Planning and Infrastructure Bill

Lead department	Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
Summary of proposal	Reforms that are expected to contribute to achieving economic growth, alongside more homes and infrastructure.
Submission type	Urgent measure – impact assessment 4 April 2025
Legislation type	Primary legislation
Implementation date	2026
RPC reference	RPC-MHCLG-25031-IA(1)
Date of issue	30 April 2025

RPC opinion

Rating	**RPC opinion**
Fit for purpose	As originally submitted, some individual IAs in respect of the Bill were not fit for purpose. The department has now clearly identified the problems under consideration in detail and consistently considered a wider range of options across all the measures. Sufficient quantitative and qualitative appraisal is undertaken to identify the preferred way forward, with the scorecard presenting a summary of the impacts on business, households and society.

Urgent measure statement

The department has used the Better Regulation Framework's 'urgent measures' process for this provision. Where the Government decide that legislation is required urgently and there is insufficient time ahead of seeking collective agreement for a preferred regulatory option, and the necessary options assessment (OA) to be submitted to the RPC for independent scrutiny in accordance with the framework, departments are, instead, required to submit an impact assessment (IA) for scrutiny as early as possible after obtaining collective agreement. The IA should contain evidence, which should have been in set out in the OA, on the rationale, identification of options and the justification for preferred way forward. The RPC then offers an opinion that includes an overall fitness-for-purpose (red/green) rating, informed by the individual red/green ratings for those three categories.

RPC summary

Category	Quality	RPC comments
Rationale	Green	The department has clearly identified the problems in detail, referencing seven overarching problems and five market failures.
Identification of options (including SaMBA)	Green	The IA discusses two options in addition to the preferred set of measures - the do-nothing approach and non-legislative options, highlighting the limitations of each. Notably, the department has stated that measures in the Bill will come alongside non-legislative interventions and the summary IA lists seven non-legislative options that would occur alongside the proposed changes to regulation. The overarching IA contains a detailed SaMBA where the department notes that many of the measures are deregulatory, so it expects the collective impact of the measures on businesses to be positive.
Justification for preferred way forward	Green	The overarching IA summarises the assessment of impacts for the proposed changes. The analysis of impacts and discussion of the shortcomings of the discarded options in meeting the objectives, provide sufficient justification for the preferred approach. The individual IAs each consider a range of options, including non-regulatory, and sufficient quantitative and qualitative appraisal is presented to justify the preferred way forward.
Regulatory Scorecard	**Satisfactory**	The department summarise its assessment of impacts in the scorecard. The appraisal of business impacts and the approach to monetisation seem appropriate and proportionate in the individual IAs (where impacts have been monetised). The department has estimated household impacts and notes that the measures in the Bill could have a disproportionate, but positive, impact on small, micro and medium-sized businesses. Non-monetised impacts have been discussed sufficiently in the scorecard.
Monitoring and evaluation	**Satisfactory**	The department has committed to undertaking a programme of process and impact evaluations to monitor the impact of reforms as well as conducting value for money assessments. A feasibility study will also be conducted to identify if any further data collection exercises need to be undertaken and outline impact evaluation requirements.

Summary of proposal

The Planning and Infrastructure Bill contains reforms that are expected to contribute to achieving economic growth alongside delivering more homes and infrastructure. This will be delivered by reducing barriers and costs to business (primarily developers) in the planning system. The largest monetised direct impact is the reduction in costs associated with delays in the planning system. Several significant indirect impacts are also monetised (including constraint cost savings relating to reforms of electricity infrastructure consenting). The measures in the IA are grouped into five categories:

1. Delivering a faster and more certain consenting process for critical infrastructure.
2. Introducing a more strategic approach to nature recovery.
3. Improving certainty and decision-making in the planning system.
4. Unlocking land and securing public value for large-scale investment.
5. Introducing effective new mechanisms for cross-boundary strategic planning.

The RPC's overall rating presented above is based on the individual IAs for 14 regulatory provisions in the Bill. In addition, the department has produced a summary IA which provides overarching discussion in relation to rationale, the regulatory scorecard and monitoring and evaluation plans, as well as a brief discussion of measures that are not regulatory provisions.

The Department estimates a net present social value (NPSV) of £3.2 billion (2025 price year and 2026 base year) for the measures in the Bill that are regulatory provisions, a business net present value (BNPV) of £2.1 billion (2025 price year and 2026 base year) and an EANDCB of -£273 million for the central scenario.

Response to initial review

As originally submitted, the IA was not fit for purpose for the following reasons:

- Lack of consistent consideration of a range of alternative options, including both regulatory and non-regulatory options, across the package of measures relating to the reforms to Nationally Strategic Infrastructure Projects to justify the preferred way forward. The IA should have presented variations of the preferred option in the form of do-minimum and do-maximum scenarios where appropriate to do so and provided sufficient justification for measures where non regulatory options are not viable.
- The IA needed to provide more evidence for the problems identified for the reforms to compulsory purchase orders (CPOs), in particular the assertion that landowners had unrealistic expectations on compensation.
- For the Strategic Planning measure, the department did not provide sufficient justification for opting for a regulatory approach when the brief assessment of the non-regulatory option appeared to be able to deliver the policy objective. In addition, the department should provide more clarity on whether this measure is a regulatory provision as defined by the Better Regulation Framework.

In response, the department has:

- Presented a wider range of options across all elements of the NSIP reforms including do-minimum and do-maximum. An annex is also included setting out how options were assessed against a range of critical success factors.
- Included more description of the current arrangements for CPOs and the need for reform based on identification of a set of harms, including how 'hope value' may increase landowners' expectations for compensation.
- Provided more explanation for why a voluntary system for strategic planning is unlikely to meet the objectives compared to a mandatory system. More clarity is provided for why the measure is a regulatory provision since it may amend the requirements against which planning applications will be assessed, which developers will need to consider.

Rationale

Problem under consideration argument for intervention

The department has clearly identified the problems under consideration in detail, referencing the presence of seven overarching problems.

1. **The level at which plans and decisions are made:** Planning is predominantly done at a district level, c.90% of decisions are made by officers and the rest are made by planning committees. In planning committees, too much time can be spent on applications which are compliant with the local plan and there are instances where development is rejected by planning committees against officer advice only to be overturned on appeal. This delays or even prohibits development and wastes taxpayers' money.
2. **Growing timescales for decision making and a lack of capacity in the system:** Only 20% of applications for major residential development meet statutory deadlines (13 weeks) and just under 50% of applications for non-major meet statutory deadlines (eight weeks). This is driven by a lack of capacity and experienced planners in local planning authorities – the RTPI estimates that 25% of planning officers left the public sector between 2013 and 2020 and 75% of local authority respondents identified staffing shortages as the main cause of delays in the planning process in response to a HBF survey. For infrastructure, there has been an increase in the average time it takes for a case to reach a decision – between 2012-2021 the timespan for a development consent order increased by 65%, from 2.6 years to 4.2 years.
3. **Increase in document volumes and increased risk of legal challenge for critical infrastructure projects:** Some applications are now generating over 90,000 pages of documentation which complicates and overwhelms the system. The rate of judicial review on development consent order applications has spiked in recent years to 58% from a long-term average of 10%, with over 30 judicial reviews started and four development consent orders quashed for the first time in 2021.

4. **Environmental regulations that require site by site mitigation:** Currently, developers may be required to go through a lengthy and detailed process to secure mitigation for environmental harm before being granted planning permission. This adds cost, delays and can entirely block the housing and infrastructure the country needs if mitigation is not possible or too costly – with rules too focused on preserving the status quo instead of supporting growth and charting a course to nature recovery.
5. **Lack of strategic planning:** Except for London, the current development plan system depends on individual authorities cooperating with one another on local plans. This approach means that planning in England is undertaken on too local a scale and is less likely to result in optimal use of land, for example relative to wider strategic infrastructure requirements, and leaves Mayors outside of London with an inability to intervene in planning applications of potential strategic importance.
6. **Overly lengthy and complex processes:** There is evidence of disproportionate approaches to consultation for major infrastructure projects. This has led to statutory pre-application periods increasing from 20 months in 2018 to 28 months in 2021. Post-consent processes are also restrictive and burdensome, causing increased administrative costs and further unnecessary delays to projects being delivered. Ultimately, longer processes lead to increased resource costs for developers, alongside delaying the benefits of infrastructure for the wider public.
7. **Limited ability to adapt to reflect strategic government priorities:** The Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects regime is rigid and unable to sufficiently adapt to changing circumstances and government priorities, such as Clean Power 2030.

Rationale for Government intervention

The IA emphasises the importance of establishing a planning regime capable of delivering the necessary homes and infrastructure for the country, while avoiding disproportionate costs to businesses as the primary rationale for intervention. The rationale for intervention specific to each policy is contained in the individual impact assessments (and summarised in the annex below).

Given the highlighted problems, the IA encompasses measures to streamline the consenting process for housing and critical infrastructure. Alongside this, the Bill includes measures to address market failures that are having an impact on the Government’s ability to deliver new homes and infrastructure, particularly the infrastructure needed for their Clean Power 2030 mission.

<u>Identified market failures:</u>

1. **Equity considerations:** High house prices in many areas of the country are pricing people out of home ownership.
2. **Barriers to entry:** Major infrastructure projects and housing development require high upfront capital and time investment from developers.

3. **Asymmetrical market power:** Driven also by barriers to entry, the housing market features a handful of very big companies that are responsible for most new building – Britain's 11 largest housebuilders deliver around 40% of new homes.
4. **Negative externalities:** The Government are taking wide-ranging action to decarbonise the power sector and correct the negative externality of emissions.
5. **Coordination Failure:** The status quo leads to fragmented efforts and suboptimal resource allocation, which impedes efficient environmental improvements.

The 14 regulatory provisions included in the Bill to address the problems under consideration:

Measure/IA	**Description**
Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects reform	These measures will deliver faster consenting decisions under the NSIP regime; and better, clearer and stronger National Policy Statements to create a more certain system.
Electricity Network Connections	Time-limited powers to manage risk to wider connections reform package which will enable prioritisation of the connections queue.
Scottish electricity infrastructure consenting reforms	Amendments to the Electricity Act 1989 to streamline electricity infrastructure consenting in Scotland
Offshore transmission owner regime	Extending the period for generator developers to transfer transmission assets to an office transmission assets owner from 18 months to 27 months.
Long Duration Electricity Storage (LDES)	This measure provides the legal framework for Ofgem to administer the cap and floor scheme to support the deployment of LDES.
Electricity Bill discounts scheme	Powers to establish a bill discount scheme for properties closest to new transmission network infrastructure.
Electric Vehicle ChargePoints	This measure will streamline the approval process of electric vehicle on-street charge point installation by moving it from a license to permit system.
Reforms to Highways Act 1980	These measures streamline and improve the efficiency of delivering road infrastructure schemes.
Transport and Works Act 1992 reforms	This measure enables additional statutory authorisations to be secured through Transport and Works Actor Order simplifying and streamlining the process of securing authorisation.
Nature Restoration Fund	This measure will establish a Nature Restoration Fund (NRF) that streamlines the process for developers to discharge environmental obligations.
Planning fees sub-delegation	This measure would establish a new power to sub-delegate planning fee setting to Local Planning Authorities while also maintaining a national default fee.

Planning committee modernisation	These measures will introduce powers to: establish a national scheme of delegation, require training for planning committee members and, allow LPAs to establish dedicated committees for strategic development.
Compulsory Purchase Order reforms	These measures will simplify and streamline the process for using CPOs.
Strategic planning	This measure will require every area in England to be covered by a strategic plan.

The IA briefly states the consequence of no government action, stating that without the Bill, there is a risk that the planning system continues to act as a major brake on economic growth and fails to deliver the housing and economic infrastructure that the country needs. The claims of harms that could occur appears reasonable given the nature of the problems and market failures discussed in the assessment.

Although the department has provided more explanation for the proposed reforms to compulsory purchase orders in response to the RPC's initial review, the IA could still be improved by providing more evidence of the scale of the problem, or a wider set of examples to better support the case for intervention. Furthermore, the IA could discuss how a reduction in planning risk might impact on 'land values' and feed through on house prices.

Objectives and theory of change

The IA has discussed five overarching policy objectives, with the aim to support the delivery of a clean power system by 2030; and help government fast-track decisions on at least 150 major economic infrastructure projects and build 1.5 million new homes in this parliament. The policy objectives highlight the problems with the current system and section 7 of the summary IA sets out how each of the proposed measures within the Bill contributes to meeting the overall objectives. Although the five overarching policy objectives in the Bill have not been developed using the SMART framework, the individual IAs do present SMART objectives for each of the proposals.

Identification of options (inc. SaMBA)

Identification of the 'long-list' of options and consideration of alternatives to regulation

The summary IA discusses two options in addition to the package of measures within the Bill - the do-nothing approach and non-legislative options, highlighting their limitations. The department has stated that measures in the Bill will come alongside non-legislative interventions and the assessment lists seven non-legislative options that would occur alongside the proposed changes to regulation. Although the department does not present the Government's preferred option in section 6 of the summary IA, section 7 provides detail on the preferred suite of measures.

Following the RPC's initial review, the department has consistently presented a wider range of long-listed options for each individual IA, including do-minimum and do-maximum regulatory options where appropriate, and non-regulatory options.

Justification for the short-listed options

The department has provided reasonable justification for discarding the do-nothing approach and non-regulatory options set out within the summary IA, by discussing their limitations in meeting the overarching objectives. The individual IAs provide sufficient justification for discarding options to generate a short-list, either qualitatively or through an assessment against a set of critical success factors (e.g. Nationally Strategic Infrastructure Projects reform). However, the IAs could be improved with systematic use of the Green Book's strategic options framework-filter and critical success factors to show how options were generated and discarded.

SaMBA and medium-sized business assessment

The IA contains a detailed SaMBA where the department notes that, since many of the measures are deregulatory, the collective impact of the Bill on businesses is expected to be positive. The SaMBA identifies developers as the primary category of businesses affected by the planning reforms. Using ONS data, the IA estimates that over 99% of developers are SMBs. To estimate the number of firms affected by the infrastructure measures, the department produces a composite category from several subcategories relating to construction of infrastructure using the same data set and estimates 97% are SMBs (Table 7). The SaMBA discusses the disproportionate impact of barriers in planning on SMBs, stating that delays and costs in the planning system disproportionately burden SMBs.

The assessment highlights two channels through which SMB developers are burdened disproportionately by the current planning system:

1. Smaller developers may have all their capital in one or two sites, whereas larger developers can continue to progress multiple projects. If one application is delayed this has a significantly larger impact on smaller developers who do not have the cash reserves to delay.

2. Smaller businesses are less likely to have dedicated staff to handle elements of the planning system such as appeals. They are also less likely to have

experience of handling challenges and uncertainty presented by the planning system.

The department states that the bill discounts and planning fees measures would impose costs on SMBs beyond familiarisation costs. For bill discounts, the assessment provides reasonable justification for non-exclusion of SMB electricity suppliers and mitigations to limit the impact on SMBs beyond familiarisation costs. Justification for non-exclusion of SMBs from the planning fees measure is also provided. The department applies the same arguments for non-exclusion and mitigation for medium-sized businesses.

Justification for preferred way forward

Appraisal of the shortlisted options

The department estimates a central NPSV of £3.2 billion and EANDCB of –£273 million. The largest component of the Bill's NPSV is generated by the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects reform (£1.4 billion); the remaining regulatory provisions that are quantified generate a total NPSV of -£1.7 billion. The IA clearly sets out (Table 1) the measures for which only a qualitative assessment of impacts has been possible e.g. electricity network connections and changes to the Transport and Works Act 1992. The IA also notes that the analysis focuses on the impacts of primary legislation and that further analysis of impacts will be presented as part of impact assessments supporting related secondary legislation.

The individual IAs provide more detail on the assessment of impacts for the short-listed options for each measure, setting out which impacts have been monetised where it is proportionate and reasonable to do so and providing a qualitative assessment where impacts are not monetised.

Selection of the preferred option

Form the combination of quantified impacts and discussion of impacts in section 7 of the summary IA and discussions of the shortcomings of the discarded options in section 6, a clear and reasonable justification for the selection of the preferred option is established.

In the individual IAs, sufficient justification is provided for the discarding of options to develop the preferred way forward. Where more than one option beyond the do-nothing is taken forward for short-list appraisal, a combination of quantitative and qualitative assessments are made to justify the preferred option (e.g. Highways Act 1980 and planning fees sub-delegation).

Regulatory Scorecard

Part A

Impacts on business

The department consolidates its assessment on business impacts in the scorecard. The appraisal of the business impacts and the approach to monetisation seem appropriate and proportionate in all individual IAs (where impacts have been monetised). The assessment expects an overall positive impact on business, with expected significant direct monetised benefits to business in the form of reduction in costs associated with delays, planning cost savings and appeal/dispute cost savings. It is noted that there are also significant benefits to business that were not monetised. Consequently, the department expects the total business NPV to understate the positive impact on business. Non-monetised impacts were also discussed in the summary IA; however much of the detailed discussion is provided in the individual IAs.

Impacts on households, individuals or consumers

The department has estimated household impacts. The estimate household NPV of -£62 million is based on two measures: higher planning fees for households from planning fees sub-delegation and the constraint cost savings from the reforms to Scottish electricity infrastructure consenting. However, the department expects a net positive impact on households, stating that while the monetised impact is negative (driven by the transfer from households to LPAs in relation to planning fees localisation), there are significant non-monetised positive impacts to households (more effective planning services and more houses, helping improve housing affordability).

Distributional impacts

The department notes that the measures in the Bill could have a disproportionate positive impact on small, micro and medium sized businesses. This stems from the arguments that smaller businesses are less resourced to deal with delays and the costs of appeal/disputes in the planning system than larger businesses. Consequently, when smaller businesses do experience delays, they are disproportionately burdened by them. As the proposed reforms reduce delays and costs in the planning system, it is a reasonable for the department to expect small, micro and medium businesses to benefit disproportionately.

Non-monetised impacts

Non-monetised impacts have been sufficiently discussed in the scorecard, with much of the detail being presented in the individual IAs for each measure. Overall, the department appears to have provided satisfactory assessment of impacts on society.

Part B

Business environment

The department states that all measures are expected to have a positive effect on UK businesses, creating a favourable business environment. Planning reforms increase certainty for businesses in securing planning permissions.

Trade and investment

International trade was also discussed, concluding that no measure is expected to impact trade directly. However, by improving the business environment, some measures may contribute to increased international investment. It is also acknowledged that to some extent increases in international investment, could be offset by imported materials required for the construction of additional infrastructure and housing.

Natural capital and decarbonisation

The department highlights that various measures relating to electricity infrastructure are expected to support further development of renewable energy.

1. Scottish consenting of electricity infrastructure is estimated to deliver £147 million in monetised carbon savings in the central scenario.
2. Bill discounts is expected support the deployment of electricity transmission infrastructure, supporting further emissions savings.
3. The Nature Restoration Fund is expected to deliver improved environmental outcomes while also reducing delays in discharging environmental obligations.
4. The Electric Vehicle (EV) ChargePoint measure is expected to support the roll out of EVs, which may indirectly reduce emissions.

Monitoring and evaluation

The department states that Critical Infrastructure reforms, planning fees, planning committees and CPOs will form part of a wider planning evaluation alongside other key reforms such as changes to the greenbelt and new housing targets. The department has committed to undertaking a programme of robust process and impact evaluations to monitor the impact of the reforms as well as conducting value for money assessments. The aim is to disaggregate the specific effects of policies in the Bill such as changes made to planning fees whilst also gathering evidence of planning reform as a whole.

The M&E plan indicates that future evaluation will use data already collected by the department to derive indicators of broader outcomes such as the number of planning approvals, speed of applications and net additions. A feasibility study will also be conducted to identify if any further data collection exercises need to be undertaken and outline impact evaluation requirements. Overall, it is stated that the final evaluation design will align with the department's evaluation strategy, the Magenta Book and Green Book principles.

The individual IAs for each of the measures contain a section on the approach to be taken for M&E. While some of the M&E plans are lacking sufficient detail (e.g. nature restoration fund, planning committees and strategic planning), they generally cover the key questions to be answered, potential sources of data and whether an informal review or post-implementation review will be undertaken within five years (e.g. critical infrastructure reforms, nature restoration fund and electricity bill discounts).

Regulatory Policy Committee

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Annex			
Regulatory Provision	**Rationale**	**Identification of options (inc. SaMBA)**	**Justification for preferred way forward**
Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects reform	The problem under consideration is clearly identified, with the IA discussing in sufficient detail the problems with the current NSIP regime following engagement with stakeholders and the department's review of the system using their internal understanding. The provided rationales of: (1) out of date policy; (2) variable and sometimes disproportionate approaches to consultation; (3) inflexibility of the Planning Act 2008 can mean disproportionate requirements for projects; and (4) delays caused by judicial reviews against DCO decisions for intervention seem reasonable, with the department highlighting that 150 major infrastructure projects by the end of the current parliament that could be affected without government intervention. The IA also discusses the potential harms that could arise without government intervention.	**(1) Up to date policy and guidance:** Following the RPC's initial review, the department considers a wider range of options, including a non-legislative option that strengthens the recommendation to update guidance every five years, a do-minimum option requiring guidance to be reviewed every five years but without a mandatory update requirement, an option for ten yearly updates, alongside the preferred option for five yearly updates. **(2) Varying and sometimes disproportionate approaches to consultation:** Four policy options were considered, including a do-nothing approach, a non-regulatory option and removal of statutory requirements. **(3) Inflexibility of Planning Act 2008 requirements which can be disproportionate for certain projects:** Following the initial review, the department now considers three options alongside the do-nothing, including a non-legislative guidance option and an alternative regulatory option with varying powers to those proposed in the preferred way forward.	Sufficient justifications for all preferred options were provided in the IA and the preferred options appear to address the issues identified in the IA. The department has estimated the NPSV of the preferred options and provide qualitative assessment of the non-monetised impacts. The IA sets out a detailed breakdown of the methodology, including estimating the baseline and incorporates sensitivity testing to account for uncertainties in the estimates. The methodology appears reasonable and proportionate. The NPSV accounts for a range of impacts: Avoided holding costs, avoided category 3 consultation costs for private projects and removing the need for additional consultation activities. Where impacts were

	Although the department provides some supporting evidence when discussing the problems (e.g. from the National Infrastructure Commission), the rational section could be strengthened through the inclusion of more evidence. The presented policy objectives were appropriately developed using the SMART objectives framework. The proposed policy interventions appear to address the identified problems.	**(4) Delays caused by judicial reviews of NPSs and DCO decisions:** Based on the RPC's initial review, the department has now included a wider set of options with different combinations of changes to the permission stages and the right of appeal. Following the initial review, the IA has included an enhanced assessment of each identified option, including RAG ratings against a set of critical success factors to provide further justification for discarding options. The department has conducted a sufficient SaMBA, stating that SMEs are burdened by the cost of delays, referencing a report from the Home Builders Federation (HBF) that found that SME 93% of SME home developers considered "delays in securing planning permission or discharging conditions" as a major barrier to growth. However, the SaMBA would benefit from the use of additional sector studies or other supporting evidence as the HBF report is not representative of all SMEs within scope of the current system.	not monetised, sufficient justification was provided. The assessment uses recent evidence from credible sources such as: National Infrastructure and Construction Pipeline 2023, NIC (April 2023), Planning Inspectorate and ARUP
Electricity Network Connections	The problem under consideration is clearly outlined by the department, the current approach to connections allows for the hoarding of network capacity. This occurs because the scarcity value	The department only considers two options, do-nothing and to provide the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) with time-limited powers via primary legislation. It appears that the proposed regulation provides stronger legal backing for	The assessment does not monetise any direct impacts on businesses, as the costs and benefits of specific connection reforms are calculated in the Ofgem/NESO

	associated with a place in the connections queue is not reflected in the very low private cost of obtaining a connection agreement and securing a spot in the queue. The rationale for intervention highlights work done thus far by NESO, DESNZ and Ofgem towards reforming the connections process and emphasises that decarbonisation via electrification cannot be achieved with an unreformed connections process. To enact reforms to the connections process, the department requires a legislative intervention in the form of time limited powers. The department justifies their high-level rationale for intervention, stating that Ofgem and NESO are currently developing the reforms with an accompanying impact assessment which will be used in their analysis when regulations are implemented at secondary legislation stage. The department's policy objective follows the SMART objectives framework, and an	NESO and network companies to make decisions on how and to whom it issues new connection offers once code changes take effect, whilst the industry connections reform process remains the main long-term approach. Given that the long-term approach is a non-regulatory option, the RPC is content with the options assessment. The assessment would be enhanced if the department explained the rationale behind selecting a three-year duration for the proposed powers. The department has provided a reasonable justification for choosing the preferred option over the do-nothing, highlighting the risk of challenges in reaching consensus agreements, which may mean that (full) reforms cannot be delivered in a timely way. The IA does not contain a SaMBA. However, the department indicated that the impact on small and micro businesses will be quantified in the Ofgem/NESO impact assessment and further addressed in the IAs for any subsequent, related secondary legislation.	impact assessment for connections reform due by the end of March 2025. The high-level qualitative assessment, highlights that the main benefit of reforming the connections process for the whole of Great Britain will be that reducing the connections queue should bring quicker, more efficient, and more certain connections to storage and generation projects. Given that the reforms are still in development, the department will further address costs and benefits in the IAs for any subsequent, related secondary legislation.

	implementation plan describing the change process is present in the IA.		
Scottish electricity infrastructure consenting reforms	The problem under consideration is clearly defined, with the IA referencing the growth in volume and complexity of planning applications to the Scottish Government under a consenting process that was not designed to deal with modern energy demands and technologies. According to the department, the current consenting process means that it is hard for developers to tell how long the consenting process might take, or where delays might appear, which affects investment confidence. Furthermore, the Scottish Government is unable to charge for administering applications preventing cost recovery for the service provided. The rational for intervention is clearly stated and appears reasonable and is supported by recommendations made by the Electricity Networks Commissioner's report, which	The IA presents only two options, do-nothing and the preferred option. Although non-regulatory options were not included in the assessment, the department has provided sufficient justification, stating that the Scottish Government has exhausted their use of non-regulatory options to ameliorate the policy problem and discussing examples. The department has provided sufficient justification for discarding the do-nothing option. The department has provided a sufficient SaMBA, providing statistics from Energy UK which estimates that between 0.6 – 2% of SMEs in the UK contribute in some way to the energy sector. As such, the department is of the opinion that SMEs are unlikely to be a major group impacted by the proposed reforms. The assessment also highlights the scale of investment needed for generation, transmission and storage projects, as such the main businesses applying for electricity consents are likely to be large businesses. Despite this, the department has considered mitigative measures as small businesses may incur comparatively higher administrative and	The department has provided sufficient justification for the preferred option, citing the support for the option from the Scottish Government. The department also states that the preferred option best meets the policy objectives of speeding up consenting in Scotland. The department's approach to monetisation appears to be well informed and based on engagement with the Scottish Government and includes sensitivity analysis. The assessment monetises familiarisation costs, implementation costs, earlier network investment costs, planning cost savings, constraint cost savings and emissions savings. The analysis uses data from reliable sources such as the Annual Survey for Hours and

	included recommendations for speeding up the electricity infrastructure planning consenting in Scotland. According to the department, government intervention is necessary as the policy area is governed by primary legislation, so cannot be changed in any meaningful way without amendments to legislation and the market cannot self-regulate to solve the current challenges. The department's policy objective follows the SMART objectives framework, and a theory of change table is included.	familiarisation burden. To minimise unnecessary burdens, the department takes the approach of clear and early publishing of the reforms to industry, increased stakeholder engagement with affected businesses and their representative bodies and monitoring of management information to identify any further impacts.	Earnings, ONS, NESO and internal analysis from DESNZ. The department also discusses risks associated with the preferred option and approach to monetisation. The analysis is sufficient to support the option preference.
Offshore transmission owner regime	The problem under consideration is clear, from 2016 to 2024 nine out of eleven windfarm projects needed transmission licence exemptions beyond the 18 months GCC period due to technical issues causing delays to commercial negotiations. With the expected growth of offshore wind deployment, the department	The IA considers only two options: the do-nothing approach and the preferred option to extend the GCC period to 27 months. This extension would mean that transfers occurring beyond 18 months but within 27 months would not require an exemption to comply with the Act. The preferred option appears to address the problem under consideration. The department has justified only considering two options, referencing:	Given that no alternative options were considered in the IA, the rationale for intervention provides the justification for the preferred course of action. The assessment estimates the administrative savings to the Government and assumes that the proportion of projects

	anticipates a growing need for exemptions. According to the department, issuing exemptions is a significant administrative burden on the public sector and usually take up to six months to issue, including the running of a consultation exercise for each exemption. As such, the department argues that intervention is necessary to reduce these burdens. The department's policy objective follows the SMART objectives framework, and an implementation plan describing the change process is present in the IA.	1. the call for evidence on the OFTO regime in 2023. The OFTO call for evidence (OFTO CfE) included suggestions of non-legislative options to introduce financial incentives to complete the process in a timely manner. However, it was deemed unlikely to alleviate delays which arise due to unexpected technical issues. The removal of the 'hard' 18 months deadline was also considered in the OFTO CfE but was discarded because it could make the unbundling rules difficult to enforce. 2. Different lengths of extension were considered in the OFTO CfE, with Ofgem suggesting the GCC period be extended from 18 months to 24 months. The 27 months GCC period was the result of further discussions between DESNZ and Ofgem. Moreover, the 9-month GCC period extension also aligned with the maximum length of the time-limited exemption which had been issued at the time. The RPC is content that sufficient options assessment was conducted through engagement with Ofgem and the OFTO CfE, including consideration of non-regulatory options.	needing exemptions will decrease from 82% to 0%. This assumption is based on historical data, where 9 out of 11 projects required time-limited exemptions, with the longest exemption period being 9 months, which aligns with the proposed extension of the GCC period. No admin savings to businesses were estimated as the assessment assumes that any time spent obtaining individual time limited exemptions are considered as part of the wider operational activities incurred to rectify the technical issues. These activities would still need to be carried out when projects make use of the GCC period extension. The methodology for estimating the familiarisation cost to businesses seems reasonable and proportionate. The total NPSV considers the admin cost savings and the cost to businesses and incorporates sensitivity

		The department has conducted a sufficient SaMBA, indicating that only newly operational windfarm projects would directly benefit from the changes. These projects would not be classified as small businesses due to the high value of their assets. Additionally, the assessment justifies not exempting small and micro businesses due to the deregulatory nature of the policy. Exempting them would also be inconsistent with the policy objective of reducing administrative burdens.	analysis by providing central, low and high estimates. The department also discusses risks and potential unintended consequences associated with the preferred option. The analysis is sufficient to support the option preference over the do-nothing scenario.
Long Duration Electricity Storage	The assessment clearly outlines the problem under consideration, referencing the Government's Clean Power Action Plan that suggests 4-6 GW of LDES could be needed by 2030 to meet the clean power system flexibility needs, and the lack of investment in long duration electricity storage in over 40 years. The department has conducted a Call for Evidence (CfE) on facilitating the deployment of LDES. The CfE found cause for government intervention as the market has failed to sufficiently incentivise investment in LDES primarily due to risk and financing issues. The IA stats that whilst	The assessment considers a range of policy options, including a do-nothing approach (Table 1). The policies considered in the assessment appear to directly address the problem under consideration and can be clearly linked to the policy objectives. The department has provided sufficient justification for discarding options, by assessing options against these four key objectives: 1. Ability to enable investment 2. Market effect 3. Deliverability 4. Cost benefit The department provided a brief SaMBA, stating that it would be unlikely that small and micro businesses would be bidding to secure contracts, but SMBs may benefit from	The department has provided a detail justification for their chosen approach, with the department stating that their preferred option received strong support from the electricity storage sector and wider industry in the Government's response to the LDES consultation (October 2024). The department's approach to monetisation appears to be well informed using research conducted by LCP Delta and Regen. The assessment monetises familiarisation costs, scheme administration, Project bid development

	LDES is independently profitable in the current electricity market arrangements, the private returns aren't high enough to justify the risk to investors. The assessment also highlights current and future harms to not deploying sufficient LDES. The policy objective follows the SMART objective framework and provides detailed discussion four key metrics: • Ability to enable investment • Market effect • Cost-benefit	subcontracting arrangements during construction or as a result of increased demand for goods and services in local areas.	ongoing compliance and capital financing. The IA uses reliable sources of data such as Europe Economics, BloombergNEF, energy.gov, ONS and Ofgem. Non-monetised costs and benefits were also covered qualitatively in sufficient detail. The department also discusses risks associated with the preferred option and sensitivity analysis was incorporated into the monetised impacts to create a range. The analysis is sufficient to support the option preference.
Electricity Bill discounts scheme	The rational for intervention is clear. New electricity transmission infrastructure will pass through communities which adds to the perception that communities that host transmission infrastructure experience disproportionate negative impacts. The IA highlights the importance of public consent for transmission network	The department has considered a range of options including a do-nothing approach and non-regulatory options. The Department tested a range of policy options using government-commissioned social research with communities surrounding several proposed future network infrastructure projects. The outcome of the research indicated that bill discounts were the form of benefit rated as most likely to improve community acceptability. The	The evidence presented from the social research is sufficient to justify the chosen approach. The assessment monetises transfers from bill discounts, administration costs, familiarisation costs, earlier network investment costs, constraint cost savings,

	infrastructure projects which could challenge the Government's ability to meet the required scale of infrastructure needed to keep pace with increasing electrification. As such, the assessment sees communities that host new network infrastructure as critical stakeholders in delivering cheaper, cleaner and secure energy that provides positive externalities for society. The IA presents positive externalities as the rationale for government intervention. It is stated that in the absence of government intervention, the external benefits are unlikely to be considered by host communities, leading to under provision of network infrastructure and community benefits. As such government intervention is required to internalise the external benefits to ensure communities can benefit from hosting network infrastructure. The presented policy objectives were appropriately developed	findings clearly influenced the Department's preferred option. Within the Government's preferred option of providing bill discounts, the department carried out analysis on four illustrative scenarios to demonstrate the potential scale of impacts from the proposed scheme. The IA also discusses the delivery model. The department has provided sufficient justification for discarding options, by discussion the findings from their commissioned social research. The department has provided a detailed SaMBA. The IA acknowledges that small, micro and medium businesses could incur additional costs initially but would benefit overall. The assessment highlights that 98.2% of the market share (licenced energy suppliers) are held by 12 large suppliers, with further analysis to assess the impact of the proposed scheme on small and micro-businesses to be provided in the IA accompanying secondary legislation. The department has adequately defended not excluding any suppliers from the scheme, citing the risk of heightening tensions in communities towards infrastructure development which would directly contradict the scheme's objectives. The department also	emission savings and impacts on businesses and impacts on billpayers, noting that the costs to energy suppliers will be passed onto billpayers. The IA uses reliable sources of data such as ONS, Ofgem, gov.uk, the Stakeholder Advisory Group on ELF EMFs, Dwelling stock by tenure, NGET and the OBR. The department also discusses risks and assumptions associated with the analysis in detail and sensitivity analysis was incorporated into the monetised impacts to create a range. The analysis is sufficient to support the option preference.

	using the SMART objectives framework	includes learning taken from other bill discount schemes such as the Energy Bills Support Scheme.	
Electric vehicle chargepoints	The problem under consideration is clearly identified. The increasing installation of EV charging apparatus due to the transition to zero-emission vehicles is causing the number of applications for section 50 licences to rise. The assessment makes the claim that Section 50 was not designed as a legislative tool to support the rollout of major infrastructure projects, rather it was designed for ad hoc street works to be carried out be organisations which do not regularly need to. The issues in the IA pertaining to 50 licences can impact the ability of some CPOs to install charge point infrastructure. A rationale for intervention is presented, in that under the current situation, EV CPOs face a longer, more expensive and more difficult process of applying to be able to undertake street works. The department has identified the	The department has presented a sufficient list of options, including a do-nothing option and a non-regulatory option. The options are discussed in sufficient detail and appear to directly address the problem under consideration. The department has provided sufficient justification for discarding options, using the Green Book's Strategic Options Framework-Filter. The Department's options assessment considered how closely each option met the SMART objectives and critical success factors. This resulted in the shortlisted options of do-nothing and the preferred option which were consulted on during the consultation stage. The department has provided a sufficient SaMBA. The assessment states that the preferred option will have a positive impact on small micro and medium businesses. The IA also justifies not exempting any small, micro or medium business, stating that the burden on them is proportionate. It goes on to say that use of Street Manager would be voluntary and should the policy change increase costs, businesses reserve the right to use section 50 licences. The RPC is content with the	The department has provided a detail justification for their chosen approach, highlighting that it was the only option that met all policy objectives and critical success factors. The assessment monetises familiarisation costs, Street Manager annual registration fees for EV CPOs, application process time savings for HAs and EV CPOs and application process cost savings for EV CPOs. Costs have been correctly categorised as direct or indirect. The IA uses reliable sources of data such as Zapmap, Street Manager, ONS and publishing service.gov.uk. Non monetised impacts have also been discussed in sufficient detail.

	presence of government failure due to 'red tape' as the Government have failed to account for technological advancements in its rules and regulations around SUs, excavating market failures such as equity and coordination failure. The policy objective was appropriately developed using the SMART objectives framework and the department uses Green Book critical success factors to narrow down the longlist of policy options to a shortlist.	department's justification for not exempting small, micro and medium businesses. The assessment also highlights that the measure is likely to reduce barriers to entry as SMBs and medium businesses would face reduced costs associated with EV chargepoint installation.	The department also discusses risks and assumptions associated with the analysis in detail and sensitivity analysis was incorporated into the monetised impacts to create a range. The analysis is sufficient to support the option preference.
Transport and Works Act 1992 reforms	The problem under consideration and rational for intervention is clearly stated. The department has identified the presence of regulatory failure. Under current legislation, multiple applications and authorisations are required for a single project which the department deems an inefficient allocation of resources that cost firms and the associated consents and public bodies. According to the department, there is no market mechanism for addressing the regulatory failure. As such,	The department presented three options including a do-nothing approach and the preferred option. Although a non-regulatory approach was not considered, from the identification of regulatory failure as the problem under consideration, it can be inferred that regulation is the only viable approach. However, the assessment would benefit from clearly making this argument in the options appraisal section. The department has provided sufficient justification for discarding options, highlighting the inadequacies of the discarded options. The assessment also uses the Green Book's	The department has not monetised the cost and benefits of the shortlisted options (do-nothing and preferred), citing a lack of robust estimate for the time savings generated from streamlining the application process and an expectation of only minimal familiarisation costs. Although at final stage IA the impacts summarised in the scorecard should be

	government intervention is required to resolve the unnecessary administrative burden. The policy objective was appropriately developed using the SMART objectives framework	critical success factors. As such, the do-nothing was taken forward for comparison purposes as it fails to mee the SMART objectives and critical success factors and the preferred option was shortlisted because it was the only option that met all the objectives and critical success factors. The Department also provides a breakdown of how the preferred option meets the critical success factors. The department has conducted a SaMBA. The assessment acknowledges that the measure will primarily impact micro businesses. It is stated that of the nine applicants for TWAO over the previous ten years, 6 applicants were micro businesses, with the other three being small businesses. Although the measure will impose familiarisation costs on SMBs, no mitigation was considered because SMBs can directly benefit from the measure as the administrative burden will be reduced on them.	monetised as much as possible, sufficient assessment against other option is provided to justify the way forward in the description of options considered.
Highway Act 1980 reforms	The department presents two problems under consideration in relation to the Highways Act 1980 (HA80). 1) **Powers of temporary possession**: There is no mechanism for the temporary possession and use of land	The department presents four options, including a do-nothing approach. It meets the requirement to consider a non-regulatory alternative by integrating it into the 'do-minimum' option, which combines regulation for powers of temporary possession and a non-regulatory approach for statutory deadlines.	The department has not monetised the impacts of the shortlisted options (do-nothing and preferred) and notes familiarisation costs are likely to be minimal. Although at final stage IA the impacts summarised in the scorecard should be monetised as much

	through means of compulsion. According to the department, current HA80 legislation only allows for compulsory acquisition which places disproportionate requirements on landowners to the needs of the Highways Authorities that only need to access the land temporarily. 2) **Statutory deadlines**: The current six-week objection period is confusing for businesses due to this being inconsistent with other consenting regimes. The assessment goes on to infer that under the current system, businesses and households need to work out the classification of a scheme or project in order to assess when they need to object by. The IA includes some analysis of recent HA80 applications that finds 63% of objections are received within a four week period and that reducing the objection period from six weeks to align with other consenting regimes is	The department has provided sufficient justification for discarding certain options, clearly delineating their inadequacies in direct reference to the policy objective and critical success factors. However, the Department does not present the critical success factors in the IA. A sufficient SaMBA has been conducted. Regarding powers of temporary possession, the department asserts that the measure would benefit small and micro businesses by providing them with access to their land after it has been acquired for works. Additionally, these businesses could benefit from accelerated negotiations. While the imposition of familiarisation costs on small and micro businesses was acknowledged, the department maintains that these costs will be significantly outweighed by the benefits of regaining land access. Consequently, small and micro businesses were not exempted. Regarding statutory deadlines, the department asserts that the impact is likely to be neutral. The department states that their analysis has not identified any reason why a small or micro business would be adversely affected by this measure, as a 30-day objection window is considered reasonable and aligns with other schemes. As a result, SMBs are not exempt nor is mitigation considered.	as possible, sufficient qualitative assessment is provided to justify the way forward.

	unlikely to reduce businesses ability to object. The department's rational for intervention is regulatory failure as both problems under consideration are a result of requirements set by the HA80 regulation. The policy objective was appropriately developed using the SMART objectives framework.		
Nature Restoration Fund	The assessment states that the current system often fails to support required development because it necessarily focuses too heavily on avoiding any harmful impacts of individual developments. The department puts forward the argument that left to individual developments, corresponding interventions are piecemeal and less effective than if there was coordinated strategic action. It is stated that the current system has operated in the context of continued environmental degradation, inferring that project-by-project mitigation is not effective;	The department considers three options including the do-nothing, the preferred option and a non-regulatory option. The department has provided justification for discarding the do-nothing and non-regulatory options. It is acknowledged that to some extent it would be possible to take a more strategic, joined up approach to mitigation within the confines of the current system. However, due to the nature of the underlying environmental legislation, the key constraints set out in the IA cannot be comprehensively and satisfactorily addressed without legislative changes. The preferred option draws on domestic case studies such as the District Level Licencing, Suitable Alternative Natural Greenspace and the Marine Recovery Fund, showing that the	The department has monetised the impacts of the proposed regulation, and the approach seems reasonable despite limitations in data on how environmental obligations affect development. The assessment acknowledges the data challenges but the impacts are expected to be positive. However, the department has not articulated their justification for the preferred option, although it can be inferred from the provided strategic context.

	however the IA could be improved by presenting more evidence or examples to better illustrate the weaknesses of the current approach and how the proposed fund will ultimately deliver improved environmental outcomes. The IA highlights coordination failure as the market failure, resulting in inefficient outcomes. The department argues that while actions taken may be effective in addressing the specific impact of a proposal; by not taking a holistic view, mitigation measures could inadvertently hinder wider objectives. This gives rise to several harmful issues that are discussed in sufficient detail. The rational for intervention is presented on the basis that the measure fulfils the Government’s manifesto commitment to “implement solutions to unlock the building of homes affected by nutrient neutrality without weakening environmental protections” through the	proposed approach does not set a new precedent, although more examples could be provided where existing schemes have achieved their stated objectives. However, the justification for discarding options could be strengthened by assessing how well options meet the policy objectives or perform against a set of critical success factors. The department has provided a sufficient SaMBA. The voluntary nature of the proposal in most cases ensures that were SMBs can more efficiently discharge their environmental obligations through other channels, they can continue to do so. It is also argued that the streamlined process can benefit SMBs as a high percentage of small developers tend to employ-offsite mitigation measures which can lead to high administrative costs and expenses relating to technical assessments. According to the assessment, the proposed approach could limit delays to development projects, resulting in cost savings from a reduction in the costs of holding capital. This is seen as particularly favourable for SMBs as they tend to hold lower case reserves and have less resource to allocate to securing mitigation.	The assessment provides a sufficient breakdown of the approach to estimating the monetised impacts and estimates total days saved, reduction in the cost of holding capital and familiarisation costs. The IA uses reliable sources of data such as gov.uk, OBR, National Housing and Planning Advisory Unit and ONS. Non monetised impacts have also been discussed in sufficient detail. The department also discusses risks and assumptions in detail and sensitivity analysis was incorporated into the monetised impacts to create a range.

	development of a Nature Recovery Fund. The policy objective was appropriately developed using the SMART objectives framework.		
Planning fees sub-delegation	The assessment clearly identifies the problem under consideration. Under current legislation, planning fees are set nationally. However, despite previous fee increases there remains an estimated annual overall funding shortfall for local planning authority development management services of £362 million (2023 – 2024). The assessment highlights that nationally set fees cannot easily account for local variations in costs of running development management services in individual LPAs across England. As such, the Department states that continuing to set fees nationally and at a level below cost recovery would result in persistent funding shortfall, impacting the ability for authorities to adequately resource their planning application service.	The department presents four policy options. Excluding the do-nothing approach, all options appear to directly address the problem under consideration. A non-regulatory option was not presented; however, the department has provided sufficient justification for not considering one. The IA sates that A non-legislative option would not achieve the objective of ensuring that all LPAs can meet their individual costs of delivering their development management service, as local planning authorities would not be able to vary or set their own fees. The department has provided sufficient justification for discarding options, discussing the ability to meet the desired outcome under each option and burden on LPAs for option two. The two broad models for localisation (option two and option three) were consulted on in the 'Proposed reforms to the National Planning Policy Framework and other changes to the planning system' consultation. The responses indicated that of the respondents	The selection of the preferred option is sufficiently justified by the analysis of impacts on business and households presented in the IA (page 4) and the consultation responses to a lesser degree. The assessment monetises the impacts for option two and three and uses the do-nothing approach as the counterfactual. The IA estimates the cost to business and households from higher fees which form a transfer to LPAs leaving a NPSV of zero. Familiarisation costs are not anticipated for business and households, with only nominal costs for LPAs. Non monetised impacts have also been discussed in sufficient detail.

	The department's rational for intervention is that allowing LPAs to set their own planning fees would be the most efficient way to increase resources in a way that responds to the individual circumstances of each planning authority. The department has considered unintended consequences by providing the Secretary of State with the power to intervene and direct a LPA to amend their fees or charges when it is considered appropriate to do so. The policy objective was appropriately developed using the SMART objectives framework.	who said that they supported localisation of fees, 76% supported option three. The Department has presented a detailed SaMBA. The assessment acknowledges that increasing fees will have a disproportional impact on small and micro businesses (SMBs) and medium-sized businesses who submit planning applications. However the department argues that SMBs and medium-sized businesses will benefit from LPAs being able to deliver good quality planning decisions quicker so their limited resources (compared to larger businesses) are not tied up for too long. SMBs and medium-sized businesses were not exempt, with the Department citing the creation of an imbalance where larger businesses or householders bear a disproportionate share of the costs. Furthermore, exempting SMBs could undermine the financial sustainability of the services, leading to reduced quality and efficiency.	The department also discusses assumptions, risks and mitigations associated with the analysis in detail. The analysis is sufficient to support the option preference.
Planning committee modernisation	The following key issues with the current planning system where identified: (1) many local schemes of delegation are not sufficiently clear about whether an application will go to committee.	The assessment considers four options including the do-nothing approach and a non legislative option. The department has provided sufficient justification both as part of the rationale for intervention and in consideration of option 3 (rely on guidance and training) for discarding non-regulatory	The department has provided a detailed justification for their selection of the preferred option. The IA monetises the direct impacts to businesses related

	(2) too much time is spent considering applications (3) in some of these instances the development is rejected against officer advice only to be overturned on appeal (4) there can be insufficient understanding among all committee members of planning principles and law (5) there is a lack of transparency of the consequences of committee decisions The policy objective was appropriately developed using the SMART objectives framework.	approaches and explains why the alternative legislative option is not taken forward. The department has provided a sufficient SaMBA, highlighting the deregulatory nature of the measure. As such, the department states that the measure are expected to result in potential cost savings to all businesses (including small and micro businesses. Consequently, the department does not exempt small and micro businesses. Additionally, at the secondary legislation stage, when more detail is known about the preferred option, a more detailed SaMBA will be produced.	to the preferred option, whilst the impacts pertaining to LPAs providing mandatory training to planning committees and the administrative cost of reducing the size of some planning committees are covered qualitatively. The department has clearly explained how the business cost savings will be realised, in that certain project applications that would have to go through committee review for approval would be automatically approved by planning officers. The IA estimates the cost savings associated with the reduction in determination times for applications, reduction in appeals (and associated costs) and familiarisation costs. Sensitivity testing was also carried out on the monetised impacts. The department also discusses risks and assumptions associated with the analysis in detail.

Compulsory Purchase Order reforms	In response to the RPC's initial review, the department has strengthened the rationale for intervention to provide more description of the current arrangements for CPOs and the case for reform and streamlining. Although the IA identifies a range of harms, including distorted land prices, encouragement of land speculation and reduced revenues for affordable housing, infrastructure and local services, due to land owners entitlement to claim 'hope value', limited evidence is provided to support the frequency or scale of these harms. However, the IA helpfully includes an example of how redevelopment of a site has been delayed due to a landowner seeking an asking price above market value.	The assessment presents four policy options, including a do-nothing and a non-regulatory option. The department has provided sufficient justification for discounting options, highlighting the limitations of the options they do not take forward. The department also refers to the policy objectives when assessing each policy option, discussing which objective can and cannot be achieved by the policy option. However, the options assessment could be improved through stakeholder consultation. The department has conducted a SaMBA, highlighting that the preferred option can affect any small and micro business, but equally can also benefit them through regeneration and the creation of opportunities. The Department makes the claim that the changes are generic changes to the CPO process that will not disproportionately impact small and micro businesses. As a result, no exemptions or mitigations were considered for small and micro businesses. Additionally, the assessment highlights that the compensation payout would cover losses that an affected party may suffer because of compulsory purchase. The changes to rebalance basic and occupiers' loss payment share for landlords and occupiers will ensure small and micro businesses are compensated more fairly	The department has provided detailed justification for their preferred option. The IA provides a breakdown of what each measure within their preferred option would deliver and clearly links the measures to policy objectives. The IA highlights the two main groups that will be affected by the preferred option. Some of the impacts have been monetised. However, most of the impacts were assessed qualitatively in detail. Although at final stage IA the impacts summarised in the scorecard should be monetised as much as possible, sufficient assessment against other options is provided to justify the way forward.

		to reflect the burden of having to close or relocate their business at a time not of their choosing.	
Strategic planning	The department has highlighted the problem under consideration. It is stated that the current system does not allow for effective mechanisms for cross-boundary strategic planning. The current development plans system therefore depends on individual authorities cooperating with one another on their local plans to address cross-boundary issues such as addressing housing need. The Government's view is that housing need in England cannot be met without planning for growth on a larger than local scale, and that reform is needed to introduce effective new mechanisms for cross-boundary strategic planning. It is claimed that this issue has resulted in the England not being able to deliver the amount of development, notably housing, and supporting infrastructure that has been required over at least the past 15 years.	The department considers two options for strategic planning across England in addition to the do-nothing – a voluntary system, and the preferred mandatory system. In response to the RPC's initial review, the department has provided more discussion for why a voluntary system is unlikely to be successful, citing several examples where previous attempts have failed in some areas. The department has conducted a SaMBA, stating that they do not expect there to be any direct impacts on SMBs as the changes will only directly affect local authorities, mayoral combined authorities and the Planning Inspectorate. Although there may be some indirect impacts on business as a result of the time required to consider strategic plans, the department argues that these impacts will be felt by larger developers.	For the preferred option, the department has estimated the cost to the public sector for producing strategic development plans. The benefits to business and society are not monetised, but the department expects the benefits from strategic planning in the form of increased opportunities for development, certainty and confidence to outweigh the costs

	The department identifies two rationales for intervention: 1. The current local plans system is not effective for delivering strategic cross-boundary plans. 2. Poor cooperation and absence of effective strategic planning in areas where its most needed The policy objective was appropriately developed using the SMART objectives framework.		