

Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2023/24



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Cover:

Top Left: A member of the Nukak Maku indigenous community speaks to members of the Colombian Government's Peace and Truth Commissions in Guaviare, Colombia.

Top Right: United Kingdom South East Asia Women in Cyber fellowship.

Bottom Left: The CSSF-funded project supporting Uzbekistan in developing it's first national strategy against organised crime.

Bottom Right: The Hil Bilaang Network in Somalia utilised the grant mechanism to respond to the deyr rainy season in 2023. The resources were used to provide non-food items to Internally Displaced Persons families hit by the floods.

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Introduction

The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) was a cross-government Fund that acted as a catalyst for a more integrated government response to tackling conflict, insecurity and instability. Over the last nine years, the CSSF transformed the way the UK responds to conflict, transnational threats and hostile state activity overseas, enabling government departments and agencies to address security priorities in a collaborative way.

Four principles set the Fund apart from other UK and international funding instruments. These principles provided a guiding framework:

- Integrated Approach: the CSSF supported integration by blending Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA funding and drawing together government departments, agencies and external experts to co-design and co-deliver programmes.
- Agility: the CSSF enabled programmes to respond quickly to changing situations and shifts in UK national security priorities. The Fund's agility and drive for innovation allowed it to act as a platform to test new responses to emerging challenges.
- Catalytic Effect: the CSSF had a catalytic effect through interventions designed to enable further change in the longer term. When an intervention was tried and tested, the CSSF worked with partners to scale up the response to tackle the biggest threats to UK security in an integrated way.
- High-Risk: the CSSF encouraged programmes to test new, innovative approaches in response to threats and opportunities, balanced by prudent risk management. High-risk tolerance means that the CSSF used experimental approaches, learned lessons quickly and continued to innovate.

The CSSF delivered four Fund Level Outcomes:

- Conflict and instability: building resilience and stability overseas, including catalysing political settlements to mitigate threats to UK national interests;
- State threats: strengthening the defence of the UK and its partners from hostile state activity;
- Transnational threats: enabling a more secure UK by tackling serious and organised crime and countering terrorist threats from abroad;

 Women, peace and security: progressing gender equality through the protection and promotion of the rights and inclusion of women and girls and addressing the gender-specific impacts of conflict.

In 2023/24, the CSSF invested £853.41 million through integrated programmes across 14 government departments and agencies. Of this, £346.14 million (40.6 % of spend) was ODA funding; and £507.26 million (59.4%) non-ODA. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office was the largest CSSF spending department (£728.54 million), with the Ministry of Defence and Home Office as the next two largest spending departments.

In 2023/24, the Fund continued to focus on supporting Ukraine, developed its work on cyber to protect the critical infrastructure of the UK and its allies, and increased its efforts to keep the UK safe through programmes targeting drug-smuggling and terrorism. In 2023/24, China was a theme across many portfolios, commensurate with its impact and influence on the breadth of issues covered by the CSSF. The Fund focused on improving China Capabilities across UK Government, in line with the wider Government drive to improve the skills, knowledge and experience of staff working on a broad range of China-related topics. The Fund also continued to support women in conflict-affected countries and their participation in peace processes and mediation in South Sudan, as well as tackling gender-based violence and supporting women to lead in crisis response in Ukraine and Kosovo. The CSSF maintained a presence in over 90 countries and territories, delivering more than 90 programmes.

This was the final year of the CSSF before it transitioned to the new Integrated Security Fund (ISF) on 1 April 2024. The ISF is designed to help address global challenges and build on the unique work the CSSF did to tackle conflict, stability and security challenges overseas which threaten UK national security. Through integrating domestic and overseas national security programming, the ISF aims to have strategic impact, bring value for taxpayers' money and demonstrate UK innovation.

The ISF retains many features of the CSSF, including international programmes and projects notably in Ukraine and the Middle East. It also includes new areas of programming such as maritime security, economic sanctions, emerging and disruptive technology, notably AI, and incorporates existing economic deterrence and cyber programmes into a single fund. This recognises the transnational nature of some of the threats facing the UK and will enable a more coherent and joined up government response.

CSSF contribution to Sustainable Development Goals

In 2023/24, the CSSF continued to support the delivery of the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Fund primarily supported:

- **Goal 16:** Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
- **Goal 5:** Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

The CSSF also supported the delivery of several other SDGs, notably:

- **Goal 1:** End poverty in all its forms everywhere
- **Goal 8:** Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
- **Goal 13:** Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
- **Goal 17:** Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development



Conflict and Instability

In an interconnected world, the national security of the UK is dependent on stability elsewhere. Conflict and instability abroad threaten the international order in which the UK can thrive and act as a global leader, and global tensions and threats are on the rise. Military conflict is increasingly seen as a legitimate tool of state power whilst conflict-related deaths are increasing. It is in the UK's interest to tackle drivers of conflict abroad to achieve a more conducive, collaborative environment in which our citizens and values are protected.

Current analyses of conflict are increasingly pointing to the interconnectedness of conflict drivers. The linkages between climate change, underrepresentation of women, serious and organised crime, ineffective peace processes, transnational threats and conflict dynamics globally are now better understood. To this end, the CSSF in 2023/24 continued to offer an integrated approach to tackling these threats and addressing conflict in a comprehensive manner. For example, the CSSF funded programming that strengthened political support for the Colombia Peace Agreement; mitigated the impact of war on civilians in Ukraine whilst strengthening the Ukrainian government's efforts to investigate Russian war crimes; strengthened security, justice and political stability in the Maldives, making its law enforcement sector more representative by increasing the senior representation of women in the Maldivian justice system; and rehabilitated former combatants in the Lake Chad Basin.

Supporting the Peace Agreement in Colombia

Colombia has experienced the longest-running armed conflict in the Americas, resulting in an estimated 400,000 deaths, mass displacement, sexual violence and environmental degradation. The conflict fuels record levels of cocaine production and organised crime, with the effects felt on the streets of the UK. The UK has been one of Colombia's closest allies in working towards a more stable and secure country, better able to tackle these threats to our shared interests and values. The CSSF's integrated programme supported UK diplomatic efforts in the UN Security Council to strengthen political support for the landmark 2016 Peace Agreement, alongside other donors and the Government of Colombia. The programme also enhanced Colombia's negotiations with the former FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and now with current armed groups. One specific project, 'del Capitolio al Territorio' has strengthened the ability of Congress to effectively legislate on peace (for example on intelligence sharing and countering narcotics) and has strengthened Congressional engagement with the communities most affected by conflict, ensuring issues get the political attention they require. Broader support enables high risk interventions critical to security and stabilisation in conflict-affected areas that have an impact on the ongoing violence and threats to the UK, notably in the defence sector and protecting women and girls.



Strengthening Ukraine's Resilience

Ukraine has demonstrated great resilience to Russia's hybrid-warfare post-2014, and in the face of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. That resilience remains strong in government-controlled territory. However, programming in the area remains high risk due to the nature of the Russian attritional warfare and the need to continuously adapt to a changing area as land is taken or reclaimed. The CSSF programme in 2023/24 focused on supporting civilians in the East affected by fighting and support to the Government of Ukraine with strategic communications and security sector reform.

CSSF-funded security sector reform assistance increased the Government of Ukraine's financial oversight to reduce corruption within military supply chains, and communications support has led to better government strategies to combat Russian information manipulation and interference. Furthermore, CSSF support ensured that civil society (and marginalised groups) were included from the outset in early recovery work. This brought transparency to the recovery process and helped to prioritise needs for government assistance. The Fund supported local government to restart the process of delivering essential services including electricity provision and education. In conjunction with the International Criminal Court, the CSSF supported national authorities in investigating and prosecuting war crimes, especially conflict-related sexual violence, in order to begin holding Russia to account and create an environment in which Ukrainian recovery is possible.

UK funding catalyses other donor support to strengthen women's role in criminal justice in Maldives

Maldives is a climate and economically vulnerable small island state, and a top world tourism destination favoured by British holiday makers. It is situated in a strategically important shipping choke point in the Indian Ocean. It is a fragile and nascent democracy in which Islamic extremism developed, including the highest per capita number of foreign fighters going to Syria, and Maldivian nationals involved in terrorist attacks domestically and abroad. It is making progress in embedding democratic values and developing a more open society. An inclusive and representative law enforcement sector is a critical precondition for political stability and effective security and justice. In the Maldives, women are underrepresented across the country's law enforcement agencies. Only 17% of officers in the Maldives Police Service (MPS) are women. No female officer currently sits on the MPS Executive Board.

Women in the police, military, prosecution and judiciary have been supported through new CSSF funded networks, mentoring schemes and conferences. These were used to share learning and advocate for positive change within the country's criminal justice system. Since the establishment of the CSSF-funded Women's Policing Network in 2021 aimed at supporting women police progress to more senior roles within the MPS, three female officers have been promoted to Superintendent level for the first time. The network's success has had a catalytic effect, with other donors funding the extension of this network to include other Maldivian women in law enforcement.

CSSF funding for the first ever Women Judges Conference in the Maldives paved the way for a second conference, also funded by other donors, which generated policy recommendations, including the establishment of a Women Judges Wing within the judiciary. The number of women judges in the country has more than doubled in recent years (18.3% are women judges across the country. Total 184 judges. Currently 30 women judges. Out of the 30, 24 were hired after 2018) and women judges now preside in the Criminal Court, adjudicating for the first time in the most serious criminal cases.



Women judges meet to share their experiences and challenges in promoting gender parity within the judiciary



judges' conference in the Maldives

Contribution to conflict resolution in the Lake Chad Basin

The insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin of Africa is causing significant harm to civilians and destabilising the states affected by the presence of violent extremist organisations, including Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province. The UK, through the CSSF, supported the Government of Nigeria to bring sustainable peace in North-East Nigeria. These insurgent groups are a key threat to the stability of North-East Nigeria, and the region as a whole. Their destabilising effect enables transnational threats to the UK to grow, terrorism threatens the lives and security of UK nationals in the region and forces many Nigerians to resort to irregular migration to seek livelihoods and more secure lives.



The rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-fighters is an important step towards peace in the region. The CSSF funded the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to support the Government of Nigeria in implementing the Operation Safe Corridor programme, this has enabled the rehabilitation and reintegration into the communities of approximately 600 men who were released from the Government rehabilitation centre in early 2023/24. Low risk former non-state armed groups associates received vocational training, mental health and psychosocial support and family reunification visits to rebuild links with their relatives, in some cases after long absences. Sensitisation activities were conducted in communities of returnees to enable successful reintegration. As a result, 88% of ex-fighters reported extremely positive relationships with their communities. 92% had been reunited with their families, and 71% were very likely to recommend the rehabilitation centre to current Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa Province associates. Community members were overwhelminaly supportive of the reintegration of rehabilitated former associates, across all genders and locations. Many reflected on the benefits of increased peaceful coexistence at community and wider state levels, and the potential positive impact of encouraging further defections and making progress towards peace.

State Threats

State threats are actions by foreign governments and their proxies that threaten the security of the UK, its citizens, critical infrastructure, information, and democracy. This includes, but is not limited to, private military companies, organised criminal and terrorist groups. State threats often fall below the threshold of open armed conflict and can be overt or covert in nature, with state threat actors often using tools and methods that enable deniability and make definitive attribution difficult. State threat actors strive to exacerbate existing conflict and instability in regions vulnerable to foreign interference and challenge global norms and international institutions, attempting to reshape the status quo in their interests.

2023/24 saw CSSF-funded activity tackling state threats in Latin America, Sub Saharan Africa, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. The funding helped detect, disrupt and deter threats to the UK and counter the spread of disinformation, cyberattacks, the use of illicit finance, economic coercion and interference in electoral processes.

Countering Disinformation

The creation and spread of disinformation by state threat actors rose during 2023/24, targeting democracies across the globe, including the UK. The CSSF used agility to meet this threat, including the establishment of the Information Threats and Influence Portfolio, created to directly counter foreign information manipulation and interference. Its primary focus over 2023/24 was to counter Russia's information war against Ukraine. The CSSF also supported countries and international organisations in building resilience to the corrosive effect of Russian disinformation by increasing the capacity of governmental and non-governmental organisations, media and others to encourage critical thinking about information sources and develop protections.

For example, in 2023 the CSSF supported a civil society organisation in a Central European country to research and report on malign actors which were exploiting online sites for pro-Kremlin disinformation and advertising revenue. As a result of the publicity one platform, averaging four million page views per month, reported significant reductions in advertising revenue whilst three other platforms were boycotted by advertisers. Government contracting guidelines

were also amended to prevent public funds supporting revenue generation for malign actors.

2023/24 was also the third year of CSSF sponsorship of a post-graduate diploma course in strategic communications for students from Eastern European countries vulnerable to Russian disinformation. The course provided training to recognised European standards including focused elements on disinformation for future leaders working across all sectors. By early 2024, 110 students had graduated from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and were working in government, multilateral organisations, NGOs, media, private sector and further education. Two alumni now work in the press teams of Presidents of countries facing extreme threats from Russia.

The UK is committed to supporting likeminded partners reduce the opportunities for malign influence in the Pacific. Solomon Islands is a Commonwealth realm country and close neighbour of Five Eyes partners Australia and New Zealand. A weak media sector allows malign state influence to spread throughout societies in the Pacific.

In Solomon Islands, media outlets are contested spaces under intense financial pressure meaning sponsored articles and press releases are published with limited scrutiny. The rapid growth of social media is escalating Solomon Islanders' exposure to false or misleading information, especially during elections, which has longer-term implications for the country's stability. The CSSF funded BBC Media Action to work with 100 local journalists to strengthen election reporting skills and produce content that challenged harmful false narratives, including supporting a network of independent freelance journalists in Solomon Islands. Training for Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation staff saw them produce the country's first ever audience-led election debates for candidates on local issues. Training, partnerships and mentoring helped build local media capability and audience resilience to disinformation, supported accurate and independent journalism, and reinforced public interest media, even within politically biased media. The UK's approach to improve information flows between provinces and the media contributed to improved national debate, and citizens confirmed through surveys that they felt better informed ahead of the April 2024 election. In a context where distribution

challenges mean that news content reaches just 34% of the population, CSSF funding also supported media sector growth to help enhance diversity within the media.



through the BBC the UK provided leading support to media during the Solomon Islands elections

Countering Cyber Attacks

State threats activity is deliberately destabilising. It often impacts UK national security despite occurring overseas away from the UK. An example of this was a major cyber-attack on Albania first reported in 2022, which was part of a series of attacks attributed to Iran. The attack targeted the Albanian State Police compromising its critical databases. In addition to exposing cyber vulnerabilities in the Albanian infrastructure this attack also hampered UK-Albanian law enforcement cooperation essential for tackling Albanian organised crime and irregular migration, which has a direct impact on the UK.

In 2023/24, a new project was rapidly set up, conducting compromise and vulnerability assessments to understand the damage caused and the existing weaknesses in cyber defences. This gave Albanian law enforcement the tools and knowledge to identify warning signs and reduce the risk of future cyber-attacks, including by upgrading their main policing database. By March 2024, UK-Albanian law enforcement communications resumed, dramatically increasing the effectiveness of cooperation in tackling cross border criminality, as until this issue was resolved, criminal records and background checks had to be transferred via hard copy: a much slower, riskier process. Additionally, the project had a catalytic effect in ensuring that Albania, a North Atlantic Treaty Ogranisation (NATO) ally, has an enhanced understanding of cyber security. The Albanian Interior Minister recently pledged over €3 million to further protect information against this threat, underlining the sustainable nature of this intervention.

Transnational Threats

Transnational security threats and challenges include serious and organised crime (SOC), illicit finance and corruption, terrorism, irregular migration, and cyber. These threats are increasingly complex, global and interlinked and have been shaped by international conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Sahel, and the increased use of technology by hostile actors against the backdrop of increased global geopolitical competition.

Serious and Organised Crime and Illicit Finance

Almost all SOC threats to the UK have an international element because either the commodities or people being exploited are from overseas, the criminals are foreign nationals, or their criminal activity is based overseas. The threat has evolved reflecting events overseas and has created new vulnerabilities and opportunities exploited by criminals, be it new supplies and routes for drugs and firearms, cost of living challenges providing recruitment opportunities for organised crime groups, or international money laundering networks facilitating not only crime but also sanction evasion by hostile actors.




Figure 1: Overseas origins of serious and organised crime affecting the UK Source: No Place to Hide: Serious and Organised Crime Strategy 2023

In this context, CSSF programming in 2023/24 sought to counter both the direct SOC threat to the UK, as well as countering SOC and illicit finance as enablers of other threats to UK national security, such as state threats, conflict and instability. The Fund has continued to tackle transnational SOC threats by strengthening local resilience to SOC, targeting the root causes drawing vulnerable individuals to crime. For example, in Nigeria, the CSSF provided funding for locally-led community-based interventions (later institutionalised by the Nigerian Police Force and securing local government funding) to divert vulnerable youth in SOC-affected communities, engaging almost 1,500 at-risk youths. At an institutional level, the Fund continued the successful roll-out of the CSSF-funded United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Organised Crime Strategy Toolkit supporting partners across Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Asia in developing more effective, gender and human rights compliant strategies against SOC and implementing legislative and structural reforms as a result. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) the project's support in developing their new SOC strategy was cited by the EU Commission as one of the reforms which contributed to the EU Commission executive arm's formal approval to open EU accession negotiations with BiH and attracted further support by other EU donors. A recent evaluation identified that "the benefits of the project are long-term, significant, and sustainable" and indicated that for every £1 invested, there is a plausible return on investment of at least £4.50.



The Fund also continued to build on successes of previous years by strengthening the capacity of international partners to disrupt the supply of illicit drugs along the main trafficking routes to the UK. In Latin America and the Caribbean, CSSF-funded support contributed to the seizure of 500 kg of cocaine in partnership with US authorities in the British Virgin Islands and contributed to Panama's highest single seizure to date of over 650kg of Class A drugs destined for Europe.

Meanwhile, along the eastern route in Turkey, Home Office – International Operations (HOIO) support unlocked new technological solutions for Turkish Customs Enforcement partners.

This coupled with training, trebled their ability to identify and search suspicious vessels and containers and contributed to the seizure of over 250 kg of cocaine, 25% of this was expected to be destined for the UK market where it would have an estimated wholesale UK value of $\pounds 2.5$ million.

In parallel, the CSSF has continued increasing its investment in targeting grand corruption and Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) as key enablers of SOC and other transnational threats. To counter grand corruption, the Fund has enabled disruptive action against several individuals in Albania with wellpublicised and documented ties to criminality and corruption, which proved catalytic alongside UK and allies' diplomatic action in strengthening the Albanian government's renewed anti-corruption drive. Elsewhere, the Fund has assisted Colombian partners in implementing the new Anti-corruption Law strengthening institutions against the risk of government corruption linked to the cocaine trade and supported the implementation of the Conflict-of-Interest Legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina which resulted in 94 politically exposed persons recusing themselves from positions of authority.

In countering IFFs, the Fund helped Panama to strengthen its national anti-money laundering regime, support that assisted the country in departing the Financial Action Task Force grey-list in October 2023. It also catalysed international action and cooperation on trade-based money laundering and anti-corruption and illicit finance in the Caribbean. Whilst in Kosovo, the CSSF supported the introduction of money laundering as a standalone offence thereby strengthening authorities' ability to prosecute it. The CSSF's impact in this area was extended to support global investigative journalists networks whose work exposed loopholes in several sectors that enabled corrupt practices, as well as sanction evasion by hostile states (from banking in Central America to real estate in France). In Latin America, support led to the first major investigation of its kind into drug-trafficking and IFFs sparking corrective action by relevant jurisdictions and informed regional and national policymakers on the links between SOC groups and environmental crime in the Amazon.

Throughout 2023/24, in line with the Fund's principle to have a catalytic effect, one of the major and recurring contributions the CSSF made to countering SOC and illicit finance was to enable stronger strategic cooperation and intelligence exchange among law enforcement partners. For example, it supported a new approach of Joint Investigation Teams working on asset recovery in environmental crime cases in Peru, and enhanced coordination across financial intelligence units in South and Central America, supported cross-border joint investigations and mutual legal assistance between Kosovo, Montenegro and North Macedonia fighting cross-border criminality in the Western Balkans and between the UK and Western Balkans jurisdictions.



Regional CSSF-funded Event for South Asia on organized crime strategies and gender and human rights mainstreaming



Irregular Migration

Irregular migration remains one of the major transnational challenges of our times, driven by conflict, instability, poverty and income inequality, climate change and other factors. Illegal or irregular migration presents risks to those making dangerous journeys who often face exploitation from people smugglers and traffickers and challenges the security and resilience of countries including the UK. The UK border remains under pressure from irregular migration; in 2023/24 there were 38,546 irregular arrivals, 28% fewer than in the year ending March 2023, and 81% of these arrived by small boats.*

In this context, the CSSF in 2023/24, mainly through its Migration Portfolio, operated with the wider government in key source and transit countries seeking to reduce push factors for onward migration. It delivered projects to provide livelihoods opportunities to those most at risk of undertaking high-risk irregular migration, supported international partners managing migration and strengthened the protection given to the most vulnerable groups. It also built robust border management procedures through new technology, training and increased collaboration and delivered locally targeted employment, promoted economic growth and reduced poverty.

For example, in Turkey the programme sat alongside the UK's contribution to the €6 billion EU Facility for Refugees and supported initiatives strengthening resilience among refugees and vulnerable host communities, including supporting service provision in Central Anatolia after the earthquake that took place in February 2023.

In Iraq, a lack of access to sustainable economic opportunities serves as a push factor, driving irregular migration from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to the UK. Iraq is consistently among the top countries of origin for irregular migration to the UK, including via small boats in the Channel.

As part of the UK partnership with the Kurdistan Regional Government to deter irregular migration from the region, a CSSF-funded pilot programme sought to test how empowering individuals economically could address aspirations to migrate irregularly. The project focused on those most at risk of undertaking irregular journeys and offering job placements (working in partnership with 170 private sector businesses in the region) and/or training tailored to their individual circumstances.

At the end of the pilot, 59% of participants in the job placement group and 25% from the skills training groups abandoned their migration plans. The programme also delivered targeted research and monitoring, with over 1,200 surveys with participants being conducted throughout the pilot, resulting in richer data on migration plans to understand the impact of the interventions.

Counter Terrorism

The UK faces a domestic terrorist threat that is less predictable and harder to detect. The terrorist threat overseas is enduring with terrorist groups expanding in unstable regions, including Afghanistan and the Sahel. The CSSF prioritised vital spending on those regions, where the terrorist threat endures. CSSF programming in 2023/24 sought to counter the direct terrorist threat to the UK, as well as the threat to UK citizens overseas. This activity focused on: reducing the likelihood of individuals engaging in terrorist activity targeted at the UK or UK interests overseas; disrupting and reducing the capability of terrorist groups; building the capacity of international partners to strengthen protective security and to respond guickly and effectively to a terrorist incident; reducing aviation and port vulnerabilities; and using strategic communications to reduce public support for terrorism and to strengthen community resilience against propaganda from Violent Extremist Organisations.

Daesh continues to pose the biggest terrorist threat to the UK and our interests overseas. Throughout 2023/24, the CSSF Counter Daesh Communications Cell continued to use CSSF funding to counter the threat from Daesh's propaganda. While severely weakened, the threat from Daesh, other terror groups and extremism is rising again as it spreads its influence in Africa and Afghanistan. Daesh continues to exploit opportunities for resurgence in Syria and Iraq where it formerly controlled territory. In northeast Syria, it focuses its propaganda on al-Hol camp, home to thousands of women and children associated with Daesh.

In 2023, the Cell launched a targeted digital communications campaign to promote the safe and durable return of families from al-Hol to Iraq. Entitled 'A Journey Home', the campaign was developed in collaboration with the al-Hol authorities, the Iraqi government, UN agencies and community leaders. It empowered potential returnees, reduced stigma and reassured communities in areas of return by connecting them with the testimonies of women and children returning from al-Hol. It built empathy and demystified their repatriation, rehabilitation and reintegration into communities and society.

The campaign reached 40 million viewers; communitylevel hostility to returnees in Iraq declined, and the campaign helped to increase the number of returns to Iraq and northeast Syria by generating a positive sentiment about returns. By March 2024, the population of al-Hol camp had declined by almost 9,000 in a year to just over 40,000 – a reduction of 17%. The camp's Iraqi population fell by 20%. Syrian returnees were welcomed back into their communities for the first time in years. Fewer people in the camp reduces Daesh's ability to influence them, which led Daesh to change its message to al-Hol residents, discouraging them from leaving. This undermines its claim that supporters in the camp are mistreated, a grievance narrative designed to garner ideological and financial support for the terrorist group.





Iman, an Iraqi resident of al-Hol Camp interviewed for the Global Coalition against Daesh's 'A Journey Home' campaign, discusses the opportunities afforded to returnees in Iraq.



An excerpt from the Global Coalition against Daesh campaign, 'A Journey Home', outlining the opportunities for Iraqis within the camp to return to their country with the aid of the Iraqi government

In 2023/24, the CSSF enhanced European partnerships through research and information sharing initiatives. It also worked with a range of governments and international and multilateral partners to develop targeted Prevent capabilities overseas, including through funding counter violent extremist multilateral organisations, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), and Hedayah, working to prevent and counter extremism through evidence-based and innovative programmes, strategic communications, and research. CSSF interventions have enhanced preventative rehabilitative capabilities of countries in North Africa and Asia; projects in the Middle East and North Africa have strengthened the resilience of several thousand people identified as susceptible to radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist groups.

In 2023/24, the CSSF funded training for the Goodir Unit within the Somali Police Force (SPF) to arrest, detain, investigate and disrupt al-Shabaab (AS) members in a manner compliant with human rights. This training supported security in Mogadishu and the disruption of AS activities, the principal terrorist threat to UK nationals and interests in East Africa. A key component of the CSSF's work with the SPF is empowering female officers and raising awareness of the value of gender equality. Women are underrepresented in Somali law enforcement agencies due to social, cultural, and institutional barriers. Improving women's participation in counter-terrorism operations generates operational outcomes, including improved local community perceptions of security forces and improved access to areas restricted for male officers by cultural or religious sensitivities.



Cyber

Cyber is a prominent and evolving transnational threat. In an increasingly volatile world, constant adaptability and innovation are important to promote the UK's cyber security, prosperity and competitiveness. During 2023/24 the CSSF played a significant role in advancing UK global leadership and influence through strengthening international partners' cyber security by building capacity, hardening cyber resilience and fighting cyber-crime. This has enabled the UK to respond to global cyber incidents, protecting the UK and its allies.

Russian malicious cyber activity has continued over the course of 2023/24 and has raised the risk of effects across the globe, including to the UK. The CSSF continues to thwart the impact of destructive Russian cyber-attacks and is helping to bolster the cyber resilience of Ukraine through the Ukraine Cyber Programme which has delivered over £15 million of cyber defence support since the start of the war to enable Ukraine to detect, respond to, and deter Russian aggression.

The CSSF played a key role in strengthening other international partners' cyber security. Programmes in Africa, the Indo-Pacific, Georgia and India and the Global Cyber Programme focus on bolstering like-minded partners capacity and threat detection capability. This work has reduced and disrupted the threat from those seeking to harm UK interests by countering the activities of our adversaries.

As an example, the Shadowserver Foundation implemented the CSSF-funded project through the Indo-Pacific Cyber Programme 'Improving Threat Data for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand'. This project improved the quality of free daily cyber threat intelligence provided to national telecoms and cyber security incident response teams. In early 2024, a significant and new malware vulnerability was identified in the region, released by a Chinese state actor. Shadowserver quickly responded by detecting and reporting on the exposed networks and devices, alerting cyber response teams, network owners and media. New scanning techniques were developed to determine whether exposed devices were vulnerable and reported through existing mechanisms. Through CSSF funding, Shadowserver helped multiple governments and users in the Indo-Pacific and across the world, including the UK, to help identify and reduce vulnerabilities to a new cyber threat.



Several noteworthy results were achieved in tackling cybercrime, where the CSSF has had success influencing both governments and the public to better protect themselves. These include strengthening cybercrime units in African law enforcement agencies, resulting in several successful operations executed by several national agencies; supporting the government of Montenegro to adopt EU-wide cybersecurity legislation; and influencing over 10 million people across Georgia and the wider region to practise improved cybersecurity behaviours.

Women, Peace and Security

2023 saw the launch of the new UK National Action Plan (NAP) for Women Peace and Security that runs until 2027. The new NAP is co-owned by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Ministry of Defence, and for the first time contains commitments for domestic UK departments. It commits the UK to focus on Transnational Threats and Women, Peace and Security (WPS), as well as continuing to work towards supporting women and their organisations in conflict-affected countries and supporting participation in peace processes and mediation, tackling gender-based violence and supporting women and girls to lead in crisis response. It has been proven that when conflict and security work is inclusive it is more effective.

Gender is increasingly weaponised by actors who seek to de-stabilise the UK and our allies, and female politicians, activists, and journalists and their organisations are on the frontline of these threats globally. In this context, Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) should be seen as both a driver of, and a result of, conflict and instability. This threatens the UK's efforts to support sustainable peace overseas and impacts global stability. Coordinated efforts by hostile states to roll back the rights of women and to shrink civic space have a transnational impact and require a transnational response.

The CSSF in 2023/24 made a critical contribution to delivering on the NAP – from ensuring women and girls' needs are included in conflict and security responses across all the Fund's work to funding dedicated WPS projects and programmes. These provide technical support and funding to a range of initiatives, including direct support to Women's Rights Organisations (WROs), enabling women's engagement in peacebuilding and mediation work (such as in South Sudan), addressing gender-based violence and gender-based disinformation affecting women's and entire communities' security (such as in Egypt, Nigeria, Somalia and Sri Lanka), improving security mechanisms by supporting women's engagement with security providers or supporting countries (such as Ukraine and Kosovo) in dealing with the legacy of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV); and working with women on the frontline of climate security in West Africa and South East Asia.

Supporting Women's Rights Organisations to Build Peace

The 'Resourcing Change' project funded by the CSSF works in Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen, providing flexible resources that 21 WROs can use to respond to emerging conflict needs. In South Sudan, the Fund supported local female peacebuilders to rapidly mobilise to prevent violence between two communities where climate pressures had brought them into conflict over grazing and cattle. As a result of their mediation, the communities agreed to put their differences aside and restored peaceful coexistence, and there have since been no reported cases of revenge killing or cattle raiding, and there is once again free movement of people.

In Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria, the CSSF supported a coalition of partner WROs to carry out targeted lobbying and campaigning work to pass the Violence Against Persons Prohibition Act into law at state level, enacting the federal law ratified in 2015, meaning survivors of gender-based violence now have the means to seek legal redress.

Better Human Security in Somalia

In Somalia, the CSSF-funded Women to Women Security project (W2WS) helped to address women's security concerns and protection needs, and identify and find solutions to day-to-day security issues, which are often not addressed by security providers. It did so by enhancing the skills and capacities of women to influence human security planning and conflict mitigation, helping to improve security and reduce violence. In Baidoa, the project supports Hil Bilaang, a local platform which brings together over 100 women from WROs, internally displaced people and local communities to identify and find solutions to day-today security issues. W2WS facilitated discussions and training with local government and security actors to raise awareness of community issues and the impact on women, with a focus on them taking action to improve security for women. The project provided small grants to give women agency to tackle community security issues - especially those with local officials and communities (for example, funding gender sensitive check point facilities, female toilets at police stations). As a result, the CSSF enabled improved security for women in vulnerable and marginalised communities in Somalia.



Hil Bilaang Network utilised the grant mechanism to respond to the deyr rainy season in 2023. The resources were used to provide non-food items to IDP families hit by the floods



Gender-Based Disinformation in Sri Lanka

In Sri Lanka, disinformation is an ongoing problem. UN data shows that in 2023/24 51% of harmful speech online in the country, often using popular platforms, targeted women and 24% targeted other minorities. Harmful speech targeting women, especially those occupying public roles or those speaking up publicly is commonplace and has the effect of pushing women out of public space and functions. The UK has an interest in a stable and democratic Sri Lanka and is the lead sponsor and has committed (including under UNHRC 46/1) to support accountability, the addressing of grievances from the armed conflict and supporting an inclusive settlement. Until 2022 Cyber-Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (CSGBV) and Gendered Online Hate Speech (GOHS) in Sri Lanka were inadequately addressed. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and WROs were excluded from the tech sector and were unable to have effective dialogues with tech companies. Reporting crimes can mean not being believed, and seeking justice when there is not an admission of guilt by the offender can sometimes entail a lengthy and frightening delay until a trial takes place with limited safeguarding, meaning

crimes often remain hidden. This impacts significantly on the ability to achieve an inclusive political settlement and contributes to democratic instability.

In 2023/24 the CSSF supported the establishment of the National Advisory Committee (NAC) on CSGBV/ GOHS to foster a comprehensive, data-driven approach and bring together MPs, CSO experts, legal professionals, law enforcement officers, IT and tech industry experts, youth and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, intersex, and asexual (LGBTQIA+) representatives and media advocates. It shared analysis of CSGBV social media trends, convened information sharing sessions, held awareness raising workshops, worked with civil society representatives to develop a civil society strategy, led a policy learning forum, and held engagement sessions with Big Tech companies. As a result of CSSF support, the NAC drove positive change - it influenced five parliamentary oversight committee discussions which resulted in the Ministries of Education, Health, Women, Child Affairs and Social Empowerment collaborating to develop resources to raise awareness among children about CSGBV. The engagement with Big Tech and platforms such as the Asia Internet Coalition saw 4,900 harmful posts taken down. The NAC remains a valuable platform for ongoing civil society and government collaboration, driving meaningful progress against CSGBV to preserve online and offline space in Sri Lanka.

Violence Against Women and Girls in Egypt

Violence against women in Egypt remains a major issue contributing directly to instability, and is often directly committed by security forces: over 7.8 million women and girls experience gender-based violence every year and 99.3% of women and girls report experiencing harassment in their lifetime*. This has major consequences for Egypt: as well as being a violation of rights, VAWG restricts women's and girls' activities in the public sphere, in work and education and has a high financial cost to the state, especially as it continues to be proliferated by economic factors and the use of narcotics. The inability to tackle VAWG undermines trust in the state. In response, in June 2023, the UK launched the CSSF-funded Laha w Maha / For Her, With Her project in collaboration with Egyptian celebrity actor Ahmed Hatem. Investing in 11 small organisations directly, it reaches throughout Egypt to prevent violence, and provide legal, medical and psychological services to survivors. Through this

investment they have been able to improve service provision, provide counselling and psychosocial care for survivors and support local organisations to respond to issues in their communities.

A substantial part of the project's work on prevention included countering regressive views shaping the opinions and behaviour of young men. In line with the Fund's catalytic approach, the project partnered with well-known actor Ahmed Hatem as an ambassador for this change, reaching his millions of young followers, ensuring wide coverage across Arabic media, including outside Egypt.

Supporting Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) in Kosovo

In Kosovo, survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) face significant challenges due to societal stigma within a patriarchal context. Since 2014, the UK has partnered with Kosovo Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims (KRCT) and other organisations through CSSF funding to empower survivors, aid their healing, advocate for their rights, and combat stigma. CSSF funding helped KRCT to provide support to hundreds of CRSV survivors. Moreover, the CSSF supported local organisations to conduct targeted campaigns and deliver crucial services, empowering CRSV survivors to combat stigma across Kosovo. Survivors have been supported to achieve justice through KRCT's empowerment programmes, and also received holistic care, including psychological, medical, and legal assistance.

CSSF governance

In April 2024, the CSSF was replaced by the Integrated Security Fund (ISF), bringing together the Economic Deterrence Initiative (EDI), the National Cyber Programme (NCP) and the CSSF.

Ministerial accountability to Parliament for the CSSF lay with the Cabinet Office. The CSSF's Senior Responsible Owner was the Deputy National Security Adviser for International Affairs. Oversight and management of the CSSF was provided by the Joint Funds Unit (now the Integrated Security Fund Unit), within the National Security Secretariat of the Cabinet Office. The Joint Funds Unit (JFU) undertook the following key functions:

- ensuring that the Fund delivered against National Security priorities articulated in the 2021 Integrated Review and 2023 Integrated Review Refresh, through a strategic, cross-government approach
- ensuring that programming represented value for money and evaluated impact
- setting the operating framework that underpinned CSSF programme design and delivery
- ensuring that programmes across the Fund followed government best practice and had the appropriate structures in place to manage risk and their allocated funds to a high standard

The JFU also provided extensive advisory support to the CSSF network and placed strong emphasis on lesson learning and sharing of best practice.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL)

Monitoring, evaluation and learning enabled the JFU to understand what worked and what did not, so the CSSF could improve programming and support evidence-informed decision-making at strategic levels. It ensured that the CSSF could improve delivery, strengthen value for money, demonstrate what it was achieving and how the Fund contributed to UK national security priorities. For example, thematic evaluations provided robust evidence and a deeper understanding of how the fund has had an impact, such as a recent study which examined how programming had been effective in supporting Peace Processes in Colombia, Libya, Pakistan, the Philippines and Yemen.

Data analytics

The JFU ensured the data needs for the Fund were understood and being met to support CSSF programme delivery as well as inhouse analytical skills and commercial capability and expertise. Data support was provided to the JFU across all stages of the programme cycle, improving the ability of the JFU to manage the Fund. For example, building custom tools to improve how programme data is managed and used by programme teams. This also included delivering data analytics projects to programme and portfolio teams so they could access the best data and analytical expertise the commercial sector could offer to help support programme delivery. Six data projects were delivered, including one that explored the relationship between Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) and Climate Change. This identified key trends, vulnerabilities, and risk factors related to SOC and Climate Change threats to the UK and UK interests that helped to inform CSSF programmes.

Gender

The JFU worked with all portfolios to ensure that gender was incorporated into all project-level activities. Since April 2022, Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) Markers have provided the CSSF with a means of integrating gender from the design stage. These use data points to measure gender equality and inclusion and to consolidate evidence of gender being addressed for each project.

Non-discretionary funding and the Rapid Response Mechanism

The CSSF oversaw non-discretionary funding commitments for several of the UK government's international obligations, including mandatory assessed contributions for peacekeeping (to the UN, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO) and Criminal Tribunals (the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT). This also included the net additional costs for UK troop deployments to UN Peacekeeping Missions, and the UK's bilateral contribution to support the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). The Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), overseen by the JFU, allowed for the mobilisation of emergency non-ODA resources in response to crises. In 2023/24, the RRM had a provision of \pounds 20 million of non-ODA from within the CSSF's budget and had access to a further \pounds 20 million from the government's Reserve.

The RRM was not used in 2023/24 – the government used separate Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds to respond to crises. However, since the inception of the CSSF, the RRM has been used to respond to several crises. These include: support for UK Overseas Territories following Hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017; repatriation of British Nationals during the Coronavirus pandemic; and most recently to fund part of the immediate UK government response to the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine.

A comprehensive review of the CSSF was conducted as a part of the Fund's governance processes to ensure alignment between funding allocations and the priorities of the National Security Council (NSC). This process ensured that the Fund delivered value for money for the taxpayer and remained adaptable to changing national security priorities.

Annex A CSSF Financial Spend 2023/24

The final CSSF Financial Year (FY) 2023/24 cross government allocation was £878.14m. Total CSSF spend was £853.41m (97.2%). This is subject to final departmental audits.

Table 1

Final CSSF Allocation FY 23-24 £878.14m
CSSF Spend FY 2023/24 £853.41m

The total CSSF 2023/24 spend of \pounds 853.41m can be split by:

1. UK Government Department/Agency

In 2023/24 the largest spender of CSSF funding was the FCDO, in large part, due to peacekeeping contributions (£308.20m).

Final spend on departmental baselines was:

- Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) 97.3%,
- Ministry of Defence (MOD) 99.8%,
- Home Office (HO) 94.7%,
- Department for Transport (DfT) 91.4%,
- Cabinet Office (CO) 90.4%,
- HM Treasury (HMT) 81.4%,
- Department for Business and Trade (DBT) 90.0%,
- UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) 102.1%,
- HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 94.7%,
- Ministry of Justice (MoJ) 90.1%,
- National Crime Agency (NCA) 95.3%,
- Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) 74.1%,
- Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) 83.8%,
- Department for International Trade (DIT) 84.9%.

Table 2 – CSSF Spend by HMG Department for Financial Year 2023/24

	2023/24 £m	2022-23 £m
FCDO	728.54	678.27
MOD	65.67	85.08
НО	38.65	39.48
DFT	5.08	14.07
CO	3.55	6.42
HMT	3.26	0.00
DBT	2.63	0.00
UKHSA	2.41	2.40
HMRC	1.31	0.70
MoJ	0.92	0.66
NCA	0.88	0.98
DSIT	0.29	0.00
DESNZ	0.12	0.00
DIT	0.09	0.00
DEFRA	0.00	1.60
UKHO	0.00	0.70
BEIS	0.00	0.06
TOTAL	853.41	830.41

Table 3 – Proportion of 2023/24 CSSF Spend by HMG Department

Table 4 – CSSF Discretionary Spend by HMG Department for Financial Year 2023/24

	%	%
FCDO	85.37	81.7
MOD	7.69	10.2
НО	4.53	4.8
DFT	0.60	1.7
СО	0.42	0.8
HMT	0.38	0.0
DBT	0.31	0.0
UKHSA	0.28	0.3
HMRC	0.15	0.1
MoJ	0.11	0.1
NCA	0.10	0.1
DSIT	0.03	0.0
DESNZ	0.01	0.0
DIT	0.01	0.0
DEFRA	0.00	0.2
UKHO	0.00	0.1
BEIS	0.00	0.1

	Total Spend £m	% of Discretionary Spend
FCDO	385.54	78.47
MOD	46.59	9.48
НО	38.65	7.87
DFT	5.08	1.03
CO	3.55	0.72
HMT	3.26	0.66
DBT	2.63	0.54
UKHSA	2.41	0.49
HMRC	1.31	0.27
MoJ	0.92	0.19
NCA	0.88	0.18
DSIT	0.29	0.06
DESNZ	0.12	0.03
DIT	0.09	0.02
TOTAL	491.33	

2. Regional and Thematic Spend

Corporate Delivery Support consists of the Joint Funds Unit (JFU) and Evidence and Data Hub, which includes the Global Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (GMEL), allocated as follows:

- JFU: £8.00m
- Evidence and Data Hub: £4.28m

Table 5 – 2023/24 CSSF Spend by regional, cross regional and non-discretionary theme.

	£m
Peacekeeping	308.20
MOD Ringfences	19.07
Sub-Saharan Africa	99.68
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	85.77
Middle East and North Africa	80.25
Western Balkans	38.50
Counter Terrorism	34.12
Cyber	31.23
Overseas Territories	20.27
Afghanistan and Pakistan	18.44
Serious and Organised Crime	18.39
Information Threats and Influence	17.33
South East Asia and Pacific	13.85
Corporate Delivery Support	12.28
Economic Deterrence Initiative	10.85
Americas	9.65
Migration	8.78
International State Threats	8.71
India and Indian Ocean	6.55
Multilateral Strategy	4.74
Gender, Peace and Security	4.63
National Security Communications	2.13
TOTAL	853.41

Table 6 – Proportion of 2023/24 CSSF spend by regional, cross regional and non-discretionary theme.

	%
Peacekeeping	36.11
MOD Ringfences	2.24
Sub-Saharan Africa	11.68
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	10.05
Middle East and North Africa	9.40
Western Balkans	4.51
Counter Terrorism	4.00
Cyber	3.66
Overseas Territories	2.38
Afghanistan and Pakistan	2.16
Serious and Organised Crime	2.15
Information Threats and Influence	2.03
South East Asia and Pacific	1.62
Corporate Delivery Support	1.44
Economic Deterrence Initiative	1.27
Americas	1.13
Migration	1.03
International State Threats	1.02
India and Indian Ocean	0.77
Multilateral Strategy	0.56
Gender, Peace and Security	0.54
National Security Communications	0.25

3. ODA/Non-ODA

The FY 2023/24 total spend was split by £346.14m (40.56%) of ODA and £507.26m (59.44%) of non-ODA.

A breakdown of calendar year 2023 CSSF ODA spend by department can be found in the Statistics on International Development report published on GOV.UK.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)

ODA - 40.56% non-ODA - 59.44%

CSSF achieved 56% spend against the 80% ODA spending target by 31 December 2023. This contributed to the UK's commitment to spend 0.5 % of GNI on aid.

The top 5 discretionary geographical recipients of ODA were:

- Ukraine (£36.38m)
- Lebanon (£10.04m)
- Syria (£9.48m)
- Afghanistan (£8.39m)
- Iraq (£8.35m)

Table 7 – Total CSSF 2023/24 ODA Spend – £346.14m by region, cross-regional, and nondiscretionary theme.

	£m
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	59.49
Middle East and North Africa	54.79
Peacekeeping	53.30
Sub-Saharan Africa	37.20
Western Balkans	28.44
Counter Terrorism	20.45
Afghanistan and Pakistan	16.40
Cyber	15.24
Serious and Organised Crime	13.25
South East Asia and Pacific	11.76
Americas	7.43
Migration	7.01
India and Indian Ocean	6.05
Gender, Peace and Security	4.21
Corporate Delivery Support	4.15
Overseas Territories	3.72
Multilateral Strategy	3.23
TOTAL	346.14

Non-ODA

The top 5 discretionary geographical recipients of non-ODA were:

- Overseas Territories (£14.38m)
- Somalia (£10.67m)
- Lebanon (£9.57m)
- Ukraine (£7.82m)
- Nigeria (£2.77m)

When combined with MOD ringfences of $\pounds19.07m$ and Peacekeeping non-ODA $\pounds254.90m$, this accounts for approximately 54.01% of total non-ODA spend.

Table 8 – Total CSSF 2023/24 Non-ODA Spend – by region, cross-regional and non-discretionary theme.

Peacekeeping254.90MOD Ringfences19.07Sub-Saharan Africa62.48Eastern Europe and Central Asia26.28Middle East and North Africa25.46Information Threats and Influence17.33Overseas Territories16.54Cyber15.99Counter Terrorism13.67Economic Deterrence Initiative10.85Western Balkans10.06International State Threats8.71Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49Gender, Peace and Security0.42		£m
Sub-Saharan Africa62.48Eastern Europe and Central Asia26.28Middle East and North Africa25.46Information Threats and Influence17.33Overseas Territories16.54Cyber15.99Counter Terrorism13.67Economic Deterrence Initiative10.85Western Balkans10.06International State Threats8.71Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Peacekeeping	254.90
Eastern Europe and Central Asia26.28Middle East and North Africa25.46Information Threats and Influence17.33Overseas Territories16.54Cyber15.99Counter Terrorism13.67Economic Deterrence Initiative10.85Western Balkans10.06International State Threats8.71Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	MOD Ringfences	19.07
Middle East and North Africa25.46Information Threats and Influence17.33Overseas Territories16.54Cyber15.99Counter Terrorism13.67Economic Deterrence Initiative10.85Western Balkans10.06International State Threats8.71Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Sub-Saharan Africa	62.48
Information Threats and Influence17.33Overseas Territories16.54Cyber15.99Counter Terrorism13.67Economic Deterrence Initiative10.85Western Balkans10.06International State Threats8.71Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Eastern Europe and Central Asia	26.28
Overseas Territories16.54Cyber15.99Counter Terrorism13.67Economic Deterrence Initiative10.85Western Balkans10.06International State Threats8.71Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Middle East and North Africa	25.46
Cyber15.99Counter Terrorism13.67Economic Deterrence Initiative10.85Western Balkans10.06International State Threats8.71Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Information Threats and Influence	17.33
Counter Terrorism13.67Economic Deterrence Initiative10.85Western Balkans10.06International State Threats8.71Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Overseas Territories	16.54
Economic Deterrence Initiative10.85Western Balkans10.06International State Threats8.71Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Cyber	15.99
Western Balkans10.06International State Threats8.71Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Counter Terrorism	13.67
International State Threats8.71Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Economic Deterrence Initiative	10.85
Corporate Delivery Support8.13Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Western Balkans	10.06
Serious and Organised Crime5.13Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	International State Threats	8.71
Americas2.22National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Corporate Delivery Support	8.13
National Strategic Communications2.13South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Serious and Organised Crime	5.13
South East Asia and Pacific2.09Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Americas	2.22
Afghanistan and Pakistan2.05Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	National Strategic Communications	2.13
Migration1.77Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	South East Asia and Pacific	2.09
Multilateral Strategy1.51India and Indian Ocean0.49	Afghanistan and Pakistan	2.05
India and Indian Ocean 0.49	Migration	1.77
	Multilateral Strategy	1.51
Gender, Peace and Security 0.42	India and Indian Ocean	0.49
	Gender, Peace and Security	0.42
TOTAL 507.26	TOTAL	507.26

Discretionary/Non-discretionary

Non-discretionary spend consists of the continued funding of peacekeeping activities as part of UK membership to the various multilateral organisations, the UK's troop deployments to UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus and Mali, and the UK commitment to ATMIS and UNSOS (Somalia).

Of the total CSSF 2023/24 spend of £853.41m, £362.07m (42.43%) was non-discretionary. This included:

- Assessed peacekeeping contributions (£308.20m);
- Operational funds for the MOD (£19.07m)
- ATMIS and UNSOS (£34.80m)

A breakdown of these figures is included in Annex B. The remaining CSSF spend was discretionary programme (57.57%).

Annex B: CSSF non-discretionary spend breakdown

United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	46.9 48.5 44.3 54.3 19.3 24.7 16.9 3.1 2.9 1.7	7.2 6.4 5.2 8.1 0.0 3.8 2.7 0.0 0.5	39.7 42.1 39.1 46.2 19.3 20.9 14.2 3.1
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	48.5 44.3 54.3 19.3 24.7 16.9 3.1 2.9	6.4 5.2 8.1 0.0 3.8 2.7 0.0	42.1 39.1 46.2 19.3 20.9 14.2
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	44.3 54.3 19.3 24.7 16.9 3.1 2.9	5.2 8.1 0.0 3.8 2.7 0.0	39.1 46.2 19.3 20.9 14.2
Mali (MINUSMA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	54.3 19.3 24.7 16.9 3.1 2.9	8.1 0.0 3.8 2.7 0.0	46.2 19.3 20.9 14.2
the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	19.3 24.7 16.9 3.1 2.9	0.0 3.8 2.7 0.0	19.3 20.9 14.2
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	24.7 16.9 3.1 2.9	3.8 2.7 0.0	20.9 14.2
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	16.9 3.1 2.9	2.7 0.0	14.2
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	3.1 2.9	0.0	
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	2.9		3.1
(MINURSO) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)		0.5	
	1.7	0.0	2.4
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)		0.3	1.4
	1.3	0.0	1.3
UN Peacekeeping Credits	-10.8	0.0	-10.8
Sub Total	253.1	34.2	218.9
UN Special Political Missions	26.2	12.6	13.6
UN Tribunals	2.7	0.0	2.7
International Criminal Court	12.7	0.0	12.7
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Field Missions	7.4	6.5	0.9
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	302.1	53.3	248.8
Foreign Exchange Adjustment (gains and losses on advance purchases of foreign currency)	6.1	0.0	6.1
TOTAL Peacekeeping Budget	308.2	53.3	254.9
MOD Operational Spend		Nor	n-ODA (£m)
Operation NEWCOMBE – Mali			7.99
Operation TOSCA – Cyprus			11.08
TOTAL			19.07
ATMIS and UNSOS Spend		Nor	n-ODA (£m)
ATMIS/UNSOS			34.80

