

Recommendation Status Report: Runaway wagon at Kineton, Warwickshire

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



Report Title	Runaway wagon at Kineton, Warwickshire
Report Number	04/2024
Date of Incident	25/05/2023

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
04/2024/01	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that the Ministry of Defence is safely managing the risks involved with defence rail operations.</p> <p>The Ministry of Defence should review the arrangements by which it conducts railway operations on behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence. This review should consider:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. If there is a full understanding of the extent and type of current defence rail operations, including interfaces with contractors and parties external to the Ministry of Defence, such as the mainline railway and the Office of Rail and Road. ii. If an appropriate organisation exists to safely manage the various elements involved in defence rail operations, including clear governance structures, roles and accountabilities and the safety assurance of relevant contractors (including appropriate escalation routes for contractors raising safety related matters). iii. If this organisation is correctly resourced with the Ministry of Defence and its contractors, with appropriately trained and competent staff occupying key roles. iv. If up-to-date and appropriate risk assessments are in place for all elements of defence rail operations, including the stabling of wagons on the sites where it is the infrastructure manager. These risk assessments should specifically consider the risks that defence rail operations can present to the public, Ministry of Defence staff, contractors, and the mainline railway. v. If an appropriate safety management system, operating rule book and 	

Recommendation Status Report



			<p>other supporting technical standards are in place and if these documents include the appropriate control measures needed to address risk and good practice in other parts of the rail industry.</p> <p>vi. How safety related documents are made available to staff working for the Ministry of Defence and its contractors.</p> <p>vii. How the Ministry of Defence takes account of appropriate safety learning from sources such as internal investigations and safety learning from the wider rail industry.</p> <p>Following this review, the Ministry of Defence should develop a timebound plan to make any appropriate changes identified to working practices, processes and organisational structure (paragraphs 188a, 188c, 188c.i, 188d, 188d.i and 189b).</p>	
04/2024/02	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that there is a clear understanding of the regulatory arrangements applying to railways operated on behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence.</p> <p>The Defence Safety Authority of the Ministry of Defence should agree the roles and responsibilities for safety regulation of defence operated railways with the Office of Rail and Road and any other relevant statutory safety regulators to ensure they are clearly defined.</p> <p>Following this agreement, the parties involved should consider their respective regulatory strategies, ensuring that there are adequate resources in place to meet their regulatory obligations (paragraph 189c).</p>	
04/2024/03	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that Kuehne+Nagel is managing the risks involved with its defence rail operation.</p> <p>Kuehne+Nagel should review its delivery of railway operations on behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence. This review should consider:</p> <p>i. If Kuehne+Nagel fully understands the extent and type of rail operations which it undertakes for the Ministry of Defence.</p>	

Recommendation Status Report



			<p>ii. If an appropriate organisation exists to safely manage the various elements of defence rail operations for which Kuehne+Nagel is responsible, including clear governance structures, roles and accountabilities and safety assurance.</p> <p>iii. If this organisation is correctly resourced within Kuehne+Nagel with appropriately trained and competent staff occupying key roles.</p> <p>iv. If up-to-date and appropriate risk assessments are in place for all elements of Kuehne+Nagel's defence rail operations, including the stabling of wagons on sites where it is responsible for rail operations. These risk assessments should specifically consider the risks that its rail operations can present to the public, staff and the mainline railway.</p> <p>v. If an appropriate safety management system, operating rules and other supporting technical standards are in place and if these documents include the appropriate control measures needed to address risk and good practice in other parts of the rail industry.</p> <p>vi. How safety related documents are made available to staff working for Kuehne+Nagel.</p> <p>vii. How Kuehne+Nagel takes account of appropriate safety learning from sources such as internal investigations and safety learning from the wider rail industry.</p> <p>Following this review, Kuehne+Nagel should develop a timebound plan to make any appropriate changes identified to working practices, processes and organisational structure (paragraphs 188a, 188b, 188c, 188c.i, 188c.ii, 188d, 188d.ii, and 189a).</p>	
04/2024/04	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve the maintenance regime applied to FAA wagons.</p> <p>DB Cargo should review the maintenance procedures relating to FAA wagons at Carlisle Kingmoor depot. This review should include:</p> <p>i. A review of the effectiveness of the current arrangements for the visual inspection and brake test of FAA wagons and if they ensure that</p>	

Recommendation Status Report



			<p>handbrake cables are appropriately inspected.</p> <p>ii. Consideration as to how visual inspection and brake tests of wagons at Carlisle Kingmoor depot can be improved to make it more effective at detecting cables which may be worn and/or approaching the end of their service life. This should include the type and suitability of the facilities used for such inspections.</p> <p>iii. Examining how the results of visual inspection and brake tests are recorded.</p> <p>Following this review, DB Cargo should develop a timebound plan to make any appropriate changes identified to working practices, processes and facilities (paragraphs 188c, 188c.iii).</p>	
04/2024/05	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the likelihood of a life expired safety-critical brake component being left in place on an operational wagon.</p> <p>DB Cargo should review the basis on which it determines the replacement of brake component parts fitted to wagons to ensure that those which are beyond their effective service life are identified and scheduled for replacement at appropriate intervals, considering both time-based and mileage-based intervals.</p> <p>This recommendation may be applicable to other entities in charge of maintenance (paragraphs 188c, 188c.iii and 190a).</p>	