Foreword

We live in an increasingly contested and volatile world. The future operating context is expected to be more congested and more urban, with greater volatility within communities and across states and a greater prospect of friendly and enemy forces engaging in close proximity to civilians and civilian infrastructure. Combative social politics, growing populations, migration and competition over scarce resources together with a more challenging information environment all add to drivers of instability. Conflict is prosecuted in new and diverse ways both above and below the threshold of armed conflict and in new areas of contestation, such and space and cyber. These sit alongside an increasing awareness that the civilian population is a domain of influence, conflict and control. For some, human rights violations against civilians are no longer viewed as collateral damage, instead the targeting of civilians has become central to warring factions’ tactics and objectives.

As the world becomes more dangerous, we must be prepared to deter our enemies, lead our Allies and defend our nation. This demands that Defence both anticipates and is prepared to navigate these new challenges, evolving its capabilities in order to do so. The UK recognises the clear link between the security of the state and security of individuals and communities. We know that gender equality and women’s participation in security institutions supports more stable outcomes, and we have seen how physical assaults, torture and sexual violence against civilians have been deployed as part of the battlespace to advance military objectives. Capture and control of cultural heritage and identities can serve to bolster territorial claims, and the weaponisation of global grain supplies can fuel food insecurity and leverage international dependencies.

Human Security in Defence recognises the specific and unique contribution that the military can make to advancing security for populations. Conflict does not exist in a vacuum and populations are not passive by-standers. There is a moral, legal and strategic imperative to human security. It is fundamentally the right thing to do, we are bound by legal obligations such as within international humanitarian law, moreover, adopting a human security approach can be a force multiplier, strengthening our legitimacy to act and our ability to deliver mission objectives.

Human Security is applicable to situations above and below the threshold of armed conflict, across all domains and surpasses geographical boundaries. It introduces an analytical lens that ensures populations are factored in as a critical audience. UK Defence must incorporate Human Security considerations in all that it does, from strategic planning through to the activity performed at the operational and tactical levels to deliver more conflict sensitive and stable outcomes. At its centre, this approach will strengthen our ability to understand the civilian environment, recognise the risks of harm to it, and enable our Defence institution to plan, fight and win.

This policy recognises that human security requires a whole of government approach. Within this, we must recognise the contribution that the military can play in both protecting it and countering adversaries that exploit it, in pursuit of our wider Defence objectives.
JSP 985 is rightly ambitious and, to achieve its objectives and maximise its potential, will require support from leadership at all levels across UK Defence. Through this, we can shape the discourse on the security of human beings on the global stage and increase the prospects for long term peace and stability.

General Sharon Nesmith
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
Preface

How to use this Joint Service Publication (JSP)

1. JSP 985 is the authoritative tri-Service Human Security (HS) policy that provides direction on a HS approach. This policy, direction and guidance applies to the development, planning and execution of military operations and activity across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and across the continuum of competition inclusive of warfare. This JSP has been developed based on lessons and experience gained on operations and exercises. Applying the direction and guidance within this JSP will make the Armed Forces more effective, more able to achieve our National Security and Foreign Policy Objectives and better placed to uphold our international commitments. This JSP will be formally reviewed as a minimum every 48 months, with any interim changes and policy development endorsed through the formal HS governance structures within UK Defence.

The policies contained within this JSP have been equality and diversity impact assessed in accordance with Departmental policy.

Coherence with other Policy and Guidance

2. Where this document contains references to policies, publications and other JSPs which are published by other Functions, these Functions have been consulted in the formulation of the policy and guidance detailed in this publication.

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<th>Title</th>
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<td>Applying Prevent within Defence</td>
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<td>JSP 381</td>
<td>Aide Memoire on the Law of Armed Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSP 398</td>
<td>United Kingdom Manual of National Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSP 465</td>
<td>Defence Geospatial Intelligence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSP 503</td>
<td>Defence Manual of Resilience</td>
</tr>
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<td>JSP 510</td>
<td>International Defence Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP 763</td>
<td>The MOD Behaviours and Informal Complaints Resolution Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP 769</td>
<td>Zero Tolerance to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP 822</td>
<td>Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP 830</td>
<td>Manual of Service Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP 834</td>
<td>Safeguarding</td>
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</table>

Further Advice and Feedback – Contacts

3. The owner of this JSP is the MOD central HS team. For further information and advice or to provide feedback on the content of this publication, please contact: SPOMilStrat-HumSec-Pol-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk.

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1 The JSP can be revised sooner if there is clear and obvious value to this.
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# Glossary

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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description/definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>An individual, group or entity whose actions are affecting the attainment of the end state.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary</td>
<td>An individual, group or entity whose intentions or interests are opposed to those of friendly parties and against which legal coercive political, military or civilian actions may be envisaged and conducted.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audience</td>
<td>An individual, group or entity whose interpretation of events and subsequent behaviour may affect the attainment of the end state. (Note: The audience may consist of public, stakeholders and actors)</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audience Analysis</td>
<td>The understanding and segmentation of audiences in support of the achievement of objectives.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>A person below the age of 18, unless the laws of a particular country set the legal age for adulthood younger.</td>
<td>United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Civil society encompasses a spectrum of actors with a wide range of purposes, constituencies, structures, degrees of organisation, functions, size, resource levels, cultural contexts, ideologies, membership, geographical coverage, strategies and approaches.</td>
<td>The Future Role of Civil Society, World Economic Forum (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>A military joint function that integrates the understanding of the civil factors of the operating environment and that enables, facilitates and conducts civil-military interaction to support the accomplishment of missions and military strategic objectives in peacetime, crisis and conflict.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)</td>
<td>Activities between military NATO bodies and non-military actors to foster mutual understanding that enhance effectiveness and efficiency in crisis management and conflict prevention and resolution.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Sector</td>
<td>For profit organisations inclusive of consultancies, professional services, think tanks and industry.</td>
<td>UK Terminology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>A political-military situation between peace and war, distinguished from peace by the introduction of organized political violence and from war by its reliance on political methods. It shares many of the goals and characteristics of war, including the destruction of governments and the control of territory.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database - 27679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict Sensitivity</td>
<td>Conflict sensitivity means understanding the context in which you are operating, understanding the interaction between your engagement and the context, and taking action to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of HMG engagement on conflict and stability.</td>
<td>CS Guidance (publishing.service.gov.uk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>A peace support effort to identify and monitor the potential causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)</td>
<td>Conflict-Related Sexual Violence as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict.</td>
<td>NATO CRSV Policy endorsed May 2021 aligns with United Nations Secretary General, June 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaggregation</td>
<td>In modelling and simulation usage, the action to decompose an aggregated entity into multiple entities representing its components.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>The surroundings in which an organization operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna, humans, and their interrelations.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentary Order</td>
<td>An abbreviated form of an operation order, issued as required, that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>The social attributes associated with being male and female, learned through socialisation, that determine a person's position and value in a given context, including in the relationship between women and men and girls and boys, as well as in the relations between women and those between men.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Advisor</td>
<td>A person who is responsible for providing advice to the commander and the staff on policies from a gender perspective and on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and related resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, in accordance with the Alliance's obligations.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Analysis</td>
<td>The systematic gathering and examination of information on gender differences and on social relations between men and women in order to identify and understand inequities based on gender.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Blindness</td>
<td>The failure to recognize that the roles and responsibilities of men and boys and women and girls are assigned to them in specific social, cultural, economic, and political contexts and backgrounds.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Mainstreaming</td>
<td>A strategy used to achieve gender equality by assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, in all areas and at all levels, in order to assure that the concerns and experiences of both sexes are taken into account.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Sensitive Conflict Analysis</td>
<td>Gender sensitive conflict analysis is the systematic study of the gendered causes, structures, stakeholders and dynamics of conflict and peace.</td>
<td>UK Terminology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Perspective</td>
<td>Gender perspectives take into consideration how a particular situation impacts the needs of men, women, boys and girls, and if and how activities affect them differently.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database - 15195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Data arranged to convey meaning.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralizing an adversary's force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander's plan and towards which the operation is directed.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligation</td>
<td>A legal, contractual or other binding duty or responsibility to act or perform in a certain way.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Order</td>
<td>A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of coordinating the execution of an operation.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>The process of deciding beforehand the manner and order of applying actions in order to reach a desired goal.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>An entity produced by the performance of an operation.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Source</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Refers to the biological aspects of an individual as determined by their anatomy, which is produced by their chromosomes, hormones and their interactions. Generally male or female and something that is assigned at birth.</td>
<td>COED definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Abuse</td>
<td>Any actual or threatened physical act of sexual nature either by force or other coercive conditions conducted by individuals sent to protect and assist communities.</td>
<td>NATO BI-SCD 40-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Exploitation</td>
<td>Any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power or trust for sexual purposes, including profiting monetarily, socially or politically.</td>
<td>NATO BI-SCD 40-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder</td>
<td>An individual, group or entity who can affect or is affected by the attainment of the end state.</td>
<td>Official NATO Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Human Security Advisor (HSA)</td>
<td>UK military service person responsible for assisting in ensuring Human Security (HS) considerations are fused and integrated into planning, analysis and delivery at all levels and within relevant staff function.</td>
<td>HS Training Needs Analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Acronyms, Initialisms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Operational Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BI</td>
<td>Building Integrity and Countering Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAC</td>
<td>Children and Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Cross-Cutting Themes (NATO uses Cross-Cutting Topic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMG</td>
<td>Commitments Management Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Civil Military Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPACC</td>
<td>Counter Proliferation and Arms Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Cultural Property Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRSV</td>
<td>Conflict-Related Sexual Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCDO</td>
<td>Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENAD</td>
<td>Gender Advisor (used in NATO and the UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>Human Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSA</td>
<td>Human Security Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law (also known as LOAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHRL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOs</td>
<td>International Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Policy and Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Integrated Security Fund (formerly Conflict Security and Stability Fund CSSF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEF</td>
<td>Joint Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Joint Service Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOAC</td>
<td>Law of Armed Conflict (also known as IHL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACA</td>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSHT</td>
<td>Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGD</td>
<td>Other Government Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSW</td>
<td>Operational Staff Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCVE</td>
<td>Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>Pre-Deployment Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Partner Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Only lists acronyms, initialisms and abbreviations with multiple entries which are relevant to this policy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSVI</td>
<td>Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>Requests for Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASE</td>
<td>Safe and Secure Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJFHQ</td>
<td>Standing Joint Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Strategic Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRO</td>
<td>Senior Responsible Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sS</td>
<td>Single Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRA</td>
<td>Training Requirements Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAD</td>
<td>Training Requirements Authority Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCDS</td>
<td>Vice Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women, Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

1. **Introduction.** This is the (third) iteration of the Human Security Policy within Defence. The Defence position continues to align with national approaches and international institutions such as NATO, the UN and the OCSE as well as supporting cross HMG positions. This latest version of the policy takes a longer-term view on achieving strategic success, has a greater emphasis on analysis and understanding of the strategic and operational environment and includes a new dimension on the application of Human Security within the Management of Defence.

2. **Call to action.** This JSP remains a call to action for Defence to continue to evolve its capabilities in responding to the evolving character of conflict. It identifies the link between the security of the state and the security of individuals and the centrality of the population as a domain of influence and control. The policy recognises that gender equality, women’s participation in security, physical and sexual violence perpetrated against civilians, the protection of cultural heritage, corruption and food insecurity may all drive, contribute to or exacerbate conflict. The Defence approach to Human Security explains the moral, legal and strategic imperatives for incorporating Human Security within Defence, and that to do so strengthens our legitimacy and improves the delivery of operational effect. This policy provides a conceptual background to Human Security and sets out how Defence is to incorporate Human Security in activity ranging from strategic planning through to delivery at the tactical level.

3. **Scope of the policy.** Chapter one situates Human Security in Defence in a whole of government approach, within a national and international framework and provides the legal position of Human Security within Defence. It defines Human Security at the strategic level and sets out three strategic objectives which are to (1) incorporate Human Security considerations in military planning and activity; (2) to coordinate with partners across government and Allies, and with International Organisations, non-governmental organisations, Civil Society Organisations, academia, think tanks and commercial SME’s; and (3) to understand how the causes of crisis and instability cause insecurity to people.

Chapter two discusses the strategic environment and how changing operating environments continue to impact on human insecurity and instability. It explains how coordination with other actors’ aides in an improved understanding of target audiences and provides an overview of the eight factors associated with human security which may drive conflict. These are; economic; food, health; environmental; personal; community; political and ‘information’. It provides a more detailed understanding of the cross-cutting themes which may exacerbate, perpetuate or entrench conflict and instability. These are: Protection of Civilians; Women, Peace and Security, including Conflict Related Sexual Violence; Children and Armed Conflict and Youth, Peace and Security; Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking; Building Integrity and Countering Corruption; and Cultural Property Protection.

Chapter three establishes a planning framework for Human Security in Defence and sets out strategic and operational planning factors and analytical approaches to understanding the human terrain environment. It provides more detailed information on planning and coordination with Other Government Departments, Allies, partners, multilateral organisations.

Chapter four describes how Defence should execute Human Security in how it operates and how it fights. It explains the ways that Human Security can support Defence activity including...
through Defence Relations and Engagement; Preventing and Countering State and non-State threats; strengthening UK Global Standing; protecting the rules based international system and crisis response. It also considers how Human Security may be integrated into generic military functions such as providing a Safe and Secure Environment and the ‘4 R’s of ‘Recognise, Respond Report and Refer’ in a Human Security context. This chapter provides direction on organisational responsibilities from the strategic to the operational.

Chapter five explains how Human Security is integrated into training and education throughout Defence. This includes the delivery of training overseas through the Human Security in Military Operations Course, individual and specialised training as well as training on command and leadership courses. It addresses collective training, continuous professional development and the governance of Human Security training.

Chapter six addresses how Defence assures the implementation of the HS in Defence. Specifically, it seeks to understand how Human Security considerations are being incorporated, how this incorporation is measured for effectiveness within military operations and whether its incorporation is supporting the achievement of Defence objectives. It explains the tools and approaches that are used to incorporate and utilise measurements of effectiveness.

Finally, chapter seven introduces a new dimension of Human Security into Defence by directing that Cross Cutting themes are applied across the Management of Defence as well as in the operational space. It sets how why and how these themes should be applied, as well as the targets that should be met for each cross-cutting theme.

4. Conclusion. Human Security is increasingly being mainstreamed throughout Defence, and this policy seeks to provide the knowledge, guidance and tools to do so effectively. Implemented across Defence, Human Security will continue to advance Defence and wider governmental objectives within the Management of Defence and in the operational space.
1 Introduction to Human Security in UK Defence

0101. Introduction.

Defence is expected to meet a broad spectrum of threats across the globe and across all domains. Confronted by challenges to the Rules Based International Order, climate change, economic challenges, the pace of technological change and competition for food and raw materials, states face increasingly complex and diverse security threats. Defence’s ability to understand the impact of these diverse challenges and adapt to them is key to strategic advantage and operational success.

Recent invasions, alongside the multitude of conflicts taking place across the globe, have made clear that many adversaries and perpetrators of violence are willing to actively target and undermine the security of individuals and communities in pursuit of their goals. Similarly, population vulnerabilities can exacerbate political tensions, become leveraged for political purposes, fuel violent conflict and threaten stability. Civilian deaths in conflict and terrorist attacks have increasingly become a narrative hook upon which military action is rationalised, fuelling further harm to populations and escalating international conflict.

In tandem, it is essential that our own activities are cognisant of the civilian environment, the risks of contributing to human insecurity and be alert to any reverberating effects from this onto our own strategic objectives. There is a moral, legal and strategic imperative for the application of a HS approach. It is the right thing to do, it is informed by our legal commitments and, delivered well, it can strengthen context and conflict analysis, inform operational planning and enhance Defence’s ability to achieve its overarching objectives. At its core, a human security approach sets the conditions in the human environment to enable Defence to fight and win.

HS is a line of context analysis enabling a more informed appreciation of the operating context, the population and gender dynamics, political relationships, types of violence and threats to populations, and the possible implications upon these by military action and interventions. This can inform more nuanced and context specific action that can reduce harm and improve outcomes. It is also a beneficial outcome in itself, recognising that there is a clear link between the security of communities and the security of the state. Finally, HS is a vehicle for Defence action, whereby Defence can engage and promote HS with others in ways that support the Rules Based International Order and build relationship on socially beneficial topics and fields of constructive cooperation.

This JSP sets out the conceptual background to HS and the specific relevance of HS to Defence action and objectives. It discusses the breadth of human security factors and cross cutting themes that it entails, and the manner in which HS can be applied within the Defence realm. It considers our engagements with multilaterals and partners and speak as much to the application within Defence as well as within the internal business functions that support the running and delivery of Defence.


HS is an approach to national and international security which places an emphasis on human beings in addition to the traditional focus on the security of the state. Expanding
understanding of security beyond the state enables a fuller understanding of threats to both the state and communities, and recognises that the two are intertwined. At its centre, the security of individuals and populations are understood as the foundation for long term stability, economic and infrastructure development, political settlements, better societal relationships, good governance and the rule of law.

The concept of HS was originally developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to include all threats to the wellbeing and security of human beings. It integrated three freedoms: ‘Freedom from Fear’ (denoting violent threats to populations), ‘Freedom from Want’ (meaning poverty and absence of basic needs) and ‘Freedom from Indignity’ (which includes human rights abuses and limits on democratic participation). The motivation for the emergence of HS as a concept derived from recognition that it may be more beneficial to prevent the emergence of violent conflict and the humanitarian disasters that came about, rather than to merely respond. It stressed the value of a holistic approach to security that established the foundations for enduring stability.

This concept has continued to evolve. Threats from natural disasters, chronic and persistent poverty, health pandemics, gender and social inequality, climate change, war and international terrorism continue to compromise the prospects of sustainable peace. When these threats overlap, they become insecurity multipliers, exacerbating existing HS issues and fuelling greater conflict and further threats to HS. The cumulative effect of this insecurity can be catastrophic, for individuals, but also for communities, nations and regions.

The HS concept is now an international framework that considers pre, inter and post conflict phases, examines early warning mechanisms and responds to violent and destabilising situations.

0103. UK Defence’s Human Security Approach.

While the full scope of HS is broader than Defence’s mandate, it is essential that Defence is aware of the significant and unique military contribution it can make in the course of its work. The policy specifically tasks Defence to consider:

a. how Defence activity, and that of military partners we support, may impact upon individuals and communities in harmful ways and identify means to mitigate this.

b. how adversaries may exploit and instrumentalise the vulnerabilities of populations or perpetrate malign actions towards the civilian population to advance their political and military agenda, and how these influence the battlefield context. Defence should consider what role it can have in mitigating and responding to these.

c. how Human Security can be a constructive means for Defence engagement, positively influencing the international environment, reinforcing the rules based international system, and generating better outcomes for communities.

This approach recognises that populations are not passive bystanders to conflict. It therefore introduces a line of analysis that can ensure the population is factored in as a stakeholder to violent conflict.

5 JDP 0-01 UK DD.
In recognition of this, UK MOD has embedded several thematic Factors and Cross-Cutting Themes under the term HS (see Chapter 2). By monitoring, analysing and engaging on these themes the UK seeks to mitigate the most harmful effects of conflict and increase the chance of a sustainable and peaceful outcome.

This method requires a whole of government approach, with military objectives and activity integrated within a broader cross government strategy which reinforces direction in the Integrated Operating Concept (IOpC). The HS approach considers how factors affect populations through cultural, social and gender dynamics and will be relevant to operations across the integrated operating framework. A HS approach will enhance our ability to work across government, better enabling the UK to shape the discourse on the security of human beings on the global stage and achieve its National Security Objectives set out in the Integrated Review Refresh and Defence Command Paper Refresh.

Defence will consider HS in all that it does, be that on operations or conducting other activity. This HS approach is essential for a compelling narrative, maintaining the legitimacy and campaign authority of the UK, its Allies and partners.

UK Defence’s **HS approach** has been defined at the strategic level as:

“To gain a heightened understanding of the human environment, potential conflict drivers and dynamics to improve integrated planning and entrench HS in the way Defence operates. This enables the UK Armed Forces to act as a ‘force for good’, minimising harm to civilians and maintaining legitimacy.”

To support this, MOD’s HS governance has endorsed the following strategic objectives:

a. **Objective 1.** To ensure UK Defence personnel have the capability, understanding and training to incorporate HS considerations in their approach to military activity and planning.

b. **Objective 2.** To embed a HS approach into the way we operate, achieving greater effect by coordination with partners across government, Allies and partners, International Organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), academia, think tanks and relevant commercial sector experts.

c. **Objective 3.** To understand how emerging root causes of crises and instability will cause HS issues, enabling better identification of opportunities for prevention and protection, mitigation of harm and enduring solutions.

0104. **National Policy and Strategy.**

The UK’s HS approach is governed by domestic and international law and is complementary to the following UK Government strategies:

a. [UK Approach to Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict](#).

b. [UK Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan 2023-2027](#).

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6 Integrated Operating Concept page 9 para (e) specifically acknowledges the importance of factoring in populations.


e. Protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict.

f. Building Stability Overseas.

g. The CONTEST Strategy 2023.

0105. UK Defence Legal Position.

Consideration of the range of actions under HS requires an appreciation of the UK and MOD’s formal position and understanding of our obligations under domestic and international law. This JSP is not a legal manual and should not be used to interpret the UK’s or an individual’s legal obligations. JSP 383 provides the current authority on obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), including the Geneva Conventions. International Human Rights Law (IHRL) may also be relevant to the activities which come within the scope of HS. For decision making on the provision of security and justice assistance, or support to other states, reference should be made to the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance process. Legal and policy advice should be sought routinely in respect of the application of international and domestic legal obligations for specific operations or activities. The legal framework for HS activities and concerns comes from a large variety of sources. Domestic law sources include the Modern Slavery Act 2015, the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 and the Bribery Act 2010, amongst others. Sources of international legal obligations and policy commitments include the requirements and prohibitions contained in treaties such as the ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’ and the ‘Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’, and in binding United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) together with non-binding UNSCR and United Nations General Assembly Resolutions. In addition, general comments and reports of the United Nations Treaty Monitoring Bodies should be considered.

This JSP has taken full account of this legal background when developing its HS approach. Where personnel have specific concerns about the application of obligations they must engage with legal and policy advisors. This supports the intent of The Good Operation handbook. A formal consideration of any legal and policy implications of proposed actions is necessary throughout operational and strategic planning and should also occur at the tactical level. When referring to legal or policy requirements, staff officers must be clear before phrasing statements in terms of ‘obligation’, ‘aspiration’ or ‘intent’ in order to ensure that commanders and decision makers are not inadvertently or inaccurately constrained in appropriate decision making.

The ability of UK Defence to act on HS related policy aspirations will always be qualified by the unique individual circumstances of each operation, including the legal mandate, mission & tasks and military resources available at the time.

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7 An updated UK Anti-Corruption Strategy is yet to be released which means that the 2017-2022 version will remain extant.
2 Understanding of the Strategic Environment

Strategic Context Setting


War and armed conflict alongside protracted fragility pose challenges and impediments to humans’ security and stability. These can take many forms but are often gendered; chronic and intractable; fuelled by economic and political interests and globalised, illegitimate forms of financing. Moreover, they are frequently exacerbated by the drugs and arms trades, human trafficking, the exploitation of and competition over natural resources and financial remittances.

As highlighted by the UK Defence report on the Future Operating Environment 2035, the strategic context is set to become increasingly complex, dynamic and competitive. The character of warfare is changing rapidly, driven by the pace and pervasiveness of information and technological change. Distinctions between peace and war; public and private; foreign and domestic; state and non-state; and virtual and physical are blurred. With increased urbanisation, violent conflict is increasingly likely to take place in urban and congested populations, putting UK armed forces in ever closer proximity to civilian populations. The UK, our Allies and partners, and the Rules Based International Order that has assured our security and stability for several generations all face diversifying, intensifying, persistent and proliferating threats. These threats are from resurgent and developing powers and from non-state actors such as non-state armed groups, violent extremist organisations and serious and organised criminal networks.

These changes demand a new audience centric approach to planning, through integrated action, at the highest levels\(^8\). This changing threat is also increasingly complex and accentuated by increasing impacts from issues driving HS such as climate, corruption, crime, energy, globalisation, population growth and urbanisation. Defence should better understand the complexities of the environment, to mitigate further harm to the population, and promote an international environment that upholds stability.

0202. Coordinate with other actors to gain wider understanding of audiences.

HS requires a deep understanding of theatre audiences and actors. Audience analysis tools, techniques and methodologies can be utilised to support this. Working with other government departments (OGD), the host nation (HN), IOs, NGOs, CSOs, academia, think tanks and relevant commercial sector experts such as technical consultants should provide additional means to understand these issues and mechanisms in depth, as well as help to identify avenues to address them. The extent of this collaboration will depend on the character of the conflict, mission mandate and security situation and will require planners to resource additional CMI / CIMIC posts to meet the needs to liaise, understand and coordinate with civil agencies. There are three primary facets to be considered when working with civilian partners:

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\(^8\) As laid out in JTTP 3.81.
a. to understand at the strategic, operational and tactical levels what other actors and organisations are already delivering and consider how UK Defence can deconflict or fuse planned military actions with existing activity, defining military parameters for tactical actions.

b. to understand how Civil Military Interaction (CMI) supports how we deliver operations and assess their effectiveness.

c. to engage effectively\(^9\) with the civilian population\(^10\) to ensure that mission outcomes are informed by nuanced information.

**Human Security Considerations**

0203. The UK’s HS approach is a methodology that considers a broad range of security and protection challenges that individuals and groups of people face in situations of conflict, instability and insecurity. UK Defence describes these challenges as HS considerations. When compromised, these are drivers of instability. In analysing HS considerations, it is useful to consider HS factors and cross cutting themes (CCT).

UK Defence recognises ‘seven plus one’ HS factors; seven are drawn from the UN development paradigm that focusses on issues that affect the wellbeing of the individual, and ‘information’ has been added to reflect the importance of this contemporary concern. These factors can also be expressed as ‘types of insecurity’. They are interdependent and do not operate in isolation from each other. Several of these HS factors are considered through the analytical frames PMESII/ASCOPE\(^11\). Reflected in paragraphs 0204 and 0205 are those additional considerations to be applied.

0204. **Overview of HS Factors.**

The [UNDP Human Development Report 1994](https://www.humanprogress.org/publications/human-development-report) describes seven factors associated with HS. These are economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. UK Defence have included an additional factor, ‘information’, to ensure planners include this and consider the wider impacts of dis/mis and malign information on human security and its intersection with military activity. While climate is covered under the factor ‘environment’, the UK acknowledges those risks arising, directly or indirectly, by changes in climate patterns and events and which are increasingly cross cutting in nature. This warrants specific comment and due attention. Detailed descriptions are given below:

a. **Personal/physical insecurity** refers to a state in which people are not protected from physical violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, from domestic violence, or from other actors.

b. **Political insecurity** defines the condition in which people live in a societal system that does not honour their basic human rights. Along with repressing individuals and groups, governments may try to exercise control over ideas, information and freedom of expression.

c. **Economic insecurity** describes the risk of a decrease in an individual’s quality of life, now and in the future, given their economic and financial circumstances.

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\(^9\) At the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

\(^10\) Giving due consideration to the different perspectives of men, women, boys and girls.

\(^11\) Refer to AJP 5 - Planning of Operations.
d. **Cultural/community insecurity** refers to the state in which individuals’ traditional relationships and values alongside their tangible and intangible cultural heritage are not protected and are threatened by sectarian and ethnic violence.

e. **Health insecurity** includes illnesses and diseases across a complex environment, touching on many different issues such as access to safe water, living in a safe environment, access to health services\(^\text{12}\) and gender specific services, prevention of disease and provision of basic knowledge to live a healthy life.

f. **Food insecurity** includes both physical and economic access to food (and water) that meets people’s dietary needs. Food insecurity can be a driver of civil unrest and political instability, it can induce migration and has been instrumentalised in conflict to advance political and military objectives, such as population displacement or co-opting global political relations and influence.

g. **Environmental/climate insecurity** concerns the direct and cascading threats that environmental/climate events and trends pose to individuals, communities or nations, as well as the adverse impact of human activities on the environment. Human induced environmental degradation\(^\text{13}\), inequitable access to natural resources or industrialisation (which are all human induced), could increase the probability of conflict and thereby pose a risk to human and national security.

h. **Information Insecurity**. Access to information empowers individuals but can also be used to manipulate or control. Denial of information constrains progress, education, employment and opportunities for development. This also recognises the dependence on information flow for modern societies to operate, the rapid destabilisation if data is suddenly inaccessible, or the implications on peace, stability and democracy from misinformation or disinformation around politics and society.

\(^{12}\) Including physical and mental/psychological support.

\(^{13}\) This can refer to man-made threats or threats exacerbated by human action. For example, deforestation, pollution, forest fires and drought or heat waves.
**Climate Change.** The physical and cascading impacts of climate change (Cc) are already being felt and will present an unprecedented challenge in the coming decade(s); including through the way in which impacts will undermine and threaten HS. This includes climate change increasing food and water scarcity, displacement and migration, humanitarian and economic crises.

Cc will have profound operational implications across all domains. This will include where we operate; what we need to operate; how we operate; and who we operate with. Defence must be prepared to fight and win in ever more hostile and unforgiving physical environments, as well as in a more volatile strategic context. Cc is a threat multiplier which is already reshaping the global security landscape and amplifying many traditional security challenges whilst giving rise to new ones. The increased scale and frequency with which Cc impacts are experienced will strain existing international security arrangements, create new geostrategic flashpoints, and raise the potential for inter-state military competition and conflict.

The Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach (March 2021), set out the UK objective to be a global leader in response to emerging geopolitical and conflict related threats exacerbated by Cc. The Defence Command Paper Refresh, published in July, further recognises that our ability to understand the impact of climate change across Defence, and adapt to it, is key to strategic advantage.

Operational lessons identified by UK Armed Forces in Mali highlighted how troops have already been confronted with HS challenges driven from Cc. This included, impacts on GBV, food insecurity, resource-based conflict and extreme weather.

During initial planning, the security implications of climate change, biodiversity loss and the energy transition should be captured when analysing the strategic environment through the HS Factors and CCTs.

0205. **Overview of Cross-Cutting Themes (CCTs).**

CCTs specify a range of different topics which could affect an operation in a number of ways due to their deep links to local societies and interaction with the core HS factors. These CCTs map onto one or more of the HS factors and are thematically categorised issues that can exacerbate, perpetuate or entrench conflict/instability or are an intended or unintentional outcome of conflict, military action or instability. The UK CCTs are closely aligned to those of NATO’s Human Security unit.

Listed beneath are descriptions of endorsed CCTs, which highlight UK Defence’s commitments and directed actions. Due to their nature, they apply throughout UK Defence activity and are not applied solely to particular situations.

a. **Protection of Civilians (POC).** UK Defence contributes to the POC by integrating related measures in the planning and conduct of its operations and missions. POC includes all efforts taken to avoid, minimise and mitigate negative effects that might arise from conditions of insecurity, as well as our own military operations. It is a vital aspect of our HS approach and failure to conduct these activities can undermine other political and strategic objectives. In UK Defence this includes:

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14 NATO’s Human Security Cross Cutting Themes are Protection of Civilians, Children and Armed Conflict, Trafficking in Human Beings, Cultural Property Protection and Conflict Related Sexual Violence. NATO has a dedicated unit on Women, Peace and Security.
(1) considering POC as central to the HS approach and integral to all military operations in line with the LOAC\(^{15}\).

(2) consideration of measures to reduce the risks posed to civilians when conducting operations and missions. Planning should involve measures to avoid placing civilians in harm’s way, taking effective steps to strengthen the protection of civilians and civilian objects from the effects of conflict, and to minimise humanitarian harms.

(3) the integration of a gender perspective into population and context analysis, which recognises that the different experiences of men, women, boys and girls, can be of strategic and operational significance. It is also applicable more broadly within defence management \(^{16}\).

(4) understanding, considering and, when required, planning to deliver specific protection needs for children, women, men and vulnerable groups informed by the integration of a gender perspective into context analysis \(^{17}\), and where feasible through meaningful engagement with communities to understand their protection priorities.

(5) continuing to protect and promote the humanitarian space and principled humanitarian action by civilian actors, seeking to avoid any politicisation or militarisation of aid provision.

(6) understanding and mitigating further harm to civilians through inappropriate conduct, including when spending power attracts criminal or unethical activity.

All of the above entails promoting actions to protect civilians, enhance compliance with IHL, and foster behavioural change. Many of the above principles are reflected in the commitments set out in the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences arising from the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas which the UK endorsed in 2022.

b. Women Peace and Security (WPS) which includes Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV). The WPS agenda is about building a more representative and effective approach to tackling conflict. It stresses the impact of conflict and post conflict situations on women and girls, and the vital importance of ensuring women’s full, equal, meaningful and safe participation in conflict prevention through to resolution. Moreover, conflict puts greater risk of physical, sexual and psychological violence such as rape, sexual abuse and forced prostitution on populations.

The WPS agenda serves to prevent conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) and gender-based violence (GBV), protect women’s and girls' safety and human rights, support women’s participation in conflict resolution and peace processes, and ensure the particular needs of women and girls are addressed in relief and recovery processes. For UK Defence:

(1) CRSV is rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced

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\(^{15}\) Refer to JDP 0-01 Edition F, UK Defence Doctrine, regarding fighting power and NATO’s Protection of Civilians.

\(^{16}\) This includes policy, capability design, commercial practices as defined in Chapter 7 of this JSP.

\(^{17}\) Protected characteristics can be a beneficial means to identify these groups.
abortion, enforced sterilisation, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict\(^\text{18}\).

(2) CRSV is frequently deliberately, and strategically used to target civilians. It inflicts long-term trauma on individuals and families, destroys the social fabric of communities, triggers displacement, fuels armed actors’ activities and fosters prolonged conflict and instability. When used or commissioned as a deliberate tactic of war, or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, CRSV can significantly exacerbate situations of instability, crisis, or armed conflict, and may impede the restoration of peace and security.

(3) GBV refers to any type of violence that is perpetrated against a person or group of people because of their sex, gender, sexual orientation and/or gender identity. GBV can include sexual, physical, mental and economic harm inflicted in public or in private. It also includes threats of violence, coercion and manipulation\(^\text{19}\).

The UK’s approach to the WPS agenda is outlined in its WPS National Action Plan (NAP) (2023-2027)\(^\text{20}\). UK Defence is a co-owner of the NAP, alongside the FCDO, which means it plays a key role in delivering on the NAP’s five Strategic Objectives (SO). These SOs are Decision-making, Gender-based Violence, Humanitarian and Crisis Response, Security and Justice, and Transnational Threats. The NAP also has two Implementation Objectives which are Strategic Partnerships and UK Capabilities. The NAP outlines specific commitments for activities across UK government, including for UK Defence and has a robust monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Through the NAP, UK Defence supports the four pillars of WPS (Prevention, Participation, Protection and Relief and Recovery).

UK Defence will also align with NATO guiding principles for WPS\(^\text{21}\), applied through external and internal elements. To ensure the guiding principles are followed and reinforced, this includes:

(1) conducting gender analysis, through Sex and Age Disaggregated Data (SADD)\(^\text{22}\) as part of the initial understand and situational awareness process to develop a broad understanding of how gender norms and roles shape the effects, causes and drivers of conflict.

(2) incorporating gender perspectives into all planning levels and in implementation of all UK military operations.

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\(^{19}\) This can include intimate partner violence, child marriage, female genital mutilation and so-called ‘honour crimes’.

\(^{20}\) The NAP is linked to the Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy and the FCDO’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative Strategy.

\(^{21}\) Integration: ensuring that gender perspectives are considered as an integral part of policies, programmes and projects guided by effective gender mainstreaming practices. Inclusiveness: promoting an increased representation of women across UK Defence and in international forces to enhance operational effectiveness and success. Integrity: enhancing accountability with the intent to increase awareness and implementation of the WPS agenda in accordance with the UK NAP.

\(^{22}\) This will enable commanders to identify how men or women are impacted differently by conflict and what can be done to mitigate harm and maximise positive opportunities on each of these groups.
(3) supporting and encouraging the meaningful participation and representation of women in defence and security institutions at all levels, and in all decision-making processes related to security, defence and peace.

(4) using our relevant resources and available legal powers to take appropriate action to prevent and respond to CRSV incidents\(^{23}\), including potential, impending and ongoing CRSV threats whilst deterring perpetrators, protecting the vulnerable and responding to and referring victims and survivors.

(5) understanding and ensuring women’s and girls’ needs are more effectively addressed in humanitarian action, including Humanitarian Assistance and/or Disaster Relief (HADR) deployments.

(6) remaining committed to preventing sexual harassment and promoting the highest standards of professional and personal conduct. UK Defence has a zero-tolerance approach to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA)\(^{24}\) and will take immediate action to investigate any allegations of misconduct and to provide support to survivors. Apart from our own troops, Defence has the responsibility to monitor the behaviour of Partner Forces (PF) we may be operating with and holding them immediately to account for any purported violations.

c. **Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) / Youth Peace & Security.** IHL and IHRL make special provision for children and youth. Noncombatants are often the main victims of armed conflicts, with children among the groups most affected. The UK recognises that protecting children from the effects of armed conflict is a moral, legal and strategic imperative and an essential element to break the cycle of violence. To protect children and youth, UK Defence should:

(1) incorporate understanding of those elements affecting children and youth, in particular the *Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict*\(^{25}\), in all planning levels and implementation of UK military operations.

(2) continue to take action to prevent and respond to issues of CAAC and proactively prevent incidents, deter perpetrators and prevent re-recruitment. This includes reporting any violations of the protected status of children in armed conflict as well as the wider impact of operations on children and refer any victims.

(3) take all reasonable steps to ensure we do not undertake operations, training or partnering with units employing children in active combat roles or those that detain children solely for membership, perceived or actual, of armed groups.

(4) continue to monitor the conduct of partner forces to ensure their compliance with IHL and IHRL, to assess potential risks to children and to respond to reports of any grave violations against children.

(5) whilst on deployments, unless absolutely unavoidable, not use functioning schools, universities or places of learning for any purpose or to carry out any security tasks in close proximity to their buildings or grounds, and not use

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\(^{23}\) Consideration of the applicability of integrating the Murad Code.

\(^{24}\) JSP 769 - Zero Tolerance to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

\(^{25}\) Killing and maiming of children; recruitment or use of children as soldiers; sexual violence against children; abduction of children; attacks against schools or hospitals; denial of humanitarian access for children.
evacuated or abandoned schools, universities or places of learning except in extenuating circumstances with no viable alternative, in line with the ‘Safe Schools Declaration’.

(6) ensure all reasonable options available have been explored when a school is being used by an adversary, making it a military objective, before attacking it.

(7) where requested to deliver training of partner nations, ensure any action undertaken is underpinned by CAAC objectives.

(8) work on geospatial information to identify regions of concern regarding CAAC and, where practical, draw on the expertise of IOs and NGOs involved with the protection of children before, during and after military operations.

d. Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking (MSHT). MSHT is likely to be encountered by UK Defence personnel and is a factor to consider in wider defence management activities. Conflict significantly exacerbates the risks to the civilian population, vulnerable groups and individuals and creates an unstable environment that engenders opportunities for the trafficking of people. Human trafficking (HT) is a violation of international and UK domestic law and a serious abuse of human rights; it undermines HS, affects society at the individual, local and national levels and weakens family and community bonds. It is usually facilitated by organised crime and terrorist networks.

UK Defence aligns with NATO’s definition of ‘trafficking in human beings’. That is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation.

Although tackling MSHT is not a primary responsibility of the military, UK Defence should:

(1) continue to coordinate with other nations’ activities to implement UN Protocols against Transnational Organised Crime and Trafficking in Persons as well as relevant UNSCRs such as UNSCR 2331 on trafficking persons in armed conflict.

(2) seek to recognise and support the work being done by national police forces and by other IOs such as the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with its Action Plan for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings in the area of operations.

(3) ensure that anti-trafficking responses are systematically included in military planning and execution of operations as a way of enhancing operational effectiveness and credibility.

(4) respond to and where possible, prevent incidents of human trafficking.

(5) raise awareness of the issues connected to MSHT and the means to combat it, recognise, respond and refer victims and survivors of trafficking and slavery.
and be conversant with the relevant reporting procedures. It should be included in exercises to test planning procedures and responses.

(6) work to improve the collection of data, monitoring and analysis of trafficking in the context of crises, including protective and risk factors, to support stronger responses.

(7) ensure that UK Defence personnel and economic activity within an operational or deployed environment is compliant with UK domestic laws and rules concerning HT in the supply chain. Thus, seek to identify and prevent the use of trafficked persons.

(8) recognise and respect victims of MSHT as they are likely to be extremely vulnerable.

e. Building Integrity (BI) and Countering Corruption. Conflict fosters corruption, and corruption can foster and sustain conflict and become an objective of conflict actors. Corruption can cause states to become unstable and weaken their economic governance systems. Corruption exists at different levels in every conflict, driving war economies and serious and organised crime, feeding cycles of violence and instability, as well as creating grievances and enabling armed actors to mobilise. Exploitation and support of corruption is a tool used by third party countries to exploit vulnerable states. It diminishes the reputation of the military among society and international partners, jeopardises the safety and security of citizens, and in its most severe form, undermines democratic governance mechanisms and the very foundations of modern states. Furthermore, corruption and the mismanagement of salaries, such as failure to pay in a timely fashion or salary diversion, can motivate the use of force to extract money, goods or other forms of personal gain from populations they are supposed to be protecting.

Some individuals may engage in corrupt practices merely to survive, others to enhance political control, while others seek affluent lifestyles. In many states almost every aspect of the economy and security sector can be affected. Unmitigated corruption has five consequences for military operations:

(1) undermines the desired end state.

(2) promotes instability.

(3) perpetuates conflict.

(4) wastes resources and effort.

(5) damages credibility.

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26 Existing anti-trafficking prevention and protection models and related policies and guidance, such as referral mechanisms and indicators for the identification of trafficked people, can be adapted to, and used in, conflict and post conflict setting.

27 Corruption networks can and often repurpose during conflict to facilitate the transport of arms and war materials, sometimes from vulnerable states facilitating or exacerbating future conflicts.

28 While it is important to note that conflict weakens governance and can engender corruption, it should not be assumed that corrupt practices are inherently cultural and cannot be changed. JDP 05, Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution, explores this in more detail.
UK Defence deployments such as stabilisation missions, peacekeeping operations and security assistance deployments will likely take place in environments affected by corruption and conflict. Counter-corruption cuts across military and political lines of activity and UK actions need to be aligned with the efforts of international and regional organisations.

UK Defence personnel are not immune to corruption risks and as a result UK Defence should:

1. raise military forces’ awareness on this topic to ensure personnel are able to recognise and support efforts to tackle corruption for the benefit of long term stability, security, legitimacy and development.

2. give commanders the skills to recognise the need to deter, detect and disrupt illegal activities, such as illegal natural resource extraction, contraband smuggling, drug cultivation, or prostitution, and the threats and risks these pose to the local economy.

3. take corruption risks into account during planning and ensure that mitigating measures are taken to prevent corruption being exacerbated by the activities or behaviours of UK armed forces, such as in processes around contracting or hiring local personnel on UK operations and in service procurement (refer to Chapter 7).

4. explore indicators and warnings that can form the basis of a corruption risk management strategy and include mission deployment directives, specific guidance on corruption risk, measures and capabilities required to mitigate.

5. encourage and support military partners to strengthen integrity as it is crucial for public legitimacy and capability.

6. analyse the prevalence of corruption in partner forces and second and third order impacts this may have on their behaviour and upon the human security of populations they may engage with.

7. assist other lead actors in their delivery of realistic, legitimate livelihood alternatives, where the dismantling of illegal economic streams may deprive communities of jobs and livelihoods.

8. continue to deliver the BI UK programme which seeks to reduce the risks of corruption globally by promoting and implementing the principles of integrity, transparency and accountability.

To support these tasks UK Defence should continue to include experts and programme resources through the Building Integrity programme in the Defence Academy.

f. **Cultural Property Protection (CPP).** The devastating effects of armed conflict on cultural heritage are well documented. Cultural property (CP) is the tangible, visual and totemic cultural expression of a community, a society, a nation and, ultimately, of

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29 The Defence Academy at Shrivenham deliver a MOD Funded BI UK course.
30 For example, the destruction of Palmyra by ISIS; the shelling of the Old Bridge in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the destruction of the two giant Buddha statues in Afghanistan by the Taliban.
humankind. It is an expression of cultural identity and emblematic of rights of cultural self-determination and community cohesion. Damaging, destroying or looting cultural heritage undermines a community's social, ethnic or religious identity, cohesion and resilience. In times of unrest or armed conflict, artefacts are prime objects to be looted and the trade in antiquities is a source of income for illegal armed groups and can fuel criminal and terrorist activities. Armed conflict may result in both the wilful and inadvertent destruction of cultural heritage. The protection of CP will preserve and enhance the UK's reputation locally and globally, maintain our ability to influence those amongst whom UK operates and contributes to our force protection and freedom of manoeuvre.

CPP can also serve to counter state and non-state threats who may see the destruction of culture as a vehicle for their political objectives or a means of financial gain. Specifically, the destruction and revisionism of cultural heritage may serve to undermine indigenous or pre-existing populations’ claims to a region or strengthen territorial claims by an adversary. Adversaries may deny local populations their historical claims to a region through the assertion of cultural presence in an area, for example through the creation of symbolic statues, renaming roads and regions, re-framing cultural practices as inherent to an adversary’s heritage or the introduction of language norms by the invading actor. Examples include the efforts of Russia to claim Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as its own through the introduction of Russian heritage narratives. We should also be alert to the pursuit of cultural artefacts for military pursuits such as through the illegal salvage of maritime military graves31.

The host nation (HN), if a functioning sovereign state, is responsible for the safeguarding of all CP in its territory. If a HN is unable to fulfil its obligations for CPP, it may request assistance.

The law obliges UK Defence to conduct CPP during armed conflict and (belligerent) occupation. UK Defence aims to deliver the same standards of CPP during counterinsurgency, stabilisation, and disaster relief operations. Specific situations should seek legal advice about the framework that applies.

For UK Defence this includes:

(1) through the MOD Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre (CPACC) maintaining policy and strategy, in conjunction with the Defence Cultural Property Protection Unit (CPPU) situated within Outreach Group, and via engagement with the Military CPP Working Group. The CPACC is also responsible for the development and maintenance of Memoranda of Understanding and Joint Declarations of Intent with OGDs, devolved administrations and relevant statutory national and international bodies on CPP matters.

(2) ensuring CPP is adequately understood and represented in targeting training, policy, and permissions.

(3) applying any amendments to UK doctrine, education, and training, which may be required to further incorporate CPP following the ratification by Parliament of The Hague Convention (1954) and its two Protocols.

(4) in accordance with Customary International Law and IHL/LOAC and other relevant rules, conducting CPP across all types of military operations.

(5) continuing to ensure military commanders at all levels understand that they bear operational responsibility for ensuring that forces under their command abide by the LOAC and follow appropriate policy and practice for the protection of CP.

(6) include cultural understanding as part of force preparation, including identification of any significant CP sites within the relevant Area of Operations. Once deployed, force elements should interact with local communities wherever possible in order to further understand and appreciate their culture, including CP.

(7) working towards prevention of adversary funding. The prohibition, prevention and stopping of CP looting can contribute to counter-threat finance efforts and can enhance the understanding of threat finance networks to enable exploitation, target development and delivery of Joint Effects.

(8) produce and promulgate CP geospatial information and intelligence to enable military forces to deliver CPP. To work with Allies, academia, institutions, and other sources, on the collection, assimilation, management and sharing of CP data.

0206. Table 1 below highlights how we can relate the factors and CCTs considered as part of the UK’s HS approach.
Table 1: HS Factors mapped against HS CCTs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HS FACTOR (TYPE OF INSECURITY)</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>LINKED CCTs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| PERSONAL/PHYSICAL | Personal / physical insecurity refers to a state in which people do not feel protected from physical violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, from domestic abuse, or from other actors. | • Protection of Civilians.  
• Women Peace and Security, which includes Conflict Related Sexual Violence.  
• Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking.  
• Children and Armed Conflict. |
| POLITICAL | Political insecurity defines the condition in which people live in a societal system that does not honour their basic human rights. Along with repressing individuals and groups, governments may try to exercise control over ideas, information, and freedom of expression. | • Building Integrity.  
• Countering Corruption.  
• Women Peace and Security. |
| ECONOMIC | Economic insecurity describes the risk of a decrease in an individual’s quality of life, now and in the future, given their economic and financial circumstances. | • Building Integrity.  
• Countering Corruption.  
• Women Peace and Security. |
| CULTURAL/COMMUNITY | Cultural / Community insecurity refers to the state in which individual's traditional relationships and values alongside their tangible and intangible cultural heritage are not protected and are threatened by sectarian and ethnic violence. It also considers how cultural values can have a destabilising effect on state security. | • Cultural Property Protection.  
• Women Peace and Security. |
| INFORMATION | Access to information empowers individuals but can also be used to manipulate or control. Denial of information constrains progress, education, employment, and opportunities for development. This also recognises the dependence on information flow for modern societies to operate and the rapid destabilisation if data is suddenly inaccessible. | These sources of insecurity are not explicitly addressed by the CCTs covered in the MOD’s HS policy, but they are included for awareness, as their impacts and manifestations will be experienced during operations. |
| HEALTH | Health insecurity includes illnesses and diseases across a complex environment, touching on many different issues such as access to safe water, living in a safe environment, access to health services and gender specific services, prevention of disease and provision of basic knowledge to live a healthy life. | These HS Factors need to be understood as both potential drivers of conflict and as a consequence of conflict. Failure to take account of them could impede freedom of manoeuvre and de-rail the mission. |
| FOOD | Food insecurity includes both physical and economic access to food that meets people’s dietary needs. | |
| ENVIRONMENTAL/CLIMATE | Environmental / Climate insecurity concerns the direct & cascading threats that climate environmental events and trends pose to individuals, communities, or nations, as well as the adverse impact of human activities on the environment. Human induced environmental degradation, inequitable access to natural resources or industrialisation (which are all human induced), could increase the probability of conflict and thereby pose a risk to human and national security. | |
3 Planning Framework for Human Security

0301. What are the operational benefits?

By applying a Human Security (HS) approach, UK Defence aims to achieve the following:

a. set the conditions for long-term strategic success.
b. improve effectiveness on operational delivery and mission success.
c. gain a heightened understanding of conflict drivers / dynamics, community dynamics, needs, grievances, motivations, and narratives.
d. improved integrated planning and action.
e. become a military instrument of power that can plan conflict sensitive outcomes by understanding the negative and linked impacts to the human and natural environment, to minimise harm to civilians, reduce Human Rights’ violations, reduce long term destabilisers, and feedback loops and maintain our legitimacy.
f. shape the international environment and global norms on human security, support, build and maintain alliances and partnerships, and offer mutual learning from best practice delivered through defence assistance, capacity building and Security Sector Reform.

0302. UK Strategic Planning.

From the outset of UK Defence activity, either domestic or overseas, HS considerations should be incorporated. Whether the cause for the demand is intentional, situational or adversary behaviour, there will be impacts on the security of the population. As a result, Defence will work collaboratively with other government departments (OGDs) through strategic planning processes.

On receipt of direction, UK Defence, assisted by OGDs, will ensure that:

a. International Policy and Strategy (IPS) will ensure HS considerations become integral to the military strategic estimate. Additional support can be sought from established MOD Policy lead, Jt Comd Human Security Advisors (HSAs), or HS focal point planners embedded in most functional areas.
b. the Commitments Management Group (CMG), where appropriate, incorporate HS considerations, through direction to Joint Commands in the form of a Chief of the Defence Staff planning directive, planning guidance or verbal guidance.
c. HS is considered, where relevant, in the end strategic effect, through the Strategic Effects Cycle (SEC). Strategic plans, directed by MOD, through UKStratCom & PJHQ to sS and Formations will include effects.
d. UN gender targets are to be considered and directed, through the Defence Tasking Function, which will trigger the generation of forces for UN peacekeeping
operations. Gender equality targets are adhered to within mission task and troop availability\textsuperscript{32}. Targets are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military Staff Officers/Experts on Mission</th>
<th>Troop Contingents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2026</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2027</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2028</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. HS risk and mitigations should be identified, as well as HS success indicators, and incorporated, where relevant, in monitoring and evaluation processes.

On receipt of strategic military direction, operational analysis begins whereby HS considerations should continue to be drawn through the planning process and incorporated in Operational Staff Work (OSW).

0303. UK Operational Planning.

The application of HS considerations in the planning and execution of operations will be integral to the operational planning process throughout Understand (including HN and Partner forces intent), Plan, Execute and Assess, requiring thorough staff branch engagement. This action will not only drive operational imperatives but also build service personnel awareness and acceptance. In addition, there is a need to include HS considerations in ‘campaign planning’ directives and OSW through PJHQ to single Service (sS) operational HQs (MOC, LOC, 11 Gp) to Formations. This application will be aided by trained HSAs whilst it is embedded into Defence\textsuperscript{33}.

0304. Understanding the Human Environment, Situation and Problem.

Planning staff must be able to understand the civil environment and the potential impact that military operations and adversary actions might have on the civilian infrastructure and population. PMESII/ASCOPE and human terrain analysis should be built upon through HS considerations. Obtaining the opinions and analysis of a diverse array of stakeholders, including hard to reach groups, is critical to its success. This requires staff to be able to carry out population centric protection of civilians (POC), gender, Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) analyses amongst others to identify potential risks to all parts of society and identify ways of mitigating harm.

Conflict sensitivity is central to both understanding the human environment and designing interventions that are not going to exacerbate conflict or associated drivers. It entails understanding that any initiative conducted in a conflict affected environment will have consequences that may have positive or negative effects. The better our understanding of the environment, the more likely we are to understand potential second and third order consequences of our actions. It is therefore a deliberate and systematic approach to ensuring we understand and minimise these negative effects (risks) and maximise positive effects of our actions (opportunities).

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\textsuperscript{32} A UK Armed Forces Gender Barrier study is underway to identify challenges and opportunities.

\textsuperscript{33} MOD endorsed HS Strategy 2020-2032.
When regional operations are being planned, it is important to identify regional HS themes rather than a specific focus on a particular population\(^{34}\). To inform directives and mission planning, an enhanced understanding of the human environment is required.

The following activities should be included:

- a. understand the context.
- b. ensure all conflict analysis and intelligence reflects how conflict impacts men, women, boys and girls and the elderly different through sex and age disaggregated data (SADD).
- c. understand the interaction between their engagement and the context.
- d. act upon this understanding in order to minimise negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.
- e. conduct early engagement with Partners across Government and OGDs, including obtaining recent copies of country relevant assessments and estimates\(^ {35}\).
- f. identify and understanding if, how and why individuals and groups are discriminated\(^ {36}\) against by the adversary, as a result of conflict, and by society (for long standing social/political/economic reasons). This action will assist commanders to identify how conflict impacts different communities or men, women, boys, and girls differently. It will contribute to the development of courses of action that will have the best chance of success, and the least chance of unintended consequences. It also allows for mitigations to be put in place, where necessary.
- g. include gender sensitive indicators through analysing measurements, numbers, facts, narratives, opinions, or perceptions in order to reveal gender related changes over time.
- h. include perception data to recognise the attitudes and sentiments of local community stakeholders into country planning for in country engagement.
- i. identify lessons from previous operations and both historical and operational analyses should be examined where available.
- j. identify if operational security permits, then relevant (and willing) IOs, humanitarian NGOs and women’s groups should be engaged with to further inform conflict analysis and to support operational planning.
- k. ensure any initial briefings and Receipt of Mission Briefs should include a summary of the civil environment, critical infrastructure, and key civil actors.
- l. submit of clear and concise HS Requests for Information (RFI) through the in unit Intelligence process.

\(^{34}\) The regional planning frameworks should include HS priorities. The RN Operational Advantage Centre also has a role through engagement.

\(^{35}\) For example, Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) reports explicitly; sense maker and humanitarian protection assessments.

\(^{36}\) Consider vulnerable groups, protected characteristics and analysis through SADD.
m. seek advice from a local HSA, HS focal points and/or subject matter experts (SMEs) from Outreach Group.


The UK Armed Forces operate under a legal basis and robust Rules of Engagement that govern the use of force during armed conflict, ensuring that authorities are consistent with policy concerns and comply with IHL. By broadening and deepening the understanding of the civilian environment, we will better inform our planning. However, it should be recognised that even tactical precautions (timing, tempo, tactics, effects, weapons, ammunition) and mitigation of harm (including prevention and rapid learning) may not prevent issues from arising during an operation. Where incidents, genuine or otherwise, are alleged, it is important that the UK engage appropriately in order to maintain public support. Losing their support can directly or indirectly impact the mission.

0306. UK Doctrine and Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) will inform the reader on how HS considerations are applied during planning and where HS considerations should be included in OSW for UK operations. Where analysed to be key to mission success, HS considerations will be included in the Campaign Plan, Activation Order, Operational Plan, Operational Order, Fragmentary Orders, and assessment reports. When required, a detailed annex37 will cover CIMIC and HS considerations relevant to the context of the mission. Some operational and tactical planning will require HN support during the planning process.

0307. Planning Staff Responsibilities.

To fully incorporate HS into strategic and operational planning it should be part of the mindset of all members of the battle staff and included by all functional groups. Most important functional groups include J2/N2/G2/A2 (intelligence) to carry out the analysis of the human environment and the J5/N5/G5/A5 (future plans) staff, supported by Engineers and logistics and to ensure that HS considerations are incorporated in all stages of planning. Planning staff should receive training so that they can apply HS considerations appropriate to their level of planning, role, and environment. Further advice can be sought from the in-unit HSA, HS Focal Points and SMEs from Outreach Group, deployed alongside or as a part of an established reach-back mechanism. If a HSA is employed directly in a HQ, it is recommended that they form part of the J5 staff, but maintain access to the Commanders planning staff, in particular POLADs, LEGADs and CULADs.

In addition to planners, individuals will be posted to singleton jobs where they will deliver HS at the operational and strategic level, these personnel will complete relevant UK Defence HS training (refer to chapter 5 of this JSP).

It must also be noted that in some areas access to legal and policy advisors is critical for context-specific guidance.

0308. Collaborative planning and coordinating with Allies, Partners, and Multilateral Organisations.

Other departments, agencies and organisations will have their own culture, priorities, ways of working and approach to risk and these must be considered to avoid frictions and misunderstandings. Responsibilities are usually clearly defined by capabilities, but Defence may sometimes have to assume responsibility for non-military lines of operation if the

security or political situation precludes delivery by other agencies. Unity of purpose to achieve an agreed outcome, through collaboration and shared practices, can be easier to achieve and can be enhanced by co-location.

The reasons for UK Defence’s commitment to operations are varied but the following aspects remain constant. Sovereign interests are put first, which is why we have defined our own approach to HS. However, operations are frequently conducted bilaterally, multilaterally or as part of a coalition, which requires working with others with aligned interests. UN and NATO are prime examples of where we will work as collective organisations. In other examples, the UK will work directly with other nations, such as the US, France, or Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) nations.

Having an approach for the UK is key for sovereign operations, but we must remain flexible in our thinking and application to enable us to work with others who have similar but not identical interpretations, whilst being careful not to undermine our own values or legitimacy.

0309. **Cooperation with NATO.**

There is significant commonality between the NATO cross cutting topics and the UK’s HS approach. NATO is committed to ensuring that all efforts are made to avoid, minimise, and mitigate any potential negative effects on civilians arising from their missions or activities, as underscored in their policy for the POC.

NATO has included HS into its recent Strategic Concept and its most recent version of AJP 01 Allied Joint Doctrine. It has identified eight cross-cutting topics, these being POC, CAAC, CPP, WPS, CRSV, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation and abuse and building integrity.

NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence has produced fact sheets for the cross-cutting topics currently recognised by NATO and applied in operational HQs.

NATO and its partners have also recognised the importance of ensuring women’s meaningful participation in decision-making and in security institutions. They remain committed to contributing to the full implementation of the agenda outlined in UNSCR 1325 on WPS. In UK Defence we do this through the HS approach and via the WPS NAP and not through a separate Gender Advisory framework.

0310. **United Nations (UN).**

The UN calls for a people-centred, context-specific, and prevention-oriented response to strengthen the protection and empowerment of human beings. The discourse on HS has emerged in concert with this evolution and there is a causal relationship between the pillars of peacebuilding (institution building and economic development), and the core elements of HS (economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security).

As the UN has a wider remit than UK Defence, it aims to address situations of insecurity through collaborative, responsive and sustainable measures. The UN’s role in peace building, in peace operations (i.e., peacekeeping and special political missions) and in humanitarian operations will all apply a HS framework. For the UK, most UN Peacekeeping missions have mandates on POC where it is essential for HS considerations to be applied.

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38 For example, US’s Civilian Harm Mitigation response action plan (CHMRAP).
The basis for the UN’s approach to the role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction is encapsulated in UNSCR 1325 (2000) and those Resolutions that came after it.

Whilst deployed, a key stakeholder for UK Defence is the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). This organisation helps coordinate complex emergencies and natural disasters with the humanitarian staff who may be operating in the battle space and need to be afforded protection. For UK Defence this coordination is conducted by a CIMIC resource, that relies on developed relationships in advance of the outbreak of conflict.

0311. **Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).**

UK Defence aims to work more closely with the OSCE as we progress HS. Respect for human rights and HS, including fundamental freedoms, are key to the OSCE’s comprehensive security model. The OSCE monitors the human rights situation in its 57 participating states, all of which have recognised that human rights are inalienable and guaranteed by law.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) provides advice, assistance and supports CSO with targeted training and education. ODIHR covers a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from the fundamental freedoms of religion or belief, movement, assembly and association, to reporting on the use of the death penalty, monitoring trials, and preventing torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Several OSCE field operations are closely aligned to HS and human rights.

0312. **Other UK Government Departments.**

The 2023 Integrated Review Refresh indicates the growing importance and increasingly engaged nature of UK Defence in the modern geostrategic environment. OGDs have specific remits in times leading up to, or during, conflict or when there is a need to contribute to humanitarian or stabilisation operations. The MOD central HS team, IPS, Security Policy and Operations (SPO) staff and the Global Defence Network (GDN) will work with OGDs at the strategic level. Operational level staff will need to interact and plan on specific operations freely, and on some missions deployed civilians will be embedded in the Headquarter framework to support the commander and staff as an advisor.

The key OGDs that the MOD will work with include:

- b. Home Office.
- c. National Crime Agency
- d. Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.
4  Execution of Human Security in how UK Defence Operates and Fights

0401. As outlined in para 0103, by integrating human security (HS) into Defence outputs, it can enhance Defence’s ability to better achieve its objectives. HS is a beneficial outcome in and of itself, however there is value in understanding where the two can be mutually reinforcing, doing good as much by society as for national security.

Given the increasing state and non-state threats to the UK and the ongoing rise in domestic hazards and threats, the integration of a HS approach should be considered across the whole spectrum of military activity (including warfighting) and be applied from the pre-planning stage, through operations, to operational conclusion.

As ever, Defence strategies and approaches need to be nuanced to the specific context of target countries and regions, and while HS analysis should be applied to all countries and theatres, some factors and CCT’s may resonate more or less depending on the location and situation. As a note of caution, while HS initiatives may achieve strategic effects, they must also seek to meaningfully effect positive change on the HS issue of concern\(^{39}\). Any initiative that cynically delivers upon HS purely for political or economic gain and without substance risks detracting from, and devaluing both the endeavour and the legitimacy of the UK on this topic.

Some of the ways in which a HS approach can support Defence are:

a. **Building Defence Relations and Defence Engagement.** Defence engagement on HS thematic areas can be a beneficial means to strengthen overseas relations, whether through delivering training, convening partners and Allies to share best practice and learn from each other, or through technical support to peers on the development of their own policies and tools on HS in Defence. Especially in politically sensitive regions or where conventional military offerings may not be appropriate, HS can be a constructive way of opening conversations with other countries or facilitating dialogue between contesting nations, offering opportunities to de-escalate tensions, build positive relations and support stability (see para 0402c for engagement directed activities);

b. **Preventing and countering state and non-state threats.** Adversaries can take the form of state and non-state armed groups (NSAGs). They may act and apply violence in ways that harm communities and populations as well as UK interests. In some cases, adversaries utilise violence against individuals and communities as a line of effort, such as CRSV or targeted attacks on civilians. Conversely, they may exploit populations vulnerabilities, such as a lack of governance or access to food, for their own gain. Applying a HS lens can enhance our ability to undermine state and non-state-based sources of threat by recognising how populations are instrumentalised.

(1) **Countering violent extremists and non-state armed groups.** Whilst it is recognised that non-military lines of effort to counter violent extremist groups and NSAGs is not primarily a military responsibility, UK Defence has a role to play. Defence should take steps to ensure they understand what activity OGDs are doing to counter extremism & NSAG as Defence might support these in the first

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\(^{39}\) Noting that within Defence mandates positive change on the ground could be limited.
instance\textsuperscript{40}. Moreover, by taking a HS approach to understanding the conflict environment, including how and why individuals join violent extremis (VE) organisations and/or NSAGs as well as how these groups can target, radicalise and manipulate the civilian population, UK Defence will be better equipped to confront the challenges posed by this. In addition, UK Defence should be cognisant of how its behaviour, and/or that of partner forces, towards populations may inadvertently fuel recruitment or vulnerability to these groups.

(2) **Countering state threats.** State adversaries may utilise violence against populations, this may be gendered, or driven by ethnicity, religious or other social identities or target critical civilian infrastructure to advance their objectives. They may also consider how to reclaim cultural and historical narratives to reinforce political claims to territory. A HS approach can assist in identifying population vulnerabilities, which adversaries may target through strategic lines of effort, to ensure appropriate actions are taken to mitigate these and lead to better protection of civilians. In addition, by applying a HS approach it can enhance UK Defence’s ability to undermine a hostile state’s activity through highlighting adversaries abuses of the population and help to maintain the legitimacy of allied or coalition forces.

c. **Strengthening UK Global Standing.** Defence demonstrating best practice and advocating through global forums on issues of HS can enhance the UK’s global standing and legitimise our ability to train and share expertise with others. Issues related to HS are held with high importance at the UN, OSCE and NATO. The UK has worked hard to build a credible reputation to be a global leader on HS. The UK is a global leader on the WPS agenda and penholder at the UN Security Council. The Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI), primarily led by the FCDO but with Defence interests, is an important agenda promoted by the Prime Minister as an HMG priority.

d. **Protecting the rules-based international system.** The UK is committed to sustaining the rules-based international system, which together with shared values and a commitment to multilateralism are important principles guiding the UK in its international relations. The protection and advancement of HS, as manifested by delivery against the multiple cross cutting themes and the international conventions and obligations we hold, constitute part of UK’s adherence and commitment to the rules based international order. Continued adherence and delivery by Defence of the international conventions that relate to HS reinforce our legitimacy to encourage others to do so to, thus sustaining the rules-based order that we hold important.

e. **Crisis response.** Objective three\textsuperscript{41} of the MOD HS strategy supports the Defence Command Paper on seizing the initiative, seeking to prevent and manage crises before they escalate and minimising the opportunity for our adversaries to exploit conflict and instability. UK Defence has the will and capability to apply hard power when the threat demands it but should only do so having analysed HS considerations and applying them. This will ensure that we plan and operate in a smarter way.

\textsuperscript{40} Such as approaches aimed at undermining the ‘route causes’ of extremism, using non-coercive measures to avoid pathways to extremism and empowering communities to counter radical narratives and resist recruitment through trusted local influencers and faith leaders.

\textsuperscript{41} To understand how emerging root causes of crises and instability will cause HS issues, enabling better identification of opportunities for prevention and protection, mitigation of harm and enduring solutions.
a. **Providing a safe and secure environment (SASE).** The UK Military may be tasked with providing a SASE. This can be achieved directly or facilitated through regional indigenous forces. This will depend on the permissiveness of the operating environment and the capabilities of the indigenous security forces. A SASE is essential for protecting citizens, creating an environment in which they have freedom of movement to pursue livelihoods and access essential services, and in which political processes can be undertaken. The following elements should be considered by UK Defence:

(1) who, whether formal (state), traditional/customary or non-state groups, plays a role in providing, or undermining, safety and security.

(2) the main threats and issues regarding safety and security, not only from the state’s perspective, but also from the perspective of different communities (disaggregated by location, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, disability, sexuality, etc).

(3) what these communities think about existing security and justice providers, including their effectiveness.

b. **The 4Rs (Recognise, Respond, Report & Refer).** The Defence contribution to Human Security will manifest itself through forces on the ground who are able to **RECOGNISE, RESPOND, REPORT** and **REFER**. These actions are known as the ‘4Rs’.

**RECOGNISE:** Detailed Human Security analysis in advance of operations should feed the planning process and be briefed down the chain through OSW and pre-deployment training. The process of understanding continues in the theatre of operation through engagement with the population and the actors / audiences involved. This understanding enables forces to recognise the HS related problems impacting the population as well as the operational theatre at large.

**RESPOND:** When HS issues have been identified, where appropriate, forces may be able to respond to mitigate further harm to the population. Our ability to respond will depend on the military mission, mandate and the resources available. While Defence may not always assume a leading role in responding to some types of human security issue, where we may be the first actors on the ground, capacity to respond and/or mitigate situations from escalating may be required.

**REPORT:** Armed Forces have a duty to report issues affecting the population up the chain of command to inform commanders, to further understanding of the operating environment and enable others to respond if needed or revise course of action if required. This requires an internal reporting mechanism and effective record keeping to ensure information is managed effectively.

**REFER:** Higher headquarters in a theatre of operations must then ensure they refer important issues on to the responsible authorities who can take action to

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42 Extract from JDP 05 - Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution.
respond and resolved the HS related issues. These might be Host Nation government departments or international organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). To effectively refer HS related issues to these organisations requires military formations to have sufficient knowledge of the reporting mechanisms in place and the humanitarian actors operating in the theatre of operations. This requires effective Civ-Mil Cooperation (CIMIC) and/or Civ-Mil Interaction (CMI) resources to be in place and a network of relationships to have been built up in advance of conflict. In conflict zones, it will often be the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) who will act as the primary coordinating body between the military, host nation and humanitarian staff operating in the battle space through a ‘cluster system’. This allows the military to remain distanced from agencies who may wish to remain impartial and avoid direct contact with armed forces.

c. **Engagement.** The positive impact of proactive and reactive military engagement has been highlighted in paragraph 0401a and 0202b. Through engagement across the operating levels, UK Defence can increase contextual understanding, pre-empt threats (through effective indicators and warnings) and build partnerships and strengthen capabilities of partners and Allies. Engagement can be at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. Defence diplomacy and the Global Defence Network are critical actors to engagement, contextual understanding and constructive liaison with partners and Allies. Persistent engagement can increase the UK’s ability to pre-empt and manage crises before they escalate and minimise the opportunities for state and non-state actors to undermine international security.

At the operational and tactical level, an important military joint function that mutually supports UK Defence’s HS approach is Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Operationally CIMIC integrates the understanding of the civil factors of the operating environment and enables, facilitates, and conducts Civil-Military Interaction (CMI). This supports the accomplishment of missions and military strategic objectives in peacetime, crisis, and conflict\(^{43}\). It enhances collaboration between civilian and military actors to safeguard individuals and communities. Moreover, where Defence may not be the best actor to respond to HS incidents, for example CRSV, CIMIC can be instrumental to ensuring effective referral mechanisms. To that end the following groups need to receive training in HS:

1. the professionalised cadre of permanently deployed personnel delivering defence diplomacy.
2. forward based service personnel who are at readiness.
3. those with an enhanced presence delivering overseas training and exercise programmes are guided on HS requirements and challenges.
4. those personnel trained to resource roles aligned to CIMIC\(^{44}\).

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\(^{43}\) Analysis conducted by CIMIC officers will reinforce any Human Environment intelligence, at any initial planning phases.

\(^{44}\) Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.19 - Civil-Military Cooperation - provides a comprehensive framework for coordinating actions that contribute to HS in various contexts, with specific emphasis on civilian protection, humanitarian aid and disaster relief community engagement, and gender considerations.
0403. **HS contribution to responding to a more contested and volatile world.**

HS has a place in UK Defence’s response to the changing threat context, the Integrated Review Refresh (IRR), published in March 2023, set out a new approach through an updated strategic framework delivered through four pillars\(^{45}\). HS considerations are applicable to all pillars and, where relevant, should be explicit in higher directives. UK Defence should:

a. continue to work with NATO on shaping HS and WPS.

b. build on the relationship with the US and Five Eyes community on sharing HS best practice and lessons learnt.

c. work through International Policy and Strategy (IPS), campaign and thematic teams to plan HS coordinated activities and outcomes with our European partners and Allies and make this explicit in higher directives where relevant.

d. consider HS activity aligned with Defence prioritised threats and challenges.

e. following from analysis of HS contextual considerations, ensure recommended tasks are included in strategic direction and frameworks.

f. in the UN, the UK should meet the required troop contribution numbers and ensure the UK deploys a qualified HSA to missions and headquarters on UN Peacekeeping missions to demonstrate our commitment to international peace and security.

g. instigate how Defence might support gender and conflict action plans, including through the use of cross-government funding tools such as the International Security Fund (ISF).

h. ensure that HS considerations are built into building partners’ capacity, when we train, advise, assist and, when necessary, accompany them.

**Organisational Responsibilities**

0404. **Strategic.**

The Minister for the Armed Forces leads on HS in UK Defence. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) is the military champion. The Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) for HS is the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (ACDS) Military Strategy within SPO. Internal Facing elements of WPS are the responsibility of the Chief of Defence People.

a. MOD HS policy and plans are the responsibility of the MOD central HS team, who work directly to the SRO and VCDS. The team are comprised of civilian and military representatives. The military SO1 is the HSA and Gender Advisor (GENAD) for UK Defence at the MOD. The team are responsible for:

   (1) all elements of HS policy and support HS planning outputs within SPO.

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\(^{45}\) Pillar 1 - shape the international environment; Pillar 2 - deter, defence and compete across all domains; Pillar 3 - address vulnerabilities through resilience; Pillar 4 - generate strategic advantage.
(2) setting direction and coordinating work through the subordinate organisational HS champions, Focal Points and SMEs to ensure that HS is incorporated across UK Defence through the HS Governance structures in line with the HS strategy.

(3) internal, cross government and external engagement that relates to all CCTs.

(4) support the wider government approach to conflict and instability.

(5) the provision of the MOD’s input into UK government, NATO and UN policy, plans, theory of change work, guidance notes, projects and programmes.

(6) translating international and government HS related strategies and policy into UK Defence activity.

(7) acting as the HS focal point for IOs and multilateral forums such as the UN, the EU and NATO, individual states, regional groupings, OGDs, agencies and forces, and the rest of the MOD.

(8) preparing, reacting and responding to Parliamentary reports, Ministerial briefings and enquiries.

(9) facilitating and delivering the assistance of military expertise on panels, external training or events relating to HS CCTs.

(10) work with Defence Sections to coordinate activity related to HS considerations across regions.

b. Key to the success of incorporating HS resides in the wider activities of SPO members. All involved in planning have a responsibility to ensure a HS approach is considered and where appropriate incorporated.

c. IPS and campaign teams and Military Strategic Effects hold many of the skills and keys to unlocking the incorporation of a HS approach across the globe and through planning. To that end, the IPS Directorate teams in the MOD Head Office should have at least one HS focal point per region. Those nominated for the role will work with the MOD central policy team on forecasting HS into country plans and projects linked to conflict, crisis, peace and stability. IPS HS focal points are responsible for:

(1) ensuring HS considerations are incorporated in both enduring and short notice commitments, at home and overseas, across the UK’s operations. In addition, where relevant, HS should be incorporated into strategic OSW and military activity.

(2) including the MOD HS central policy team when developing country strategies to bring in advice on opportunities to better integrate HS considerations and gender perspectives.

(3) ensuring HS is incorporated in activities as defined in paragraph 0302 and 0405 to this JSP. Particular attention should be given to the inclusion of HS in formal directives to Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ).
ensuring the initial force generation request considers and directs more diversity where appropriate, contingent on operational requirement theatre and threat, and which reflects the population or training audience to be able to deliver on all aspects of HS as outlined in this JSP.

where deployed personnel are being considered for PK missions, direction is given to consider deploying mixed patrols / engagement troops. This applies for troop and staff appointments.

seeking opportunities to meet with members of civil society in the UK and in countries in which the military is deployed or conducting training on a regular and ad hoc basis to better understand the concerns of civilians in the areas where the military is deployed or trains international militaries are deployed.

ensure they work with the Global Defence Network and MOD central HS team on shaping the formal requirement and input through ESCAPADE.

d. The Global Defence Network will continue to ensure that the UK’s NAP on WPS and HS continues to be implemented, through International Engagement and country plans. Guidance should be sought from the MOD central HS team, where appropriate. This includes:

1. allocating 15% of International Tier 1 UK-funded course places to female international officers, with priority given to women officers where appropriate.

2. including WPS through HS into discussion and training with international militaries, emphasising the participation of women at all levels.

3. seeking opportunities through the UK Integrated Security Fund (UKISF), and other funding, for HS inclusion in conflict, mediation and stability projects or programmes where UK Defence can assist.

4. working with other HMG colleagues in embassies on wider HS issues such as BI.

0405. Strategic Command Headquarters.

Strategic Command holds the key to many of the assets and capabilities that will widen the reach for planned HS activities, ensuring Defence has the right resources, processes and training to incorporate a HS approach. In addition, incorporating HS considerations into the way Defence understands the operational context and integrates this into the operational planning process through the Strategic Effects Cycle and campaign planning directives. Strategic Command will:

a. continue to provide a HS champion (at 1*/2* rank or grade) for VCDS HS engagements.

b. ensure appropriate representation and attendance at the HS governance meetings with an allocated HS Advocate (1*/OF5 rank or grade at the HS steering group).

Such as governance advisers where they are in place.
c. maintain a HS staff capability (policy and planning) within both Strategic Command HQ and PJHQ to support policy delivery as well as operational delivery.

d. establish deployable HSAs in both SJFHQ and Joint Force Headquarters to integrate HS considerations in planning and OSW.

e. foster a HS culture throughout Strategic Command HQ in all daily outputs, where context-appropriate, in particular reflecting HS considerations in operational level ‘campaign planning' directives and OSW.

f. assist UK Defence Intelligence (DI) to instil HS into Intelligence to deepen the situational awareness, contribute to identifying transnational challenges resultant from interventions and strengthen reputational resilience. DI will:

(1) seek to integrate HS considerations into the single intelligence environment (SIE) and look at the ends, ways and means of how intelligence is delivered by providing ‘assurance' (Policy, Standards & Process), ‘improving capability’ (ISR, capability, policy, people, training, events & plans) and ‘Advocating’ for intelligence across Defence through the function of intelligence governance structures.

(2) develop the Intelligence Picture for HS so that it can be incorporated into the military planning process to enrich understanding for planners.

(3) further evaluate operational reach back mechanisms to establish a more permanent model that will support deployed assets with HS RFIs.

(4) appoint a HS thematic lead, whilst developing the broader function of intelligence led by CDI.

(5) appoint a standing member to attend the HS governance groups and boards.

(6) inculcate HS RFIs into the current Information requirement management structure.

(7) train a HS Advisor in all three regional centres of the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence AOR.

g. ensure that UK Defence Medical Services deliver on their specified HS and WPS NAP commitment as follows:

(1) will train, equip and support deployed clinical practitioners who, in extremis, will respond to victims of Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) by providing initial emergency care, and/or reporting and referral as required, noting the principal aim is to avoid further harm to the victim and acknowledging victims can be men, women, boys and girls.

(2) will allocate a CRSV Champion to create and implement a CRSV plan.

h. in line with the HS strategy assume responsibility of the HS Training Requirements Authority (TRA) from 2023, with the UK Defence Academy remaining
as the training delivery unit for Defence courses. This role will also lead the HS Training and Doctrine Working Group which ensures the golden thread of HS through training in UK Defence.

i. ensure all Joint Warfare exercise development and delivery include HS considerations that can be addressed by the training audience. Joint Warfare sponsored courses should include HS.

j. through Joint Force Development work towards allocating 15% of Tier 1 UK-funded course places to international officers, with priority given to women officers where appropriate.

k. ensure there is a HS lead within DCDC to assist with weaving HS into all UK, Joint and allied doctrine, and concepts.

l. ensure there is a HS lead within HQ DSF, to assist with weaving HS considerations into all UK, Joint and allied operations, and through lessons learnt, revise concepts impacting the J2, J3 & J5 planning functions.

0408. Operational - Single Service Commands.

Responsibility for incorporating HS into the sS rests with the Naval, General and Air Staffs. The sS exercise control through Navy Command, Army HQ, and Air Command respectively. Each sS will:

a. appoint a HS Champion at 2* for VCDS HS engagements.

b. appoint a HS Advocate at 1* or OF5 who attends the HS Steering Group.

c. appoint a HS policy, technical and plans lead who represents at the HS Implementation Working Group to assist with strategy, policy and incorporating HS considerations into training, analysis, planning and OSW.

d. establish Service-level understanding of HS so that all planners are able to apply HS principles throughout Service activity.

e. establish sS HS training and doctrine plans.

f. establish sS HS advisor and focal point network to operationalise a HS approach.

g. establish a HS Working Group to progress actions from policy and plans. Any measures of achievements should be briefed through the HS governance structures.

h. ensure all deployments have received relevant Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) on HS.

i. ensure Suitably Qualified Experienced Person (SQEP) HSA(s), deploy when appropriate and in accordance with PJHQ Standing Operating Procedure for deployments.

j. ensure directed tasks in paragraphs 0404-0408 are incorporated in HQ directives, planning and operational outputs.
k. ensure Service Police (Royal Military Police, Royal Navy Police, RAF Police, and the Defence Serious Crime Unit (DSCU)) are prepared to assist HS policy objectives through the investigation of adversaries, partners and own force legal violations related to HS including MSHT, SEA and other violations of applicable IHRL and/or IHL / LOAC.

0409. **External Advisory Group.**

The MOD central HS team will create and coordinate an external advisory group. This will be HS CCTs’ interested parties who can consult with the military on its HS approach. As this group develops, please direct any expressions of interest to be included in this advisory group; requests of UK Defence personnel for events, delivering training or forum inclusion; and any requests of UK Defence relating to HS to the MOD central HS team at SPOMilStrat-HumSec-Pol-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk.
5 Integrating Human Security into Training and Education

0501. To ensure UK Defence personnel have the capability, understanding and training to incorporate HS considerations in their approach to military activity, a through-career Human Security (HS) education and training pathway needs to be implemented.

0502. Internal training and education will be designed and delivered in line with JSP 822, Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education. The lead TRA will be Strategic Command HQ for UK Defence level requirements. SS will lead for Service level training, in line with the 2023, HS Training Needs Analysis (TNA). They must aim to ensure that inclusion of HS is included in the Professional Military Education (PME) and training of our serving and future leaders. Moreover, ensuring, that deployed personnel have HS training appropriate for the region and context to which they are deploying. SS must develop staff understanding of HS issues and more tri-service and Joint roles likely to be undertaken as leaders progress through their career.

0503. **International Training.**

The delivery of HS training overseas will continue and should be considered in line with JSP 510, International Defence Training.

IPS and Defence sections should consider promoting the HS in Military Operations course to nations, run by the Defence Leadership Centre at the Defence Academy. Although not listed in JSP 510, the Training Requirements Authority (TRA) reserve up to 20 places for International Students to attend on two courses a year, which supports UK Defence’s commitment to UNSCR 1325. Applications can be made in accordance with the HS Defence Information Note (DIN) and students from the published NAP focus countries will be UK funded. Consideration to funding will be given to each place on its own merit, with particular focus on how it supports UK Defence global engagement objectives and IPS priority frameworks. Where doubt over the basis of agreement exists, clarification and guidance on ESCAPADE entries can be sought from the MOD central HS team. Moreover, places on the UK delivered BL course for Senior Leaders and BL Train the Trainer courses should be bid for, also delivered by Defence Academy.

0504. **Individual training.**

Will be structured such that all personnel have the appropriate level of awareness, that those putting it into practice can do so and that there are experts available to support specific operations and plans. Specialist training for specified roles should be developed where required. As a baseline, all service personnel must receive HS awareness training which should include understanding of HS considerations and actions on preventing, recognising, responding, and referring. Specialist training will include:

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47 Generally, through Short Term Training Team and qualified staff, but also through Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS).

48 Use of the CSSF, ODR, Defence Engagement Project Funds or Defence Assistance Funds should be considered.
a. **Human Security in Military Operations course**. Pre employment training for individuals working in roles at the operational and strategic level, UK, or exchange, which require HS integration or delivery. sS and Front-Line Commands are to identify individual posts and the training requirement to the Training Requirements Authority Directive (TRAD) annually. Successful students will become qualified Human Security Advisors.

b. **sS Commanders and Career Leadership courses**. A baseline of appropriate awareness should be in phase 1 and 2 training. Specific training must be delivered to those on command courses as appropriate for Non-Commissioned Officers and Officers. Where relevant, performance statements should be updated. This ensures that commanders understand their responsibilities and drive the incorporation of HS. Operational Role Performance Statements should be updated to reflect the requirement for all ranks to understand HS dynamics and to represent them to their subordinates.

**0505. Collective training.**

HS should be included in:

a. all relevant PDT. The degree to which service personnel are instructed will be in line with sS training strategy and direction, prioritised against mission relevance.

b. all major exercise planning, scenario development, pre-exercise briefs and exercise delivery. Exercise leads should work with sS HS focal points, HS Advisors, key civilian advisors and CS members of the advisory group to help shape relevant material. The white cell on joint exercises is a great source for support and guidance.

c. Reception, Staging and Onward Integration to include theatre specific HS issues.

d. briefs for those service personnel deploying on MACA and HADR where relevant.

e. Defence Attaché training delivery and to those deploying in engagement roles.

**0506. External individual training.**

UK Defence personnel will continue to support courses being delivered by the UN, NATO, OGDs and wider associations both as students and presenters, on request. Student bids and selection for NATO courses should come through the MOD central HS team to prioritise attendance. Formal requests for training should be directed to SPOMilStrat-HumSec-Pol-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk in the first instance.

**0506. Professional Military Education (PME).**

As stated in paragraph 0502, integrating HS into PME is integral to the development of military leaders. Through Education Pathway at the officer and non-commissioned officer leadership academies, the next generation of military leaders will assess conflicts and contemporary operations. Greater emphasis should be placed on understanding the human environment, application of gendered analysis and integration of HS considerations, specific to the service. PME establishments will seek to enable critical analysis and evaluation skills

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49 Already being taught at the Defence Academy to qualify HSAs.
50 STABADS, GENADS or HSAs.
of the significance of Human Security factors and cross cutting themes. Moreover, leadership must involve an ability to monitor success and critically evaluate contemporary conflicts, by applying HS approach. Understanding how to best communicate the findings effectively to guide or reinforce PDT. PME goes beyond training and embeds HS as an essential part of military practice.

0507. **Continuous Professional Development.**

Will be explored to include annual seminars, think piece events and Defence-accredited tertiary academia opportunities.

0508. **Governance for HS training and doctrine.**

A HS Training and Doctrine Working Group chaired by the Training Requirements Authority (TRA) is already established against an approved Terms of Reference. This group occurs quarterly. Regular attendance is expected from all sS, TLBs, key internal training establishments and, if required, SMEs.

0509. **Training repository.**

A training repository will ensure that training materials remain up to date and are used consistently across Defence. A central repository will be designed, developed and maintained at the Defence Academy hosted by the Defence Leadership and Business Group (DLaB).
6 Assessment of the Delivery of Human Security in Military Operations

0601. This chapter highlights that UK Defence must seek to address the following questions:

a. How does Defence know HS considerations are being incorporated in military operations?

b. How is HS measured within military operations?

c. How can it be determined whether the integration of HS into Defence’s work is supporting the achievement of Defence objectives?

The approaches at the strategic and operational levels will vary but the end state is similar. In considering these questions it should be borne in mind that Defence reporting will feed into wider UK government reporting for the strategies mentioned in para 010 and is consistent with the language used by those departments.

0602. A maturity model is being used by MOD’s central HS team, aligned to our change programme, to assess Defence progress towards delivering at the institutional level against HS strategic outcomes. It will look across all operations for evidence of HS. It should be based on a theory of change\(^\text{51}\) assuming that people are available with their specialist knowledge who will inform and influence the change(s). It should consider that, if informing and influencing takes place, then operational lessons will be generated, and engagement plans will be made that relate to HS.

0603. The MOD policy team is guided by an overarching 12-year strategy and subordinate annual action plans that sets priorities for delivery over the fiscal year. sS have in place implementation plans and annual action plans. A Human Security Implementation Working Group (HSIWG) and liaison between MOD central HS team and sS leads supports assessment of progress towards delivery. Oversight of delivery of Human Security activity is by the Human Security Steering Group chaired by Assistant Chief of Defence Staff Strategic Policy and Plans.

0604. Any measurement of effect at the operational level will be contextual to the operation and developed through the planning process. Established lesson capture mechanisms will be used for HS. Post Op/Activity Reports and Post Trg Reports should include a Human Security focus.

0605. Measurement of effect of a HS approach to achieving Defence objectives as articulated in the IRR and DCP Refresh is more challenging to capture. If delivered well, it is hard to know whether the lack of harm to human populations is a product of Defence action (or our Partner Force actions) or not, and even harder to know if the outcome would have been different without intervention.

In the first instance, there will be monitoring of how HS policy, planning and engagement may synergise with Defence objectives and priorities. This will be captured during HS

\(^{51}\) Explains how a group of early and intermediate accomplishments sets the stage for producing long-range results. The MOD central HS team will lead for UK Defence at the request of OGDs, to provide input.
reporting by the HS policy team. Secondly, efforts will need to be undertaken to fund and capture measurement of effect over time given the often slow generation of impact by working on issues of HS. Lessons capture from missions and case study analysis will be beneficial in this regard.
7 Integrating Human Security into the Management of Defence

0701. While the primary purpose of this policy is to direct human security (HS) integration into the military operational space, it is essential that elements of HS cross cutting themes (CCT’s) are applied across the whole of Defence business. This chapter addresses the importance of applying a HS approach across Defence business and considers institutional areas where there may be HS risks and what policy provisions exist to address these. JSP 985, recognises the importance of internal application of HS, however responsibility for these internal policies and delivery against them rests with dedicated teams and roles.

0702. CCTs applicable to Defence’s internal operating environment. Working with the framework of HS CCTs, the following considers how each may apply to the internal operating environment.

a. Women Peace and Security (WPS). Defence commitments on WPS are set out in the UK’s fifth National Action Plan on WPS. The plan provides strategic direction for the UK’s diplomatic, development, security and Defence efforts and applies to both foreign and domestic arenas. Two of the five objectives within the NAP, on decision making and security and justice, are directly relevant to the management of our own personnel within Defence, whether during recruitment or while in post in respect of progression and advancement in the institution, or protection from harassment and harm. Together they reinforce the following NAP pillars: Prevention, Participation and Protection.

b. Gender mainstreaming and gender perspectives in Defence are a vital aspect of our HS approach, and failure to meet NAP commitments internally can undermine political and strategic objectives associated with the NAP. Defence recognises that by improving Diversity and Inclusion (D&I) it can derive benefits not just for its personnel, but for enhanced business capabilities and operational effectiveness. Policy on D&I is owned by Chief of Defence People and their respective branches, and entails multiple commitments including the following:

(1) achieving a 30% Level of Ambition for inflow of women into the Armed Forces by 2030 and continued efforts to improve representation by introducing retention friendly initiatives, such as flexible working.

(2) continued implementation of UK Defence’s Female Talent Development Programme.

(3) increasing the number of UK women peacekeepers in line with the UN Secretary-General’s Gender Parity Strategy which sets targets that increase by 1% each year until 2028 when the number of Military Staff Officers should be at 25% and Troop Contingents at 15%.

(4) understand those barriers to women’s participation in and recovering from missions.

52 UK’s WPS NAP 2023.
53 Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018-2028.
(5) ensure all policies complete the mandated equality analysis assessment as stated in JSP 503 Defence Manual of Resilience, to fulfil the requirements of the Public Sector Equality Duty (the Equality Duty) as set out in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 and to enhance the experience of women in the Armed Forces.

(6) ensure that any new capabilities or equipment procurement programmes include a gender analysis.

(7) seek to harness those opportunities presented through the Defence Diversity and Inclusion Programme (DDIP), to drive forward the internal facing elements of WPS agenda.

(8) support and assist other countries in developing their strategic WPS work and encourage them to tackle the barriers that prevent women’s participation and leadership in other militaries.

(9) continuing to work on tackling the obstacles to women’s leadership, inflow, throughflow and meaningful participation in all aspects of conflict: prevention, management, and resolution throughout UK Defence.

c. Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking (MSHT). Within the UK, human trafficking is the responsibility of the Home Office, the Joint Slavery and Trafficking Analysis Centre (JSTAC) (or its Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit (MSHTU)) and police forces and national law enforcement agencies. The UK legal framework is the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (‘the 2015 Act’) which consolidates existing offences of human trafficking and slavery and encompasses trafficking for all forms of exploitation. As defined in paragraph 0205, sub-paragraph d, MSHT is not a primary responsibility of the military. That said, MOD Head of Strategic Supply Management (SSM) is the commercial advocate for anti-slavery and is responsible for raising awareness in the function. Moreover, UK Defence:

(1) will take steps to prevent and address trafficking in human beings in its procurement processes and through due diligence in supply chain management.

(2) is to ensure that UK and NATO funds are not used to support actions related to trafficking in human beings directly or indirectly.

(3) should ensure that UK Defence personnel and economic activity within the UK is compliant with domestic rules concerning human trafficking (HT) in the supply chain. Thus, seek to identify and prevent the use of trafficked persons in the UK or overseas.

(4) will continue to incorporate contractual provisions that prohibit contractors and sub-contractors from engaging in, supporting and facilitating trafficking in human beings. UK contracts will incorporate obligations for suppliers to remEDIATE wrongdoing and UK reserve the right to terminate contracts and, as appropriate impose sanctions where suppliers fail to fulfil their obligations in this regard.

(5) has a zero-tolerance policy regarding human trafficking by our own forces and staff, therefore staff shall not engage in trafficking in human beings, including for the purpose of sexual exploitation, nor will they facilitate it.
(6) staff shall have the duty to report to their supervisors any instance of human trafficking of which they may have become aware, as well as any concerns that they may have regarding the involvement of another staff member in trafficking in human beings including for the purpose of sexual exploitation.

(7) will use where necessary the National Referral Mechanism (NRM)\(^\text{54}\).

(8) where appropriate, will use the government’s Modern Slavery Assessment Tool (MSAT) designed to help public sector organisations work in partnership with suppliers. The aim is to improve protections and reduce the risk of exploitation of workers in defence’s supply chains. It also aims to help public sector organisations understand where there may be risks of modern slavery in the supply chains of goods and services they have procured.

(8) will ensure that NATO staff who are under their jurisdiction and who have engaged in criminal activities related to trafficking in human beings, are reported to own nation and subsequently processed in accordance with their national legislation and procedures.

(9) will ensure that training and guidance related to MSHT is reflected in the appropriate courses at the Defence College of Logistics, Policing and Administration (DCPLA).

d. **Building Integrity (BI) and Countering Corruption.** Corruption within any defence sector presents significant obstacles to the effectiveness of defence establishment and the operational capabilities of the armed forces. BI is an integral part of UK Defence work and is being mainstreamed in defence activities.

The Defence Counter Fraud and Corruption Strategy (2023-2026) seeks to protect the Defence Purpose from the risk and harm of fraud, bribery and corruption. Through this strategy, enabled by the counter fraud function, Defence will ensure our values are supported through policies, procedures, behaviours, cultures and actions optimised for the disruption and prevention of fraud and corruption. The Defence Fraud Policy is set out in JSP 462 - Financial Management and Charging Policy Manual - Chapter 14, Annex 4. This policy document applies to all personnel who have a role to play in creating an anti-fraud culture which underpins efforts undertaken to detect and prevent fraud. Through the counter fraud policy statement and action plan FY 2021-2024, UKStratCom remains committed to protecting public funds by prevention and detection of fraudulent activity across the organisation. In addition, UK Defence:

(1) should continue to deliver training for UK Defence personnel and international staff, through the Defence Academy, on the following Areas of Risk:

(a) public financial management, including fraud, risk and audit.

(b) corruption risks in acquisition and procurement.

(c) human resources management (including codes of conduct).

(d) gender-specific corruption risks.

\(^{54}\) This is our national framework for identifying and referring potential victims of modern slavery, human trafficking, servitude, and forces or compulsory labour.
(e) strategies and plans to help tackle corruption.

(2) will not tolerate any bribery, fraud or corruption, thus has a zero tolerance approach. All allegations will be thoroughly investigated and appropriately dealt with.

(3) will create a counter fraud culture alongside raising awareness of the impact of fraud both on the organisation and the individual through training and communication, enabling staff to identify and mitigate fraud risks.

(4) should provide access to rules and procedures that stakeholders will be expected to follow and publicise successes were deemed to demonstrate an effective counter fraud culture.

(5) has mandated that all Defence personnel complete the Fraud, Bribery & Corruption awareness training, accessible on the Defence Learning Environment (DLE), annually. This course will make individuals aware of the fraud, bribery and corruption threats facing the Ministry of Defence (MOD), and defines the important role individuals play in tackling these threats and how to report them as crimes to the Confidential Hotline (0800 161 3665 (UK); +44 1371 85 4881 (OS); confidential-hotline@mod.gov.uk).

(7) will ensure personnel, both Service and Civilian, who are responsible for expenditure of public funds (including claiming T&S) or public accounting must ensure that they do not receive private benefit or create a perception of private benefit. All funds and public accounting must only be used for the purposes intended.

0703. For the purpose of this JSP the following organisations will have a requirement to integrate a HS approach. Managers within Defence are crucial to ensuring the success of integrating directed actions across the CCTs.

a. **Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S).** Equips and support the UK’s Armed Forces for operations now and into the future. On behalf of its military clients, DE&S purchases new military equipment and provides the ongoing support that the Armed Forces need to operate effectively. It is responsible for the safe procurement and through-life support of a vast range of equipment.

b. **Chief of Defence People (CDP).** Is the strategic HR Business Partner to Defence. This means that CDP, supported by the Defence People Team (DPT), provides strategic advice on people-related issues and delivers Defence strategic workforce priorities. CDP is accountable to the Defence Board, through the People Committee, for delivering the People Strategy and managing risk where the workforce is not aligned to planned outputs.

c. **Commercial.** Director General (DG) Commercial leads MOD’s Commercial Function, oversees procurement and commercial professionals across the Department, provides insight to Ministers and senior officials, and ensures the strategic direction of commercial-related activities.
d. **Finance.** DG Finance plays a key role in the management of the Department's finances and budgets, leading the 10-year programme, supporting the Defence Plan and other key outputs, and allocating resources across the Department.
### HUMAN SECURITY (HS) ‘ON A PAGE’ – CONCEPT SLIDE (Reference: JSP 985)

**INTEGRATE A RANGE OF HUMAN SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS (FACTORS & CROSS-CUTTING THEMES) INTO THE WAY WE UNDERSTAND, PLAN & OPERATE/WARFIGHT**

**MORAL IMPERATIVE - LEGAL IMPERATIVE - STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE**

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<td><strong>CHILDREN AFFECTED BY ARMED CONFLICT / YOUTH PEACE &amp; SECURITY</strong></td>
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<td><strong>MEDIA / IA</strong></td>
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<td><strong>P - POLITICAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>POLITICAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>BUILDING INTEGRITY / COUNTERING CORRUPTION</strong></td>
<td><strong>S5 / JOINT</strong></td>
<td>FACILITATE ACCESS TO BASIC NEEDS (FABN)</td>
<td><strong>REPORT</strong> CAVES TO ACTUATE ON SCOPE OF MISSION, MANDATE &amp; RESOURCES</td>
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<td><strong>M - MILITARY</strong></td>
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<td><strong>X-GOVt</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>CONFLICT SENSITIVE OUTCOMES &amp; REDUCED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS / CIVCAS</td>
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<td><strong>E - ECONOMIC</strong></td>
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<td><strong>PARTNERS ALLIES HOST NATION IOs NGOs CSOs Academia</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ENVIRONMENT/CLIMATE</strong></td>
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**ANALYSIS OF SEX & AGE DISAGREGATED DATA (SADD) INFORMS HOW CONFLICT IMPACTS MEN, WOMEN, BOYS & GIRLS / ELDERLY = GENDERED ANALYSIS**

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