



Home Office

Country Policy and Information Note

Yemen: Humanitarian situation

Version 1.0

March 2025

Contents

Executive summary	4
Assessment	5
About the assessment	5
1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals	5
1.1 Credibility.....	5
1.2 Exclusion	6
2. Convention reason(s)	6
3. Risk	7
4. Protection.....	11
5. Internal relocation	11
6. Certification.....	11
Country information	12
About the country information	12
7. Geography and demography	12
7.1 Geography.....	12
7.2 Demography.....	14
8. Socio-economic situation	14
8.1 Basic indicators	14
8.2 Economy.....	15
8.3 Employment	18
8.4 Poverty	20
9. Humanitarian situation.....	21
9.1 Overview.....	21
9.2 People in need (PIN).....	25
9.3 Severity of need by location.....	27
9.4 Shelter and non-food items (NFI)	29
9.5 Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH).....	31
9.6 Food and nutrition	34
9.7 Children	43
9.8 Education.....	43
9.9 Health and healthcare.....	48
9.10 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).....	52
10. Humanitarian aid.....	55
10.1 Humanitarian support.....	55
10.2 Access to humanitarian support	58

11. Freedom of movement	65
Research methodology	66
Terms of Reference	67
Bibliography	68
Sources cited	68
Sources consulted but not cited	73
Version control and feedback	74
Feedback to the Home Office.....	74
Independent Advisory Group on Country Information	74

Executive summary

Conflict, climate events, an economic crisis, and disrupted public services have resulted in Yemen becoming one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.

Around 18.2 million people, almost 50% of the population, are in need of humanitarian aid, of whom 17.6 million, 45% of the population, have severe needs.

The general humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable due to the severity of the general humanitarian situation and the overall limitations on aid distribution.

Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

[Back to Contents](#)

Assessment

Section updated: 18 March 2025

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the [country information](#), refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, **in general**:

- the humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within [paragraphs 339C and 339CA\(iii\) of the Immigration Rules](#)/Article 3 of the [European Convention on Human Rights \(ECHR\)](#)
- the state (or quasi state bodies) can provide effective protection
- internal relocation is possible to avoid serious harm
- if a claim is refused, it is likely to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under [section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002](#).

Decision makers **must**, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

Points to note

The names of people and places in this document have been transliterated from Arabic by the sources cited in the [Country information](#). This has resulted in different spellings for the same person, people, or place(s).

In the Assessment section of this CPIN, and any commentary added to the COI, CPIT has used the spelling of place names as they appear in the [Map](#).

[Back to Contents](#)

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

- 1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).
- 1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the [Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants](#)).
- 1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check (see [Biometric data-sharing process \(Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process\)](#)).
- 1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the [Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis](#)).

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section

The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section

[Back to Contents](#)

1.2 Exclusion

- 1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.
- 1.2.2 Several armed groups operate in Yemen. This includes (but is not limited to): Yemeni government forces, forces of the Southern Transitional Council, and the Houthis (also known as Ansar Allah). Some of these groups may be involved in terrorist activities or are responsible for serious human rights abuses and/or war crimes in Yemen. The United Kingdom, the United States, and the United Nations Security Council apply sanctions and arms embargoes against the Houthis (see [UK and international response to Houthis in the Red Sea 2024](#)), and on 22 January 2025, the United States redesignated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (see [Designation of Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization](#)).
- 1.2.3 If there are serious reasons for considering that the person has been involved with the Houthis or (an)other armed group(s), decision makers must consider whether any of the exclusion clauses under Article 1F apply.
- 1.2.4 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).
- 1.2.5 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on [Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33\(2\) of the Refugee Convention](#), [Humanitarian Protection](#) and the instruction on [Restricted Leave](#).

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section

The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section

[Back to Contents](#)

2. Convention reason(s)

- 2.1.1 A severe humanitarian situation does not in itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.
- 2.1.2 In the absence of a link to one of the 5 Refugee Convention grounds

necessary to be recognised as a refugee, the question to address is whether the person will face a real risk of serious harm in order to qualify for Humanitarian Protection (HP).

- 2.1.3 However, before considering whether a person requires protection because of the general humanitarian situation, decision makers must consider if the person faces persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. Where the person qualifies for protection under the Refugee Convention, decision makers do not need to consider if there are substantial grounds for believing the person faces a real risk of serious harm meriting a grant of HP.
- 2.1.4 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds see the Asylum Instruction, [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#). For guidance on HP see the Asylum Instruction, [Humanitarian Protection](#).

[Back to Contents](#)

3. Risk

- 3.1.1 In general, the humanitarian situation in Yemen is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm as set out in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 ECHR. However, decision makers must consider each case on its facts.
- 3.1.2 Whilst not country-specific to Yemen, decision makers should note the Upper Tribunal (UT)'s findings and general approach to assessing humanitarian conditions in [OA \(Somalia\) \(CG\) \[2022\] UKUT 33 \(IAC\) \(2 February 2022\)](#):

'In an Article 3 "living conditions" case, there must be a causal link between the Secretary of State's removal decision and any "intense suffering" feared by the returnee. This includes a requirement for temporal proximity between the removal decision and any "intense suffering" of which the returnee claims to be at real risk. This reflects the requirement in [Paposhvili \[2017\] Imm AR 867](#) for intense suffering to be "serious, rapid and irreversible" in order to engage the returning State's obligations under Article 3 ECHR. A returnee fearing "intense suffering" on account of their prospective living conditions at some unknown point in the future is unlikely to be able to attribute responsibility for those living conditions to the Secretary of State, for to do so would be speculative.' (Headnote 1)
- 3.1.3 The information in this note indicates that, at the time of publication, there is, in general, a real risk that a person returning to Yemen would face imminent and intense suffering on account of the living conditions there in line with the thresholds set out in [OA \(Somalia\)](#).
- 3.1.4 Population estimates for Yemen vary between 32 and 38.7 million, with a median age of 22. Yemenis are mostly Muslim Arabs and they mainly reside in the far west (see [Geography and demography](#)).
- 3.1.5 Yemen is divided between the internationally-recognised government in the south and east, and the Houthis (a group with de facto authority over some areas) in the north-west. The country's economy is similarly divided (see [Economy](#) and country information in the CPIN on [Yemen: Security situation](#)).

- 3.1.6 By 2023, Yemen's economy had shrunk to less than half its size in 2015, with GDP per capita dropping to the equivalent of approximately £677. The World Bank assessed 74% of Yemenis to be living in poverty in 2024. Yemen's currency hit a record-low value in government-controlled areas, and basic necessities cost 117% more than they did in 2021. Sources report ongoing disruptions to livelihoods, agriculture, and other businesses due to armed violence, landmines, corruption, and the economic situation. While the level of unemployment has decreased between 2021 and 2023, informal employment has increased. Working conditions, wages, and the purchasing power of Yemenis have deteriorated and remain poor. Some public sector salaries have not been paid for years, particularly in Houthi-controlled areas. While the socio-economic situation varies by place and group, it is generally poor across Yemen (see [Socio-economic situation](#)).
- 3.1.7 Conflict, climate events, the economic crisis, and disrupted public services are all contributing factors to a poor humanitarian situation. While a truce in the conflict which began in 2022 meant fewer incidents of direct damage to civilian infrastructure, the resumption of airstrikes in 2024 saw the downward trend reversed. Sources report little or no improvement to the humanitarian situation in 2023, and a worsening situation in 2024. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 18.2 million people, 47% of OCHA's population estimate, would be in need of humanitarian assistance (see paragraph 9.2.1 for the definition of people in need (PIN)) in 2024, a decrease from 2023 levels (21.6 million). OCHA also estimated a 31% increase in acute needs (17.6 million in 2024 compared with 13.4 million in 2023). Governorates with the most severe estimated needs include Taiz (in the south-west), Al Hudaydah, and Hajjah (in the west) followed by Saada, Ibb, Marib, and Abyan (scattered across the west and south-west), all located in the more densely populated region of Yemen. Districts with people in 'dire' need are located close to conflict frontlines. Children, internally displaced persons (IDPs), disabled people, and pregnant and breastfeeding women are also some of the most in-need people (see [Humanitarian situation: Overview](#), [People in need](#), [Severity of need by location](#) and [Geography and demography](#)).
- 3.1.8 The UN estimated that around 6.7 million people (17% of the population) would have shelter and non-food item (NFI) needs (see paragraph 9.4.1 for definition) in 2024. Therefore, an estimated 32 million people, approximately, would not have shelter and NFI needs in 2024. The scale and severity of shelter needs are greater in the more heavily populated west than in the east. Parts of Taiz, Saada, and Dhale governorates, close to conflict frontlines, are among the worst affected. IDPs and their host communities are forced to live in over-crowded and sub-standard conditions due to property damage, displacement, and ownership and access challenges, faced particularly by women (see [Shelter and non-food items \(NFI\)](#)).
- 3.1.9 Yemen experiences a scarcity of water, as well as water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure, and it has a lack of latrines. Additional challenges are presented by sewage-contaminated water sources, a proximity of water sources and treatment facilities to conflict frontlines and landmines, and regular power outages in the WASH sector. In late 2023, and over the first six months of 2024, access to safe drinking water in a single

governorate, Taiz (in the south-west), varied from 22% of households in the highlands to 96% of households in Taiz city. An OCHA map indicates southwestern Yemen experiences the most severe WASH needs, with Taiz and Marib among the worst-affected governorates. 39% of the Yemen population lack access to safe methods of sanitation disposal, and solid waste disposal systems are generally at their worst in urban areas. OCHA reported that 17.4 million people (45% of the population) would have WASH needs (see paragraph 9.5.1 for definition) in 2024. Poor access to WASH services increases the risk of preventable diseases, including diarrhoea and wasting in children (see [Water, sanitation and hygiene \(WASH\)](#)).

- 3.1.10 UN sources estimated that between 16.4 and 17.6 million people would have food security needs (see paragraph 9.6.1 for definition) in 2024, around 42% to 45% of the population. Yemen was assessed as predominantly in Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) phase 3 (crisis, see paragraph 9.6.7 for more information about the phase classifications) as of October 2024, with the governorates of Al Jawf, Hajjah, Al Hudaydah, and Taiz, in the northwest, in phase 4 (emergency, phase 5 being famine). In the first half of 2024, 85% of over 47,000 interviewed households, mostly IDPs, adopted coping mechanisms due to being unable to meet their daily food needs. The UN World Food Programme (WFP) reported that in September 2024, 64% of surveyed households in government areas were unable to meet minimum food needs, 57% in Houthi areas lacked access to adequate food, and 35% and 32%, respectively, were severely food deprived. Sources indicate increasing food costs, irregularity of food assistance, limited livelihood opportunities, and the impacts of climate events on agricultural activities all contribute to the food insecurity issue in Yemen (see [Food security](#)).
- 3.1.11 The nutrition situation has deteriorated since early 2022 and continues to worsen, with malnourishment figures at record-high levels as of the end of 2023. Taiz, Al Hudaydah, and Hajjah are among the worst-affected governorates, where acute malnutrition rates are significantly above the emergency threshold. According to the UN, nearly half of children under 5 across Yemen experienced moderate to severe stunting. The World Bank said over 3.5 million people (almost 11% of the population) were experiencing severe malnutrition in late 2024. Yemen ranked second highest in the 2024 Global Hunger Index based on data for several aspects of hunger, namely undernourishment, and child wasting, stunting and mortality (see [Malnutrition](#)).
- 3.1.12 Children are heavily impacted by Yemen's conflict and humanitarian crisis. OCHA reported 9.8 million children in need in 2024, including 5 million under 5 years old. Child malnutrition has led to developmental complications and increases the risk of illness and death. Children are also more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse as they often work to support their families rather than attend school (see [People in need](#), [Children](#) and [Education](#)).
- 3.1.13 School enrolments indicate that approximately 4.5 million children, or 39% of 5 to 17 year-olds, did not attend school in 2023/2024. Of those who did attend, 1.3 million were displaced children in overcrowded and underequipped schools. A Yemeni human rights organisation documented

over 500 incidents of attacks or the use of schools by conflict parties between January 2023 and December 2024. While the OCHA reported 28% fewer people with education needs (see paragraph 9.8.1 for definition) in 2024 than in 2023, the figure remains high at 6.2 million people, of whom it said 97% are children. Over 600,000 people with education needs are reportedly children with disabilities. The high cost of education and transportation, the non-payment of salaries to teachers, and the use of schools to push the political agendas of conflict parties, particularly in Houthi areas, exacerbate a poor quality of education and non-attendance issues (see [Education](#)).

- 3.1.14 Around half of Yemen's health facilities are reported not to be operational, either completely or partially, due to damage sustained and shortages of medical supplies and staff. Public health information in Yemen is limited. However, OCHA estimated that 17.8 million people would have health needs (see paragraph 9.9.1 for definition) in 2024 (45% to 55% of the population and 98% of all people in need), down from the 2023 level (20.3 million). One source documented 63 incidents of attacks or use of hospitals by conflict parties between January 2023 and December 2024, the worst-affected governorates being Raymah, Taiz, Lahjj, Ibb and Saada (see [Health and healthcare](#)).
- 3.1.15 There has been a recent increase in diseases, many of which are preventable and up to 70% of children under 3 have reportedly not received routine vaccinations. Around 8 million people suffer mental health challenges, with 7 million requiring mental health treatment. However, only 10% of primary health care facilities have staff trained to identify or treat mental disorders. Fewer than 2% of those requiring treatment, around 120,000 people, have uninterrupted access to mental health services, disproportionately affecting women and girls. Similarly, reproductive and maternal health services are available at only 20% of health facilities and are particularly limited in Houthi areas (see [Health and healthcare](#)).
- 3.1.16 There are around 4 to 4.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs) (about 10% to 14% of the population). The influx of IDPs to Marib, Hajjah, Al Hudaydah, Taiz, and Al Jawf, the governorates hosting the most IDPs, has placed greater demand on already-stretched resources. IDPs often lose their means of income and civil documentation, required to access services, during displacement. OCHA reported 1.8 million IDPs receiving assistance and protection activity support in IDP camps, and in need (see paragraph 9.10.7 for details), in 2024. It also noted those with additional vulnerabilities, such as people with disabilities, women, children, and older people, faced significant shortages in available services. A WFP survey found IDPs were unable to meet minimum food needs, faced severe hunger, and resorted to extremely negative coping mechanisms (see [Internally Displaced Persons \(IDPs\)](#)).
- 3.1.17 Sources report that in 2023 aid organisations assisted around 8.4 to 8.6 million people per month. The OCHA 2023 humanitarian response plan (HRP) identified 219 humanitarian actors, including 10 UN agencies, 57 international NGOs, and 152 national NGOs. Sources report that 229 humanitarian actors delivered the 2023 response. Between January and

August 2024, 169 humanitarian organisations delivered aid to an average of 2.96 million people per month. An OCHA-published map, covering the same period, showed at least 2 humanitarian organisations to be present in every district (see [Humanitarian support](#)).

- 3.1.18 However, agencies do not deliver aid to areas contaminated with landmines, predominantly in the west of Yemen. Access to other areas can be impaired due to surging transport costs, damaged, unsafe, or closed roads, and significant funding shortfalls causing organisations to close or downsize humanitarian programmes. Additional challenges include corruption and interference by armed groups, particularly the Houthis in their effort to tighten their grip on civil society. The Houthis increasingly block aid, detain aid workers, and impose complex bureaucratic requirements on agencies. In December 2023, the WFP announced a pause in its general food assistance programme due to reduced funding. In 2024, the distribution of food aid was infrequent and unpredictable, and provided recipients with only 17% of their recommended daily calorie intake. The people with the most restricted access to aid include IDPs, Muhamasheen ethnic minorities, and other people who lack civil documentation, as well as people with disabilities, and women and girls (see [Access to humanitarian support](#)).
- 3.1.19 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

[Back to Contents](#)

4. Protection

- 4.1.1 The state is not able to provide protection against a breach of Article 3 because of general humanitarian conditions if this occurs in individual cases.
- 4.1.2 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

[Back to Contents](#)

5. Internal relocation

- 5.1.1 While the level of need and access to humanitarian aid varies across Yemen, internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable due to the severity of the general humanitarian situation and the overall limitations on aid distribution.
- 5.1.2 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and factors to be taken into account see the Asylum Instruction on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

[Back to Contents](#)

6. Certification

- 6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
- 6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see [Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 \(clearly unfounded claims\)](#).

[Back to Contents](#)

Country information

About the country information

This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the [research methodology](#). It provides the evidence base for the assessment.

The structure and content follow a [terms of reference](#) which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

The COI included covers events up to and including **31 December 2024**, though some sources may have been published or made publicly available after this date. Any event taking place after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

[Back to Contents](#)

7. Geography and demography

NOTE: The maps in this section are not intended to reflect the UK Government's views of any boundaries.

7.1 Geography

7.1.1 The US Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) World Factbook stated on its undated 'Yemen' webpage, updated on 25 November 2024, that Yemen comprises a total of 527,968 square kilometres¹, about twice the size of the UK². Yemen has 1601 kilometres of land borders, 294 with Oman and 1,307 with Saudi Arabia, plus 1,906 kilometres of coastline, along the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea³.

7.1.2 Robert Burrowes and Manfred Wenner in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (EB), updated 14 January 2025, stated:

'Most of Yemen's northern frontier with Saudi Arabia traverses the great desert of the peninsula, the Rub' al-Khali ("Empty Quarter"), and until 2000 remained undemarcated, as did the eastern frontier with Oman until 1992. Yemen is bounded to the south by the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea and to the west by the Red Sea. Yemen's territory includes a number of islands as well ...

'Yemen may be divided into five major regions: a coastal plain running north-south known as the Tihāmah ..., the western highlands, the central mountains (the Yemen Highlands), the eastern highlands, and finally the eastern and northeastern desert regions.

'... Yemen is an arid country, and there are no permanent watercourses.'⁴

¹ CIA World Factbook, [Yemen](#) (Geography), updated 25 November 2024

² CIA World Factbook, [United Kingdom](#) (Geography), updated 25 November 2024

³ CIA World Factbook, [Yemen](#) (Geography), updated 25 November 2024

⁴ Burrowes and Wenner, EB, [Yemen](#) (Land), updated 14 January 2025

7.1.3 On its undated 'Maps of Yemen' webpage, which was updated on 7 December 2022, WorldAtlas, a cartographer-created geography resource⁵, stated:

'Yemen (officially the Republic of Yemen) is divided into two main administrative divisions. They are known as Governorates ... and Districts ... Governorates constitute the highest administrative division in Yemen. There are 22 governorates including the capital city - Amanat al Asmah (Sanaa City) ...

'... The 22 governorates are further subdivided into 333 districts and smaller subdivisions including 2,210 sub-districts and 38,284 villages.

'Sana'a is the largest city in Yemen and the capital of the country.'⁶

7.1.4 OnTheWorldMap.com published the following 2021 map of Yemen, showing its 22 governorates and their capitals⁷:



7.1.5 For maps showing the split of control of Yemeni territory between the Houthis and the government of Yemen (and affiliated groups), see CPIN, [Yemen: Security situation](#) (Control of territory sub-section).

[Back to Contents](#)


⁵ WorldAtlas, [About WorldAtlas](#), no date

⁶ WorldAtlas, [Maps Of Yemen](#), updated 7 December 2022

⁷ OnTheWorldMap.com, [Yemen Map](#), 2021

7.2 Demography

- 7.2.1 The US CIA World Factbook estimated the population of Yemen in 2024 to be a little over 32 million⁸, while the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA's) estimated it to be 38.7 million⁹. By comparison, the population of the United Kingdom, estimated in 2024 at just under 68.5 million¹⁰, is around double the population of Yemen.
- 7.2.2 The US CIA World Factbook also noted that 34.4% of Yemenis were estimated to be aged 0 to 14 years, 62.2% aged 15 to 64 years, and 3.4% aged 65 years or over, with a median age of 22 years¹¹.
- 7.2.3 Yemen's population was stated, by the same source, to be mainly concentrated in the Asir Mountains, part of the larger Sarawat Mountain system, located in the far western region of Yemen¹².
- 7.2.4 Cartograf.fr, a geography and maps information site¹³, published the below undated map, showing population distribution across Yemen¹⁴:



[Back to Contents](#)

8. Socio-economic situation

8.1 Basic indicators

Life expectancy	68.2 years (2024 estimate) ¹⁵
------------------------	--

⁸ CIA World Factbook, [Yemen](#) (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024

⁹ OCHA, [Yemen](#), 2024

¹⁰ CIA World Factbook, [United Kingdom](#) (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024

¹¹ CIA World Factbook, [Yemen](#) (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024

¹² CIA World Factbook, [Yemen](#) (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024

¹³ Cartograf.fr (English version), [Research](#), no date

¹⁴ Cartograf.fr (English version), [Map of Yemen with population density](#), no date

¹⁵ CIA World Factbook, [Yemen](#) (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024

Maternal mortality rate (deaths per 100,000 live births)	183 (2020 estimate) ¹⁶
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	44.6 (2024 estimate) ¹⁷
Poverty rate	74% (2022 estimate - based on statistical modelling conducted for the last World Bank Country Economic Memorandum) ¹⁸
GDP per capita	\$855 USD (around £677 GBP ¹⁹) (2021 estimate) ²⁰
Child malnutrition, (moderate or severe, under age 5)	609,808 (estimated by the end of 2024 ²¹ - represents approximately 9.5% of children under 5 (CPIT calculation), based on estimated number of children under 5 in Yemen in 2024 ²²)
Literacy rate (age 15 and older who can read and write)	70.1% (2015 estimate – males 85.1%, females 55%) ²³
Average years of schooling (for age group 20-24 years)	9.36 years (2023 estimate) ²⁴

[Back to Contents](#)

8.2 Economy

8.2.1 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a US-based independent think-tank²⁵, published an article entitled ‘Global Conflict Tracker: Yemen’, which it updated on 5 March 2024. The article, which cited various sources, stated:

‘An economic crisis continues to compound the ongoing humanitarian crisis. In late 2019, the conflict led to the splintering of the economy into two broad economic zones under territories controlled by the Houthis and the Saudi-backed government. In the fall of 2021, the sharp depreciation of Yemen’s currency, particularly in government-controlled areas, significantly reduced people’s purchasing power and pushed many basic necessities even further out of reach ...’²⁶

8.2.2 On 18 January 2023, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published ‘Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 12/December 2022’ which stated:

¹⁶ CIA World Factbook, [Yemen](#) (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024

¹⁷ CIA World Factbook, [Yemen](#) (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024

¹⁸ World Bank, [Yemen Poverty and Equity Assessment 2024...](#) (page 10), February 2024

¹⁹ XE.com, [Currency Converter – US Dollars to British Pounds](#), 24 February 2025

²⁰ UN Data, [Yemen](#) (Economic indicators), no date, accessed: 24 February 2025

²¹ IPC, [Yemen: Acute Malnutrition Situation for November 2023 - June 2024...](#), 19 August 2024

²² Our World in Data, [Number of children under 5 years old](#) (Yemen), accessed 21 November 2024

²³ CIA World Factbook, [Yemen](#) (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024

²⁴ UNESCO IfS & GEMR, [... Database on Education...](#) (Mean years of education in Yemen), 2023

²⁵ CFR, [About CFR](#), no date

²⁶ CFR, [Global Conflict Tracker: Yemen](#), updated 5 March 2024

‘Following the announcement of ... [a conflict] truce in April [2022], the exchange rate made a short recovery before continuing to worsen. The Yemeni Rial (YER) in areas under the Government of Yemen’s (GoY) control, while continuing to fluctuate, has lost approximately 22 per cent of its value since mid-April [2022]. Although the YER largely remained stable in Ansar Allah (AA) [also known as the Houthis²⁷]-controlled areas... prices have increased at a similar rate to those in GoY-held areas, largely due to global increases in food and fuel prices and restrictions on imports through ports in AA-controlled areas.’²⁸

- 8.2.3 On 1 February 2024, the OCHA published a report entitled ‘Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (January 2024)’. The report, which cited various sources including primary data gathered in 2023, stated:

‘While the median cost of the total MEB [minimum expenditure basket, an operational tool that is used to identify and calculate the average cost of a socioeconomically vulnerable household’s multi-sectoral basic needs that can be monetized and accessed in adequate quality through the local market, in a particular context and for a specific moment in time, without resorting to negative coping strategies or compromising their health, dignity, and essential livelihood assets²⁹] largely stabilized in 2023, on average it remains at a multi-year high in both Government and AA-controlled areas. Between January and November [2023], the total MEB cost increased by just 0.4 per cent in Government-held areas and decreased by 9 per cent in AA-controlled areas. However, both figures reflect an increase of 117 per cent and 17 per cent in Government-controlled and AA-controlled areas, respectively, compared to the January 2021 MEB.’³⁰

- 8.2.4 On 31 October 2024, the World Bank Group published a press release which stated:

‘Yemen’s economy continues to confront deepening challenges as prolonged conflict, political fragmentation, and escalating regional tensions drive the country into an even more severe humanitarian and economic crisis, according to the World Bank’s latest Yemen Economic Monitor (YEM). The Fall 2024 edition... reveals that Yemen’s GDP [gross domestic product, ‘a measure of the size and health of a country’s economy’³¹]... [saw] a 2 percent decline in 2023, exacerbating the 54 percent drop in real GDP per capita since 2015.

‘... The report underscores the significant economic hardships caused by the continued Houthi blockade on oil exports, which contributed to a 42 percent drop in fiscal revenues for the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) in the first half of 2024, preventing it from providing essential services to the population.

‘... Economic fragmentation between Houthi- and IRG-controlled areas continues to worsen, with disparities in inflation and exchange rates undermining both stability and future recovery efforts. Simultaneously,

²⁷ Al Jazeera, [Who are the Houthis? A simple guide to the Yemeni group](#), 12 January 2024

²⁸ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 12/December 2022](#) (page 2), 18 January 2023

²⁹ CALP Network, [Calculating the Minimum Expenditure Basket ...](#) (page 7), October 2022

³⁰ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 10), 1 February 2024

³¹ Bank of England, [What is GDP?](#), no date, last updated 10 January 2019

regional tensions, especially in the Red Sea [the Houthis began attacking ships in the Red Sea in November 2023³²], have led to a more than 60 percent reduction in traffic through the strategic Bab El-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal. However, these disruptions have not yet resulted in significant increases in consumer prices.³³

- 8.2.5 On 15 October 2024, the Policy Center for the New South (PCNS), a Moroccan think tank³⁴, published a report entitled ‘Yemen’s Path to Stability’, which cited various sources. The report stated:

‘Economic recovery has been slow and uneven. The PLC [Presidential Leadership Council, currently the central authority in government-controlled areas of Yemen] faces significant challenges in reviving Yemen’s economy, which has been devastated by years of conflict. Issues such as rampant inflation, unemployment, and the destruction of infrastructure persist, making economic stabilization a daunting task. The Presidential Leadership Council currently lacks a cohesive economic strategy beyond its focus on revenue generation and stabilizing the exchange rate. While these priorities are crucial, efforts to enhance revenue generation are significantly impeded by a lack of trust and coordination among its various factions. This disunity hinders the Council’s ability to implement effective and unified economic policies.’³⁵

- 8.2.6 On 16 October 2024, the Sana’a Center, an independent think-tank which operates in, and focuses on, Yemen³⁶, published a report entitled ‘The Yemen Review Quarterly: July-September 2024’ which stated:

‘New rials, the banknotes used in territory controlled by the internationally recognized government, reached a record low in September [2024], trading at less than YR1,900 [~£6.06 GBP³⁷] to the dollar [~£0.79 GBP³⁸]. The government has struggled to prop up its value through foreign currency auctions and various debt instruments, but the rial has now lost approximately a quarter of its value since the beginning of the year [2024]. Insufficient Saudi support and the ongoing Houthi blockade of oil exports are the primary drivers of decline.

‘... Frontline fighting may have eased, but the eruption of the Gaza war and the escalation of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have sunk the country further into political division, economic deterioration, and a deep sense of drift.’³⁹

- 8.2.7 On 25 October 2024, the World Bank Group updated its webpage, ‘The World Bank in Yemen’. It stated: ‘The ongoing conflict has crippled the economic and social development in the country and led to a deterioration in living standards of most of the population. The economy is expected to contract for the second consecutive year by 1% in 2024.’⁴⁰

³² BBC News, [Who are the Houthis and why are they attacking Red Sea ships?](#), 15 March 2024

³³ World Bank Group, [... Mounting Economic Challenges as Conflict Continues...](#), 31 October 2024

³⁴ PCNS, [About Us](#), no date

³⁵ PCNS, [Yemen's Path to Stability ...](#) (page 18), 15 October 2024

³⁶ Sana’a Center, [About Us](#), no date

³⁷ XE.com, [Currency Converter – Yemeni Rials to British Pounds](#), 22 November 2024

³⁸ XE.com, [Currency Converter – US Dollars to British Pounds](#), 22 November 2024

³⁹ Sana’a Center, [... Review Quarterly: July-September 2024](#) (pages 6 and 7), 16 October 2024


⁴⁰ World Bank Group, [The World Bank In Yemen](#) (Overview: Context), updated 25 October 2024

8.2.8 For information about the internationally recognised government of Yemen, including the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the Houthis (also known as Ansar Allah), and the territories of control in Yemen, see CPIN, [Yemen: Security situation](#).

[Back to Contents](#)

8.3 Employment

8.3.1 On an unspecified date in 2024, Statista, a global data and business intelligence platform⁴¹, published the below graph showing the unemployment rate in Yemen between 2004 and 2023⁴²:



© Statista 2024

CPIT noted the above figures relate to the formal employment economy. However, many Yemenis are informally employed (see paragraph 8.3.6 below). CPIT also noted that the unemployment rate on the above graph (the y axis) starts at 12%, resulting in a steeper increase on the graph than would appear had the y axis started from zero.

8.3.2 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated:

‘A loss of livelihoods for millions of Yemenis, coupled with the ad hoc payment of civil servant salaries, continues to hold the country back. Young people under the age of 25 ... are particularly affected: 1 in 4 youth[s] aged between 15 and 24 were unemployed in 2021, with women worst affected (36 vs. 24 per cent [of men] unemployed).

⁴¹ Statista, [Who We Are](#), no date

⁴² Statista, [Yemen: Unemployment rate from 2004 to 2023](#), 2024

'... Wages across the country continue to stagnate and, in some cases, decrease, serving to ... negatively impact household purchasing power.'⁴³

- 8.3.3 The same source stated: 'Yemen ... remains one of the most contaminated countries globally by landmines and explosive remnants of war ... The presence of mines ... creates barriers to pursuing subsistence farming and other income generating activities.'⁴⁴
- 8.3.4 On 14 April 2023, ACAPS, an independent organisation that provides humanitarian data and analysis to assist with disaster response⁴⁵, published a report about the challenges to housing, land, and property rights in Yemen. The report cited various sources including 3 key informant interviews (KIIs) with housing, land, and property experts in the Yemen⁴⁶. Citing one such KII, held in March 2023, the report stated: 'Public sector salaries in the DFA [the de-facto authority, also known as the Houthis⁴⁷] governorates have not been paid for several years, and there are limited alternative income-generation options.'⁴⁸
- 8.3.5 On 29 February 2024, Freedom House published 'Freedom in the World 2023 – Yemen', covering events of 2023, which stated: 'Normal [trade] union activity has been disrupted by the civil war and the related breakdown of the economy... [B]usiness activity ... [has] been severely disrupted by the civil war and unchecked corruption, as well as the retreat of state authorities from large areas of Yemen and the division of the country into spheres of influence controlled by different armed groups.'⁴⁹ CPIT noted that the report did not elaborate on the disruption that it said occurred.
- 8.3.6 On 23 April 2024, the United States Department of State (USSD) published '2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Yemen', covering events of 2023 (the 2023 USSD Human Rights report), which stated:
'The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimated in March 2021 that informal employment represented 78 percent of total employment. In July [2023], the government reported the informal sector had developed at an "accelerated pace" in recent years due to the impact of conflict and lack of effective economic policies ... Working conditions were poor in the informal sector, and wage and overtime violations were common.'⁵⁰
- 8.3.7 Amnesty International (AI) also published its annual report on 23 April 2024. Entitled 'The State of the World's Human Rights' and covering events of 2023 (the AI 2023 Human Rights report), the report stated: 'The Huthi de facto authorities continued to ban women from travelling without a male guardian, restricting their ability to work ...'⁵¹

⁴³ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024...](#) (pages 9 and 10), 1 February 2024

⁴⁴ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 8), 1 February 2024

⁴⁵ ACAPS, [Who we are](#), no date

⁴⁶ ACAPS, [Yemen: Challenges to Housing, Land, and Property Rights](#) (page 2), 14 April 2023

⁴⁷ ACAPS, [Yemen: Challenges to Housing, Land, and Property Rights](#) (page 4), 14 April 2023

⁴⁸ ACAPS, [Yemen: Challenges to Housing, Land, and Property Rights](#) (page 11), 14 April 2023

⁴⁹ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2023 – Yemen](#) (sections E3 and G2), 29 February 2024

⁵⁰ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Yemen](#) (page 59), 23 April 2024

⁵¹ AI, [The State of the World's Human Rights](#) (Yemen) (page 409), 23 April 2024

8.4 Poverty

8.4.1 On 25 February 2024, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) published a report dated December 2023 entitled 'Measuring Multidimensional Poverty in Yemen'. The report presented the national Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) for Yemen based on the results of a 2021 Yemen Human Development Survey (YHDS). The 2021 YHDS, with a sample size of 1,681 households, was the first face-to-face household survey since the onset of conflict in Yemen. It comprised 6 dimensions (education, health, child and maternal health, services, living standards and employment) and 17 indicators⁵². The report stated:

'Results indicated that 82.7 percent of people were living in multidimensional poverty, or more than 8 in every 10 people based on the regions surveyed. The intensity of poverty, or the average number of deprivations faced by multidimensionally poor people, was 46.7 per cent.

'... Poverty tended to be higher in rural areas (89.4 percent) than urban areas (68.9 percent). Ad Dali' and Al Bayda [governorates] had the highest incidence of multidimensional poverty. An estimated 40 percent of multidimensionally poor people lived in Ta'iz governorate, which has a large population.'⁵³

8.4.2 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report, which cited various sources, stated: 'The current level of poverty is believed to be significantly higher than in 2014, when nearly half (49 per cent) of Yemenis were living below the poverty line, with 2022 estimates reaching nearly 80 per cent of the population.'⁵⁴

8.4.3 A World Bank report entitled 'Yemen Poverty and Equity Assessment 2024: Living in Dire Conditions', dated February 2024, stated:

'Many millions of Yemenis suffer from hunger and poverty. But a lack of data makes it hard to estimate exactly how many people are poor, or to analyze the main drivers of poverty. Produced by the World Bank's Poverty and Equity Unit, this Poverty Assessment synthesizes multiple novel data sources...

'... The majority of Yemenis live in poverty ... Given the extent of Yemen's economic deterioration, precipitous rise in the cost of living, rising population, and comparisons with non-monetary data gathered in other countries, it is reasonable to claim that poverty has risen drastically from the 49 percent recorded in 2014. As many as 74 percent of Yemenis could live in poverty, and Yemen is likely among the top 15 percent of poor countries.'⁵⁵

8.4.4 The 31 October 2024 World Bank Group press release stated: 'The conflict has pushed most Yemenis into poverty ...'⁵⁶

⁵² UNDP, [Measuring Multidimensional Poverty ...](#) (page 7), December 2023 (25 February 2024)

⁵³ UNDP, [Measuring Multidimensional Poverty ...](#) (page 7), December 2023 (25 February 2024)

⁵⁴ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 9), 1 February 2024

⁵⁵ World Bank, [Yemen Poverty and Equity Assessment ...](#) (pages 9 and 84), February 2024

⁵⁶ World Bank Group, [... Mounting Economic Challenges as Conflict Continues...](#), 31 October 2024

9. Humanitarian situation

9.1 Overview

9.1.1 In January 2024, the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP), a service under the United Nations Protection Cluster for Yemen which monitors the civilian impact of armed violence in Yemen⁵⁷, published its '2023 Annual Report', covering the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023⁵⁸. The report stated: 'There was a significant decrease in the impact of armed violence on civilian infrastructure in 2023 ... 25 incidents of armed violence were reported to have impacted civilian infrastructure, down 80% compared to 2022.'⁵⁹

9.1.2 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report also stated:

'Crucial civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, water supply systems [sic] and housing infrastructure, have sustained extensive damage due to the conflict.

'... Nearly 90 per cent of the population lack access to publicly supplied electricity. Critical infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, have been widely damaged. Key public service employees (notably most Yemeni health workers and two-thirds of all Yemeni teachers) have not received a regular salary in years. For women, additional risks exist. Access to comprehensive GBV [gender based violence] services remain scarce, with less than 5 per cent of health facilities provide [sic] clinical management of rape or GBV.

'... Socio-economic vulnerabilities are heightened for persons with disabilities in Yemen, including in terms of access to economic, social, health and civil rights and opportunities, particularly in districts with high severity ... Social services for persons with disabilities were effectively suspended in Yemen in 2015 due to the conflict, and only a fraction of the organisations previously providing support are still doing so. Of the available services, many lack the capacity required to address specific needs, and staff often lack appropriate knowledge.'⁶⁰

9.1.3 The Freedom in the World 2023 report stated: 'Border controls, naval blockades, internal controls on utilities, and other disruptions associated with the war have contributed to shortages of food, medicine, fuel, and other essential goods and services, leaving the public more exposed to famine and disease as well as coercion and deprivation by armed groups and illegal traders... [a]lthough the 2022 truce allowed more supplies to enter the country...'⁶¹

9.1.4 On 7 March 2024, the OCHA published 'Yemen Humanitarian Update: Issue 1, January-February 2024' which stated: 'The UN-brokered truce, which

⁵⁷ CIMP, [2023 Annual Report](#) (page 8), January 2024

⁵⁸ CIMP, [2023 Annual Report](#) (page 1), January 2024

⁵⁹ CIMP, [2023 Annual Report](#) (page 8), January 2024

⁶⁰ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024...](#) (pages 19 and 24), 1 February 2024

⁶¹ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2023 – Yemen](#) (section G4), 29 February 2024

lasted formally until October 2022, and its de facto continuation throughout 2023, saw some slight improvements in humanitarian conditions.’⁶²

- 9.1.5 On 18 July 2024, Mwatana for Human Rights (referred to solely as Mwatana herein), an independent Yemeni organisation that advocates for human rights via the verification and documentation of human rights violations⁶³, published its annual report on the human rights situation in Yemen, covering events of 2023. The report, which cited various sources, stated:

‘Although Yemen is experiencing a relative calm in terms of large-scale military operations compared to previous years of conflict... [t]his calm has not translated into an improved humanitarian situation for civilian populations ...

‘Obtaining even the most basic necessities of life, including food, clean drinking water, healthcare, and education, has become an urgent matter requiring strenuous efforts and exhaustion in the face of limited income sources, continuous economic deterioration, and restrictions imposed on businesses, including the simplest and lowest-income-generating activities.

‘... [V]ital sectors such as health, education, electricity, and water have been paralyzed due to shortages of supplies and necessary equipment, along with the non-payment of employee salaries and the commission of other violations and obstructions by parties to the conflict. Additionally, a significant portion of the infrastructure in these vital sectors has been partially or completely destroyed as a result of targeting by conflict parties through various means, including airstrikes, ground attacks, occupation, and use for military purposes, posing a significant challenge to civilians in accessing services provided by these sectors.

‘... [T]he deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Yemen... showed no improvement throughout 2023.’⁶⁴

- 9.1.6 The CIMP 2024 Quarter 1 report included the following graphic showing the number of incidents that impacted civilian property and infrastructure during quarter one of 2024, by type of armed violence⁶⁵:


⁶² OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Update: Issue 1, January-February 2024](#), 7 March 2024

⁶³ Mwatana, [About Mwatana](#), no date

⁶⁴ Mwatana, [... Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023](#) (pages 30,31 and 34), 18 July 2024

⁶⁵ CIMP, [CIMP Quarterly Report, Q1 2024: January – March 2024](#) (page 4), 2024

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IMPACTING CIVILIAN PROPERTY AND INFRASTRUCTURE DURING Q1 2024 BY TYPE OF ARMED VIOLENCE



9.1.7 The same source noted that during quarter 1 of 2024:

- 3 incidents led to 20,403 households facing restricted access to health, education, first responders, and/or worship
- 13 incidents led to 1,270,746 households facing restricted access to transport, telecommunication, media, fuel, governmental buildings, recreation, and/or electricity
- there were no incidents relating to, and therefore no households facing restricted access to, water facilities, aid, and/or food storage⁶⁶

9.1.8 On 6 May 2024, the OCHA published a joint Statement by 190 Humanitarian Organisations in Yemen which stated:

‘Economic decline, deteriorating public services and infrastructure and displacement induced by conflict and climate-related disasters continue to drive the humanitarian crisis. Rising food insecurity, the risk of increasing malnutrition rates - particularly among pregnant and lactating women, older people and children - and the spread of cholera during the current rainy season, pose threats to communities across the country... [T]he presence of explosive remnants of war results in ... displacement, restricts access to agricultural land and resettlement and hinders post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts.’⁶⁷

9.1.9 On 23 October 2024, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations sexual and reproductive health agency⁶⁸, published ‘Situation Report #03: Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen’ which stated: ‘Against a

⁶⁶ CIMP, [CIMP Quarterly Report, Q1 2024: January – March 2024](#) (page 6), 2024

⁶⁷ OCHA, [Joint Statement by 190 Humanitarian Organisations in Yemen...](#), 6 May 2024

⁶⁸ UNFPA, [Who we are](#), no date

backdrop of regional escalation, the humanitarian situation in Yemen continues to worsen, both in scale and severity.’⁶⁹


9.1.10 The 31 October 2024 World Bank Group press release stated: ‘Since 2023, living conditions have deteriorated drastically for the majority of the population.’⁷⁰

9.1.11 On 7 November 2024, the OCHA published ‘Yemen: Humanitarian Response Snapshot - August 2024’ which stated: ‘Yemen remains one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises ... Despite the de facto continuation of the truce on the ground, the country still faces the brunt of conflict and displacement, protection concerns, climate change, and economic deterioration.’⁷¹

9.1.12 In January 2025, CIMP published its ‘2024 Annual Report’ (the CIMP 2024 Annual report) on the direct impact of armed violence on civilians in Yemen, covering the period from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024. The report published the below graph, showing incidents impacting on civilian infrastructure in 2024, and stated:

‘There was a significant increase in reports of armed violence impacting civilian transport, telecommunications and electricity infrastructure in 2024, driven entirely by the resumption of airstrikes on Yemen. Across the categories below, 70 incidents of armed violence were reported to have impacted civilian infrastructure, almost threefold the 15 reported in 2023. Transport infrastructure was the most heavily impacted category, impacted in 33 incidents, the highest frequency to be reported since 2018. Of the 70 incidents to impact infrastructural sites in 2024, 51 (73%) were on account of airstrikes.’⁷²

Incidents impacting on civilian infrastructure in 2024



[Back to Contents](#)

⁶⁹ UNFPA, [Situation Report #03: Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen](#) (page 2), 23 October 2024

⁷⁰ World Bank Group, [... Mounting Economic Challenges as Conflict Continues...](#), 31 October 2024

⁷¹ OCHA, [Yemen: Humanitarian Response Snapshot - August 2024](#) (page 1), 7 November 2024

⁷² CIMP, [2024 Annual Report](#) (page 9), January 2025

9.2 People in need (PIN)

9.2.1 A Technical Manual published in July 2024 by the Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF), a partnership of donors, United Nations agencies, NGOs, global clusters and other stakeholders which sets the standards for the analysis and estimation of humanitarian needs⁷³, noted that it used the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), a humanitarian coordination forum⁷⁴, definition of people in need (PIN)⁷⁵ which stated:

‘People in Need are a sub-set of the population affected and include those members:

- ‘whose physical security, basic rights, dignity, living conditions or livelihoods are threatened or have been disrupted, AND
- ‘whose current level of access to basic services, goods and social protection is inadequate to re-establish normal living conditions with their accustomed means in a timely manner without additional assistance.’⁷⁶

9.2.2 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated:

‘In 2024, 18.2 million people - over 55 per cent of the population [CPIT noted that OCHA subsequently upwardly revised it’s 2024 population estimate to 38.7 million, which therefore alters the percentage of the population to 47%⁷⁷] - will need humanitarian assistance and protection services in Yemen. This represents a 16 per cent decrease compared to 2023 and confirms the downward trend witnessed in the past two years. The overall decrease in civilian casualties, greater freedom of movement inside the country and increased flow of commercial imports, as well as enhanced humanitarian access in some areas, were key factors leading to a decrease in forecasted people in need moving into 2024.

‘... Lack of access to adequate services remains a key driver of humanitarian needs, with considerable pressure on basic services and hosting communities.

‘More than half of the country’s population struggles to access food, safe drinking water and adequate health services.’⁷⁸

9.2.3 OCHA published an updated [Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan \(HNRP\) 2025](#) on 15 January 2025, from which country information has also been cited within this CPIN. CPIT noted that in its updated report, OCHA provided estimated numbers of people in need, including by sector-specific needs, for 2025. It was further noted that where OCHA provided estimated numbers of people in need, including by sector-specific needs, for 2024 in its 2025 HNRP, these were unchanged from the estimated numbers that OCHA provided in its [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024](#). As the country information within this CPIN relates to events up to 31 December 2024 (see [About the country information](#) for details), and as OCHA does not

⁷³ JIAF, [Homepage](#), no date

⁷⁴ IASC, [Who We Are](#), no date

⁷⁵ JIAF, [JIAF 2: Technical Manual](#) (page 32), July 2024

⁷⁶ IASC, [Humanitarian Population Figures](#) (section 3.1), April 2016

⁷⁷ OCHA, [Yemen](#), 2024


⁷⁸ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024...](#) (pages 13 and 19), 1 February 2024

appear to have revised its 2024 estimated numbers in retrospect, CPIT has quoted the OCHA 2024 estimated figures from the [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024](#) despite the publication of the [2025 HNRP](#). CPIT deemed this particularly helpful due to the OCHA graphics for the 2024 estimated numbers included throughout this CPIN, which were provided in the [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024](#) but not the [2025 HNRP](#) (which provided many of the equivalent graphics for 2025 estimated numbers only).

9.2.4 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report also provided a breakdown of the estimated people in need, by population group, and by sex and age⁷⁹:

Sex/Age Group	PIN population in millions % of the PIN in brackets	Population group	PIN population in millions % of the PIN in brackets
Men (over 18)	4.2m (24%)	Children under 5	5m (27%)
Women (over 18)	4.2m (23%)	Internally displaced people (IDPs)	4.5m (25%)
Boys (0-17)	5m (27%)	Persons with disability	2.7m (15%)
Girls (0-17)	4.8m (26%)	Pregnant and lactating women	2.7m (15%)

9.2.5 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report also published the below graph, showing annual numbers of people in need in Yemen since 2013⁸⁰:



⁷⁹ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 4), 1 February 2024

⁸⁰ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 13), 1 February 2024

- 9.2.6 The same source set out that the population groups forecast to be most in need in Yemen were malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women; internally displaced persons (IDPs); migrants, refugees and asylum seekers; and, the largest of the population groups in need, vulnerable residents within the non-displaced population⁸¹. It stated that:
- 9.2.7 ‘This broader group of “vulnerable residents”... includes those facing severe needs, such as non-displaced people with high food needs, those living close to frontlines with restricted access to basic services, communities hosting a high number of IDPs facing collapsing public services and/or depleting resources, those facing barriers in accessing basic health, WASH [water, sanitation and hygiene], education and nutrition services and are under risk of a severe deterioration of their conditions, those with severe protection needs, and those living with inadequate shelters.’⁸²
- 9.2.8 On 31 March 2024, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) published a report entitled ‘2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen’ which noted that of 18.2 million people in need, 17.6 million of them were in acute need (compared with 13.4 million people in acute need of 21.6 million people in need in 2023⁸³)⁸⁴. CPIT noted that no definition of ‘acute’ in this context was provided.
- 9.2.9 OCHA also provided an [interactive map](#) showing people in need in 2024 in Yemen, by location.

[Back to Contents](#)

9.3 Severity of need by location

- 9.3.1 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated:

‘Based on the JIAF [Joint and Intersectoral Analysis Framework, a partnership of donors, United Nations agencies, NGOs, global clusters and other stakeholders which sets the standards for the analysis and estimation of humanitarian needs⁸⁵] inter-sectoral analysis, the districts of Al Modhaffar, Al Qahirah and Salah in Ta’iz Governorate, Hays [a town and district of the same name in the south of Hudaydah governorate, close to the border with Ta’izz governorate⁸⁶] and Al Jarrahi in Al Hodeidah Governorate and Abs in Hajjah Governorates are the top six districts reporting the highest severity score (severity five [which indicates ‘dire humanitarian crisis’⁸⁷]), with an overall number of 900,000 people in dire needs. All six districts are located in close proximity to conflict frontlines. 95 per cent of the internally displaced people (IDPs) living there and up to 83 per cent of the host communities in five districts need urgent humanitarian assistance and protection.

‘Thirteen million people live in 167 districts classified as severity four as per the inter-sectoral analysis. Al Hodeidah governorate comes at the top with

⁸¹ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024...](#) (pages 22 to 23), 1 February 2024

⁸² OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 23), 1 February 2024

⁸³ UNFPA, [UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023](#) (page 8), 7 February 2023

⁸⁴ UNFPA, [2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen](#) (page 6), 31 March 2024

⁸⁵ JIAF, [Homepage](#), no date

⁸⁶ Mapcarta, [Hays](#), no date


⁸⁷ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024...](#) (footnote 43 on page 66), 1 February 2024

19 districts in severity four [extreme conditions⁸⁸] followed by Ta'iz (17 districts), Sa'dah (14 districts), and Hajjah (12 districts). The governorates of Ibb, Marib and Abyan have respectively 10, nine and eight districts in severity four.

'Notwithstanding the slight improvements, large scale needs remain countrywide.'⁸⁹


9.3.2 The same report also published the map below, showing the number of PIN by district in December 2023⁹⁰:

PEOPLE IN NEED BY DISTRICTS (DECEMBER 2023)



9.3.3 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report also published the below map, showing severity of needs by district in December 2023⁹¹:

SEVERITY BY DISTRICT (DEC 2023)



⁸⁸ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 57), 1 February 2024

⁸⁹ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 14), 1 February 2024


⁹⁰ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 4), 1 February 2024

⁹¹ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 14), 1 February 2024

9.4 Shelter and non-food items (NFI)

9.4.1 The JIAF Technical Manual, published in July 2024, defined people with shelter/ NFI needs as: ‘Affected population whose shelter needs severity is classified as “Crisis”, “Critical” or “Catastrophic” where shelter needs refers to the gap or discrepancy that the population are experiencing in relation to living with dignity and security of tenure in adequate dwellings, with access to community-level services and infrastructure.’⁹²

9.4.2 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report published the below graphic showing the numbers of people it estimated would have shelter and non-food items (NFI) needs in 2024, and the severity of those needs, by location⁹³:



9.4.3 The same source stated:

‘The impact of the protracted crisis resulted in severe housing damage both in urban and rural areas. Multiple displacements, the destruction of housing and infrastructure, and lack of livelihoods and income-generating activities have forced both internally displaced persons and host populations to reside in over-crowded and sub-standard shelter conditions exposing them to significant protection risks. Unlawful occupancy of property, unaffordability or unavailability of housing, or restrictions on access to property are some of the rampant HLP violations taking place in the country. Other HLP challenges include insecure land tenure; lack of suitable land; ineffective land dispute mechanisms; limited access to land for livelihoods; contamination of land by explosive hazards; and lack of civil and HLP documentation (the former being a prerequisite to obtaining HLP documentation) ... Displaced women face particular barriers to accessing their rights: they are less likely than men to have property documents in their

⁹² JIAF, [JIAF 2: Technical Manual](#) (page 33), July 2024

⁹³ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 38), 1 February 2024

name, less likely to be decision-makers in their household, and they are often expected to inherit less than would their male counterparts.

'... Between January to September 2023, 29 per cent of IDPs living outside of hosting sites received an eviction notification, in comparison to 17 per cent in IDP hosting sites. Forced evictions in IDP sites are usually applied to groups and caused by landlords and government bodies who wish to use the land on which IDPs are staying. Individual forced evictions most often affect IDPs in rented accommodation due to an inability to pay rent, a trend that is worsening with increasing inflation, unemployment and loss of livelihoods. From January to September 2023, an estimated 86 per cent of IDPs living in rental housing - the majority of the displaced population - were unable to pay rent on a regular basis, in comparison to 71 per cent of IDPs living in hosting sites. Difficulties paying rent may also lead to property and identification seizures or imprisonment, each with substantial further protection implications.'⁹⁴

- 9.4.4 The April 2023 ACAPS housing, land, and property report, citing a key informant interview, stated:

'Before the conflict, certain groups, such as women, already faced disadvantages in accessing their HLP [housing, land, and property] rights. Both tradition and law largely restrict housing, land and property ownership to men. Members of the Muhamasheen [an ethnic group which translates from Arabic to English as "marginalised"⁹⁵] in Yemen also face discrimination and cannot access their HLP rights. Access to adequate housing and land dispute resolution mechanisms has become even more difficult for those displaced.'⁹⁶

- 9.4.5 The same source, citing various KIIs held in February and March 2023, stated:

'Large-scale damage to houses in both urban and rural areas influences people's choice to return to their places of origin. Besides continued insecurity and a lack of viable livelihood options, the destruction of houses, markets, and infrastructure is one of the reasons for the very low rate of intention to return, as people anticipate large repair and rebuilding work that for most is unaffordable without support.

'... Many landlords want to ensure that IDPs only stay temporarily on their land and do not agree to setting up more permanent structures and infrastructure.

'... The large number of cases in the displacement context limits the local authority's capacity to deal with HLP rights issues.

'... Tribes can have a powerful influence over land-related decision-making and can have more leverage over land than local authorities. This influence often results in violent conflict, which can cause new displacement.'⁹⁷

⁹⁴ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024...](#) (pages 17 to 18), 1 February 2024

⁹⁵ ACTED, NRC & IOM CCCM teams (pub. by UNHCR), [... Yemen Muhamasheen...](#), 21 March 2023

⁹⁶ ACAPS, [Yemen: Challenges to Housing, Land, and Property Rights](#) (page 3), 14 April 2023

⁹⁷ ACAPS, [Yemen: Challenges to Housing, Land, and Property ...](#) (pages 8 and 10), 14 April 2023

- 9.4.6 The Freedom in the World 2023 report stated: ‘Land disputes in the Houthis-held areas are handled by Houthi-controlled courts, which can lead to the rejection of government-issued documentation and the seizure of land.’⁹⁸
- 9.4.7 The CIMP 2024 Quarter 1 report stated: ‘There were 26 reports of armed violence impacting civilian houses in Yemen in Q1 2024, down from 43 in Q4 2023, and the lowest quarterly count of such incidents on CIMP records [which commenced in 2018⁹⁹] ...’¹⁰⁰
- 9.4.8 The CIMP 2024 Annual report stated:
 ‘Houses were reportedly impacted in 111 incidents of armed violence in 2024, marking a decrease for the fifth consecutive year, and down 61% from the 287 incidents to impact houses in 2023 [and down 77% from the 480 incidents to impact houses in 2022¹⁰¹]. 109 civilians were reportedly killed or injured in incidents impacting civilian homes, almost a third of whom were children. Moreover, as many as 446 households were assessed to face possible displacement as a result. As in 2023, more incidents (42) impacted civilian houses in Ta’izz than in any other governorate, due to persisting frontline hostilities near residential areas. 19 incidents reportedly impacted civilian homes in Ta’izz city, and another 11 in Maqbanah, in the west. Another frontline governorate, Dali’, saw 15 reports of houses being impacted, and 16 such incidents were reported in the western border districts of Sa’dah, as a result of cross-border shellfire.’¹⁰²

[Back to Contents](#)

9.5 Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)

- 9.5.1 The JIAF Technical Manual, published in July 2024, defined people with WASH needs as: ‘Affected population who have insufficient access to water, sanitation and/or hygiene to meet their needs or who have to rely on negative coping strategies to meet their WASH need.’¹⁰³
- 9.5.2 In October 2022, the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), a Washington DC-based non-profit organisation that focuses on advocating for the responsibility of conflict parties towards civilians before, during and after armed conflict¹⁰⁴, published a report entitled ‘Risking the Future: Climate change, Environmental Destruction, and Conflict in Yemen’. The report, based on semi-structured telephone and video call interviews with 37 individuals including members of CIVIC-support Community Protection Groups (CPGs) and security forces, government officials, and subject-area experts¹⁰⁵, and which also cited various other sources, stated:
 ‘Waste management is ... a significant challenge across the country. According to Ishraq Al-Maqtari, a member of the National Commission for the Investigation into Alleged Human Rights Violations in Yemen and an

⁹⁸ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2023 – Yemen](#) (section G2), 29 February 2024

⁹⁹ CIMP, [2023 Annual Report](#) (pages 2 and 5), January 2024

¹⁰⁰ CIMP, [CIMP Quarterly Report, Q1 2024: January – March 2024](#) (page 2), 2024

¹⁰¹ CIMP, [2023 Annual Report](#) (page 8), January 2024

¹⁰² CIMP, [2024 Annual Report](#) (page 8), January 2025

¹⁰³ JIAF, [JIAF 2: Technical Manual](#) (page 33), July 2024

¹⁰⁴ Ecoi.net, [Source description - Center for Civilians in Conflict ...](#), 15 September 2022

¹⁰⁵ CIVIC, [... Climate Change, Environment ... and Conflict in Yemen](#) (page 6), October 2022

activist from Taiz, waste is not picked up or managed at all in the governorate because waste management sites are located at the edge of the governorate on the frontlines of the war. Since these sites became inaccessible, the government has done little to divert the waste, instead leaving it to pile up throughout the governorate. This situation has led to drastic spikes in disease. “There used to be a trench down the middle of the main road [in Taiz city] to navigate water, and now it is being used as a dump,” Al-Maqtari told CIVIC... In many areas across the country... sewage holes have been dug at random and without any government regulation. Some have been dug too deep and have infiltrated the groundwater, thus contaminating vital water sources.

‘... In Marib, where the population exploded from under 500,000 to over 3 million people during the war due to the influx of IDPs, the Hygiene Improvement Office... have not had the resources or infrastructure to solve the city’s overflowing waste problems. In Aden, too, the Ministry of Water and Environment has struggled to manage what sewage systems they have without the money to buy fuel or much-needed new pumps and piping. “... There are no government offices working on these issues,” Dr. Saleh [the Chief Technical Advisor] of UNFAO [UN Food and Agricultural Organization] shared with CIVIC, “particularly in the north where they haven’t gotten their salaries for years...”¹⁰⁶

9.5.3 The same source also stated:

‘Landmines have... been specifically placed around and within water sources. In Taiz, the many areas that contain wells and are critical water sources for the area have been “contaminated the most with landmines.” Landmines were also placed in a stream in the area, a practice seen in other parts of the country as well.’¹⁰⁷

9.5.4 The October 2022 CIVIC report also stated:

‘In conversations with CIVIC, Dr. Saleh [said]... “Water scarcity is the biggest problem Yemen faces,”...

‘... Marib, [is] the governorate most impacted by the influx of IDPs from around the country... The governorate has “little infrastructure” and “not enough water,” and it “can’t meet the needs of all of the people,” said a government official working on environmental protection in Marib... The exponential increase in population in the area has also led to... further threats to the limited water supplies, and other health problems.

‘In Taiz as well, there has been a great strain on resources. “Water resources have always been an issue,” Colonel Aref [the head of YEMAC (Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre) in Taiz] told CIVIC. “Now it’s become a huge issue.” As more civilians from the outskirts of Taiz have been displaced to the city center because of the war, he noted, crowding around wells has increased and water has become scarcer.’¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ CIVIC, [... Climate Change, Environment ... and Conflict in Yemen](#) (pages 12 to 13), October 2022

¹⁰⁷ CIVIC, [... Climate Change, Environment ... and Conflict in Yemen](#) (page 16), October 2022

¹⁰⁸ CIVIC, [... Climate Change, Environment... and Conflict ...](#) (pages 18 and 20 to 21), October 2022

9.5.5 The OCHA December 2022 Yemen Humanitarian Update stated: ‘Water infrastructure is operating at less than five per cent efficiency.’¹⁰⁹

9.5.6 On 11 December 2023, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report about Houthi and Yemeni Government violations of the right to water in Taizz which stated:


‘Yemen is one of the most water-scarce countries in the world ...

‘Since the start of the current conflict in 2014, warring parties only have exacerbated Yemen’s water crisis. Today, the UN finds that 15.3 million Yemenis - more than half the population - do not have access to sufficient, safe, and acceptable water for personal and domestic uses, including drinking, cooking, and sanitation.

‘... For eight years, Houthi and Yemeni government forces have violated the rights of Taizz’s residents to water’¹¹⁰

9.5.7 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated: ‘More than 80 per cent of the population do not have connection to the sewer system, and 39 per cent lack access to safe methods of sanitation disposal and the abysmal state of solid waste management throughout Yemen, especially in urban areas is evident.’¹¹¹

9.5.8 The same source also published the below graphic showing the numbers of people it estimated would have water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) needs in 2024, and the severity of those needs, by location¹¹²:



9.5.9 On 5 April 2024, Action Against Hunger, a US-based global humanitarian organisation¹¹³, published an article which stated: ‘... [W]hile water has always been scarce in this arid climate, the conflict extensively damaged

¹⁰⁹ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 12/December 2022](#) (page 2), 18 January 2023

¹¹⁰ HRW, [... Violations of the Right to Water in Taizz](#) (Summary), 11 December 2023

¹¹¹ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 19), 1 February 2024

¹¹² OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 39), 1 February 2024

¹¹³ Action Against Hunger, [About](#), no date

Yemen's water and sanitation infrastructure. An estimated 15.3 million people are making do without access to clean water sources or even water purification products. Dirty water and lack of sufficient sanitation is a deadly combination, with waterborne "diseases of inequity" like cholera on the rise last year and likely to surge again with warmer weather.¹¹⁴

9.5.10 The Mwatana July 2024 Yemen human rights report, covering 2023, stated:

'... [T]he armed conflict has caused a severe crisis in accessing clean and potable water.

'... [T]he water ... sector ... suffer[s] from widespread power outages in various Yemeni regions for extended periods, exposing residents of hotter areas like Al- Hudaydah and Aden to additional suffering and diseases resulting from high temperatures ... In the nine years following the onset of the conflict, access to clean drinking water ... in Aden has deteriorated, despite its relative stability compared to other areas, due to the failure of the internationally recognized government and the Southern Transitional Council to provide sufficient access to these essential services.'¹¹⁵

9.5.11 On 19 August 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), a multi-partner initiative for improving food security and nutrition analysis and decision-making among governments, UN Agencies, NGOs, civil society and other relevant actors¹¹⁶, published a report on the acute malnutrition situation in Yemen, covering the period from November 2023 to June 2024, and making projections for July to October 2024. The report stated:

'Lack of access to safe water, sanitation, and hygiene services result to [sic] outbreaks of infections and particularly diarrhea ... Many households have no access to safe drinking water ranging from 22.1 percent in Taiz Highland to 96.3 percent in Taiz city. Furthermore, access to improved toilet facilities is also concerning with an estimated access of about 30 percent of households. This is coupled with contamination of water sources with E.Coli in some of the areas analysed, indicative of sewage or fecal water contaminated water sources. The contamination of water, poor latrine coverage and poor hygiene practices of washing hands before food and after toilet visit pose health risks that ultimately affect children and result into diarrhea and wasting.'¹¹⁷

9.5.12 The World Bank Group's Yemen webpage, updated on 25 October 2024, stated: '... [A]pproximately 18 million Yemenis lack access to safe drinking water and dependable sanitation facilities. Consequently, the country grapples with recurrent outbreaks of preventable diseases like cholera, diphtheria, measles, and dengue fever.'¹¹⁸

[Back to Contents](#)

9.6 Food and nutrition

a. Food security

¹¹⁴ Action Against Hunger, [After Nine Years of War...](#), 5 April 2024


¹¹⁵ Mwatana, [... Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023](#) (pages 31 and 33), 18 July 2024

¹¹⁶ IPC, [IPC Overview and Classification System](#), no date

¹¹⁷ IPC, [Yemen: IPC Acute Malnutrition... November 2023 – October 2024](#) (page 3), 19 August 2024

¹¹⁸ World Bank Group, [The World Bank In Yemen](#) (Overview: Context), updated 25 October 2024

- 9.6.1 The JIAF Technical Manual, published in July 2024, defined people with food security needs as: ‘Affected population who either have food consumption gaps (below average 2,100 kcal pp/day) OR are unable to meet required food needs without applying crisis coping strategies.’¹¹⁹
- 9.6.2 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report published the below graphic showing the numbers of people it estimated would have food security and agriculture needs in 2024, and the severity of those needs, by location¹²⁰:



- 9.6.3 The March 2024 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) humanitarian response report, however, noted that 16.4 million people were food insecure in 2023¹²¹ (compared with 17.3 million who were food insecure in 2022¹²²). This included 2.7 million acutely malnourished pregnant and lactating women (compared with 1.5 million reported in February 2023¹²³)¹²⁴.
- 9.6.4 On 31 July 2024, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR, formerly known as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) published an ‘IDP Protection Monitoring Update’. The report covered the period from 1 January to 30 June 2024, based on data collected by UNHCR partners during interviews they conducted with 47,222 households. Of the assessed households, 84.2% were IDPs (68.5% of which resided in IDP sites), 6.7% were IDPs returnees, and 9.1% belonged to host communities, thereby assessing 279,803 individuals¹²⁵. The report stated that 85% of assessed households were unable to meet their daily food needs, and adopted the following mechanisms to cope with this challenge:
- relied on less preferred/expensive food (83.1 per cent)

¹¹⁹ JIAF, [JIAF 2: Technical Manual](#) (page 33), July 2024

¹²⁰ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 35), 1 February 2024

¹²¹ UNFPA, [2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen](#) (page 6), 31 March 2024

¹²² UNFPA, [UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023](#) (page 8), 7 February 2023

¹²³ UNFPA, [UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023](#) (page 8), 7 February 2023

¹²⁴ UNFPA, [2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen](#) (page 6), 31 March 2024

¹²⁵ UNHCR, [IDP Protection Monitoring Update](#) (page 1), 31 July 2024

- borrowed food or relied on friends and relatives (71%)
- reduced the size of portions of meals (67.9%)
- reduced the number of meals eaten per day (60.7%)
- reduced the quantity consumed by adults (35.7%)¹²⁶

9.6.5 On 18 November 2024, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) published ‘Yemen Food Security Update, October 2024’. The report stated:

‘After reaching a historic record in August 2024, the prevalence of inadequate food consumption in Yemen decreased from 64 percent in August to 60 percent in September 2024.

‘... [T]he food security situation remained at [an] alarming level across the country, with the 2024 Global Hunger Index (GHI) ranking Yemen as the second highest GHI score in the world. At the end of Q3 2024, the share of households with inadequate food consumption was 20 percent higher in Yemen compared to the same quarter in 2023, with severe levels of food deprivation (poor food consumption) soaring over the past year and reaching 33 percent in September 2024.

‘... At regional level, the prevalence of inadequate food consumption was higher in IRG areas, however the annual deterioration was sharper in SBA areas. Nearly two-thirds of the surveyed households (64 percent) in IRG controlled areas were unable to meet their minimum food needs in September 2024, down by merely one percent month-on-month while being 15 percent higher compared to a year before [2023]. Severe levels of food deprivation ... saw a 39 percent rise year-on-year, reaching 35 percent in September [2024].

‘... On the other hand, the share of households lacking access to adequate food reached 57 percent in September [2024] in SBA areas, down by 10 percent from the previous month while increasing by 21 percent year-on-year and by 25 percent from November 2023. Nearly one-third of households (32 percent) reported severe food deprivation in the north in September 2024. Despite the 14 percent monthly decline, the prevalence of poor food consumption remained 51 percent higher than a year before and up by 65 percent from November 2023. All governorates in the north exceeded the “very high” threshold of ≥ 20 percent for poor food consumption in September [2024], except for Sana’a City.

‘... In September 2024, more than half of the surveyed households in Yemen (52 percent) adopted extremely negative food-coping behaviours ... with a higher share observed in the north (54 percent) compared to the south (49 percent)... Nationally, limiting meal portion size and consuming less expensive or less preferred food were the most frequently used strategies, indicated by 77 percent and 71 percent of the interviewed households, respectively.

‘... Despite the Red Sea crisis, food imports through Yemeni seaports increased by 18 percent from January to September 2024 compared to the same period in 2023. Food imports via the Red Sea ports rose by 26 percent

¹²⁶ UNHCR, [IDP Protection Monitoring Update](#) (page 2), 31 July 2024

... while the southern ports of Aden and Mukalla witnessed an eight percent decline during the same period. Essential food items were available in the Yemeni markets during Q3 2024, however food remained beyond reach for most vulnerable households due to higher prices in IRG areas and low purchasing power countrywide.¹²⁷

- 9.6.6 On 16 October 2024, the IPC published the key results of a report which looked at the acute food insecurity situation in Yemen from July 2024 to September 2024. The report stated:

‘Nearly half of the population (4.7 million people) in the Government of Yemen (GoY) controlled areas experienced high levels of acute food [insecurity] between July and September 2024, classified as IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse). This included 1.2 million people who experienced critical levels of food insecurity – IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) – characterized by large food gaps and high levels of acute malnutrition. This reflects a continued, though slower, deterioration in the food security situation compared to the last IPC update (October 2023 – February 2024), when around 4.6 million people were classified in Phase 3 or above.

‘The declining economy, coupled with continued conflict and irregular humanitarian food assistance (HFA) continue to drive the high levels of acute food insecurity. In addition, torrential rains in August 2024 led to localized flooding that... disrupted agricultural activities, resulted in loss of livestock and farmland...’¹²⁸

- 9.6.7 The IPC published an updated version of a ‘Famine Fact Sheet’ in October 2024, setting out the Acute Food Insecurity scale, which has become the global standard for classification. It stated:

‘IPC Phase 1 None/Minimal: Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.

‘IPC Phase 2 Stressed: Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.

‘IPC Phase 3 Crisis: Households either: Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.

‘IPC Phase 4 Emergency: Households either: Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.

‘IPC Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine: Households experience an extreme lack of food and/or cannot meet other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute

¹²⁷ WFP, [Yemen Food Security Update, October 2024](#) (pages 2 and 3), 18 November 2024

¹²⁸ IPC, [Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for July - September 2024...](#), 16 October 2024

malnutrition levels are evident. For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.¹²⁹

9.6.8 See pages 4 and 5 of the [IPC's full acute food insecurity analysis report](#) for a commentary on which governorates were most affected by food insecurity at IPC phase 3 or above between July and September 2024.

9.6.9 The 16 October 2024 IPC food insecurity analysis report also stated:

‘... [I]n 2024, local food prices in GoY areas were on an upward trajectory and remained above average levels ... The increase in basic food commodity prices has maintained high headline inflation and strained market-dependent households’ purchasing power.

‘The cost of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) has followed this trend on food prices, increasing steadily since the start of 2024 and reaching an all-time high in GoY areas at YER 137,819 [£434.50 GBP¹³⁰] per household by July 2024, marking a 15 percent increase year-on-year and 35 percent above the 3-year average.

‘... Given the crucial role of humanitarian assistance in Yemen as a source of food and income, and with over 30 percent of the population dependent on it, its irregularity, coupled with rising food prices, limited livelihood opportunities, and the lean season effects, has exacerbated food insecurity in GoY controlled areas.’¹³¹

9.6.10 For more information about food assistance, and the irregularity of it, referred to by the IPC report, see [Humanitarian aid](#).

9.6.11 In October 2024, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), a provider of global early warning and analysis on acute food insecurity established by the United States Agency for International Development¹³², published the following map, showing its assessment of the IPC acute food insecurity classifications, by governorate, with key below¹³³:


¹²⁹ IPC, [The IPC Famine Fact Sheet](#) (page 2), updated October 2024

¹³⁰ XE.com, [Currency Converter – Yemeni Rials to British Pounds](#), 29 November 2024

¹³¹ IPC, [Yemen: IPC Acute Food Insecurity... July 2024 – February 2025](#) (page 5), 16 October 2024


¹³² FEWS NET, [About FEWS NET](#), no date

¹³³ FEWS NET, [Yemen Acute Food Insecurity](#), October 2024




9.6.12 The 31 October 2024 World Bank Group press release stated: ‘In July 2024, World Bank phone surveys indicated that severe food deprivation more than doubled in some governorates [since 2023].’¹³⁴

9.6.13 On 26 December 2024, the WFP published ‘Yemen Food Security Update, December 2024’. The report included graphs showing the percentage of households with inadequate food consumption between January 2021 and November 2024. The graphs show the figures broken down by SBA (Sana’a-based authorities, also known as the Houthis or Ansar Allah) and IRG (internationally recognised Government) areas, and by figures in the north and the south in November 2023 and in November 2024, respectively¹³⁵:



¹³⁴ World Bank Group, [... Mounting Economic Challenges as Conflict Continues...](#), 31 October 2024

¹³⁵ WFP, [Yemen Food Security Update, December 2024](#) (page 3), 26 December 2024



[Back to Contents](#)

b. Malnutrition

- 9.6.14 The JIAF Technical Manual, published in July 2024, defined people with nutrition needs as: ‘Children 0 to 59 months, pregnant and lactating women, and other highly vulnerable groups who are acutely malnourished or at risk of becoming acutely malnourished who are in the areas affected by the crisis or in areas where acute malnutrition rates are above emergency level.’¹³⁶
- 9.6.15 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated:
 ‘Yemen is experiencing some of the highest malnutrition rates ever recorded, and the situation continues to worsen. Nearly half of all children under the age of five are currently estimated to be experiencing moderate to severe stunting ... The lack of funding for prevention services, coupled with a measles outbreak ... further exacerbates the risk of deteriorating nutrition conditions.
 ‘Acute malnutrition, both in terms of admissions and occurrence in 2023, was highest in Al Hodeidah, Hajjah and Ta'iz governorates. These areas ... report global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates surpassing 17 per cent - well above emergency thresholds.’¹³⁷
- 9.6.16 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report additionally published the below graphic showing the numbers of people with nutrition needs, and the severity of those needs, by location¹³⁸:


¹³⁶ JIAF, [JIAF 2: Technical Manual](#) (page 33), July 2024

¹³⁷ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 15), 1 February 2024


¹³⁸ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 36), 1 February 2024

PEOPLE IN NEED	WOMEN	CHILDREN	WITH DISABILITY
7.7M	35%	65%	10%

People in need



Severity of needs



9.6.17 The 19 August 2024 IPC acute malnutrition analysis report opined:

‘By the end of 2024, an estimated 609,808 children will be acutely malnourished, with 118,570 projected to suffer from severe acute malnutrition - a 34 percent increase from 2023 levels. Additionally, around 222,918 pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to be malnourished...


‘... Acute malnutrition is a major public health problem in several parts of the Government of Yemen (GoY) areas. Of particular concern are two districts in Hodeidah Southern lowland and one in Taiz lowland (Makha) that are classified in IPC AMN [Integrated Food Security Phase Classification acute malnutrition] Phase 5 (extremely critical) in the current period (from November 2023 to June 2024). This classification is projected to expand to four districts - Mawza and Al Makha in Taiz lowland and Hays and Al Khawkhah in Hodeidah lowlands - in IPC AMN Phase 5 during the July to October 2024 projection period. These districts require immediate intervention to prevent increased morbidity and potential mortality among children under 5 years of age.’¹³⁹

9.6.18 The full acute malnutrition analysis report from the IPC, also published on 16 October 2024, included the following map, showing the IPC acute malnutrition classifications, by location, from November 2023 to June 2024¹⁴⁰:

¹³⁹ IPC, [Yemen: Acute Malnutrition Situation for November 2023 - June 2024...](#), 19 August 2024

¹⁴⁰ IPC, [Yemen: IPC Acute Malnutrition... November 2023 – October 2024](#) (page 10), 19 August 2024


Nov 2023-June 2024



9.6.19 The same source also published the following map, showing the IPC acute malnutrition phase classifications for the ‘area in extremely critical acute malnutrition (IPC AMN Phase 5)’, namely southwest Yemen, between November 2023 and June 2024¹⁴¹:

AREA IN EXTREMELY CRITICAL ACUTE MALNUTRITION (IPC AMN PHASE 5)

Current Situation: Hodeidah Southern lowland and Taiz lowland (Makha districts)



9.6.20 On 10 October 2024, Concern Worldwide, an international humanitarian organisation¹⁴², and Welthungerhilfe (WHH), a private aid agency in Germany¹⁴³, jointly published the 19th annual publication of the Global Hunger Index (GHI). The report, which scored countries based on four indicators which together, it said, capture the multidimensional nature of hunger¹⁴⁴, ranked Yemen the second worst¹⁴⁵. It based Yemen’s score on the following data: 39.5% of the Yemeni population were undernourished between 2021 and 2023, 16.8% and 48.5% of under 5s experienced child

¹⁴¹ IPC, [Yemen: IPC Acute Malnutrition... November 2023 – October 2024](#) (page 2), 19 August 2024

¹⁴² Concern Worldwide, [Who we are](#), no date

¹⁴³ WHH, [Who we are](#), no date

¹⁴⁴ Concern Worldwide & WHH, [2024 Global Hunger Index](#) (page 39), 10 October 2024

¹⁴⁵ Concern Worldwide & WHH, [2024 Global Hunger Index](#) (page 13), 10 October 2024

wasting and child stunting, respectively, between 2019 and 2023, and in 2022 child mortality rates (also for under 5s) were 4.1%¹⁴⁶

- 9.6.21 The World Bank Group's Yemen webpage, updated on 25 October 2024, noted there to presently be over 3.5 million people in Yemen experiencing severe malnutrition¹⁴⁷.
- 9.6.22 For more information about which parts of Yemen are considered 'Government of Yemen areas', see CPIN, [Yemen: Security situation](#).

[Back to Contents](#)

9.7 Children

- 9.7.1 On 11 January 2024, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published 'World Report 2024 – Yemen', covering events of 2023. The report stated:

'Yemen's protracted armed conflict and humanitarian crisis severely impact children. Eleven million children in Yemen need humanitarian assistance... Parties to the conflict have attacked hospitals and schools, causing disruptions to health services and children's education...

'Warring parties' attacks on water and food infrastructure and their weaponization of water have had especially harmful impacts on children. Many children have had to drop out of school to make time to travel and queue to bring water to their families.'¹⁴⁸

- 9.7.2 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated:

'Between 2.2 to 3 million girls and boys are at risk of increased morbidity and mortality every year in Yemen due to acute malnutrition. This represents at least 50 per cent of the total at-risk population among children under five. At least 2 million more children are having their future developmental and learning opportunities put at risk as a result of chronic malnutrition, such as stunted growth, cognitive impairment, weakened immune system, and delayed social and emotional development.'¹⁴⁹

- 9.7.3 On 8 September 2024, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) published 'UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2 – January to June 2024' which stated: 'The ongoing humanitarian crisis has heightened the vulnerability of children... exposing them to exploitation, violence, and abuse and leading to negative coping mechanisms such as gender-based violence (GBV), child marriage, and child labour.'¹⁵⁰

- 9.7.4 See [People in need](#) for details of how many children (of all people in need) OCHA consider to be in need in 2024, including for those under 5

[Back to Contents](#)

9.8 Education

- 9.8.1 The JIAF Technical Manual, published in July 2024, defined people with education needs as: 'School-aged children and youths in the areas affected

¹⁴⁶ Concern Worldwide & WHH, [2024 Global Hunger Index](#) (page 45), 10 October 2024

¹⁴⁷ World Bank Group, [The World Bank In Yemen](#) (Overview: Context), updated 25 October 2024

¹⁴⁸ HRW, [World Report 2024 – Yemen](#) (page 722), 11 January 2024

¹⁴⁹ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 22), 1 February 2024

¹⁵⁰ UNICEF, [UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2...](#) (page 2), 8 September 2024

by crisis who do not have access to protective education and acceptable learning conditions, which can negatively impact (i) their physical and psychosocial wellbeing, (ii) cognitive development, and (iii) their ability to meet their future needs. Teachers and other educational staff are included in the PiN when their availability and/or working conditions directly influence children's education needs or learning conditions.'¹⁵¹

9.8.2 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated:

'Currently, over 4.5 million Yemeni children of school age (5 to 17 years) do not attend schools. Also, 1.3 million children are displaced and are forced to cope with overcrowded classrooms and overburdened and unequipped teachers. This adds to the existing vulnerabilities of 600,426 children with disabilities who already suffer from a lack of trained teachers, adapted learning/teaching materials, and physical accessibility of school and WASH infrastructure.

'Surveyed parents during the MCLA [Multi-Cluster Location Assessment] reported several barriers to providing their children with quality education, including the inability to afford the cost of education (90 per cent) and transportation (66 per cent). A similar proportion (66 per cent) reported that their children were working to support their families, either through child labour or the engagement of children in household chores. Female-headed households are generally more likely to engage in negative coping strategies, with child marriage being slightly more prevalent in female-headed households.

'The school age population in Yemen (5 to 17 years old) represents nearly 33 per cent of the overall population. Two-thirds of school-aged children live in areas that are hard-to-reach due to conflict or other impediments. Enrolment records show that only 61 per cent of school-aged children are in schools.

'The quality of learning is negatively affected by nearly 193,668 teachers not receiving salaries or any incentives during 2023, overcrowded classrooms, lack of teacher training, lack of teaching/learning materials, and attacks on education institutions, which have caused teachers to leave the teaching profession and resulted in interrupted learning for students and subsequently reduced retention at schools.'¹⁵²

9.8.3 The same source also published the below graphic showing the numbers of people it estimated would have education needs in 2024, and the severity of those needs, by location¹⁵³:

¹⁵¹ JIAF, [JIAF 2: Technical Manual](#) (page 33), July 2024

¹⁵² OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 42), 1 February 2024

¹⁵³ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 34), 1 February 2024

PEOPLE IN NEED

6.2M

GIRLS & WOMEN

47%

CHILDREN

97%


WITH DISABILITY

10%


IDP CHILDREN

20%

People in need



Severity of needs



- 9.8.4 The OCHA report went on to state: ‘Approximately 6.2 million children and teachers are in need of assistance in 2024, a 28 per cent decrease from 2023. The UN-brokered truce has significantly contributed to limiting exacerbation of needs. Nevertheless, long years into the conflict coupled with the economic decline, natural disasters and fragmented education system have continued to be the main drivers of people’s needs.’¹⁵⁴
- 9.8.5 The OCHA report also added: ‘The Handicap Care and Rehabilitation Fund reports that around 8,000 students with a disability in AA-controlled areas have missed out on their education since the escalation of the conflict.’¹⁵⁵
- 9.8.6 The 2023 USSD Human Rights report stated: ‘In their submission to the country’s UPR [Universal Periodic Review], Mwatana reported there were many cases in which schools were used as prisons, military bases, and detention centers. Between 2019 and July 2023, Mwatana attributed at least 91 incidents to forces it described as UAE-backed and 19 incidents to government forces in which these groups used schools for military bases or detention centers.’¹⁵⁶
- 9.8.7 The Freedom in the World 2023 report stated: ‘The war has caused damage to educational facilities across the country, suspension of classes and other activities at many schools and universities, and deaths of children caught in either errant or deliberate military attacks on schools. Millions of students no longer attend school due to the war, and thousands have been recruited by armed groups.’¹⁵⁷
- 9.8.8 On 25 March 2024, Save the Children published a report entitled ‘Hanging in the Balance: Yemeni Children’s Struggle for Education’. In the Executive Summary, which they published separately on the same date, they stated:

¹⁵⁴ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 42), 1 February 2024

¹⁵⁵ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 24), 1 February 2024

¹⁵⁶ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Yemen](#) (page 25), 23 April 2024

¹⁵⁷ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2023 – Yemen](#) (section D3), 29 February 2024

'In a survey of 1,068 children and 528 caregivers across Yemen about school dropouts in their families over the past two years. 34% of those surveyed reported instances of school dropout, with displaced children twice as likely to face this risk (58%).

'... Over 44 per cent of parents and children said that the need to support their family's income generation was a primary reason for school dropouts in the past two years.

'... 20% of dropout cases over the past two years were attributed to the unaffordability of school costs.

'... 14% of dropout cases were linked to insecurity on the way to and from school.

'... Over 58% of parents report no improvement in their children's education access despite the truce.'¹⁵⁸

9.8.9 The Mwatana July 2024 Yemen human rights report, covering 2023, stated:

'In the education sector, dropout rates have increased, and the quality and standards of education have declined. Curricula and schools have been manipulated to enable indoctrination into the goals of the conflict parties, diverting the learning process, particularly in areas under the control of the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group. Additionally, the non-payment of teachers' salaries in most Yemeni areas has led to a decline in the quality of education and the ability of teachers to perform their duties effectively due to their engagement in other jobs and the pressures they face from the loss of their main source of income.

'Yemeni children receive their education in unsuitable and unequipped buildings, with many receiving education outdoors or in classrooms lacking proper seating and basic facilities in some areas. They struggle to access textbooks due to their high prices and unavailability in schools, while annual fees and study costs represent an additional burden on families, leading many to withdraw their children from schools and engage them in child labor or military recruitment instead.'¹⁵⁹

9.8.10 The World Bank Group's Yemen webpage, updated on 25 October 2024, stated: 'A 2023 mobile phone survey highlighted that, with limited viable options to weather adverse shocks, households are resorting to detrimental coping mechanisms, such as withdrawing children from school (33 percent of the sample)...'¹⁶⁰

9.8.11 Mwatana published an undated 'Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations in Yemen' which includes incidents of attacks and use of schools it documented by district, governorate, date, and actor. The map showed that Mwatana documented 1,352 incidents of attacks and use of schools in Yemen between 1 January 2015 and 31 December 2024, with 267 of those having occurred in 2023 (which included 4 ground attacks and 1 drone

¹⁵⁸ Save the Children, [Hanging in the Balance... \(Executive Summary\)](#), 25 March 2024


¹⁵⁹ Mwatana, [... Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023](#) (pages 32 to 33), 18 July 2024

¹⁶⁰ World Bank Group, [The World Bank In Yemen](#) (Overview: Context), updated 25 October 2024

strike). A further 252 incidents of this type occurred in 2024 (which included one incident involving explosive objects and 1 terrorist bombing)¹⁶¹.

9.8.12 The Mwatana data should be considered in the context of Mwatana having stated that: ‘Mwatana emphasized that the information presented through the interactive map is not exhaustive. The map includes only what Mwatana has documented and verified according to its methodology. It represents a portion of the violations against civilians in Yemen, documented over the years of conflict.’¹⁶²

9.8.13 CPIT produced the following graph based on data from the Mwatana human rights violations interactive map, showing the number of incidents of attacks and use of schools it documented in 2023 and 2024, by governorate¹⁶³:



9.8.14 For further information regarding incidents of attacks and use of schools, including exact dates, districts, and the actors of incidents, see the [Mwatana human rights violations interactive map](#). See also CPIN, [Yemen: Security situation](#).

9.8.15 The CIMP 2024 Annual report stated:

‘There was an increase in the number of educational sites reported to have been impacted by armed violence, up to five, from three in 2023, and another three incidents were reported in close proximity to schools. These incidents cumulatively resulted in 58 child casualties, jeopardising the safety of the educational environment and threatening to hinder access to education. Schools were impacted in Sana'a, Ta'izz, Dhamar, Aden and Hajjah.’¹⁶⁴

9.8.16 The OCHA HNRP, published on 15 January 2025, stated: ‘Despite the collective efforts of education partners, only 120,532 out-of-school children

¹⁶¹ Mwatana, [Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations...](#), no date, accessed 25 February 2025

¹⁶² Mwatana, [Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations Yemen](#), no date

¹⁶³ Mwatana, [Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations...](#), no date, accessed 25 February 2025

¹⁶⁴ CIMP, [2024 Annual Report](#) (page 9), January 2025

(53,250 boys and 67,282 girls) were supported with learning opportunities in non-formal education due to funding shortages in 2024.¹⁶⁵

[Back to Contents](#)

9.9 Health and healthcare

9.9.1 The JIAF Technical Manual, published in July 2024, defined people with education needs as: ‘Populations who experience or are at imminent risk of experiencing negative health consequences in terms of physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being that result from disruptions to the standard who are in the areas affected by the crisis or in areas where morbidity or mortality are above the emergency level.’¹⁶⁶

9.9.2 The OHCA December 2022 Yemen Humanitarian Update stated: ‘Yemen remains vulnerable to disease outbreaks, including vaccine-preventable diseases. Almost a third of the population under the age of one is missing routine vaccinations... Less than half of health facilities are functioning and many that remain operational lack basic equipment.’¹⁶⁷

9.9.3 On 7 February 2023, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), published ‘UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023’ which stated: ‘Less than half of Yemen’s hospitals remain functional with an estimated 11 per cent fully or partially damaged due to the conflict. This is compounded by extreme shortages of essential medicines, supplies and specialized staff, only 1 in 5 of the functioning facilities is able to provide maternal and child health services. Nineteen out of 22 governorates face severe shortages in available maternity beds – less than six beds per 10,000 people, half of the WHO [World Health Organization] standard. In addition, an estimated 42 per cent of Yemen’s population lives more than one hour away from the nearest fully or partially functional public hospital.’¹⁶⁸

9.9.4 The CIMP 2023 Annual Report stated: ‘Four incidents of armed violence directly impacted health facilities in Yemen in 2023, down from 12 incidents in 2022. Due to the often wide-reaching catchment areas of health facilities, over 57,000 civilians may have faced restricted access to health care as a result. All four incidents were the result of drone activity in frontline areas, including two incidents in Qa’atabah district, Dali’ ...’¹⁶⁹

9.9.5 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated: ‘Only half of all health facilities across the country are operational (either fully or partially functional)...

‘... A sharp decline in reproductive health services in Yemen has [been] experienced since January 2022, with the monthly number of services delivered declining by more than 30 per cent. Alarming, this downward trend is accelerating - already limited reproductive health and postnatal care declined by 35 and 22 per cent, respectively, in the first half of 2023.’¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025](#), (page 44) 15 January 2025

¹⁶⁶ JIAF, [JIAF 2: Technical Manual](#) (page 33), July 2024

¹⁶⁷ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 12/December 2022](#) (page 2), 18 January 2023

¹⁶⁸ UNFPA, [UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023](#) (page 7), 7 February 2023


¹⁶⁹ CIMP, [2023 Annual Report](#) (page 9), January 2024

¹⁷⁰ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 ...](#) (pages 19 and 20), 1 February 2024

9.9.6 The same source stated:

‘In 2023, a number of disease outbreaks took hold across the country - including a worrying reappearance of cholera and acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) in twelve governorates, including Shabwah and Al Hodeidah, in the final months of the year. Many of these outbreaks are of vaccine-preventable diseases, including measles, polio, pertussis, and diphtheria, with unvaccinated children comprising many of those affected. Across Yemen, an estimated 70 per cent of children aged three years have not received a full course of basic vaccinations recommended in the national immunisation schedule. These outbreaks have been worsened by limited access to clean water, food and healthcare, among other factors. Organised and widespread anti-vaccination misinformation campaigns have also prevented the effective control of disease outbreaks in many communities. In AA-controlled areas, vaccination has been limited to health facilities since the beginning of the year, preventing outreach activities and mobile community-based vaccination campaigns. The situation has been compounded by significant reductions to incentives for healthcare workers in January 2023, which has seen a withdrawal of qualified healthcare workers, including critical women staff, from remote and frontline areas.’¹⁷¹

9.9.7 The report also published the below graphic showing the numbers of people estimated would have health needs in 2024, and the severity of those needs, by location¹⁷²:



9.9.8 The Freedom in the World 2023 report stated: ‘Both the Houthis and the Yemeni government have allegedly withheld public health data in recent years.’¹⁷³

9.9.9 The March 2024 UNFPA humanitarian response report stated that of 18.2 million people in need of some form of assistance, 17.8 million of them were

¹⁷¹ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 ...](#) (pages 20 to 21), 1 February 2024

¹⁷² OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 35), 1 February 2024

¹⁷³ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2023 – Yemen](#) (section C3), 29 February 2024

in need of health care services (compared with 20.3 million people in need of health assistance of 21.6 people in need, reported in the February 2023 UNFPA humanitarian response report¹⁷⁴)¹⁷⁵.

9.9.10 The same source stated that 20% of health facilities were providing maternal and child health facilities¹⁷⁶, the same figure that was reported by the UNFPA in its 2023 humanitarian response report¹⁷⁷.

9.9.11 The March 2024 UNFPA humanitarian response report also stated: ‘The cumulative impact of conflict and deprivation has also taken a heavy toll on the mental health of Yemenis, particularly its women and girls. Mental health care remains scarce, and psychological illness is highly stigmatized. An estimated 7 million people require mental health treatment and support, but only 120,000 have uninterrupted access to these services.’¹⁷⁸

9.9.12 The 2023 USSD Human Rights report stated:

‘The continuing conflict and ensuing humanitarian crisis made it difficult to find reporting on the government’s approach to reproductive rights. The conflict led to a breakdown of the health-care system, and women and girls, including survivors of sexual violence, did not have access to essential reproductive health services.

‘The Houthis prevented health centers and pharmacies in areas under their control from providing any method of family planning to women without a prescription and the presence and consent of their husbands. The Houthis justified this policy and a ban on health workers using illustrated family planning guides as being consistent with “faith identity.”’¹⁷⁹

9.9.13 The April 2024 Action Against Hunger article stated:

‘In Yemen... there are too few healthcare facilities. Those that exist often lack enough qualified staff or supplies.

‘... Yet, health centers are often too far away for families to access them, making it a challenge to control disease or treat people for malnutrition.

‘... All the while, the stress of living under constant pressure to meet their most basic needs – and nine years of conflict that has brought an estimated 377,000 deaths – is fueling a mental health crisis. More than a quarter of Yemenis – over eight million people – suffer from mental health challenges such as depression, anxiety or post-traumatic stress disorder.

‘According to surveys by Action Against Hunger and other data, the continuing conflict, forced displacement, deteriorating economic situation, poverty and food shortages are exacerbating the prevalence of mental health challenges.

‘Despite the scale of this public health emergency, there is no national mental health programme in Yemen. Just 10 per cent of the country’s primary health care facilities have staff trained to identify or treat mental

¹⁷⁴ UNFPA, [UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023](#) (page 8), 7 February 2023

¹⁷⁵ UNFPA, [2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen](#) (page 6), 31 March 2024

¹⁷⁶ UNFPA, [2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen](#) (page 6), 31 March 2024

¹⁷⁷ UNFPA, [UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023](#) (page 8), 7 February 2023

¹⁷⁸ UNFPA, [2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen](#) (page 5), 31 March 2024

¹⁷⁹ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Yemen](#) (pages 48 to 49), 23 April 2024

disorders. The stigma surrounding mental health issues delays treatment and, by devaluing the related professions, discourages students from getting training to tackle these issues.¹⁸⁰

- 9.9.14 The UNICEF Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2, covering the first half of 2023, stated: ‘Despite the rise in suspected cholera cases, the case fatality rate remains below the Sphere [an association which ‘defines, promotes and applies humanitarian principles and minimum standards to ensure lifesaving, protective and accountable response to crisis’¹⁸¹] standards, at 0.4 per cent in the north and 0.63 per cent in the south...’¹⁸²
- 9.9.15 The October 2024 UNFPA Humanitarian Crisis Situation Report #03 stated:
- ‘... Since March this year [2024], more than 203,000 suspected cases of cholera have been reported and more than 720 people have died. Women and girls account for 53 per cent of cholera cases.
 - ‘The deteriorating health system is struggling to provide basic healthcare services, especially reproductive health services in remote and underserved areas. Only 45 percent of births are attended by trained personnel, with significant disparities in health outcomes between urban and rural areas.’¹⁸³
- 9.9.16 The undated Mwatana human rights violations interactive map documented 197 incidents of attacks and use of hospitals in Yemen between 25 January 2013 and 31 December 2024, with 33 of those having occurred in 2023 (which included 1 ground attack, 3 drone strikes, and 1 unmanned aerial vehicle attack). A further 30 incidents of this type occurred in 2024¹⁸⁴.
- 9.9.17 CPIT noted that the incidents documented by Mwatana are likely to represent a portion of all those to have occurred and are therefore likely to be higher in reality (see paragraph 8.8.11).
- 9.9.18 CPIT produced the following graph based on data from the Mwatana human rights violations interactive map, showing the number of incidents of attacks and use of hospitals it documented in 2023 and 2024, by governorate¹⁸⁵:

¹⁸⁰ Action Against Hunger, [After Nine Years of War...](#), 5 April 2024


¹⁸¹ Sphere, [‘About’](#), no date

¹⁸² UNICEF, [UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2...](#) (page 2), 8 September 2024

¹⁸³ UNFPA, [Situation Report #03: Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen](#) (page 2), 23 October 2024

¹⁸⁴ Mwatana, [Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations...](#), no date, accessed 25 February 2025

¹⁸⁵ Mwatana, [Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations...](#), no date, accessed 25 February 2025



9.9.19 For further information regarding incidents of attacks and use of hospitals, including exact dates, districts, and the actors of incidents, see the [Mwatana human rights violations interactive map](#). See also CPIN, [Yemen: Security situation](#).

9.9.20 The CIMP 2024 Annual report stated: ‘Healthcare facilities were directly impacted by three instances of armed violence in 2024. Hand grenades damaged An Nukbah hospital in Rada city, Bayda, and a pharmacy in Ibb. Another hospital in Ibb was the site of factional armed clashes, restricting civilians’ access to critical healthcare.’¹⁸⁶

[Back to Contents](#)

9.10 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

9.10.1 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated:

‘Protracted and multiple displacements remain prevalent for many affected by the conflict. An estimated 4.5 million people - 14 per cent of the population, are currently displaced. Almost 31 per cent of displaced families have been displaced more than once over the years with each displacement further eroding coping capacity. A considerable number of those displaced sought refuge in already overcrowded IDP hosting sites, many of which are characterised by inadequate shelter, poor water and sanitation and hygiene facilities as well as heightened health and protection risks. Analysis of conflict and displacement trends indicates that the total IDP population has decreased since a peak in mid-2022 following the truce, though restrictions on assessments prevent these changes being fully reflected in current estimates.

‘In 2023... over 314,000 people (44,835 households) were newly displaced [the reporting period covers displacement from 1st January to 15th December 2023]. During this period ... 24 per cent (over 75,000 people) were displaced due to conflict.

‘... Conflict-related displacement saw a year-on-year decrease of 83 per cent in 2023, marking the fourth consecutive year of decreased conflict-related displacement. This trend is likely to be maintained in the absence of any

¹⁸⁶ CIMP, [2024 Annual Report](#) (page 9), January 2025

major flare-up of hostilities ... Large-scale damage to houses in both urban and rural areas influences people's choice to return to their places of origin. Besides continued insecurity and a lack of viable livelihood options, the destruction of houses, markets, and infrastructure is one of the reasons for the very low rate of returns, as people anticipate large repair and rebuilding work that for most is unaffordable without support. Conflict-induced displacement has ... created a huge influx to some cities, leading to higher service demands.¹⁸⁷

9.10.2 The same source added: 'Marib, Hajjah and Al Hodeidah governorates continue to host the largest IDP populations in Yemen, with significant population figures also present in other governorates.'¹⁸⁸

9.10.3 The October 2022 CIVIC report stated:

'Since 2015, the conflict in Yemen has displaced over four million people. This displacement has created significant strains on already deeply constrained resources, as millions of people have fled to areas that lack the proper infrastructure to host such large populations.

'The strain of displacement is particularly evident in Marib.

'... Since the start of the war... the governorate has been trying to cope with the influx of 2.5 million IDPs who have been displaced to the area. The wells in the city have been insufficient to meet the needs of the population.

'... The influx of IDPs in Marib has resulted in an exponential increase in waste and sewage that the government cannot keep up with. This buildup across the governorate has led to more pollution and disease, including cholera and typhoid...

'... The situation in Marib is not unique. In conversation with CIVIC, the government official in Aden working in water described that many new communities have sprung up in Aden in the last few years, and that many cities have grown, because of the influx of IDPs. He stated that people have been "digging sewage holes with no plan" around one of the governorate's water basins, "including in the land above the water basin... [which will] eventually infiltrate the groundwater."

'Notably, the influx of IDPs has also created land management problems in different governorates. In many cases, IDPs have built homes and camps on lands where either the owner is not in the area or where the owner has granted permission for IDPs to stay temporarily. However, as the war has continued for eight years, the issue of land has become more fraught. IDPs continue flooding into different areas, and landowners have begun seeking the return of their land. In Taiz, for example, the government under former President Abdullah Saleh used to own all of the land, selling parcels to individuals. Now, people use their connections with security officials to take over areas of land, a practice that is leading to conflict in some cases.'¹⁸⁹

9.10.4 The October 2022 CIVIC report also stated:

¹⁸⁷ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 ...](#) (pages 15 and 16), 1 February 2024

¹⁸⁸ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 22), 1 February 2024

¹⁸⁹ CIVIC, [... Climate Change, Environment... and Conflict in Yemen](#) (pages 13 to 14), October 2022


‘Many IDPs and refugees have lost their livelihoods and thus do not have any - or adequate - income sources, which makes this situation even more challenging. Circumstances are particularly acute for the many families who have been displaced from rural areas. They often relied on farming and agriculture for their livelihood and thus may not have other skills or opportunities to find new jobs in the areas where they have been displaced. Furthermore, IDPs and refugees not living in camps are also often in vulnerable positions with respect to the host community, which may blame them for straining local resources and driving up rent prices.’¹⁹⁰

9.10.5 The April 2023 ACAPS housing, land, and property report stated:

‘Conflict-induced displacement has created a huge influx to some cities, leading to higher service demands.

‘... The lack of civil documentation of IDPs hampers any relocation, integration, or return efforts and access to services. IDPs may have lost documentation during displacement, authorities may have confiscated it, it may be outdated, or some IDPs may never have had any documents even before the conflict.’¹⁹¹

9.10.6 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report also published the below graphic showing the numbers of IDPs it estimated would have needs under Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM, which ‘coordinates the assistance and protection activities for IDPs [sic] living in sites across Yemen’¹⁹²) in 2024, and the severity of those needs, by location¹⁹³:



9.10.7 The JIAF Technical Manual, published in July 2024, defined people with CCCM needs as: ‘Internally Displaced Populations in camp or camp-like settings (, that meet the minimum population size threshold (which is agreed

¹⁹⁰ CIVIC, [... Climate Change, Environment... and Conflict in Yemen](#) (pages 23 to 24), October 2022

¹⁹¹ ACAPS, [Yemen: Challenges to Housing, Land, and Property Rights](#) (page 3), 14 April 2023

¹⁹² OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Update: Issue 7, October 2024](#), 14 November 2024

¹⁹³ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 34), 1 February 2024

upon per context). A proportion of the host community around the site may also be included in the PiN depending on context¹⁹⁴

9.10.8 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report went on to state:

‘The majority of IDP sites are situated in rural areas, with 83 per cent of the IDP population residing in Al-Hodeidah, Hajjah, Marib, Ta’iz, and Al-Jawf. Monitoring and consultations with communities reveal that children are compelled to forgo education in order to support their families, with more girls than boys deprived of primary education. Women lack gender-specific facilities in 70 per cent of monitored [IDP] sites [based on 2023 data from 633 managed sites]. Older persons encounter difficulties accessing specialized services. Persons with disabilities, especially persons with visual, hearing, and mobility impairments, confront numerous challenges in accessing specialized services. These vulnerabilities are exacerbated by insecurity, economic crisis, overcrowding, climate-related adversities, and disrupted services.’¹⁹⁵

9.10.9 The Mwatana July 2024 Yemen human rights report, covering 2023, stated: ‘While the deteriorating humanitarian conditions affect all Yemenis, the situation is even worse for internally displaced persons (IDPs), numbering over 4 million and scattered across various governorates. They lack the most basic necessities in terms of living standards, healthcare, and psychological well-being, making it challenging for them to access essential services.’¹⁹⁶

9.10.10 The October 2024 WFP food security update report, published on 18 November 2024, stated:

‘IDPs are one of the worst affected groups in Yemen. In September [2024], nearly two-thirds of the surveyed IDPs (64 percent) were unable to meet their minimum food needs, compared to 57 percent among residents. Severe level of food deprivation (poor food consumption) increased by 61 percent over the past year among IDPs, reaching 36 percent in September 2024... Additionally, the share of households facing severe hunger (Phase 4 and above), as measured by household hunger scale, reached nine percent among IDPs versus five percent of residents.

‘In order to meet food shortages, around 59 percent of the surveyed IDPs resorted to extremely negative food-based coping mechanisms... compared to 49 percent among residents.’¹⁹⁷

[Back to Contents](#)

10. Humanitarian aid

10.1 Humanitarian support

10.1.1 On 1 February 2024, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published a ‘Yemen: Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2024 (January 2024)’, citing various sources, which stated:

¹⁹⁴ JIAF, [JIAF 2: Technical Manual](#) (page 33), July 2024

¹⁹⁵ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 40), 1 February 2024

¹⁹⁶ Mwatana, [Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023](#) (page 32), 18 July 2024

¹⁹⁷ WFP, [Yemen Food Security Update, October 2024](#) (page 1), 18 November 2024

‘Despite challenges, aid organizations reached an average of over 8.6 million people monthly in 2023.’¹⁹⁸

10.1.2 The same source also noted that 219 humanitarian actors were included in the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan, namely 10 UN partners, 57 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and 152 national non-governmental organisations (NNGOs)¹⁹⁹.

10.1.3 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated: ‘The initial findings of the 2023 community perception survey led by UNICEF through a third-party monitoring agency indicates 58 per cent of the respondents expressed satisfaction with the services provided by the humanitarian agencies (compared to 52 per cent in 2022)...’²⁰⁰ CPIT noted that the sample sizes for the surveys were not provided.

10.1.4 The joint statement by 190 humanitarian organisations in Yemen, published on 6 May 2024 by OCHA, stated:

‘The humanitarian community in Yemen, committed to serving populations in a principled manner, continues to deliver one of the world’s largest humanitarian responses in a challenging and complex operational environment. In 2023, 229 humanitarian actors - the majority of whom were local partners - supported an average of 8.4 million people each month with life-saving protection and humanitarian assistance. Aid is reaching those in need, despite constraints of access and funding.’²⁰¹

10.1.5 The Mwatana July 2024 Yemen human rights report, covering 2023, stated:

‘With increasing levels of food insecurity and the loss of income sources among the population, humanitarian aid has become one of the primary pillars and essential sources sustaining thousands of families.

‘... Humanitarian aid takes various forms, including food, medical, and shelter assistance provided by international and local relief, medical, and developmental organizations. All these efforts are urgent measures aimed at ensuring the survival of civilians amidst the ongoing armed conflict in Yemen.’²⁰²

10.1.6 The August OCHA Humanitarian Response Snapshot, published on 7 November 2024, stated:

‘Even though \$1.91 billion [around £1.5 billion GBP²⁰³] remains in unmet funding requirements, the aid agencies are working tirelessly to provide people in need with crucial assistance and services.

‘In the first eight months of 2024, a total of 169 humanitarian organizations continued to deliver aid to an average of 2.96 million people per month. While the number of people reached with assistance per cluster remained low, partners continued to provide support to millions of people – an average of 1.6 million people were reached each month with food assistance, over

¹⁹⁸ OCHA, [Yemen: Humanitarian Response Plan \(HRP\) 2024 ...](#) (page 5), 1 February 2024

¹⁹⁹ OCHA, [Yemen: Humanitarian Response Plan \(HRP\) 2024 ...](#) (page 7), 1 February 2024

²⁰⁰ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#) (page 27), 1 February 2024

²⁰¹ OCHA, [Joint Statement by 190 Humanitarian Organisations in Yemen...](#), 6 May 2024


²⁰² Mwatana, [... Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023](#) (page 124), 18 July 2024

²⁰³ XE.com, [Currency Converter – US Dollars to British Pounds](#), 3 December 2024

476,000 people were assisted with healthcare, over 650,000 people were provided with water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services, and nearly 618,000 people received nutrition support.²⁰⁴

- 10.1.7 For a similar map relating to the period between January and August 2024, see page 1 of the [August OCHA Humanitarian Response Snapshot](#). The snapshot also provided a breakdown of the number of organisations active by Cluster type, including by month, and a breakdown of the number of people targeted and reached, by Cluster type, including by demographics and geographical location of the people reached (see pages 1 to 5)²⁰⁵.
- 10.1.8 The OCHA HNRP, published on 15 January 2025, included the following map of Yemen, showing the number of humanitarian organisations present and active as of November 2024²⁰⁶:

ORGANIZATIONAL PRESENCE MAP



Source: Who does What, Where and When (4Ws) as of November 2024.

- 10.1.9 For information about specific support provided by some of the humanitarian organisations in Yemen, see the following reports:
- [October 2024 WFP food security update report](#) (pages 3 and 18)²⁰⁷
 - [December 2024 WFP food security update report](#) (pages 2 and 14)²⁰⁸
 - [UNHCR Yemen Country Factsheet January - June 2024](#) (pages 1 to 4)²⁰⁹
 - [UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2](#)²¹⁰
 - [April 2024 Action Against Hunger article, After Nine Years of War, Yemen Becomes Another Forgotten Crisis](#)²¹¹

²⁰⁴ OCHA, [Yemen: Humanitarian Response Snapshot - August 2024](#) (page 1), 7 November 2024

²⁰⁵ OCHA, [Yemen: Humanitarian Response Snapshot – August ...](#) (pages 1 to 5), 7 November 2024

²⁰⁶ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025](#), (page 32) 15 January 2025

²⁰⁷ WFP, [Yemen Food Security Update, October 2024](#) (pages 3 and 18), 18 November 2024

²⁰⁸ WFP, [Yemen Food Security Update, December 2024](#) (pages 2 and 14), 26 December 2024

²⁰⁹ UNHCR, [UNHCR Yemen Country Factsheet January - June 2024](#) (pages 1 to 4), 28 August 2024

²¹⁰ UNICEF, [UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2...](#), 8 September 2024

²¹¹ Action Against Hunger, [After Nine Years of War...](#), 5 April 2024

10.1.10 For information about the humanitarian response of The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which provides services to people in Yemen impacted by violent conflict and by other emergencies including economic collapse, recurrent natural disasters and severely disrupted public services²¹², also ‘... is leading the efforts of three agencies i.e. UNFPA, UNICEF [the UN Children’s Fund] and WFP to distribute immediate, most critical life-saving emergency supplies to families who are newly displaced, on the move, in hard-to-reach areas or stranded close to the front lines.’²¹³. For information about the humanitarian response of UNFPA, see the following:

- [March 2024 UNFPA humanitarian response report](#) (pages 13 and 15)²¹⁴
- [UNFPA Situational Report #02](#) (pages 2 to 4)²¹⁵
- [UNFPA Humanitarian Crisis Situation Report #03](#) (pages 2 to 5)²¹⁶

[Back to Contents](#)

10.2 Access to humanitarian support

10.2.1 The October 2022 CIVIC report stated: ‘Landmines... prevent aid from entering areas that have been mined. The Houthis are responsible for laying landmines before and since the start of the war, and the group has repeatedly mined areas where they have lost control.’²¹⁷

10.2.2 For more information about the extent and locations of areas that have been mined in Yemen, see CPIN, [Yemen: Security situation](#) (Landmines and other explosive remnants of warfare (ERW) sub-section).

10.2.3 The OCHA December 2022 Yemen Humanitarian Update stated: ‘The six-month UN-brokered truce (2 April – 2 October 2022) [which subsequently continued informally]... enhanced humanitarian access in some areas... [However] [t]he operating environment in Yemen remains extremely challenging, with more than 3,500 humanitarian access-related incidents recorded in 2022.’²¹⁸

10.2.4 The July 2023 UN Security Council meeting coverage stated: ‘Detailing the United Nations work on the ground, she [Joyce Msuya, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs] said some activities are forced to scale back due to funding of the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan at just 29 per cent. She called for the immediate release of detained United Nations staff and for the protection of all humanitarian workers.’²¹⁹

10.2.5 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2024, covering events of 2023, stated:

‘The Houthis and the Yemeni government impose unnecessary restrictions and regulations on humanitarian organizations and aid projects, creating

²¹² UNFPA, [What We Do: Humanitarian response](#), no date

²¹³ UNFPA, [Situational Report #02 April – June 2024](#) (page 2), 29 July 2024

²¹⁴ UNFPA, [2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen](#) (pages 13 and 15), 31 March 2024

²¹⁵ UNFPA, [Situational Report #02 April – June 2024](#) (pages 2 to 4), 29 July 2024

²¹⁶ UNFPA, [Situation Report #03: Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen](#) (page 2), 23 October 2024

²¹⁷ CIVIC, [... Climate Change, Environment ... and Conflict in Yemen](#) (page 15), October 2022

²¹⁸ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 12/December 2022](#) (pages 1 and 2), 18 January 2023

²¹⁹ UN, [... Relative Calm in Yemen... Special Envoy Tells Security Council](#), 10 July 2023

lengthy delays. Human Rights Watch has documented many cases of aid interference and obstruction by Houthi forces, including but not limited to lengthy delays for approval of aid projects, blocking aid assessments to identify people's needs, attempts to control aid monitoring and recipient lists to divert aid to those loyal to the authorities, and violence against aid staff and their property. The Yemeni government has impeded much needed aid through the imposition of complex bureaucratic requirements on aid agencies that have impacted millions of civilians' ability to access it.'²²⁰

10.2.6 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated:

'... 36 per cent [of survey respondents, see paragraph 9.1.3 for further details] reported being unsatisfied [with the services provided by humanitarian agencies]. Over a third (35 per cent) of respondents felt that humanitarian interventions in their communities did not meet priority needs, and half felt priority needs were somewhat met. Focus group discussions clarified that despite receiving assistance, most people are still living in difficult conditions.

'Among those dissatisfied, the majority (70 per cent) felt the amount of assistance was not enough, followed by dissatisfaction with the selection criteria (48 per cent). Some felt the aid leaves out some groups, including host communities... Others noted the unreliability of community representatives registering beneficiaries, not knowing how to apply for assistance, and the quality of assistance.'²²¹

10.2.7 The same source also stated:

'In 2024, an estimated 9 per cent of the total displaced population lack access to civil documentation [based on 823,272 individuals the UNHCR surveyed across 20 Yemeni governorates and the total displaced population in 2023²²²] rendering them vulnerable due to limited or no access to humanitarian assistance ... The lack and loss of civil documentation affects all population groups in Yemen... IDPs are however disproportionately affected by this issue ...

'The Muhamasheen are significantly affected by the lack of civil documentation ...

'Persons with disabilities struggle in accessing humanitarian aid... Many forms of disability remain invisible due to cultural issues and perceived shame associated with disability in Yemen. Persons with a disability are often requested to hide inside their homes by their families. This can lead to individuals being less integrated in their communities and facing challenges in accessing specialised support and services, especially for women and girls.

'... [T]he CCCM [Camp Coordination and Camp Management] cluster Site Monitoring Tool (SMT) [in 2023²²³] noted that while the majority of sites (64 per cent) reported that there are no barriers to accessing humanitarian

²²⁰ HRW, [World Report 2024 – Yemen](#) (pages 723 to 724), 11 January 2024

²²¹ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 ...](#) (pages 27 to 28), 1 February 2024

²²² OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 ...](#) (footnote 96 on page 68), 1 February 2024

²²³ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024...](#) (footnote 106 on page 68), 1 February 2024

assistance, frequently reported barriers in other sites included insufficient humanitarian assistance, followed by missing civil documentation. Lack of civil and legal documentation plays a major barrier to accessing basic services for all population groups including minority groups, women and girls, as well as individuals who lost documentation during displacement, had their IDs confiscated by the authorities, or were without documentation since before the conflict.²²⁴

10.2.8 The Freedom in the World 2023 report stated:

‘Food aid is often stolen and sold illegally by officials on all sides of the conflict. In an effort to address perceived corruption, the PLC [Presidential Leadership Council, currently the central authority in Yemen²²⁵] in July 2022 reshuffled the cabinet, replacing the oil and defense ministers.

‘... Following the path of other national institutions, the central bank has been split between a government-backed version in Aden and a Houthi-backed version in Sanaa since 2016. This has caused politicized disruptions to... aid, and commerce, and further reduced the transparency of state finances and monetary policy.

‘... A number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) work in the country, but their ability to function is restricted by interference from armed groups. Houthi forces have closed or raided NGO offices and detained workers, and both main sides in the civil war have blocked or seized humanitarian aid.²²⁶

10.2.9 The April 2024 Action Against Hunger article stated:

‘In Yemen, transport costs have surged approximately 400 per cent, and shipments traveling the usual route no longer have a guaranteed delivery. Aid organisations like Action Against Hunger are actively looking for alternatives to get medicines and basic supplies into Yemen, but these routes are more expensive (by plane), not very safe (by road) and involve tighter controls that are causing traffic back-ups and delays at key checkpoints in Jeddah [in Saudi Arabia] and Djibouti.²²⁷

10.2.10 The same source also stated:

‘Damage to roads, bridges, and other infrastructure from the conflict hindered the movement of goods and persons throughout the country, including hampering the delivery of humanitarian aid and commercial shipments.

‘In July [2023], the conflict analysis NGO ACAPS confirmed movement restrictions in areas controlled by each party to the conflict continued impacting the safety and security of humanitarians and movement of commodities.

‘Houthi forces had kept the main roads in and out of the city of Ta’iz closed since 2015, severely restricting freedom of movement for civilians and impeding the flow of essential goods, medicine, and humanitarian access to residents. The Houthis agreed under the terms of the truce to negotiate with

²²⁴ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024...](#) (pages 25 and 28), 1 February 2024

²²⁵ PCNS, [Yemen's Path to Stability ...](#) (pages 11 and 18), 15 October 2024

²²⁶ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2023 ...](#) (sections C2, C3 and E2), 29 February 2024

²²⁷ Action Against Hunger, [After Nine Years of War ...](#), 5 April 2024

the government on restoring access to Ta'iz roads, but there was no progress while the truce remained in effect, and the roads remained closed as of year's end [2023].²²⁸

10.2.11 The AI 2023 Human Rights report stated:

'According to OCHA, the 2023 funding gap in the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan exacerbated food insecurity and jeopardized the humanitarian response, compelling aid organizations to scale back or close crucial humanitarian programmes.

'... Parties to the conflict continued to restrict movement and the delivery of aid, including by imposing bureaucratic constraints such as delayed approvals, travel permit denials or delays, cancellation of humanitarian initiatives, and interference in the project design, implementation and assessment of humanitarian activities.

'In May [2023], Huthi de facto authorities issued a circular requiring humanitarian organizations to inform them every month about their media, advocacy and awareness-raising projects and activities and to apply for permits to implement them. The circular also required humanitarian organizations to provide their monthly media reports for review and sign-off by the Supreme Council, and to be accompanied by a media representative appointed by the Huthis during field operations.

'... On 21 July [2023], unknown gunmen shot dead World Food Programme staff member Muayad Hameidi in Al Turbah city, Ta'iz governorate.

'On 11 August [2023], five UN staff who had been abducted in February 2022 in Abyan governorate were released.

'On 25 October [2023], the Safety and Security Director at Save the Children, Hisham Al-Hakimi, died while being arbitrarily detained by the Huthis in Sana'a. He was detained on 9 September [2023] while off duty and was held incommunicado. Following his death, Save the Children suspended operations in northern Yemen for 10 days.²²⁹

10.2.12 On 26 June 2024, the USSD published its '2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Yemen', covering events of 2023, which stated: 'The Houthis and some tribal authorities in Abyan, Lahij, and Ma'rib continued to enforce a religiously based requirement that a male relative accompany women in public (known as a mahram requirement) ... The UN and NGOs said mahram requirements that female aid workers be accompanied by a male relative negatively impacted the delivery of humanitarian aid.'²³⁰

10.2.13 On 1 July 2024, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), an independent regional human rights organisation²³¹, published 'Yemen: At Symposium on Sidelines of HRC [Human Rights Council], Renewed Demand to Open the Roads' which stated:

'Sakkaf [Bahia al-Sakkaf, Chairwoman of the Peace for Sustainable Societies Foundation] said the donors' meeting in Brussels in May [2024]

²²⁸ USSD, [2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Yemen](#) (page 33), 23 April 2024

²²⁹ AI, [The State of the World's Human Rights](#) (Yemen) (pages 409 and 411), 23 April 2024

²³⁰ USSD, [2023 Report on International Religious Freedom ...](#) (Executive Summary), 26 June 2024

²³¹ CIHRS, [About Us](#), no date

failed to secure the necessary funding to cover the Yemen emergency humanitarian response plan. Pledges were received for just one-quarter of the total amount needed, which is the lowest funding commitment by donors since the beginning of the conflict, in a sign of the waning interest of the international humanitarian community in one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. According to Sakkaf, the decline in funding for UN relief programs, international organizations, and local civil society groups in Yemen has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. In fact, some relief programs have ground to a halt, and the World Food Program has suspended operations in densely populated areas controlled by the Houthis.²³²

10.2.14 The Mwatana July 2024 Yemen human rights report, covering 2023, stated:

‘Mwatana documented 54 incidents of humanitarian aid obstruction during the year 2023 ... The majority of aid obstruction incidents occurred in areas controlled by the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group, which is responsible for 37 of the incidents recorded.

‘The obstruction of humanitarian aid resulted in dozens of the poorest families being deprived of their right to access humanitarian assistance. The various methods used by the conflict parties to obstruct humanitarian aid, as documented by Mwatana, included restricting the movement of aid and humanitarian workers, reducing the ration amounts for beneficiaries, controlling distribution mechanisms, interfering with and manipulating beneficiary lists, among other tactics. Additionally, many restrictions were imposed on the staff of humanitarian organizations and numerous obstacles were created to hinder the swift delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians.

‘The continuous intervention by conflict parties to restrict and impede humanitarian access, and their attempts to steer aid towards specific groups, have led to the suspension or reduction of many relief activities. This has deprived thousands of families of their right to receive such assistance.’²³³

10.2.15 CPIT noted that the incidents documented by Mwatana are likely to represent a portion of all those to have occurred (see paragraph 8.8.11).

10.2.16 For some examples of specific incidents of denials of humanitarian access in 2023, see the [Mwatana July 2024 report](#)²³⁴.

10.2.17 The same source stated:

‘What further exacerbates the food security situation is the announcement made by the World Food Programme in Yemen on December 5, 2023, regarding the pause of its General Food Assistance program in areas under the control of the Sana’a authorities [also known as the Houthis] due to limited funding and failure to reach an agreement with the authorities to implement a smaller program tailored to the available resources for the most vulnerable and needy families.’²³⁵

10.2.18 The 16 October 2024 IPC food insecurity analysis report stated:

²³² CIHRS, [Yemen... Renewed Demand to Open the Roads](#), 1 July 2024

²³³ Mwatana, [... Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023](#) (pages 124 to 125), 18 July

²³⁴ Mwatana, [... Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023](#) (pages 124 to 125), 18 July

²³⁵ Mwatana, [... Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023](#) (page 31), 18 July 2024

‘Since the beginning of 2024, humanitarian food assistance has been largely irregular, with the World Food Programme (WFP) providing only two cycles of General Food Assistance (GFA) between January and July 2024 due to acute shortages in humanitarian funding and food stocks. The current funding crisis faced by the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) is unprecedented and the most severe since 2015. This has led to a reduction in Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) in terms of distribution frequency and ration sizes, resulting in heightened food consumption gaps, particularly for vulnerable households that rely on assistance as their main food and income source. As at the time of the IPC analysis in August 2024, GFA was being provided to about 3.6 million individuals, with a ration size of only 17 percent (358 to 400 kcal) per person per day compared to the reference food basket. This is considerably lower than the FSAC recommended threshold of 1,600 kcal per person per day.’²³⁶

10.2.19 The 16 October 2024 Sana’a Center report stated:

‘The Houthis have continued ... the ongoing arrest of ... UN and aid workers, as the Houthis seek to expand their control over the humanitarian sector, even raiding the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on August 13 [2024].

‘... The newly appointed Houthi Foreign Minister Jamal Amer later announced that the OHCHR headquarters had been returned to UN control after an understanding was reached on “enhancing cooperation” with Houthi authorities.

‘... [T]he Houthis are villainizing foreign influence and arresting Yemeni workers with international ties as a means to further consolidate control over the humanitarian aid sector and civil society.’²³⁷

10.2.20 The Sana’a Center report also stated:

‘In August [2024], the World Food Programme announced it would resume food assistance in Houthi-controlled territories after a six-month hiatus. The agency stated that 62 percent of households reported inadequate food consumption as of July [2024]. Details of distribution remain unclear as the humanitarian community struggles to deal with increasing Houthi restrictions and arrests. In September [2024], the UN announced the suspension of all non-life saving and non-life sustaining activities in Houthi-controlled areas.’²³⁸

10.2.21 The World Bank Group’s Yemen webpage, updated on 25 October 2024, stated, ‘... not all Yemenis in need have been receiving aid, partly due to insufficient humanitarian funding.’²³⁹

10.2.22 The undated Mwatana human rights violations interactive map, which includes denials of humanitarian access it documented by district, governorate, date, and actor, showed that Mwatana documented 625 denials of humanitarian access in Yemen between 1 April 2015 and 31 December

²³⁶ IPC, [Yemen: IPC Acute Food Insecurity... July 2024 – February 2025](#) (page 5), 16 October 2024


²³⁷ Sana’a Center, [... Review Quarterly: July-September 2024](#) (pages 5, 11 and 13), 16 October 2024

²³⁸ Sana’a Center, [The Yemen Review Quarterly: July-September 2024](#) (page 6), 16 October 2024

²³⁹ World Bank Group, [The World Bank In Yemen](#) (Overview: Context), updated 25 October 2024

2024, with 76 of those having occurred in 2023 and 55 in 2024²⁴⁰. The incidents documented by Mwatana are likely to represent a portion of all those to have occurred (see paragraph 8.8.11).

10.2.23 CPIT produced the following graph based on data provided by Mwatana in its human rights violations interactive map, showing the number of denials of humanitarian access it documented in 2023 and 2024, by governorate²⁴¹:



10.2.24 For further information regarding the denials of humanitarian access, including exact dates, districts, and the actors of denials, see the [Mwatana human rights violations interactive map](#).

10.2.25 The OCHA HNRP, published on 15 January 2025, stated:

‘In 2024, the humanitarian operating space continued to be challenged in Yemen by ongoing active hostilities, bureaucratic impediments, interference, and violence directed at aid workers.

‘In 2024, humanitarian partners recorded 1,331 security and access incidents, primarily security and active hostilities, movement restrictions, delayed or rejected visa and residency approvals, and project sub-agreement approval delays.

‘Additionally, there were instances of interference in programming, including issues with staff recruitment, beneficiary selection, tendering, and unjustified demands for information.

‘Violence against humanitarian personnel and assets was also reported, encompassing detention, threats, physical assaults, and harassment, as well as looting and damage to humanitarian resources. These challenges have led to substantial delays in providing essential life-saving services to populations facing urgent needs.

‘Restrictions on the movement of national female aid workers in DFA [de facto authorities]-controlled areas have challenged the availability of critical


²⁴⁰ Mwatana, [Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations...](#), no date, accessed 25 February 2025

²⁴¹ Mwatana, [Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations...](#), no date, accessed 25 February 2025

services, adversely affecting the health of women and girls, in particular. It has also greatly reduced women’s and girls’ access to services and diminished the humanitarian’s understanding of their needs by limiting the presence of female humanitarian’s in assessments.²⁴²

10.2.26 The same source also published the below graph, showing the number of people reached by humanitarian response compared with the number of people in need and those targeted, as well as funding required compared with funding received, between 2019 and 2024²⁴³:

YEMEN HNRP TRENDS (2019 - 2024)



[Back to Contents](#)

11. Freedom of movement

11.1.1 For information about freedom of movement in Yemen, see CPIN, [Yemen: Security situation.](#)

[Back to Contents](#)

²⁴² OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025](#), (pages 32 to 33) 15 January 2025

²⁴³ OCHA, [Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025](#), (page 3) 15 January 2025

Research methodology

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the [Common EU \[European Union\] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information \(COI\)](#), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation's (ACCORD), [Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual](#), 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI's relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

- the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
- how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
- the currency and detail of information
- whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the [bibliography](#).

[Back to Contents](#)

Terms of Reference

The 'Terms of Reference' (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the [country information](#).

The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

- socio-economic indicators, including statistics on life expectancy, literacy, school enrolment, poverty rates, levels of malnutrition²⁴⁴
- socio-economic situation, including access and availability to:
 - food
 - water for drinking and washing
 - accommodation and shelter
 - employment
 - healthcare – physical and mental
 - education
 - support providers, including government and international and domestic non-government organisations
 - variation of conditions by location and/or group
 - whether government is purposely withholding or not delivering support services, if so to which areas/groups
- internally displaced persons (IDPs) – numbers, trends and location

[Back to Contents](#)

²⁴⁴ See, for example, the UN's [Human Development Index](#) for country-specific data, not date

Bibliography

Sources cited

ACAPS,

[Who we are](#), no date. Accessed: 3 September 2024

[Yemen: Challenges to Housing, Land, and Property Rights](#), 14 April 2023.
Accessed: 3 September 2024

ACTED, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) & International Organization for Migration (IOM), Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster teams, published by United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), [2022 Yemen Muhamasheen Community Profile](#), 21 March 2023. Accessed: 14 November 2024

Action Against Hunger,

[About](#), no date. Accessed: 21 November 2024

[After Nine Years of War, Yemen Becomes Another Forgotten Crisis](#), 5 April 2024. Accessed: 21 November 2024

Al Jazeera,

[What the designation of “terrorist” means for Yemen’s Houthis](#), 18 January 2024. Accessed: 3 December 2024

[Who are the Houthis? A simple guide to the Yemeni group](#), 12 January 2024.
Accessed: 29 October 2024

Amnesty International (AI), [The State of the World’s Human Rights](#), 23 April 2024.
Accessed: 15 November 2024

Bank of England, [What is GDP?](#), no date, last updated 10 January 2019. Accessed: 22 November 2024

BBC News, [Who are the Houthis and why are they attacking Red Sea ships?](#), 15 March 2024. Accessed: 22 November 2024

Burrowes, Robert and Wenner, Manfred W., Encyclopedia Britannica (EB), [Yemen](#), updated 14 January 2025. Accessed: 17 January 2025

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS),

[About Us](#), no date. Accessed: 20 November 2024

[Yemen: At Symposium on Sidelines of HRC \[Human Rights Council\], Renewed Demand to Open the Roads](#), 1 July 2024. Accessed: 20 November 2024

CALP Network (Choice and Dignity for People in Crisis), [Calculating the Minimum Expenditure Basket: A Guide to Best Practice](#), October 2022. Accessed: 21 January 2025

Cartograf.fr (English version),

[Map of Yemen with population density](#), no date. Accessed: 30 January 2025

[Research](#), no date. Accessed: 30 January 2025

Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), [Risking the Future: Climate Change](#),

[Environmental Destruction, and Conflict in Yemen](#), October 2022. Accessed: 27 August 2024

Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP),

[CIMP Quarterly Report, Q1 2024: January – March 2024](#), 2024. Accessed: 28 October 2024

[2023 Annual Report](#), January 2024. Accessed: 25 October 2024

[2024 Annual Report](#), January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025

Concern Worldwide, [Who we are](#), no date. Accessed: 24 January 2025

Concern Worldwide and Welthungerhilfe (WHH), [2024 Global Hunger Index](#), 10 October 2024. Accessed: 24 January 2025

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR),

[About CFR](#), no date. Accessed: 30 August 2024

[Global Conflict Tracker: Yemen](#), updated 5 March 2024. Accessed: 30 August 2024

Ecoi.net, [Source description - Center for Civilians in Conflict \(formerly: CIVIC - Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict\)](#), 15 September 2022. Accessed: 27 August 2024

Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET),

[About FEWS NET](#), no date. Accessed: 24 January 2025

[Yemen Acute Food Insecurity](#), October 2024. Accessed: 24 January 2025

Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2023 – Yemen](#), 29 February 2024. Accessed: 28 August 2024

Ground News, [News from Al Jazeera](#), no date. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Human Rights Watch (HRW),

[“Death is More Merciful Than This Life”: Houthi and Yemeni Government Violations of the Right to Water in Taizz](#), 11 December 2023. Accessed: 20 November 2024

[World Report 2024 – Yemen](#), 11 January 2024. Accessed: 19 November 2024

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC),

[IPC Overview and Classification System](#), no date. Accessed: 27 August 2024

[The IPC Famine Fact Sheet](#), updated October 2024. Accessed: 21 November 2024

[Yemen: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis July 2024 – February 2025](#), 16 October 2024. Accessed: 20 November 2024

[Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for July - September 2024 and Projection for October 2024 – February 2025 \(partial analysis\)](#) (snapshot), 16 October 2024. Accessed: 19 November 2024

[Yemen: IPC Acute Malnutrition Analysis November 2023 – October 2024](#) (p2), 19 August 2024. Accessed: 20 November 2024

[Yemen: Acute Malnutrition Situation for November 2023 - June 2024 and Projection for July - October 2024](#) (snapshot), 19 August 2024. Accessed: 27 August 2024

Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC),

[Humanitarian Population Figures](#), April 2016. Accessed: 21 March 2025

[Who We Are](#), no date. Accessed: 21 March 2025

Joint and Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF),

[Homepage](#), no date. Accessed: 21 March 2024

[JIAF 2: Technical Manual](#), July 2024. Accessed: 21 March 2025

Mapcarta, [Hays](#), no date. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Mwatana for Human Rights (Mwatana),

[About Mwatana](#), no date. Accessed: 15 November 2024

[Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations in Yemen](#), no date. Accessed: 25 February 2025

[Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023](#), 18 July 2024. Accessed: 20 November 2024

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), [About us](#), no date. Accessed: 14 November 2024

OnTheWorldMap.com, [Yemen Map](#), 2021. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Our World in Data, [Number of children under 5 years old](#) (Yemen), no date. Accessed 21 November 2024

Policy Center for the New South (PCNS),

[About Us](#), no date. Accessed: 12 November 2024

[Yemen's Path to Stability: Evaluating the Presidential Leadership Council's Role and Impact](#), 15 October 2024. Accessed: 12 November 2024

REACH & Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster, [Site Monitoring Tool \(SMT\) Quarterly Trends Analysis Report – Q1 2023](#), May 2023. Accessed: 15 November 2024

Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies (Sana'a Center),

[About Us](#), no date. Accessed: 27 August 2024

[The Yemen Review Quarterly: July-September 2024](#), 16 October 2024. Accessed: 5 November 2024

Save the Children, [Hanging in the Balance: Yemeni Children's Struggle for Education \(Executive Summary\)](#), 25 March 2024. Accessed: 21 November 2024

Sphere, ['About'](#), no date. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Statista,

[Who We Are](#), no date. Accessed: 22 November 2024

[Yemen: Unemployment rate from 2004 to 2023](#), 2024. Accessed: 22 November 2024

The White House, Presidential Actions, [Designation of Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization](#), 22 January 2025. Accessed: 18 March 2025

UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, [UK and international response to Houthis in the Red Sea 2024](#), 30 July 2024. Accessed: 3 December 2024

UN, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases,, [Amid Relative Calm in Yemen, Warring Parties Must Halt Military Provocations, Achieve Key Breakthrough to End War, Special Envoy Tells Security Council](#), 10 July 2023. Accessed: 30 August 2024

UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), [UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2 – January to June 2024](#), 8 September 2024. Accessed: 29 November 2024

UN Data, [Yemen](#), no date, accessed: 24 February 2025

UN Development Programme (UNDP), [Measuring Multidimensional Poverty in Yemen](#), December 2023 (published 25 February 2024). Accessed: 21 November 2024

UNESCO Institute for Statistics (IfS) and Global Education Monitoring Report (GEMR), [World Inequality Database on Education \(WIDE\)](#) (Mean years of education in Yemen), 2023. Accessed: 22 November 2024

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
[Humanitarian Action](#), 2024. Accessed: 24 February 2025

[Joint Statement by 190 Humanitarian Organisations in Yemen: Humanitarian partners urge donors to remain committed to the millions in need in Yemen](#), 6 May 2024. Accessed: 21 November 2024

[Yemen](#), 2024. Accessed: 21 January 2025

[Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025](#), 15 January 2025. Accessed: 18 March 2025

[Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 \(January 2024\)](#), 1 February 2024. Accessed: 15 November 2024

[Yemen: Humanitarian Response Plan \(HRP\) 2024 \(January 2024\)](#), 1 February 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

[Yemen: Humanitarian Response Snapshot - August 2024](#), 7 November 2024. Accessed: 22 November 2024

[Yemen Humanitarian Update: Issue 1, January-February 2024](#), 7 March 2024. Accessed: 3 September 2024

[Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 12/December 2022](#), 18 January 2023. Accessed: 3 September 2024

[Yemen Humanitarian Update: Issue 7, October 2024](#), 14 November 2024. Accessed: 24 February 2025

UN Population Fund (UNFPA),
[Situational Report #02 April – June 2024](#), 29 July 2024. Accessed: 14 November 2024

[Situation Report #03: Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen](#), 23 October 2024. Accessed: 14 November 2024

[UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023](#), 7 February 2023. Accessed: 30 October 2024

[What We Do: Humanitarian response](#), no date. Accessed: 30 October 2024

[Who we are](#), no date. Accessed: 30 October 2024

[2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen](#), 31 March 2024. Accessed: 30 October 2024

UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR, formerly known as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees),

[IDP Protection Monitoring Update](#), 31 July 2024. Accessed: 2 September 2024

[UNHCR Yemen Country Factsheet January - June 2024](#), 28 August 2024. Accessed: 3 September 2024

[UNHCR Yemen - 2023 Quarter 4 Factsheet](#), 9 April 2024. Accessed: 3 September 2024

UN World Food Programme (WFP),

[Yemen Food Security Update, December 2024](#), 26 December 2024. Accessed: 14 March 2025

[Yemen Food Security Update, October 2024](#), 18 November 2024. Accessed: 21 November 2024

US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook,

[United Kingdom](#), updated 25 November 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

[Yemen](#), updated 25 November 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

US Department of State (USSD),

[2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Yemen](#), 23 April 2024. Accessed: 19 November 2024

[2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Yemen](#), 26 June 2024. Accessed: 29 August 2024

Welthungerhilfe (WHH), [Who we are](#), no date. Accessed: 24 January 2025

WorldAtlas,

[About WorldAtlas](#), no date. Accessed: 27 August 2024

[Maps Of Yemen](#), updated 7 December 2022. Accessed: 9 December 2024

World Bank Group / The World Bank,

[The World Bank In Yemen](#), no date, updated 25 October 2024. Accessed: 20 November 2024

[Yemen Faces Mounting Economic Challenges as Conflict Continues, Regional Tensions Escalate](#), 31 October 2024. Accessed: 19 November 2024

[Yemen Poverty and Equity Assessment 2024: Living in Dire Conditions](#), February 2024. Accessed: 21 November 2024

XE.com,

[Currency Converter – US Dollars to British Pounds](#), no date. Accessed: 3 December 2024

[Currency Converter – Yemeni Rials to British Pounds](#), no date. Accessed: 29 November 2024

[Back to Contents](#)

Sources consulted but not cited

Associated Press (AP) News, [Saudi Arabia praises “positive results” after Yemen’s Houthi rebels visit kingdom for peace talks](#), 20 September 2023. Accessed: 30 August 2024

Chatham House, [The Houthis have cracked down brutally on Yemeni civil society. A strategic response is required](#), 7 August 2024. Accessed: 3 September 2024

The Guardian, [Yemen crowd crush: at least 85 dead after Houthi gunfire sparks panic](#), 20 April 2023. Accessed: 29 August 2024

UN International Organization for Migration (IOM),

[About DTM](#), no date. Accessed: 25 October 2024

Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), [Yemen - Rapid Displacement Tracking Update \(13 - 19 October 2024\)](#), 21 October 2024. Accessed: 25 October 2024

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), [Yemen Humanitarian Update: Issue 11, December 2023](#), 18 January 2024. Accessed: 3 September 2024

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), [Yemen: Türk condemns storming of UN Human Rights office in Sana’a, renews call for release of detained staff](#), 13 August 2024. Accessed: 5 November 2024

UN Population Fund (UNFPA), [Situational Report #01 January - March 2024](#), 30 April 2024. Accessed: 14 November 2024

US Embassy & Consulate in the United Arab Emirates, [Terrorist Designation of the Houthis](#), 18 January 2024. Accessed: 30 December 2024

[Back to Contents](#)

Version control and feedback

Clearance

Below is information on when this note was cleared:

- version **1.0**
- valid from **24 March 2025**

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section

The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section

[Back to Contents](#)

Changes from last version of this note

First version of this note, separating humanitarian from security situation.

[Back to Contents](#)

Feedback to the Home Office

Our goal is to provide accurate, reliable and up-to-date COI and clear guidance. We welcome feedback on how to improve our products. If you would like to comment on this note, please email the [Country Policy and Information Team](#).

[Back to Contents](#)

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

The [Independent Advisory Group on Country Information](#) (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to support them in reviewing the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of approach of COI produced by the Home Office.

The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office's COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. The IAGCI may be contacted at:

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration

1st Floor

Clive House

70 Petty France

London

SW1H 9EX

Email: chiefinspector@icibi.gov.uk

Information about the IAGCI's work and a list of the documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector's pages of the [gov.uk website](#).

[Back to Contents](#)