

Recommendation Status Report: Overspeed at Spital Junction, Peterborough

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

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Report Title	Overspeed at Spital Junction, Peterborough
Report Number	10/2024
Date of Incident	04/05/2023

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
10/2024/01	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of Grand Central’s train operations by providing its drivers with additional skills to manage the approaches to signals controlling multiple routes.</p> <p>Grand Central should review, and amend as necessary, its training and competence management processes to provide all its drivers with the necessary skills and strategies to manage the risk encountered at signals which may show different aspects to those usually encountered (paragraphs 249a.i, 249a.iii and 250a).</p>	
10/2024/02	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve the quality and the follow-up of incident investigations carried out by the industry which involve risks that need to be managed between industry parties, so that safety lessons can be learnt and shared in an open manner and cross-interface risks be more effectively managed.</p> <p>Network Rail, working with transport undertakings using its infrastructure, should review the processes by which they identify, share and implement safety learning from accidents and incidents that involve risks which need to be managed by more than one party. This review should consider legal requirements, including the duty of co-operation, good practice, such as that contained in Rail Industry Standard, RIS-3119TOM ‘Accident and Incident Investigation’, RIS-3704-TOM, ‘Managing Train Accident Risk Arising from Infrastructure Assets and Train Operations’ and safety learning from other industries.</p> <p>The review should also consider how those risks are equitably shared and appropriately controlled between Network Rail and the different</p>	

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			<p>organisations using its infrastructure.</p> <p>Following this review, Network Rail should develop a timebound plan to make any appropriate changes identified to standards, processes and its organisational structure (paragraph 250b).</p>	
10/2024/03	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to minimise the possibility of drivers not correctly reading signals by ensuring that the conspicuity of the necessary elements of junction indicator signals is optimised.</p> <p>The Rail Safety and Standards Board should review the specifications for the procurement of signal aspects stated within Rail Industry Standard RIS-0737-CCS and Railway Group Standard GKRT0057. This should include consideration of vertical separation and relative brightness of main aspects and junction indicators to understand the effects on conspicuity of the complete signal at distances up to which a signal is required to be readable. The Rail Safety and Standards Board should then consult with industry on the findings of this review and, if appropriate, update the relevant standards which will be used by industry in its specifications for the procurement of signal equipment (paragraph 249c.i and 249c.ii).</p>	
10/2024/04	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to manage the risk of a driver not seeing a route indication because of the gradual reduction in light output of LED modules over time.</p> <p>Network Rail should review its current arrangements for maintenance and replacement of LED indicators used for signalling purposes considering the expected degradation in performance that is predicted to occur over time. This review should identify how this degradation will be managed to prevent the reduction in output reaching a point where its readability to approaching drivers may be affected to an unacceptable degree. Network Rail should then implement any necessary improvements to the arrangements that have been identified as part of this review (paragraph 251c).</p>	

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			This recommendation may also apply to other railway infrastructure managers.	
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