



Department for  
Business & Trade

# Public Attitudes to Trade Tracker

Wave 7 report

Data collection May to July 2023

Prepared for the Department for Business and Trade

Prepared by **BMG Research**

**March 2025**

# Table of contents

<b>Table of contents</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>1. Executive summary</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1. Background and Methodology	3
1.2. Overview of key findings	3
<b>2. Background and methodology</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1. Background, context and research objectives	9
2.2. Overview of methodology	9
2.3. Contents and structure of the report	12
2.4. Presentation of results	12
<b>3. Interest, knowledge and engagement</b>	<b>14</b>
3.1. Interest in trade	14
3.2. Knowledge of free trade	18
<b>4. Support for free trade agreements and perceived impact</b>	<b>24</b>
4.1. Support for free trade agreements	24
4.2. Future economic outlook	28
4.3. Perceptions of the impact of free trade agreements	31
4.4. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership	42
4.5. The Gulf Cooperation Council	45
4.6. Attitudes towards trade and consumer purchasing	46
<b>5. Trading partner preferences</b>	<b>52</b>
5.1. Support for establishing free trade agreements with specific countries	52
5.2. Support for enhancing existing free trade agreements	55
5.3. Trade agreement priorities	57
<b>6. Appendix</b>	<b>69</b>
6.1. Socio Economic Grade (SEG) classification definitions	69
6.2. Regression analysis	70
6.3. Statistical outputs	70
<b>7. Statement of terms</b>	<b>71</b>
7.1. Compliance with International Standards	71
7.2. Interpretation and publication of results	71
7.3. Ethical practice	71

# 1. Executive summary

## 1.1. Background and Methodology

This report presents the findings from the seventh wave of the Public Attitudes to Trade Tracker. The tracker is a nationally representative survey of attitudes towards trade and public priorities concerning trade policy.

Fieldwork for wave 7 took place between 2 May and 7 July 2023, so the results should be viewed within this context. Over this period, national and world events have impacted the UK economy and the wider priorities and views of the UK public. These events will likely have played a part in informing responses given by respondents when taking part in this survey.

Waves 1 and 2 of the DBT Public Attitudes to Trade Tracker (PATT) combined push-to-web<sup>1</sup> invites with a face-to-face administered Computer-Assisted Self-Interviewing (CASI) approach. Due to the COVID-19 outbreak, the face-to-face CASI fieldwork element for waves 3 could not go ahead as originally planned.

A new methodology combining push-to-web and online panel interviews was introduced at wave 3, increasing the push-to-web sample size. This methodology has been used for every wave from wave 3 onward. 63% of the final sample at wave 7 was push-to-web, and 37% was achieved via an online panel. The introduction of the online panel approach helped to ensure a representative sample was achieved with more scope for sub-group analysis<sup>2</sup>.

Despite these changes to the methodology, BMG Research has concluded that tracking against waves 1 and 2 can still be done credibly. However, even if statistically significant, small shifts should be treated with additional caution.

This executive summary sets out key findings for wave 7 as well as an outline of changes compared to the previous waves.

## 1.2 Overview of key findings

### 1.2.1 Views about Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in general

#### Interest, knowledge and awareness

Two thirds (68%) of respondents said they were interested in how the UK trades with other countries inside the European Union. 67% said they were interested in how the UK trades with other countries outside the European Union.

Interest in how the UK trades with countries in the EU has decreased by 2 percentage points since wave 6. Interest in how the UK trades with countries outside the EU has remained stable.

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<sup>1</sup> For more information on methodology, please see the accompanying technical report

<sup>2</sup> Please note that in each wave a small number of telephone interviews were also conducted due to accessibility issues. This accounts for 14 interviews at wave 7.

There have been increases of 4 percentage points in self-reported knowledge of how the UK trades with countries both inside and outside the EU:

- to 42% for knowledge of how the UK trades with countries inside the EU
- to 39% for knowledge of how the UK trades with countries outside the EU

Respondents were asked about their awareness of recent trade and non-trade related events. The agreement of the Windsor Framework concerning trade in Northern Ireland was the trade-related story that the public were most aware of. 36% of respondents reported awareness of this story. This was followed by the UK's negotiations for a new trade deal with India (33%).

Around 1 in 5 had seen or heard about the UK concluding negotiations to join the CPTPP. 22% had seen or heard that the UK and Ukraine signed a Digital free trade agreement. 19% had seen or heard that negotiations were launched between the UK and Switzerland.

Awareness of the UK's free trade agreement with Australia was higher than New Zealand and Japan (63%, 59% and 56%, respectively). A large proportion had not heard of these trade agreements at all, however (37%, 41%, 44% respectively)

### **Support for FTAs with other countries**

65% of respondents said they were supportive of the UK establishing free trade agreements with other countries. Apart from a peak of 70% at wave 4 (2021), this is in line with all other waves. Opposition to establishing free trade agreements with other countries remains very low, with just 4% of respondents opposed, similar to previous waves.

Reasons for supporting FTAs included:

- strengthening the UK economy (57%),
- improving trade opportunities (38%),
- the UK being able to set its own trade policy (32%),
- lowering prices for consumers (32%),
- and improving ties with other countries (30%).

Reasons for opposing FTAs included:

- concerns about a reduction in safety and food standards (47%),
- a lack of trust/confidence in the government (36%),
- negative impacts on the environment (35%)
- and detrimental effects on key industries (30%),

Similar reasons were seen in previous waves.

### **1.2.2 Views about specific trade agreements**

#### **The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership**

Awareness of the CPTPP has increased by 4 percentage points to 32%. Among those who say they are aware of it, support has remained stable since wave 6 (60% compared<sup>3</sup> to 59%). The proportion of those saying they neither support nor oppose the UK's membership of the CPTPP increased by 3 percentage points (from 20% to 23%).

### **The Gulf Cooperation Council**

Most respondents (60%) had never heard of the GCC, which is higher than the 56% who had never heard of it at wave 6. Around a quarter (24%) knew at least a little about the GCC, in line with previous waves.

Over a third (34%) of all respondents said they would support the UK establishing a free trade agreement with the GCC. This is a decline compared to wave 6 (36%), while 1 in 5 (21%) opposed this, in line with wave 6 (22%). As with the CPTPP, the proportion of those neither supporting nor opposing the UK joining the GCC increased by 3 percentage points to 28%.

Looking at support for FTAs for Saudi Arabia and UAE specifically, 39% support FTAs with the UAE, and 34% with Saudi Arabia. While around 2 in 5 opposed establishing free trade agreements with both countries (20% and 24%, respectively).

There has also been a decline in opposition toward deals with both countries since wave 6. For the UAE, 23% opposed an FTA in wave 6 compared to 20% in this wave. 30% opposed FTAs with Saudi Arabia in wave 6 compared to 24% in this wave.

### **Support for FTAs with specific countries**

Respondents were presented with five countries, and asked to what extent they would support or oppose the UK establishing a free trade agreement with them.

Following significant increases at wave 6, support for free trade agreements with all of the countries included in multiple waves has remained stable. The exception is the USA, which has seen a 3-percentage point decrease.

Support for securing a free trade agreement with the USA drew the highest support (60%), almost matching that for FTAs with non-EU countries generally (65%). Half (51%) supported a free trade agreement with India and 45% with Indonesia.

### **Trade agreement priorities**

Respondents were asked to think about what considerations the UK government should give priority to when negotiating free trade agreements generally. They were also asked to consider this question specifically thinking about, Israel, Turkey, South Korea, Switzerland, Canada and Mexico, and the USA.

The three most frequently selected considerations were the following:

- protecting key industries in the UK such as agriculture, manufacturing and the NHS (43%),

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<sup>3</sup> For Windsor Framework click here <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-windsor-framework>

- maintaining current UK food standards (42%),
- and protecting existing jobs in the UK and creating new ones (39%)

These were also the top considerations for each of the individual countries, albeit in varying order.

All respondents were also asked what considerations they thought the UK government should be giving the least priority to when negotiating free trade agreements

- around 2 in 5 mentioned increasing choice for consumers (41%) and sharing knowledge and innovations (38%),
- a third (34%) mentioned growing trade with lower-income nations, supporting jobs and growth across the globe,
- and around a quarter mentioned investment in environmentally friendly products and services (26%) and promoting investment in the UK and partner countries (23%).

### **Support for enhancing existing free trade agreements**

Respondents were shown six countries with which the UK already has trade agreements in place. They were asked the extent to which they would support or oppose enhancing the existing FTAs with these countries. For the first time at wave 7, this included Switzerland, South Korea and Turkey.

The six countries are listed below:

- Canada
- Israel
- Mexico
- South Korea
- Switzerland
- Turkey

Support for enhancing the existing trade deal with Canada was high, with 7 in 10 (67%) respondents supportive and 4% saying that they were opposed. This exceeds the level of support for FTAs with other countries generally (65% supported).

- around 3 in 5 (62%) were supportive when asked about Switzerland,
- half when asked about South Korea (49%) and Mexico (48%),
- and around 2 in 5 when asked about Turkey (43%) and Israel (39%).

For those countries included in previous waves, support has reduced:

- Canada, by 4 percentage points to 67%
- Mexico, by 4 percentage points to 48%

- Israel, by 3 percentage points to 39%

### **1.2.3. The impact of trade on people and communities**

#### **The impact of trade on the UK overall and on daily life**

Two thirds (68%) felt that signing free trade agreements with other countries would positively impact the UK overall. This maintains the significant uplift at wave 6 for this measure (69% compared with 64% in wave 5).

The proportion who felt that trade would have a positive effect on their daily lives has been maintained. In wave 7 the proportion is 60%, compared with 62% in wave 6.

There continues to be a gap in expected trade impact when asked to think about the whole UK or respondents local area and own life. 68% of respondents stated free trade agreements will positively impact the UK overall, and 60% that it will positively impact their daily lives.

In this wave we have seen an increase in those who say there would be no impact on the UK overall. This went up 3 percentage points to 12%. There was also an increase in those who expect no impact on their daily lives (up 3 percentage points to 20%).

#### **The impact of trade on job opportunities and wages**

Three in 5 (59%) respondents felt that increased free trade would have a positive impact on job opportunities for the UK as a whole. 44% believed there would be a positive impact on job opportunities in their local area, in line with wave 6 (60% and 44% respectively). For both, 1 in 10 expect a negative impact (11% and 10% respectively), again in line with wave 6 (10% and 9% respectively)<sup>4</sup>.

The upward trend in the proportion of respondents believing that increased free trade would result in higher wages continued at wave 7. This applied both at a national and local level. These measures returned to the levels seen at wave 1. Three in ten (33%) felt it would result in higher wages nationally, and a quarter (27%) felt it would do so locally. Perceptions that increased free trade would result in lower wages in the UK and their local area reduced to 13% and 12%, respectively.

#### **The impact of trade on the price and quality of goods and services**

The proportion of respondents expecting prices to decrease as a result of more free trade maintained the increase of 6 percentage points achieved last wave. This measure remained at the highest level seen since the tracker began (45%). The downward trend in the proportion who believe it would lead to higher prices also continued, reducing 3 percentage points to 20%. The proportion who believe it would not change the price of goods and services has increased by 3 percentage points to 20%.

Views on the quality of goods and services also improved further at wave 7. There was an increase in the proportion believing free trade would lead to increased product quality

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<sup>4</sup> In wave 6, question wording was changed to 'Do you think that increased free trade would have a positive or negative impact on job opportunities?'

from 32% at wave 6 to 36%. There was a corresponding decrease in the proportion who believed it would lead to reduced product quality, from 22% to 18%.

### **The economic climate**

There was a significant uplift at wave 6 in the proportion of respondents who believed the economy would get worse, from 35% to 60%.

In the latest wave, this proportion has returned to wave 5 levels (36%). There were increases in the proportion believing the economy will improve over the next 12 months, from 14% to 23%. Nevertheless, this proportion is at its lowest since wave 4, with the exception of wave 6.

There have also been increases in the proportion who believe the economy will stay the same, from 20% to 32%.

How people feel about the economy continues to be a strong predictor of how they feel about free trade. However, the large increase in economic optimism has not led to an increase in support for the UK establishing FTAs with other countries. While there was a decline in support for FTAs among those who expected economic worsening (65% at wave 6 to 57%), this remains high. Opposition to the UK signing FTAs among this group has remained low, at 7%.



## 2. Background and methodology

### 2.1. Background, context and research objectives

The Department for International Trade (DIT) was incorporated in February 2023 into the Department for Business and Trade (DBT). The Department for Business and Trade is the department for economic growth and supports businesses to invest, grow and export, creating jobs and opportunities across the country. The department plays a critical role in driving the governments manifesto commitments on industrial strategy, investment, small business, trade and employment rights.

In September 2018, DIT commissioned the first wave of the PATT to examine public attitudes towards trade and to understand respondents priorities as they relate to trade policy. Waves 2 to 6 and now wave 7 of the PATT have enabled DBT to track shifts in sentiment over time.

Fieldwork for wave 7 was conducted between 2 May and 7 July 2023. This was during the administration of the previous government.

The first wave, which set the baseline for the study, concluded in January 2019. Wave 2 finished in August 2019, wave 3 was completed in August 2020, wave 4 finished in May 2021, and wave 5 ended in January 2022. Fieldwork for the sixth wave finished in September 2022. Final reports for all previous iterations of the PATT have been published by DBT<sup>5</sup>.

### 2.2. Overview of methodology

#### Overview of methodological changes<sup>6</sup>

Readers should treat comparisons between data from waves 3 onwards with data from waves 1 and 2 with additional caution. Caution should always be exercised when tracking survey data. Still, extra caution should be taken in this instance due to the methodological changes introduced in wave 3, following the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Waves 1 and 2 of the PATT combined push-to-web invites with a face-to-face administered Computer-Assisted Self-Interviewing (CASI) approach. Each element comprised roughly 50% of the achieved sample. Due to the COVID-19 outbreak, the face-to-face CASI fieldwork element for wave 3 could not go ahead as originally planned, with a new methodology introduced and replicated again at waves 4 to 7.

As a result, the push-to-web sample size was increased (63% of the final sample at waves 6 and 7, 64% of the final sample at wave 5, 74% at wave 4, and 73% at wave 3).

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<sup>5</sup> For wave 1, please see: [Public attitudes to trade tracker \(PATT\): wave 1 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-attitudes-to-trade-tracker-patt-wave-1)  
For wave 2, please see: [Public attitudes to trade tracker \(PATT\): wave 2 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-attitudes-to-trade-tracker-patt-wave-2)  
For wave 3, please see: [Public attitudes to trade tracker \(PATT\): wave 3 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-attitudes-to-trade-tracker-patt-wave-3)  
For wave 4, please see: [Public attitudes to trade tracker \(PATT\): wave 4 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-attitudes-to-trade-tracker-patt-wave-4)  
For wave 5, please see: [Public attitudes to trade tracker \(PATT\): wave 5 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-attitudes-to-trade-tracker-patt-wave-5)  
For wave 6: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-attitudes-to-trade-tracker-patt-wave-6>

<sup>6</sup> For a more detailed overview of the methodology used at wave 7, please see the technical report available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-attitudes-to-trade-tracker>

Online panel interviews were used to supplement the push-to-web approach to ensure a more representative sample with more scope for sub-group analysis<sup>7</sup>.

A summary of modes and sample sizes is included in Table 1 below.

**Table 1: Sample composition by wave<sup>8</sup>**

Wave	Push-to-web	CASI	Online Panel	Total	Push-to-web response rate
1	1,149	1,251	N/A	2,400	19%
2	1,130	1,219	N/A	2,349	19%
3	2,374	N/A	850	3,224	20%
4	2,953	N/A	1,036	4,009	25%
5	1,907	N/A	1,082	2,989	16%
6	1,938	N/A	1,120	3,058	16%
7	1,817	N/A	1,055	2,872	15%

### Push-to-web

In line with previous waves, the push-to-web sample was selected via a stratified random probability design. Postal invites were sent to 12,000 randomly selected addresses, and 1,817 respondents completed the survey, representing a response rate of 15%.

This is in line with the push-to-web response rate at waves 5 and 6 but lower than the push-to-web response rates of 25% at wave 4 and 20% at wave 3.

Prospective respondents were provided with a link to the online survey in their invitation letter. The survey was created on software designed to maximise accessibility by ensuring compatibility across devices, including tablet devices and smartphones.

To ensure sufficient base sizes to allow reliable analysis, the number of invites was boosted in each devolved nation.

### Online panel interviews

Alongside the push-to-web approach, BMG conducted 1,055 of the target interviews via online panel interviews (37% of the total). An online panel is defined as an online group of recruited people willing to conduct social and market research surveys in return for a

<sup>7</sup> Please note that in each wave a small number of telephone interviews were also conducted due to accessibility issues. This accounted for 7 interviews at wave 6.

<sup>8</sup> A small number of telephone interviews were conducted in each wave resulting in the total column being slightly higher than the sum of push-to-web, CASI and online panel

small financial incentive for each survey completed. BMG Research worked with an online panel partner, Savanta, to achieve the online panel interviews<sup>9</sup>.

The panel interviews were used to target sub-groups of people with low response in the push-to-web approach, but are easier to target on panels. An interlocking grid of targets was created on the basis of age, gender, and region. Doing so ensured a more balanced and representative sample overall with more scope for sub-group analysis.

## Weighting

Following the completion of fieldwork, the data was weighted to maximise representativeness to the UK population. Weighting targets were as follows:

- age
- gender
- Government Office Region
- Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD)
- 2016 EU referendum vote
- education level<sup>10</sup>

All targets were ascertained using official population statistics released by the ONS and the Electoral Commission's official published 2016 Referendum results.

**Table 2: Unweighted total per region**

Region	Unweighted total
England	2,334
Scotland	230
Wales	223
Northern Ireland	85
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,872</b>

All reporting is based on the combined response from push to web and panel, which have been weighted to represent the UK population. More information on weighting can be found in the accompanying technical report.

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<sup>9</sup> For more information, please see: [Data Collection & Analytics - Savanta](#)

<sup>10</sup> A new addition at wave 3 and continued at wave 4 and 5 and 6. For more detail on why this was introduced, please see technical report for wave 4 available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-attitudes-to-trade-tracker>

## Questionnaire content

Most of the questions in wave 7 remained identical to previous waves, with a similar order and structure to minimise potential order effects<sup>11</sup>. This allows for the majority of questions to be tracked across multiple waves to see how responses have changed over time.

In some instances, while the questions remain the same, specific response options have changed to reflect emerging priorities.

As with previous waves, BMG conducted a round of cognitive testing with members of the public to review the wording and structure of new or substantially altered questions<sup>12</sup>. Upon review of themes emerging from the cognitive interviews, small textual changes were made before a final draft of the questionnaire was agreed.

The full questionnaire can be found in the technical report.

## Fieldwork

Fieldwork was conducted between 2 May and 7 July 2023. Notable events during the fieldwork period included raised inflation in the UK, with inflation reaching 7.9% before fieldwork (May 2023).

More details on the technical and methodological elements of the study can be found in the accompanying technical report.

### 2.3. Contents and structure of the report

The findings outlined in the report are structured under the following headings:

1. interest, knowledge and engagement
2. support for free trade agreements and their perceived impact
3. trade partner preferences

### 2.4. Presentation of results

Below is a set of guidance to assist when reading and interpreting the data outlined in this report.

**Rounding:** the data used in this report are rounded up or down to the nearest whole percentage. This is why, on occasion, tables or charts may add up to 99% or 101%. Results that do differ in this way should not have a sum-total deviance larger than 1 to 2%.

**Sample:** the sample was designed to be representative of the UK public. Findings refer to 'respondents' rather than residents or the general public. However, findings can be considered indicative of the wider UK public's views.

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<sup>11</sup> For more information of order effects, please see Strack, F. (1992) "Order Effects" in *Survey Research: Activation and Information Functions of Preceding Questions*, available here:

[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4612-2848-6\\_3](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4612-2848-6_3)

<sup>12</sup> For more information on the cognitive testing process, please see the technical report available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-attitudes-to-trade-tracker>



Base sizes: results are based on all respondents unless otherwise specified. Where sub-group results have been used in charts, their relevant base sizes (unweighted) are shown in parentheses after the description of the sub-group. Otherwise, base sizes are detailed in the notes at the bottom of each figure and table.

Annotation: in the tables and charts contained in this report, a \* symbol denotes a proportion that is less than 0.5% but greater than zero.

Open responses: figures relating to questions in an open response format have been labelled as such in the notes at the bottom of each figure.

Statistical Significance: Throughout this report, the term "significant" is only used to describe differences between particular groups that are statistically significant to 95% confidence. This means there is only a 5% probability that the difference has occurred by chance (a commonly accepted probability level) rather than being a 'real' difference.

Unless specified, all statistics are compared against the total.

- where a result is significantly higher than the average or when compared to results observed at previous waves, charts in this report will be marked with the following symbol: 
- where a result is significantly lower than the average or when compared to results observed at previous waves, charts in this report will be marked with the following symbol: 

The report focuses on where statistically significant differences have been identified. Where differences between waves are discussed during the commentary, these differences can all be presumed statistically significant unless otherwise noted<sup>13</sup>.

It is important to note that the online panel interviews relied on quota sampling. Some potential issues with using formal statistical significance tests on quota sample data include bias and lack of known sampling probability. Therefore, it is advised that any results of statistical significance tests are used as a guide and should always be interpreted with a degree of caution<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> Data tables can be accessed here: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-attitudes-to-trade-tracker>

<sup>14</sup> Further discussion on quota and probability sampling and the consequences for statistical tests is provided in the technical report which can be accessed here: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-attitudes-to-trade-tracker>

## 3. Interest, knowledge and engagement

### 3.1. Interest in trade

**While lower than the peak achieved at wave 6, interest in the UK economy remains high. Levels of interest in how the UK trades with countries in the EU and with non-EU countries are among the lowest since tracking began.**


To examine interest levels around the subject of trade, respondents were separately asked about the extent to which they were interested in how the UK trades with European Union (EU) countries and non-EU countries. This is consistent with the approach in previous waves. This featured alongside a list of other topics of potential public interest: the UK economy, the UK's approach to environmental issues, and UK foreign affairs. The results are presented in figure 1.

While lower than the peak achieved at wave 6 (86%), interest in the UK economy remains high at 83%.

There has been a continuing downward trend in interest in the UK's approach to environmental issues, from 83% at wave 3 to 77% in the latest wave.

Two in 3 reported being interested in UK foreign affairs (67%), how the UK trades with countries outside the EU (67%) and how the UK trades with countries in the EU (68%), although the latter has seen a decline since wave 6 (70%). In each instance, interest levels have returned to among the lowest since tracking began.

**Figure 1: Interest in how the UK trades with other countries and other topics**  
**Interest in different issues (% interested)**



IK1: How interested would you say you are in ...?  
 Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 1 = 2,400, Wave 2 = 2,349, Wave 3 = 3,224, Wave 4 = 4,009, Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7, 2,872)  
 Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results observed at previous wave.

**Those who were older, in higher socio-economic grades, with a higher household income, or were degree-educated continued to be more likely to report interest in how the UK trades with countries outside the EU.**

By analysing responses across demographic groups, consistent patterns emerge in the groups more likely to report being interested in how the UK trades with countries outside the EU. Figure 2 below charts interest levels among demographic groups regarding how the UK trades with countries outside the EU<sup>15</sup>.

Consistent with patterns observed in previous waves, and as shown in figure 2, respondents were more likely to report being interested if they:

- were in higher socio-economic grades (SEG): 79% of those in SEG classifications AB said they were either very or fairly interested, as compared to 57% in SEG DE classification<sup>16</sup>
- were older: respondents in older age groups were more likely to report being interested, while the opposite was true of those aged under 24. Of those aged 16 to 24, 57% said they were interested, as compared to 77% of those aged 65 to 74 and 74% of those aged 75 and over
- had obtained degree level qualifications: 80% of those with at least an undergraduate degree level of education reported being interested, as compared to 51% of those with no qualifications
- were men: by a margin of 10 percentage points, men (72%) were significantly more likely than women (62%) to report being interested<sup>17</sup>. This is a commonly observed phenomenon in survey research, with women often more likely to state they feel less knowledgeable when answering survey questions about political issues<sup>18</sup>
- had a higher household income: 79% of those with a household income of £60,000 or more reported being interested, as compared to 42% of those with a household income below £10,000

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<sup>15</sup> Whilst not set out in full, responses to the question about interest in how the UK trades with countries inside the EU follow a similar pattern.


<sup>16</sup> More detail on SEG classifications is provided in the appendix.

<sup>17</sup> Gender differences in interest levels with respect to political issues is a common phenomenon within survey research. See, for example: Coffe, H. (2013) *Women Stay Local, Men Go National and Global? Gender Differences in Political Interest*, available at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11199-013-0308-x>

<sup>18</sup> Evidence from academia suggests that this can often be partly explained by a variety of factors that are often not related to the 'actual' knowledge levels of respondents. For example, some studies suggest that women are more risk-averse when answering knowledge related questions and are more likely to state 'don't know'. Other studies suggest that women tend to be more interested in political information related to local affairs rather than national and international issues. For further discussion, please see Lizotte, M and Sidman, A. (2009) *Explaining the Gender Gap in Political Knowledge*, available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231898529\\_Explaining\\_the\\_Gender\\_Gap\\_in\\_Political\\_Knowledge](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231898529_Explaining_the_Gender_Gap_in_Political_Knowledge)



**Figure 2: Interest levels in how the UK trades with countries outside the EU across key groups**



IK1: How interested would you say you are in....? How the UK trades with countries outside the European Union

Proportions stating that they are very or fairly interested.

Unweighted base sizes provided in parenthesis.

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences against the average result.

### 3.2. Knowledge of free trade

#### Self-reported knowledge levels of how the UK trades with countries both in and outside the European Union have increased.


While around 2 in 3 indicated that they were interested in how the UK trades with other countries (68% were interested in how the UK trades with countries inside the EU, and 67% in how the UK trades with countries outside the EU), only a minority said they felt knowledgeable (see figure 3). The results, therefore, continue to indicate a gap between interest levels and knowledge levels.

However, there have been increases of 4 percentage points in self-reported knowledge of how the UK trades with countries both inside and outside the EU, to 42% and 39% respectively.

There has also been an increase in self-reported knowledge of the UK economy, from 63% in wave 6 to 66% in the latest wave, continuing an upward trend on this measure since wave 5.

Close to 3 in 5 (57%) reported being knowledgeable about the UK's approach to environmental issues, and close to half (47%) reported being knowledgeable about UK foreign affairs.

**Figure 3: Self-reported knowledge of how the UK trades with other countries and other topics**



IK2. How knowledgeable would you say you currently are about ...?

Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 1 = 2,400, Wave 2 = 2,349, Wave 3 = 3,224, Wave 4 = 4,009, Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872)

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results from previous wave.

### **Those in higher socio-economic grades or were degree-educated continue to report higher levels of knowledge than average.**

Consistent with previous waves, respondents in higher socio-economic grades and degree education were more likely to say they felt knowledgeable about how the UK trades with other countries. This applies both in terms of trade inside and outside the EU.

Figure 4, below, charts interest levels among key groups on how knowledgeable they felt about how the UK trades with countries outside the <sup>19</sup>.


In line with previous waves, respondents were more likely to say they were knowledgeable if they:

- were in higher socio-economic grades (SEG): 50% of respondents from SEG classification AB reported feeling knowledgeable compared to 33% of those in SEG classifications DE
- had obtained degree level qualifications: there continues to be a significant gap between those who had obtained a degree or above level qualifications (46%) and those who had no qualifications (26%)
- were men: men (46%) were much more likely than women (32%) to report feeling knowledgeable about how the UK trades with countries outside the EU. As explained in the interest section, women feel less knowledgeable than men when it comes to political issues.
- were younger: 45% of those aged 16 to 24 reported being knowledgeable, as compared to 31% of those aged 75 or over

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<sup>19</sup> Whilst not set out in full, responses to the question about how knowledgeable they feel about how the UK trades with countries *inside* the EU follow a similar pattern.

**Figure 4: Self-reported knowledge levels about how the UK trades with countries outside the EU – across key groups**



IK2. How knowledgeable would you say you currently are about...? How the UK trades with countries outside the European Union

Unweighted base sizes provided in parenthesis.

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences against the average result.


**The agreement of the Windsor Framework concerning trade in Northern Ireland was the trade-related story respondents were most likely to recall.**

Respondents were presented with a list of topics and asked which they recall having seen or heard about in the previous 3 months. This question included both trade-specific stories and items not related to trade. Reference periods varied from February to November 2023.

Results presented in figure 5 show the agreement of the Windsor Framework concerning trade in Northern Ireland was the trade-related story most respondents had heard about (36%), followed by the UK's negotiations for a new free trade agreement with India (33%). Around 1 in 5 were aware of the UK concluding negotiations to join the CPTPP (22%), the UK and Ukraine signing a Digital free trade agreement (22%) and the UK launching negotiations for a free trade agreement with Switzerland (19%).

Trade stories in waves 6 and 7 tended to have less cut-through than in previous waves, with the end of the EU/UK negotiation period and the trade deal with Australia (wave 5) having the most salience across stories asked about at all the waves.

**Figure 5: Prompted topic recall**




## Awareness of a free trade agreement with Australia is higher than awareness of a free trade agreement with New Zealand and Japan

For the first time this wave, respondents were asked to rate their level of awareness of free trade agreements with Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The agreements between the UK and New Zealand and Australia came into force during wave seven fieldwork, in May 2023. The agreement between the UK and Japan came into force in January 2021.

Awareness of the agreements was relatively high, with around 3 in 5 having heard of them (63%, 59% and 56%, respectively), but overall awareness was higher for Australia.

**Figure 6: Awareness of free trade agreements**



CV5.  
 Have you seen or heard anything about the free trade agreements (FTA) between the UK and following countries?  
 Unweighted base size: (2,872)

## 4. Support for free trade agreements and perceived impact

### 4.1. Support for free trade agreements


Support for establishing FTAs with countries outside the EU remained stable following a decline at wave 5.

Respondents were asked about the extent to which they support the UK establishing free trade agreements with countries outside of the EU.

Despite the increase in self-reported knowledge of how the UK trades with other countries, there has been no increase in support for them. As Figure 7 shows, 65% of respondents said they were supportive of the UK establishing free trade agreements with other countries. Apart from a peak of 70% at wave 4, this is in line with all other waves. Opposition to establishing free trade agreements with other countries remains very low, with just 4% of respondents opposed, in line with previous waves.

The proportion who neither support nor oppose free trade agreements has remained stable compared to wave 6 (19% compared to 18%), as has the proportion who are unsure (11% at both waves).

**Figure 7: Support and opposition to the UK establishing free trade agreements with other countries**





In waves 3 to 7: FT4. In general, would you say that you support or oppose the UK establishing free trade agreements with countries outside the European Union?

In waves 1 and 2: FT4. In general, would you say that you support or oppose free trade agreements?  
Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 1 = 2,400, Wave 2 = 2,349, Wave 3 = 3,224, Wave 4 = 4,009, Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872)

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave prior.

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As with previous waves, the same differences between demographic sub-groups exist. A closer look at the results reveals that support was higher within the following groups:

- men: by a margin of 15 percentage points, men (73%) were more likely than women (58%) to say they support the UK establishing free trade agreements with other countries
- higher socio-economic grades (SEG): 77% of those in SEG classifications AB supported the UK establishing free trade agreements with other countries, as compared to 65% of respondents in SEG classifications C1C2, and 56% of respondents in grades DE
- older people: there was a steady increase in support as you go up the age scale, from 50% of those aged 16 to 24 to 80% of those aged 75 or over being supportive
- those with degree level qualifications: of those with degree or above level qualifications, 74% reported being supportive of the UK establishing free trade agreements with other countries, as compared to 65% of those with non-degree qualifications and 46% of those with no qualifications

As was noted in previous waves, some caution should be used when comparing differing levels of support within sub-groups. Stating that support is lower among certain groups may implicitly suggest that opposition is also higher. However, this is not the case. Consistent with previous waves, whilst support varied considerably between sub-groups, levels of opposition remain consistently low (only above 10% among respondents of 'other' ethnicity (12%), and those who feel there will be a negative impact of signing FTAs both on the UK overall (34%) and on their daily life (33%). Instead, the proportions of those that selected "neither support nor oppose", or to a lesser extent those who said they "don't know" varied quite considerably between subgroups.


## The key reason for supporting trade agreements was strengthening the UK economy.

Figure 8 illustrates that, when asked why they support free trade agreements, the most commonly cited reason given by respondents was to strengthen the UK economy (57%), followed by improving trade opportunities for businesses (38%). Around 1 in 3 mentioned the UK's ability to set its own trade policy (32%), lowered prices for consumers (32%) and improve ties with other countries (30%).

Newly introduced this wave, just 11% selected higher quality jobs as a main reason for their support. Other reasons were mentioned by fewer than 1 in 3 respondents.

These results are in line with reasons for support chosen at wave 6.

**Figure 8: Reasons for supporting free trade agreements (where support FTAs)**



FT5. Which of the following best represent the main reasons you support free trade agreements?

\* New at Wave 7.

Base: Where support free trade agreements (Wave 6 = 2,121, Wave 7 = 1,948)

**The key reasons for opposing trade agreements were fears over reducing safety and food standards, a lack of trust/confidence in the government, environmental concerns, and the effects on key industries.**


As shown in figure 9 below, when asked why they oppose free trade agreements, the most commonly cited reason given by respondents was the reduction in safety and food standards, mentioned by close to half of those opposed to free trade agreements (47%).

Around 1 in 3 mentioned a lack of trust/confidence in the government (36%), negative impacts on the environment (35%), and the detrimental effects on key industries (30%).

Other reasons were mentioned by fewer than 1 in 3 respondents.

Again, these results are similar to choices made in wave 6.

**Figure 9: Reasons for opposing free trade agreements (where oppose FTAs)**



FT5. Which of the following best represent the main reasons you oppose free trade agreements? New at Wave 6.

Base: Where oppose free trade agreements (Wave 6 = 158, Wave 7 = 145)

## 4.2. Future economic outlook

### Views on the future economic outlook have improved


The survey explored the economic outlook of respondents, asking whether they expect the general economic conditions of the country to improve, get worse or stay about the same in the next 12 months. This question changed following wave 3, where respondents were asked how long they thought it would take for the UK economy to recover from COVID-19 once lockdown restrictions were lifted.

Reflecting the economic situation at the time, and as shown in figure 10, there was a significant uplift at wave 6 (July – September 2022) in the proportion of respondents who believed the economy would get worse, from 35% to 60%.

In the latest wave, this proportion has returned to wave 5 levels (36%), with increases in the proportions who believe the economy will improve over the next 12 months, from 14% to 23%. Nevertheless, this proportion is at its lowest since wave 4 when the question was introduced, with the exception of wave 6.

There have also been increases in the proportion who believe the economy will stay the same, from 20% to 32%.

**Figure 10: Future economic outlook**



ECON. Do you think the general economic conditions of the country will improve, stay the same or get worse over the next 12 months?

Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 4 = 4,009, Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872)

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave prior.

As in previous waves, the economic outlook differed significantly by gender, with men more likely to expect an improvement than women (27% compared to 19%).

Again, as has been the case before, there were also differences by age. Respondents aged 16 to 34 were in line with the average, however those aged 35 to 54 were more

likely to believe the economy will worsen (42%) and less likely to think it will improve (19%). By contrast, those aged 55 or over were more likely to believe the economy will improve (28%) and less likely to think it will worsen (34%).

Those educated to degree level or above were more likely to think the economy will improve over the next 12 months (26%), while those with no qualifications were less likely to do so (16%). Readers should note that this is driven by a high level of 'don't know' responses (20%) for this group, rather than of a high degree of pessimism (39%) when compared to the overall average.

Respondents of AB socio-economic grouping were more likely to believe the economy will improve (28%), while those of DE socio-economic grouping were less likely to do so (19%), again as a result of a high level of 'don't know' responses (15%) rather than a high level who believed it would worsen (37%) when compared to the overall average.

Black British individuals were more likely to believe the economy will improve (44%), and White individuals were more likely to think it will worsen (37%).

Views were consistent by region/nation.

### **Respondents' feelings about the economy continued to relate to how they felt about trade more broadly.**

Figure 11, below, shows how attitudes towards the economy continue to be linked to attitudes about the economic impact of free trade. This figure reports the impact on jobs and wages locally, but the results presented are selected as indicative of the relationship for other questions exploring perceived impact or support for free trade<sup>20</sup>.



Taking the impact on local jobs as an example, 63% of those who believed the economy would improve also believed increased free trade would lead to significantly improved job opportunities, as compared to less than half of those who thought the economy would stay the same (46%) or that it would get worse (36%).

As with waves 3 and 4, these findings highlight that worsening perceptions of trade may not always be related to the specifics of trade but more to the state of the economy and general levels of economic pessimism. Survey questions about trade-specific matters can become proxies for respondents expressing their wider-held beliefs. Thinking about findings in this context continues to be important when interpreting results.

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<sup>20</sup> Regression analysis at FT4 confirms that levels of economic optimism was a statistically significant driver of support for free trade agreements with countries outside the European Union. Full regression outputs are available in the appendix.

**Figure 11: Impact of free trade on job opportunities and wages by economic outlook**



UK3. Now thinking about both the UK as a whole and then just your local area, do you think that increased free trade would have a positive or negative impact on job opportunities?


UK4....still thinking about the UK as a whole, and then just your local area, do you think that increased free trade would result in higher wages, or lower wages? Base: all respondents (Wave 6 = 3058)

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to total.

Regression analysis<sup>21</sup> was conducted to reveal the most significant drivers of support for the UK establishing free trade agreements with other countries. Economic outlook is the most significant driver of support, with a relative importance score of 41%. This mirrors findings from previous waves. However, regression can only explain 10% of variation which is important to note when interpreting findings.

However, while how people feel about the economy remains a strong predictor of how they feel about free trade, the increase in economic optimism this wave has not led to an increase in support in the UK establishing FTAs with countries outside of the EU. Figure 12 illustrates that while support for FTAs among those who felt the economy will worsen has fallen since wave 6, from 65% to 57%, returning to wave 5 levels, it remains relatively high, and opposition to FTAs remains low (7%).

**Figure 12: Support for FTAs by those who think the economy will worsen**



ECON. Do you think the general economic conditions of the country will improve, stay the same or get worse over the next 12 months?

FT4. In general, would you say that you support or oppose the UK establishing free trade agreements with countries outside the European Union?

Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 5 = 2989, Wave 6 = 3058)

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave prior.

### 4.3. Perceptions of the impact of free trade agreements

**Positive perceptions about the impact of trade on the UK overall and on daily life have remained at the higher levels achieved at wave 6.**

As Figure 13 illustrates, close to 7 in 10 (68%) felt that signing free trade agreements with other countries would positively impact the UK overall, maintaining the significant uplift at wave 6 (69% compared to 64% in wave 5).

Similarly, the gains made at wave 6 concerning the proportion who felt that the effect would be positive on their daily lives, from 56% in wave 5 to 62% in wave 6, have been maintained in the latest wave (60%).


<sup>21</sup> A definition of regression analysis and further details on the regression analysis conducted can be found in the appendices section.

However, there continues to be a gap between the proportion of respondents who stated free trade agreements will positively impact the UK overall (68%), and those who stated they will positively impact their daily lives (60%).

Additionally, while expectations relating to positive and negative impact on the UK overall and respondents' local areas have remained stable, there has been an increase in those saying there would be no impact. Once again, the proportion that thinks there will be no impact is higher when thinking about respondents' local areas area (20%) than it is for the UK overall (12%)



**Figure 13: Perceived impact of free trade agreements on UK overall and daily life**



UK1. In general, do you think that the UK signing free trade agreements with countries outside the European Union would have a positive impact or a negative impact on *the UK overall*?

UK2. In general, do you think that the UK signing free trade agreements with countries outside the European Union would have a positive impact or a negative impact *on you and your daily life*?

Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 1 = 2,400, Wave 2 = 2,349, Wave 3 = 3,224, Wave 4 = 4,009, Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872).

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave prior.

**Belief that increased free trade would positively impact job opportunities at a UK level continues to be relatively high. Views were less likely to be positive regarding expected impact on opportunities locally.**

In addition to exploring the impact of free trade agreements more generally, respondents were asked about their perceptions of the impact of trade in more specific areas. These included jobs, wages, the quality of goods and services, the price of goods and services and the cost of living.

When exploring data related to expectations of impact on jobs, it should be noted that the question wording and response options changed at wave 6. In previous waves, respondents were asked whether they thought that increased free trade would result in more jobs being created overall or fewer jobs being created overall. In wave 6, respondents were asked whether they thought that increased free trade would positively or negatively impact job opportunities. Consequently, while figure 14 overleaf shows the trend on this measure over time and shows an upward trend in positive sentiment, the commentary below makes no comparison of findings from wave 6 and 7 with results from waves 1 to 5.

- Three in 5 (59%) respondents felt that increased free trade would have a positive impact on job opportunities for the UK as a whole. This is similar to what was reported in wave 6 (60%)
- 44% felt that it would have a positive impact on job opportunities in their local area, in line with wave 6 (44%).
- when both thinking locally and at a UK level, 1 in 10 felt trade would have a negative impact again in line with wave 6
- there was an increase in those who did not think free trade agreements would impact jobs at the overall UK level (18% in wave 7 vs. 16% in wave 6).


Concerning the impact at a UK level, men are more positive than women (54% compared to 46%), which is also the case for the impact at a local level (48% compared to 42%).

Positivity increased with age in relation to the impact at a UK level:

- 48% of those aged 16 to 24
- 67% of those aged 75 or over,

Views were consistent across all age groups concerning the impact at a local level, unlike wave 6 where respondents over 55 were more likely to expect a positive impact than younger people.

**Figure 14: Perceived impact of free trade on job opportunities**



UK3. Waves 1 to 5: Now thinking about both the UK as a whole and then just your local area, do you think that increased free trade would result in more jobs being created overall, or fewer jobs being created overall?

UK3. Wave 6 and 7: Now thinking about both the UK as a whole and then just your local area, do you think that increased free trade would have a positive or negative impact on job opportunities?

Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 1 = 2,400, Wave 2 = 2,349, Wave 3 = 3,224, Wave 4 = 4,009, Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872).

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave prior. Statistical significance arrows not added to wave 6 due to the changes in question wording.

**A sizeable proportion continue to believe free trade agreements would have no impact on wages in the UK or in the local area.**

A significant proportion continue to feel that free trade would have no impact on wages, both concerning the UK overall (34% expect no impact), but particularly in relation to the local area (41%), where this was the most common sentiment.

Three in 10 (33%) felt trade would result in higher wages nationally, and a quarter (27%) felt trade would have this impact in their local area.

Incidence of the perception that increased free trade would result in lower wages in the UK and in a respondent's local area have reduced to 13% and 12%, respectively.


As was the case at wave 6, those aged 16 to 24 were more likely to believe that free trade would lead to higher wages across the UK (39%) and more likely to think it would lead to lower wages (25%). However, while those aged 25 to 44 were also more likely to believe free trade would lead to higher wages (39%), they were no more likely than average to think it would lead to lower wages (12%). Those age 55 or over were both less likely to believe that free trade would lead to higher wages across the UK (29%) and less likely to believe it would lead to lower wages (8%), with 41% believing it would make no difference.

This pattern was largely repeated in relation to the impact of increased free trade on wages in a respondent's local area. One in 3 (34%) of those aged 16 to 34 felt it would result in higher wages locally, and 21% thought that it would result in lower wages locally, both higher than average. However, while those aged 35 to 44 were also more likely to believe free trade would lead to higher wages locally (32%), they were no more likely than average to believe it would lead to lower wages (14%).

Again, those aged 55 or over were more likely to feel it would make no difference (47%) or not know (23%), although, on balance, they felt it would result in higher (21%) than lower (9%) wages across the UK.

By region, respondents in Yorkshire and Humber were more likely to feel that increased free trade would result in higher wages (33%), and those in London were more likely than average to think that increased free trade would result in lower wages (18%).

**Figure 15: Impact of trade on wages**



UK4. Do you think that increased free trade would result in higher wages or lower wages? In the UK  
 UK4. Do you think that increased free trade would result in higher wages or lower wages? Your local area  
 Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 1 = 2,400, Wave 2 = 2,349, Wave 3 = 3,224, Wave 4 = 4,009, Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872).

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave prior.

**The proportion of respondents who expected prices to decrease as a result of more free trade is aligned with wave 6. Views on the quality of goods and services improved further at wave 7.**

As illustrated in figure 16, the proportion of respondents who expected prices to decrease as a result of more free trade has maintained the increase of 6 percentage points achieved at wave 6, remaining at the highest level seen since the tracker began in 2018 (45%). The downward trend in the proportion who believe increased trade would lead to higher prices has also continued, reducing 3 percentage points to 20%. Those believing there would be no change in prices has increased by 4 percentage points to 21% and, for the first time, is higher than those that believe there will be an increase in prices.

As has been the case previously, men were more positive than women in this respect, with half (50%) believing free trade would lead to lower prices (compared to 40% of women). Those aged 16 to 34 were less positive than older age groups, with 30% believing free trade would lead to higher prices (compared to 18% of those aged 35 to 54 and 13% of those aged 55 or over).

In addition to the differences outlined above around sex and age, the following groups were also more likely than average to believe that increased free trade would lead to reduced prices:

- those in the South East (54%)
- those educated to a degree level or above (54%)
- those in SEG classifications AB (54%)
- those with a household income of £60,000 or more (53%)
- those in the two least deprived IMD quartile (50% and 54%)
- White respondents (46%)



By contrast, the following groups were more likely than average to believe that increased free trade would lead to higher prices:

- people from ethnic minority backgrounds (35%)
- those with a household income of less than £10,000 (27%) or between £10,000 and £19,999 (24%)
- those in London (25%)
- those in the most deprived IMD quartile (24%)

Views on the impact of trade on quality of goods and services also improved further at wave 7, with an increase in the proportion who believed free trade would lead to increased quality from 32% at wave 6 to 36% in the latest wave and a corresponding decrease in the proportion who believed it would lead to reduced quality, from 22% to 18%.

Sub-group differences in this respect largely reflected those outlined above concerning the price of goods and services.

**Figure 16: Impact of trade on the price and quality of goods and services**



UK5. Thinking about just the UK as a whole, do you think that increased free trade would result in an increase in the price of goods and services, or a decrease in the price of goods and services?

UK6. Still thinking about the UK as a whole, do you think that increased free trade would result in the availability of higher quality goods and services, or lower quality of goods and services?

Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 1 = 2,400, Wave 2 = 2,349, Wave 3 = 3,224, Wave 4 = 4,009, Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872).

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave prior.



**Two in 5 (41%) thought increased free trade would result in a decrease in the cost of living while 2 in 10 believed increased free trade would increase the cost of living**


New at wave 6, respondents were asked what impact they felt increased free trade would have on the cost of living, and the results for waves 6 and 7 are presented in figure 17. While 22% believed increased free trade would increase the cost of living, a decrease since wave 6, 41% thought it would result in a reduction.

As was the case in wave 6, men were more likely than women to believe the cost of living would decrease as a result of increased free trade (45% compared to 37%), although unlike wave 6, men and women were equally likely to believe it would increase (21% and 23% respectively).

Belief that trade would raise cost of living reduced with age. The belief that trade would raise the cost of living was expressed by 32% of those aged 16 to 34, but only 16% of those aged 55 or over. Conversely, the likelihood of believing the cost of living would become less increased with age, from 33% of those aged 16 to 34 to 45% of those aged 55 or over.

Those in London were more likely than average to believe increased free trade would lead to a rise in the cost of living (28%), and those in the South East were more likely to think it would lead to a decrease in the cost of living (47%).

**Figure 17: Impact of trade on the cost of living**



UK7. Thinking about the UK as a whole, what impact do you think increased free trade would have on the cost of living? New at Wave 6.

Base: All respondents (Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872)

#### **4.4. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)**

**The proportion of respondents who said they know a little about the CPTPP was at its highest at wave 7.**


The survey explored awareness of and attitudes towards the UK joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). CPTPP is a trade agreement between 11 countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam), half a billion people with a joint gross domestic product (GDP) of £9 trillion in 2022. The UK submitted its application to join CPTPP on 1 February 2021 and on 2 June 2021, the CPTPP Commission formally invited the UK to begin accession negotiations. Negotiations about the terms of accession took place between the UK and member countries from July 2021. On 18 February 2022, the UK moved into the final stage of the accession process, market access negotiations<sup>22</sup>. On 31st March 2023, the UK concluded accession negotiations and, on 16th July, signed the Accession Protocol; the treaty which sets out the terms for the UK's accession to the CPTPP.

The proportion of respondents who said they knew about CPTPP was at its highest at wave 7, at 32%, an uplift of 4 percentage points on wave 6, driven by an increase in the proportion who knew a little (23% compared to 20% in wave 6). Nevertheless, nearly half (48%) reported never having heard of it. This has remained stable since wave 3.

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<sup>22</sup> More details: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/trade-secretary-secures-major-trade-bloc-milestone-ahead-of-asia-visit>

**Figure 18: Awareness of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)**



CPTPP. How aware are you of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) formerly known as Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?  
 Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 1 = 2,400, Wave 2 = 2,349, Wave 3 = 3,224, Wave 4 = 4,009, Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872).  
 Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave.


## Support for the UK joining the CPTPP remains high, and opposition has decreased.

Respondents were then asked whether they would support the UK joining the CPTPP (see figure 19). In waves 1 to 3, this question was only asked to those who indicated some degree of awareness of the agreement (beyond simply reporting having heard of the name alone). From wave 4, all respondents were asked this question. To make results comparable to previous waves, waves 4, 5 and 6 results shown in figure 19 are also based on those with some degree of awareness of the CPTPP.

Support among those who indicated awareness of the agreement was 60%, in line with the 59% who supported it in wave 6, but 3 percentage points lower than the peak level seen at wave 4. However, opposition has decreased by 4 percentage points to 15%.

The observed decline in opposition is due to more people selecting the middle option of neither supporting nor opposing.

**Figure 19: Support for the UK to join the CPTPP (where know a little)**



CPTPPa. To what extent would you support or oppose the UK joining the CPTPP?

Unweighted base sizes: respondents who know at least a little about the CPTPP or TPP (Wave 1 = 538, Wave 2 = 529, Wave 3 = 958, Wave 4 = 1,206, Wave 5 = 911, Wave 6 = 927, Wave 7 = 993)

Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave prior.

## 4.5. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

### Awareness of the Gulf Cooperation Council remains low, with over half saying that they have never heard of it.

Respondents were asked about their awareness of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This question was asked for the first time at wave 5. Respondents were shown a brief description of what the GCC is at the start of this section of the questionnaire. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional trade union between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar.


As figure 20 shows, most respondents (60%) had never heard of the GCC, which is higher than the 56% who had never heard of it at wave 6.

Around a quarter (24%) knew at least a little about the GCC, in line with previous waves.

As in wave 6, the following groups were more likely than average to know at least a little about the GCC:

- ethnic minority respondents (44%)
- respondents aged 16 to 34 (36%)
- those based in London (36%)
- those in SEG classifications AB (30%)
- men (29%)
- respondents educated to degree level or above (29%).

**Figure 20: Awareness of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)**



GCC. How aware are you of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)?

All respondents (Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872)


Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave prior.

**Levels of support for the UK establishing a free trade agreement with the GCC were higher than levels of opposition.**

Figure 21 shows support and opposition levels to the UK establishing a free trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Around a third (34%) of respondents said they would support the UK establishing a free trade agreement with the GCC, in line with wave 6 (36%), while 1 in 5 (21%) opposed this, again in line with wave 6 (22%).

Both support and opposition to the UK joining the GCC has declined, while there has been an increase in those saying they neither support nor oppose.

**Figure 21: Support for the UK establishing a free trade agreement with the GCC**



GCCA. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional trade union between Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. The UK has begun negotiations with the GCC. To what extent would you support or oppose the UK establishing a free trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council?

All respondents (Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872)

**4.6. Attitudes towards trade and consumer purchasing**

**People tend to favour a liberal agenda regarding tax-free free trade and the worldwide supply of essential goods. Protectionist views are most evident when it comes to the cross-border sharing of data and the UK being self-sufficient and less reliant on imports from other countries.**

Using a grid format, 8 questions using a 0 to 10 scale with statements expressing opposing sentiments about trade at each end were put to respondents. The results have been presented in figures 22 and 23 and show that respondents tended to demonstrate liberal, free trade based attitudes rather than taking protectionist positions.

Two in 5 (42%) respondents gave a score of 7 and above, thus showing a preference towards the liberal end of the scale, regarding tax-free trade as an effective way for the economy and businesses to grow. Just 11% gave a score of 0 to 3, showing a preference for prioritising higher import taxes to protect domestic industries.

Likewise, 2 in 5 (38%) gave a score of 7 and above, favouring prioritising the worldwide supply of essential goods, allowing food and medicines to cross borders. Just 16%

favoured preventing UK goods from being exported at the other end of the scale (scores 0 to 3).

Two in 5 (42%) believed free trade can help avoid shortages because it increases the number of sources for each product that are available, while just 1 in 10 (10%) believed free trade between different countries makes the UK more vulnerable to global supply chain problems, causing shortages.

One area where there were higher levels of agreement at the protectionist end of the scale was concerning the UK's self-sufficiency and its reliance on imports. A third (34%) of respondents favoured strengthening the economy to increase self-sufficiency and reduce reliance on imports (giving a score between 7 and 10). In comparison, 1 in 5 (22%) favoured strengthening the economy by embracing international trade and ensuring a free flow of imports and exports of goods and services.

38% favoured a focus on building our own industries so we can supply ourselves, while 1 in 5 (19%) favoured signing agreements with as many countries as possible so we have lots of options to source goods for us to buy.

Cross-border data sharing is another area where there are higher levels of agreement at the protectionist end of the scale. Half (49%) of respondents favoured tight controls placed on the cross-border sharing of consumer data to ensure everyone's privacy is protected and data is used appropriately (giving a score between 7 and 10). Considerably fewer respondents preferred consumer data being shared freely and openly across borders to support innovation, collaboration and boost economic growth (12%).


**Figure 22: Protectionist versus liberal free trade attitudes (1)**

**Protectionist perspective**

**Liberal Perspectiv**


It's best to protect our own domestic industries by applying higher taxes to imports.

Tax free trade between different countries is the most effective way to encourage our businesses and economy to grow.




We should prevent essential goods manufactured in the UK from being exported, allowing us to assist our

We should prioritise protecting the worldwide supply of essential goods, allowing food and medicines to cross borders.



To strengthen our economy the UK should become self-sufficient and less reliant on imports from other countries

To strengthen our economy the UK should embrace international trade, ensuring a free flow of imports and exports of goods and service




CV2: Here are some pairs of statements. Please indicate where your own view lies on a 10-point scale where 0 means complete agreement with the statement on the left, 10 means complete agreement with the statement on the right, and 5 means you don't agree with either of the statements or that your views are mixed or balanced on the issue in question.

Unweighted base size: all respondents (2,872).

\*Figures for don't know are not shown to ease reading



**Figure 23: Protectionist versus liberal free trade attitudes (2)**



CV2: Here are some pairs of statements. Please indicate where your own view lies on a 10-point scale where 0 means complete agreement with the statement on the left, 10 means complete agreement with the statement on the right, and 5 means you don't agree with either of the statements or that your views are mixed or balanced on the issue in question. Unweighted base size: all respondents (2,872)

\*Figures for don't know are not shown to ease reading

**Balances of protectionist and liberal sentiment remained relatively consistent with wave 5.**

Building on the results from figures 22 and 23, table 3 shows the differences in levels of protectionism and liberalism between waves 4 to 7.

Protectionist and liberal sentiments were largely consistent with wave 6 where comparisons are possible.

**Table 3: Protectionist versus liberal free trade attitudes – differences between waves 4 to 7**

Question scale	Question scale	Protectionist	Protectionist	Protectionist	Protectionist	Liberal	Liberal	Liberal	Liberal
Protectionist end	Liberal end	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6	Wave 7	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6	Wave 7
It's best to protect our own domestic industries by applying higher taxes to imports	Tax free trade between different countries is the most effective way to encourage our businesses and economy to grow	8% ↓	11% ↑	9%	11%	47%	43%	42%	42%
We should prevent essential goods manufactured in the UK from being exported, allowing us to assist our own nation best	We should prioritise protecting the worldwide supply of essential goods, allowing food and medicines to cross borders	13% ↓	16%	15%	16%	41%	41%	41%	38% ↓
We should focus on building our own industries so we can supply ourselves	The UK should prioritise signing agreements with as many countries as possible so we have lots of options to source goods for us to buy	33%	37% ↑	36%	38%	21%	20%	20%	19%
To strengthen our economy the UK should become self-sufficient and less reliant on imports from other countries	To strengthen our economy the UK should embrace international trade, ensuring a free flow of imports and exports of goods and services	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	34%	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	22%
Tight controls should be placed on the cross-border sharing of consumer data to ensure everyone's privacy is protected and data is used appropriately	Consumer data should be shared freely and openly across borders to support innovation, collaboration and boost economic growth	50%	49%	50%	49%	12%	12%	12%	12%
Free trade between different countries makes the UK more vulnerable to global supply chain problems, causing shortages	Free trade can help avoid shortages, for example of different vegetables, because it increases the number of sources for each product that are available	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	10%	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	42%

CV2: Here are some pairs of statements. Please indicate where your own view lies on a 10-point scale where 0 means complete agreement with the statement on the left, 10 means complete agreement with the statement on the right, and 5 means you don't agree with either of the statements or that your views are mixed or balanced on the issue in question Base: all respondents (Wave 3 = 3224, Wave 4 = 4009, Wave 5 = 2989, Wave 6 = 3058) CV3: and these statements?

## 5. Trading partner preferences

### 5.1. Support for establishing free trade agreements with specific countries

Around half support trade deals with India and Indonesia. Support was lower for the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Respondents were presented with five non-EU countries and asked to what extent they would support or oppose the UK establishing a free trade agreement with them. The findings are presented in table 4, alongside the findings concerning supporting trade with other countries in general.

Support for securing a free trade agreement with the USA drew the highest support (60%), almost matching that for FTAs with other countries generally (65%).

Half (51%) supported a free trade agreement with India, 45% with Indonesia, 39% with the UAE, and 34% with Saudi Arabia. With regard to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, significant minorities opposed establishing free trade agreements with them (20% and 24%, respectively).

**Table 4: Support and opposition to establishing free trade agreements<sup>23</sup>**

	Non-EU countries	USA	India	Indonesia	UAE	Saudi Arabia
Strongly support	34%	30%	21%	17%	15%	13%
Somewhat support	31%	30%	31%	28%	24%	21%
Neither support nor oppose	19%	17%	23%	30%	27%	27%
Somewhat oppose	3%	7%	7%	7%	12%	13%
Strongly oppose	1%	3%	4%	3%	8%	11%
Don't know	11%	12%	14%	15%	14%	15%
Summary: support	65% <sup>24</sup>	60%	51%	45%	39%	34%
Summary: oppose	4%	10%	11%	10%	20%	24%

<sup>23</sup> The USA and India have been included in all waves conducted to date, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have been included since wave 4, and Indonesia was introduced at wave 6.

<sup>24</sup> Support for non-EU countries may be higher than support for individual countries for a number of reasons: When asked about to think generally, people often think of the 'ideal' partner that they would be happy to trade with, but when presented with a specific country, approval can drop. in their head. Also, the way the question is presented shows each county in a grid, therefore respondents may trade them off against each other.

NET score	+61%	+50%	+40%	+35%	+18%	+9%
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FT4. In general, would you say that you support or oppose the UK establishing free trade agreements with countries outside the European Union? TP2. To what extent would you support or oppose the UK establishing a free trade agreement with each of the following countries? Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (2,872)


Support for FTAs with all countries has remained stable, with the exception of the USA, which has seen a decrease of 3 percentage points.

Figure 24 shows how support for free trade agreements with individual countries has changed over the waves.

Following significant uplifts at wave 6 for all countries included previously, at wave 7, these increases have been maintained, except for the USA, where support decreased by 3 percentage points.

The decline in support for the USA has come from an increase in those saying they 'don't know' whether they support or oppose a free trade agreement with the USA. Similarly, while support has remained stable for India and Saudi Arabia, opposition has declined as more people have said they 'don't know'.

**Figure 24: Changes in support for establishing free trade agreements with a selection of other non-EU countries**



TP2. To what extent would you support or oppose the UK establishing a free trade agreement with each of the following countries? Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 1 = 2,400, Wave 2 = 2,349, Wave 3 = 3,224, Wave 4 = 4,009, Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872). Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave prior.

While levels of support for FTAs vary by country, there is a high degree of consistency in the demographic groups more likely to support or oppose them across all countries.

India: the following groups were more likely to support an FTA with India:

- those aged 55+ (63%)
- those with a household income over £60,000 (62%)

- those educated to degree level or above (61%)
- those in SEG classifications AB (60%)
- men (59%)
- those in the South East (58%)
- those in the two least deprived IMD quartiles (58% and 57%)
- White respondents (53%)

Opposition to an FTA with India was largely consistent by sub-group.

Indonesia: the following groups were more likely to support an FTA with Indonesia:

- those with a household income over £60,000 (56%)
- those aged 55+ (54%)
- those in SEG classifications AB (53%)
- men (52%)
- those educated to degree level or above (52%)
- those in the South East (50%)
- those in the two least deprived IMD quartiles (both 50%)

Opposition to an FTA with Indonesia was largely consistent by sub-group.

Saudi Arabia: the following groups were more likely to support an FTA with Saudi Arabia:

- Ethnic minority respondents (55%)
- men (42%)
- those in London (41%)
- those in SEG classifications AB (37%)
- those educated to non-degree level (36%)

Conversely, the following groups were more likely to be opposed to an FTA with Saudi Arabia:

- those educated to degree level or above (36%)
- those with a household income over £60,000 (32%)
- those aged 55+ (29%)
- those in the South East (29%)
- those in SEG classifications AB (28%) and C1C2 (27%)
- those in the two least deprived quartiles (30% and 27%)
- White respondents (26%)

United Arab Emirates: the following groups were more likely to support an FTA with the UAE:

- Ethnic minority respondents (57%)
- men (46%)
- those in SEG classifications AB (45%)
- those with a household income over £60,000 (45%)
- those in London (44%)
- those educated to non-degree level (34%)

Conversely, the following groups were more likely to be opposed to an FTA with the UAE:

- those educated to degree level or above (28%)
- those in the South East (24%)
- those with a household income over £60,000 (24%)
- those aged 55+ (23%)
- those in SEG classifications C1C2 (23%)
- White respondents (21%)

USA: the following groups were significantly more likely to say they support establishing an FTA with the USA:

- those aged 55+ (73%)
- those in the two least deprived IMD quartiles (71% and 64%)
- those with a household income over £60,000 (68%)
- those in SEG classifications AB (67%)
- men (66%)
- those educated to degree level or above (66%)
- those in the South East (65%)
- White respondents (62%)

Conversely, the following groups are more likely to be opposed to an FTA with the USA:

- Ethnic minority respondents (18%)
- those educated to degree level or above (16%)
- those aged 16 to 34 (15%)
- those in London (15%)
- those in SEG classifications AB (12%)

## **5.2. Support for enhancing existing free trade agreements**

There continues to be particularly high levels of support for enhancing the existing trade deal with Canada, and levels of support for enhancing the existing trade deal with Switzerland were also high.

Respondents were shown six non-EU countries with which the UK already has trade agreements in place and were asked the extent to which they would support or oppose enhancing the existing FTAs with these countries. For the first time at wave 7, this included Switzerland, South Korea and Turkey.

As Table 5 shows, support for enhancing the existing trade deal with Canada was high, with close to 7 in 10 (67%) respondents in support and just 4% saying that they were opposed. This exceeds the level of support for FTAs with other countries generally (65% supported).

Around 3 in 5 (62%) were supportive when asked about Switzerland, half when asked about South Korea (49%) and Mexico (48%), and around 2 in 5 when asked about Turkey (43%) and Israel (39%).

**Table 5: Support and opposition to enhancing existing free trade agreements**

	Non-EU countries	Canada	Switzerland	South Korea	Mexico	Turkey	Israel
Strongly support	34%	38%	31%	23%	18%	17%	16%
Somewhat support	31%	29%	31%	27%	30%	26%	23%
Neither support nor oppose	19%	16%	20%	26%	29%	31%	29%
Somewhat oppose	3%	3%	2%	6%	6%	8%	9%
Strongly oppose	1%	1%	2%	4%	3%	4%	8%
Don't know	11%	13%	13%	15%	15%	15%	15%
Summary: support	65%	67%	62%	49%	48%	43%	39%
Summary: oppose	4%	4%	4%	10%	8%	11%	17%
NET score <sup>25</sup>	+61%	+63%	+58%	+40%	+39%	+31%	+22%

FT4. In general, would you say that you support or oppose the UK establishing free trade agreements with countries outside the European Union? TP2i. The UK has trade agreements with some countries already. To what extent would you support or oppose the UK enhancing existing free trade agreements with the following countries? Unweighted base size: all respondents (2,872)

Support for enhancing existing trade deals with Canada and Mexico has fallen following significant increases at wave 6 but remains high. Support for improving existing deals with Israel has also fallen back

As shown in Figure 25, support for enhancing existing free trade deals with Canada and Mexico has declined since a peak in wave 6, in both cases by 4 percentage points, to 67% and 48%, respectively. This comes as more people say they do not know whether they support or oppose enhancing these free trade agreements.


Support has also decreased for Israel by 3 percentage points to 39%.

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<sup>25</sup> Net score



**Figure 25: Changes in support for enhancing existing free trade deals with a selection of other non-EU countries**



TP2i. The UK has trade agreements with some countries already. To what extent would you support or oppose the UK enhancing existing free trade agreements with the following countries? Asked from Wave 4. Unweighted base sizes: all respondents (Wave 4 = 4,009, Wave 5 = 2,989, Wave 6 = 3,058, Wave 7 = 2,872). Statistical significance arrows represent significant differences when compared to results in the wave prior.

As has previously been the case, in each instance, men and those in SEG classification AB were significantly more likely than average to support enhancing existing trade agreements with each country. However, women and those in other SEG classifications were generally no more likely to oppose enhancement, but rather more likely to offer neutral or ‘don’t know’ responses. In each instance, support increased with age, and opposition decreased with age.

White respondents were more likely than average to support enhancing existing trading agreements with Canada (68%) and Switzerland (63%), while Ethnic minority respondents were more likely than average to support enhancing existing trading agreements with Turkey (54%).

### 5.3. Trade agreement priorities

Respondents’ top considerations for trade agreements with selected countries were protecting existing jobs in the UK and creating new ones, protecting key industries in the UK such as agriculture, manufacturing and the NHS, and maintaining current UK food standards.

Respondents were asked to think about what considerations the UK government should give priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with other countries generally, and specifically with the USA, Israel, Turkey, South Korea, Switzerland, Canada and Mexico.

At wave 7, all respondents were shown an option for non-EU countries generally, and each respondent was then asked about two of the seven specific countries.


Respondents could select up to 5 considerations they saw as the highest priority for each country from a prompted list. The top 3 most frequently selected considerations for each country are presented in Figure 26.

Protecting key industries in the UK such as agriculture, manufacturing and the NHS, maintaining current UK food standards, protecting existing jobs in the UK and creating new ones were the top three most frequently selected considerations for other countries generally and for each of the individual countries.

All respondents were also asked what considerations they thought the UK government should be given the least priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with other countries. Around 2 in 5 mentioned increasing choice for consumers (41%) and sharing knowledge and innovations (38%), a third (34%) mentioned growing trade with lower-income nations, supporting jobs and growth across the globe, and around a quarter mentioned Investment in environmentally friendly products and services (26%) and promoting investment in the UK and partner countries (23%).


Figures 27 to 34 show the full results for other countries overall and for each country.

**Figure 26: Top 3 priorities when negotiating free trade agreements with selected non-EU countries**



TP2e. Please select up to five considerations you think the UK government should be giving the highest priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with the following countries? Base: Each respondent was shown non-EU countries plus an additional two countries – base for each country: USA (821), Israel (817), Turkey (817), South Korea (831), Switzerland (833), Canada (830), Mexico (818)

**Figure 27: Considerations to be given the highest priority when negotiating free trade agreements with other non-EU countries**




TP2e. Please select up to five considerations you think the UK government should be giving the highest priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with non-EU countries? Base: All respondents: (2,872)

**Figure 28: Considerations to be given the highest priority when negotiating free trade agreements with the USA**




TP2c. Please select up to five considerations you think the UK government should be giving the highest priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with the USA? Base: Each respondent was shown 2 countries – base: (821)

**Figure 29: Considerations to be given the highest priority when negotiating free trade agreements with Israel**




TP2c. Please select up to five considerations you think the UK government should be giving the highest priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with Israel? Base: Each respondent was shown 2 countries – base: (817)

**Figure 30: Considerations to be given the highest priority when negotiating free trade agreements with Turkey**



TP2c. Please select up to five considerations you think the UK government should be giving the highest priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with Turkey? Base: Each respondent was shown 2 countries – base: (817)


**Figure 31: Considerations to be given the highest priority when negotiating free trade agreements with South Korea**



TP2c. Please select up to five considerations you think the UK government should be giving the highest priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with South Korea? Base: Each respondent was shown 2 countries – base: (831)




**Figure 32: Considerations to be given the highest priority when negotiating free trade agreements with Switzerland**




TP2c. Please select up to five considerations you think the UK government should be giving the highest priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with Switzerland? Base: Each respondent was shown 2 countries – base: (833)

**Figure 33: Considerations to be given the highest priority when negotiating free trade agreements with Canada**




TP2c. Please select up to five considerations you think the UK government should be giving the highest priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with Canada? Base: Each respondent was shown 2 countries – base: (830)

**Figure 34: Considerations to be given the highest priority when negotiating free trade agreements with Mexico**



TP2c. Please select up to five considerations you think the UK government should be giving the highest priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with Mexico? Base: Each respondent was shown 2 countries – base: (818)

**Figure 35: Considerations to be given the lowest priority when negotiating free trade agreements with other non-EU countries**



TP2f. Please select up to five considerations you think the UK government should be giving the least priority to when negotiating free trade agreements with non-EU countries? Base: All respondents: (2,872)

## 6. Appendix

### 6.1. Socio Economic Grade (SEG) classification definitions

SEG Classification	Description
A	<b>Higher managerial / professional/ administrative</b> (For example, Established doctor, Solicitor, Board Director in a large organisation (200+ employees, top level civil servant/public service employee).
B	<b>Intermediate managerial / professional/ administrative</b> (For example, Newly qualified (under 3 years) doctor, Solicitor, Board director small organisation, middle manager in large organisation, principle officer in civil service/local government
C1	<b>Supervisory or clerical/ junior managerial / professional / administrative</b> (For example, Office worker, Student Doctor, Foreman with 25+ employees, salesperson, etc.)
C2	<b>Skilled manual worker</b> (For example, Skilled Bricklayer, Carpenter, Plumber, Painter, Bus/ Ambulance Driver, HGV driver, AA patrolman, pub/bar worker, etc.)
D	<b>Semi or unskilled manual work</b> (For example, Manual workers, all apprentices to be skilled trades, caretaker, Park keeper, non-HGV driver, shop assistant)
C	<b>Full time Student</b>
E	<b>Casual worker – not in permanent employment</b>
E	<b>Homemaker</b>
E	<b>Retired and living on state pension (That is, no private or work-related pension scheme)</b>
E	<b>Unemployed or not working due to long-term sickness</b>
E	<b>Full-time carer of another household member</b>
E	<b>Other</b>

## 6.2. Regression analysis

Regression analysis is a set of statistical processes for estimating the relationships between a dependent variable and a set of independent variables. Using regression analysis, we can identify whether a particular independent variable is a statistically significant driver of the dependent variable whilst controlling for various other factors. Doing so can give us more confidence in the strength of the relationships between variables.

## 6.3. Statistical outputs

### Regression on selected factors driving support for the UK establishing free trade agreements with other countries

Independent variable	Relative Importance Score
Economic optimism (more optimistic about the economy)	41%
Gender (male)	13%
Income (higher household incomes)	9%
Social grade (SEG AB)	8%
Age (older age groups)	5%
Education (higher educational attainment)	3%

Overall R-Square value of 10%.

## **7. Statement of terms**

### **7.1. Compliance with International Standards**

BMG complies with the International Standard for Quality Management Systems requirements (ISO 9001:2015) and the International Standard for Market, opinion and social research service requirements (ISO 20252:2012) and The International Standard for Information Security Management (ISO 27001:2013).

### **7.2. Interpretation and publication of results**

The interpretation of the results as reported in this document pertain to the research problem and are supported by the empirical findings of this research project and, where applicable, by other data. These interpretations and recommendations are based on empirical findings and are distinguishable from personal views and opinions.

BMG is not publishing any part of these results without the written and informed consent of the client.

### **7.3. Ethical practice**

BMG promotes ethical practice in research: We conduct our work responsibly and in light of the legal and moral codes of society.

We have a responsibility to maintain high scientific standards in the methods employed in the collection and dissemination of data, in the impartial assessment and dissemination of findings and in the maintenance of standards commensurate with professional integrity.

We recognise we have a duty of care to all those undertaking and participating in research and strive to protect subjects from undue harm arising as a consequence of their participation in research. This requires that subjects' participation should be as fully informed as possible and no group should be disadvantaged by routinely being excluded from consideration. All adequate steps shall be taken by both agency and client to ensure that the identity of each respondent participating in the research is protected.

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