EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)

Case Number: 6000082/2022

Hearing held in Glasgow (by video) on 14 and 15 August 2024

Employment Judge M Whitcombe
Tribunal Member Ms L Taylor
Tribunal Member Mr G Doherty

Mr J-P Pryce	**Claimant** **In person**
Accountant in Bankruptcy	**Respondent** **Represented by:** **Ms E Campbell (Solicitor)**

JUDGMENT

The unanimous judgment of the Tribunal is as follows.

(1) When this complaint was presented on 9 December 2022 the respondent was in breach of its duty to make reasonable adjustments for the claimant's disability, contrary to sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010.

(2) The claimant did not seek any remedy beyond that declaration. None is awarded.

(3) Oral reasons were given in the presence of the parties and/or their representatives.

REASONS

1. As noted above, oral reasons for our judgment were given in the presence of the parties or their representatives at the end of the hearing. These written reasons are provided under rule 62(3) following the respondent's request dated 23 August 2024. Our decision was unanimous and so was our reasoning. Our assessment of reasonableness was informed partly by the practical industrial experience and specialist expertise of the non-legal members of the Tribunal.

Introduction and background

2. This case concerned a narrow but important question of reasonable adjustments. The respondent is based in Kilwinning, Ayrshire. It is the Scottish government agency responsible for administering the process of personal bankruptcy and corporate insolvency. Its functions also include administering the Debt Arrangement Scheme ("DAS"). The claimant lives in Ardrossan and has been employed by the respondent since 14 May 2007 as a "DAS Admin Case Officer". He continues to be employed in that role. He has been working remotely from home since the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020.

3. In a claim form received by the Tribunal on 9 December 2022 the claimant made a complaint of disability discrimination. The scope of this hearing was therefore limited to allegations of discrimination which were within time on 9 December 2022. There has not been any ***Prakash***-type amendment to add allegations of discrimination post-dating the claim form, so this judgment will be of limited use to the parties if they seek a determination of their rights and obligations now, or in the future. The relevant circumstances might already have changed. They might well change in the future. The reasonableness of a particular adjustment might now be assessed in a different factual context.

Summary of the claimant's case

4. As noted above, claimant has worked entirely from home since early 2020. The respondent's policy on homeworking has evolved since the end of the Covid-19 pandemic. Since mid-April 2022 it has been that employees should work in the office for a minimum of 2 days each week, with freedom to work from home for up to 3 days each week. The claimant's case is that he should be permitted to work entirely from home as a reasonable adjustment for his disability.

Summary of the respondent's case

5. The respondent's initial argument was that it would not be reasonable for the claimant to work from home for 100% of his working time, other than on an interim or temporary basis, and that the claimant must eventually meet the expectation of working in the office for 2 days each week. During the hearing the respondent's sole witness appeared to concede some ground, accepting that it might be reasonable for the claimant to work in the office for 1 day each week, working at home for the rest of the time.

6. The essence of the respondent's case is that some minimum amount of office working generates benefits both for clients and for staff. The respondent argues that the disruption and non-financial cost of the proposed adjustment is too great for it to be reasonable.

Issues

7. A different Tribunal had already found that the claimant was a disabled person for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. Many other potential issues were now agreed. The disputed issues were narrow.

Type of complaint

8. By the start of the final hearing, only one type of disability discrimination was alleged: a failure to make reasonable adjustments contrary to sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010.

Disability and its effects

9. On 11 January 2024 EJ J Hendry found as a preliminary issue that the claimant was a disabled person for the purposes of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. The judgment records that the claimant had a history of agoraphobia, claustrophobia and anxiety. The claimant had a current diagnosis of social anxiety and mysophobia. Mysophobia is also known as "germophobia" and can be summarised as an irrational fear of dirt, contamination or infection.

10. The claimant avoids indoor spaces because he experiences panic attacks when indoors with others. Merely thinking about the prospect of being indoors with other people can bring on a panic attack. That was vividly illustrated during the hearing when the claimant became extremely distressed when required to contemplate a phased return to the office and how it might affect or benefit him. On the few occasions that the claimant has had to enter indoor spaces with others he was able to spend no more than a few minutes there before starting to sweat, becoming angry about anyone coming even remotely close to him and feeling a need to leave as soon as possible. The claimant summarises, "*I can't stand being near others and see them as coughing, sneezing, germ and virus spreaders*". Apart from his elderly parents, the claimant does not visit other people and was excused jury service because his GP wrote to confirm that he was too anxious to attend a jury trial.

Knowledge of disability and its effects

11. On behalf of the respondent, Ms Campbell helpfully indicated that the respondent did not rely on the defence of lack of knowledge in paragraph 20 of Schedule 8 to the Equality Act 2010.

Provision, criterion or practice ("PCP")

12. The relevant PCP was the respondent's expectation that staff should work in the office for at least 2 days each week rather than from home.

13. While the respondent has not so far sought to enforce its normal policy in the claimant's case and has allowed the claimant to work from home as an interim measure (however lengthy), the respondent's position is that its normal policy should apply to the claimant at some point and that it is something that he should work towards.

14. It does not matter that the respondent's policy has yet to be applied to the claimant in a strict sense. It can still be a PCP for the purposes of a reasonable adjustments claim. Cases such as ***General Dynamics Information Technology Ltd v Carranza*** [2015] ICR 169, EAT establish that a mere expectation, as opposed to a strictly applied rule, can be sufficient to constitute a PCP.

Substantial disadvantage

15. The respondent conceded that the PCP put the claimant at the necessary substantial disadvantage. For this purpose, "substantial" means only "more than minor or trivial" (s.212(1) of the Equality Act 2010). That concession was properly made, because it was well-established by the evidence that the claimant would suffer greatly increased anxiety if he were to be required to work in the office to any extent at all, or even to give it serious contemplation. As the claimant put it:

"*it places me in an environment which would cause me extreme distress, anxiety and panic*"

"*I cannot deal with being stuck indoors with people for any extended lengths of time, I feel sick, my head pounds and I have a compulsion to get away…*"

"*I only feel safe in my house because I know I don't allow people into it so as far as possible it is germ free, and anything that comes in (like letters or deliveries) is anti-bacterial wiped and then I leave it lying for a day or two*"

"*I don't understand how the respondent thinks I could concentrate and do my work.*"

16. Very obviously, a non-disabled comparator would not experience those effects.

Remedy

17. The claimant did not seek any compensation if successful. The remedy sought was limited to a declaration of discrimination and, initially, a recommendation. Once we had given our judgment on liability the claimant no longer sought a recommendation.

Evidence

18. We heard from just two witnesses: the claimant and Miss Donna Grady, Debt Administration Team Leader, which is the level above that of the claimant's line manager. We found them both to be honest and credible witnesses and we did not think that either of them sought to mislead us.

19. We found the claimant to be an especially compelling witness when he described the effects of his disability and the effect on him of an expectation that he should attend the office. It was not suggested in cross-examination that

he had misrepresented or exaggerated those effects in any way. We could see the claimant's fear and distress as he gave his evidence.

20. Although we thought that both witnesses were honest, that did not mean that we always accepted that their honest views had an objective basis in the evidence. For example, we found that Miss Grady's concerns about the claimant's performance were at odds with his entirely satisfactory appraisal ratings. Additionally, Miss Grady did not appear to have appreciated that any amount of office working at all would cause the claimant to experience extreme distress, anxiety and panic. See seemed to think that the claimant could simply build up his tolerance from a starting point of one hour a week in the office without adverse effects. There is currently no medical support for that view and it fails to acknowledge the reality of the phobias with which the claimant has been diagnosed.

21. We were also provided with a well-organised joint file of documentary evidence running to 118 pages. We were not referred to all of it.

Relevant facts

22. Many of the relevant facts were either agreed or found by EJ Hendry at the preliminary hearing on disability status. See in particular the passages above dealing with the PCP and the substantial disadvantage to which it put the claimant. The claimant thought that it would be quite impossible for him to comply with the respondent's hybrid working policy. That is also our finding.

23. Where facts were disputed we made our findings on the balance of probabilities, in other words, a "more likely than not" basis. If we thought that something was more likely to be true than untrue, then for the purposes of our decision it was deemed to be true. That is the binary approach to fact finding adopted in almost all civil litigation.

Working arrangements and internal procedures

24. The claimant commenced employment with the respondent on 14 May 2007. He is therefore an extremely experienced member of staff. He works in a team made up of 5 administrative staff (of whom he is one) and 5 case managers, who act as line managers to the administrative staff. Ms Grady, the DAS Team Leader, sits above the case managers in the hierarchy.

25. In March 2020 the claimant contracted Covid-19 and became very ill. He found that to be an extremely traumatic experience.

26. The claimant performs a computer-based administrative role. Prior to the Covid-19 lockdown, the claimant had worked in the office for all of his working time and did not work from home at all. During lockdown, he worked entirely from home. The respondent provided the equipment necessary for him to do so. Part of the claimant's role involved answering telephone queries. The respondent provided a work mobile phone so that he could answer those calls at home. The respondent also provided a system for video communication which was eventually superseded by the well-known Microsoft Teams product. The claimant's firm belief was that all his duties could be performed from home and that he had already been provided with the necessary technology to do so. We accept that evidence. We will consider *how well* the claimant was able to perform those duties below.

27. In about April 2022 the respondent asked all staff to return to the office for 3 days of each working week. In anticipation of that change, on 19 March 2022 the claimant made a flexible working request, asking that he be allowed to work entirely from home on a permanent basis. That led to a meeting with Donna Grady on 29 March 2022, which led to a referral to Occupational Health ("OH"). The claimant was permitted to continue to work from home until a decision was made on his flexible working application. The OH report dated 18 May 2022 recommended that the claimant should be reintroduced to the office gradually, eventually building up to 3 days in the office which was consistent with the

"hybrid working plan" operated by the respondent at the relevant time. As noted above, the policy has since changed so that staff are expected to work in the office for a minimum 2 days each week rather than 3. Against that background, Donna Grady rejected the flexible working request on 9 June 2022. Her decision was confirmed on appeal on 13 July 2022.

28. The claimant lodged a grievance on 9 September 2022. While that appeal was pending the respondent offered another OH referral on 14 October 2022. By then, the claimant had commenced ACAS Early Conciliation. The claimant's grievance was rejected on 24 November 2022, and the decision maker recommended a further OH referral. At that stage the claimant did not have his current diagnoses of misophobia or agoraphobia The claimant appealed the grievance decision on 6 December 2022 and this claim was started when the Tribunal received a claim form on 9 December 2022.

Communication with colleagues

29. The claimant has used Microsoft Teams to communicate with colleagues. He finds it effective and we accept his evidence on that point. While the respondent placed emphasis on the fact that the claimant would miss out on "impromptu conversations" with colleagues if he were not physically present in the office, we think that the importance of that possibility has been overstated for the following reasons. Firstly, the respondent is prepared to accept arrangements under which all staff at the claimant's grade are permitted to work from home for up to 3 days each week anyway, which suggests that facilitating impromptu conversations in the workplace is not of critical importance. Secondly, if there were a need to discuss anything important, or if impromptu discussions led to learning points or other issues of significance, then that could easily be the subject of a more formal communication, either by email or through meetings held using Microsoft Teams. The claimant receives other work communications by email and joins weekly team meetings by using MS Teams. If he wants to contact his line manager in the meantime, the claimant uses a phone app or video conferencing via Teams. Thirdly, we accept the claimant's evidence that, as an experienced employee, his job

mostly involves working through jobs on a rota basis and completing them on his own, unless for some reason he requires help. If he needs it, he can request help by email or by Teams. Finally, messaging groups have been set up so that colleagues can share information and ask questions. The claimant's uncontradicted evidence was that those groups are used both by him and by his colleagues. That represents a partial substitute for the impromptu conversations and queries that might occur in the office.

Training of colleagues

30. In cross-examination it was put to the claimant that some training of colleagues that he had carried out remotely had to be redone, the implication being that the mode of delivery had reduced the quality of that training.

31. We do not accept the general proposition that training carried out by sitting next to someone is necessarily any more effective than training done remotely, for example by Microsoft Teams. It is within the experience of this Tribunal that provided the trainer and the trainee both have a minimum level of skill with Teams (or similar software) then perfectly effective training can be delivered. The claimant explained that he was essentially training someone in the operation of a computer system, which could be done efficiently by using the "screen share" function on Microsoft Teams. We accept that evidence.

32. The more important considerations are the content of the training, the skill of the trainer and the aptitude and experience of the trainee. If it is correct that some training conducted by the claimant had to be re-done (an issue which was not raised with him at the time) then we are not satisfied that the remote delivery of that training was to blame. There could be other causes and the respondent has not led evidence that would allow us to conclude on the balance of probabilities that the mode of delivery had been a contributory factor. The claimant was aware of training done face to face (or more accurately, side by side) which had to be redone too.

Managing the claimant's welfare

33. It was also suggested to the claimant that it was more difficult to monitor and to support his welfare if he worked entirely from home. We do not accept that proposition. A skilled and diligent line manager should have no difficulty enquiring after, monitoring and supporting the welfare of someone working remotely by using standard methods of communication such as the phone, email and video conferencing. We think that the respondent has overstated the unique welfare benefits of observing an employee in the workplace, especially if physical presence in that workplace is likely to cause the employee distress. The claimant has regular, scheduled, monthly meetings with his line manager via Teams. We think that is likely to be both effective and sufficient. If the respondent's aim is to monitor and support the claimant's welfare, then it must allow for the fact that physical presence in the office would harm the claimant's welfare.

Contact with clients

34. The clients of the service are those who are seeking or who are already subject to a Debt Arrangement Scheme. In all the years that the claimant worked wholly from the office (2007-2020) he was never asked to speak to a client who had attended the office in person. We find that there is no business need for the claimant to be in the office to meet clients. Contact is by phone, and that can be done just as well remotely. Some highly satisfied clients have written to the claimant's manager to say that they were getting a good service, and those letters have been passed to the claimant. The claimant dealt with some of those clients remotely.

35. It was suggested in cross-examination that the claimant's managers could not tell how often he was answering the phone, or whether he was answering it at all, when he worked from home. It was unclear whether the respondent had genuine concerns about the claimant's diligence or whether it was putting forward a theoretical need that might arise in the future. Either way, we see no

objective basis for that concern. The respondent has other ways of monitoring the claimant's productivity and if it was concerned to know how many calls he had answered, it could simply ask him to keep a log. That could then be checked against the case records. We also note that the implication of the respondent's current flexible working policy is that it might only be able to monitor call handling for 40% of the working week of any employee, disabled or not. On that basis we find that it is a factor of limited weight, and that there are effective ways of monitoring the claimant's call activity other than observing him taking calls in the workplace.

General productivity and performance

36. The claimant believes that he has worked productively from home for more than 4 years now. We were not shown the full appraisal documentation and the bundle contained just a single page from a single appraisal. However, oral evidence established that the claimant had received a rating of "effective" in his 2024 appraisal, "effective" in his 2023 appraisal and "highly effective" in his 2022 appraisal. We were not shown the narrative sections of any of those appraisals, but we proceed on the basis that if they had contained any relevant concerns about the claimant's performance they would have been produced and shown to us. The claimant is not on a performance improvement plan and Donna Grady told us that she had not even contemplated one.

37. While Donna Grady told us that she thought that the claimant was "not doing the full array of work", she was nevertheless comfortable counter-signing for an "effective" grade in the claimant's two most recent appraisals and for a "highly-effective" grade in 2022, the appraisal which was the most recent when these proceedings commenced.

38. In cross-examination the suggestion was made to the claimant that his relationship with stakeholders was not as good as that of his colleagues. The claimant firmly rejected that suggestion. In this context "stakeholders" means money advisors and creditors. Donna Grady accepted that neither she nor the claimant's line manager had made any comments in the narrative sections of

the appraisal forms suggesting that they had concerns about the claimant's "stakeholder engagement".

39. We find that there were no serious concerns about the claimant's performance in general or "stakeholder engagement" in particular. If there had been, then they would have been recorded at the time. There was a formal process for doing so and the opportunity was not taken. Donna Grady confirmed that managers complete appraisal documentation honestly. We do not accept her evidence that the claimant only "scraped by". She did not record any comments consistent with that view in the appraisal. The claimant's line manager, who was in the best position to comment on the claimant's performance, did not do so either. We were not persuaded by Donna Grady's analysis that, "*…if I was writing his full report, I would put it in, but unfortunately it was a new line manager*". As the counter-signing manager she had the power, authority and duty to make any relevant comments. The claimant has never previously been told that he was showing a problematic lack of stakeholder engagement.

40. For those reasons, we do not accept the respondent's evidence that the claimant's performance and stakeholder engagement has declined while working entirely from home. Even if it had done so, it would remain to be established that working from home was the cause or a contributory factor, rather than a coincidence. The claimant was recently bereaved, an event which he said had "shattered" his life.

Legal principles

41. Since the only live issue was the reasonableness of the proposed adjustment, it would be disproportionate to set out in full detail the directions in ***Environment Agency v Rowan*** [2008] IRLR 20, EAT and ***Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Higgins*** [2014] ICR 341, EAT.

42. It is well-established that reasonableness must be determined objectively, and that in some cases the duty to make reasonable adjustments may entail *more favourable* treatment of a disabled person, possibly extending to affirmative action or positive discrimination. The policy objective is to achieve substantive

equality and to assist integration into the working environment. The difficulties faced by disabled workers are very different from those experienced by people subjected to other forms of discrimination. See for example:

a. ***Archibald v Fife Council*** [2004] ICR 954, HL, paragraph 47 (Lady Hale);
b. ***Griffiths v SSWP*** [2017] ICR 160, CA, paragraphs 15-16 (Elias LJ);
c. ***Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police v Jelic*** [2010] IRLR 744, EAT, paragraph 41 (Cox J).

43. We have considered paragraphs 6.23 to 6.29 of the EHRC Code of Practice, a section which is headed "What is meant by 'reasonable steps'". Paragraph 6.28 includes a non-exhaustive list of potentially relevant matters which largely replicates the list once contained in section 18B of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.

- The extent to which taking the step would prevent the effect in relation to which the duty is imposed.
- The extent to which it is practicable for the employer to take the step.
- The financial and other costs which would be incurred by the employer in taking the step and the extent to which it would disrupt any of his activities.
- The extent of the employer's financial and other resources.
- The availability to the employer of financial or other assistance with respect to taking the step.
- The nature of the employer's activities and the size of his undertaking.

44. In relation to cost, ***Cordell v Foreign and Commonwealth Office*** [2012] ICR 280, EAT (Underhill P and members), held that cost was central to reasonableness, but that a decision about how much it was reasonable for an employer to spend could not be a product of "nice analysis". There was no objective measure by which the disadvantage to the employee of not making the adjustment could be balanced against the cost to the employer. Ultimately, it was an 'industrial jury' question.

45. Although ***Cordell*** was concerned with financial costs, we think that an equivalent approach must be appropriate in a case where non-financial costs and disruption are central to the assessment of reasonableness. It is for the Tribunal to make a judgment as to what it considers right and just.

Reasoning and conclusions

46. The respondent concedes that the duty to make adjustments arose, and the sole issue for us is the reasonableness of the proposed adjustment of allowing the claimant to work entirely from home, free of any obligation to attend the office at all.

47. We will begin by considering the relevant disadvantage, a question which must be approached quantitatively as well as qualitatively. The disadvantage to which the claimant was and is put by the PCP is striking. If he were required to attend the office then he would experience severe distress, panic and anxiety. He would also be unable to concentrate on his work. We do not think that the claimant would be able to function effectively in the office at all. Not only would that be extremely unpleasant for him, but it could also cast doubt on the viability of his continued employment.

48. That can be contrasted with the position if the adjustment were to be made, which is that the claimant would be able to continue to perform his role to a standard which the respondent has repeatedly graded “effective” or “highly effective”. A tribunal must always consider the efficacy, or likely efficacy, of an adjustment. In this case the proposed adjustment would be extremely beneficial because it would almost entirely remove the disadvantage to which the claimant was put by the combination of the PCP and his disability.

49. Against that, we must consider the cost and difficulty of making the proposed adjustment. The respondent’s arguments are not really about the *financial* costs of making the proposed adjustment. We heard no evidence about that. The respondent is concerned about the disruption, difficulty and non-financial

costs. While the respondent's concerns are all of a type which might well be relevant to reasonableness in many cases, we find that many of them have been overstated in this case, for reasons given above.

50. Stakeholder engagement sessions have customarily been done in the office, apparently at the request of those stakeholders. However, we do not think it would be impossible or difficult for there to be stakeholder engagement based on interacting with the claimant remotely, for example by means of Microsoft Teams. While that might not be what stakeholders have requested, we heard no evidence to suggest that it had ever been offered to them, nor evidence to show that it would be less effective. The claimant has never previously been told that he is showing a problematic lack of stakeholder engagement. We think that the absence of any documented concerns of that sort in the appraisal process is telling. That suggests to us that the alleged lack of stakeholder engagement is not a very serious problem if it is a problem at all. We also note that 9 out of 10 members of the team (or 4 out of 5 if the analysis is confined to the claimant's own grade) are still available to offer office-based stakeholder engagement sessions. Sometimes, it can be reasonable to transfer part of a disabled worker's duties to others. The respondent did not suggest, still less explain why, that would be insufficient to cover the need or unfair on the rest of the team. For those reasons, we give the stakeholder engagement point limited weight in the assessment of reasonableness.

51. The formal training received by the claimant seems to have gone smoothly enough when consumed remotely. There was no suggestion that there was any deficit in the claimant's own formal training. As for the rather more informal training gained through presence and discussion in the office, we have already set out above the reasons why we think that is a factor of limited weight in the assessment of reasonableness. If important issues arose, they could very easily be shared with the claimant by email, at team meetings, in monthly supervisions or by one-off uses of video conferencing software.

52. As for training given by the claimant to others, we have set out above the reasons why we are not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the mode

of delivery was the reason why some of that training had to be redone. There are several alternative explanations for the need for additional training in that instance, and training given in person must sometimes be redone too. In principle, effective training on a computer system can certainly be given by MS Teams and its screen sharing function, and we are not persuaded that there was anything about the mode of delivery which caused problems on the occasion highlighted in the respondent's evidence. Sometimes well-trained people struggle and require extra support. The training is not necessarily to blame, still less the mode of delivery of that training. We give this point limited weight in the assessment of reasonableness.

53. For the reasons set out above, we do not think that the need to monitor the claimant's call handling is a powerful consideration in the assessment of reasonableness. The respondent has no call monitoring software as such, but presence in the office enables one side of a conversation to be heard by line management if they wish. However, the respondent is content for any employee to spend up to 60% of their working week working from home where no such monitoring can take place. There was no suggestion that there was any known problem with the way the claimant took calls, or the number of calls that he took. The appraisal process records that he has been (at least) an effective performer. If there were any actual or suspected problem, then the respondent would have other ways of monitoring performance than observing one half of a telephone conversation while the claimant worked in the office. The respondent's hybrid working policy means that for the most part, the claimant's calls and those of his colleagues would not be observed or capable of observation at all. We give this point limited weight in the assessment of reasonableness.

54. For the reasons set out above, we do not accept that physical presence in the office has much to offer in terms of monitoring and supporting the claimant's welfare. A skilled manager can do that remotely, and the respondent's logic completely overlooks the fact that physical presence in the office does harm to the claimant's welfare.

55. Having weighed all those considerations in the balance, our conclusion is that they weigh strongly in favour of making the proposed adjustment. It would be reasonable in those circumstances. The benefit to the claimant outweighs the difficulty and disruption caused by making the adjustment. The complaint brought under sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010 therefore succeeds.

56. Given the way in which this dispute has arisen, and the failure of several internal processes to resolve it, all three members of the Tribunal wish to add these brief comments. In the Tribunal's view, good practice would usually entail the following.

a. Both sides must be prepared to keep the situation under periodic review. Entrenched positions are unhelpful. This judgment does not necessarily provide a durable answer. Circumstances may change.
b. Both sides must therefore engage in an ongoing dialogue about adjustments.
c. It is necessary for both sides to cooperate to ensure that good expert advice is available on the questions of support and adjustments.
d. That almost certainly entails obtaining up to date OH or other medical evidence. The claimant must cooperate with that. His distrust of OH evidence in general and his assumption that it will always support the employer's position is not well-founded. If he has objections to particular OH practitioners or OH providers because of past experiences then there are many others that the respondent could choose instead.
e. Both sides are reminded of the valuable EHRC Code of Practice on Employment, of which Chapter 6 deals with the duty to make reasonable adjustments. Other useful resources are available on the EHRC website.

Employment Judge:	**M Whitcombe**
Date of Judgment:	**30 August 2024**
Entered in register:	**02 September 2024**
and copied to parties	