Case No: 6011690/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: **Mr P Allwright**

Respondents:
1. Wells Fargo Bank National Association
2. Wells Fargo Securities International Limited
3. Stephen Longo
4. Lee Mann
5. Tracy Copley
6. Clare Jones
7. Roisin O'Neill
8. Saira Shah

Heard at: **London Central** **On:** **12 May 2025**

Before: **EJ Joyce**

Representation
Claimant: **Ms L Prince KC (Counsel)**
Respondent: **Mr C Stone KC (Counsel)**

RESERVED JUDGMENT

The Judgment of the Tribunal is that:

(1) The claimant's application for interim relief is denied;

(2) The respondent's application for a deposit order is denied.

REASONS

Introduction

1. The First Respondent ("respondent") is a financial institution. The claimant, Mr Peter Allwright, was continuously employed by them in the role of Lead Compliance Officer from 3 January 2023 until his dismissal on the stated ground of redundancy on 1 April 2025.

2. In proceedings brought on 5 April 2025, the claimant brough a complaint of 'automatically' unfair dismissal on 'whistleblowing' grounds (Employment Rights Act 1996 ("ERA"), s. 103A) and made a claim for interim relief.

3. On 8 May 2025, the respondent filed an application for a deposit order.

Hearing, Procedure and Evidence

4. The matter was listed to consider the claimant's application for interim relief and the respondent also wished to have its application for a deposit order heard. It was a public hearing via CVP.

5. There were two hearing bundles. The first bundle ("B1") was 300 pages. The second bundle (B2) was 563 pages. There were witness statements from the claimant, Mr Daniel Thompson on behalf of the claimant and Ms Hayley Mitchell on behalf of the respondent. Both parties provided skeleton arguments and made oral submissions. There was a joint bundle of authorities.

Law

Interim Relief

6. Section 128 ERA provides:

(1) An employee who presents a complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been unfairly dismissed and—
(a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in—
(i) section (…) 103A
may apply to the tribunal for interim relief

7. Section 129 ERA provides:

(1) This section applies where, on hearing an employee's application for interim relief, it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find—
(a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in—

(i) Section (…) 103A.

8. Where section 129 is found to apply and other conditions as set out in that section are met, the Tribunal will make an order for the continuation of the employee's contract of employment until final determination is made on the claimant's claim.

9. *London City Airport Ltd v Chacko [2013] IRLR 610*, the Employment Appeals Tribunal ("EAT") held that:

"23 (…) the correct starting point for this appeal to fully appreciate the task which faces an employment judge on an application for interim relief. The application falls to be considered on a summary basis. The employment judge must do the best he can with such material as the parties are able to deploy by way of documents and argument in support of their respective cases. The employment judge is then required to make as good an assessment as he is promptly able of whether the claimant is likely to succeed in a claim for unfair dismissal based on one of the relevant grounds. The relevant statutory test is not whether the claimant is ultimately likely to succeed in his or her complaint to the Employment Tribunal but whether 'it appears to the tribunal' in this case the employment judge 'that it is likely'. To put it in my own words, what this requires is an expeditious summary assessment by the first instance employment tribunal as to how the ma\er looks to him on the material that he has. The statutory regime thus places emphasis on how the matter appears in the swiftly convened summary hearing at first instance which must of necessity involve far less detailed scrutiny of the respective cases of each of the parties and their evidence than will be ultimately undertaken at a full hearing of the claim".

10. In *Hall v Paragon Finance Plc [2024] EAT 181* (para 43) the EAT held that the Tribunal's determination of an application for interim relief **"will inevitably be broad brush and impressionistic".**

11. As to the meaning of likely, in *Taplin v C Shippam Ltd [1978] ICR 1068*, the EAT held that the word 'likely' means a better than 'reasonable' prospect of the claimant succeeding:

"It may be undesirable to find a single synonym for the word 'likely' but equally, we think it is wrong to assess the degree of proof which has to be established in terms of percentage (…) We think the right approach is expressed in a colloquial phrase (…). The industrial tribunal should ask themselves whether the application has established that he has a 'pretty good' chance of succeeding in the final application to the tribunal".

12. Further guidance on the meaning of 'likely' was provided in *Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz* [2011] IRLR 562 EAT:

"16 (…) In this context "likely" does not mean simply "more likely than not" - that is at least 51 per cent - but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood".

13. In *Dandpat v The University of Bath and others UKEAT/0408/09/LA*, the EAT (Underhill P and members) reaffirmed the *Taplin* guidance, adding (para 20):

"We do in fact see good reasons of policy for setting the test comparatively high … in the case of applications for interim relief. If relief is granted the respondent is irretrievably prejudiced because he is obliged to treat the contract as continuing, and pay the claimant, until the conclusion of the proceedings: that is not a consequence that should be imposed lightly".

14. As to the reason for dismissal, the respondent drew my attention to *Bombardier Aerospace/Short Brothers plc v Mc Connell [2007] NICA 27* (paras 8-10) in support of his argument that if the claim is one of unfair selection in a redundancy process due to having made protected disclosures, while it may make a dismissal unfair, it does not mean that unfair selection becomes the principal reason for dismissal in place of redundancy :

Where the principal reason for dismissal is redundancy within the meaning of the Order and an employee is selected for dismissal for one of the reasons specified his dismissal is to be regarded as unfair under Article 137 however, he cannot apply for interim relief under Article 163.

If an employee seeks to make the case that although there was redundancy the reason why he was selected and not a fellow employee for dismissal is that he is a member of an independent trades union it does not follow that this becomes the principal reason for his dismissal though he is to be regarded as unfairly dismissed. If in such circumstances it could displace redundancy as the principal reason for dismissal the employee would come within Article 136 and be regarded as unfairly dismissed. There would be no requirement for Article 137 if unfair selection could become the principal reason.

Should an employer decide to dismiss an employee for one of the specified reasons and create a redundancy for this purpose the principal reason for dismissal would not be redundancy and the employee would be unfairly dismissed within Article 136(1).

'Whistle-blowing'

15. The 1996 Act, Part IVA is directed to 'protected disclosures'. These are 'qualifying disclosures' made in accordance with ss43C to 43H (s43A).

16. Qualifying disclosures are defined in s43B, materially as follows:

… any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following:
that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed,
that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject …

(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject

17. The 1996 Act, s103A provides:

An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure.

18. From *Al Qasimi v Robinson UKEAT/0283/17* I derive the principle that, where more than one protected disclosure is claimed to have been made, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider whether each individual disclosure satisfies the requirements of section 43B:

"(…) I can see why the ET did not, on the interim relief application, separately set out and address each of the section 43B questions in respect of each of the communications. There was a way in which they could be viewed as a whole and the ET permissibly approached its task in this way."

19. The Supreme Court authority of *Royal Mail Group Ltd v Jhuti [2019] UKSC 55* provides that in a case of automatic unfair dismissal, where the claim is based on the decision maker having been misled by another employee, Tribunal is essentially trying to establish the real reason for dismissal: If a person in the hierarchy of responsibility above an employee determines that, for reason A (for example whistleblowing), the employee should be dismissed but that reason A should be concealed behind another invented reason B (for example conduct), which the decision maker innocently adopts, it is the court's duty to penetrate through the invention rather than to allow it also to contaminate its own determination.

Deposit Orders

20. Rule 39 (1) of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure provides:

Where at a preliminary hearing (under rule 53) the Tribunal considers that any specific allegation or argument in a claim or response has little reasonable prospect of success, it may make an order requiring a party ("the paying party") to pay a deposit not exceeding £1,000 as a condition of continuing to advance that allegation or argument.

21. From *Sharma v New College Nottingham EAT 0287/11*, and *Hemdan v Ishmail and anor 2017 ICR 486 EAT*, I derive the general principle that there is a need for caution when considering making a deposit order in a case where key facts are in dispute.

22. As a further and instructive example of the above principle, I relied upon *Simpson v Air Business Ltd EAT 0009/19:* a claimant brought a claim of victimisation alleging detriments due to a grievance claim she had brought alleging sex discrimination. The decision of the Tribunal to order the claimant to pay a deposit was overturned by the EAT due to its conclusion that there was a dispute between the parties as to the cause of the alleged detriments which required findings of fact to be made.

Factual Background

23. As is usual practice, no oral evidence was presented at the hearing. I consider that it is inappropriate for me to make findings on disputed matters of fact given the broad-brush approach at an interim relief hearing and considering that such findings would be likely to overlap with findings of fact at the Full Merits Hearing, where the evidence will be heard in full. The following narrative of background facts should not prove to be contentious:

24. On 3 January 2023, the claimant was employed by the respondent as a Lead Compliance Officer. In broad terms, his role was to conduct surveillance of trade activities and also communications to try to identify any instances of market abuse.

25. The claimant's direct supervisor was Ms Lee Mann whose job title at the time was EMEA Head of Surveillance Oversight and Global Head of Communications Surveillance Oversight.

26. Ms Clare Jones was the International Head of Compliance with the respondent.

27. In August 2024, Ms Haley Mitchell commenced employment with the respondent as Global Head of Surveillance Oversight.

28. Between March 2023 and February 2025, the claimant made numerous disclosures to his employers which he maintains are protected disclosures within the meaning of section 43B ERA.

29. On 5 July 2024, the claimant issued a claim of 'whistleblowing' as claim 6005257/2024.

30. In August 2024, the respondent commenced a redundancy consultation process ("First Redundancy Process"). It was proposed that one 'vice president' level employee would be made redundant from the London surveillance oversight team.

31. On 11 November 2024, the claimant issued a second claim of 'whistleblowing' as claim 6018185/2024.

32. Also in November 2024, Ms Mitchell began drafting a separate 'resourcing document' as the commencement of a second redundancy process ("Second Redundancy Process").

33. The result of the First Redundancy Process was that the claimant was placed at risk of redundancy. On 10 December 2024, following the claimant's return from sick leave, Ms Hayley Mitchell, Lee Mann and a HR representative informed the claimant that he was at risk of redundancy.

34. In the event, another team member resigned and so it was not necessary to follow through with the claimant's redundancy in the First Redundancy Process.

35. As part of her review in the Second Redundancy Process, Ms Mitchell put forward a written business case which proposed that a total of 6 positions be made redundant: five vice president level positions and one associate vice president level position.

36. On 28 January 2025, Ms Mitchell's business case was approved by herself and five members of senior management at the respondent.

37. On 29 January 2025, the claimant informed Ms Mitchell that he was, in his view, a whistleblower and sent her two disclosures by email referred to as Protected Disclosures 100 a-b [B2 560-563].

38. On 3 February 2025, Ms Mitchell held a call with the impacted employees, including the claimant.

39. On 1 April 2025, the claimant and three other employees (two at vice president

level and one at associate vice president level) were dismissed on the stated ground of redundancy. By this time, one of the initial 5 vice president level employees had resigned and the redundancy process for the fifth was paused as he was on long term sick leave.

The Parties Principal Arguments

40. The principal arguments advanced on behalf of the claimant were:

(i) The claimant clearly made numerous protected disclosures within the definition of section 43B ERA (b);

(ii) There was no genuine redundancy situation within the respondent and the claimant was being targeted;

(iii) As to knowledge, Ms Mann and Ms Jones were both respondent's in relation to the claimant's previous Tribunal claims. Ms Mann was the direct recipient of numerous disclosures by the claimant. Ms Jones signed off on Ms Mitchell's business case for the Second Redundancy Process and Ms Mann was involved in numerous discussions with Ms Mitchell as to that process. It is therefore inevitable that Ms Mitchell knew about the claimant's protected disclosures.

As to causation:

(iv) The timing of the claimant's dismissal and those who were involved in his dismissal strongly indicate that the protected disclosures were the principal reason for his dismissal;

(v) When the claimant made previous protected disclosures the respondent subsequently treated him poorly and told him not to make further disclosures. The poor treatment included a performance improvement plan from July 2024 and the First Redundancy Process following protected disclosures 53 a-c, 54a-c and 59 a-f. The claimant points to the evidence of witness Daniel Thompson as instructive;

(vi) The Second Redundancy Process involved manipulation of the nature of the claimant's role to ensure that he was made redundant. The exclusion of Ms Iyers from the redundancy pool further points to the claimant being targeted for redundancy; and

(vii) The fact that other employees were made redundant does not demonstrate that the Second Redundancy Process was legitimate as the others who were made redundant were either whistleblowers as well or intended to leave the respondent for other reasons.

(viii) A job advertisement posted on 'LinkedIn' since the claimant's redundancy contains some of the claimant's job functions, which demonstrates that his redundancy was a sham.

41. The principal arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent were:

(i) Claimant must show that it is likely at the final hearing, that each of the required elements of his claim will be made out: that the claimant (a) had disclosures of information to his employer or a prescribed person; (b) reasonably believed that that disclosures tended to show one or more of (a) to (f) under section 43B ERA; (c) reasonably believed that the disclosure was in the public interest; and (d) that the disclosure was the reason or principal reason for his dismissal. Without conceding on issues (a)-(c) above, Mr Stone focused his submissions on issue (d) – whether the disclosure was the reason or principal reason for his dismissal.

(ii) In order to succeed in his application for interim relief, the claimant would also have to show that it is likely at the final hearing that he can show that there was not a redundancy situation or that the Second Redundancy Process was a sham to cover the true reason (in this case alleged to be the protected disclosures) in order to succeed in a claim of automatic unfair dismissal;

(iii) Of the claimant's 154 (the respondent's estimate of the number of disclosures claimed by the claimant) alleged disclosures, the claimant has not made it clear which disclosures caused his dismissal. Moreover, only two of the disclosures (100 a-b) are alleged to have been made to Ms Mitchell, who made the decision to dismiss the claimant on the stated ground of redundancy. Both alleged disclosures took place on 29 January 2025, which was the day after the business case for the Second Redundancy Process (including the claimant's redundancy) took place. Therefore as a matter of timing, the disclosures could not have been the principal reason for the claimant's dismissal;

(iv) This is not a case of sham redundancy. The First Redundancy Process is irrelevant as it was not the basis for the claimant's redundancy. There is clear documentary evidence of the business case underpinning the Second Redundancy Process which was signed off by five other senior managers in addition to Ms Mitchell.

(v) The decision not to include Ms Iyers in the redundancy pool in the Second Redundancy Process was investigated by the respondent and found no evidence to support the suggestion that her non-inclusion in the redundancy pool was for nefarious reasons. The claimant's claim that Ms Iyers was excluded from the redundancy pool to target the claimant is nonsensical: In order for it to be true, several employees (including Ms Mann, Ms Copley and Ms Mitchell) would have had to conspired to achieve this result. This is fanciful.

Analysis and Conclusions

42. The outcome of this claim turns on the Tribunal's determination on six matters. The claimant must succeed on each of them. These matters are:

43. (a) did the claimant's disclosures amount to disclosures of information to his employer or a prescribed person;
(b) If so, did the claimant believe that that disclosures tended to show one or more of (a) to (f) under section 43B ERA;

(c) If so, was the claimant's belief reasonable?;
(d) If so, did the claimant believe that the disclosure was in the public interest;
(e)If so, was that belief reasonable; and
(f) Was/were the disclosure(s) the reason or principal reason for the claimant's dismissal.

44. While the parties both necessarily included submissions within their respective skeleton arguments as to matters (a) to (e), the key area of contention and the focus of the vast majority of the submissions on both sides related to matter (f) – Was/were the disclosure(s) the sole or principal reason for the claimant's dismissal.

The test in s. 103A ERA

45. It was agreed by the parties that this was not an 'unfair selection for redundancy case' to which s.105 (6A) ERA would apply. As acknowledged by the claimant, "(…) there was no selection in this case (…) and (…) [the claimant's] role was misstated in order to ensure his inclusion in the redundancy exercise (…)" (Claimant's Skeleton Argument, para. 20). Therefore, the central issue to consider is that of the 'principal reason' for the dismissal.

46. A central pillar of the claimant's application for interim relief is that the Second Redundancy Process was a sham. The claimant alleges that the respondent neither needed, nor intended, to carry out a genuine redundancy exercise and that the aim of the Second Redundancy Process was to dismiss the claimant.

47. On the basis of the evidence before me, while the claimant *could* succeed in demonstrating that the decision maker, Ms Mitchell, had knowledge of some of his alleged disclosures, I am not able to conclude that he has a 'pretty good chance' of doing so.

48. This is because the conclusion that Ms Mitchell had knowledge of any disclosures prior to the signing off on the business case for the Second Redundancy Process (on 28 January 2025) rests on inferences. These inferences include that she must have had knowledge of the disclosures from Ms Mann, Ms Jones or another individual with direct knowledge of those disclosures.

49. The only disclosures that the claimant can currently point to definitively being within the knowledge of Ms Mitchell are those referred to as 100 a-b, and these were only disclosed to Ms Mitchell the day *after* the business case, (including the proposed redundancy of the claimant), for the Second Redundancy Process was signed off. As such, the timing of the disclosures does not enable me to conclude that it is 'likely' that those disclosures were the principal reason for the claimant's dismissal.

50. As to the Second Redundancy Process being a sham, the documentary evidence of the business case for that process, undermines the suggestion that it was indeed a sham. The business case, as further explained by Ms Mitchell in her witness statement, sets out the rationale for the proposed redundancies. In summary, the respondent's position is that there was a move of focus on both trade and communications surveillance from 2nd line of defence (oversight/quality control work) to 1st line of defence (core surveillance work) under the 'Move the Line Model' [B1 p. 134-142; HM WS paras 4, 7-10].

51. The respondent, relying on the evidence of Ms Mitchell, maintains that the 'knock-on' effect of this shift in focus was that there were too many people performing oversight/quality control work, and that these functions would be more efficiently performed by centralising them in the US offices of the respondent. The business case seems to be supported by a resourcing analysis, including numbers of employee per function [B1, 164-166].

52. I emphasise again that the claimant, depending on various factors including how the evidence 'plays out' at trial, *could* succeed in demonstrating that the process was a sham. However, I consider that there is sufficient objective material underpinning the Second Redundancy Process such that I am unable, (on a submissions-only review of the evidence), to conclude that the claimant is 'likely' to succeed in demonstrating that it was indeed a sham process.

53. As to the impact of First Redundancy Process, I consider that it is likely to be important contextual evidence at trial. However, the documentary evidence and the witness statement of Ms Mitchell support the submission by Mr Stone that the focus of the business review and case for the Second Redundancy Process was on a global consideration of trade and communication surveillance functions. This seems to have been, on the face of it, a far more wide-ranging process than the First Redundancy Process, which concluded that all that was required was one redundancy at the vice-president level in the London Office.

54. The claimant *may* be able to demonstrate that the timing and circumstances of both redundancy processes paints a picture of a will to have him dismissed. However, my review of the documentary evidence does not enable me to conclude that it is likely that the claimant can show that the Second Redundancy Process was targeted at making him redundant due to his having made protected disclosures.

55. As to the exclusion of Ms Iyer from the 'redundancy pool' in the Second Redundancy Process, I have considered that the rationale for this has been explained by Ms Mitchell both in the business case and also in her witness statement. I am unable to conclude that the claimant has a pretty good chance of showing that Ms Iyer was excluded for reasons that amounted to favouritism towards her, or in order to enable the respondent to target the claimant for redundancy.

56. It is, on my review of the documentary evidence, equally possible that Ms Mitchell concluded that Ms Iyer should be excluded from the 'redundancy pool' because her role was distinct due to the global basis of her role including training new team members and implementation of new global initiatives. In reaching this conclusion, I note that the internal investigation into allegations of, among others, favouritism of Ms Iyers did not uphold those allegations.

57. I further note that the claimant's purported job title changed as between the First and Second Redundancy Processes. The claimant submits that his 'characterisation' as performing the trade surveillance function, as opposed to communications surveillance, in the Second Redundancy Process was not an innocent error. Ms Prince submits that this enabled the respondent to place him within the same functional group on the relevant organigramme, [B1 p. 136 for then

current structure; p. 139 for then proposed structure], as others who were made redundant.

58. However, on the face of it, the respondent's position that both trade and communications surveillance functions were made redundant in London and so the claimant's functional title was of no mind for purposes of the Second Redundancy Process, is equally possible.

59. The claimant further contends that the other redundancies in the Second Redundancy Process were a form of 'collateral damage' which the respondent was willing to accept as those other individuals who were made redundant were also either whistleblowers themselves or were considering leaving the respondent's employment. Against the above evidential backdrop, it does not seem to me to be 'likely' that the Tribunal will conclude that this was the case on the basis of the evidence before me. At present, there is an absence of clear evidence that the other individuals made redundant were either whistleblowers, or were intending to leave the respondent's employment in any event.

60. Finally, regarding the job advertisement on LinkedIn, the claimant submits that this is further evidence of the Second Redundancy Process being a sham. This is because, in the claimant's view, it demonstrates the continued need for the performance of functions in the London Office, which the respondent had claimed were redundant.

61. As this was a matter raised shortly prior to the hearing (no criticism of the claimant – this was a result of the advert only being discovered shortly before the hearing) the respondent had understandably not had an opportunity to provide any evidence in rebuttal. However, on the basis of the submissions of Mr Stone that the job advertisement relates to a different team, covering a different stage of the compliance process, I am unable to conclude that this is evidence of the continued need for the claimant's functions such that it is likely that the claimant would succeed in showing that the Second Redundancy Process was a sham.

62. From the above analysis, it is apparent that there are numerous disputes of fact for the Tribunal to resolve at the Full Merits Hearing, including for example what Ms Mitchell was told, if anything, regarding the claimant during the Second Redundancy Process. The Tribunal will also consider what inferences it can reasonably draw and I emphasise that it is impossible to predict what may emerge from the evidence at trial. However, following my review of the documents, without evidence being heard, I am unable to say that there is a substantially better than evens chance of the claimant succeeding in his claim of automatic unfair dismissal.

Deposit Order

63. Having reached the above conclusion that I do not consider that the claimant has a pretty good chance of succeeding in his claim, it does not follow that I consider that the claimant's claim for automatic unfair dismissal has little reasonable prospect of success.

64. The respondent's arguments in support of its application for a deposit order also rest on their submission that the claimant has little reasonable prospect of success

in showing that the principal reason for his dismissal was due to him being a whistleblower. Again, the focus is on the issues of knowledge and causation: that it can only be proven that Ms Mitchell was the recipient of two alleged disclosures both of which occurred after the business case for redundancy was signed off. As such at the time of her relevant decision, she did not know about the alleged disclosures.

65. While acknowledging that knowledge is one element which appears to pose the difficulty for the claimant's claim, I remind myself that the claim as to knowledge rests primarily on the inferences to be drawn from the knowledge of other actors (Ms Mann and Ms Jones, who were both named respondents in other tribunal claims for whistleblowing by the same claimant) being communicated to the decision maker (Ms Mitchell) prior to her signing off the business case for the Second Redundancy Process. This is a matter which could only properly be determined at trial and I consider at this stage, consistent with my findings above, that the claimant *could* succeed in demonstrating such knowledge.

66. Similarly, as to causation, the claimant relies on numerous different strands of evidence in support of his claim that the principal reason for his dismissal was redundancy. These different strands of evidence, disputed by the respondent with other evidence, require careful findings of fact at trial.

67. While I have concluded that the claimant does not, at this stage, have a 'pretty good chance' of succeeding, nor do I consider that the claim has 'little reasonable prospect of success' – my best estimate is that the chances of success of the claim, on the basis of my submissions-only review of the evidence, is approximately slightly better than an evens chance.

68. As to the other elements of the claim as contained at (a) to (e) in paragraph 43 of this judgment (broadly speaking, whether the disclosures amounted to protected disclosures), the respondent has not based its application on these.

69. However, based on my own review, I am not satisfied that these matters have little reasonable prospect of success. In reaching this conclusion I have considered that the respondent accepts that numerous disclosures amount to disclosures of information falling within section 43B ERA.

70. As to belief, on the basis of the claimant's witness statement I am unable to say that there is little reasonable prospect of him showing at trial that he believed those disclosures to show breaches of legal obligations and that they were in the public interest, and that his belief as to both of those matters was reasonable.

Conclusion

71. For the reasons provided above, the claimant's application for interim relief is denied, and the respondents application for a deposit order is also denied.

Employment Judge **M Joyce**

20.5.2025

Date

JUDGMENT & REASONS SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

21 May 2025

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FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE