# Security Investment Programme (SIP)

Process evaluation report

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The National Centre for Social Research

Data and Analysis exists to improve policy making, decision taking and practice by the Ministry of Justice. It does this by providing robust, timely and relevant data and advice drawn from research and analysis undertaken by the department's analysts and by the wider research community.

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1.   Summary

1.1   Introduction

This report presents the findings of the process evaluation of the Security Investment Programme (SIP), a £100 million investment with the strategic aim of reducing crime and improving security in prisons. SIP is comprised of three lines of defence: Physical Security Measures (PSM), Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) and Counter Corruption Measures (CCM).

The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) commissioned a qualitative process evaluation to explore the set-up, delivery and perceived impacts of SIP from the perspective of prisoners and prison staff – both in frontline and in strategic roles. Key findings for each line of defence are described below, and more detail is provided within the individual substantive chapters dedicated to each of the SIP strands.

1.2   Methodology

The process evaluation methodology included:

- A scoping review which comprised a desk review of relevant literature and qualitative interviews and focus groups with SIP strategic leads, stakeholders and partners to explore the intended implementation of SIP at a national/ regional level.

- Mainstage fieldwork which used a qualitative case study design to understand the delivery and perceived impacts of measures implemented under SIP's three lines of defence. Elements of SIP were deployed throughout the closed male estate and twelve prisons were selected from these as case studies to explore experiences and views on the set-up and delivery of SIP. Establishments with different categorisations, SIP equipment and geographies were chosen to understand how these factors impacted on SIP delivery. Interviews and focus groups were conducted with leadership staff, operational staff, and prisoners. SIP-related measures in use at establishments were also observed. A total of 183

participants took part in the interviews and focus groups, including 31 prisoner participants between May 2022 and February 2023.

- A staff survey on counter corruption awareness which was administered online across the 12 prisons included in the case studies, as well as eight additional prisons recruited to include geographic regions not represented by the case study sample. The survey received 530 responses.

Methodological considerations

As with all research, the methodology had limitations, which included:

- The study is based on qualitative interview data, therefore the findings included in this report are based on perceptions of staff and prisoners. There is a separate SIP overview and outcome study, which considers quantitative evidence related to SIP's effectiveness.

- Limits on participants sharing classified information pertaining to the security of establishments limited the depth of information gathered around more sensitive strands of SIP, such as MPD or elements of the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU).

- A self-selecting survey sample, where individuals volunteered to take part, was chosen as the most ethical and cost-effective way to deliver the survey. The survey sample was therefore not representative of the prison staff population.

- Variation in implementation of SIP across establishments led to difficulty determining what the overall impact of SIP and certain elements of the programme was. Even within establishments, there were differences in engagement and knowledge among staff and prisoners, resulting in wide variations in how SIP was perceived, which is why opposing views are presented throughout the report. This caused difficulties when considering how local factors may have interacted with SIP.

- The perceptions of SIP were impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only did this impact the implementation and delivery of SIP, but it greatly impacted the way in which prisons were run and how SIP equipment was used as a result. Prisons operated under restricted regimes and experienced staff shortages. This limited visits and transfers which reduced the necessity for SIP equipment at entry points, such as X-Ray Body Scanners (XRBS) and Enhanced Gate Security (EGS).

1.3   Key findings

Crosscutting contextual factors affecting SIP implementation

Participants highlighted three crosscutting factors which were perceived to have contributed to a difficult operational context during the period of SIP implementation and delivery:

- **Despite SIP's attempts to onboard new staff, shortfalls in hiring and reduced retention rates across the prison service reduced the capacity of prisons to deliver the programme and/or elements of SIP as intended**. Although new staff were hired to support the Enhanced Gate Security as part of SIP, this resource was not ring-fenced. This led to SIP-funded staff sometimes being redeployed to different roles or areas of the prison to deal with shortfall problems. The problem with staff shortages was exacerbated by the pandemic.

- **High turnover of staff in prisons was perceived to have led to a deterioration in skills and knowledge.** This was highlighted as a particular challenge in relation to staff training on the SIP equipment. Staff often relied on less effective peer-to-peer training, as sometimes there were not sufficiently trained staff in post to pass knowledge on. In some cases, this meant that equipment was not used correctly or at all.

- **Delivery and procurement issues occurred due to COVID-19**. For example, some planned elements of SIP, such as baggage scanners, were unable to be delivered due to procurement problems. This resulted in staff needing to adapt the processes in place to search staff and visitors. There was also disruption to planned training (including necessitating virtual training) and problems building relationships between teams when using virtual working. This is further explored in the 'Factors impacting SIP implementation' section.

Physical Security Measures (first line of defence)

Physical Security Measures (PSM) were designed primarily for SIP's first line of defence: to reduce conveyance of illicit items into establishments via the gate, reception and post. SIP funding was intended to be used for installation and day-to-day delivery of Enhanced Gate Security (EGS), including the increased presence of dogs and dog handlers, the

X-ray body scanner (XRBS) and trace detection equipment to help address this objective. More detail on PSM can be found in Appendix A.

Set-up and governance

The Headquarters SIP project team and other external staff to the prison consulted with and provided support and advice to prisons during the PSM set-up phase. This was valued among prison staff and was felt to have had a positive impact on the programme's effectiveness. However, some prison staff thought that there had been a lack of consultation over areas such as the prison's infrastructure and its suitability for housing some of the equipment, and details about when some of the equipment would arrive. It was therefore sometimes felt that their input had not fed into implementation.

Facilitators and barriers to Physical Security Measure (PSM) delivery

Staff identified a range of enablers to the use and effectiveness of PSM. These included having effective consistent processes, and equipment and training delivered to the appropriate staff groups to use.

Barriers to the effective use of PSM included:

- **A lack of infrastructure in some establishments to support the installation and delivery of the equipment and measures.**
- **A lack of trained staff to deliver PSM; competing priorities within establishments that meant other activities may be delivered instead of the PSM.** Although funding was provided for additional staff to operate Enhanced Gate Security, part of PSM, the staff were not ring-fenced and therefore were sometimes redeployed to other roles in prisons, due to staff shortages.
- **The provided equipment was not able to detect all illicit items.** For example, staff reported that EGS is less effective at stopping drugs getting into the prison, as non-metal items would not trigger the metal detector and could be easily concealed.
- **The arrival of the X-ray baggage scanners was delayed**. X-ray baggage scanners have since been delivered at establishments, however the delay meant staff had to manually search bags by hand. This increased the time needed to conduct searches and potentially made searches less effective.

Perceived impacts of Physical Security Measures (PSM)

The PSMs were perceived by some lead and operational prison staff as well as prisoner participants to have reduced the number of illicit items in circulation within prisons, thereby increasing safety and stability. Staff and prisoners also reported that the PSM strand increased the chance of illicit items being detected which had a deterrent effect on corrupt staff, visitors and prisoners attempting to bring items into establishments.

PSM were also felt to have improved staff and prisoner resilience to corruption as they would be less pressured to bring items into the prison, if their ability to smuggle items was decreased. More specific perceived impacts from EGS included a positive impact on professionalism and morale among the workforce.

Staff also spoke about the displacement of illicit items to conveyance channels, not targeted by SIP, such as throw-overs and drones. Some staff felt that this demonstrated the effectiveness of EGS as people were looking for alternate means of conveyance, however, this was also perceived to make it difficult to measure the actual effect of PSM on the level of illicit items in prisons.

Mobile Phone Detection (second line of defence)

The Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) work was aimed at detecting and retrieving mobile phones found in establishments. Unlike the other two lines of defence, MPD did not provide completely new functionality to prisons. Instead, additional equipment was given to regionally located Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) and centrally located Detection Capability Leads (DCL) posts were created to provide training and support for prisons to use equipment. Due to the covert nature of operations, participants were often unaware of MPD operations. More detail on MPD can be found in Appendix B.

Training and guidance

There appeared to be greater awareness of, and appetite for, training by Detection Capability Leads (DCLs) than formal training from His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) Learning & Development team. In line with stated SIP objectives, staff viewed DCL roles funded through the programme as important additional capacity in establishments. Establishments welcomed the engagement of DCL's and the fact that support seemed to be tailored to their individual settings. Barriers to MPD training included

the timing of the support offer which sometimes did not coincide with the provision of equipment and a perceived lack of available expertise in the early stages of the programme.

Facilitators and barriers to Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) delivery
Key benefits of the MPD strand included the accessibility and enhanced accuracy of some equipment. The more compact nature of some equipment allowed prison officers to more easily deploy the equipment in different locations, such as prison wings.

Reported limitations included equipment breaking and difficulty using some detectors discreetly, limiting circumstances in which they could be effective. Factors which were perceived to have impacted on the effectiveness of MPD included the shifting landscape of technology to circumvent signal detection, for example, and a lack of available, trained staff to deliver MPD activities.

Perceived impacts of Mobile Phone Detection (MPD)
There was a sense among some participants that the MPD equipment provided through SIP was of high quality and enabled prisons to scale up their work in this area. Equipment was also thought to have reduced the resource and administrative burden of standard approaches to finding phones. In addition, the visible presence of Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) in establishments was felt to serve as a deterrent. However, measuring the effectiveness of MPD was found to be challenging for two reasons. Firstly, many factors can impact how many phones are found – such as the different search regimes adopted by prisons which meant you could not use the number of phones found to determine the success of MPD. Secondly, some staff and prisoner participants had little or no awareness of MPD equipment and were therefore unable to give their opinions about the impact of the equipment.

Counter Corruption Measures (third line of defence)
The Counter Corruption Measures (CCM) were intended to tackle corruption among prison staff. This was led by the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) and the measures comprised of two strands: the introduction of the Prevent strand focussing on providing training, support, and guidance to staff to prevent corruption, and the re-organisation of the existing Pursue strand to identify and investigate corrupt staff and bring them to a criminal justice outcome.

A central Security Capability Team was also set up, responsible for enhancing prison staff capability through training and upskilling. More detail on Counter Corruption Measures can be found in Appendix C.

Facilitators and barriers to CCU delivery

Four key factors were thought to have impacted the delivery of the CCU strand:

- The external position of the CCU, which facilitated access to information for investigations that prisons did not hold and allowed for difficult conversations to be had. However, some argued that in the current model, prisons had less oversight of what counter corruption staff were doing but still held responsibility for corruption risks.

- The expertise and commitment of the CCU: It was suggested that CCU staff's knowledge of the legal framework around corruption investigations was particularly helpful. However, some senior CCU staff were viewed as not having adequate prior experience of working for HMPPS and so had a limited understanding of how decisions would impact establishments.

- Partnership working and communication between different organisations (including the CCU, HMPPS, the police, and intelligence units) was felt to work well overall. However, there were some challenges with silo working, limitations with what could be communicated and poor understanding of different partners roles and responsibilities.

- Participants' qualitative accounts indicate how the training not being compulsory limited the number of staff who accessed corruption training, particularly since prisons were already short on resource throughout the SIP implementation period and so could not spare staff for training.

Perceived impacts

Participants discussed a range of perceived impacts of the counter corruption strand, including:

- Increased awareness of corruption risks and how to manage them and increased confidence in the process for dealing with corruption. The survey found that most staff felt improvements in understanding about what constitutes corruption and how to identify corruption had improved over the last two years.

- More corruption being prevented due to a shift towards prosecuting prisoners involved in corrupting staff, improved management of corruptors and early intervention for staff at risk of corruption.

- More corruption being reported due to an improved understanding of reporting options; better understanding of the potential consequences of having corrupt staff in the prison and improved trust that reports would be handled sensitively.

- Improved outcomes for prosecuting corruption cases as the CCU strand enabled higher quality investigations and improved establishments' understanding of how to build a case for court. However, some staff felt there was a lack of communication regarding the outcomes of cases to staff involved. This may have contributed to a feeling among some that CCU work had little impact on how HMPPS dealt with corruption cases.

1.4   Conclusions and learning points

Overall, SIP investment was perceived to be necessary to improve safety and security in prisons. As a package of support, participants thought that SIP was comprehensive and far-reaching, and welcomed the focus on three overlapping strands to tackle the conveyance of illicit items and corruption and to improve overall safety within prisons.

Positive perceived impacts included detection and deterrence of illicit items coming into prison, and improvements in feelings of safety and wellbeing among staff and prisoners. However, for the impacts of SIP to be fully realised, there was a sense that structural barriers needed to be addressed, including for example, ensuring there are enough trained staff to use equipment and deliver SIP as intended. It was also highlighted that a continued multipronged approach to improving security was needed to reduce conveyance of illicit items displaced to other routes.

Learning from the process evaluation of SIP

Learning points to be considered as prison security policy and practice develops over the coming months and years include:

- **Sustain commitment to investing in security measures** to ensure they are effective and continue to improve in line with shifting security threats. Future

investment should include consideration of security risks that were not tackled by SIP (e.g. drones and throwovers) where appropriate.

- **Prioritise dealing with staff shortages** across prisons to ensure the essential resource required to deliver security measures is in place.

- **Build effective relationships with establishments early** to aid consultation and support delivery, as these relationships take time to develop. Establishments have a lot of local variation, and it is important this is considered in the roll out of far-reaching and ambitious projects like SIP.

- **Build long term Learning & Development (L&D) strategies**. Future interventions need to ensure effective L&D offerings remain accessible to establishments for as long as the intervention is in place. This may for example, include ensuring there is high-quality and accessible documentation in place and that L&D continue to run training sessions and upskill prison staff to become peer-to-peer trainers. Without continuing input from L&D, there is a risk that incorrect knowledge and bad practice will spread over time.

- **Encourage ex-operational staff** to be involved in the deployment of future security projects. These colleagues understand the complexity and variation in prisons and who can help deploy interventions sympathetically.

- **Ensure a balancing focus on rehabilitative measures alongside strengthening security**, which could help reduce incentives for prisoners to convey illicit items. This could include investing in safe in-cell technology for prisoners to contact their families, reducing the need to bring in mobile phones and delivering impactful recovery programmes to reduce reliance on drugs.

- **Consider non-conventional approaches to prison security**. Staff report a scepticism that new security functionality will work and there is evidence that even with a large programme like SIP, security interventions can be evaded. Non-traditional approaches to security alongside traditional security measures, could help reduce incentives to convey illicit items and reduce the security threat. As with above, this could include investing in safe in-cell technology.

2. Introduction

This report presents the findings of the process evaluation of the Security Investment Programme (SIP), a £100 million investment with the strategic aim of reducing crime and improving security in prisons. The programme was rolled out in prisons gradually across England and Wales from July 2020. This chapter sets out the policy context, the evaluation aims and objectives and describes the evaluation methodology.

2.1 SIP policy context

Effective security measures and positive staff-prisoner relationships are integral to the delivery of safe, decent and secure prisons. The trafficking of illicit items, including mobile phones and drugs is a significant threat to establishments, causing harm to prison populations and wider communities. Studies have shown that the use of unauthorised mobile phones in prisons support a variety of criminal activities, including serious violence, organised crime and gang activity, and the harassment of both prisoners and victims (Ellison et al., 2018). Unauthorised mobile phones have also been identified as fundamental to drug supply within prisons (Wakeling & Lynch, 2020). Substance use, in turn, has been identified to facilitate illicit economies within establishments (Hammill & Newby, 2015), increasing rates of reoffending, violence, self-harm, and suicide (HMIP, 2020). Recently, there have been increasing incidents where soluble illicit Psychoactive Substances (PS) have been sprayed on to letters and transported into prisons. Forty eight per cent of all non-natural deaths between 2015 and 2020 in English and Welsh prisons were linked to synthetic cannabinoids (a type of psychoactive substance) (Duke et al., 2023).

Historically, establishments have, to varying degrees, implemented a variety of measures to reduce the conveyance of illicit items, including mandatory drug testing (MDT), the use of X-ray scanners, searching, drug detection dogs and gate and perimeter security. Research within prisons, however, has suggested that prison technology has not always been adequate to address the trafficking of, and threats associated with, illicit items (Wakeling & Lynch, 2020). These concerns have been reinforced by policy outputs,

such as the Prisons Drugs Strategy, which call for a strengthening of security to prevent prison supply and trade.

2.2   Conveyance routes targeted by SIP

Below are the conveyance routes that were targeted by SIP. This does not represent all conveyance routes into prisons.

Staff corruption

Staff corruption is suspected to be a significant route for conveyance of illicit items into prison. This occurs when staff bring illicit items through the gate to give to prisoners. Prison staff and prisoners identified several factors that would make staff more vulnerable to corruption. They included rises to the cost of living combined with low pay for prison staff, particularly Operational Support Grades (OSG), which were felt to make engaging in corrupt behaviour more tempting.

SIP aimed to prevent staff corruption in three ways. Firstly, SIP implemented Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) to make it harder for corrupt staff to bring in illicit items. More detail about EGS can be found in Appendix A, section 5.2. Secondly, SIP initiated training and awareness raising programmes to make staff more aware of the dangers of corruption. Finally SIP provided resource to investigate and prosecute corrupt staff to remove them from the prisons, (see Appendix C for more detail).

Visitors

Visitors who enter prisons via the gate are a route of conveyance, bringing illicit items to prisoners during visits. To address this SIP introduced EGS, which aimed to identify visitors attempting to bring illicit items and act as a deterrent to smuggling. More detail about EGS can be found in Appendix A, section 5.2.

Reception

Prisoners enter prison via the reception and internally secrete items to avoid them being detected by searching. SIP provided X-Ray Body Scanners (XRBS), which were used on adult male prisoners suspected of internally concealing illicit items. Prisoners with internally secreted items would then be held separately whilst the items passed through

their systems, before being moved into the main prison without the item they had secreted. For more information, see Appendix A, section 5.3.

Mail

Mail is used as a conveyance route due to the ease with which paper items can be impregnated with drugs such as 'Psychoactive substances'. SIP provided trace detection equipment, which could identify items impregnated with illicit substance, allowing staff to stop them entering prisons. Prison staff described interventions in place to tackle this pre-SIP, including photocopying all mail except for legal mail,[1] (where it was not legal to open the mail and there was deemed to be less of a risk) and having trace detection equipment which they used prior to SIP. Views on the effectiveness of these measures are explored in more detail in Appendix A, section 5.4.

2.3   Overview of SIP

SIP is comprised of three lines of defence: Physical Security Measures (PSM), Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) and Counter Corruption Measures (CCM).[2] A summary of the measures introduced under each line of defence, the equipment and resources provided to support delivery of the measures and coverage of the interventions is included in Table 2.1. Subsequent chapters in this report provide more detail on each line of defence to support and contextualise the data collected for this evaluation. Additionally, an overview of the whole programme can be found in the SIP overview and outcome study report.

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[1]   Further information on sending legal mail to prisons can be found at Send legal mail to prisons - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

[2]   SIP also had a fourth aim, not covered in this report, to increase targeted disruptions against high-harm Serious Organised Crime (SOC) and corrupt staff to frustrate criminal enterprise. This is reviewed separately in the Multi Agency Response to Serious and Organised Crime (MARSOC) Process Evaluation.

Table 2.1. Summary of SIP measures

	Measure and resources/ equipment	Aim	Location in prisons	Coverage
First line of defence: Reduce conveyance of illicit items into establishments via the gate, reception and post.	**Physical Security Measure:** X-ray Body Scanners	To identify if prisoners are conveying illicit items internally.	Reception/ Gate	74 Male closed prisons
	Physical Security Measure: Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) comprising archway metal detectors, handheld detection wands and drug detection dogs.	To detect if staff or visitors are conveying illicit items into prisons.	Reception/ Gate	49 Male closed prisons (including 100% of the male local prisons)
	Physical Security Measure: New trace detection equipment	To provide greater capability to prison estate for detecting drug-laced mail.	Mailroom[3]	45 Male closed prisons[4]
Second line of defence: Stop mobile phones working and detect/retrieve devices.	**Mobile Phone Detection:** Detection Capability Leads (DCL)	To provide greater capability in detecting and recovering mobile phones from prisons.	n/a	Entire prison estate
	Mobile Phone Detection: Mobile phone detection equipment	To provide greater capability in detecting and recovering mobile phones from prisons.	Kept by regional Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs)	Entire prison estate

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[3] Trace detection may sometimes be kept in an office/ administration space rather than the mailroom. This is likely due to available space.

[4] A further 50 trace detection units were provided in additional prisons from a separate source of funding.

	Measure and resources/ equipment	Aim	Location in prisons	Coverage
Third line of defence: Strengthen staff resilience to corruption and equip staff to defend against efforts to subvert security regime	**Counter Corruption Unit:** Set-up of Pursue teams at a regional and national level	To support the investigation of corruption cases and ensure appropriate outcomes, including employer sanctions and criminal justice outcomes.	n/a	Entire prison estate
	Counter Corruption Unit: Interim delivery of Prevent	To improve staff resilience to corruption by raising staff awareness of issues related to corruption and increasing knowledge to tackle corruption, such as the process for reporting concerns.	n/a	Entire prison estate

2.4   Research aims

The National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) was commissioned by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) to carry out a process evaluation of SIP. The purpose of the process evaluation was to:

- describe the set-up and delivery of SIP at a strategic and establishment level, including fidelity to the intended delivery model;
- understand how contextual factors within individual establishments affected local delivery of the programme;

- describe the perceived outcomes of SIP, including on improving security in prisons and its impacts on staff and prisoners; and
- identify factors affecting successful implementation of SIP and its component strands and recommendations for future delivery.

Alongside the process evaluation, MOJ conducted an outcome study; its purpose was to identify (un)intended outcomes of the programme, and the extent to which these were associated with the varied implementation of the programme across different prison types.

2.5   Methodology

The process evaluation methodology adopted a phased approach.[5] This included:

An initial scoping review which comprised a desk review of relevant literature and qualitative interviews with SIP strategic leads. A workshop was held to review and refine the SIP Theory of Change, to identify key areas of the programme in scope for the process evaluation and ensure alignment between the design for process and outcome studies.

Interviews and focus groups with strategic stakeholders and partners to explore the intended implementation of SIP at a national/regional level. Interviews and focus groups were conducted between May – July 2022, with participants including national and regional leads for SIP strands, and partner stakeholders including regional DSTs, national intelligence unit counter corruption teams and police investigators. The sampling strategy for this strand was agreed with MOJ to ensure a diversity of perspectives across those with responsibility for management and implementation of the programme.

In total, 20 encounters (11 interviews and 9 focus groups) were conducted with SIP strategic leads, stakeholders and partners.

Case study research with public and private prisons to understand the delivery and perceived impacts of measures implemented under SIP's three lines of defence. Twelve case studies were conducted with establishments between August 2022 and February 2023 to explore experiences and views on the set-up and delivery of SIP. In-depth case study research was conducted with ten public establishments, with smaller scale case

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5   A more detailed account of each strand of the methodology is included in Appendix E.

studies carried out for two private establishments. Prisons were purposively selected to ensure range and diversity across the factors important to the implementation and delivery of SIP. This included:

- Geographic region
- Category (i.e. Category A, B or C prisons)
- Long-term High Security Estate (LTHSE)
- Prisons offering Tier 1 and Tier 2 models of PSM[6]
- Prisons in receipt of different versions of the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) Prevent offer.[7]

Case study research included observation of SIP-related measures in use at establishments, as well as qualitative depth interviews and focus groups to gather a range of insights and perspectives about the perceived impacts of SIP and the challenges involved in its day-to-day delivery. Interviews and focus groups were conducted with a range of participant groups including leadership staff, operational staff and prisoners. In total, 109 encounters were conducted across the 12 prisons: 70 interviews and 8 focus groups with prison lead and operational staff and 31 interviews with prisoners. More information on the achieved sample is included in Appendix E.

A staff survey of counter corruption awareness to understand staff awareness of issues related to counter corruption (the third main line of defence included in SIP). The survey asked about participants' understanding of the impact of staff corruption on prison safety, how to recognise signs of vulnerability, and how to report concerns. The survey also gathered data on staff engagement with SIP counter corruption measures (CCM) and whether/how perceptions had changed since the introduction of SIP.

The survey was administered online, disseminated via senior staff in the twelve prisons included in our case studies, as well as eight additional prisons recruited to include

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[6] Prisons were selected for either a Tier 1 or Tier 2 package of PSM equipment. Tier 2 was provided to prisons where it would have been prohibitively expensive to make structural changes needed to deliver EGS according to the Tier 1 model. More detail on equipment provided as part of each is included in Appendix D.

[7] Different prisons received different versions of CCU support, with establishments receiving variously a full, partial or no CCU offer. See Appendix D for what each included.

geographic regions not represented by our case study sample. Fieldwork for the survey occurred between January and February 2022, by which time the roll-out of CCU had begun at all sites. The survey received 530 responses. Of these, 475 answered every question, the remainder answered at least one substantive question (other than providing demographic information).[8] All responses to survey questions have been reported.

2.6   Methodological considerations

A key aim of this process evaluation was to comprehensively represent the views of a broad range of individuals. Verbatim quotations and examples from the interviews are used throughout to illustrate the findings. As is the case with all qualitative research, the evaluation did not aim to quantify the prevalence of particular views and experiences. Instead, the robust qualitative methodology used for this study captured information from a range of different perspectives. As with all research, the methodology had limitations, which are discussed below.

- **COVID-19:** The widespread disruption caused by COVID-19 significantly affected prison establishments. The rollout and initial delivery of SIP evaluated in this report coincided with a period where the normal running of prison regimes was suspended in response to the pandemic. Significantly, restrictions on visits and prisoners' movements interrupted usual conveyance routes.

- **Variation in implementation of SIP across establishments and differences in engagement and knowledge among staff:** Prisons varied in terms of existing capabilities prior to SIP, as well as the equipment and training provided as part of the programme and the timing of the rollout. This variation between establishments, combined with lack of awareness of the programme among prison staff, meant it was not always possible to discern the extent to which participants' accounts reflected equipment, resources or training provided by SIP. Furthermore, as there was variation both in terms of what was in place before and what was introduced as part of SIP, it was difficult to make comparisons between perceived impacts of the programme as some perceptions and views may depend on what was in place previously.

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8   Full text of survey questions is included in Appendix G.

- **Limitations within staff samples for individual prisons:** Ongoing pressures on the prison system, notably staff shortages, restricted some prisons' capacity to facilitate fieldwork. Minimising unnecessary burden on prisons required us to be flexible about the composition of fieldwork. This flexibility was key to maximising participation, but meant that it was not always feasible to speak to participants with the full range of roles and experiences to fulfil agreed sampling quotas, limiting the extent to which it has been possible to undertake sub-group analysis in some areas.

- **Limited knowledge of SIP among participants:** Some participants (most notably operational staff and prisoners, but also those in more senior roles) had limited awareness of the programme prior to taking part in this study, or had awareness related to very specific elements of the programme rather than a holistic view of all three strands. Consequently, it was sometimes challenging for participants to reflect on areas of key interest for this research, such as the programme's strategic aims. This was particularly pertinent to interviews with prisoners, as prisons sometimes intentionally limited their awareness of security measures to preserve their effectiveness. As part of this, the research team were requested by MOJ to limit discussion with prisoners to only cover topics that were proactively raised by them during data encounters. This restricted researchers from probing across all areas of the programme.

- **Limits on sharing sensitive information:** Some discussions were limited by the need for participants to protect classified information pertaining to the security of establishments. Information related to investigating corruption was considered particularly sensitive. Consequently, some participants were unwilling to discuss counter corruption in detail with researchers, limiting our capacity to map these processes comprehensively.

- **Non-representative survey sample:** The survey data provides useful context and background information about staff awareness of issues related to counter corruption. Survey data provides a snapshot of some staff views and experiences at the time the survey was conducted. The survey does not provide comparison pre and post rollout of SIP. Due to the time and resources available, the survey sample was designed to be self-selecting, (i.e. reliant on volunteers to take part,

rather than the individuals being selected by researchers), and is not therefore representative of the prison staff population. For this reason, results were not tested for statistical significance. It should also be noted that due to the sampling methodology, any differences identified between subgroups (for example, staff grade or SIP delivery model) may not be directly related to SIP but instead to a range of other factors.

- **Changing status of prisons:** This affected sampling and ability to conduct subgroup analysis. As detailed in the section above, different prisons received different versions of CCU support, with establishments either receiving a full, partial or no CCU offer. Prisons were selected to include a range of Prevent offers that were accurate at the time sampling took place. However, by the time the survey took place (towards the end of the fieldwork period), some prisons had changed their statuses, for example moving from a partial to full CCU offer which limited our ability to understand how different Prevent offers may have led to different experiences and perceived impacts.

2.7   Report outline

The structure of the report is as follows:

- **Chapter 2** provides details of the background and context for the evaluation
- **Chapter 3** provides an overview of participant views on early expectations and awareness of SIP
- **Chapter 4** sets out the report's conclusions and recommendations
- **Appendices** provide more detailed findings related to each SIP strand (Physical Security Measures: Appendix A, Mobile Phone Detection: Appendix B and Counter Corruption Measures: Appendix C), a more thorough overview of the background of SIP and a more detailed breakdown of the research methodology.

Please note that that each substantive appendix can be read in isolation as individual process evaluations focussing on each of the three SIP strands separately. As such they each cover findings on set-up and implementation, delivery and perceived impacts and readers will note some overlap in themes and findings across these chapters.

3. Common findings across Security Investment Programme interventions

This chapter presents findings from the qualitative data on views on the need for Security Investment Programme (SIP) investment and early expectations for SIP. It also presents cross-cutting contextual factors which are discussed throughout the report in relation to all three strands and were perceived to have impacted the implementation and delivery of SIP as intended.

3.1 Views on the need for SIP

The presence of illicit items such as mobile phones and drugs was reported to pose distinct threats to the safety and security of prisons. Participants described how when smuggled in, they increased the likelihood of violence and prisoners getting into debt, making prisons feel less safe for those living and working in them.

Having effective security measures was therefore seen by prison staff as vital to ensure the safety of staff and prisoners. Some prison staff felt that investment was overdue, reporting that the prison service had faced budget cuts and a dearth of investment in recent years, allowing violence and corruption in prisons to escalate. Staff reported that without investment in security, prisons stood little chance of reducing or combatting crime and corruption.

> "Any money that they invest in prisons is worthwhile, certainly on the security side of things. I think it's a long time overdue. [...] Your violence and your corruption keeps on escalating in prisons and without this investment, […] that will never reduce." (Establishment lead)

In discussing the need for SIP, participants identified a range of conveyance routes directly targeted by SIP (for example, the prison gate, mail, staff corruption and via prisoners during transfer), as well as others not included as part of SIP, such as throwovers and drones. The importance of SIP's multi-pronged approach to improving security in the

longer term and having a holistic and linked approach was thought to be crucial to preventing contraband coming in.

> "I think there's never one thing that is going to solve a multitude of problems. You need a concerted approach, with different elements and different things at your disposal. Sometimes, you might not require a dog, you might just need a member of staff. It might not be appropriate sometimes to have the dog, the body scanner, or it might not be practicable." (Establishment lead)

3.2   Early Expectations

Staff expressed a range of expectations for SIP in tackling conveyance routes for illicit items. Establishment leads who described initial excitement about SIP, welcomed having additional tools and greater numbers of staff to reduce corruption, which is a known conveyance route. Staff hoped SIP measures would have a deterrent effect and demonstrated a more 'proactive' approach to tackling conveyance of illicit items and corruption in prisons. They also felt that the investment in prison security brought about by SIP indicated that they were being listened to.

> "I think we were very excited when we heard there's £100 million available. You could probably put £200 million, £300 million in it and still not be able to fix everything, but it's a start." (Establishment lead)

Some resistance to change and negative early reactions to SIP were also reported by staff, including cynicism over whether the programme was going to deliver on promises. Participants recounted having been disappointed when previous measures or initiatives failed to deliver and were concerned that Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) in particular would not be delivered effectively, including providing adequate staff to operate equipment.

> "'Okay, yes, we've heard all this before', so I didn't really have any expectations. If anything, it was an expectation that what they were talking about was never going to turn up or whatever was talked about would be below par as opposed to what was being discussed in the briefings." (Establishment staff)

Early resistance to changes implemented through SIP seemed to decrease as people got used to new processes and equipment.

> "I think with any change there's always going to be [...] grumbles to start off with. Once they see actually the process, I hardly hear any negative comments anymore." (Strategic staff/ partner)

However, some of the concerns that participants had about the delivery of SIP were substantiated to a certain extent. For example, as highlighted in Appendix A, certain prisons faced delays receiving crucial pieces of equipment promised through SIP which caused disappointment. This was not, however, felt uniformly across all participants or prisons.

Some prison staff also expressed initial concern that the measures introduced as part of SIP could disrupt the prison regime. For example, staff feared that increasing security could escalate the threat of violence, including a greater risk of reprisals against prisoners unable to obtain illicit items to sell to pay off debts. As detailed in the conclusion, there was a perception among some staff that these concerns had been substantiated. However, some staff and prisoners felt SIP actually decreased levels of violence. This mixed finding on violence further illustrates the complexity of understanding the drivers of prison violence. Evidence suggests the drivers are multifaceted and offender characteristics and prison environment can all be contributing factors (McGuire, 2018). More information on other impacts of SIP measures and related mitigations is provided in each of the substantive appendices.

3.3   Factors impacting SIP implementation

Participants consistently highlighted how staff shortages across the prison estate and the impact of COVID-19 restrictions contributed to a difficult operational context during the period of implementation and delivery of SIP. More detail on these factors is included here to frame the findings presented in subsequent chapters.

Staffing challenges

- **Shortfalls in hiring and reduced retention rates** across the prison service had implications for the capacity of prisons to deliver the programme and/or elements

of it as intended. Despite SIP providing prisons with additional resources to support SIP activities, this resource was not ring-fenced and the safe running of the wings was considered a higher priority than delivering SIP interventions in some circumstances. This meant staff were pulled away from resourcing elements of SIP like Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) and Mobile Phone Detection (MPD). It was therefore felt that some SIP measures were not delivered consistently or fully, limiting participants' ability to comprehensively reflect on impacts.

"In the time they recruited 12 [Operational Support Grades], we had lost 18, so we were in a negative six but we've now got to roll out EGS. You're just feeling the pinch everywhere. As much as I love all the investment, it's only good if you've got the staff there to actually do it." (Establishment lead)

- **High turnover of staff** in prisons was perceived to have led to a deterioration in skills and knowledge within the prison estate and was highlighted as a particular challenge for training staff in the use of SIP equipment, despite the funding that SIP provided for training. Across all three strands of SIP, trained individuals were reported to have moved on or left the service, which led to more informal, less effective peer-to-peer training and SIP being delivered by staff who were less experienced. In some cases, this meant that equipment was not used correctly or at all.

"There's a select few of us that know how to use the equipment, because staff come and go all the time […] They've not done the training, they don't know how to use it. They've not got a clue what they're looking for because they don't know how it works. They don't know what they're listening out for, they don't know what they're looking at, so to have the equipment there, it's pointless."
(Establishment staff)

COVID-19 pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic meant there needed to be big changes in how prisons were run. Prisons had to adapt to large numbers of staff on sick-leave, social distancing requirements and fewer visitors, amongst other things. Participants suggested that the

urgency required for the COVID-19 responses meant that in some instances resource was pulled away from delivering SIP.

Strategic leads found that remote working had hindered efforts to build trust with prison staff as they were unable to visit prisons. Correspondingly, prison staff suggested that prioritisation of COVID-19 responses disrupted clear communication around SIP and contributed to a fragmented approach to delivery, with different leads overseeing separate strands of the programme within prisons.

Participants reported that COVID-19 and the measures adopted by prisons in response:

- **Exacerbated existing staffing issues** across the prison service as detailed above. Prison staff reported that higher numbers of staff absences due to illness and self-isolating measures contributed to difficulties staffing some SIP measures. Further disruption was caused by staff in strategic roles being redeployed to prisons to assist as part of COVID-19 responses.
- **Caused disruption to training intended for delivery as part of SIP**. Training packages were redesigned to be delivered remotely, which participants felt made sessions less interactive and effective. However, one reported advantage was that delays caused by COVID-19 gave teams designing training packages time to develop content before contacting prisons.
- **Caused divergence in implementation** from what was intended. For example, COVID-19 disruptions delayed the supply and installation of equipment. Some processes were also described as needing to be modified to enable them to comply with social distancing requirements, such as the layout of EGS areas or the use of dogs as part of searches.

4. Conclusion and learning points

This research was commissioned to explore the set-up, delivery and perceived impacts of Security Investment Programme (SIP). This chapter distils findings on the perceived value of SIP across the three strands of work and highlights crosscutting contextual factors which were perceived to have affected the extent to which SIP achieved impact in line with the stated objectives. It also sets out key learning and implications arising from the research to support ongoing delivery of security measures across the prison estate.

4.1 Overall views on the value of SIP

Overall, prison staff and some prisoners welcomed the significant investment of SIP. As a package of support, participants thought that SIP was comprehensive and far-reaching, and welcomed the focus on three overlapping workstreams to tackle the conveyance of illicit items and corruption and to improve overall safety within prisons. There was a sense among some staff that this investment was long overdue.

Prisoners felt that effective security measures, particularly those targeted at tackling the conveyance of drugs, could support prisons to be more rehabilitative environments. They also thought that it was important to deliver rehabilitative programmes to support people with substance misuse needs and decrease the demand for drugs in prisons, alongside effective security measures, to achieve the greatest impacts in this space.

Highly visible items procured as part of SIP (including equipment delivered through the Physical Security Measures [PSM] strand) and measures that sought to bring in significant change to existing processes (such as Enhanced Gate Security [EGS]) were described across participant groups as highly valuable. These measures (X-ray body scanner [XRBS] and EGS, in particular) were perceived to have a significant impact by reducing two key conveyance routes, via prisoners and staff and visitors respectively, and also worked as deterrents. Impact was perceived to be closely linked to consistent and routine use, facilitated by the appropriate allocation of trained staff to deliver the measures effectively.

Participants reported that it was important for the three SIP strands to work alongside each other, as intended, to improve feelings of safety and security within establishments. A holistic approach tackling different routes of conveyance, as well as addressing staff corruption in a more targeted way than before was key to ensuring SIP achieved as much impact as possible overall. Participants viewed tackling staff corruption and the role of the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) strand as particularly important in the context of displacement.

4.2   Overall views on the impact of SIP

SIP included many complex interventions, deployed non-uniformly across a large and diverse estate, which made it somewhat challenging to definitively conclude what impact the programme had from the perspective of those involved in this research. However, across all three strands of work, reported perceived impacts of the programme included:

- **The strengthening of security measures** which was perceived to have reduced the level of illicit items in circulation within the prison when measures were resourced properly, in part, because they had a deterrent effect.
- **Perceived reductions in the levels of violence** among prisoners in some instances and related to this, improved feelings of safety**.** However, there was also perception that instances of disruption and violence had increased (rather than decreased) due to a reduced availability of drugs, increased pressure on corrupt staff bringing drugs into prison and an increased requirement to manage prisoner withdrawal symptoms.[9]
- **Improved perceptions of staff wellbeing,** due to them feeling that the service and staff workforce was being invested in, prisons had become safer environments to work in and staff members were less likely to be corrupt.

In addition, strategic stakeholders described two longer-term impacts they perceived SIP could contribute to going forward. These included expectations that staff retention might improve and hopes that there would be fewer negative stories reported in the media and fewer court cases relating to corrupt staff in the longer term, potentially improving the

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[9]   The data does not enable us to comment on the extent of these other impacts, particularly in relation to reported displacement of illicit items to other routes into the prison.

reputation of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS). It was hoped that these longer-term impacts would have an overall stabilising effect on the prison service.

Other impacts of SIP were also discussed. These included displacement of illicit items to other routes into the prison.

Some participants felt that SIP had not been as effective at meeting its stated objectives. These participants commented on the high levels of illicit items that were still found in prisons, despite the investment delivered through SIP, and how this negatively impacted their views of safety and security in prisons. As detailed across the substantive sections of the report and in the appendices, a number of crosscutting contextual factors were perceived to have limited the extent to which SIP was perceived to have achieved impact. These included:

- The difficulty of judging the impact of SIP against a landscape of overall reduced resources and staffing levels within the prison estate.
- Difficulties disentangling impacts of SIP from the other non-SIP funded security measures at prison, such as existing Trace Detection or Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) equipment and nets in the yards. The complexity of the programme, including the fact that there were three different strands of work, and differences in how SIP was delivered across the prisons further complicated this, as it was difficult to capture fidelity to a model that required a certain degree of flexibility.
- The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the prison regime.

4.3 Learning points

The following learning points incorporate direct feedback from participants that they thought should be considered as prison security policy and practice develops over the coming months and years.

1. **Sustained commitment to ensure essential security measures introduced through SIP continue to be effective and improve in line with shifting security threats.** SIP funding was allocated to prisons from 2019 to 2021. Though the investment was largely welcomed, it was unclear across staff participant

groups how various security measures and improvements delivered through SIP were to be sustained and there was a general lack of awareness around succession planning. To continue to deliver improvements realised through SIP, participants highlighted the critical need to ring-fence and replace staff working on SIP activities, deliver ongoing training and maintain equipment procured through the investment package. Due to the shifting security threats, it is also important to not only maintain current security measures, but adapt to new threats.

2. **Effective consultation with both operational prison staff and wider partners** to ensure that any further investment in prison security is implemented and delivered to their full potential. There was a sense among some that communication from and with the centre (including the SIP national team) had not been as thorough as it could have been. This resulted in, for example, delays to the installation of equipment and a perception that some hardware was not fit for purpose. Participants were also keen to ensure programmes like SIP achieve value for money and enable prisons to deliver the most fair, safe, and efficient regimes possible, which some staff felt required more of a tailored approach, for example, the allocation of proportionate resources and funding in line with each prison's needs.

3. **Prioritise dealing with staff shortages across prisons** to ensure the essential resource required to deliver security measures is in place. Having trained, committed staff was seen as fundamental to SIP, but was often cited as a barrier to effective delivery. Staff participants acknowledged the need to 'ring-fence' security staff and resources, without having detrimental impacts on other parts of the system, for example, the delivery of rehabilitative programmes within prison.

4. **Build long term Learning & Development (L&D) strategies.** Future interventions need to ensure effective L&D offerings remain accessible to establishments for as long as the intervention is in place to help prisons continue to deliver programmes as intended and innovate effectively where required. This may for example, include ensuring there is high-quality and accessible documentation in place and that L&D continue to run training sessions and upskill

prison staff to become peer-to-peer trainers. Without continuing input from L&D, there is a risk that incorrect knowledge and bad practice will spread over time.

5. **Consider specific gaps SIP did not address.** Future investment should include consideration of security risks that were not tackled by SIP. Staff participants felt there needed to be more of a tailored consideration of how illicit items entered each prison, with a focus on investment in those areas. The use of drones and 'throwovers' were, for example, two routes that were not tackled specifically by SIP and may have impacted the extent to which the programme was perceived to be effective in certain prisons.

6. **Ensure a balancing focus on rehabilitative measures** alongside strengthening security, which could help reduce incentives for prisoners to convey illicit items. Strategic stakeholders and prisoners felt that more could be done to tackle the root causes of the presence of illicit items in prisons. Investing in, for example, safe in-cell technology for prisoners to contact their families, reducing the need to bring in mobile phones and delivering impactful recovery programmes to reduce reliance on drugs were thought to be vital to improving safety and reducing violence within establishments. Linked to this, some felt that there should be a more joined-up approach to essential support and services in the community to reduce the likelihood of prisoners reoffending and to tackle corruption issues in other areas, such as probation.

7. **Better coordination of SIP within prisons.** There was a sense among some staff that having a dedicated lead within each establishment might have enhanced the delivery of the programme. Having a SIP lead could, for example have prevented misunderstanding of SIP at an early stage, encouraged effective delegation of security priorities among key staff and ensured the programme was delivered as one coherent package. Some participants felt that better coordination of the whole programme might have increased buy-in and awareness among all staff and, where relevant, prisoner groups. This role could also have delivered more streamlined and effective communication on progress which staff felt may have helped to motivate and encourage individuals with security responsibilities.

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Appendix A
Physical Security Measures

Physical Security Measures

This chapter presents the findings on the set-up, implementation and perceived impacts of the Physical Security Measures (PSM) funded through the Security Investment Programme (SIP).

The chapter describes the overarching findings for this strand of the programme, before examining in more detail it's three key elements: Enhanced Gate Security (EGS), X-ray body scanner (XRBS) and trace detection equipment.

Overview of the PSM strand

Introduction

The package of PSM were designed primarily for SIP's first line of defence: to reduce conveyance of illicit items into establishments via the gate, reception and post. SIP funding was intended to be used for:

- Installation and day-to-day delivery of EGS (including **the increased presence of dogs and dog handlers[10])** – used to search staff and visitors entering prisons for illicit items.

- **Installation of the XRBS** - used to search adult male prisoners entering prisons who are suspected of having internally secreted items.

- **Trace detection equipment** – which tested materials for impregnated illicit substances. This was often used in the mailroom to test letters being sent to prisoners for substances like Psychoactive Substances (PS).

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[10] Some of the evidence suggests that SIP funding was used to increase capacity within the regional dog team and the DST, and increased dog capacity at prisons was used for more wider searching activities other than just at EGS.

Across interviews and focus groups, strategic staff and partners recognised and welcomed the significant investment of SIP in front-of-house security, the like of which had not previously been experienced within His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS).

Set-up phase of PSM

The Headquarters SIP project team and other external staff to the prison provided support and advice to prisons during the PSM set-up phase. This was valued among the prison management staff and was felt to have had a positive impact on the programme's effectiveness. The SIP team's experience in operational delivery and their assistance in helping the prison to address problems that arose during set-up of PSM was welcomed.

> "For EGS, bodyscanner and trace detection, […] they had very experienced operational people running the projects and because they [...] had done the same job as we do, they were very aware of the problems we had and were [....] very solution-focused when those problems arose. [...] we were all [singing] from the same hymn sheet [...] it made it a lot smoother than other projects I've been involved in [where....] people [...] don't understand what we do."
> (Establishment lead)

However, a reflection among strategic staff and partners was that this operational background and expertise was sometimes lacking. This made it challenging for strategic staff to fully support the effective set-up of SIP. Staff also reported that additional support for implementation would have been welcomed.

> "It did feel a little bit like we kind of just got it, had quite a lot of intensive support to deliver it, and then everything got pulled back, so there wasn't as much oversight as what we thought there would be." (Establishment lead)

There were mixed views on the use of communication and information sharing between strategic staff and partners to support the effective roll out of the programme. Some strategic staff and partners expressed that this had worked well, especially when different roles and responsibilities had been understood. However, strategic staff and partners also described a lack of communication over certain aspects of SIP implementation (for example in relation to the timeline for the roll out of equipment). Some strategic stakeholders and partners thought that that this may have in part been due to the large

number of people involved in the programme. There were felt to be many layers of management in the security capability function so approval and sign off processes for set-up took time.

The HMPPS Learning & Development (L&D) team who fulfil national prison training needs delivered training on EGS, and other elements linked to capability under SIP. The Risk and Capabilities unit (previously called the Security Risk team) in the Directorate of Security funded by SIP also delivered training on specific elements of the PSM such as EGS. A range of other external sources also supported establishments during the set-up stage, including training staff in using the SIP funded measures. This is detailed in the individual PSM sections throughout this chapter.

Overall perceived impacts of Physical Security Measures (PSM)

PSM was perceived to have reduced the number of illicit items in circulation within prisons, increasing safety and stability. Staff and prisoners also reported that the impacts of the PSM strand included a deterrent effect.

However, staff also reported a displacement of the conveyance of illicit items to other channels not targeted by SIP. It was therefore difficult to measure the actual effect of, for example, EGS on the level of illicit items in prisons.

Prisoner participants suggested that prisoners would still sometimes attempt to bring illicit items into the prison because they did not think they would be caught by XRBS, or they were willing to take a risk. Perceived impacts of each measure are detailed in the individual PSM sections throughout this chapter.

Enablers to the delivery of Physical Security Measures (PSM)

Staff identified a range of enablers to the use and effectiveness of PSM. Enablers included having effective targeted processes, equipment and training delivered to the appropriate staff groups, so they could use the equipment and measures proficiently.

> "One of our biggest routes of where items that breached our security and safety came from was through the gate, like I say, whether it would be staff or visitors. I think it has - and the body scanner, I think, has been a massive plus for us.

> The use of it and what we can detect on it and utilise it for has been good and
> been welcomed." (Establishment lead)

Barriers to the delivery of Physical Security Measures (PSM)

Barriers to effective PSMs included a lack of infrastructure in some establishments to
support the installation and delivery of the equipment and measures; a lack of trained staff
to deliver PSM; and competing priorities within establishments that meant other activities
may be delivered instead of the PSM.

> "No, they're fantastic tools, they are absolutely fantastic tools, and they can make
> the world of difference to a prison, but they have to be used properly, they have to
> be used effectively, and they have to be used full stop. If those things aren't
> happening, then it is literally a waste of taxpayers' money doing the entire SIP."
> (Establishment staff)

Enhanced Gate Security (EGS)

Introduction

The provision of EGS equipment and measures was intended to identify and stop illicit
items from entering the prison at the gate, and to deter individuals from attempting to bring
items in. It was intended to be used on all staff and visitors.

Across establishments, EGS equipment comprised of archway metal detectors, handheld
wands and the X-ray baggage scanner. The equipment and measures in place varied
across establishments. At the time of research, EGS did not include X-ray baggage
scanners for the public prison estate. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) research team
reported that this was due to difficulties with procurement, and X-ray baggage scanners
had been deployed at all sites with Tier 1 EGS by the time of drafting this report.

As noted in Appendix D, variation was also intended at the design stage of SIP, including
for example the differences in EGS provision between Tier 1 and Tier 2 establishments.[11]
Additional resources were also funded through the programme and included increased

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[11] Prisons were selected for either a Tier 1 or Tier 2 package of PSM equipment. Tier 2 was provided to
prisons where it would have been prohibitively expensive to make structural changes needed to deliver
EGS according to the Tier 1 model. More detail on equipment provided as part of each is included in
Appendix D.

staff capacity to work on EGS and search staff before they entered the prison, and the increased presence of dog handlers and dogs.

Set-up phase of Enhanced Gate Security (EGS)

This section provides an overview of the various activities involved in setting up EGS, including the procurement and installation of equipment. Views and experiences of communications, training and guidance and resourcing during set-up are also discussed here.

Procurement and installation of equipment

The set-up phase of EGS included the installation of the new equipment at prison gates such as archway metal detectors, handheld wands and X-ray baggage scanners. In some establishments this required structural changes to the prison buildings to accommodate SIP equipment. Staff noted how the ease of installation of EGS and good partnership working with, for example, the external contractors who built the extension to house EGS had helped to facilitate the set-up phase.

> "We worked well with them. It was a very good project [...] They provided everything they said they would. The building looks good. It's very fit for purpose and [...] we were up and running on time." (Establishment lead)

However, some staff participants reported that in some cases there was a lack of forward logistical planning for housing existing equipment, fixtures and fittings. For example, places for staff to store prison radios, access to staff lockers, or areas where visitors or staff could wait while entering the prison.

A key challenge to setting up EGS as intended was the delivery of X-ray baggage scanners. Although the MOJ research team fed back that these have now been delivered, SIP funded X-ray baggage scanners were not in place at the time of research across all of the public prisons. An establishment lead noted how this had less of an impact on setting up EGS where a prison had pre-existing baggage scanners on site. However, challenges of using pre-existing baggage scanners were raised by some participants, such as insufficient capacity with one scanner and the scanner breaking down. These were felt to have undermined set-up and delivery and at the time of the research there were some

concerns over the timeline around their implementation.[12] Due to a lack of baggage scanners, staff conducted manual searches of all bags, at random, or if, for example, the archway metal detector indicated that a search should be conducted.

> "What we've got at the moment is an EGS that isn't really an EGS, because we're unable to do [baggage scanning]." (Establishment lead)

Communication

The Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) set-up phase also involved **consultation between SIP strategic staff and partners overseeing implementation and management staff within prisons**. This included discussions over the best way of implementing EGS at an establishment and receiving and responding to information via email about the implementation of EGS measures, such as timetables detailing when equipment would arrive.

Some staff participants felt that discussions about implementation had been useful in providing a steer around how to effectively set up EGS, and others reported how they had found the email communication sufficient and in line with expectations over how programmes are rolled out within the prison service. However, other prison staff reported that there had been a lack of consultation with prisons prior to or during the set-up of EGS. This included the prisons' infrastructures and their suitability for housing equipment and the delayed X-ray baggage scanners (mentioned above).

Internal communication and consultation within the establishment also took place between prison management and operational staff. For example, a management staff participant explained that the introduction of EGS was described to staff as a step-by-step process, in the hope that it was more positively received by them.

> "So we get the building in first and get people used to going through actually expecting to be searched [...] on the way in [...] get that running smoothly and then we'll bring the X-ray equipment in. So it wasn't full-on scaring people, or causing massive queues at the gate because everybody was new to what they

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[12] The two private prisons included in the sample had received SIP funded X-ray baggage scanners when fieldwork was conducted at establishments. MOJ have fed back that all sites with Tier 1 EGS have now been equipped with baggage scanners.

were doing and it was holding things up. So we did promote that in a positive way." (Establishment lead)

In addition, staff described how they were invited to input on the design and workings of EGS by the management team, which was generally well received. However, some staff felt their input was not fully taken on board.

"They […]asked for my opinion because I do search people and we used to in the past; how I thought it should be laid out and how it was going to work and was asked my opinion on it." (Establishment staff)

Initial training

Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) training was provided to establishments by two central teams: the HMPPS Learning & Development (L&D) team and a team within the Risk and Capabilities unit; details of their roles and responsibilities are described below[13]:

- **The HMPPS L&D team training** included modules for Operational Support Grades on how to use the EGS equipment and customer service to help staff communicate with others about the equipment such as the handheld wands. The L&D team received funding for nine additional trainers to support the roll out of EGS training, which was felt to help meet the increased demand on their team during this period. They also received equipment being installed through SIP such as the metal archway detector to create a mock prison gate to support the delivery of the training and were expecting to receive five X-ray baggage scanners to support delivery of the training.

- **The Security Capability team training** was aimed at Heads of Security and custodial managers (CM). It covered procedural security, dynamic security, the implementation of the technology and how to support staff and manage their capability. At the time of the research, strategic stakeholders reported that this training was going to be handed over to the Learning & Development (L&D) team as it was felt they had more resources to deliver it.

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[13] All staff were intended to be fully trained and all equipment deployed by 31 March 2022.

Some strategic stakeholders thought that the two teams had constant communication throughout and were present at each other's board meetings which helped to ensure their responsibilities were clear and that there was no duplication of work. This was thought to facilitate the roll out of effective training provision. Other strategic stakeholders thought that there had been a lack of information sharing and that the role of teams involved in setting up EGS was confusing. This included, for example, knowing who was responsible for delivery of different parts of the training.

Whilst EGS training was thought to be valuable, several challenges were identified by participants, which included:

- It was sometimes challenging to free up staff to attend training (staffing challenges are explored more in section 3.3).
- Prison staff sometimes also wanted more provision including an ongoing training programme, especially given the high staff turnover.
- The provision of some of the training had to be delivered remotely instead of face-to-face due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was perceived to be less effective.
- A lack of timely training delivery, meaning that sometimes training was delivered without equipment being in place or vice-versa.
- Sometimes training was not felt to have been targeted at the right staff within an establishment.
- Specific gaps in content for example around conflict management – for example what to do if an individual does not consent to searching or refuses to surrender an item.

Guidance documents

In addition to the training described above, Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) policy and guidance documents were provided to prison staff. There was mixed awareness of EGS policy and guidance amongst participants.

Some described how they could draw on policy and guidance documents when they used EGS, which were intended as a reference point for staff. These included information such as how to conduct searching, how to use the equipment, for example, what the different indicators meant on the handheld wands, and an updated list of illicit items. Others appeared to have little engagement with the policy and guidance documents. Reasons for

this included the information not being found to be user friendly, clear or concise. Staff also noted how they had limited time to read the documents, and that they were difficult to access when available online as there was no computer in the EGS area.

Staffing of Enhanced Gate Security (EGS)

As described in chapter 2, SIP provided additional funding for the recruitment of managerial, Operational Support Grades (OSG) and officer posts to work on EGS, including dog handlers. However, the MOJ research team reported that the resource was not ring-fenced purely for SIP provision. Some strategic stakeholders and partners reported that EGS delivery was therefore sometimes viewed as optional within an establishment, and prison management re-allocated staff to work in other areas of the prison when there were competing demands for resources (more detail on staffing challenges across SIP can be found in section 3.3).

Delivery of Enhanced Gate Security (EGS)

Staff identified a range of enablers and barriers to the use and effectiveness of EGS.

Enablers included:

- **Effective management with a well-trained team to staff EGS.** This included the prison and staff prioritising its delivery.
- **Discretion and autonomy of sites over delivery.** For example, one staff participant described how their establishment was given some flexibility in the number of bags that were being scanned during busy periods. This was felt to have a positive bearing on their ability to run EGS effectively.

Barriers to delivery of EGS were also identified:

- **A lack of management support to oversee and inform delivery and decision-making at the gate.** Some operational prison staff felt that there was a need for greater senior management presence on the gate to help oversee delivery and to support staff working on EGS. Specific examples of where this would be welcomed included to help ensure staff standards were maintained, and when OSG had to conduct bag checks on more senior staff and take action if an illicit item were to be found.

"I think they think there's a hierarchy here, 'I'm an officer, you're an OSG. You're band two, you're not looking through my bag, get a boss down here.''
(Establishment staff)

- **EGS delivery was sometimes viewed as optional** among strategic stakeholders and partners. They felt that this meant prison management could re-allocate staff to work in other areas of the prison, which was possible since resource for EGS was not ring-fenced.

"We had the money for enhanced gate security, but unfortunately, because of a shortage of staff, the emphasis was on making sure that prisoners had a regime. The [job role at management level], quite rightly, thought that it would be totally inhumane to lock people up for the whole of the time." (Establishment lead)

- **EGS was not manned by a dedicated team of staff,** however, some strategic stakeholders and partners felt that the intended model of EGS staffing was unrealistic, as establishments needed flexibility to draw on staffing resources from other parts of the prison as necessary, especially as SIP funding came to an end.

"Just because you've paid for ten members of staff to be part of enhanced gate security, you still need the whole group of 50 staff to be able to work in that area. You're not just going to have the ten staff there, and there seemed to be a lack of understanding about how post SIP ending that this work would become just our everyday work." (Strategic staff/ partner)

- **A lack of appropriately trained staff to work on EGS** including dog handlers, which meant that the equipment was not always used effectively. Reasons given for this included existing staff leaving and the prison finding vacant posts difficult to fill, as well as staff sickness. In addition, arranging training for replacement staff was felt to be challenging due to a limited access to ongoing training after the initial training programme.

"It's all well and good putting loads of money into this security [...] the SIP [...]. To give us the machinery [...] but if there isn't the physical members of staff to actually use them, then it's a waste of money." (Establishment staff)

- **Differences between establishments not always being considered in the allocation of SIP funding.** For example, one prison described how they had not received additional investment to accommodate EGS unlike some other prisons and were having to carry out work retrospectively.

- **The lack of dog presence at EGS.** Staff spoke about how they had expected the dogs and dog handlers to work more frequently on EGS to support searching activities. Some staff thought dogs may not be working as frequently at establishments because training them was taking longer than anticipated. As a result, dog handlers were spending more time looking after the dogs than working with them in the prisons, which was felt to be an ineffective use of resources. Staff also said there had been unrealistic expectations around the amount of work that could be achieved by the increased dog handler and dog capacity provided through SIP.

Perceived impacts of Enhanced Gate Security (EGS)

EGS had not been fully implemented across all establishments at the time of the research, and some staff felt that its full potential had not yet been realised.

> "I think there's more to come. When we get the training sorted properly and when we get the rest of the equipment in place, I think the real fruits will come to bear, but I don't think we're quite there yet. Not with the EGS." (Establishment lead)

However, when in use consistently, EGS was felt to have helped prevent and deter people from bringing illicit items into establishments which helped make the prison a safer environment.

> "A lot of contraband comes through the prison; the enhanced gate security definitely deters that completely[...] It can deter staff from bringing anything in, so that for me is the main thing, about the safety. Obviously weapons, mobile phones, drugs, all leads to debt and then if certain people don't get what they want or what they're asking for, that leads to violence." (Establishment lead)

More specific perceived impacts from EGS were also reported and are described below:

- **Displacement to channels of conveyance other than the gate.** While EGS was viewed positively as helping to prevent and deter staff and visitors from bringing in illicit items via the gate, there was also the perception that it had led to the displacement of illicit items coming in via other routes. This included increased drone activities and throwovers. Some staff felt that this demonstrated the effectiveness of EGS as people were looking for alternate means of conveyance. However, this likely made it difficult to measure EGS's effect on the level of illicit items in prisons.

- **Positive impact on professionalism among workforce and awareness of what constitutes an illicit item.** Some staff reported that EGS processes had a positive impact on staff behaving more professionally, as everyone was required to follow the same set of rules regardless of, for example, the length of time they had worked at the prison. This was described in one prison as a change to prison culture, making it more acceptable to address conveyance of illicit items through the gate.

  "There was a backlash, but it brings everyone into line. I get that someone might have been in the job 10 years, 15 years, but it doesn't mean you're any different from someone starting today. You may know more, but you can't treat the job as if you own it and it belongs to you, and everyone should do as you say and bend the rules here and there." (Establishment staff)

  In addition, it was felt that EGS meant that staff were more mindful and had a better awareness and understanding about illicit items, so they were less likely to try and bring them into an establishment.

  "When it first started, people were coming on, 'Oh, I've got my phone,' 'Oh, I've got this lead,' like just a phone lead or bits and pieces in their purse. That has got reduced and reduced, so we're finding less silly little bits." (Establishment staff)

- The additional EGS resource was felt to have **helped the establishment's Security teams focus on other activities and prioritise their resources.** For example, one staff participant reported how EGS implementation had enabled the

security team to strategise their covert operations and staff searching to when EGS was not in operation, which had supported the identification of corrupt staff.

- **Improved staff morale and wellbeing,** because it was felt that staff were reassured the prison had taken measures about staff coming in with potentially illicit items.

EGS was also felt to improve staff resilience to corruption as they would be less pressurised to bring items into the prison if measures worked effectively.

Alongside these impacts, staff identified a range of facilitators and barriers to these impacts being realised, described below.

Enablers and barriers to Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) impacts
Enablers included:
- The positive response to its implementation from prison staff
- The gate's professional and modern appearance showing that the prison had stronger security measures in place, more in line with airport security
- Its consistent use at an establishment contributing to its deterrent effect
- "Obviously, there isn't kind of a, 'Oh, they don't do it on this day,' or, 'They don't do it on this day.' It's done every single day it's open and staff are there, so I think the fact that it's consistent, that is also quite a good deterrent, yes." (Establishment staff)

Barriers to Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) impacts included:
- The inconsistent use of EGS. EGS was not applied consistently on everyone coming into prisons and when it was used, different prisons took different approaches. Examples include:
  - Suggestions among prisoner participants that application of EGS had become less rigorous over time and that the archway metal detectors were not used on all staff coming into the prison; and
  - Suggestions from staff participants that it may be possible to predict when it was easier to bring illicit items through the gate, for example, when certain

staff were working who may be more likely to let items through or at times when there were fewer staff working on EGS.

- There was also the risk that a corrupt prison staff member could be working on EGS and allow illicit items through.

- **EGS equipment not being able to detect all illicit items:** Staff report that EGS is less effective at stopping drugs getting into the prison, as non-metal items would not trigger the metal detector and could be easily concealed and enter the prison.

- **The lack of an X-ray baggage scanner as part of EGS at some prisons** at the time of research. Whilst manual searches were reported to be carried out in most or at least in some cases where X-ray baggage scanners were not available, some participants highlighted a potential consequence that items may still get into the prison.

Other impacts of Enhanced Gate Security (EGS)

In addition to the impacts described above a range of other impacts from EGS implementation and delivery were also identified and fell into the following categories.

- **Reduced functionality of the gate area** because of the change in layout due to the installation of EGS. For example, the space taken up by implementation of EGS meant that in some establishments there was no longer anywhere inside the gate for visitors to wait and, staff had to stand outside before coming in.[14] This was felt to be especially problematic when weather conditions were poor.

  "[T]he way that our EGS area is set up, we can only have so many in that area. If it's cold and raining, to have people stood outside for a period of time is not pleasant - or decent to be honest." (Establishment lead)

- **Increased time for staff and visitors to enter the prison.** EGS was felt to have increased the amount of time it took staff and visitors to enter the prison. This was felt to be exacerbated by the absence of the X-ray baggage scanners in many establishments, where staff had to conduct manual bag searches. The increased

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[14] SIP implementation staff attempted to preserve other functions of the gate where possible and consulted with establishment staff to install EGS as sympathetically as possible.

time it took to go through the gate could impact on people being late for their shifts and could also affect the time that visits were able to start, which was frustrating. Prisoners also noted it increased the waiting length for visits, and that visitors with disabilities struggled to stand for the required time.[15]

- **High turnover among EGS staff** was attributed to staff finding the limited resources to carry out their role stressful, coupled with the challenges of long periods without any activities to occupy their time.

  "I'm sitting there pulling my hair out, finding things to do... We're not allowed a computer system, so we can't even go on and check our emails and things like that…." (Establishment staff)

X-ray Body Scanner (XRBS)

Introduction

SIP funding was used to purchase XRBS machines to detect illicit items on prisoners. Prison staff generally recognised the benefits of XRBS and how the prevention of internally secreted illicit items coming into the prison would positively impact an establishment's overall security and safety.

Set up phase for X-Ray Body Scanners (XRBS)

Scanner installation and communication

The set-up phase of XRBS involved consultation within the prison about the XRBS's location, some alterations to the reception space to accommodate the equipment, and the introduction of new processes to facilitate its use. Prison staff felt that this was a generally straightforward process, facilitated by effective communication and planning.

> "There was a lot of consultation before, around thinking where's the best place for it? They must have spent months measuring it to the nearest millimetre, to make sure they could squeeze it into this gap." (Establishment staff)

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[15] MOJ policy suggests that normal routine searching procedures may need to be varied according to the disability of the person. An assessment should consider factors such as the level/nature of the physical disability of the individual. Reasonable adjustments may include the transfer of individuals between chairs with specialist assistance and aids. For further advice on searching individuals with disabilities please refer to the Searching Policy Framework Re-Issued: 28 Sept 2023.

However, participants also reported challenges to implementation centred around a lack of effective forward planning, including limited resources to support set-up and delivery (as detailed later in this chapter), and the logistics involved in finding suitable areas to house the equipment in reception as intended.

Initial training

Prison staff recognised the importance of training so that the XRBS was used effectively.

> "I think you've got to understand what you're looking for, which is obviously part of the training and why not everybody does it." (Establishment staff)

XRBS training covered how to use the machine and conduct the scan, interpreting the images, health and safety considerations, and sharing information with prisoners about the functionality of the machine. The training was provided to a range of staff. This included staff who worked in reception, in the security department and some managers. Training was delivered by some staff working at the prison who were 'trainer trained' (where a small number of staff are taught a skill, and then spread the knowledge among their colleagues), and a variety of external sources including: the organisation that installed the equipment, the XRBS assurance and support team and the Learning & Development (L&D) team. Staff working at other prisons had also provided advice and support in using the machine more effectively.

Strengths highlighted among staff on the training included it being delivered at the right time and pitched at the right level, the right length and its usefulness in supporting people to learn how to use the machine and interpret the images. It was felt to have helped staff to quickly develop skills in carrying out body scanning on prisoners in a competent and confident way, including how to identify and deal with illicit items.

> "I think it was pitched at the right people. It was the right length. I think the staff felt quite enthused about the piece of equipment once they'd actually had the training and been shown what its capabilities were." (Establishment lead)

An alternative view among staff was that the training was not targeted at the correct staff or delivered or received as intended. One expectation at a prison lead level was that there

was going to be more training for staff than there had been. Limitations of the training included:

- **It was basic,** with a view that staff should be given an opportunity to practice on the XRBS, and that understanding and interpreting the images developed with time and experience.

- **The format of the training was unsuitable for some staff**. For example, it was felt that some staff may be less engaged in classroom style learning, and that learning on the job might instead be more engaging and confidence building.

- **It had specific gaps in the content.** This included the next steps in the process if a prisoner was suspected of concealing an illicit item and around interpreting the images.

- **Limited staff resources for training.** It was also felt to be difficult to ensure all staff were available to attend training, and some staff had not been able to access it.

In addition, the need for ongoing training for using the XRBS was noted (especially given the high rate of staff turnover) but did not appear to be in place in all establishments. In lieu of ongoing training, some staff described how they tended to either rely on their common sense when interpreting the images, or 'blag it'.

> "We've had a couple of blokes who've come from other prisons to show us some things or to… All they've ever done is gone off our previous body scans and gone, 'well, you've clicked 'negative' for him but, well, he's positive.' Well, I don't know that because, again, I've not been given the training." (Establishment staff)

Guidance documents

In addition to the training described above, staff explained how they could draw on policy and guidance documents (including internal policy documents) when using the XRBS.[16] These covered practical and health and safety guidance including radiation and rules about its use. The frequency the guidance was used appeared to vary. This ranged from staff using it regularly and for a specific purpose, for example to check if scanning a

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[16] The HMPPS and MOJ use of XRBS (adult male prisons) policy framework can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-x-ray-body-scanners-adult-male-prisons-policy-framework.

prisoner was justifiable and to help answer questions from prisoners, to guidance being used much less often. Barriers to using the policy and guidance documents included a lack of computers in the prison for staff to access documents online, and a lack of time to read them.

Partnerships

A range of partnerships helped support the XRBS set-up and implementation. They included external trainers, the XRBS assurance and support team and the manufacturers of the equipment. Partners were reported to have carried out maintenance and checks on the machines, provided refresher training and had also randomly checked images to review staff decision-making. Staff generally felt that this external input was a helpful source of support.

> "It's really useful for the Prison Service to have bought some technology and bought a maintenance contract.[...] the amount of times we buy things and then go, 'You've got this laptop. Yes, you can't fix it. It's broke now, you've got to pay £200 to get it fixed.' You know, like why didn't you just get the maintenance contract as well. […] That was brilliant, the fact that we've got that as well." (Establishment lead)

An alternative view among staff was that some aspects of the external input such as the checks described above were not necessary, as if staff were properly trained, they could be carried out locally instead.

Delivery of the X-Ray Body Scanners (XRBS)

Staffing arrangements

The XRBS was reported to be run by staff working in reception, and some staff described them as a 'dedicated team'. However, in one establishment there also appeared to be contrasting views among staff around whether the XRBS was used by the Dedicated Search Teams as well.

Participants highlighted the need for staff to be experienced at using the equipment so that scans could be properly interpreted. However, even with experience, interpretation was sometimes difficult, and participants described how, on occasions, they sought a second

opinion from other XRBS-trained colleagues to help ensure the scans were interpreted accurately.

> "It's everyone's own interpretation of a round shape or a tablet or whatever. It's everyone's interpretation and we always have a second pair of eyes if we're unsure anyway." (Establishment staff)

In some cases, more senior staff were also reported to be involved in overseeing XRBS delivery. This included inputting on the interpretation of the scans and the maintenance of the machine.

X-Ray Body Scanners (XRBS) policy

The XRBS policy states that prisoners should only be scanned when there is intelligence or reasonable suspicion to do so. However, staff and prisoner perceptions of the target prisoner group for the XRBS appeared to vary. One view was that a **universal approach** was taken which was used on all prisoners coming in and out of the prison. An alternative view was that the XRBS was intended to be used in a more **targeted way** with specific cases or groups. Examples given by staff reflected varied practice, ranging from targeting those who were felt to pose the highest level of threat; where there was a suspicion or intelligence; for all new transfer prisoners; and for prisoners already living at the prison where a particular need was identified (for example, before they went onto the drug rehabilitation wing, or as part of cell searching).

> "[T]here is a cohort of people that are required to go through […] then if any other potential threat groups are identified, they will be discussed and potentially added […] Body scanner that's set in stone who needs to go through that." (Establishment staff)

X-Ray Body Scanners (XRBS) operational procedures

The scanning process involved the prisoner standing on the machine, and staff looking at a screen to search for illicit items inside the prisoner's body. Prisoners emphasised that the scan shows 'everything' inside.

> "For them to focus on and to be able to notice […] things in my stomach, was just physically part of my actual body, I think anything else that you've got in there is going to pop up straightaway" (Prisoner)

If the scan was positive the prisoner would be given the option to relinquish the item and in some establishments an amnesty policy was implemented. MOJ reported that this aimed to speed the searching process to allow prisoners to move into the main wings and free up isolation rooms, where prisoners suspected of smuggling items were held.

> "They turn around and say, 'Look, if you've got something, there's a toilet, go and get rid of it,' but they don't tell you, 'We're giving you an amnesty policy, if you get rid of it, you're not going to get a nicking,' that's never said." (Prisoner)

Prisoner communication

Information shared about the XRBS with prisoners included a short overview of the machine and what movements it would make, what the scan entailed, what would happen if something were found, the onward processes in relation to adjudications,[17] and an explanation that the radiation from the scan would not have an impact on them. In addition, staff described the presence of posters on radiation and information on the scanning process which each prisoner was entitled to read.

Prisoners accounts indicated that this information was not provided consistently, with some participants noting there was no or little explanation given about the XRBS process. Some prisoners had found the lack of information about the health and safety aspects of the XRBS concerning. Language was identified as a potential barrier to sharing this information with prisoners.

Staff and prisoners also described what happened when prisoners refused to be scanned (without a legitimate medical reason), and the response appeared to vary. From staff accounts this included feeling that there was nothing they could do, consulting a member of the management team for support, and classifying them as a positive scan prisoner and sending the individual to the segregation until they agreed to go on the scanner. If they did

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[17] This is a disciplinary hearing when a prisoner is alleged to have broken prison rules. Further information can be found at Prison adjudications policy: PSI 05/2018 - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk).

not agree to a scan at this point, they would be placed on report.[18] Prisoner accounts also described how alongside being sent to the segregation unit or a dry cell (where prisoners suspected of internally concealing items are held until the substance passes through their system), other outcomes included being stripped searched, receiving extra charges or adjudications, not being able to see visitors for a set period of time, or not being able to receive prescription medication while having items hidden inside the body.[19] These appeared to broadly fall within the guidance set out in the XRBS policy framework.[20]

Enablers to X-Ray Body Scanners (XRBS) delivery

A range of enablers to the use and effectiveness of the XRBS were identified by staff and prisoners. They included: the involvement of more senior staff in delivery (as described above); an openness to working with the technology among staff and prisoners; adequate space to house the equipment; appropriately trained and experienced staff, having the right amount of resources in place; the equipment's effectiveness and accuracy in detecting illicit items on prisoners.

> "'[N]o matter what you're hiding and no matter where you hide it, the scanner will pick it up." (Prisoner)

> "[The XRBS] doesn't solve all of the problems, but it's probably one of the best things I've seen in the service that they've brought in, that is actually up there in the technology and the usefulness, and the ease for staff to use it and the willingness for staff to use it because there is a lot of suspicion." (Establishment lead)

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[18] This is when a prison officer tells a prisoner that they have committed an offence, and the prisoner has to attend a hearing also known as an adjudication (see Prison rules and adjudications | Prison Reform Trust).

[19] MoJ reported that if a prisoner has a positive X-ray/body scanner result which shows they are hiding a substance in their body, the clinician assessing the impact of this may decide that it is unsafe for them to receive specific types of medicines that could interact with the hidden substance.

[20] The XRBS policy framework notes how if a prisoner refuses to be scanned, it may be appropriate to charge the prisoner with an offence against prison discipline or have their incentive level downgraded. Staff should also consider whether it is necessary to manage the prisoner, in terms of risk to self, as if they do have an internally concealed item. For further information see https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-x-ray-body-scanners-adult-male-prisons-policy-framework pages 19 and 20.

Barriers to X-Ray Body Scanners (XRBS) delivery

Barriers to delivery were also identified which could lead to more limited and less effective use of the XRBS. These included the pressures of limited time and space at reception. For example, the time required for scanning meant that staff sometimes did not have the time or forgot to scan prisoners, or there was inadequate reception staffing in place to operate the scanner.

> "[W]hen somebody comes into the prison, they spent thousands and thousands and thousands of pounds on a body scanner, but they never give us staff to use it." (Establishment staff)

Other reported barriers included not having adequate staff resources in place to work on the XRBS, a lack of management of the process in line with the training (for example around health and safety protocols and the radiation checks to help ensure mechanical integrity); and the perception that the process of reading the scans was subjective and underpinned by staff's confidence. In addition, and as noted above, some staff felt that there was nothing they could do if a prisoner refused to go on the XRBS. This suggests how the success of the machine in identifying illicit items was dependent on prisoners' cooperation with the process.

Perceived impacts of X-Ray Body Scanners (XRBS)

Perceived impacts

There were mixed views around the relative importance of the XRBS compared to the other PSM. Some staff felt that the XRBS was the most important PSM element, as secretion by prisoners was perceived as one of the main routes of illicit items into the prison.

> "The most important one was the body scanner [...] Because that's the main route [...] of drugs and mobile phones getting into prison." (Establishment lead)

However, another view from staff was that prisoners only internally secreted small levels of drugs or phones and therefore the XRBS was the least important element of the PSM, compared to the quantity of illicit items intercepted through other routes such as EGS.

Staff described how some of the existing equipment and processes to identify concealed items on prisoners prior to the XRBS were less effective. This included an older version of a XRBS machine used to detect concealed metal, referred to by participants as the 'BOSS chair' and placing prisoners in segregation (in a cell away from other prisoners) to hand over illicit items voluntarily.

A range of perceived impacts were identified by prison staff and prisoners from the use of the XRBS. These fell into the two broad categories:

- **Reduction of illicit items entering the prison via reception and in circulation within the prison.** This was either because the XRBS acted as a deterrent to prisoners concealing items, the prisoner voluntarily relinquished them (in anticipation of being scanned), or the item(s) were detected by the machine. Items found included drugs, phones, and sometimes weapons.

  "[P]eople have plugged in little […] phones and […] you can see as clear as day on there. They're not getting through with a phone on with that body scanner. It's not happening." (Prisoner)

  "[I]t's [The XRBS has] cut the illegal stuff in prison by a third, if not nearly half. So they might have not solved the complete problem, but it's solved a big proportion of the problem". (Prisoner)

  Some staff felt that the XRBS was critical in combatting the main route of illicit items into prisons, and reflected one reason why phone and drug levels were lower at their establishment at the time of the research. Fewer illicit items in circulation within prisons was also perceived to help reduce the 'illicit economy in the jail', leading to reductions in debt and associated violence and supporting the rehabilitation of prisoners with substance misuse needs.

  "The money that it's worth, I would - you'd buy it over and over again. I do think that is really worth it because that can deter us from sending a potential prisoner with a lot of drugs inside them going to the wings and then dishing it all out because it is a nightmare when that happens, a nightmare." (Establishment staff)

Staff also described how the XRBS may be particularly effective at stopping certain cohorts of prisoners bringing in drugs. For example, prisoners who left and came back into the prison more often, such as those on Release On Temporary Licence (ROTL) and local prisons where prisoners got recalled.

- **Improved safety for staff and prisoners at reception.** Staff reported that prisoners were more likely to handover illicit items than previously, as they knew that they would be found by the XRBS. This helped reduce the need for staff to restrain prisoners if they refused to hand over an item and deal with any resultant violent behaviour from prisoners who were trying to conceal items. In addition, the use of the XRBS was felt to provide more vulnerable prisoners with a reason for refusing to traffic items into the prison.

Enablers to positive impacts

Staff and prisoners identified a range of enablers to the XRBS achieving positive impacts. These included the machine becoming common knowledge among prisoners so that bringing in illicit items was not viewed as worth the risk, with one staff participant reporting how the number of positive finds at reception had decreased as a result; the effective technology being able to identify illicit substances and telephones (including those without metal components unlike the previous 'BOSS chair' in place), and it being used to its potential in a consistent way.

Barriers to positive impacts

Barriers to impacts from the XRBS were also identified and included:

- The machine not being used as regularly and as consistently as it could be (more detail on staffing challenges can be found in section 3.3).

  "The body scanner is brilliant but unfortunately, it don't run itself and you need staff to do it." (Establishment staff)

- XRBS not being used to its full potential because of a lack of trained staff to work on it.

Despite the barriers described above there was evidence of establishments' attempts to ensure that prisoners were still searched for illicit items, even if the XRBS was not used.

For example, one staff participant described how when there were no trained staff present to operate the XRBS, prisoners had a full strip search and staff used handheld wands. However, staff that commented on this felt that was that this was a less dignified process for prisoners.

- Lastly, the process, which included the amnesty policy not being able to stop all prisoners from attempting to conceal illicit items, including those who were more motivated to do so. For example, one staff participant explained how some prisoners with concealed drugs smoked them in the segregation/ dry cell before they went onto the wing, and a prisoner participant recognised that some prisoners may still try and bring drugs into the prison if they were suffering from addiction.

   "People are aware that it's [the XRBS is] there and you're going to be body-scanned, so they probably, well, it's got to put people off. Then again, addiction is a powerful thing. Addiction will make you do a lot of things." (Prisoner)

Other impacts

Other impacts from the XRBS included a perceived negative impact on the health and wellbeing of prisoners and staff. For example, prisoner participants had concerns over radiation exposure and some prisoners viewed that the current XRBS process was degrading and could be an invasion of prisoner privacy.

   "People going and having a look, 'Has he got anything?' That's a bit impersonal. It should be one person that's trained to do it and they do it." (Prisoner)

There were also fears that XRBS could cause conflict between prisoners and prison staff if prisoners did not want to be scanned. In addition, some prisoner participants reported that the process was used inconsistently by staff which could have negative repercussions on some groups of prisoners. This included staff being more likely to use the XRBS based on their perceptions of risk relating to specific prisoner groups.

   "If a black youth has gang issues, they'll use it on them. If somebody is an old, fragile person, first time in prison, maybe 62 or something, they won't bother to use it on him. That's how it gets used." (Prisoner)

In addition, some staff felt that the interpretative nature of reading the scans meant that courts were advised to dismiss cases with XRBS evidence.

Positive other impacts included a perception that the use of the XRBS was a better and more dignified process for prisoners than having to get undressed so that staff could carry out a full body search.

> "We have to do full searching a lot less because of the body scanner, because actually, that obviously reveals without us needing to… Which is obviously much more decent, as well, because I don't think it's very pleasant that you've been in court all day, you've been in a sweaty van, and you show up and immediately you've got to go naked in front of strangers. That's utterly undignified and so the body scanner is much, much better in that respect." (Establishment lead)

However, some staff described how strip searching was still a routine part of the reception process in some establishments in addition to prisoners going through the XRBS. MoJ guidance states that this is often carried out prior to the XRBS, to limit prisoners' exposure to unnecessary radiation.

Trace detection

Introduction

For the third element of the PSM, SIP funding was used to purchase new trace detection equipment for establishments, with the intention of reducing the conveyance of illicit items via the post. The 'new scanning technology' allowed the mail received at establishments to be scanned for traces of drugs.

Set Up

Equipment provided through SIP

There appeared to be some confusion or a lack of awareness about the trace detection machines SIP provided among prison staff participants. As well as the machines, delivered to prisons through SIP,[21] prisons already had existing trace detection machines (of a

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[21] Observational work highlighted how some staff may refer to the new SIP funded detection machine using the name of a previous model.

different model), and some prisons were provided with additional trace detection machines (which were the same model as the SIP funded machines), as part of the drug strategy.[22]

In addition, some prison staff reported how although there had been an expectation that their establishment would receive new equipment through SIP, this had not happened at the time of the research.

Training and guidance

Similar to the other Physical Security Measures (PSM), training for using this equipment was identified as a key requirement of the set-up phase. Training was reported to have been delivered by external trainers such as the equipment's manufacturing company, a team from headquarters, and by operational staff working at the prison. There were mixed views and experiences around the availability and quality of the training delivered to establishments among prison staff. Some of the training was described as 'excellent' and 'thorough' with trainers that were perceived to be 'knowledgeable' and 'patient'. Participants also recognised how proficiency further improved with increased use of the machine.

> "The items have come in, a set amount of people have been trained, and that's it really. Obviously, you only get more proficient the more you use it, so it's just like a bit of a base knowledge on how to use it and the rest of it is hands on." (Establishment staff)

Less positive aspects of some of the training were also raised among staff. This included the timing of the training not coinciding with the delivery of the equipment and the costs involved in procuring some of the external training.

In addition to training described above, some prison staff described using the existing guidance in place to support their use of the equipment. This included a manual, a 'cue card style guide' and a step-by-step guide and information booklet of who to contact about any issues with the machine.[23]

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[22] 2017 Drug Strategy (publishing.service.gov.uk).

[23] The HMPPS and MOJ use of trace detection policy framework can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-narcotics-trace-detection-equipment-on-correspondence-policy-framework.

Delivery of trace detection

Trace detection in the mailroom

Establishments appeared to vary in how often they used the trace detection equipment. This ranged from some reporting to using it regularly and on all incoming mail and any suspicious papers found during cell searches to others reported using it on a proportion of mail or less routinely.[24] Reasons for more limited uses of the equipment included the high volume of paperwork the prison received, a lack of trained staff to work on it and the prison photocopying all non-legal mail. Photocopying mail is used to eradicate the chance of drugs being present on paper received by prisoners, thus removing the need to swab the mail.

Other measures used for detecting illicit substances on mail

There also appeared to be some variation in the involvement of dogs in the process of detecting illicit substances on mail at establishments. One staff participant for example, described how dogs sniffed the letters first and any suspicious finds were then tested by the trace detector machine; another explained how their establishment sometimes used dogs to check the mail, however, they were not always present as the prison did not have their own dogs.

Alternative uses of trace detection

There was also evidence to suggest that trace detection was being used for other purposes alongside detecting drugs via mail and paper at some establishments, including on clothes or on other surfaces. This was felt to be helped by the trace detector being a mobile piece of equipment that staff could carry around.

Enablers to delivery

A range of enablers to the use and effectiveness of trace detection were identified by staff. It is important to note that participants were reporting on different trace detection machines

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[24] Rule 39 mail from solicitors or mail from the House of Commons was not allowed to be opened routinely as part of this process. Prisons responded to this in various ways, which included swabbing the top of the envelope near the seal which then went through the trace detection machine, getting permission from the Governor to open Rule 39 mail that appeared suspicious, getting the dogs to check legal mail and using the legal mail barcode system (for more information see Send legal mail to prisons - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk).

(as described above), which may in part explain why there is some overlap in the facilitators and challenges described in the subsequent section below.

Prison staff identified four key enablers:

- **Having a location ready to house the equipment.** One establishment described how they were already using a trace detection machine which meant that they had a suitable location to house the new one.

- **The accurate and easy to use equipment.** Some participants were confident that the machinery could accurately detect drugs, with one operational staff participant describing it as a 'brilliant bit of kit'. The machine was also described as being quick, simple and easy to use (though concerns around the effectiveness of machinery were also raised below). In addition, one staff participant reported that the current trace detection machine broke less than the previous model at the prison.

- **Skilled staff who used the equipment effectively and regularly,** to detect drugs coming into the establishment via the post.

- **Using SIP equipment in conjunction with non-SIP funded trace detection equipment.** One establishment described how they used both the SIP funded and non-SIP funded trace detection equipment together to help maximise the benefits of both. One view among prison staff participants was that the SIP funded machine was quicker while the non-SIP funded machine was more accurate.

Barriers to delivery

In contrast, barriers to the use and effectiveness of trace detection at establishments included:

- **The changing contextual landscape within which the machinery was being operated**. Prison staff recognised how the chemical variants of drugs and particularly spice kept evolving which meant that there was a greater chance of them evading detection, as the machine needed to be calibrated to recognise them.

- **The accuracy levels of the machine** meant that it was difficult to identify some drugs or which drug was being detected. In addition, the effectiveness of the machine depended on the level of trace for detection.

- **Equipment that was more difficult to use or flawed including it being temperamental, faulty, or broken.** Although staff recognised that confidence in using the equipment increased over time, there was still some anxiety around using the machine and breaking it.

   "[Y]ou kind of get a bit nervous using it. You don't want to be known as the [person] that's broken that machine, do you really? Yes, I am pretty confident, but there's always that in the back of my head about making sure it doesn't get broken." (Establishment staff)

   In addition, staff described how repairing the equipment could take time, because it had to be done by an external organisation with limited availability.

Perceived impacts

It was challenging for the evaluation to unpick the impact of trace detection machines delivered by SIP, since some prisons had trace detection machines pre-dating SIP, and new non-SIP funded trace detection machines (which were the same model as SIP funded machines). However, perceived impacts of trace detection overall among staff and prisoners included stopping drugs coming into the prison via the mailroom and further exacerbating existing drug problems within the establishment. This was perceived to be particularly helpful in tackling the influx of Spice[25] in prisons, which was described as having 'horrendous' side effects.

   "I can't see anything getting sent through via post now. Unless someone's not doing their job properly [...]." (Prisoner)

The SIP funded trace detection machine was also felt to have continued the deterrent effect on using the mailroom as a conveyance route, already in place from the previous trace detection work in place at an establishment. Some prisoner participants also

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[25] Spice can be dissolved and sprayed onto paper and therefore this was a risk for mail coming into establishments.

recognised its deterrent effect, because it was felt that people sending drugs to prison via mail would be caught.

A contrasting view among staff was that the trace detection equipment in place at the time the research was conducted was less effective than the equipment previously in place. Reasons included it being more difficult to take samples, less nuanced detection, and inaccurate detection of illicit substances including giving false positives. One view among establishment operational staff was that this meant that fewer illicit substances were now being detected by this new security measure.

> "We know from our experience that there is an illicit [...] substance but it's not providing the results that we need to do anything about it. The other one was [name of brand/model], and we believe that piece of kit was better than the trace detection machine that we've got now. [...] it was a lot slower than the [model/brand] detection machine, but it provided a lot more positive results." (Establishment staff)

Appendix B
Mobile Phone Detection

Mobile Phone Detection (MPD)

This chapter sets out thematic findings on Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) delivery. The first section explores views and experiences relating to training and guidance on MPD, including participant perspectives on the Detection Capability Lead (DCL) provision through the Security Investment Programme (SIP). We then provide an overview of MPD delivery, with reflections on the effectiveness of equipment that was in place. Finally, we set out perceived benefits and limitations of the MPD strand of SIP.

Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) overview

The aim of the MPD strand was to detect and retrieve mobile phones found in establishments. Intended delivery included provision of:

- **Equipment to regional Dedicated Search Teams (DST)** – Comprising signal and hardware detectors, inspection cameras, and toolkits (including power tools) used for physical searches of the prison's fabric, fixtures and fittings; and
- **Training and guidance for establishments and DST** and appointment of two Detection Capability Leads (DCL), to support all prisons in improving detection capability.

Across the establishments included in the research, a range of staff appeared to be involved in MPD activities. In some prisons, activities were led by the establishment's Security team involving other prison staff (for example, Operational Support Grades (OSG) and dog handlers where necessary) and in others, MPD was largely or entirely the responsibility of DST.

The frequency of MPD activities and ways in which it was used to detect phones differed significantly across establishments. Participants discussed two types of MPD activity, broadly categorised as either **exploratory**, seeking to detect phones for the first time, or **targeted**, to follow up suspicion and/or intelligence. In addition, both overt and covert

detection activities were described. Overt detection activities included regular use of detection equipment in static locations, and covert detection activities involved staff using equipment in locations where they were out of sight.

Participants described two responses that would be taken when a phone was detected. These varied both between and within establishments:[26]

- Some said that, provided sufficient staff were available to do so safely, the cell would be entered directly, with approval of the governor in charge. If a signal detector had indicated that a phone was in use, this would mean that a prisoner would be caught 'red-handed'.
- Others suggested that equipment was used effectively to build up a picture of how phones were being used and thereby determine the best time to search while minimising potential risks. This staged process was considered by some to be overly administratively burdensome, however, and less likely to be effective than searching immediately.

An important caveat to these findings is that awareness of MPD varied widely across and within participant groups. For example, while some participants were able to identify additional equipment that had been provided, others were either unsure how SIP had changed MPD or certain that SIP had not altered practice around MPD. As such, this chapter includes reflections on MPD generally, including SIP-specific findings wherever possible.

Training and guidance

Official training and guidance offered to MPD users (in both prisons and Dedicated Search Teams [DSTs]) included information provided by His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) Learning & Development (L&D) team during implementation, and by Detection Capability Leads (DCLs) thereafter.

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26 The data was not always clear as to which of these responses would be typical when phones were detected, or the circumstances in which different processes might apply.

Training and guidance provided by Learning & Development (L&D)

The three pieces of operational guidance which Learning & Development committed to produce included:

- Basic user guidance for any staff member using the mobile phone detector in their role (usually Operational Support Grades (OSGs));
- Advanced user guidance aimed at Dedicated Search Team (DST staff members, including DST Custodial Managers);
- Hardware detection pole operational user guidance, aimed at any staff member using the hardware detection pole, including DST staff members who might then go on to train local staff.

Awareness of formal MPD training was mixed. Some staff had awareness of the basic and advanced user guidance. In addition, some reported that information about MPD was also part of the week-long DST training programme delivered by L&D. (A separate day course for security custodial managers (CMs) was also planned but had been delayed by COVID-19.) Others had less awareness of any formal training, reporting instead that MPD users were largely self-taught or drew on existing experience and expertise in their team.

There appeared to be limited awareness of the written guidance mentioned by executive leads involved in its delivery. Some participants mentioned disparate resources such as a manual for a single MPD device, or self-produced guidance from a DST; others were unaware of any available guidance. As such, provision of information appeared somewhat piecemeal and may have differed across establishments.

Among those who were aware of training and support offered by L&D, views on its appropriateness were mixed. Some staff reported that the coverage of MPD in DST training provided by L&D was limited, in that it focused primarily on scenarios in which MPD could be conducted, rather than on practical information about the equipment.[27]

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[27] SIP provided two sets of Mobile Phone Detection training. DST training was more comprehensive and fitting to their expertise in this area, linked to other aspects of searching, whereas the OSG course was not as detailed but designed to provide a good overview to enable basic use and understanding.

Training and guidance provided by Detection Capability Leads (DCLs)

DCL roles were funded by SIP and introduced part-way into the programme to support establishments to use their pre-existing MPD equipment. Staff viewed DCL roles funded through the programme as important additional capacity in establishments that did not have frequent access to a Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) to undertake MPD activities on their behalf. DCLs offered a point of contact to signpost users to appropriate resources or provide specific support where needed. Their 'upskilling' support included step-by-step guidance on how to use approved MPD devices, and information to resolve any specific issues related to MPD in their establishment.

Some participants described proactive promotion of this support offer, 'to make sure establishments knew support was available'. This included, for example, circulating introductory information both directly to Heads of Security and via Security bulletins, and initiating contact with DST staff who had attended Learning & Development (L&D) training to follow up and offer additional support. DCLs also set up a staff forum for staff using MPD to ask questions and share good practice and provided additional written guidance, for example, an illustrated 'how to' spreadsheet, intended to display information about using the devices. However, some participants had much lower levels of awareness of DCL support.

As with L&D training, views on the value of the support provided were mixed. Some staff felt that it could be beneficial to have 'fresh eyes' on MPD processes and practice; however, some would have preferred more experienced leads to have been appointed.

Views on the need for Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) training

Views as to whether training, guidance and support were necessary to deliver MPD were mixed. Some felt there was little need for specific training, as the tools and devices provided were relatively straightforward to use, and/or those using the equipment already had extensive experience and, therefore, little need for guidance.

> "[T]hey were giving the equipment to the subject matter experts […] Okay, the toolbox and the drills were [new], but anybody can use a drill and a screwdriver, can't they? […] So I don't think that [a lack of training or guidance] was a gap

[in provision from] the centre, because the people they were giving the equipment to were […] experts in that field." (Strategic staff/ partner)

However, some staff participants reported that training was needed because equipment was more complex than what was previously in place. Linked to this, some described feeling unconfident or uncertain about some functionality; others questioned the validity of colleagues demonstrating devices informally:

"It's like Chinese whispers really [… for all] you know, someone is holding it the wrong way and upside-down…" (Establishment staff)

Prison staff also provided some examples of variation in MPD practice, which might suggest that additional training or opportunities to share good practice would be beneficial. For example, equipment had been damaged when unsuitable chargers were used, and weaker signals had been incorrectly interpreted as sufficient evidence to initiate a search.

In the absence of these training needs being met, participants reported several measures that had been adopted to reduce risks including improper use and breakages of equipment. These included:

- Informal knowledge-sharing, including the independent production of additional guidance on how to use equipment. For example, a guide was produced locally by a Dedicated Search Team (DSTs) for prison staff after equipment was broken by staff who had not received formal training; and
- Restricting MPD equipment to trained staff and/or specific department(s). Examples included use of handheld equipment being restricted to the team who owned it. Additionally, some equipment could only be used at particular times, planned and signed off by establishment management in advance.

Facilitators to Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) training
Three key facilitators were:
- **Practical resources provided by SIP:** these included funding to recruit new trainers, and provision of training resources (such as demonstration equipment).
- **Knowledge-building resources:** Detection Capability Leads (DCLs) themselves received formal training on the approved MPD devices and guidance documents

and were given their own devices with which to practice. DCL also proactively engaged with Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) to consult them about devices, their usual practice, and to sense-check materials in development.

- **Working remotely:** remote work helped to streamline resources. DCL provided support remotely in the first instance, to ensure best use of resources and align with COVID-19 restrictions. In-person support was provided where necessary thereafter.

Barriers to Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) training

Barriers to the effective delivery of training included:

- **Timing:** The support offer was not consistently in sync with provision of relevant equipment. For example, some prisons received Learning & Development (L&D) training relating to equipment they did not receive until much later; others received equipment significantly ahead of support provision being put in place. In addition, Detection Capability Leads (DCLs) were appointed after SIP equipment was provided and focused initially on information-gathering to develop their role and remit, rather than delivering training. This reported lack of synchronicity meant that local expertise was established in the meantime, or that equipment languished unused for significant periods.

- **Expertise:** Detection Capability Leads (DCLs) were not themselves experienced with MPD prior to involvement in SIP and consulted with experienced staff to develop their knowledge. While consultation of experienced Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) was felt to be a facilitator of open, collaborative working relationships, the approach also contributed to a perception that the information DCLs could offer would be of limited value. One view among DST was that it would have been preferable for more experienced MPD users to have been appointed to these roles.

- **Accessibility of necessary information:** Detection Capability Leads' access to more advanced information on MPD devices was also felt to be challenged due to costs and limited availability of relevant resources.

Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) equipment

Mobile Phone Detection (MPD) equipment: what was delivered

Staff participants discussed having access to equipment which was either their own, or owned by partners.[28] A range of equipment used for detection of mobile phones was mentioned:[29]

- Handheld detectors
- Signal detection poles
- Signal detection boxes
- Additional search equipment used by Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) included telescopic cameras, toolkits and power drills.
- Some establishments also had access to mobile phone detection dogs and dog handlers.

Procurement and consultation

Participants who worked in Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) roles reported that they were asked for their views on what equipment would be necessary as part of the set-up and implementation of SIP. One view was that the headquarters SIP project team were 'quite supportive'. Staff recalled being consulted on equipment needs at several times during this period, and anticipated that all relevant teams would have been canvassed for their input:

> "They did come back […] I remember three or four times […] asking me if there was anything else we wanted. So there was an opportunity there [to request additional MPD equipment], if we could have thought of anything." (Strategic staff/ partner)

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[28] Whether and to what extent equipment was funded by SIP was unclear in much of the staff data in particular. Some participants said that specific devices had been provided to the prison as part of the programme; others believed equipment had been in place prior to SIP; and some said that new equipment introduced during the programme had been funded separately. Some participants were not aware of any relevant equipment within the prison, and/or were unsure of how DST equipment was funded.

[29] Specific details of the make and model of equipment were not always clear in the data. While some drew comparisons between models, others were not specific, so there is limited ability to infer clear conclusions on effectiveness.

However, some DST staff characterised this consultation as a 'tick box' exercise of limited value: while their input had been sought, they did not feel it was taken on board. This was because some of the equipment provided was not best suited to their needs, and their opinions did not appear to have been factored into procurement decisions.[30]

> "[W]ith the screwdriver sets, we didn't ask for [the] snap-on ones [that were provided]: we said that would be a waste of money." (Strategic staff/ partner)

One suggested reason for this mismatch was a perception that greater weight was given to the requirements of the Long-term High Security Estate (LTHSE) establishments (which had a different risk profile due to the nature of their prisoner population, and were served by their own individual DST) than those of other prisons (which might be served by regional DST):

> "[H]igh Security […] are responsible for testing all the technical equipment before it's rolled out to the wider estate [… so] we got what they wanted, not what we wanted." (Strategic staff/ partner)

As such, some participants felt that variation in needs across different DST models and/or establishment types was not sufficiently factored into decision-making, and the equipment provided through SIP was more suitable for DST based in single establishments than regional DST visiting several sites. As a result, participants suggested that an opportunity had been missed to make more effective use of the funding available with SIP.

> "[T]he funding […] was great but it just wasn't used right. I think we could have got more value for money if they'd have listened to us. We could have got more tools that were [more appropriately] designed for us to use [… For example,] we probably wouldn't have wasted half the money on those […] toolboxes […] that we didn't really need." (Strategic staff/ partner)

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[30] MOJ reported that procurement of equipment was determined by extensive engagement with regional DST leads through a series of focus groups which were held with local and national DST to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of different pieces of equipment and what they needed.

Effectiveness of equipment

Among those with knowledge of the MPD equipment perceived to be provided through SIP, there was a sense that it was of high quality. Views on the appropriateness of this equipment for MPD tasks were, however, mixed. Some of the key benefits and limitations discussed are set out below.

Key benefits of MPD equipment that prison staff highlighted related to:

- **Accessibility** (in terms of both ease of use and portability). For example, some devices such as detection poles were more compact than equipment previously in place. This facilitated flexible use around the prison, including for full lockdowns and random searches at key locations such as workshops or visits.

  "We use them on every single operation we go in as [Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) …] They're very accessible. […] Only about six foot tall, quite easy to hand round, plug them in and they're very, very effective. They're one of the best tools I've ever seen, and we set them up in gate lodges, we set them up in random places around establishments, because they're very, very mobile. Very durable, very, very good asset." (Strategic staff/ partner)

- **Accuracy:** some new equipment was described as much more accurate at pinpointing the location of phones, thereby leading to successful finds.

  "The [new equipment] is directional, so you can go, 'That door I'm getting five out of ten, that door seven out of ten, that door ten out of ten: right, it's that door I'm going to go through'." (Establishment staff)

- **Suitability** to particular MPD tasks was a key benefit of some devices. Examples included the cameras provided to DST, which participants described as enabling much more thorough cell searches.

Limitations of the equipment included:

- **A lack of durability:** for example, some handheld devices were described as having 'flimsy' aerials, and a number of items had been broken quickly. Staff mentioned long timelines to book in maintenance and repairs of equipment that wasn't functioning.

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- **Limited practicality:** some detectors were difficult to use discreetly, limiting circumstances in which they could be effective. As previously mentioned, the toolkit provided to Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) was considered overly cumbersome, which made them unfit for purpose for DST covering multiple prisons. DST toolkits also contained some equipment that was not needed at all, and the power drills were not well-suited for necessary tasks such as searching prisoner property, as they caused damage when used to remove screws.

  "[T]hey gave us these big Snap-on toolboxes which are about the size and weight of a suitcase […] as well as a big cordless Bosch drill which you would use if you were building a house […] A cordless screwdriver would be more appropriate for us, to be honest. […] We don't use half of the tools that are in the Snap-on toolbox." (Strategic staff/ partner)

- **Limited coverage:** some devices could not be detected by the equipment most establishments had in place. This was perceived by staff to be a newer risk that might not have been possible to predict at programme inception.

  Additionally, some participants noted that some devices could only detect signals when phones were in use (rather than simply switched on). This meant that MPD activities needed to be targeted to align with times of the day or night when prisoners were more likely to access and use phones – which could be challenging to schedule with roaming DST and/or local staffing pressures.

- **Suitability to particular environments:** aspects of prisons' physical environment could make some signal detection devices more or less effective in particular settings or areas of prisons than others. Factors that made signals more difficult to detect included interference from outside prisons; from the prisons' healthcare equipment; and the thickness and/or material of walls.

Perceived impacts

Staff views on impacts of Mobile Phone Detection (MPD)

Views about the effectiveness of MPD measures overall were mixed among prison staff.[31] Some participants felt confident that use of new MPD equipment had resulted in increased numbers of finds of mobile phones. One view among staff was that the provision of high-quality equipment was key in enabling prisons to scale up their work in this area.

> "[W]e were doing [detection] on a much smaller scale with much inferior equipment prior to extra new equipment being delivered to us." (Establishment lead)

Staff noted occasions when phones had been detected and removed, and reflected on the usefulness of particular pieces of equipment. In some cases, signal detection MPD equipment was perceived to reduce the resource and administrative burden of standard approaches to finding phones: they provided immediately actionable evidence of ongoing illicit activity within a specific location, and if staff could enter immediately, prisoners were likely to be caught in the act. Staff reported that smaller teams were needed to enter a cell in such circumstances, and that the element of surprise could also help to minimise risk of adverse responses from prisoners:

> "When the [new equipment] goes off, you can just open the door and generally they're stood there [on the phone]. Because of the shock value, they generally just hand it over […] so it's quite a safe way to achieve that goal." (Establishment staff)

Finally, some staff felt that MPD activities served as a deterrent.

However, staff participants were also unsure whether having more detection equipment had helped to find more phones. For example, some described a steady stream of mobile phones in the establishment, found in a combination of ways including signal detection, full cell searches, and by chance. Others suggested that the potential benefits of MPD were hampered by challenges around staffing and resources, which meant detection could not

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[31] Given the lack of clarity about which elements of MPD relates to SIP, it is difficult to disentangle views on effectiveness in the data.

be conducted at 'peak times' when prisoners were most likely to use phones, or that evidence could not immediately be followed up on. This meant that the potential benefits discussed earlier in this chapter could not be achieved in practice.[32]

Participants also noted that measuring the effectiveness of MPD was challenging, which could, in part be due to the different search regimes in place across establishments. Further, other factors such as increased provision of in-cell telephones might have reduced demand for and use of illicit mobiles.

Prisoner views on impacts of Mobile Phone Detection (MPD)

Prisoners reflected broadly on their knowledge and awareness of measures to reduce the number of phones in prison, including perceived effectiveness.

Prisoners' mixed views on the likelihood of phones being detected may relate in part to different levels of awareness and experience of particular MPD processes (which may in turn reflect differences in practice within different establishments). For example, some participants discussed ways in which those with mobile phones might avoid detection by staff by, for example, using phones at times of day when they were less likely to be overheard or visually identified – whereas others mentioned immediate detection by signal scanning devices which could not be avoided.

> "[A] scanner […] is down in the Security office. If anyone was to use an illegal mobile phone on the wing […] it would pick up a signal from a mobile phone straightaway." (Prisoner)

Views varied on the extent to which searches undertaken by Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) and Security teams served as a deterrent. Some prisoner participants had heard about phones being found during recent cell searches, for example, and thought that equipment such as handheld metal detection wands made it difficult to conceal phones in such circumstances. Given this perceived likelihood of being caught, potential punishments were perceived to serve as a deterrent.

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[32] More detail on challenges and limitations around MPD is discussed in the next section.

However, others suggested that the deterrence effect of measures to prevent mobile phone use would be limited to altering when and how much phones were used, rather than preventing their use altogether. Prisoners were thought to adapt their behaviour to circumvent detection, using phones more selectively at times when they considered they would be less likely to be caught.

> "People don't walk around with [a phone], you know what I mean, or they won't be silly with it and use it daytime. If I was using one personally, I'd use it at night – 6pm, 7pm, when everyone's locked away and the staff is not at the door."
> (Prisoner)

Barriers and challenges to impact

Staff highlighted a range of barriers to the effectiveness of MPD, including technological, procedural and staff challenges. They included:

- **Shifting technology:** some devices circumventing signal detection was highlighted as a particular challenge for MPD, which participants perceived would have to adapt to a shifting technological landscape in order to be effective.

- **Response timeframes:** MPD equipment potentially enabled faster detection than an intel-based approach, but in some prisons, users were required to get official permission to enter cells, which introduced delay during which phones could be moved and concealed. Where action was not undertaken immediately, effectiveness of detection was perceived to be more limited.

- **Availability of suitably trained staff:** Staffing pressures could make it difficult to prioritise MPD activity, and both prison and Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) staff were not always available to carry out detection at peak times when phones were mostly likely to be in use and therefore detectable.

> "I know the dedicated teams should be ring-fenced and we shouldn't be using them for other duties within an establishment, but when you're […] trying to balance safety […] sometimes it's inevitable that we use ring-fenced facilities and resources for […] purposes other than those they're intended for."
> (Establishment lead)

Staff turnover also limited the number of staff in post who had received relevant training, which in some prisons was a requirement for them to be involved in MPD. Reduced staff numbers had also limited some prisons' ability to respond rapidly when signals were detected. This was thought to have been exacerbated during the pandemic, when minimal searching was carried out in establishments where DST staff had been redeployed.

- **Staff competence:** Staff noted variation in the competence and confidence of staff undertaking MPD activities as a key influence on its effectiveness. Some staff were considered particularly adept at using the equipment effectively; one view was that personal preference and familiarity with particular devices also influenced willingness to undertake MPD and/or to make use of newer devices with which they had less familiarity. In some instances, lower levels of competence had resulted in equipment breakages or misinterpretation of results shown by the MPD devices. This variation across staff might reflect a need for more consistent training and guidance delivered across all teams.

Appendix C
Counter Corruption Strand

Counter corruption strand

This chapter outlines the structure of the counter corruption strand of the Security Investment Programme (SIP), as well as discussing its delivery model, key facilitators and barriers and perceived impacts. The chapter includes data from qualitative interviews and survey responses (which mostly feed into findings towards the end of the chapter).[33]

Overview of the strand

The Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) was established prior to the SIP investment to replace the Corruption Prevention Unit. The SIP investment provided the CCU and related agencies with additional funding and resources. It also introduced the Prevent strand to counter corruption work; this focused on providing training, support and guidance to staff to prevent corruption. Additionally, SIP was described as re-organising and extending the existing, but fragmented, Pursue strand to identify and investigate corrupt staff and bring them to a criminal justice outcome.

Set-up of the strand

Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) staffing

The CCU strand was overseen by the Head of the CCU, while Regional Prevent and Pursue Leads, Managers, and Officers were responsible for delivering and supporting Prevent and Pursue work within several establishments in defined regions. SIP funding was used to recruit counter corruption investigators based within the police and Pursue

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[33] The survey data provides useful contextual information about staff awareness of issues related to counter corruption and when discussed in the report provides a snapshot of some staff views and experiences at the time the survey was conducted. However, the survey sample was self-selecting and is not therefore representative of the prison staff population. For this reason, results were not tested for statistical significance.

Analysts to assist with investigating potential cases of corruption, both within the Regional Intelligence Units[34] and the National Intelligence Unit.[35]

SIP funding also introduced Pursue Administration Specialists. These roles were introduced to act as a link between establishments and the CCU, for example triaging intelligence and managing documentation for ongoing cases. However, participants within establishments described experiencing disappointment that these roles were only focused on administration (for example taking minutes for meetings), rather than being able to provide support with handling intelligence, as it limited how useful they could be.

Governance and partnership working

Strategic staff reported that a range of partnerships were key to the set-up and ongoing work of the CCU through sharing information about ongoing cases and establishments. This included:

- Regional Pursue and Prevent Managers working together to ensure a unified message about the role and work of the CCU was provided to establishments.
- Senior establishment staff working closely with Regional Prevent and Pursue staff.
- The CCU working with other local agencies to build cases, including police forces, organised crime units, and intelligence units.

While greater collaboration between key agencies was valued, some establishment staff felt that the introduction of this structure (where establishments spoke to Pursue staff rather than directly with police forces) had slowed the process of sharing information, limiting the effectiveness of counter corruption work in prisons.

One strength of the strand's structure, according to strategic staff, was strong governance and strategic direction, with these staff noting that they felt their work contributed to the overall counter corruption strategy. Having separate Prevent and Pursue strategies was

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[34] Regional Intelligence Units are part of national security infrastructure, set up to understand the activities of organised crime groups across the UK, the threats and risks posed, and potential opportunities to disrupt these groups.

[35] The National Intelligence Unit works to collect actionable intelligence on threats posed by those within prisons and probation, including staff corruption, Serious and Organised Crime, and extremism.

also seen as a good approach as it enabled work to happen concurrently on the two workstreams, helping to establish Prevent, which was newly introduced while continuing to deliver and enhance Pursue. However, it was suggested that in the future a combined approach may work better, as it was felt that limited communication could hamper delivery while the strands were run separately.[36]

Resources

There were a range of views on the level and appropriate targeting of counter corruption resources:

- Some staff felt that the **resources provided through SIP for the CCU strand were adequate** and had significantly increased capacity for managing corruption. Staff believed that the approach to distributing and protecting resources had worked well, reporting that ring-fencing ensured it was used for counter corruption work rather than filling staffing gaps in individual establishments (which was perceived to be a risk in the context of staff shortages across the service). In addition, the funding of dedicated staff in partner organisations (including the Regional and National Intelligence Units) reduced the pressure on CCU staff to get buy-in from agencies to progress work.

- Other staff felt that **additional resources were required**, including more Regional Prevent Managers and analysts to meet the workload demands for the strand. For example, it was noted that Prevent managers did not have enough time to spend the number of days they were expected to in each establishment, and that the Regional Intelligence Unit did not have capacity to handle all of the work directed to them by the CCU. Staff reported that the fact that all regions received the same resource (for example, two counter corruption investigators) did not make sense, as some regions were much busier than others so needed additional resources. There was a sense therefore that funding could have been better distributed to proportionately support areas with greater need.

- Finally, another view among staff was that the **SIP resources had not been effectively managed for this strand**, resulting in unnecessary spending. For

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[36] MOJ reported that this suggestion has already been taken onboard by the CCU team and is being implemented.

example, some staff felt that having separate Prevent and Pursue Regional Leads was unnecessary, as an individual of 'Band 8' seniority should be able to lead both strands regionally.[37] Additionally, some strategic staff reported that they received little notice about the funding and associated staff recruitment, resulting in a feeling that funding was being spent quickly rather than strategically. It was suggested that a slower roll out, so that challenges could be addressed as they arose, would have been helpful for this strand.[38]

Training for set-up

Participants reported multiple trainings which had been delivered during the roll out of the counter corruption strand. This included training delivered by the Learning & Development (L&D) team for intelligence analysts, Pursue Administrative Specialists, and Local Counter Corruption Managers (LCCM). Participants reported that role-specific training meant that senior staff could be certain that roles were being carried out consistently, and that one-to-one training (where it was possible to deliver) allowed individuals the space to learn and ask questions they may not feel comfortable asking in group settings. However, training gaps at the set-up stage of the CCU strand were identified by participants:

- Little formal training was available for those who started after the initial SIP roll out, so these staff had to develop their own way of working or learn informally from others.

- Limited training on systems and processes such as Mercury, Corruption Prevention Intelligence Reports, and Linkspace,[39] leaving participants feeling unsure about how to use these systems. However, participants noted that this improved later in the roll out of SIP.

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[37] MOJ reported that this suggestion has already been taken onboard by the CCU team and is being implemented.

[38] MOJ reported that, prior to roll out, work was conducted centrally to determine the right staffing structures for CCU. However, once SIP funding was agreed, recruitment needed to progress rapidly due to SIP being funded for only two years. Central CCU staff have reflected that more communication with local teams could have reassured them funds were being spent strategically.

[39] Mercury is an intelligence management system used by HMPPS which contains security information and intelligence reports. Corruption Prevention Intelligence Reports are submitted by staff onto this system. Corruption cases and updates regarding ongoing investigations are in turn uploaded to Linkspace.

- Some Prevent staff noted that they had not received training on Linkspace by the time of fieldwork, highlighting that the system was not being consistently and fully utilised.

Delivery of the strand

There was a range of staff within establishments working on counter corruption, including the Local Counter Corruption Managers (LCCM) and Deputy LCCM, police liaison officers, and security analysts. Prevent and Pursue appeared to be embedded in the majority of prisons, and senior staff within establishments had regular contact with Regional Prevent and Pursue teams. This was felt to be positive as the regional teams were seen to provide valuable support in managing potential corruption issues and it worked well when senior staff and new regional staff had pre-existing working relationships.

> "It's quite thorough. If I was to pick the phone up and say, 'I desperately need you up here tomorrow because I need to look at something', I'm sure that [the Regional Managers] would come." (Establishment lead)

The delivery of Prevent and Pursue within establishments is described below, with findings reported for each strand separately. However, it is important to note that in qualitative encounters, some staff reported very little or no awareness of corruption work at their establishment. This was perceived to be due to the sensitive nature of the work.

> "There's a select few people that are involved in counter corruption work and it's kept, like I say, quite sensitive because it's behind closed doors and kept away from the rest of us." (Establishment lead)

Prevent[40]

The Prevent strand which was aimed at reducing the number of staff who become corrupt, comprised various activities, including training and awareness-raising, check-in meetings with potentially corrupt staff, introductory meetings with new staff, being present in the

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[40] In addition to the qualitative data collected, the rest of this section of the report draws on the survey findings. As detailed in section 2.6, the survey sample was designed to be self-selecting and therefore the survey findings are not representative of the prison staff population. Survey findings have been rounded to the nearest percent.

prison, the provision of communication materials such as posters, and 'corruptor monitoring'. These are each discussed in turn below.

Training and awareness-raising

The key training described by participants was the corruption awareness package, a two-hour training package for all staff focused on raising staff awareness of corruption, improving staff resilience, and providing an overview of the support available. However, despite this being mentioned as key to the Prevent strand's work, the survey found that only 39% of respondents had been invited to attend one of these sessions (base 476), suggesting that roll out had not been as extensive as hoped for. Aligning with survey findings, the qualitative data highlighted that some participants reported no awareness of training on corruption. It is possible that some of this low awareness was related to differences in how establishments carried out the training. For example, while some training was run by the Prevent team, other events had support from within establishments, for example, from the Head of Security, who was helping to run some sessions and raise the profile of the training.[41]

> "We don't get training, just referred to reading materials on the MOJ website. Nobody has time to do [training]" (Establishment staff)

Where training was received, both establishments and individual staff were reportedly happy with the corruption awareness training and found it useful. One perceived benefit of the package was its suitability for non-directly employed, non-operational staff and new staff, as these groups were unlikely to have attended training covering corruption awareness before joining the establishment. Another benefit was that Prevent staff delivering training were seen to be more realistic about corruption risks and vulnerabilities than trainers for the Prison Officer Entry-Level Training course (POELT),[42] who were reported to sometimes minimise corruption risks. Positive views on the value of the training were echoed in the survey responses; of the survey respondents who had attended the corruption awareness sessions, 71% of staff said the session was extremely or very useful

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[41] While differences in how establishments rolled out the training add challenges in how to interpret evidence, MOJ note that this can bolster local engagement with training.

[42] New prison officers attend the POELT, a 12-week programme covering the skills and knowledge needed as a prison officer. Ten weeks are carried out at a learning centre while the first week and last week are completed within the prison the individual has applied to.

(base 166) and 78% said it was extremely or very relevant to their role (see Figures 1 and 2. Base 165).

Figure 1: Survey responses on the usefulness of Corruption Awareness sessions (base 165)

Figure 2: Survey responses on the relevance of the Corruption Awareness sessions to participants' roles (base 165)

However, during interviews, staff also noted challenges with the training package, including practical and logistical problems with staff missing/ not attending sessions due to staff shortages; difficulties pitching training at the right level for both new and long-serving staff; and a reluctance in some establishments to deliver the package because it was not compulsory. Additionally, it was noted that some establishments had not been able to carry out compulsory training due to COVID-19, which could indicate that the non-mandatory corruption training was not viewed as a priority. This potentially highlights a

missed opportunity for clear communication on the purpose, value and need for staff to attend training, especially given the positive feedback highlighted in the survey in relation to usefulness and relevance.

> "[We] have to accept that there [are] conflicting priorities within the establishments where, through COVID, they haven't carried out their essential training. […] Then when we come knocking on the door saying we've got an awareness package, then they're not necessarily going to make it a priority for them, despite the fact that we feel that it is really important." (Strategic staff/ partner)

Additionally, interviews with frontline staff highlighted that, while training was felt to be important, it was different from actually encountering corruption challenges on the job. This indicates that more could be done beyond the training package to equip frontline staff with the tools and skills they require to act on issues of corruption in real-life scenarios.

In addition to the two-hour session, other training on corruption that was delivered by the Prevent team varied locally and included, for example, training for new starters as part of their induction and bespoke sessions (one-to-one or for whole units) based on intelligence related to specific establishments.

While views on training that was received were positive overall, gaps that were specifically highlighted included specific training for OSGs who typically have some prisoner interaction and are, therefore potentially vulnerable, and for long-serving staff who had been at the prison for a long time and were seen as potentially benefiting from refresher training.

Prevent Resilience and Support Meetings
Prevent Resilience and Support Meetings (PRSM) were used when prisons had intelligence that a staff member may be vulnerable to corruption or there were suspicions of corrupt behaviour. Meetings were held with the Regional Prevent Manager with a focus on making the individual aware of their behaviours, providing support, and offering upskilling. The survey found that a minority of respondents were generally aware of PRSM, with 23% of staff respondents reporting that they knew what they were (base 441). Qualitative data highlights that staff thought that the meetings were generally received well and appreciated, as they were not punitive, but that some staff felt that their behaviour or

conduct was being called into question by being asked to attend a PRSM which initially felt uncomfortable.

> "People, at first, don't like [PRSM] because it's like you're questioning their integrity. When [the Regional Prevent Manager] puts that across in a supportive manner, [they] always come away with a very positive response at the end of that. Yes, a good piece of work from [them]" (Establishment lead)

One challenge noted by operational staff and establishment leads was that these meetings relied on intelligence being submitted to the prison. It was noted that this required a staff member to have noticed the behaviour and reported it, so it was felt that PRSM were often delivered too late as the staff member was already corrupt at the point of a report being submitted, perhaps signalling that more training and awareness raising would be helpful to spot problems early. Establishment staff reported that the meetings felt like a 'tick-box exercise' to prove measures had been taken to prevent corruption in the event of the case going to court, rather than providing support to staff prior to becoming corrupt.

'On-side' meetings

'On-sides' were another type of meeting used by Regional Prevent Managers to raise awareness of corruption risks. These were one-to-one sessions with new staff who had been working at the prison for between six weeks and three months to discuss how they were settling in, how their interactions with prisoners had been, any conditioning / prisoners manipulating prison staff they had already seen or experienced and how best to respond.

These were viewed as a good opportunity to act early and address any concerns before they became more serious and as a helpful way for Regional Prevent Managers to introduce themselves to new staff. It was felt to be particularly helpful that these meetings could address issues specific to the individual establishment unlike the training prior to starting (for example at college) which was more generic. One reported difficulty was a lack of follow-through from the Regional Prevent Managers, with senior establishment staff reporting that they had been told 'on-sides' would be carried out with all new staff but had not seen them happening consistently in practice.

Floor-walking

Interview participants reported that Regional Prevent Managers used floor-walking to build relationships with staff in establishments and raise awareness of their work. This involved walking around the establishment, including the wings, and speaking to staff informally.

The qualitative data highlighted that some staff felt that the Prevent team did not have a particularly strong presence in the prison and, in the CCU survey, only 29% of respondents reported knowing who their Regional Prevent Manager was, while a further 29% knew they had a Regional Prevent Manager but did not know who this was (base 481), suggesting that floor-walking had had a limited impact on staff awareness of CCU work within prisons.

Communication materials

The counter corruption strand also provided prisons with communication materials such as posters aiming to raise awareness of what corruption looks like and how to report it. These were placed around the prison in visible locations.

Sixty-two percent of respondents in the survey reported having seen posters (base 475), highlighting good levels of awareness of this Prevent activity. A key positive of this activity was that posters were thought to be updated in line with corruption trends recognised by intelligence analysts, making them relevant and informative. However, some establishment staff expressed that many people don't read the posters and therefore they were not particularly useful or valuable. Contributing to this feeling, some participants noted that information on some posters could be outdated and included, for example, phone numbers for those who no longer worked at the establishment, which made people feel less inclined to take notice of the information. Additionally, some staff felt that posters should not be needed to remind staff not to engage in corruption.

> "Any sort of corruption within the prison service shouldn't be happening in the first place, and if I need to read a poster to tell me that it shouldn't be happening, I shouldn't be doing my job. That's the way I see it, because the minute we walk through that door […] we're saying we're not going to be corrupted, we're not going to put anyone at risk, […] and if I have to walk through a door and read a poster as to why, I shouldn't be here". (Establishment staff)

Corruptor monitoring

The Prevent team monitored corruptors and potential corruptors using corruption flags. These were placed on the National Offender Management Information System (NOMIS) to identify prisoners who had been found or were suspected of trying to corrupt staff.

In the survey, under half of respondents (43% of all staff respondents (base 511) and 47% of operational staff respondents (base 317)) reported that they were aware of the corruptors list, showing who was flagged as a corruptor or potential corruptor, and knew how to access it. However, 65% of respondents agreed that their ability to recognise which prisoners represent a corruption risk had improved over the last two years (base 459)[43] and 77% of respondents agreed that they knew how to respond to corruptors and potential corruptors appropriately (base 504). This suggests that the majority of staff respondents felt prepared to handle corruptors even if they were not aware of corrupter monitoring activities.

In the qualitative fieldwork, strategic leads also reported that the Prevent team investigated and shared corruptors' tactics where possible so staff could be briefed on specific risks. If prisoners moved establishments, the Prevent team could also ensure any methods of management for that individual could be continued at the new establishment.

Pursue

The Pursue strand focused on investigating cases of corruption and bringing them to an outcome. In the qualitative fieldwork, it was noted that staff not involved in counter corruption work generally had limited knowledge of this strand due to the sensitivity of the information collected and a desire to keep Pursue tactics covert.

Corruption Prevention Intelligence Reports

A limited number of staff within security departments had access to Corruption Prevention Intelligence Reports. Governance circles for counter corruption work within prisons were thought to be kept purposefully small to reduce the risk of intelligence or tactics being leaked. However, some staff felt that the introduction of the counter corruption strand had

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[43] Reflecting a period during which SIP was implemented and it is likely that staff gained additional knowledge and experience.

increased the number of individuals involved in Pursue work, through the allocation of additional resources, which led to increased concerns about security leaks.

> "When you're dealing with sensitive information, [additional staff present] goes against the grain for me. Nothing against the people in the room, they're vetted, cleared, trusted, all of that stuff, but when you're talking to 12 people, there's more risk, I think, than when you're talking to three." (Establishment lead)

Participants explained that reports were reviewed regularly to assess any potential corruption risks and that significant intelligence was gathered on an individual before any action was taken. Staff described this thorough intelligence-gathering as giving them confidence in the process, as it was assumed that appropriate consideration would be given to cases before they were acted upon. It was also noted as beneficial that Regional Pursue Managers had a presence in establishments, meaning staff knew of them and they could provide assurances about the confidentiality of corruption intelligence reports. However, in the survey, 39% of respondents reported that they were not that confident or not at all confident that their identity would be kept confidential if they reported a corruption concern (base 514), which indicates that more could be done to give staff assurances about the processes involved in gathering and using intelligence.

Case management meetings

Case management meetings were described as another key part of the Pursue process and were held regularly to discuss ongoing investigations and open cases within the establishment. Staff reported that these were generally attended by the Head of Security, the Governor, sometimes the Deputy Governor, and members of the Regional CCU team to limit how many people had access to the information being discussed. The presence of the Regional Pursue Manager was felt to be helpful as they could highlight if other establishments were facing similar challenges and solutions that had been tried elsewhere.

Facilitators and barriers

There were a range of facilitators and barriers to the counter corruption strand, with some factors perceived to provide both benefits and challenges to its delivery.

The external position of the CCU was viewed as both a facilitator and barrier by staff. Benefits included that workloads for establishment staff did not increase and the CCU was able to access information for investigations that prisons could not, for example, financial records if appropriate. Furthermore, the independence of the regional counter corruption staff was viewed as facilitative in that it allowed them to have conversations which staff may be less willing to hear from those based in their establishment. This independence was seen as particularly important to the success of PRSM, as it was felt that, if these were delivered by establishment staff, they affect the working relationships between those in the meeting, rather than being seen as helpful interventions to support staff. On the other hand, some establishment leads felt the external position of the CCU work was challenging, as senior establishment staff carried the corruption risk but, in the current model, did not have oversight of what counter corruption staff were doing.

Similarly, there were both positive and negative views about the **expertise and commitment of CCU and establishment counter corruption staff**. One view held by staff was that this had been a key facilitator to the programme. For example, it was suggested that CCU staff's knowledge of the legal framework around corruption investigations was particularly helpful as establishment staff often lacked this knowledge. However, others felt that some senior CCU staff did not have adequate prior experience of working for His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS), so had a limited understanding of how decisions would impact different establishments.

Having dedicated corruption resource due to SIP funding was viewed positively. For example, external agencies, such as the police, had a single regional point of contact rather than having to contact individual governors at local prisons, allowing a more efficient approach to corruption management and enabling the planning of a long-term response.

Some staff reported that the introduction of new roles was sometimes felt to be challenging. It was suggested, for example, that there were too many staff at regional and national levels compared to establishment staff, leading to more actions being planned than were possible to facilitate on the ground. Similarly, some staff explained that the increased resources led to an increased number of corruption cases being identified, which was perceived to have overburdened investigators in some instances.

"There's almost so [many] chefs, chiefs, getting involved from the centre that you end up with two people on the ground floor trying to deliver what 15 people are organising. Resource-wise, I think it's way too top heavy." (Establishment lead)

While **partnership working and communication between different organisations** – including the CCU, HMPPS, the police, and intelligence units – was felt to work well overall due to a strong desire to work together and high levels of trust, several challenges regarding partnership working were also highlighted, including:

- Silo working: Staff reported that different organisations and teams, for example, the police and individual HMPPS departments, tended to work in silos, sometimes leading to a reluctance to share information across teams.

- Limitations on what could be communicated: Examples included limited communication to establishments during roll out of the strand due to uncertainty around what the CCU could offer at that point, and the CCU team sometimes being unable to provide answers to questions establishments or individuals had, due to the sensitive nature of information they held.

- Use of different software across agencies, for example intelligence units, HMPPS, and organised crime units. This was seen to lead to challenges when assigning action points after cross-agency meetings, sometimes meaning that items were not completed on time.

- Limited understanding of others' work: Strategic staff explained that a limited understanding of each role's responsibilities could sometimes create more work for others. For example, HMPPS counter corruption staff did not receive training in how investigations are run, resulting in CCU investigators having to make edits to documentation in preparation for court.

- Limited partner resources: Some agencies, for example, regional intelligence units, received less investment than the CCU so had limited capacity to support with investigations. In other cases, it was felt that agencies had different priorities so it could be challenging to encourage them to invest resources in a case.

- Resistance to changes: Participants described some resistance to the changes introduced by the SIP investment. This included:
  - Resistance from establishments due to a limited understanding of what the CCU could offer them. Linked to this, it was noted that resistance from some

establishments had led to challenges for the Prevent team when trying to access corruption prevention systems or deliver training, impeding the delivery of their work.

– Resistance from private establishments associated with concerns over monitoring by HMPPS and a perception that they might be losing some of their autonomy.

– Resistance from individual governors who wanted to maintain ownership over sensitive information and corruption investigations, exacerbated by a lack of trust that what was promised would be delivered.

– Resistance from Pursue staff about the introduction of Prevent due to fears it would remove Pursue's role or compromise intelligence.

Another related barrier outlined by participants was a lack of **engagement from staff** in corruption processes. In the qualitative interviews, there were a range of reasons provided for staff not reporting corruption, including concerns their identity would not be kept confidential, viewing reporting corruption concerns as 'snitching' and feeling that reports were not properly investigated so there was little point in submitting one.

> "There was a time down in [prison area] where certain people had put in [Intelligence reports] IRs, and then the prisoners came back and said, 'You said…' whatever. I then took that back up to Security and they said, 'Well, they put two and two together. Nothing comes out of Security,' but there was still that lingering doubt, so maybe it's not as secure as people think it is. Which then, whereas we were putting in regular IRs about people, you just thought, 'oh, maybe not this time'." (Establishment staff)

While the survey found that 96% of respondents were very or fairly confident that they knew how to submit a corruption report (base 514), this viewpoint may not align with some strategic staff. In the qualitative fieldwork these staff pointed to a lack of awareness of how to report corruption as a key perceived reason for under-reporting, highlighting that more training/ awareness raising in this area might be helpful. However, since the survey was conducted up to four months after interviews with strategic staff, it may also reflect staff's growing understanding of corruption.

Limited awareness from those not working in counter corruption of the work required behind the scenes during investigations was also identified as a barrier. It was suggested that this led to staff believing that corruption reports were not being investigated, as most of the time staff only saw reports being submitted. This was felt to be due to staff not understanding the intelligence-gathering and groundwork required to develop a case and take it forwards, leading to scepticism about whether reporting led to any action.

Finally, it was also noted that **regional staff working across a wide geographical area and numerous prisons** had been a barrier at points. This included, for example, challenges organising training for regional staff not based in a single area compared with establishment-based training which could happen on site.

Perceived impacts

Participants discussed a range of perceived impacts of the counter corruption strand. However, they also noted that there were various challenges with measuring the impact of this strand. This included difficulties measuring prevention and there not yet being enough data available to fully understand the impacts, particularly as many cases had not reached the Crown Prosecution Service due to a backlog after COVID-19. There were seven key perceived outcomes reported by participants:

- **More preventative work undertaken:** The introduction of more dedicated counter corruption staff was seen to have increased capacity and enabled more efficient work on counter corruption to be carried out. This was generally perceived to be a positive step forward in tackling corruption within prisons.

  "Having that external support within the region or across the [region], we've never had that before. So we know now that we can pick up a phone and we can speak to people confidentially and say, 'This is what's presented to us. What can we do about it?' […] [T]here's a lot of tools that are at our disposal that we've never had before." (Establishment lead)

- **More corruption reported:** It was suggested that this was due to an improved understanding of reporting options, better understanding of the potential consequences of having corrupt staff in the prison, improved trust that reports would be handled sensitively, and the ability to discuss concerns informally with

regional counter corruption staff prior to submitting a report. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier in the chapter, some staff were still reluctant to submit reports.

- **Ability to investigate less serious corruption cases:** Strategic staff reported that increased investigation capacity improved ability to investigate less serious corruption cases and had prevented some cases from escalating into more serious corruption. It was also suggested that improved criminal justice outcomes (see below) acted as a deterrent.

"I think the way they've come in and spoken to staff who have been targeted seems to have had a good effect on them. Maybe in the past before we did any of that, they might have done down that slippery road and ended up being corrupt. It's had a good effect". (Establishment lead)

- **More corruption being prevented:** Participants suggested that the shift to prosecuting prisoners involved in corrupting staff had led to fewer prisoners seeking out officers to bring in illicit items.
- **Improved outcomes for corruption cases:** The introduction of the counter corruption strand was seen to have enabled higher quality investigations, improved establishments' understanding of how to build a case for court, and prevented staff from claiming they had not received training about corruption, which had previously resulted in suspended, rather than custodial, sentences being given by judges. These factors were felt to have led to an increased number of corrupt staff being removed from their post and more cases going to court.[44] However, some staff felt the counter corruption strand had had little impact on outcomes and that the process had been more efficient prior to its introduction. This was felt to be exacerbated by a lack of communication regarding the actions or outcomes of cases to staff who submitted a report or analysts involved in intelligence-gathering for a case.

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[44] It was noted that outcomes were dependent on the Crown Prosecution Service rather than the CCU or Prison Service (meaning outcomes could only be influenced by the CCU through thorough preparation of a case rather than having input into the final decision).

"We have seen the back of quite a number of staff. Right from people resigning, because they've found themselves in that world, and they think, 'well, hang on a minute, the jail are all over this, so I'm out', to people [who] ended up in court, and all different grades as well." (Establishment lead)

- **Increased staff awareness of corruption risks and how to manage them:** It was felt the training and communications from the counter corruption strand had improved some staff's awareness of corruption. The staff survey supported this, with 65% of respondents agreeing that their understanding of the behaviours and actions that constituted corruption had improved over the last two years (base 459), 69% agreeing that their ability to identify corruption had increased over the last two years (base 459), and 61% agreeing that their understanding of how to protect themselves from corruption had improved in the last two years (base 449).[45] However, while knowledge is likely to improve organically over time, in the qualitative work participants explained that some staff still had limited knowledge of corruption and its consequences. It was suggested that a lack of regular communication about ongoing corruption work in and around prisons and the associated risks, as well as some staff feeling like they were not susceptible to risk, contributed to this.

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[45] The period of time during which SIP was implemented.

Figure 3: Survey responses to questions about changes in corruption understanding during SIP (base 449 - 459)

- **Increased confidence in the process:** It was explained that having an external team managing corruption and more tangible outcomes (for example, staff being removed from the establishment or going to court) had improved confidence that corruption would be taken seriously and handled impartially. The survey also highlighted positive findings here, for example 82% of survey respondents reported being very or fairly confident that a corruption concern they reported would be taken seriously (base 493) and 76% were very or fairly confident that a report would be acted on appropriately (base 490). Some staff suggested this extended to increased public confidence in the Prison Service as a whole. However, it was noted by others that some staff still lacked confidence in the process, and that this could be improved through increased presence of, and communication from, both Pursue and Prevent teams about the role and remit of their work.

Figure 4: Survey responses to questions regarding confidence in reporting (base 493 and 490)

	Very confident	Fairly confident	Not that confident	Not confident at all	Dont know
How confident are you that a corruption concern you reported would be taken seriously?	43%	39%	10%	5%	3%
How confident are you that if you reported a corruption concern it would be acted on appropriately?	32%	43%	14%	7%	4%

In addition, participants reported two other impacts from the counter corruption strand. Firstly, participants reported that resignations due to staff being investigated and sometimes found guilty of counter corruption offences had increased pressure on staffing levels, which were already low. Secondly, some perceived there to be less trust among colleagues because of the increased focus on counter corruption work.

Appendix D
Context and Background

This appendix includes additional information provided by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) research team to give background and context to the intended delivery of the Security Investment Programme (SIP), and which activities were within and outside of scope for this evaluation. This information was provided to the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) during the writing of this report.

Overview of SIP delivery plan

Physical Security Measures (PSM)

Physical Security Measures (PSM) were designed primarily for the first line of defence: to reduce conveyance of illicit items into establishments via the gate, reception and post. The equipment deployed is provided in Table A.1 below.

Table A.1. PSM equipment

Equipment	Purpose
X-ray body scanners	To search prisoners entering the establishment for internally secreted items
Enhanced Gate Security (Tiers 1 & 2)	To search visitors and staff entering the establishment for non-internally secreted items
Trace Detection Machines	To detect illicit drugs in mail rooms and on the wings.

X-ray body scanners

Alongside the physical provision of X-ray body scanners (XRBS), SIP intended to provide:

- Dedicated staff to be recruited to operate the equipment.

- The training to ensure staff were able to operate equipment and carry out procedures effectively, including floor walking support during go live week.

- The policy for effective and legal use of the equipment, with follow up assurance support.

Enhanced Gate Security

Tier 1

Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) Tier 1 comprised handheld wands, metal detection archway, searching equipment, drug detection dogs and dog handlers. Alongside the physical provision of enhanced gate security, SIP intended to provide:

- Dedicated staff to be recruited to operate the equipment.
- Train the trainer style training to ensure staff were able to operate equipment and carry out procedures effectively.
- The policy for effective and legal use of the equipment.

Tier 2

Comprising of a more flexible provision than the above, Tier 2 was introduced due to the prohibitive costs of gate reconfiguration, or a shortage of space to accommodate EGS (i.e. dedicated search spaces). Therefore, archway metal detectors are often missing for Tier 2 sites.

Trace Detection Machines

The new SIP funded trace detection machines were rolled out to sites, much later than originally planned due to procurement issues. The provision of existing trace detection machines was not uniform across the estate. Therefore, when SIP was deployed there were 3 different scenarios across the estate:

- The new SIP funded machine **replaced** an existing machine
- The new SIP funded machine is in **addition** to an existing machine
- It is **completely new** capability for a prison.

The SIP evaluation team have attempted to verify exactly which scenario each prison falls into. Post SIP, there has been a wider roll out of trace detection to more sites. Wider policy changes are in the pipeline which will impact the use of trace detection machines across all sites, including SIP ones.

Phone Detection

The phone detection space has wider areas which sit outside the scope of this evaluation. Phone detection can be summarised into Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) provision and

the provision of training – including the posting of Detection Capability Leads (DCL), as described below.

Table A.2. Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) provision – the physical provision of equipment to regional Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs)

Item	Number provided
Portable signal detector	76 for national DST (Long-term High Security Estate [LTHSE] x 32, North x 20, South x 20, Wales x 4)
Hardware detection pole	38 for national DST (LTHSE x 20, North x 8, South x 8, Wales x 2)
Hand-held metal detector/wand	71 for national DST (LTHSE x 38, North x 14, South x 15, Wales x 4)
Search scope inspection camera	71 for national DST (LTHSE x 38, North x 14, South x 15, Wales x 4)
DST Toolkit	70 for national DST (LTHSE x 38, North x 14, South x 15, Wales x 3)
Power drill	71 for national DST (LTHSE x 38, North x 14, South x 15, Wales x 4)

Detection capability leads

The posting of detection capability leads was intended to support prisons in delivering training and support to all prisons to utilise existing equipment that they already had. Although it is not clear what their role looks like today, they were in place to give prisons a point of contact for improving detection capability.

Counter corruption: prevent

The counter corruption strand is one where many of the activities have not been in scope for this evaluation, and this de-scoping exercise was done in consultation with the Head of the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU). The survey was designed with all this in mind, and the final version of the survey reflected the activities intended to be delivered that were also in scope of this evaluation. A summary is provided below.

Corruptors

Completed cleanse of corruptor alerts on the National Offender Management Information System (NOMIS): Pursue teams are going through Mercury and assessing intelligence to re-apply alerts.

Interim Prevent offer

The interim Prevent offer was taken up by most prisons, and the bits of it which were delivered in time for this evaluation was:

- Corruption Awareness Package (a package of slide decks delivered to prisons)
- Briefing/Floor Walking from Prevent officers
- Resilience and Support Meetings (RSM) for staff (full Prevent offer sites only)

Prevent posters

These were delivered but are relatively minor and were perceived to not warrant undue exploration as part of the evaluation.

Pursue

The Pursue function consists of specialist staff, including intelligence analysts, split into one national and five regional teams and one Long-Term High Security Estate (LTHSE) team. There are also embedded corruption specialists in the Operational Partnerships Team, Digital Media Investigations Unit and Regional Intelligence Units.

The role of Pursue at the national level is to understand key corruption threats, manage the highest risk corruption investigations and those centred on Head Quarters staff and work with National Intelligence Unit (NIU) colleagues to develop and take action on the most sensitive corruption-related intelligence. The LTHSE CCU team oversees corruption investigations within the LTHSE.

Regionally, Pursue is intended to work with prisons and probation to build the strongest case for police investigation and prosecution and provide support to local prisons and probation to ensure cases are dealt with quickly and appropriately. Prisons and probation will receive extra resource to manage the requirements of the policy framework, process and triage counter corruption intelligence and work with regional teams on the development of banded cases.

The Regional Corruption Pursue Lead is the owner of a regional team's activity. They maintain relationships with key regional stakeholders and provide assurance on the delivery of the model. Regional Pursue Managers manage the Band 1-3 caseload on behalf of establishments and Local Delivery Units (LDUs), provide tactical options for developing cases and act as a strategic point of contact for a group of establishments.

Regional Counter Corruption Analysts and Researchers are an expert analytical service provided to Regional CCU teams for Band 1-3 cases. Regional Pursue Officers oversee admin activity for regional CCU teams and manage the regional functional mailbox. Regional admin specialists (9-12 per region) deliver on policy framework requirements for corruption triage and process Counter Corruption intelligence, manage all documentation for case management and work with the wider Pursue team to develop cases.

The Pursue offer includes Pursue Managers seven day working, a national 24/7 on call provision and a 1.2 million per annum investment in 20 new police investigator roles to support Pursue investigations. The expectation is that this will improve chances of successful prosecutions by removing resource limitations.

Case management meetings
Attendees at case management meetings include the LCCM (Local Counter Corruption Managers who chair meetings, typically the Deputy Governor), DLCCM (Deputy Local Counter Corruption Manager, typically the Security Governor), regional CCU staff and PIO (Prison Intelligence Officer). Other police may also be invited.

In each case management meeting it will be considered whether the banding of a case is still right, what the current intelligence assessment is, what a proportionate outcome for the case would be and what the plan is for achieving that outcome.

The banding system uses a scoring between 1 and 4 (where 1 is high and 4 is low) determined based on a combination of likelihood and impact. Likelihood is associated with motivation, capability and opportunity. Impact is associated with harm to others, enabling criminality and undermining the service. Aggravating factors which can increase the banding include involvement of a known corruptor, involvement of a corruptor/ member of staff that is likely to move between prisons, association of a case with Serious Organised Crime (SOC) or Counter Terrorism (CT), safeguarding considerations, alignment with regional threats and a threat that is recurring and has not been resolved locally. Possible outcomes stemming from case management meetings include criminal justice outcomes (police caution, conviction, found not guilty), HR outcomes (informal/ formal warning, dismissal, exclusion), contract management outcomes and adjudications.

Appendix E
Methodology

This appendix gives further information about the methodology used for this evaluation. In total, 183 people took part and 129 qualitative encounters were conducted (20 interviews and focus groups with strategic leads, stakeholders and partners; 78 interviews and focus groups with prison leads and operational staff; and 31 interviews with prisoners), and there were 530 returned responses for the quantitative survey.

Ethics

This evaluation underwent a full review by NatCen's Research Ethics Committee (REC), which includes members from senior NatCen staff. This ethics governance procedure is in line with the requirements of the Government Social Research (GSR) professional guidance and Social Research Association (SRA) Research Ethics Frameworks. A number of ethical considerations were taken into account for this study, especially given the vulnerable nature of some participants. For example, the research team took care to ensure that before the interview all participants were aware of the subject matter of research, the issues likely to be raised, what participation would require of them and any other facts which might have affected their willingness to participate, for example, process in an event of a disclosure. These issues were communicated to potential participants both in writing and verbally.

Sampling and recruitment

As discussed in chapter 2, a range of strategic stakeholders and partners were interviewed prior to the case study research in establishments. The sampling strategy was agreed with MOJ to ensure a diversity of perspectives across those with responsibility for management and implementation of the programme. MOJ also supported the recruitment of this group of participants. They approached them on behalf of the NatCen research team and with individuals' agreement shared their contact details with NatCen. The NatCen research team then contacted strategic stakeholders and partners directly and arranged the interviews and focus groups. Introductory information leaflets about the evaluation and what participation involved were sent to these individuals to support this stage.

Qualitative case study fieldwork was conducted with 12 establishments. Prisons were purposively selected to ensure range and diversity across the key factors important to the implementation and delivery of SIP, and the achieved sample is shown in Table B.1 below.

Table B.1. Achieved sample of establishments

Criteria	Number of establishments
Operator	
Public	10
Private	2
Establishment category	
Male local	6
Male cat B trainer	2
Male cat C trainer	4
Long-term and high security prisons (LTHSE)	
LTHSE	1
Non-LTHSE	11
Region	
London	3
South East	1
North West	5
Wales	2
South West	1
Tier	
Tier 1	10
Tier 2	2
Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) offer	
No	1
Partial	4
Full	7
Total	**12**

Following the selection of case study establishments, MOJ provided the NatCen research team with the contact details of key staff (with their permission) to assist with the

recruitment of staff and prisoners to take part in the evaluation. Introductory information leaflets about the evaluation and detailed what participation involved were sent to these individuals to support this stage.

A range of staff were interviewed in each case study establishment and included those responsible for overseeing the running of the establishment, operational staff directly involved in implementing SIP measures and processes, and staff who had less direct involvement in the programme's delivery. Prisoners were also interviewed at some of the establishments. The achieved sample for establishment staff and prisoners is set out in Tables B.2 and B.3.

Table B.2. Achieved establishment staff sample

Demographic	Number of establishment staff
Band[46]	
9–11 / Senior Managers	4
6–8 / Managers	9
5 / Custodial Managers	12
4 / Supervising Officer	15
3–4 / Prison Officer (including specialists)	34
2 / Operational support	19
Not known	14[47]
Length of service	
Up to 1 year	10
Up to 5 years	20
5 years and over	64
Not known	13
Gender	
Male	56
Female	38
Other	0
Not known	13

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[46] The grade/ role for private prisons slightly differs so staff chose the option that best fitted their role.

[47] Sample monitoring began part way through fieldwork which meant that some of the earlier interviews with more senior managers fall into this category.

Demographic	Number of establishment staff
Ethnicity	
White	80
Mixed / Multiple ethnic groups	1
Asian/ Asian British	4
Black/ African/ Caribbean/ Black British	5
Other ethnic group	4
Not known	13
Total	**107**

Table B.3. Achieved prisoner sample

Demographic	Number of prisoner participants
Ethnicity	
White	19
Mixed/multiple ethnic groups	2
Black/African/Caribbean/ Black British	3
Asian / Asian British	0
Other ethnic group	1
Not known	6
Age	
18-24	2
25-35	9
36-49	15
50+	3
Not known	2
Prison experience	
First time	9
Previous experience	21
Not known	1
Total	**31**

Qualitative Fieldwork

Interviews and focus groups conducted for the scoping and mainstage fieldwork were qualitative depth encounters. They took place either face-to-face or remotely via MS

teams. Topic guides were used to ensure a consistent approach across encounters and between members of the research team. Separate topic guides were developed for each participant group and were used flexibly, with open and nonleading phrasing to allow researchers to respond appropriately to participants' accounts. More information on the topic guides and an overview of key themes covered is included at Appendix F.

In addition, the SIP processes were observed by the research team across all case study establishments taking part in the evaluation and handwritten notes were taken. The observation work carried out was invaluable in assisting the research team to develop a detailed understanding of SIP implementation across the establishments and prompting specific areas of questioning during the subsequent research interviews, as well as providing some primary data.

Qualitative data analysis

With participants' permission, the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Where permission was not given, notes were taken instead. Interview data was managed and analysed using the Framework approach developed by NatCen (Richie et al., 2013). This matrix-based analytic method facilitates rigorous and transparent qualitative data management, with a thematic framework used to classify and organise data according to key themes, concepts and emergent categories.

Quantitative survey data analysis

In addition to the qualitative component, the research team analysed the quantitative survey data to produce a set of descriptive statistics around staff awareness of issues related to counter corruption. The final analysis was carried out on 530 returned survey responses, of which 475 were fully completed and 55 were partially completed.[48]

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[48] Partially completed responses include responses which had at least one answer to a question other than demographic information.

Appendix F
Topic Guides

Tailored topic guides were used to ensure a consistent approach across all the interviews and focus groups and between members of the research team. The guides were used flexibly to allow researchers to respond to the nature and content of each discussion, so the topics covered and their order varied between encounters. Researchers used open, non-leading questions, and answers were fully probed to elicit greater depth and detail where necessary.

The main headings and subheadings from the topic guides used for the qualitative encounters with strategic staff and partners, prison operational staff and prisoners are provided below. Slightly different versions of the staff guide were used for interviews with different participant staff groups to ensure that topic guides reflected the nature of participants' role and/or involvement.

Prison operational staff topic guide

1.   **Introduction**
   - Researchers and the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen)
   - Study background and purposes of the interview
   - Brief overview of topics to be covered in interview
   - Length of every interview (60 minutes per interview, 90 minutes per focus group)
   - Voluntary participation
   - Audio recording (including encryption, data storage, and destruction)
   - Confidentiality, anonymity, and potential caveats
   - Information about support services
   - Use of collected data and the opportunity to redact information
   - End questions about personal characteristics
   - Consent

2. **Participant background and prison context**

   - Current role, length of time in role, and responsibilities

   - Involvement in the Security Investment Programme (SIP) and changes of responsibilities brought up by SIP

   - Perception of prison (including physical environment, safety and security, and prison culture)

   - Local area/context of the prison

3. **Awareness and understanding of SIP**

   - Key features of the programme in establishment in respect of Physical Security Measures (PSM), phone detection, and counter corruption

   - Views on the rationale and general need for the programme as a whole

   - Overview of initial views about the programme

4. **Physical Security Measures**

   - Overview of how PSM is managed at the prison

   - Views on resources available for PSM

   - Training, guidance and policy related to PSM

   - Overview of partnership working for PSM

   - Reflection on delivery of PSM the programme to date

5. **Phone detection and the associated equipment through SIP**

   - Overview of how phone detection and associated equipment is managed at the prison

   - Overview of resources available for phone detection and the associated equipment

   - Training and guidance for phone detection and the associated equipment

   - Partnership working for phone detection

   - Reflection on delivery of phone detection and using the associated equipment through SIP

6.   SIP corruption strand/strategy/counter-corruption measures

- Initial implementation

- Overview of the management of corruption in the prison

- Rolling programme of awareness raising and level of contact/communication with the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU)

- Reflection on the delivery of SIP corruption strand/strategy/counter-corruption measures

7.   Early indicators / Outcomes and impacts

- Perceived outcomes/impacts of programme to date on this prison and the wider establishments

- Reflections on intended or unintended outcomes

- Alternatives and added value of SIP

8.   Reflections

- Hopes for programme going forward

- Recommendations for future delivery

9.   Next steps and close

- Final closing comments – anything else to raise

- End questions on personal characteristics for monitoring purposes

Prisoner topic guide

1. **Introduction**

    - Researchers and NatCen

    - Study background and purposes of the interview

    - Brief overview of topics to be covered in interview

    - Voluntary participation

    - Audio recording (including encryption, data storage, and destruction)

    - Confidentiality, anonymity, and potential caveats

    - Use of collected data and the opportunity to redact information

    - End questions about personal characteristics

    - Consent

2. **Background and context**

    - Individual background such as age, time in establishment so far, and whether been in prison before

    - Perception of the prison (including physical features of the prison, prison staff, and other prisoners) and its culture in terms of safety and security

3. **Awareness of SIP-related security measures**

    - Awareness of any schemes in place to help the prison be safe i.e., the ways in which illicit items may get into the prison

    - Security measures or equipment in place (awareness of SIP's key features)

4. **Views on need for SIP security measures**

    - Perception of security measures at gate and reception and their rationale

    - Perception of security measures in places others than gate and reception and their rationale

5.   Experiences of SIP-related security measures

- X-ray body scanners

    – Participant's understanding of the processes involved in use of x-ray body scanners

    – Own and others' experiences of body-scanner

    – Views on usefulness of equipment/measures

- Metal detection archways, handheld wands

    – Participant's understanding of the processes involved in metal detection archways and handheld wands

    – Own and others' experiences of metal detection archways/handheld wands

    – Views on usefulness of equipment/measures

- Dogs/Dog Handlers

    – Participant's understanding of the processes involved in using dogs/dog handlers

    – Own and others' experiences of dogs/dog handlers

    – Views on usefulness of/difficulties with dogs/dog handlers

- Trace detection

    – Participant's understanding of the processes involved in using trace detection

    – Own and others' experience(s) of trace detection

    – Views on usefulness of equipment

- X-ray baggage scanners (if relevant)

    – Participant's understanding of the processes involved in using X-ray baggage scanners

    – Own and others' experience(s) of X-ray baggage scanners

    – Views on usefulness of equipment

6. **Early indicators, outcomes and impacts**

- Perceived impacts of programme

  – Phones in prisons

  – Other illicit items (e.g., drugs) in the prison

  – Impacts of SIP on the overall prison culture

  – Broader impacts

- Reflections on outcomes

- Alternatives and added value of SIP

7. **Reflections**

- Reflections on extent to which SIP features are meeting expectations

- Any suggestions for improvement to improve safety and security in prison

8. **Next steps and close**

- Final closing comments – anything else to raise

- End questions on personal characteristics for monitoring purposes

Appendix G
CCU (Counter Corruption Unit) survey

A copy of the survey disseminated to prison staff is included below.

Introduction

What is the survey about?

This survey will ask you a range of questions about counter-corruption measures and activities in your establishment, as well as your views on these measures.

His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) defines corruption as "a person in a position of authority or trust who abuses their position for benefit or gain for themselves or for another person. For example, the misuse of a person's role to plan or commit a criminal act, or a deliberate failure to act to prevent criminal behaviour."

How long will it take?

The survey will take around 15 minutes. Your responses will be saved on our secure survey platform after each response you provide. If you are unable to complete all the questions at one time, you will not be able to return to your part-completed questionnaire.

Who is doing the survey?

The study is being carried out by NatCen Social Research, an independent not-for-profit research organisation, on behalf of the Ministry of Justice.

Do I have to take part?

No – participation in this survey is entirely voluntary and you can stop the survey at any point by clicking on the 'Stop' button or by closing the window. If you would prefer to skip a question, 'don't know' response options are included in applicable questions, and all open text box questions are optional. Please note that if you decide to stop the survey part way through, your responses up until that point will be saved on our secure survey platform.

Who do I contact if I have questions?

If you have any questions or concerns about the survey, please contact the NatCen research team. To do this, email [email address] or call freephone [number].

How will the survey data be looked after?

Your involvement and answers will be kept confidential – so you and your responses will not be identified to the Ministry of Justice or anyone else outside the NatCen research team. Your information will be kept securely by NatCen Social Research and will not be shared with any third party outside the research team. It will be deleted once the project is complete. NatCen meets all the relevant data and privacy regulations (including the GDPR). Please visit our website for [weblink] for our privacy notice.

How will my survey data be used?

Your responses will be analysed together with other participants' responses. The analysis will form part of a report that NatCen will write for the Ministry of Justice, but there will be no way to identify you or your responses in the report.

It is really helpful to have your views, so the Ministry of Justice can understand the effectiveness and perceptions of counter-corruption measures in prisons. Thank you.

Consent

Consent to this study

Please confirm that you understand the above and agree to participate in this study.

a. Yes [route to Q3_Demographics]
b. No [route to ExitConsent]

Section A: Demographics and job information

1.   Demographics

This section of the survey will ask you a few questions about yourself and your job. None of the information you provide will be used to identify you in the survey results. The section should take about 2-3 minutes to complete.

2. Gender

Are you:

a. Female

b. Male

c. Other (please specify)

d. Prefer not to say

3. Age

What is your age group?

a. 18-24

b. 25-34

c. 35-44

d. 45-54

e. 55+

f. Prefer not to say

4. Ethnicity

Which of the following best describes your ethnic group?

a. White

b. Asian/Asian British

c. Black/African/Caribbean/Black British

d. Arab

e. Any other ethnic group

f. Prefer not to say

5. Hours_worked

Do you work part-time or full-time for His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS)?

a. Full-time (36+ hours per week)

b. Part-time (less than 36 hours per week)

c. Prefer not to say

6.   Grade

What is your Band / Grade?

a. Band 2 / Operational Support

b. Bands 3-4 / Prison Officer (including specialist)

c. Band 4 / Supervising Officer

d. Band 5 / Custodial Manager

e. Bands 6-8 / Manager

f. Bands 9-11 / Senior Manager

g. Prefer not to say

7.   Time_in_role

How long have you been working for HMPPS?

a. Less than 1 year

b. More than 1 but less than 2 years

c. More than 2 but less than 3 years

d. More than 3 but less than 4 years

e. More than 4 but less than 5 years

f. More than 5 but less than 10 years

g. More than 10 but less than15 years

h. More than 15 but less than 20 years

i. Over 20 years

j. Prefer not to say

8.   Role_type

Are you in an operational or non-operational role?

a. Operational

b. Non-operational

c. Prefer not to say

9.   Employment_type

Are you directly employed by HMPPS or non-directly employed?

a. Directly employed

b. Non-directly employed

c. Prefer not to say

10. Establishment

What is the name of your establishment? [drop down options provided]

- None of the above [route out of survey to ExitEstablishment]

Section B: Changes in understanding of corruption over time

11. Changes_understanding

Section C: Changes in understanding of corruption over time

This section of the survey will ask you a few questions about whether and how your understanding of corruption and counter-corruption measures has changed **over the last two years**. None of the information you provide will be used to identify you in the survey results. The section should take about 4 minutes to complete.

How far do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

12. Understanding_behaviours

Over the last two years, my understanding of behaviours and actions that constitute corruption has increased.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f. Don't know

13. Prisoners_risk

Over the last two years, my ability to recognise which prisoners represent a corruption risk has increased.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f. Don't know

14. Consider_job

Over the last two years, I think about the corruption risk I am exposed to more often when doing my job.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f. Don't know

15. Ability_identify

Over the last two years, my ability to identify corruption has increased.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f. Don't know

How far do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

16. Ability_report

Over the last two years, my understanding of how to report corruption has increased.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f. Don't know

17. Confidence_systems

Over the last two years, I am more confident that reports of corruption are processed and acted on appropriately.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f. Don't know

18. Corruption_tolerated

Over the last two years, I believe that corruption has become less tolerated by colleagues who I work closely with.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f. Corruption was never tolerated by colleagues I work closely with.

g. Don't know

How far do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

19. Establishment_protected

Over the last two years, HMPPS has protected me better from corruption.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f. Don't know

20.   Manager_protected

Over the last two years, my manager has protected me better from corruption.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f. Don't know

21.   Protect_self

Over the last two years, I have improved my understanding of how to protect myself from corruption.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f. Don't know

Section C: Raising corruption concerns

22.   Raising_concerns

This section of the survey will ask you a few questions about your current understanding of how to raise a corruption concern and how you feel about this process. None of the information you provide will be used to identify you in the survey results. The section should take about 4 minutes to complete.

23.   How_report

How confident are you that you know how to submit a corruption report?

a. Very confident

b. Fairly confident

c. Not that confident

d. Not confident at all

e. Don't know

24. Identity_confidential

How confident are you that your identity would be kept confidential if you reported a corruption concern?

a. Very confident

b. Fairly confident

c. Not that confident

d. Not confident at all

e. Don't know

25. Treatment_colleagues

If you raised a corruption concern, how do you think your colleagues would treat you?

a. They would treat me much better

b. They would treat me a bit better

c. It would not affect how they treat me

d. They would treat me a bit worse

e. They would treat me much worse

f. Don't know

26. Recognise_corruptors

Are you aware of the corruptors list and how to access this?

Corruptors are offenders who have received an adjudication or criminal justice outcome for trying to corrupt staff. Potential corruptors are typically offenders who are suspected of trying to corrupt staff.

a. I am aware of the corruptors list and I know how to access it

b. I am aware of the corruptors list but do not know how to access it

c. I am not aware of the corruptors list

d. Don't know

27.   Respond_corruptors

How far do you agree with the following statement? I know how to respond to corruptors and potential corruptors appropriately.

Corruptors are offenders who have received an adjudication or criminal justice outcome for trying to corrupt staff. Potential corruptors are typically offenders who are suspected of trying to corrupt staff.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f.   Don't know

28.   Support_incident

If prison staff reported an incident where they did not follow corruption guidelines, how supported would they be?

a. Fully supported

b. Fairly supported

c. Not that supported

d. Not supported at all

e. Don't know

29.   Comfortable_getsupport

I have someone I would feel comfortable going to for support if I had a corruption concern.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f.   Don't know

30. Who_concern

Who would you go to if you had a concern about corruption in your workplace?

a. My Local Counter Corruption Manager

b. Regional Prevent Manager

c. My line manager

d. Senior staff at the prison

e. Union Representative

f. Care team

g. Someone in my team

h. Other

i. Not sure

j. I would not report a corruption concern

31. Taken_seriously

How confident are you that a corruption concern you reported would be taken seriously?

a. Very confident

b. Fairly confident

c. Not that confident

d. Not confident at all

e. Don't know

32. Acted_appropriately

How confident are you that if you reported a corruption concern it would be acted on appropriately?

a. Very confident

b. Fairly confident

c. Not that confident

d. Not confident at all

e. Don't know

33.   Consequences_appropriate

How far do you agree with the following statement?

The consequences for staff engaging in corruption are appropriate.

a. Strongly agree [route to Q37_SIP_activities]

b. Somewhat agree [route to Q37_SIP_activities]

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f.   Don't know

34.   Consequences_inappropriate_why

Please state why you do not think that the consequences for staff engaging in corruption are appropriate. [open text] [optional]

Section D: SIP activities

35.   SIP_activities

This section of the survey will ask you a few questions about your experiences of activities and roles introduced as part of the Security Investment Programme. None of the information you provide will be used to identify you in the survey results. The section should take about 5 minutes to complete.

36.   Who_LCCM

Do you know who your **Local Counter Corruption Manager** is?

a. Yes, knows who

b. No, doesn't know who [route to Q40_Regional_manager]

c. Knows LCCM exists but doesn't know who [route to Q40_Regional_manager]

37. Confident_LCCM

[only ask if answer "yes" to previous question] How confident would you feel going to the **Local Counter Corruption Manager** about corruption concerns?

a. Very confident

b. Fairly confident

c. Not that confident

d. Not confident at all

e. Don't know

38. Regional_manager

Do you have a Counter-Corruption Unit (CCU) **Regional Prevent Manager**?

a. Yes, and I know who they are

b. Yes, but I don't know who they are

c. No [route to Q45_Aware_PRSM]

d. Not sure [route to Q45_Aware_PRSM]

39. How_reach_RPM

[only ask if answer "yes" to previous question] Do you know how to reach out to your Counter-Corruption Unit (CCU) **Regional Prevent Manager**?

a. Yes

b. No

c. Not sure

40. Confident_RPM

[only ask if answer yes to Regional_manager] How confident would you feel going to the Counter-Corruption Unit (CCU) **Regional Prevent Manager** about corruption concerns?

a. Very confident

b. Fairly confident

c. Not that confident

d. Not confident at all

e. Don't know

41. Support_RPM_offers

[only ask if answer yes to Regional_manager] How far do you agree with the following statement? I understand the support that the Counter-Corruption Unit (CCU) **Regional Prevent Manager** offers.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree [route to Q45_Aware_PRSM]

d. Somewhat disagree [route to Q45_Aware_PRSM]

e. Strongly disagree [route to Q45_Aware_PRSM]

f. Don't know [route to Q45_Aware_PRSM]

42. Support_RPM_useful

[only ask if answer "agree" to previous question] How useful do you think the support offered by the Counter-Corruption Unit (CCU) **Regional Prevent Manager** is?

a. Extremely useful

b. Very useful

c. Moderately useful

d. Slightly useful

e. Not at all useful

43. Aware_PRSM

Are you aware of Prevent Resilience and Support meetings?

a. No [route to Q48_CAS_invited]

b. Yes, but I don't know what they are [route to Q48_CAS_invited]

Yes, and I know what they are

c. Not sure [route to Q48_CAS_invited]

44. Attended_PRSM

[only ask if answer "yes" to previous question] Have you ever attended a Prevent Resilience and Support meeting?

a. Yes

b. No

c. Not sure

d. Prefer not to say

45. PRSM_support

[only ask if answer "yes" to Aware_PRSM] How far do you agree with the following statement? Prevent Resilience and Support meetings are places where colleagues receive support and advice.

a. Strongly agree

b. Somewhat agree

c. Neither agree nor disagree

d. Somewhat disagree

e. Strongly disagree

f. Don't know

46. CAS_invited

Have you been invited to any Corruption Awareness sessions?

a. Yes, and I attended

b. Yes, but I did not attend [route to Q53_Seen_posters]

c. No [route to Q53_Seen_posters]

d. Not sure [route to Q53_Seen_posters]

47. CAS_useful

[only ask if attended Corruption awareness session] To what extent, if at all, were the Corruption Awareness sessions useful?

a. Extremely useful

b. Very useful

c. Moderately useful

d. Slightly useful

e. Not at all useful

48. CAS_engaging

[only ask if attended Corruption awareness session] To what extent, if at all, were the Corruption Awareness sessions engaging?

a. Extremely engaging

b. Very engaging

c. Moderately engaging

d. Slightly engaging

e. Not at all engaging

49. CAS_informative

[only ask if attended Corruption awareness session] To what extent, if at all, were the Corruption Awareness sessions informative?

a. Extremely informative

b. Very informative

c. Moderately informative

d. Slightly informative

e. Not at all informative

50. CAS_relevant

[only ask if attended Corruption awareness session] To what extent, if at all, were the Corruption Awareness sessions relevant to your role?

a. Extremely relevant

b. Very relevant

c. Moderately relevant

d. Slightly relevant

e. Not at all relevant

51. Seen_posters

Have you seen posters from the Counter-Corruption Unit (CCU) showing the risks of corruption?

a. Yes

b. No [route to Q56_Anything_else]

c. Not sure [route to Q56_Anything_else]

52. Posters_engaging

[only ask if seen posters] To what extent, if at all, are the posters from the Counter-Corruption Unit (CCU) engaging?

a. Extremely engaging

b. Very engaging

c. Moderately engaging

d. Slightly engaging

e. Not at all engaging

53. Posters_informative

[only ask if seen posters] To what extent, if at all, are the posters from the Counter-Corruption Unit (CCU) informative?

a. Extremely informative

b. Very informative

c. Moderately informative

d. Slightly informative

e. Not at all informative

54. Anything_else

Do you have anything else you would like to share about corruption and counter-corruption measures? Please do not share any corruption concerns or details of corruption in this box – there is information on the next page about how to report this. [open text] [optional]

End page

Appendix H
Glossary

Archway Metal Detector (AMD) – A walk through metal detector.

Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) – The roll out of the CCU is the 3rd line of defence for SIP.

Custodial Managers (CM) – Operational prison service staff.

Counter Corruption Measures (CCM) – SIP's 3rd line of defence intended to tackle corruption among prison staff to stop illicit items being conveyed into prison by corrupt staff.

Corruption Prevention Unit (CPU) – Precedent to CCU.

Detection Capability Leads (DCLs) – this role was created as part of the MPD line of defence, to provide training and support for prisons to use existing mobile detection equipment.

Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) – Operational prison service staff.

Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) – PSM / 1st line of defence includes use of EGS alongside updated policy, operational guidance and training.

His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) – an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) responsible for the correctional services in England and Wales.

Local Counter Corruption Manager (LCCM) – Work on counter corruption within establishments.

Learning & Development team (L&D team) – Team within HMPPS responsible for all learning and development needs across the organisation.

Long Term and High Security Estate (LTHSE) – A Directorate within HMPPS that includes Public Sector prisons housing high risk Category A and B men and young people.

Mandatory Drug Testing (MDT) - All prisoners can be tested for drugs or alcohol.

Mobile phone detection equipment and capability (MPD) – SIP's 2nd line of defence.

Ministry of Justice (MOJ) - A government department working to protect and advance the principles of justice.

Operational support grade (OSG) – An operational support grade (OSG or prison support) working to keep the prisons safe and running smoothly.

Physical Security Measures (PSM) – 1st line of defence PSM to reduce the conveyance of illicit items via gate, reception and post.

Prison Officer Entry-Level Training (POELT) – Initial training of newly recruited prison officers.

Prevent Resilience and Support Meeting (PRSM) – Resilience and Support Meetings are intended to be used when there are concerns about professional standards or when intelligence indicates that a member of staff is displaying less resilience (related to CCU).

Prison Security Investment Programme (SIP) – Seeks to invest £100 million to combat the supply of illicit items into prisons.

Release on temporary licence (ROTL) – Being able to leave prison for a short period of time.

Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) – The Home Office defines serious and organised crime as individuals planning, co-ordinating and committing serious offences, whether individually, in groups and/or as part of transnational networks.

X-ray body scanner (XRBS) – A machine that scans the body with a form of X-ray imaging.