcuffs:
- Will each have a unique identification number, and these must be issued individually to members of staff and a central log maintained.
  - Must be stored in secure storage inside the prison (not outside locker rooms), they can be taken out of the prison for escorts/bedwatches (they should not be used as the primary restraints) and detached duty.
  - If they are to be carried in a personal vehicle (on-route to detached duty), then the governor must provide a covering letter to the member of staff to produce to the police if stopped (see Detached Duty Authorisation Template, Annex K).
  - If the staff member is carrying out bedwatch duties for another prison, then that prison should provide a rigid bar cuff for the staff member when reporting for duty if deemed as necessary to take on the bedwatch.

## OFFICIAL

### 4.239 Cut down tools (big fish):

- Must be individually marked/etched with a unique identification number, and these should be issued individually to members of staff and a central log maintained.
- Must be stored in secure storage inside the prison (not outside locker rooms), they can be taken out of the prison for escorts/bedwatches and detached duty.
- If they are to be carried in a personal vehicle (on-route to detached duty), then the governor must provide a covering letter to the member of staff to produce to the police if stopped (see Detached Duty Authorisation Template, Annex K).
- If the staff member is carrying out bedwatch duties for another prison, then that prison should provide a cut down tool for the staff member when reporting for duty if deemed as necessary to take on the bedwatch.

### 4.240 PAVA:

- Each have a unique identification number, and these must be issued individually to members of staff and a central log maintained.
- Must be stored in secure storage inside the prison (not outside locker rooms).
- Must never exit the gate of the as per the [Use of Force Policy Framework](#).
- If attending a prison on detached duty, PAVA must be provided by that prison.

### 4.241 All tactical aids must also be either returned to dedicated storage or prisons must provide staff with secure storage for when using the gym or similar. Tactical aids must not be left unattended.

## **Night Procedures**

### 4.242 Nights can be a difficult, lonely time for staff members and therefore staying alert and aware of surroundings is vitally important. Prisoners may use the night state as a time to attempt escape due to reduced staffing levels and may also attempt to condition or manipulate staff who are alone on the unit throughout the night.

### 4.243 All OSGs should have a period of 'shadowing' and complete the two-week OSG training course, which covers all things related to 'Nights' as well as typical duties and Suicide and Self-harm procedures and Assessment, Care in Custody Teamwork (ACCT) procedures, prior to being alone on night duty.

### 4.244 Officers must have completed the Prison Officer training course prior to any night duty and Officers and Night Orderly Officers (NOO) must be given the opportunity to shadow a set of nights prior to carrying out Night Orderly Officer duties.

### 4.245 Prisoners may set cell fires to prompt removal from their cells at night. All staff on nights must complete In Cell Fire (RPE) training locally, prior to conducting night duty.

### 4.246 There are four main priorities during night state:

- All Night Staff are aware of information necessary to maintain the safety and security of the prison.
- The prison remains safe and secure in the event of prisoners being unlocked at night.
- The prison remains safe and secure in the event of prisoners being moved within the prison at night.
- The prison remains safe and secure in the event of prisoners being received or discharged at night.



## OFFICIAL

- 4.247 Night staffing and procedures must be agreed locally, taking into account need to maintain the safety and security in prison. Night staff levels should include considering critical staffing level. These must be set out in the LSS and approved by the PGD.
- 4.248 Night Staff must be aware of the local requirements to maintain the safety and security of the prison. This will include locking procedures, patrols, ACCT observations and the secure movement of prisoners during night state.
- 4.249 A Duty Governor must always be on call throughout the night. They must be informed immediately of serious events to include:
- Death in Custody.
  - Serious Fire.
  - Escape/attempted escape.
  - Emergency discharge to hospital.
  - Location of any prisoner to the segregation unit.
  - Placing a prisoner on constant supervision.

### Commencement of Duty – Day to Night Handover

- 4.250 A full roll check must take place prior to entering night state. The night lock up roll must be collated by the orderly office once all prisoners are secured in their cells. This must be recorded on the 'night lock up sheet' and handed to the NOO.
- 4.251 Staff must be allocated specific sets of keys for nights and/or pouches which must be attached to key chains. All staff must be in possession of a radio and a cut down tool (fish knife).
- 4.252 The NOO must conduct a full key and radio check and sign for it once complete on the night lock up sheet. Any missing keys or radios must be reported as per key / radio compromise procedures.
- 4.253 The NOO must receive a full briefing from the day Orderly Officer
- 4.254 Night Staff must receive a full briefing from day staff on residential accommodation to include the segregation unit.
- 4.255 There must be a night procedures sheet to document key information as part of the handover. Handovers should include the following key elements:
- Prisoners on ACCT documents or constant supervision, frequency of observation, conversations required and any key risk information highlighted/ action taken.
  - Newly arrived prisoners subject to first night checks, including documenting any key risk information/ action taken and the expectation of the level of checks.
  - E List prisoners.
  - Potential Category A or Restricted Status Prisoners.
  - Incidents that have occurred during the day that staff will need to be aware of (missed medications, individuals that have received bad news, prisoners who have been involved in serious incidents etc).
  - Any prisoners on escort or bed watch.
  - Any prisoners remaining in reception (such as late court arrivals).

## OFFICIAL

- 4.256 Prior to the day staff leaving residential accommodation, night staff must account for all prisoners and undertake a physical check of cells and relevant doors to ensure they are secure. If appropriate, staff must also ensure all relevant gates and emergency fire-fighting equipment are unlocked.

### Night Staff Requirements

- 4.257 All night staff must be briefed at the start of the week by the NOO and made aware of the actions to take in an incident. This will include how to summon assistance and containment of the incident (where possible). The following incidents must be covered:
- Escape.
  - Attempted escape.
  - Death in custody.
  - Fire.
  - Serious self-harm.
- 4.258 Other situations may arise during night state such as a loss of electricity or water and staff must be able to locate the local contingency plans that set out how to manage various types of incidents. The NOO must be competent in carrying out the actions within the contingency plans.

### Late Receptions / Court Arrivals

- 4.259 Local prisons are likely to still be processing prisoners as the prison enters night state. Local procedures must take this into account and the LSS must specify the procedures to be undertaken which may include:
- Prisoner orderlies and peers being returned to their residential units.
  - Remaining prisoners secured in holding rooms in reception evenly distributing the number of prisoners between all the holding rooms available.
  - Numbers of prisoners that are unlocked in reception at any time, whether this is to be first night interviewed or to see the medical staff.
  - Procedures for movement of prisoners from reception to the first night centre/other residential accommodation.

### Entering Night State

- 4.260 Once all day staff have left, all prisoners are accounted for and keys and radios have been checked, the NOO will prepare the prison for night state. This must include:
- Closing the main Gate for the night
  - Ensuring all doubles (where applicable) have been applied throughout the prison.
  - Ensuring all night staff are fully briefed and in their correct places.
  - Ensuring that patrolling staff have been briefed on any internal perimeter checks required throughout the night.

### NOO Visits

- 4.261 The NOO must make visits throughout the night to all residential units including segregation and healthcare units (where applicable).
- 4.262 The purpose of these visits is to check the welfare of the staff, identify and discuss any concerns or issues and gain assurance of the completion of relevant documentation.

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4.263 Night visits must be recorded on the night sheet.

### Prisoners Conduct and Behaviour During Night State

4.264 Night staff must be fully aware of the procedures for managing inappropriate prisoner behaviour during the night state, including the procedures for challenging these (e.g., adjudication, incentive procedures) and appropriate recording on NOMIS.

4.265 If a prisoner's behaviour needs addressing further, the NOO must be contacted to make any assessment and further decision. This may include moving a highly disruptive prisoner for the safety of themselves/ others or other appropriate action. All actions must be recorded and justified on NOMIS and in the unit observation book.

### At Risk Prisoners

4.266 The LSS must set out procedures for the observation of those in special security categories to include:

- Category A prisoners.
- E-List prisoners.
- Restricted Status and protected witnesses.
- Individuals at risk of self-harm/ suicide.

4.267 The following prisoners must be checked hourly during night state:

- Exceptional Category A prisoners.
- High-Risk Category A prisoners.
- Potential Category A prisoners held temporarily outside of Category A prisons.
- Provisional Category A prisoners held temporarily outside of Category A prisons.
- E-List standard prisoners.
- E-List Heightened prisoners.

4.268 Observations of prisoners in the Segregation Unit must be completed in line with the [Segregation PSO 1700](#) and the LSS.

### Night patrols

4.269 Regular patrols of residential accommodation and landings should take place between 2200hrs and 0600hrs and may include undertaking any ACCT observations.

4.270 The end of every landing should be visited, and this procedure documented on the night sheet. Prisons may have other ways of recording these patrols to include systems such as 'pegging'.

4.271 Patrols must be irregular, for example not taking place at the same time every hour.

4.272 Patrols must also include the completion of fire safety checks during night state.

### Entering a cell at night

4.273 All prisoners must be secured behind their doors during the night state unless authorised by management or on the instructions of the Healthcare staff.

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- 4.274 The LSS must clearly state how many staff must normally be present before cell doors can be unlocked as well as the local procedures that staff should follow if faced with a potentially life-threatening situation when there are no other staff in the immediate vicinity.
- 4.275 Staff must have access to the LSS and be made aware of the implications of this for their role in maintaining security during the night state.
- 4.276 There are many incidents that may occur at night, and it is difficult to be prescriptive about what actions to take in each particular case. The following is a guide to the minimum mandatory actions that are required before opening cell doors at night.
- 4.277 Under normal circumstances, authority to unlock a cell at night must be given by the NOO and no cell will be opened unless a minimum of two/three (subject to local risk assessment procedures) members of staff are present one of whom should be the NOO.
- 4.278 Staff have a duty of care to prisoners, to themselves and to other staff. The preservation of life must take precedence over the directions above. Where there is, or appears to be, immediate danger to life, then cells may be unlocked without the authority of the NOO (but subject to the conditions set out below) and an individual member of staff may enter the cell on their own. However, night staff should not take action that they feel would put themselves or others in unnecessary danger. Further guidance can be found on the HMPPS Intranet - [Night Operating Procedures - entering a cell V3.0 Nov 2023.mp4 \(sharepoint.com\)](#).
- 4.279 Before entering a cell:
- Every effort should be made to gain a verbal response from the prisoner.
  - This, together with what the member of staff can observe through the panel and any knowledge of the occupant(s), should inform a rapid dynamic risk assessment of the situation and decision on whether to enter immediately or wait for assistance; and
  - The communications room/control room must be informed before entering the cell stating the location of the cell and describing the circumstances that require intervention.
- 4.280 Although it is not possible to include a check list of every potential risk in a live situation, some things that may be considered as part of a rapid dynamic risk assessment could include:
- the presentation of the prisoner who appears to be in danger.
  - whether or not it is a single or shared cell.
  - the occupant's security category.
  - the occupant's history of self-harm and/or violence if known. Are they likely to act erratically?
  - how vulnerable does entering the cell make the member of staff?
  - the level of visibility into the cell, can a clear assessment be made of what the prisoner may have in their hands?
  - is there anything that could be used as a weapon?
  - is there anyone else who is at risk?
  - how can staff exit the situation if needed?
  - how confident does the member of staff feel? How close are other colleagues to assist?
- 4.281 If a decision is taken to enter a cell, staff must tell their colleagues what they are doing. If it is not possible to inform a colleague, staff should summon assistance using a personal or general alarm.

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- 4.282 Staff must contact the communications/ control room or Orderly Officer before entering the cell and provide the location of the cell and describe the circumstances that require intervention.
- 4.283 If applicable, staff must use the emergency response codes 'red' or 'blue' over the radio which will call for an immediate local healthcare response where this service is available, as well as emergency services. Staff must also state whether the person is conscious and breathing so that this information can be given promptly to the ambulance operator.
- 4.284 The communication/control room must then contact the NOO and inform them of the situation. Staff will be deployed immediately to the cell.
- 4.285 Cells must only be entered using the sealed pouches. The NOO “doubles keys” must not be taken onto a residential unit. Before a cell door is opened, the doubles key should be secured to the key chain of another member of staff who remains outside of the immediate area of the prison.
- 4.286 Where observation panels are covered, the NOO must be informed immediately and staff deployed to the cell. In these circumstances a decision by a member of staff to enter the cell immediately on their own will be more difficult as there is less evidence to inform a dynamic risk assessment.
- 4.287 Staff should consider the SSOW-reducing risk of exposure to illicit airborne contaminants on cell entry. A copy can be requested from [Health-Safety.national@justice.gov.uk](mailto:Health-Safety.national@justice.gov.uk).

### Prisoner movement during night state

- 4.288 The LSS must clearly state how many staff must normally be present before any prisoner accommodation can be unlocked to include single and double cells in addition to dormitory/spur style accommodation.
- 4.289 All prisoner movements during the night state must be co-ordinated and approved by the NOO with appropriate staffing according to the known risks relating to the individual prisoner/s concerned.
- 4.290 In addition, the LSS must specify the requirements around keys and their use during night state. Doubles keys must never be in the vicinity of an open cell door. When entering a residential unit to unlock a cell, the only keys in possession of the staff should be a cell key and a class 3 key (if attached to the night pouch). These must be secured to the staff member via the key chain.
- 4.291 All other keys (class 2 and class 1 doubles key) must be retained by a member of staff off that unit, behind a secured gate. (Other entry routes to the unit must also be secured prior to the cell being unlocked). This secures the area should a hostage situation emerge.
- 4.292 Any time a cell door is unlocked it must be recorded in the unit observation book and on the night sheet.

### Breaking night state to permit visitors

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- 4.293 The LSS will set out the circumstances under which the night state may be justifiably broken and the secure perimeter of the prison breached. Prisons must take into account the potential risk that arises when the gate is unlocked and whether any person wishing to enter may be under coercion.

### Duty Governor night visits

- 4.294 At least one night visit must take place per month by a Duty Governor. To ensure the security of this visit and that the Duty Governor is not under coercion, prisons must have specific local procedures set out to manage this visit. This may include the Duty Governor contacting the prison prior to arrival and supplying a password to the NOO. The password must be confirmed by the NOO before entry to the prison is permitted. The password should be changed regularly.
- 4.295 If the password is incorrect the police must be informed and entry to the prison must be refused.

### Statutory right of entry

- 4.296 The NOO must be aware of who has a statutory right of entry, Prior to the entry of the individual, ID must be confirmed and the NOO must be content that the visitor is not under coercion. Any concerns must be reported to the Duty Governor and the police immediately.
- 4.297 In accordance with the provisions of the S19(1) of the Prison Act 1952, Prison Rule 79(2), YOI Rule 77(2), S20 and S48 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and S54 of the Food Act 1990, the following people have a statutory right to enter a prison at any time:
- Justices of the Peace for the County or Borough of the prison or the prisoner in question.
  - Members of the prison's IMB.
  - Health & Safety Inspectors of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) enforcing Health & Safety legislation.
  - Local Authority Environmental Health Officers enforcing the 1990 Food Act or Food Safety (General Food Hygiene) Regulations 1995; and
  - Members of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
- 4.298 If the NOO does not feel comfortable in allowing access, (for example reduced staffing levels as a result of an emergency escort would mean the visit can't be conducted securely) then access must be denied, and immediate contact made with the Duty Governor. The situation must be clearly explained to the visitor(s).

- 4.299 All night visits must be recorded.

### Emergency services and emergency escorts

- 4.300 Night state will need to be broken in the event of a medical emergency. There must be clear instructions in the LSS and the Gate about the unhindered admission of any emergency services vehicles and personnel during night state.
- 4.301 Immediate and safe access must be provided to the emergency services when entering the prison. The NOO will need to ensure that escorting staff are available to permit entry via the gate and that they are aware of the quickest route to different parts of the prison.

## OFFICIAL

- 4.302 In cold weather, some prisons will need to have anti-freeze or other measures on hand and stored in the vehicle lock/gate area to release any frozen locks that may delay entry.
- 4.303 If an emergency escort is dispatched without a full escort risk assessment due to a life-threatening situation, then an Emergency Escort Risk Assessment must be completed and the PER must be annotated with 'no restraints to be used' if that is the decision made at time of dispatch by the Duty Governor/Orderly Officer. The full risk assessment must be taken to the escorting staff at the earliest opportunity (no longer than 18 hours). For more information, see the [External Escorts Policy Framework](#).
- 4.304 On most occasions an emergency escort will consist of two escorting officers but in some circumstances, three officers may be required. The minimum requirement is two officers.
- 4.305 The NOO will remain in charge of the prison and will need to assess what work can continue to be safely carried out, or whether there is a need to attempt to call more staff in (this would be done in consultation with the Duty Governor). Any reduction in work duties during night state will need to be recorded, outlining the circumstances.
- 4.306 For more information on entry and exit of emergency vehicles, please see the [Conveyance Policy Framework, Annex H](#).

### Exiting night state

- 4.307 Prior to coming out of night state, the following must take place where relevant:
- Internal Perimeter Check.
  - Removal of doubles.
  - Full key check.
  - Full roll check.
  - Staffing the Gate.
- 4.308 A full handover must be given to the daytime Orderly Officer to include:
- The night's events.
  - Any security concerns.
  - Prisoners subject to open ACCT documents.
  - Prisoners on constant supervision.
  - Any concerns raised about those recently arrived prisoners.
  - Any prisoners located to Segregation during the night.
  - Any E-List and/or Pot / Cat A Prisoners.
  - Any hospital escorts/ bedwatches.

### Covert testing

- 4.309 Covert Testing must be carried out in line with the [Covert Testing Policy Framework \(to be published\)](#) to assess internal security procedures.

## **5. Constraints**

- 5.1 There are dependencies between this Policy Framework and the following policy documents:
- [Searching Policy Framework](#).

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- [Management and Handling of Evidence Policy Framework.](#)
- [External Escorts Policy Framework.](#)
- [Management of E List Prisoners Policy Framework.](#)
- [Management of the LSS Policy Framework.](#)
- [Conveyance Policy Framework.](#)

### Data Protection

- 5.2 Any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual recorded as a consequence of this Framework will be processed in accordance with [the Data Protection Act 2018](#), [UK General Data Protection Regulation](#) and [Records Information Management Policy: PSI 04/2018](#).

### Freedom of Information Act

- 5.3 This document has been assessed as OFFICIAL and therefore suitable for public release. Some annexes and supporting tools have been marked as OFFICIAL SENSITIVE and will not be available for public release.

### Diversity & Inclusion

- 5.4 When communicating to staff, prisoners or visitors, prisons are expected to ensure that briefing documents and information is available in a variety of formats including easy read, braille, voice, and other languages.
- 5.6 A full Equality Impact Assessment has been completed in support of this Policy Framework.

## **6. Guidance**

### **Support for Prisoners**

- 6.1 It must be recognised that as understanding of the reasons for escape increases, so too does the implementation of procedures and staff's confidence. Collectively, these improvements further restrict opportunities for escape, which may cause prisoners to seek alternative outlets to vent their frustrations. Such outlets include, but are not limited to, violence, disorder, and self-harm.
- 6.2 There are several policies, processes and key areas that can help support prisoners. Some of these are listed below and should be always considered throughout a prisoner's time in custody, to aid with the avoidance of prisoners feeling like they have no choice but to escape from custody or carry out other actions due to frustrations.

PRISONER SUPPORT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Keyworkers</li><li>• Family support</li><li>• Substance Misuse Services</li><li>• Mental Health Services</li><li>• Pastoral Support</li><li>• Individual Case Management</li><li>• <a href="#">Managing Prisoner Safety PSI 64/2011</a></li><li>• <a href="#">CSIP (Challenge, Support &amp; Intervention Plan)</a></li><li>• <a href="#">PSI 07/2015 Early Days in Custody Prison service instructions (PSIs) - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)</a></li></ul>
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|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Serious and Organised Crime Policy Framework Prison &amp; Probation Policy Frameworks - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Debt Materials and Learning for prisoners</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Listener Scheme &amp; Samaritans - Safety in prisons (sharepoint.com)</a></li></ul> |
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### **Gate Procedures**

#### **Gate**

##### **Vehicles entering**

- 6.3 Vehicles arriving for delivery should park and report outside of the gate; the delivery arrival slot and process will vary by prison. Vehicles should be prioritised and processed as quickly as possible.
- 6.4 Staff should submit an intelligence report (IR) if they if they have concerns regarding an upcoming or previous delivery.
- 6.5 Security Departments should consider covert testing in this area to gain assurance that local delivery procedures sufficiently mitigate the associated risks. These tests should also include the mechanical procedures (emergency overrides for example) that may be required to operate the gate particularly in prisons that operate electronic gates. See [Covert Testing Policy Framework \(to be published\)](#).
- 6.6 In some circumstances this may not always be possible:
- Emergency vehicle access in life threatening situations.
  - Vehicle to long for the lock.
  - Gate failure (mechanical or electrical).
- 6.7 The decision to open both gates simultaneously will generally be under the direction or supervision of an appropriate manager (Band 5 or above) and only in exceptional circumstances. All staff working in the gate must be aware of how to operate any necessary overrides if this is needed.
- 6.8 To aid with the prevention of escape, extra staff will be deployed to the area to manage both gates and consideration to the use of patrol dogs if available. The use of patrol dogs and when they can be used will always be under the direction of the dog handler/dog team and [Prison Dogs Policy Framework](#).
- 6.9 It can be good practice to issue drivers with driver instruction cards to ensure they are aware of prison processes such as escorting arrangements, 5mph speed limit, searching and ID requirements and keeping safe whilst within the prison.
- 6.10 Gate staff should be able to operate gates where there is a loss of power to electric gates and hand cranking is required. Staffing in the gate should consider this.

##### **Vehicle searching and supervision**

- 6.11 Searching equipment should always be well maintained and replaced as required. How this is done and by whom should be set out in the LSS. A system of managerial checks should also be in place to provide assurance of compliance in all these areas.

## OFFICIAL

- 6.12 Communication of the searching process and unauthorised items should be in verbal, written, and pictorial form wherever possible. This will ensure that all people entering the prison are fully aware of the requirements. Individuals who are neurodiverse or where English may not be their first language may find it more difficult to understand written communication.
- 6.13 Once the vehicle has entered the gate, staff should move the driver and any passengers away from the vehicle and conduct the level of search outlined in the Local Security Strategy. See also the [Searching Policy Framework](#).
- 6.14 Prior to this search, the driver and any passengers should be reminded of the unauthorised items list and advised that any items not disclosed will lead to a warning being issued or further consequences as outlined in the [Conveyance Policy Framework](#).
- 6.15 At this point, the delivery vehicle will be searched as per the procedures outlined in the LSS. The items in the vehicle will not usually be searched however the Security Department should direct when the delivery should be searched, on an intelligence led basis.
- 6.16 Staff should seek guidance from a manager on every occasion an illicit item is discovered. See [Conveyance Policy Framework](#) and the [Management and Handling of Evidence Policy Framework for further information](#).

### Vehicle movement

- 6.17 All staff working in the gate and escorting vehicles should:
- Have received up-to-date security awareness training/briefing.
  - Control and monitor those whom they are escorting from the point of entry to the point of exit.
  - Know the identities of those they are escorting.
  - Possess a thorough knowledge of the geography of the prison and the areas in the prison to which those they are escorting are permitted access.
  - Be aware of local contingency plans.
  - Be proficient in the use of the prison radio net and any technical aids or equipment associated with the escorting role.
  - Be aware of the security and safety requirements of the prison and of the vehicle to be escorted.
  - Move vehicles to and from required destinations in a timely manner to meet the published local regime and requirements of other services.
- 6.18 Where vehicles are not escorted in accordance with the requirements of this Policy Framework, prior authorisation of these vehicles to enter should be requested from the communications/control room.
- 6.19 When escorting vehicles, staff should wear the appropriate Protective Equipment (PPE) such as prison issue footwear and a high visibility tabard.

### Emergency vehicles

- 6.20 In an emergency, it may not always be appropriate to search emergency vehicles on entry to a prison as the preservation of life takes precedence over local procedures. Emergency

## OFFICIAL

vehicles include Ambulance Service, Fire and Rescue Service, and Police Service. In an incident, this may also include Operational Response and Resilient Unit (ORRU) staff vehicles & responding tornado staff. In some cases, emergency vehicles will also be allowed to leave the prison without the need for a search of the vehicle to take place.

For more information on entry and exit of emergency vehicles, please see [Conveyance Policy Framework, Annex H](#).

A short video on vehicle gate procedures with a focus on escape prevention can be found on the NSF intranet page.

### Prisoners

- 6.21 In several prisons prisoners will move through the gate either on entry or exit on most days for different reasons:
- As part of outside work parties.
  - Final discharge.
  - Escorts conducted by HMPPS and PECS.
- 6.22 It is therefore vital that gate staff understand their role in preventing the unauthorised exit and entry of prisoners and are confident in doing so.
- 6.23 All prisoners attending the gate for any form of discharge must be accompanied by a member of staff with a gate pass, which will inform the gate of the reason for discharge and the prisoner's identity.
- 6.24 Several checks should have been conducted prior to the prisoner arriving at the gate in the case of final discharge. Sentence calculations should be carried out by trained staff and in line with the [Sentence Calculations Policy Framework](#).
- 6.25 As part of the final discharge process carried out by the discharging officer in Reception (Band 4 or above) the prisoner's identity should be confirmed using a selection of different questions (see Prisoner Discharge Checklist, Annex N).

### Perimeter

- 6.26 Prisons have varying types/layers of perimeter security, ranging from fences, walls, prisoner intrusion detection systems (PIDS), CCTV, internal/external patrols and others. These layers of security are in place not only to prevent escape but also conveyance of illicit items. Local assessments should identify the strategies used to maintain perimeter security in line with the current threat and mitigating factors.
- 6.27 Where perimeter security includes physical patrols, this should be co-ordinated by the communication room and a record of the check should be made with the Security Department.
- 6.28 Consideration should always be given to staff safety; staff should also be aware of their limitations in relation to apprehension/challenge of persons outside of the prison.
- 6.29 Operational staff of Band 3 and above can use PACE powers of arrest, but if doing so should consider other factors especially around their own safety. If they are to use their powers of arrest, then the following caution will be issued to the person being arrested:

*I am ..... (state name)*

## OFFICIAL

*I must inform you that you are under arrest on suspicion of .....  
You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.*

- 6.30 The arresting officer should detain the person under arrest and call the police. They must not question the individual but must document anything stated by the person under arrest so it may be used as evidence.

### **Communications Room and Radio**

#### **Communications Room**

- 6.31 The communications room will be the 'hub' of the prison that controls prisoner movement, vehicle movement, emergency situations, staff and prisoner safety (general/fire alarms) and so on.
- 6.32 Incident managers should ensure communications room staff are kept informed of relevant information about incidents throughout.
- 6.33 Security and/or Orderly Officers should ensure that the comms/control room is kept informed about specific prisoners as issues arise, particularly relating to any E list, category A or other prisoners considered to present a risk to security.

### **Internal Movement**

#### **Prisoner Movement**

- 6.34 Movement of prisoners around the prison either unescorted, mass movement or in small groups may leave prisons vulnerable to escape due to many influencing factors.
- 6.35 It is easy for staff to be distracted when supervising the unloading of prisoners from a vehicle. Consideration should be given to the individual risk factors of each prison and whether it is necessary to handcuff prisoners prior to exiting a vehicle, entering reception and vice versa.
- 6.36 For more guidance on the movement of prisoners please see Internal Movement of Prisoners Guidance (ST9.1) and Internal Movement of Prisoners Poster (ST9.2), an instructional video, poster and guidance document.

### **Roll checks** (see Roll Check Procedure Poster ST6.1)

- 6.37 The 'roll' is the number of prisoners held in a prison, at any one time. This is any prisoner who is on the inside of the prison perimeter, including those lodging on a van whilst other prisoners are dropped off.
- 6.38 Accounting for all prisoners is important to identify any escapes (attempted or actual).
- 6.39 To aid with maintaining a prison roll, the gate and reception (where operating) should always maintain a prison roll, recording the:
- Unlock roll.
  - Discharge.
  - Receptions.
  - Current roll.

## OFFICIAL

- 6.40 It is recommended that this be clearly displayed in the gate lodge area and must also be recorded in the gate book.
- 6.41 A “whole prison roll reconciliation” does not mean a stand-fast roll check must be routinely undertaken after every mass movement. Provided that a prison has cleared their roll before a movement period commences, there is no need to re-count areas where numbers have remained static. Provided the post-movement figure matches the pre-movement figure there is no need to physically re-count all areas.
- 6.42 When assuring themselves that prisoners appear alive and well during roll checks, staff should consider the following:
- are there any signs of ligaturing
  - is there blood or vomit visible
  - is the prisoner laying on the floor of the cell
  - Is it possible to see if the prisoner is breathing
  - does the prisoner appear to be moving
- 6.43 This list is not exhaustive and there may be other factors to consider. Staff should use their judgment to determine what may be abnormal behaviour for certain prisoners and what may be a cause for concern in certain situations. Staff should consider that what constitutes abnormal behaviour may differ depending on the time of the roll check.
- 6.44 If staff cannot assure themselves that a prisoner is present and appears alive and well during roll checks in night state, it may then be necessary to attempt to wake the prisoner. It is good practice for staff to inform prisoners on their wing that they are required to check on them during the night and early in the morning and if they cannot clearly see that they are present and safe they may have to wake them. This means that they should keep their observation panels clear and keep themselves visible while sleeping.

### Stand fast roll check

- 6.45 A stand fast roll check is an ad hoc (when necessary or needed) roll check. This is a contingency measure that should be deployed, rather than a matter of routine.
- 6.46 There are several circumstances where a stand fast roll check may be called, these may include (this list is not exhaustive):
- Gate found open.
  - Missing prisoner.
  - Hole in fence.
  - The roll cannot be reconciled after a movement period.
  - Escape aid found near perimeter wall (rope/ladder).
- 6.47 The procedures to follow will be the same in each circumstance and may operate alongside escape contingency plans. Prisons may choose to carry out more frequent stand fast roll checks if they consistently struggle to reconcile their roll.
- 6.48 Any member of staff coming across or being alerted to any of the above circumstances must raise the alarm in the appropriate manner immediately at which point a stand fast roll check will be called.

### Stand fast roll check procedure

## OFFICIAL

- 6.49 A stand fast roll check will be managed by the communications room/orderly officer.
- 6.50 Consideration to deploying fixed posts should be made at each stage. Fixed posts is a system used in closed prisons in which staff attend a dedicated internal section of the wall/fence, usually identified by a large number or letter. Each staff member should be in the line of sight of the next staff member and are to monitor that section of wall for any breaches of security (see Fixed Posts ST7).
- 6.51 Consideration to freezing the gate should be made at each stage. Freezing the gate will result in no persons or vehicles exiting the gate without permission from the Duty Governor. Consideration should be given to allowing certain individuals to enter the prison, such as staff and Prisoner Escort Contractor Services (PECS) (with prisoners on board to ensure decency) but not contractors or visitors.
- 6.52 Emergency Service vehicles must be allowed to both access and leave the prison.
- 6.53 The stand fast roll check will be announced over the radio net, it is advised to use the alarm warble at this stage to gain staff attention.
- 6.54 Acknowledgements should be obtained via the radio to all relevant areas/call signs.
- 6.55 At the announcement, the following will take place:
- All areas within the prison will secure the area and cease all movement to and from their area including work parties.
  - All areas will carry out a physical head count of all prisoners.
  - All areas will contact the communications room/orderly officer by landline or radio to report numbers; and
  - The communications room/orderly officer will be responsible for collating the roll.
- 6.56 If the roll is incorrect then 'incorrect roll' procedures and/or escape contingency plans should be activated if not already done so.
- 6.57 Incorrect roll procedures should be set out in the LSS and may include the below procedures at different stages throughout:
- Recount, unlocking all cell doors, checking under beds/behind curtains etc.
  - Checking locations of all prisoners via NOMIS and the use of ID cards/other identifying paperwork.
  - Swapping locations (Staff on one residential unit, must swap and count on a different residential unit).
  - Returning all prisoners from activity/appointments, taking into consideration the routes for return; and
  - Cross referencing gate passes between reception and the gate to ensure all discharges have been accounted for correctly.
- 6.58 It must be remembered however that all these actions can take time, allowing any escaped prisoner to make further their getaway, therefore no delays should be made in implementing escape contingency plans.

### **Members of the public filming**

## OFFICIAL

- 6.59 It is an offence under 40D of the Prison Act 1952 for a person who, without authorisation takes a photograph, or makes a sound-recording, inside a prison. This includes images taken by drones. For more information and guidance on drones please see the [Conveyance Policy Framework](#).
- 6.60 Where a member of staff in the course of their duties has reason to believe that a person is making an unauthorised recording, or video of the inside of a prison then they should carry out the following actions:
- Ask the person if they have authorisation to take photographs/videos.
  - Where insufficient proof of authorised filming is given, inform the person that they are in breach of section 40d of the Prison Act and that this is a criminal offence.
  - Direct the person to stop their recording/capturing of images.
  - If the person is on prison property, they should be directed to leave.
  - Raise the alarm and request assistance.
  - Request police attendance at the earliest opportunity.
  - If CCTV is in action, staff may inform them that they are being filmed and this may be sent on to the police.
  - Do not engage if they are trying to do something. If they request, you to say something reply "No Comment".
  - Do not react. Whilst this can be difficult, remember that footage of staff reacting is more likely to get likes, shares and views. By not reacting, you take away their power.
  - The first on scene should remain in the vicinity of the person until relieved. The staff member should not engage with the person other than replying "no comment" to questions, or to remind them they are breaching section 40d of the prisons act, or to request they leave HMPPS property.
- 6.61 There is no definition of a prison boundary in the Prison Act or the Prison Rules 1999. As such, the most likely interpretation is that a prison boundary is the physical boundary which marks and/or effects the segregation of the prisoners from those outside the prison. This is most likely to be considered a wall or fence for closed prisons, or beyond obvious barriers such as a vehicle barrier for open prisons.
- 6.62 It is not an offence for individuals to film outside a prison, as long as any images captured are not images of the inside of a prison. Areas accessible by the public, such as pedestrian footpaths and prison car parks would be considered outside the prison boundary and therefore are not private property. Furthermore, examples such as filming of officers queuing to enter a prison building would not be deemed to be an offence.
- 6.63 See Members of the Public Filming – Guidance for Staff (ST10.1) and Being Filmed Poster (ST10.2) for more guidance and a poster in relation to members of the public filming. Please also see Safety Outside the Wall Guidance (ST11) for guidance on staying safe outside the prison.

### **Gates, doors, keys and locks**

#### **Gates and doors**

## OFFICIAL



- 6.64 Securing and locking doors and gates is a critical security task.
- 6.65 Gates and doors are fundamental parts of our physical security.
- 6.66 Safety and security are compromised when gates and doors are left unattended or unlocked.
- 6.67 A Class I gate and/or door being left unsecured and unattended could aid prisoners in escape or escape attempts.
- 6.68 It is the member of staff's responsibility to ensure that the gate or door is closed correctly and secured in the frame when they pass through it. Staff should prove they have locked a gate or door before moving away. (See Lock and Secure Briefing ST12.1, Prove Before You Move Poster ST12.2 and Prove Before You Move Stickers ST12.3). Leaving a gate unlocked for someone else to follow provides opportunity for prisoners to access unauthorised areas. A member of staff could be distracted or be required to change direction resulting in the gate or door being left unsecured.
- 6.69 Open Class II gates and doors can allow prisoners into unauthorised areas leading to several possible security breaches.
- 6.70 Incidents and compromises may require additional roll checks. This impedes regime delivery and can impact the prison's security and stability.
- 6.71 The following should be highlighted to all staff:
- Be responsible and follow correct locking procedures and processes for all class types.
  - Be mindful of who is around you when moving across the site. It may be appropriate to check ID, if you are asked to leave a gate open or allow someone through.
  - Be aware of your surroundings, other members of staff and their movements. They may not be passing through the same gates and doors as you.
  - Be vigilant, help spot potential incidents before they occur and report faulty or difficult locks so that they can be fixed.
  - Report key and lock incidents and compromises correctly.
  - If you come across a gate which has been left unsecured incorrectly, secure it and report it.

### Keys and Locks

- 6.72 Security keys are a fundamental part of day-to-day life in a prison and carry one of the biggest risks regarding escape, disorder etc. It is important that all key holders understand fully their responsibilities regarding key control/discipline.
- 6.73 To provide effective movement around the prison there are three main security keys namely Class I, II and III.



## OFFICIAL

- 6.74 Class I locks can be mechanical, magnetic, or electronic. Their purpose is to form a secure perimeter and they may be found on:
- Cell doors (including gated cells).
  - Gates on the perimeter of all buildings containing prisoner accommodation.
  - The main entrance to the prison.
  - Control and restraint staircases: external ground floor gates, control and restraint doors, and the staircase side of bolt holes (keyhole on the secure side only).
  - Access to perimeter sterile areas.
  - The perimeter security of Close Supervision Centres (CSCs).
- 6.75 Class I locks should never be left unlocked or unattended. This is to prevent prisoners from tampering with the lock. Lock backs may be used except where not physically possible (see 4.130).
- 6.76 Class II locks can be mechanical or magnetic. They are used in locations where a lower level of security and control is required, and they may be fitted to:
- The prisoners' side of doors next to building perimeter gates which themselves are fitted with a Class I lock.
  - Internal control doors and gates within the secured perimeter of a building.
  - Doors and gates of other buildings within the secure perimeter of the prison, such as workshops, education facilities, and gymnasias.
  - Gates in zone control fences.
  - Control and restraint staircases, "weather" doors, escape doors from landings to a bolthole (keyhole on both sides), plus a bolt on the sterile side.
- 6.77 Other than where authorised during the night state, no Class II locks (including wooden outer doors) are to be left unlocked or unattended. This is to prevent prisoners from tampering with the lock. Lock backs may be used except where not physically possible (see 4.130).
- 6.78 Class III locks (Identification lettering and numbering on 'bow' of key - EX, AX, EN etc). Examples of where these will normally be used are:
- Internal doors such as offices, locker rooms, and staff toilets.
  - Accountable suites of locks fitted internally and externally to prisoner areas, which are additional to the Class II lock and are locked when the facility is not in use.
  - Buildings outside of the secure perimeter of the prison such as the visitor centre, staff locker rooms and the officers' mess.
  - The LSS should set a target for the total number of different suited locks, and this should not exceed 25 different suited locks on Class III keys per prison.
- 6.79 Each prison will have different procedures for the storage of keys, dependant on factors individual to that prison. The prison's LSS should describe the procedures specific to that prison to enable all staff to understand their roles and responsibilities.

### Electronic Key Management Systems (TRAKA)

- 6.80 Electronic key management systems are operated by individual users, utilising biometric fingerprint readers or individually assigned PIN numbers.
- 6.81 When enrolling new users (see TRAKA Enrolment Guide, ST13) the security department will ensure only the necessary keys are allocated to the new user, for example:

## OFFICIAL

- Only Band 3 and above operational staff (or equivalent in contracted prisons) are given access to cell keys.
- Specialist keys are only allocated to those staff working in those areas.

- 6.82 On accessing the cabinet, green lights will identify the keys that are available to an individual, whilst red lights identify those keys that are not available. To aid those staff with a colour vision deficiency, security departments should turn off the red lights on the main server for the individual user. This will enable those users to be able to identify keys allocated to them (TRAKA Colour Deficiency Guide, ST14).
- 6.83 Electronic management systems are at risk of failure due to power cuts, generator failures etc. All cabinets have internal backup power supplies and manual override functions, allowing manual key issue and reset (TRAKA Override Guide, ST15).

### Daily key checks

- 6.84 Carrying out key checks provide assurance that all security keys have been accounted for and not taken out of the prison/lost, whilst also ensuring that all staff are safe and not missing, both scenarios should be taken into consideration when completing a key check.

#### Scenario:

- 1900hrs key check
- Keys 'blue 35' not in key safe/electronic key management system.
- Keys were issued to Mr R Sterling of the education department at 1330hrs.

#### To consider:

- Has Mr R Sterling left the prison with the keys?
- Is Mr Sterling working late and not informed anybody?
- Has Mr R Sterling been taken hostage?

- 6.85 It is therefore important to carry out all appropriate actions to locate the missing keys as quickly as possible in line with local contingency plans.

### Full key checks (audit)

- 6.86 It is good practice to use the six-monthly full key check as a time to check for not only any missing keys but also damage to keys and an opportunity to remove any keys out of circulation which are no longer in use (this includes those keys in works departments).
- 6.87 For efficiency it is advised that key audits take place overnight when most keys have been returned to storage.
- 6.88 Any discrepancies are a potential key compromise, in which case the discrepancy needs reporting to NIMU, on IRS, security intelligence report submission, PGD informed, and local investigations commenced.

### Keys allowed outside the prison

- 6.89 There are a small number of Class III keys which may need to exit the prison for areas such as visitors' centres, works access, staff locker rooms and alike. These keys are not to be stored on a bunch and instead on an individual ring to prevent other security keys being taken out of the prison.

## OFFICIAL

- 6.90 These keys could be stored in electronic key management systems were possible, ensuring only appropriate enrolled users have access or alternatively, stored securely in the main gate area and signed in/out when issued and returned. The procedures for these keys and location of storage should be described in the LSS.
- 6.91 Cuff keys may also be taken outside of the prison for the purposes of an external escort and should remain attached to the escorting officer's (not the officer cuffed to the prisoner) key chain.

### Reading/photography

- 6.92 It is important for all staff members to keep keys concealed to prevent 'reading' of keys or unlawful photography of keys by prisoners (mobile phones). Key pouches are available for issue to staff via NDC Branston.
- 6.93 On occasion in prisons, filming and photography does take place for many varied reasons, including TV documentaries, training videos, journalist articles and so on. Any filming/photography if not controlled appropriately could result in security keys being recorded, allowing copies to be made by anybody viewing the filming/photography. In order to stop this, all camera operatives are to be briefed fully by the security department in advance of the restrictions in regard to recording keys and locks and all key holders should be informed in advance of the filming/photography taking place.
- 6.94 For any footage or photographs where the detail of a key or lock can be seen (for example, via CCTV/ BWVC), the detail of the key will be pixilated. If the image of the key or lock is not clear or taken from a distance and the detail of the key or lock cannot be seen, the Governor can determine whether the pixilation is required.

### Keys testing

- 6.95 On occasion following a key compromise, it may be necessary to have the keys forensically tested. This is a local decision to be made and is dependent on the circumstances of the compromise. Details and procedures can be obtained from the National Locking Section.

### Key use during Nights

- 6.96 On entering night state and during some incidents, (dependant on the circumstances as per local contingency plans), all residential areas will be 'doubled'. This is a secondary lock to secure the area further.
- 6.97 During night state limited keys are to be issued to staff. Local night procedures/night orders will describe the keys to be issued and to whom. Patrol staff will be issued a sealed pouch usually with just a cell key, to allow access to a cell in an emergency.

### Key maintenance

- 6.98 Key rings will be sealed with tamper evident seals (Key Tamper Evident Seals, ST17) to prevent unauthorised removal or adding of keys to a bunch and to prevent keys 'falling off' a bunch. No other keys should be added to a security bunch, such as locker keys, filing cabinet keys etc.
- 6.99 Keys can become worn and damaged over time affecting their functionality, if this is the case then the security manager should be informed of the key type and bunch number to

## OFFICIAL

arrange replacement, this is the responsibility of all staff to prevent key/lock incidents of broken keys, keys stuck in locks etc.

- 6.100 Under no circumstances should any part of a lock/lock mechanism be altered, tampered or modified to suit the needs of a prison.
- 6.101 In the same way as keys are and need to be accounted for to maintain security, locks also need to be, however locks and locking schedules will be managed by the facilities management team.
- 6.102 Spare or replacement locks are to be ordered from the National Locking Section. Keys can take up to 8 calendar weeks from supplier receipt of a valid purchase order, locks can take up to 12 weeks, and padlocks up to 8-10 weeks.

### Crown Courts

- 6.103 Nominated prisons will have responsibility for the keys and locks of their local crown court custody suites, it is the responsibility of the designated security manager to maintain and audit crown court keys on their local ledger along with the prison's other security keys and within the same timescales.

### Padlocks

- 6.104 There are times in prisons when the use of padlocks will be necessary, this may be on a permanent basis for securing items which will not fit in shadow boards, cupboards etc or on a temporary basis for short term security solution:
- 6.105 Examples of padlock use may include securing of:
  - climbing aids/ladders.
  - wheelie bins.
  - skips.
  - vehicles; and
  - Gates with chains (during activation of contingency plans).
- 6.106 The only authorised padlocks to be used are detailed in Authorised Padlocks, ST18.

### Tools and Equipment

- 6.107 Tools and equipment if not controlled properly can assist prisoners with escape, acts of violence within prison and a range of other criminal activities. Remaining vigilant to risk always is key. Staff should always be aware of the potential security threats from item(s) in use around the prison which can be placed near or against a perimeter wall or fence or used to assist with escape/acts of violence.
- 6.108 Within a prison environment tools and equipment incorporate a wide variety of items, ranging from as simple as an iron on a unit, computers in education, to heavy plant machinery such as a cherry picker in the facilities management department.
- 6.109 Due to the potential of tools being used as escape aids/weapons, it is important that we always know the whereabouts of such items and that all staff receive an induction in tool control relevant to the area they work.

### Climbing aids

## OFFICIAL

6.110 Remaining vigilant as we move around prisons is one of the key ways to prevent escape. Many items are used in the day to day running of a prison and could be used to assist with escape. The list below provides some examples of the types of equipment we may come across. However, this list is not exhaustive and each prison should ensure they are aware and managing their own risks:

- Cabling.
- Wheelie bins.
- Bed frames.
- Wooden pallets.
- Metal cages.

### Buildings

6.111 Low buildings and flat roof buildings especially those near the perimeter may also provide prisoners the means/incentive to attempt escape. Buildings of this sort should be considered when completing risk assessments for mass movement, freeflow and similar.

### Sports equipment/gyms

6.112 Physical Education Instructors (PEIs) will use a wide variety of equipment both internal and external to aid with the training and physical improvement of prisoners. This equipment is often attractive to prisoners and will often also be an ideal escape aid.

### Facilities Management Teams (works)

6.113 Facilities management teams will have a large variety of tools and equipment that they use daily, including building, plumbing, carpentry and electrical tools.

### Contractors

6.114 It will be necessary for contractors to enter prisons on a regular basis, this may be for routine maintenance, ongoing building works or one visit to repair/maintain a system.

### Stores

6.115 Stores areas hold large amounts of items which would be attractive to prisoners and could be used as escape aids or to assist with ongoing criminal activities.

### Staff Tactical Aid

6.116 Prison Officers will be personally issued items of tactical aid either on temporary or permanent basis. These items remain the responsibility of the member of staff, however there are several restrictions in place to prevent loss of items and to remain in line with the law. These restrictions are detailed in the requirements section of this policy. For more information please also see the [Use of Force Policy Framework](#).

The items referred to here are:

- Batons.
- Rigid bar cuffs.
- PAVA.
- Cut down tools (big fish knives).

## **7. Annexes and Supporting Tools (STs)**

## OFFICIAL

7.1 Official Sensitive annexes and STs can be accessed here [National Security Framework \(NSF\)](#).

Annex A	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Roll Check Template Form and Procedures
Annex B	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - 420 Meeting Example Template
Annex C	Official Visitors Booking Form Template
Annex D	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Radio Call Signs
Annex E	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Key Ledger
Annex F	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Key and Locking Condemnation Form A40
Annex G1	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Disclosure or Compromise Risk Assessment and Decision Tool
Annex G2	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Key and Lock Requisition and Disclosure Form
Annex H	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Tool Risk Assessment Template
Annex I	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Prisoner Workplace and Activity Allocation Risk Assessment Template
Annex J	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Workplace and Activity Area Risk Assessment Template
Annex K	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Detached Duty Authorisation Template
Annex L	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Tool Inventory Template
Annex M	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Physical Security Audit Template
Annex N	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Prisoner Discharge Checklist
ST1	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Night Operating Procedures Infographic
ST2	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Tool Issue and Receipt
ST3	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Tool Disposal
ST4	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Management of Skips
ST5	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Serviceability and Replacement Standard Handcuffs
ST6.1	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Roll Check Procedure Poster
ST7	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Fixed Posts
ST8	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Escape During Freeflow Report and Learning
ST9.1	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Internal Movement of Prisoners Guidance
ST9.2	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Internal Movement of Prisoners Poster
ST10.1	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Members of the Public Filming – Guidance for Staff
ST10.2	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Being Filmed Poster
ST11	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Safety Outside the Wall Guidance
ST12.1	OFFICIAL SENSITIVE - Lock and Secure Briefing
ST12.2	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Prove Before You Move Poster
ST12.3	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Prove Before You Move Stickers
ST13	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - TRAKA Enrolment Guide
ST14	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - TRAKA Colour Deficiency Guide
ST15	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - TRAKA Override Guide
ST16	OFFICIAL SENSITIVE - Reporting A Key Lock Incident
ST17	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Key Tamper Evident Seals

OFFICIAL

ST18	OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Authorised Padlocks
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