Recommendation Status Report: Derailment of a passenger train near Walton-on- Thames, Surrey

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
(replaces Progressing and	
Implementation On-going)	

Closed	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and
(replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non- implementation)	evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.

Insufficient response:	t response: The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into	
	consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is	
	insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.	

Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have		
	subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.		

Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the
	recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



Report Title	Derailment of a passenger train near Walton-on- Thames, Surrey	
Report Number	04/2025	
Date of Incident	04/03/2024	

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
04/2025/01	Awaiting Response	None	The intent of this recommendation is for Colas Rail to have a robust process in place to deliver work in such a way as to avoid the risk of redundant material being dropped or left on track. Colas Rail, working in consultation with Network Rail, should undertake a risk-based review of its planning and processes (including work package plans and task briefing sheets) to ensure that appropriate methods of work are in place to ensure the safety of the line when redundant material is to be collected from on or near the line. This review should particularly consider the risk of redundant material being dropped or left on the track in a position where it may be struck by trains. Colas Rail should develop a timebound programme to make any	
			appropriate changes identified to its rules, policies, and procedures (paragraphs 147a and 148a). This recommendation may be applicable to other contractors.	
04/2025/02	Awaiting Response	None	The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail to have adequate processes in place to ensure the co-ordination and supervision of work on complex Capital Delivery worksites.	
			Network Rail, working in consultation with the Rail Safety and Standards Board, should review GERT8000, the Rule Book, and standard NR/L2/OHS/019, 'Safety of people at work on or near the line' to determine how co-ordination and supervision of activities should be undertaken on a site of work which involves the interaction of multiple persons in charge.	
			This review should explicitly consider how individual task and overall work	

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 site safety is managed by a single controlling mind where there is one or more of the following: multiple sites of work within a site of work multiple shifts and handovers of responsibility different teams with staff employed by different companies (including prime contractor and labour suppliers). 	
The review should also consider the interaction required between controllers of site safety, persons in charge and engineering supervisors and how these roles work together to ensure that the line is safe for the passage of trains following work.	
Network Rail should develop a timebound programme to make any appropriate changes identified to its rules, policies, and procedures (paragraphs 145a, 146b, 146c)	