# Security Investment Programme (SIP)

Overview and Outcome Study

Aamir Ramzan, Heidi Harries, Jen Taylor and Stacey Musimbe

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Data and Analysis exists to improve policy making, decision taking and practice by the Ministry of Justice. It does this by providing robust, timely and relevant data and advice drawn from research and analysis undertaken by the department's analysts and by the wider research community.

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Glossary

Archway Metal Detector (AMD) – A walk through metal detector. This is placed at the gate and used to search visitors and staff entering prisons.

Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) – A team within His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) tasked with tackling corruption in prisons. The CCU provides staff at a local, regional, and national level. It aims to prevent corruption through training and awareness raising and pursues corrupt individuals, leading to investigations and prosecutions. The expansion of CCU is part of the Security Investment Programme's (SIP) third line of defence.

Corruptors – inmates with a suspected history of trying to corrupt staff.

Detection Capability Leads (DCLs) – this role was created as part of SIP's second line of defence, to provide training and support for prisons to use existing mobile detection equipment.

Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) – Operational prison service staff tasked with conducting searches in prisons.

Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) – Enhanced Gate Security is used to search staff and visitors entering prisons. It comprises of equipment (such as archway metal detectors, handheld detection wands, dogs), staff conducting searches, policies, operational guidance. EGS is a physical security measure and part of SIP's first line of defence.

His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) – an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) responsible for the correctional services in England and Wales.

Local Counter Corruption Manager (LCCM) – A staff member leading on counter corruption work within an establishment.

Long Term and High Security Estate (LTHSE) – A Directorate within HMPPS that includes Public Sector prisons housing high risk Category A and B men and young people.

Mercury – An intelligence management system allowing users to analyse intelligence reports submitted by HMPPS staff.

Multi-Agency Response to Serious Organised Crime (MARSOC) – SIP's fourth aim to disrupt high-harm Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) nominals.

Ministry of Justice (MOJ) – A government department working to protect and advance the principles of justice.

National Intelligence Assessment Centre (NIAC) – NIAC sit within the HMPPS National Intelligence Unit (NIU), and assess local and regional intelligence reports, alongside wider security metrics, to understand emerging threats to prison security as a national level.

National Offender Management Information System (NOMIS) – The principal information database for offender management in HMPPS public prisons.

Operational Support Grades (OSG) – These are HMPPS staff who support operational duties in prisons. OSGs are often responsible for conducting routine operations at prisons, such as operating the gate.

Physical Security Measures (PSM) – SIP's first line of defence to reduce the conveyance of illicit items via gate, reception, and post.

Prevent Resilience and Support Meeting (PRSM) – These are meetings facilitated by the Counter Corruption Unit intended to be used when there are concerns about professional standards or when intelligence indicates that a member of staff is displaying less resilience.

Security Investment Programme (SIP) – A programme set up to invest £100 million to combat the supply of illicit items into prisons.

Reception – The location where prisoners enter the prison. Prisoners will be searched for illicit items here and if there is suspicion that they are concealing items internally, they will be scanned with X-ray Body Scanners.

Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) – The Home Office defines "serious and organised crime as individuals planning, co-ordinating and committing serious offences, whether individually, in groups and/or as part of transnational networks".

Throwovers – Illicit items which land in the prison after being "thrown over" walls, fences, or gates.

X-ray Body Scanner (XRBS) – A machine that takes internal scans of the body using X-ray imaging.

1.   Summary

1.1 Overview of SIP

The Security Investment Programme (SIP) was a £100M investment announced in August 2019, with the strategic aim of reducing the crime in prison that disrupts delivery of safe, decent, and secure regimes. SIP's objectives supported the delivery of this strategic aim and are as follows:

- First Line of Defence: Reduce conveyance of illicit items into establishments via the Gate, Reception and through the Post;
- Second Line of Defence: Stop mobile phones working and detect and retrieve devices; and
- Third Line of Defence: Strengthen staff resilience to corruption and equip staff to defend against efforts to subvert the security regime.
- Fourth aim: Increase targeted disruptions against high harm Serious Organised Crime (SOC) and corrupt staff to frustrate criminal enterprise.

As part of the SIP funding there was a Treasury condition for the investment to be evaluated. After considerable scoping the following evaluations were conducted:

- A process evaluation on SIP's three lines of defence.
- An outcome study on SIP's three lines of defence (methodology and findings outlined in this paper).
- A process evaluation on the Multi-Agency Response to Serious and Organised Crime (MARSOC). This evaluation covers the fourth aim.

1.2 Outcome Study Methodology

The main purpose of this document is to provide evidence on whether SIP has met its five expected outcomes, which map to the objectives of SIP:

- Reduction of conveyance at the gate and reception
- Reduction of conveyance in the mail room
- Increase in staff capability and confidence

- Staff are better equipped to understand and manage corruption effectively
- Staff are more resilient to corruption

The outcome study used several sources of data to measure these five key outcomes. These are:

- The Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation (Kerr et al. 2024). This includes case study research across 12 prison establishments (involving qualitative interviews and focus groups of senior establishment staff, prison staff and prisoners), and an online survey of prison staff across 20 establishments.
- Expert opinions from the HMPPS National Intelligence Assessments Centre (NIAC). The MOJ SIP Evaluation Team invited NIAC, as experts of prison intelligence, to provide their qualitative opinions on the landscape of prison security since SIP implementation. NIAC were provided with a list of questions and responded with a bespoke briefing note in April 2023.
- Analysis of prison management information; X-ray body scanner data and Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) audit data.
- X-ray Body Scanner Training Feedback

This approach was considered feasible as the nature of illicit contraband means that it is difficult to observe and record. Therefore, a single, consistent measure of how many illicit items are conveyed into prisons does not exist. In addition, due to the roll-out of the programme (across the whole closed male estate) it was not possible to conduct an impact evaluation as we were unable to compare SIP sites to similar non-SIP sites. As such, the findings below are informed using a triangulated approach incorporating qualitative and quantitative data. The main evidence informing this study was the Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation. For further detail on delivery and management of SIP, plus further detail on the qualitative research findings included below, please refer to the SIP Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation report.

1.3 Summary of Findings

- The research found that the security equipment at the gate and reception is not used consistently throughout the estate, which means that interventions may be evaded i.e. illicit items may be conveyed via these routes. However, the research

also identified that when the equipment is used correctly and consistently, there is evidence to suggest that SIP funded equipment is stopping entry of some illicit items at the gate and reception.

- There is limited evidence to assess how effective SIP was at preventing illicit items from entering through the mailroom. The research shows mixed perceptions on the impact of trace detection. Some staff and prisoners felt that the equipment had stopped or continued to stop drugs from coming into prison whereas other staff felt that the new equipment was less effective than the previous equipment. For example, they felt it was more difficult to take samples, there was less nuanced detection, and there was inaccurate detection of illicit substances including giving false positives.

- It is not possible to assess the overall reduction of conveyance caused by SIP for various reasons. One key factor was the impact of COVID-19. During the implementation of SIP, prison regimes were adjusted to handle the pandemic which affected how people were entering the prison. This meant several conveyance routes (including those targeted by SIP) were supressed, causing suppliers and distributors to seek alternative means to acquire illicit items e.g., drones.

- In general, staff recognised the need for SIP and reported feeling more confident in security measures due to SIP.

- Some staff felt their corruption awareness and understanding had increased over the last two years since the introduction of SIP. Findings on how staff felt they were managing corruption were mixed; whilst staff felt that more cases of corruption were being reported and there was an increase in investigative capabilities following SIP, barriers to reporting were also identified. This included lack of staff engagement and reports not being investigated properly. Some staff felt that SIP's activities associated with tackling counter corruption had little impact on investigating and prosecuting corruption and that the process had been more efficient prior to its introduction. This was felt to be exacerbated by a lack of communication regarding the actions or outcomes of cases either to staff who submitted a report or to analysts involved in intelligence-gathering for a case.

- There is evidence of the counter corruption aspects of SIP making staff feel more resilient and staff feeling that fewer prisoners were seeking out staff to corrupt them. SIP's investment in Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) was also reported to be aiding staff resilience to corruption, as they would be less pressured to bring items into the prison if measures worked effectively. However, it is very likely that prisoners would be looking for alternative ways to convey items i.e., via staff. Several barriers such as staff turnover, low pay and the cost-of-living crisis were noted as possible challenges which may have impacted the success of this outcome.

Other consequences of SIP included:

- A change in conveyance patterns since SIP was implemented. The process evaluation identified evidence of conveyance facilitators opting for conveyance routes which are not subject to SIP interventions (drones and throwovers). However, a large driver for this changing pattern may be regime changes after COVID-19, rather than SIP.
- The research found there were mixed perceptions amongst staff and prisoners about SIP's impact on violence, some felt that violence reduced as a result of SIP and others felt that violence had increased. This finding further feeds into the complexity of understanding the drivers of prison violence.
- Security interventions could sometimes be disruptive of the wider prison function. Although there is evidence of internal SIP teams consulting with local establishments about their needs, this was not always felt to be effective. Large pieces of equipment were felt to sometimes disrupt the wider function of areas in prisons, such as the gate. It was also felt to be challenging to prioritise staffing security interventions, as establishments needed flexibility to draw on staffing resources from other parts of the prison as necessary.

1.4 Conclusion

When delivered effectively, SIP interventions showed promise of being able to meet its intended outcomes. However, one dominant barrier that prevented SIP from achieving its full impact was staff shortages and retention. For SIP to be fully effective staffing levels

and training will need to be considered. The security landscape in prisons is always changing and any future research and analysis will need to consider this.

2. Overview

2.1 The Security Investment Programme

The Security Investment Programme (SIP) was a £100M investment announced in August 2019, with the strategic aim of reducing the crime in prison that disrupts delivery of safe, decent, and secure regimes. SIP's objectives supported the delivery of this strategic aim and are as follows:

- First Line of Defence: Reduce conveyance of illicit items into establishments via the Gate, Reception and through the Post;

- Second Line of Defence: Stop mobile phones working and detect and retrieve devices; and

- Third Line of Defence: Strengthen staff resilience to corruption and equip staff to defend against efforts to subvert the security regime.

- Fourth aim: Increase targeted disruptions against high harm Serious Organised Crime (SOC) and corrupt staff to frustrate criminal enterprise.

An HMPPS study (Ellison et al, 2018) found that mobile phones were a feature of prison life in all establishments, including facilitating of organised crime, drug dealing, and exposing vulnerable individuals to bullying, exploitation and extortion. Mobile phones were also shown to create instability in a prison. Substance use, in turn, has been identified to facilitate illicit economies within establishments (Hammill & Newby, 2015), increasing rates of reoffending, violence, self-harm, and suicide (HMIP, 2020). In 2019–20, there were 89,105 recorded finds of at least one illicit item across the prison estate, with over 80% in the Adult Male Closed estate, where SIP funding was focused (Source: HMPPS Annual Digest April 2019 to March 2020).

The first line of defence in SIP aimed to block or restrict the conveyance of illicit items into prisons via the gate (where staff and visitors enter prisons), reception (where prisoners enter prison) and the mailroom. For this, SIP installed Enhanced Gate Security (EGS), X-ray Body-Scanners (XRBS), and trace detection machines, respectively. Several routes of conveyance were targeted at the same time to prevent any exposed conveyance routes

being exploited during implementation, as observed by operational staff and existing evidence (Watson, 2016). However, SIP was unable to disrupt all routes of conveyance meaning there was still the risk of displacement.[1]

SIP's second line of defence aimed to stop mobile phones working, and detect and retrieve devices. For this, Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) were resourced with specialist tools for the detection and retrieval of mobile phone devices. In locations where it was not cost effective to install the full Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) offering, the prisons were also equipped with further tools to detect and retrieve mobile phones.

SIP's third line of defence aimed to strengthen staff resilience to corruption and equip staff to defend against efforts to subvert the security regime. Corruption includes the supply of illicit items, allowing prisoners to have undue control in prisons, and violence against staff or prisoners. To tackle corruption, two strands were deployed: Prevent and Pursue. Prevent aimed to increase staff's knowledge of and resilience to corruption. Prevent teams did this through training sessions, posters and via Local Counter Corruption Managers. Pursue aimed to identify and investigate corrupt staff and achieve criminal justice outcomes.

The fourth aim was designed to increase targeted disruptions against high-harm Serious Organised Crime (SOC) and corrupt staff to frustrate criminal enterprise through a Multi-Agency Response to Serious and Organised Crime (MARSOC). MARSOC aimed to develop and maintain a list of the highest-harm SOC nominals using a single, consistent approach to assessment and prioritisation. They aimed to deliver a more joined up response through sharing information and intelligence relating to the MARSOC cohort more effectively.

As part of the SIP funding there was a Treasury condition for the investment to be evaluated. After considerable scoping the following evaluations were conducted:
- A process evaluation on SIP's three lines of defence
- An outcome study on SIP's three lines of defence (methodology and findings outlined in this paper)

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[1] Displacement – when a chosen route for the entry of illicit items into prisons is replaced by another route.

- A process evaluation on the Multi-Agency Response to Serious and Organised Crime (MARSOC) – targeting the fourth aim.

2.2 SIP Equipment and Processes

The table below shows the equipment and processes supplied via SIP, and in scope for this evaluation. The equipment received varied from prison to prison and was targeted at the closed male estate. The investment from SIP's second and third line of defence were targeted at the entire prison estate.

Full details on SIP's equipment and processes can be found in Appendix A.

Table 1: SIP Overview

First Line of Defence: Reduce conveyance of illicit items into establishments via the Gate, Reception and Post

What was delivered?	Provided to
X-ray Body Scanners (XRBS) along with • Classroom based training and floorwalking training for staff in the use of XRBS.	74 male closed prisons
Tier 1 Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) • Archway metal detectors • Handheld metal detection wands • Drug detection dogs and dog handlers • Additional staff to operate equipment provided • A number of packages of training, including 'Train the trainer' style for prison staff to learn how to operate equipment and carry out procedures effectively.	42 male closed prisons
Tier 2 Enhanced Gate Security • comprising of a scaled down provision of Tier 1 EGS due to the prohibitive costs of gate reconfiguration to accommodate Tier 1 EGS.	7 male closed prisons
Drug Trace Detection Units	45 male closed prisons

Second Line of Defence: Stop mobile phones working and detect/retrieve devices

What was delivered?	Provided to
Training and support for prisons to use new and existing equipment effectively • Posting of phone detection capability leads to offer support and guidance in using equipment • Development and delivery of phone detection user guidance	Entire prison estate

What was delivered?	Provided to
Provision of equipment to Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) - Portable signal detectors - Hardware detection poles - Handheld metal detector wands - Other supporting searching tools	4 Regional Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs) - North - South - Wales - Long Term High Security Estate

Third Line of Defence: Strengthen staff resilience to corruption and equip staff to defend against efforts to subvert security regime

What was delivered?	Provided to
Setup and delivery of the Counter Corruption Unit Prevent function - Resilience and Support Meeting - Floorwalking of Regional Prevent Managers - Delivery of corruption awareness package	CCU activities are delivered to all prisons through a central CCU team overseeing five regional teams and one LTHSE team.
Setup and delivery of the Counter Corruption Unit Pursue function - Monthly prison-level case management meetings with key prison, police, intelligence staff - Funded posts for 58 prison-based caseworkers - Funded posts for 20 police investigators - Improved capability of case management systems	
Setup and delivery of the Counter Corruption Unit Cross function staff	

Fourth aim: Increase targeted disruptions against high harm Serious Organised Crime (SOC) and corrupt staff to frustrate criminal enterprise

What was delivered?	Provided to
- Develop and maintain a list of the highest-harm SOC nominals using a single, consistent approach to assessment and prioritisation. - Share information and intelligence relating to the MARSOC cohort more effectively between partners to deliver a more joined-up response; and - Co-ordinate activities across multiple agencies to deliver disruptions which make the most of each agency's tools, powers and interventions, based on jointly agreed plans for each individual.	MARSOC is implemented through a hub-and-spoke model with ten regional hubs aligned to the Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs).

2.3 Outcome Study

As well as providing an overview on the SIP evaluation, this paper outlines the methodology and findings from the outcome study. The outcome study aimed to answer the following research questions:

- What outcomes occurred (both intended and unintended)?
- What outcomes were associated with different versions of the implementation?
- In what ways did the contexts of different establishments contribute to different outcomes?

The outcome study measured five key outcomes which map to the objectives of SIP (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Aims and Expected Outcomes of SIP

Strategic Aims of SIP	Expected Outcomes		
Reduce conveyance of illicit items into establishments via the Gate, Reception and Post	**1** SIP has led to reduced conveyance at the gate, reception	→	Displacement of contraband to other areas
	2 SIP has led to reduced conveyance in the mail room		
Stop mobile phones working and detect / retrieve devices	**3** SIP has led to an increase in staff capability and confidence		
Strengthen staff resilience to corruption and equip staff to defend against efforts to subvert security regimes	**4** Staff are better equipped to understand and manage corruption effectively		
	5 Staff are more resilient to corruption		

2.4 Methodology

The outcome study used several sources of data to measure the five outcomes. This approach was considered feasible as the nature of illicit contraband means that it is difficult to observe and record. Therefore, a single, consistent measure of how many illicit items are conveyed into prisons does not exist. As such, the findings below are informed using a triangulated approach incorporating qualitative and quantitative data. A full methodology can be found in Appendix B.

The following data sources have been used:

Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation

Most of this report is informed by qualitative research conducted by NatCen. As such, this document solely reports on the findings which help measure how SIP has met its five outcomes. The methodology included:

- Case study research based in 12 prison establishments (incl. qualitative interviews and focus groups of senior establishment staff, prison staff and prisoners). This was conducted in the second half of 2022 and early 2023. A total of 183 participants took part in the interviews and focus groups, including 31 prisoner participants.

- A non-representative staff survey on counter-corruption awareness was administered online in early 2023 across the 12 prisons included in the case studies, as well as eight additional prisons recruited to include geographic regions not represented by the case study sample. The survey received 530 responses.

As is the case with all qualitative research, the extent to which the experiences and views identified in the process evaluation report are representative of wider prison staff and establishments cannot be estimated. The use of non-probability, purposive sampling, consistent and high-quality fieldwork, systematic and comprehensive analysis, and interpretation that presents categories, themes and explanations rather than simply individual accounts, however, means that the range and diversity of perceptions and views can be qualitatively generalisable. For further detail on these findings plus the delivery and management of SIP please refer to the Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation.

HMPPS Intelligence Data

This report uses qualitative expert opinions from the HMPPS National Intelligence Assessments Centre (NIAC). NIAC use a combination of management and intelligence information.

Analysis of prison metrics

- **X-ray Body Scanner data**: As part of the SIP roll-out, there were 75 scanners installed across 74 prisons by the end of March 2022. These prisons were asked to report the total number of positive, negative and inconclusive scans. From

July 2020 – April 2021 this information was collected via a weekly paper-based exercise by prisons and from May 2021 this data collection has been automated with prisons uploading their data monthly, to the HMPPS performance hub.

- **EGS audit data:** Following the implementation of Tier 1 Enhanced Gate Security in 42 prisons, HMPPS conducted ad-hoc data collection exercises where prisons were asked to self-report their usage of EGS in different months, to enable support provisions to be put in place. Due to the self-reported nature of collection, this data is considered to be management information, and has been referenced where useful to help contextualise findings.

X-ray Body Scanner Training Feedback

This report draws on the results of an internal survey conducted following classroom-based training on the use of XRBS in prisons. The training events were delivered to over 1,900 staff during the implementation of XRBS into prisons, with the survey being open from July 2020 until October 2021. Feedback was completed individually and confidentially using an online form. There were 324 responses, out of 1,838 staff who were sent a link to the survey, meaning that there was a response rate of almost 18%.

2.5 Methodological considerations

This report is an outcome study, rather than an impact study. It is not possible to measure the impact of SIP as SIP was implemented across the whole closed male estate. Due to the speed at which SIP was delivered due to the funding model, we were unable to pilot the full SIP offering, before rolling it out to the entire male closed estate. This means we were unable to compare SIP funded sites to similar non-SIP funded sites to see what difference SIP had made. Figure 2 details the timeline for the delivery of PSM. In addition, as explained in the methodology above a clear output measure does not exist.

A number of other challenges also affected the extent in which SIP could be measured:

- **The COVID-19 pandemic** created unprecedented changes in the way prisons are managed. The pandemic coincided with SIP delivery, and led to prison lockdowns, prison staffing issues and regime changes. This had a large impact on metrics linked to SIP data and inhibited our ability to attribute change to SIP.

Figure 2: Timeline for the delivery of PSM

- **The covert nature of tackling illicit item conveyance.** SIP aims to disrupt illicit activities; they are by their nature hard to observe and record.

- **SIP cannot be isolated from other programmes** and interventions unrelated to SIP. An example of this would be rehabilitation programmes, zero tolerance approaches to drugs and fast track punishments. These interventions may vary at a local level and like SIP, have potential to alter the demand for illicit items in prisons.

- **The long-term impact of SIP is yet to be realised,** particularly elements like changing culture as a result from SIP which may take years to arise.

- **There are many interventions within SIP,** and they were deployed at different times, and on different scales. Some corruption activities were being rolled out during the research period. Therefore, there is no clear date when a prison received the full SIP offer.

- **Different SIP interventions were also likely to have conflicting outcomes,** which made it hard to assess the full impact. For example, the PSM aimed to limit the availability of illicit items in prisons. This was predicted to increase pressure on staff from prisoners to become corrupt and bring in illicit items themselves. However, CCU also provided training with staff to prevent corruption.

- **The intervention is extremely dynamic.** Prisons use SIP investment differently to each other, often changing how they used it over time. This makes it hard to compare like-for-like.

- **Prisons have different baseline levels of equipment, resource and training.** Before the roll out of SIP, there was variation in security processes and practises, such as in the use of trace detection equipment. This meant it was challenging for researchers to unpick impact for these parts of SIP investment.

3. SIP Outcomes

3.1 Reduction of conveyance at the gate and reception

In this section, we review how effective SIP was at preventing illicit items from entering establishments through the gate and reception, and the factors that aided or impeded this.

Below is a theory of change to show the theoretical impact of the implementation of SIP measures aimed at decreasing conveyance at the gate and reception.

Table 2: Reducing conveyance at the gate and reception theory of change model

Input: SIP measures aimed at decreasing conveyance	Output:	Intended effect: short term	Intended effect: long term	Other effect: long term
Deployment of Enhance Gate Security and X-ray Body Scanners at the gate and reception Trained operators who can maintain and operate equipment effectively Effective and consistent policies in place to use equipment	Improved searching capabilities on people used to detect illicit items at the gate & reception	More people are caught trying to convey illicit items through the gate and reception	Reduced conveyance through routes targeted by SIP due to a deterrence effect	Displacement to other routes of conveyance

XRBS

Some staff and prisoners in the qualitative research reported that XRBS prevented illicit items entering prisons via internal concealment. This finding was supported by reflections from the HMPPS National Intelligence Assessment Centre (NIAC). The qualitative opinion shows that the scanners allowed officers to identify and isolate prisoners concealing items internally and they acted as a deterrent to prevent prisoners with secreted contraband.

This evidence is further supported by the number of positive scans from the body scanners. Since the first SIP-funded XRBS was installed in July 2020 up to March 2024, there has been almost 520,000 body scans completed (the full XRBS figures can be found

in appendix C)]. This resulted in over 53,000 positive indications, where operators deemed a scan showed signs of potential internally secreted objects. It is unclear how many conveyance attempts these scans represent, since some prisoners may have been scanned more than once and there may be false-positives included – where a scan was marked or reported incorrectly as positive.[2]

Some staff credited XRBS for reducing the numbers of illicit items such as drugs and phones from entering into and being in circulation within prisons. NIAC have also noted an increase in mobile phones within incoming prisoner property parcels and assessed that this is a realistic possibility this is a displacement effect from the success of XRBS in detecting phones. XRBS are particularly effective at detecting metallic items such as mobile phones, which show up clearly on X-rays.

Although, staff and prisoners agree XRBS stops items being smuggled internally, there are mixed views about how much this impacts the overall level of illicit items going into prisons. Some staff felt that since prisoners were only able to internally secrete relatively small levels of illicit items, XRBS was the least important element of the PSMs. However, other staff viewed that the XRBS were the most important PSM element as secretion by prisoners was one of the main routes of illicit items into the prison. Staff and prisoners also stated that in addition to physically stopping items being conveyed through reception, the XRBS acted as a deterrent to prisoners.

Enhanced Gate Security (EGS)
Due to data limitations, there was limited evidence available to assess the role of EGS in reducing the levels of illicit items entering via the gate. However, the qualitative research found that some staff reported that when EGS was used consistently, it was successful at preventing illicit items entering via the gate. As with the XRBS, EGS was also perceived to be deterring people from bringing illicit items into establishments, and displacing conveyance to other routes.

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[2] When a positive indication occurs, a prisoner is given the opportunity to dispose of the illicit item before further rescanning.

Overarching view

Overall, prison staff, prisoners and HMPPS's National Intelligence Assessment Centre (NIAC) suggested that there was reduced levels of conveyance at the gate and reception following the introduction of SIP measures.

Staff and prisoners reported that the decrease in conveyance via the gate and reception was, at least in part, due to SIP's measures. As well as physically stopping illicit items entering establishments, participants also reported that the PSMs are acting as an ongoing deterrent.

As mentioned in the methodological considerations section it is not possible to attribute change directly to SIP because of the impact COVID-19 had. However, it is likely that overall, COVID-19 was a bigger factor than SIP in the reduced conveyance via the gate and reception. This is both because there were fewer people to search with SIP equipment and SIP equipment was not implemented successfully at all establishments. Although some staff establishments described XRBS and EGS working effectively, at other establishments, staff reported significant problems. These were said to be caused by a lack of staff and a lack of adequate staff training, meaning equipment was either not used consistently or effectively. This is further explored in the Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation (section 3.3). This variation is shown in HMPPS's data collection exercise, where prisons self-reported their EGS usage, showing that EGS was used by some establishments all the time, and by others none of the time. The impact of COVID-19 is further supported by NIAC who report that it is almost certain that as a result of restrictions put in place to manage the pandemic, several conveyance routes were supressed, causing suppliers and distributors to seek alternative means to convey illicit items.

As well as COVID-19 the research indicated several barriers to SIP being able to achieve this outcome:

**Availability of resource to deliver interventions consistently**

A major reported barrier for SIP interventions was prisons being unable to provide adequate resource to deliver the intervention. Despite SIP providing the funding for additional staff within each prison to run the Enhanced Gate Security (EGS), this resource was not ringfenced. Therefore, when the SIP roll-out coincided with the COVID-19

pandemic and many staff leaving the organisation, it is reported that staff were redeployed from SIP activities to other functions in the prison. This led to EGS being under-resourced and not used consistently. This was also the case for XRBS, although staff were not employed specifically for this role.

Figure 3 shows how staff absences in key operational grades rose throughout recent years.

Figure 3: Average number of workdays lost per month for each operational staff member (Band 2 – Band 5) in HM Prisons


Average work days lost

Staff retention and training

In the years since the SIP roll-out, prisons faced problems with staff retention, leading to both a resource and knowledge gap. In the 12 months to March 2023, almost 19% of Band 2 OSGs left HMPPS, above the pre-pandemic average of 11.4% (see figure 4).

Figure 4: Leaving rate of operational staff (Band 2 – Band 5)

Note: Leaving rate is calculated by the number of leavers divided by the average number of staff in post.

Source: HMPPS Workforce Statistics – March 2023

The staff leaving included those who had been trained as part of SIP which left a gap in staff who had been trained to use the equipment. The level of experience amongst Band 2 OSGs was falling in each of the last 4 years. In the 12 months to March 23, 41.9% of OSGs had been in post for less than 2 years (see table 3). Therefore, many of the staff specially trained on SIP equipment will no longer be in post.

Table 3: Operational Support Grade (OSG) staff with less than two years' experience at the end of each financial year 2020–2023

Source	31-Mar-20	31-Mar-21	31-Mar-22	31-Mar-23
Table 4 – HMPPS Workforce Statistics – March 2023	26.9%	28.3%	35.1%	41.9%

A staff survey from the XRBS classroom training demonstrated that the training was largely successful in upskilling the participants in the knowledge required to carry out body

scanning, with generally high levels of confidence reported. For example, 65% of all respondents said that they were mostly or very confident in their ability to use the XRBS effectively following training and of those who completed both classroom and floorwalking training 77% were mostly or very confident in their ability. This suggests a level of competency using the body scanners from those who completed the training. However, there were also perceptions that not all prisons had access to ongoing training. Staff reported training each other through word-of-mouth, and also not using the equipment to its full potential because of a lack of trained staff, reducing the impact of SIP interventions. In addition to this, staff identified limitations to training for PSM. For example, participants reported that staff being trained to use EGS were not taught how to resolve conflict if an individual resists. Further considerations around training can be found in the Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation (section 5).

3.2 Reduction of conveyance in the mail room

Below is a theory of change to show the theoretical impact of the implementation of SIP measures aimed at decreasing conveyance at the mailroom.

Table 4: Reduced conveyance in the mail room theory of change

Input: SIP measures aimed at decreasing conveyance in the mailroom	Output:	Intended effect: short term	Intended effect: long term	Other effect: long term
Provision of 45 trace detection units to prisons	New or additional capability for prison staff to identify substances on incoming mail	More substances are stopped from entering the prison estate via the mailroom	Reduced conveyance through routes targeted by SIP due to a deterrence effect	Displacement to other routes of conveyance

Due to data limitations with not being able to measure the number of items being conveyed via this route, there is limited evidence available to assess how effective SIP was at preventing illicit items from entering through the mailroom. However, the qualitative research suggests there were mixed perceived impacts reported by participants. The research found that some staff and prisoners reported that SIP trace detection had stopped or continued to stop drugs from coming into prisons via the mailroom. However,

some staff also reported that the new equipment was less effective than previous equipment. Reasons given included it being more difficult to take samples, less nuanced detection, and inaccurate detection of illicit substances including giving false positives. One view among establishment operational staff was that this meant that fewer illicit substances were now being detected by this new security measure. For further detail on this equipment please refer to the Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation (section 5.4).

Assessing the impact of the SIP investment on the conveyance of illicit items via the mailroom is particularly challenging as the impact may differ based on the pre-existing practices for each prison. In establishments with equipment already in place or existing measures to stop conveyance via the mailroom,[3] the impact was expected to be less pronounced. To protect the anonymity of research participants, it has not been possible to link the perceived impacts for this investment with the pre-existing equipment for trace detection in that establishment.

3.3 Increase in staff capability and confidence

The outcomes above suggest a general increase in staff capability for preventing illicit items entering via the gate and reception as there is evidence demonstrating that this equipment is stopping these items, all of which are staff led. The qualitative research further supports this as some staff reported they recognised the need for SIP and report feeling more confident in security measures due to SIP. Further information on staff perceptions on capability and confidence can be found in the Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation.

3.4 Staff are better equipped to understand and manage corruption effectively

In this section, we review how effective SIP was at equipping staff to better understand and manage corruption effectively, and the factors that aided or impeded this. SIP primarily aimed to achieve this through the funding and activities introduced by the

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3 Some existing measures in place to prevent conveyance via mail include; providing photocopies of social letters being sent to prisoners; barcode verification protocols for legal mail where barcodes are issued by the prison and displayed on legal mail to show prison mailroom staff that the sender is approved.

Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) Prevent function, the CCU Pursue function, and other cross function staff introduced through SIP funding. These functions are closely intertwined in their delivery, and so the findings associated with SIP's investment in CCU cannot always be isolated to a particular CCU function or activity. The following findings provide evidence that staff feel they are better equipped to understand and manage corruption effectively since the introduction of SIP, however, it should be noted that it is likely that knowledge and understanding would improve organically over time, because staff would have gained more experience. Therefore, caution needs to be given when applying some of these findings solely to the SIP investment.

Survey participants were asked for their views on how their understanding of corruption had changed over a two-year period, which coincided with the beginning of SIP investment. The survey found:

- 65% of staff agreed that over the last two years their understanding of the behaviours and actions that constituted corruption had improved (base 459).
- 65% of people agreed that over the last two years their ability to recognise which prisoners represent a corruption risk had increased (base 459).
- 69% agreed that over the last two years their ability to identify corruption had increased (base 459).
- 62% agreed that over the last two years their understanding of how to protect themselves from corruption had improved (base 449).

The second aspect of this outcome, managing corruption effectively, can be seen through the reporting of staff corruption cases. The qualitative research identified one perception amongst participants that more cases of corruption were being reported. Reasons given for this included a better understanding of reporting options, and the processes in place to handle reports. This was further echoed in the survey:

- 58% of staff who completed the CCU survey said that in the last two years, their understanding of how to report corruption had increased (base 454).
- 82% of staff felt confident that any corruption reports would be taken seriously (base 490).

These survey responses may be supported by NIAC's reflections, where they reported an increase in intelligence reports for staff through prison intelligence systems (Mercury).

However, in addition to staff corruption, intelligence reports for staff include reports pertaining to professional standards and conflicts of interest. It is not currently possible to isolate intelligence reporting on staff corruption from the other two categories. Therefore, it can only be concluded that the increase in intelligence reports for staff *may* be due to increased reporting of possible staff corruption.

The research also identified some barriers to staff reporting corruption. The perceived lack of engagement towards staff in corruption processes as well as the feeling of reports not being investigated properly were some barriers given. In the survey 35% of staff did not think that the consequences for those engaging in corruption were appropriate, and when asked why, inadequate punishment was cited as a reason for over 75% of respondents' outcomes.

SIP also enabled staff's ability to manage corruption through investigation work. Strategic staff reported that the increase in investigative capabilities following SIP investment had facilitated the investigation of less serious corruption cases and hence played a role in averting the escalation of certain cases into more severe forms of corruption. The qualitative research further found that SIP was perceived by some participants to have enabled higher quality investigation and improved establishments' understanding of how to build a case for court.

Despite the findings above, the research also found that some staff still felt that the CCU strand had little impact on investigating and prosecuting corruption and that the process had been more efficient prior to its introduction. This was felt to be exacerbated by a lack of communication regarding the actions or outcomes of cases either to staff who submitted a report or to analysts involved in intelligence-gathering for a case.

A barrier, perceived by staff, to the CCU strand improving awareness and management of corruption was training. In the survey 39% of respondents answered that they had been invited to a corruption awareness session. Of those that did attend, 71% answered that the session was 'extremely' or 'very' useful. To note at the time of the survey some prisons were still in the process of receiving CCU Prevent's corruption awareness sessions.

For further detailed on the findings please refer to the Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation (section 7).

3.5 Staff are more resilient to corruption

This section reviews how the individuals experience of resilience has changed following SIP's activities, rather than the broader organisational resilience that will be seen from managing corruption effectively. This expected outcome is aligned with the previous outcome, as staff resilience to corruption is an extension of an improved understanding of corruption risks. The following findings provide examples on staff resilience to corruption having been improved as a result of SIP.

Fewer prisoners seeking out staff to corrupt them

Some staff suggested that the shift to prosecuting prisoners involved in corrupting staff had led to fewer prisoners seeking out officers to bring in illicit items.

Corrupt staff removed from post

One view among staff was that there was an increased number of corrupt staff being removed from their post and more cases going to court.

Enhanced Gate Security (EGS) has increased staff resilience to corruption

It was not purely through increased CCU activity that staff resilience to corruption was affected. SIP's introduction of Enhanced Gate Security measures was also felt to improve staff resilience to corruption, as they would be less pressured to bring items into the prison if measures worked effectively. However, it was felt by some staff that it may have the opposite effect i.e., the reduction in conveyance of illicit items into prisons through SIP measures was leading to alternative routes of conveyance, including increased pressure on staff. This is further supported by NIAC who report that the financial incentive for staff to bring in illicit items is greater when other viable routes of conveyance are closed.

Regardless of the mixed view on the effect of EGS and corruption, there is evidence to suggest that SIP has not completely stopped corruption. NIAC has reported that conveyance still occurs, and staff are using similar concealment methods as pre-SIP, although it is impossible to know the extent of this.

Multiple barriers were identified which may have affected staff becoming more resilient to corruption as a result of SIP.

- Staff turnover – The high level of staff turnover seen in HMPPS (see staff retention and training in section 3.1) could erode organisational resilience to corruption. This is because staff who have received training leave the organisation and their replacements lack the same knowledge. Although, on the other hand, new staff may have had less exposure to influences that may corrupt them.

- **COVID-19 disrupted conveyance routes –** NIAC reported that due to the reduction in items coming from visitors, there was a larger financial benefit for staff bringing in items which made corruption more attractive.

- **Rises in the cost of living for prison staff –** According to staff and prisoners, and NIAC, the cost-of-living crisis is almost certainly impacting prison staff and their households. It is a realistic possibility that this will make some staff more susceptible to corruption to increase their income, particularly staff on lower pay.

3.6 Other consequences of SIP

In the next section, we speak about the other consequences of SIP. Whilst these outcomes are non-desirable, they were predicted consequences of SIP investment and their presence indicates a level of success in the deployment of SIP.

SIP causes displacement

The rationale with SIP was to block several routes of conveyance into the prisons at once to minimise the ability to find alternative routes of conveyance (referred to as displacement). SIP deployed PSM aimed at blocking conveyance through the gate, reception, and mailroom as part of its first line of defence (see Table 1). Despite the relatively broad reach of SIP, it did not cover all existing and emerging conveyance routes.

Since SIP was implemented, participants taking part in the Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation and NIAC have reported increased activities of routes which have not been targeted by SIP (for example, drones). Whilst some staff report that this is due to SIP, an alternative view among NIAC suggest it was due to COVID-19 lockdown controls, amongst other factors. This is due to fewer prisoners and visitors going into prisons, who may bring in illicit items.

There are some examples, of where SIP has forced conveyance facilitators to adapt their conveyance routes. For example, staff report it is easy to see internally secreted mobile phones with XRBS. NIAC reports that it is likely that conveyance facilitators are having to use different routes to convey phones and assess that it is likely further displacement will be seen as XRBS becomes an embedded counter conveyance measure.

One hypothesised route of displacement from PSM, was via staff, who would be under increased pressure to smuggle items if other routes were blocked. This rationale was part of the reason behind the investment in CCU. In practice, PSM was seen as both a driver and a barrier for corruption. The impact of this is further explored in section 3.5.

It is unclear the extent to which displacement was able to "replace" illicit items which SIP and COVID-19 lockdown controls blocked from entering the prisons. Some staff report lower levels of drugs in prisons leading to various issues such as: increased requirements to manage prisoner withdrawal symptoms; increased disruption; increased violence due to limited supplies in the illicit economy; and increased pressures on staff vulnerable to corruption to smuggle goods. This may indicate that in these instances displacement has been effectively blocked. However, other staff mention not seeing much impact on levels of illicit items, suggesting that displacement had been effective.

The differences in perceptions of conveyance may have been due to:
- Local differences – some establishments may be more vulnerable to displacement due to their location, architecture, wider security interventions employed and cohort of prisoners and staff.
- Timing of research – the longer time had passed between the new security measures being implemented and the research, the longer alternative conveyances routes had to form. These differences were widened by the long process of implementing SIP measures and conducting research.

Violence patterns changed due to SIP's restriction of illicit items

Understanding the drivers of prison violence is complex. Evidence suggests the drivers are multifaceted, for example, offender characteristics and prison environment can be contributing factors (Ellison et al, 2018). This complexity is further illustrated by the

process evaluation which concluded in mixed perceptions amongst staff and prisoners about SIP's impact on violence.

One view was that SIP was seen by staff and prisoners to **reduce** violence because:

- SIP prevented illicit items entering prisons. This reduced the illicit economy and led to reductions in debt and associated violence.

Another view was that SIP was seen by staff and prisoners to **increase** violence because:

- Prisoners faced reprisals if unable to obtain illicit items to sell to pay off existing debts.
- Reduced availability of illicit items sparks fights, due to competition for scarce resources.
- Increased numbers of prisoner suffering from withdrawal symptoms and a resulting higher care burden from staff.

Security interventions need to be considered in the context of the wider function of establishments

Various pieces of equipment provided by SIP, particularly for EGS, were large and needed to be installed in establishments which were not designed to accommodate them. This resulted in internal structures needing reconfiguration, which was particularly challenging where prisons consisted of listed buildings.

Due to this reconfiguration in some establishments, there was no longer anywhere inside the gate for visitors to wait and staff had to stand outside before coming in. This was particularly problematic when the weather conditions were poor. Furthermore, EGS was felt to have increased the amount of time it took staff and visitors to enter the prison. This was felt to be exacerbated by the absence of the X-ray baggage scanners in many establishments where staff had to conduct manual bag searching.

It was also felt to be challenging to prioritise staffing security interventions as establishments needed flexibility to draw on staffing resources from other parts of the prison as necessary.

For further detail on EGS please refer to the Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation (section 5.2).

4. Conclusion

When delivered effectively, SIP interventions showed promise of being able to meet its intended outcomes to some degree. NatCen's process evaluation research findings, triangulated with other available data sources and metrics, suggest that SIP was preventing conveyance of some illicit items through the gate and reception. Some staff felt they had an improved understanding of, and resilience to, corruption, and some staff reported feeling more confident in security measures due to SIP.

However, one dominant barrier that prevented SIP from achieving its full impact was staff shortages. Fixed levels of staff resource provided by SIP to manage the PSM were often absorbed into wider prison priorities, even when SIP trained staff were available.

Some of these causes, such as high sickness levels in staff as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, may naturally ease over time. However, high levels of staff turnover and increasing demands on staff because of growing prisoner populations[4] will continue to hinder the effectiveness of SIP's investment, if not addressed. In areas where SIP resource was being used as intended, such as funded police investigators for corruption cases, there is still a risk that resources become too stretched as caseloads of minor and major instances of corruption increase.

The security landscape in prisons is ever changing. The delayed addition of X-ray baggage scanners, reported by participants as the key component of Enhanced Gate Security, happened shortly after the research period. There was also investment in additional trace detection units beyond that funded by SIP. The Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) continued to engage with prisons to encourage full take up of the CCU Prevent offer and were largely successful in this. Therefore, as interventions have more time to embed further, their impact may continue to improve, providing sufficient resourcing

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[4]   Prison Population Projections 2022 to 2027 – https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1138135/Prison_Population_Projections_2022_to_2027.pdf

remains in place. Aspects of SIP's aims, such as increasing departmental resilience to corruption, requires cultural change which may take years to achieve.

Any future research and analysis will need to consider the wider security implementation, as well as SIP. However, as illustrated by this outcome study there remains a challenge in measuring the impact of SIP. The covert nature of some interventions, the interconnected nature of the security environment and the differences in security measures across establishments and the lack of robust data all contribute to this challenge. The evidence for outcomes were mainly based on the findings from the qualitative encounters of the process evaluation and are therefore mainly perceptions led. This is important for providing an in-depth understanding of the perceived outcomes of SIP among stakeholders and partners, prison staff and prisoners. However, the first two outcomes in particular (relating to reduction in conveyance) would have benefited from data on the number of items prevented, to provide greater insight into whether the programme is meeting its intended aims or not. Due to data limitations this has only been feasible for the XRBS.

For further detail on please refer to the Three lines of Defence Process Evaluation and the Multi-Agency Response to Serious and Organised Crime Process Evaluation.

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Appendix A
SIP's equipment and processes

X-ray Body Scanners (XRBS)

The XRBS was delivered to prisons to allow them to scan prisoners for internally secreted items when there was sufficient intelligence or reasonable suspicion.

- 75 XRBS machines were given to 74 prisons in the male closed estate, with the scanners being housed in and around the prisoner reception area.
- The scanners were delivered between July 2020 and August 2021

Enhanced Gate Security (EGS)

The EGS was installed in prisons to provide 'airport style' security at the prison gate, where staff and visitors enter the establishments. Since SIP was initiated, its scope changed.

- The Tier 1 EGS was provided to 42 prisons comprising of handheld wands, metal detection archways, searching equipment, drug detection dogs and dog handlers.
- A further 7 prisons received Tier 2 EGS, a flexible provision of EGS due to the prohibitive costs of gate reconfiguration to accommodate Tier 1 EGS.
- SIP originally scoped to include X-ray baggage scanners as part of Enhanced Gate Security (EGS). These were excluded from SIP due to issues with procurement; however, they have since been rolled out across the estate. The delayed arrival happened after the research period and so the impact of X-ray Baggage Scanners on prisons has not been assessed.
- EGS went live in prisons between December 2020 and March 2022.

Trace Detection

As part of SIP's second line of defence, SIP provided trace detection units to prisons. Trace Detection machines are primarily used to prevent drug-laced prisoner mail entering prisons and they are normally housed in or around the mailroom. Trace Detection machines also have the capability to be used to test items found in other locations in the

prisons for illicit substances.[5] Prior to the SIP investment some prisons were already using another make of trace detection machines (referred to as 'rapiscanners' or 'itemisers'). In other sites, trace detection capability was missing entirely before SIP.

- SIP provided 45 male closed prisons with a trace detection machine. The units were rolled out between February 2022 and a further 50 Smith machines were rolled out through a separate funding exercise to bolster capability even wider across the prison estate.

- The 45 units funded by SIP were delivered between February 2022 and March 2022. The additional non-SIP funded units were delivered between April 2022 up until March 2023.

Training and support for prisons to use new and existing equipment effectively

As part of SIP's second line of defence, SIP implemented a range of measures to allow prisons to utilise equipment they already had. A range of training packages and guidance was made available to staff, including user guidance for pieces of equipment. SIP also funded the posting of DCLs, who were central points of contact for all users of phone detection equipment in the prison estate and regional search teams.

Provision of equipment to Dedicated Search Teams (DSTs)

SIP provided searching equipment to the four regional DST teams, North, South, Wales and Long-Term High Security Estate (LTHSE). This equipment would be used in DSTs regular activities and added to their range of searching equipment.

- SIP provided:
    – Portable signal detectors
    – Hardware detection poles
    – Handheld metal detector wands
    – Other supporting searching tools

Like all SIP activities, the provisions coincided with the onset of restricted regimes, and increasingly stretched resource across prisons. This led to shifting priorities for DST teams. In at least one region, DST teams were redeployed entirely to support basic

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[5]   The use of trace detection machines in other target locations will be outlined in an updated trace detection policy framework.

prisons operations. This limited the impact DSTs were able to have with their new equipment. DSTs often use different equipment in conjunction with each other to carry out effective searches, including equipment unrelated to SIP investment.

Setup and delivery of the Counter Corruption Unit Prevent function.

SIP's third line of defence allowed for the expansion of HMPPS's Counter Corruption Unit (CCU), and the introduction of the Prevent strand. The Prevent strand focused on providing training, support and guidance to staff to prevent corruption. The newly recruited CCU team began rolling out the 'Prevent offer' to prisons, starting from April 2021. Not all of the Prevent activities undertaken since SIP funding were in scope for this research. Those that were in scope have been listed here:

- The 'Interim Prevent Offer' was the initial package of support offered to prisons. As the name suggests, future changes were already anticipated at the outset. The offer consisted of Resilience and Support Meetings (RSM), Floorwalking of Regional Prevent Managers and Delivery of an awareness package. Prevent posters were also developed and put in prisons, and a full cleanse of corrupter alerts on NOMIS.

Setup and delivery of the Counter Corruption Unit Pursue function

In addition to the Prevent strand, the Pursue function changed the landscape of managing and investigating corruption cases. The primary investment into Pursue has been listed here:

- The framework and investment to undertake monthly case management meetings (see figure 5). The case management meetings take place at the prison, and ensure the review, categorisation and ongoing management of local corruption cases.
- SIP also funded posts for 58 prison-based caseworkers, and 20 police investigators.
- Improve capability of case management systems

Figure 5: Illustration of CCU's monthly case management meetings

All local counter corruption staff

Local Counter Corruption Manager (typically the Deputy Governor)

Deputy Local Counter Corruption Manager

Regional Corruption Prevent Manager

Monthly case management meetings at a prison

Agenda:

- Local corruption caseload

- Risk categorisation of cases (assigning Band 1-4)

- Potential outcomes

Police Investigator

Regional Corruption Prevent Lead

Regional Corruption Administration Specialist

Regional Corruption Pursue Manager

Regional Corruption Pursue Lead (optional)

Multi-Agency Response to Serious and Organised Crime

A full description of MARSOC can be found in the Multi-Agency Response to Serious and Organised Crime Process Evaluation.

Appendix B
Methodology

This study sought to measure the outcomes that were expected to be achieved following the delivery and roll out of SIP. The five key expected outcomes were identified at the start of the evaluation period in conjunction with the programme aims and in consultation with key stakeholders responsible for programme delivery and management.

To understand outcomes associated with SIP, a qualitative-led mixed methods approach was chosen, primarily using the findings from the independently administered qualitative research to understand the delivery of SIP's three lines of defence. The findings were then triangulated with other available data sources (intelligence perceptions, MI data, internal surveys) to help build a full understanding.

The triangulation of data sources in this outcome study involved cross checking findings from the process evaluation with independent sources of information and working closely with data partners and experts inside MoJ to ensure the balanced presentation of evidence. NatCen also reviewed this report to corroborate reference to the process evaluation findings. Where possible and / or applicable, data sources were also used to add additional context to a finding. Any mixed or unclear findings were also represented.

The remainder of this appendix details the data sources used in this study.

Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation
This was commissioned by the MoJ SIP Evaluation Team in December 2021, and conducted by the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen). As well as evaluating the setup and delivery of the three lines of defence, a key focus of the research was understanding the perceived impacts of the programme. The perceived impacts were taken from different groups consisting of strategic stakeholders of SIP, prison management, prison staff and prisoners.

Research for the Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation was made up of:

- In-depth interviews and focus groups with a range of strategic stakeholders and partners of SIP responsible for the management and implementation of the programme.
- In-depth interviews and focus groups in 12 prison establishments during the second half of 2022 and early 2023. Participants were made up of senior establishment staff, prison staff, and prisoners.

In total, 183 people took part and 129 qualitative encounters were conducted (20 interviews and focus groups with strategic leads, stakeholders, and partners; 78 interviews and focus groups with prison lead and operational staff; and 31 interviews with prisoners).

- A survey for prison staff, in relation to counter corruption, was administered online in early 2023. The survey was rolled out to the same 12 case study prisons, as well as 8 additional prisons recruited. The survey sample was designed to be self-selecting, where individuals volunteered to take part, and as such were not representative of the whole prison estate.

In total, 530 staff returned responses for the quantitative survey, of which 475 were fully completed.

Further information around the methodology undertaken, including sampling criteria, recruitment process and achieved sample, can be found in the Three Lines of Defence Process Evaluation.

Intelligence

The MOJ SIP Evaluation Team invited HMPPS National Intelligence Assessments Centre (NIAC), as experts of prison intelligence, to provide their qualitative opinions on the landscape of prison security.

NIAC sit within the HMPPS National Intelligence Unit, and assess local and regional intelligence reports, alongside wider security metrics, to understand emerging threats to prison security at a national level.

NIAC were provided with a list of questions and responded with a bespoke briefing note in April 2023. The questions posed to NIAC can be seen below. NIAC conforms to the

Government Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis, a body in Cabinet Office who design and control the analytical and predictive language intelligence analysts use in their reporting. This is a 'yardstick' tool to assist the selection of verbal probability terms to illustrate the likelihood of events. The probability and analytical confidence statements articulate the uncertainty surrounding an intelligence judgement.

The questions posed to NIAC were as follows:

1.   Any evidence of a change in the number of illicit items in prisons over the last 2–3 years? And why is that?

2.   Has there been a change in the conveyance channels over the last two years and if so, how?

3.   Why have there been changes to conveyance channels?

4.   Are there any new conveyance methods emerging?

5.   Has the level of corruption changed in the past two years and if so, how?

6.   Has there been any change in the drivers of corruption and if so, what are they?

Analysis of prison management information

Some management information was referenced in this report. The information was not collected for statistics or research, but rather as a by-product of administering HMPPS security processes.

- XRBS data: As part of the SIP roll-out, prisons were asked to report the total number of positive, negative and inconclusive scans. From July 2020 –April 2021 this information was collected via a weekly paper-based exercise by prisons who received an XRBS under SIP. Since May 2021 this data collection has been automated with prisons uploading their data monthly to HMPPS performance hub. The information used in this report was therefore extracted from HMPPS Performance Hub. Previous publications of XRBS scan data can be found here.

- EGS audit data: Following the implementation of Tier 1 enhanced gate security in 42 prisons, HMPPS conducted ad-hoc data collection exercises where prisons were asked to self-report their usage of EGS in different months, to enable support provisions to be put in place. Due to the self-reported nature of collection, this data is strictly considered to be management information, and has been referenced where useful to help contextualise findings.

HMPPS Workforce Statistics

The report made use of HMPPS Workforce Statistics. In addition, this report includes a monthly breakdown of 'Average Workdays Lost' (Figure 3).

X-ray Body Scanner Training Feedback

This report incorporates findings from the XRBS training feedback survey which is outlined below.

This survey was distributed via an online link to 1838 of the 1955 prison staff who were trained to use XRBS. Information on the total number of attendees was not collected and 1955 represents only those who were willing to pass on their name for feedback collection purposes. The link was sent one or two weeks after completing the course and it was left open from July 2020 until October 2021.

There were 324 responses, meaning that there was a response rate of almost 18%. As the total number attendants was not recorded, this percentage is not definitive. Due to the low response rate, these responses cannot be generalised, and no statistical significance testing was carried out.

Survey questions

1.   Which prison did you receive the training at? Please state below:

2.   What grade/band are you?
   - Band 2 OSG
   - Band 3/prison officer
   - Band 4/supervisory officer
   - Band 5/custodial manager
   - Band 6
   - Band 7 and above

3.   Have you had previous experience of using X-ray Body Scanners in prisons?

4.   Please select which method of training you have had with X-ray Body Scanners. Tick all that apply.

- Classroom training (end user training)

- Received advice/information from floor walker

- Other – please comment below

5.   To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

I understand when it would be appropriate to put a prisoner through the X-ray Body Scanner

- Strongly disagree

- Disagree

- Neutral

- Agree

- Strongly agree

I know how to use the X-ray Body Scanner to produce a good quality image

- Strongly disagree

- Disagree

- Neutral

- Agree

- Strongly agree

I know how to identify anomalies in X-ray Body Scanner images correctly

- Strongly disagree

- Disagree

- Neutral

- Agree

- Strongly agree

6.   Overall, how confident are you in your ability to use the X-ray Body Scanner effectively?

- Very confident
- Mostly confident
- Somewhat confident
- A little confident
- Not confident at all

7.   Do you feel like your need more training on the following? Please tick all that apply:

- The legislation for X-ray Body Scanners
- Health and safety measures for X-ray Body Scanners
- How to use the X-ray Body Scanner to produce a good quality image
- How to interpret X-ray Body Scanner images correctly
- Other (please comment below)

8.   Is there anything you expected to learn but didn't during the X-ray Body Scanner training? Please comment below

9.   Is there anything else you would like to mention?

Appendix C
X-ray Body Scanner (XRBS) Management Information

Background and Coverage

This appendix sets out management information on the number of scans and indications from X-ray Body Scanners (XRBS) used in the adult male closed prison estate invested in as part of the Security Investment Programme (SIP). It does not include information on scans from existing XRBS installed in prisons before or after SIP.

This appendix refers to indications of suspected contraband from the XRBS only. This is different to the finds data published in the HMPPS Annual Digest[6] which refers to the number of physical finds of illicit items in prison.

Since the first installation under SIP, prisons have been asked to report the total number of positive scans, negative scans and inconclusive scans. From July 2020 – April 2021 this information was collected via a weekly paper-based exercise by those who received an XRBS under SIP. Since May 2021 this data collection has been automated with prisons uploading their data on a monthly basis to a performance hub.

Overall, since July 2020 there have been 53,041 positive scans from XRBS installed as part of SIP. These are scans where there was an indication of suspected contraband. A breakdown of the scan data is presented in Table 5.

Table 5: XRBS scan results for prisons where X-ray body scanners were installed as part of the SIP

	July 2020 – March 2024
Positive Scans Reported to Date	53,041
Negative Scans Reported to Date	446,912
Inconclusive Scans Reported to Date	19,079
Total Scans Reported to Date	**519,032**

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[6] HMPPS Annual Digest, April 2022 to March 2023 - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

Data collection and data quality notes:

- Prior to May 2021, reporting was through a paper-based exercise. The recording of the number of inconclusive and the total number of scans may have been inconsistent as some prisons treated the counts of inconclusive scans and rescans differently. Some prisons recorded multiple scans for an individual whereas other prisons only counted the final result of an individual's scans. The figures presented here are as recorded by prisons with no adjustments made.

- There is limited scope to quality assure the data submitted by prisons, however, the data collection has now been automated and a consistent methodology for recording scans data is being defined through the Performance Hub.

- The data was extracted on 15 April 2024. As this is management information the numbers are likely to change following receipt of further data from prisons.