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UK Defence Doctrine

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Chief of the Defence Staff

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Foreword

The purpose of United Kingdom Defence Doctrine (UKDD) is to explain the military instrument of power and its utility both in and beyond warfare. Professions are defined in part by their bodies of professional knowledge and UKDD is part of ours. While UKDD is authoritative, it requires judgement in its application. Doctrine draws on the lessons of history, upon original thinking and from experiences gained from training and operations. It sets out the fundamental principles by which military force is employed.

The level of military doctrine covered in this publication is, for the most part, intended to be enduring. This edition of UKDD refreshes British Defence Doctrine (4th Edition) and, without losing the importance of hard power and excellence in war-fighting, better explains the full spectrum utility of Defence. It also incorporates developments such as the whole force concept and the importance of cyber to the UK’s security considerations. UKDD should be read by all officers of the Armed Forces, both in regular and reserve service. I also commend it to all MOD Civil Service personnel. Initial training should introduce this doctrine and all stages of subsequent training and education should re-visit it to extend our understanding and competence. UKDD is of particular relevance to officers of mid-seniority and above, in command and staff appointments.

Whoever reads this doctrine should, however, remember that it can never replace individual initiative. Doctrine is a guide to commanders and subordinates on how to think, not what to think.

Chief of the Defence Staff
Doctrine is a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books: it will light their way, ease their progress, train their judgement and help them to avoid pitfalls. Doctrine is meant to educate the minds of future commanders.....not to accompany them to the battlefields.

C Von Clausewitz

On War
Abstract

Purpose

1. Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine* (UKDD) (5th Edition) outlines the broad philosophy and principles underpinning how Defence is employed. UKDD is the basis from which all other subordinate national doctrine is derived.

Context

2. This fifth edition of UKDD reflects and reinforces:
   - policy and operational experience;
   - the need for cross-government and inter-agency cooperation; and
   - the shift from campaigning to Defence engagement and contingency.

Audience

3. UKDD should be essential reading for all members of the Armed Forces, both in regular and reserve service. We also commend it to all MOD Civil Service personnel. Initial training should introduce the doctrine and all stages of subsequent training and education should revisit it to extend our understanding and competence. UKDD is of particular relevance to officers of mid-seniority and above in command and staff appointments.

Structure

4. UKDD is divided into three chapters.

   • Chapter 1 – Strategy. Chapter 1 provides an overview of strategy. It outlines concepts of security, national interests, understanding and the link between strategy and policy. Chapter 1 also describes the instruments of national power, crisis management and the levels of warfare.

   • Chapter 2 – Characteristics of the military instrument. Chapter 2 outlines the characteristics of the military instrument. The chapter describes fighting power, leadership, and the centrality of joint, integrated and multinational action. The chapter concludes with a précis of legal and ethical considerations.
Chapter 3 – The utility of Defence. Chapter 3 describes the utility of Defence – it situates Defence’s main role as deterring threats to our security and prosperity. The chapter outlines the concepts of hard and soft power and how these are used through deterrence, coercion and Defence engagement activities. The chapter concludes by outlining the employment of armed force.

Linkages

5. UKDD is linked to a number of policy documents including:

- National Security Strategy (NSS);¹
- Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR);²
- International Defence Engagement Strategy;³
- New Operating Model: How Defence Works;⁴ and
- DCDC’s Global Strategic Trends Programme.⁵

6. DCDC welcomes your feedback on this publication or any of our other publications. Please address correspondence to the DCDC Doctrine Coordinator at:

The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre,
Ministry of Defence Shrivenham,
SWINDON,
Wiltshire,
SN6 8RF.

⁴ https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-new-operating-model-how-defence-works
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Strategy

Chapter 1 provides an overview of strategy. It outlines concepts of security, national interests, understanding and the link between strategy and policy. It also describes the instruments of national power, crisis management and the levels of warfare.

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“Thus it is that in war the **victorious strategist** only seeks battle after the victory is won, whereas he who is **destined to defeat first fights** and afterwards looks for victory.

Sun Tzu
*The Art of War*

“Strategy is to derive from the [policy] aim of a series of **military objectives to be achieved**: to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate: to **measure available and potential resources** against the requirements and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.

**Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke**
Chapter 1 – Strategy

Section 1 – National security

1.1. Our national security encompasses the safety of our state and protecting it from external and internal threats. It also requires us to endeavour to preserve the security of UK nationals living overseas. External threats may lead to invasion, attack or blockade. Internal threats may include terrorism, subversion, civil disorder, criminality, insurgency, sabotage and espionage. Other threats include instability caused by financial crisis, climatic events, cyber or other forms of attack on critical national infrastructure and the possibility of pandemic disease. We cannot maintain our own security in isolation. Our national security is both integrated within, and dependent upon, our neighbours’ and partners’ security.

Human security

1.2. Maintaining authority and stability within democratic states requires meeting the legitimate political, economic, societal, religious and environmental needs of individuals and groups. These needs are usually expressed collectively as human security.¹ Internal threats may be externally-sponsored, but are only likely to jeopardise the stability of a state when they receive internal popular support and challenge established authority. Characteristics of, and threats to, human security are shown below in Table 1.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human security is characterised by:</th>
<th>Human security is threatened by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The availability of essential commodities such as water, medical aid, shelter and food</td>
<td>Political/ideological tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broader environmental security</td>
<td>Environmental events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom from persecution, want and fear</td>
<td>Racial, ethnic or religious tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting cultural values</td>
<td>Poverty, inequality, criminality and injustice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible and transparent governance</td>
<td>Competition for, and/or access to, natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corrupt and inept governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1 – Human security

¹ See http://www.unocha.org.
1.3. Increased competition for resources within a globalised world increases the threat to human security. A lack of, or threat to, human security undermines the stability of a state or region. Individuals may transfer loyalty to any group that appears, or promises, to meet their needs. These groups\(^2\) include non-governmental and transnational structures, and organisations that may exist temporarily and/or, in part, virtually. Once such groups receive popular backing, the threat to security increases. Those benefiting from insecurity may seek to perpetuate crises and attempt to undermine any national or international response.

1.4. Providing human security demands an awareness of the needs of individuals as well as states. Therefore, providing security requires an understanding of the impact of factors on a society including:

- ideology and politics;
- education;
- commercial and economic factors;
- humanitarian and health issues;
- freedom of movement and information;
- aspiration and contentment;
- attitude to gender equality;
- racial, ethnic and religious factors;
- the military; and
- diplomacy, administration and governance.

These factors, shaped by history and culture, must be considered in context.

United Kingdom security

1.5. The UK’s security is rooted in perceptions of both national sovereignty and national interests, and how these are both protected and promoted. Our government’s prime duty is to maintain the freedom and integrity of the UK, its Overseas Territories and its people. The government also seeks to secure a range of broader interests – political, economic and social – that contribute to the nation’s strength and prosperity. Our commitment, with our allies and partners, to strengthening international peace and security enhances our national security.

1.6. Our security is shaped by a complex combination of geostrategic factors, including environmental, resource, social, political, scientific, technological and military aspects. Our global perspective is also shaped by our responsibility for over five million British citizens who live and work overseas, and our diverse population.

\(^2\) For example, organised criminal gangs, warlords and insurgent groups.
1.7. The UK is a prominent international actor, with numerous interests overseas and a role to play in maintaining international stability and law. Our stability, prosperity and well-being depend on international trade and investment. This requires importing raw materials from overseas, exporting goods by sea, land and air, and access to global information flows. The UK is also one of the world’s largest international investors.

1.8. We constantly review our security and modify our approach in response to events, emerging priorities and an informed view of the future. Some factors are of enduring significance, but none can be regarded in isolation and all may vary in importance over time. Therefore, the MOD identifies strategic trends and analyses how they may affect the future security environment. These assessments offer a range of potential outcomes, subject to chance and contingency, and the possible impact of strategic shocks. They inform policy-makers of future possibilities and potential problems, as well as their likely security implications.

**Collective security**

1.9. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the UK has an important role, and/or responsibility, in maintaining the international world order. To enhance mutual international security and prosperity, the UK also seeks to extend its influence internationally by collaborating on a broad agenda of issues and challenges. Our ability to project and employ our Armed Forces is one factor within this multilateral system.

1.10. Alliances and partnerships are fundamental to our approach to defence and security. Collective security is built upon three principles:

- the primacy of diplomacy to resolve disputes;
- agreement to act collectively; and
- trust.

1.11. In the context of politics, international security and cooperation, the UK prefers to work with its many friends and allies to maintain the international order and the UK’s position within it. Collective security is an essential pillar of the UK’s overall security strategy. This is promoted through our membership of NATO, close relationships with the USA and France, the Five Powers Defence Arrangement, and membership of major international organisations such as the UN, EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Other multilateral organisations that can help underpin a robust rules-based international system include the G8, the

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3 See DCDC, *Global Strategic Trends out to 2045 (5th Edition)* and DCDC’s *Future Operating Environment* (due to be published late 2014).
1.16. As a global actor, we interact with differing cultures, ethnic groups and races. Therefore, it is crucial that we develop and maintain understanding of those we wish to influence. Understanding also helps us to avert crises through applying soft power (covered in Chapter 3, Section 3). While Defence will develop understanding, it must not do so in isolation and we must work closely with our partners which allows different perspectives to be considered.

1.17. Attempts to solve major security issues by military means alone seldom succeed in the long term, even if initially enjoying apparent success. Only by understanding the dynamics of any particular situation or crisis can the appropriate range of responses be planned and orchestrated. These may be conducted by:

- other government departments;
- international organisations;
- non-governmental organisations;
- other governments;
- private and commercial actors; and
- local and regional populations.

1.18. Building understanding is an active process. Commanders must guard against relying on experience or mental models that served them well in prior situations. In a world where competitive and contextual circumstances are subject to change, these biases can lead to poor decision-making and costly mistakes. Understanding must be built on up-to-date information, self-awareness, critical analysis, collaboration and creative thinking.

Section 2 – Understanding

1.15. Understanding is defined as: the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context. Insight and foresight are required for effective decision-making. Understanding should not be confused with intelligence or information. Understanding in the context of our national interest:

- informs choice on developing state policy and strategies; and
- supports the application of national power to achieve influence.

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6 See JDP 04, *Understanding*. 
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Section 3 – Policy and strategy

1.19. Conducting international politics involves applying national power, within the international system, to support our national or collective interests. This involves collaborating and coordinating with allies and partners. Political outcomes and objectives are articulated in policy.

- Policy articulates a choice leading to a course of action proposed or adopted by a government. Policy is a statement of intent, or a commitment to act.

- Strategy is creating and orchestrating the instruments of power in support of long-term policy objectives.
Together, policy and strategy describe what we need to achieve (the ends), how we will do this (the ways) and the resources we need (the means). While policy and strategy are shaped by external factors, they are inter-dependent. Policy only works if there is a credible strategy to deliver it and strategy demands an achievable policy end-state. Advice to policy-makers is only effective when it comprises an honest, realistic appraisal of both current and future capabilities.

**National strategy**

1.20. In a globalised, competitive world, states will legitimately set out to secure their own interests and achieve influence. The UK’s national strategy coordinates the instruments of national power in pursuit of national policy aims to secure our interests. The Prime Minister and Cabinet are responsible for the UK’s national strategy. The government’s political intentions are articulated as a national strategic aim or end-state, supported by strategic objectives. Our national strategy is contested globally within the diplomatic, economic, military and informational contexts. Therefore, formulating and executing strategy is dynamic and iterative. Unexpected events and crises may also radically change national strategy, requiring the military to operate outside of previous planning assumptions and Defence policy.

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Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine outlines that effective military strategy comprises ends, ways and means. UKDD outlines that, at the national level, military, economic and diplomatic activity must contribute to a policy end-state.
1.21. The National Security Council (NSC) is the main forum for discussing the government’s objectives for national security. The Council’s key purpose is to make sure that ministers consider national security in the round and in a strategic way. The NSC, chaired by the Prime Minister, meets weekly and its members comprise the Secretaries of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Home Department, International Development, and Energy and Climate Change as well as Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the Minister for Government Policy. Other Cabinet ministers, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Heads of Intelligence Agencies attend as required.

1.22. The Government’s national security priorities are decided using the National Security Strategy (NSS) and by Strategic Defence and Security Reviews (SDSRs), both led by the NSC. The SDSR identifies the means and ways across Government which are needed to deliver the ends described in the NSS. The Government has committed to producing a new NSS and SDSR every five years.

1.23. National strategy informs our contribution to multinational activity. To realise policy objectives with other actors to achieve common strategic goals, we must:

• understand the interests and resolve of other actors; and
• influence both decision-making and the division of burden-sharing.

The process by which objectives are established and resources allocated across an alliance or coalition is more complex than for a national enterprise.

Defence policy

1.24. Defence policy establishes the ends of military strategy and shapes the structures and capabilities of Defence’s contribution to national objectives within resource and other constraints. UK and Defence interests and objectives must be articulated clearly to provide the baseline for making decisions.

Defence strategy

1.25. Defence strategy constitutes Defence’s overall contribution to national strategy and is a subset of it. It is a Department of State function, owned by the Secretary of State for Defence. Its delivery is the joint responsibility of the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) and Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). National strategy articulates national policy objectives and the routes by which government departments, in combination, will deliver them. Defence strategy translates the responsibilities allocated to Defence to more specific outcomes and the outputs required to deliver them.
1.26. A further function of Defence strategy is to ensure that the UK maintains and sustains credible and capable military forces. Defence strategy directs how Defence will develop over time based on the anticipated requirements of the future operating environment, balanced against the reality of finite resources and the need to prioritise. Defence strategy formally changes through the five-yearly NSS\(^8\) and SDSR but also directs changes to the strategic approach between SDSRs. Examples include, committing the Ministry of Defence to supporting new operations, forging new bilateral or multilateral relationships or by adjusting major equipment programmes.

1.27. Defence strategy sits above the interests of individual Services. It is about knitting together corporate strategy (namely, organising and managing Defence resources to generate capability) with political/military and military strategy. To be effective, Defence strategy requires close collaboration across a number of areas of expertise, both civilian and military. This is exemplified in the membership of the Defence Board and the Defence Strategy Group respectively.

**Political/military strategy**

1.28. Political/military strategy shapes and directs a range of Defence activities, including operations, but focussing on influence, conflict prevention and supporting broader Government interests. Political/military strategy also encompasses shaping and implementing the various individual strategies which direct our broader activities, including the International Defence Engagement Strategy,\(^9\) Building Stability Overseas Strategy,\(^10\) UK’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) and Emerging Powers Strategy.

1.29. Further, Political/military strategy encompasses our multilateral Defence engagement within the international institutions the UK belongs to, including the UN, NATO and the EU. It includes supporting Defence exports and other MOD activities at home and abroad. Leadership on thematic issues across counter-proliferation, climate change, energy security, nuclear deterrence, stabilisation, cyber and space all fall within the political/military strategic space.

**Military strategy**

1.30. Military strategy is a subset of Defence strategy. It directs the use of the military instrument where it has been identified by the Government as part of a UK response to a specific challenge. Military strategy is a strategic headquarters function, owned

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8 NSS, op. cit.
by CDS and led on his behalf by Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations).

1.31. Specifically, the aim of military strategy is to ensure coherent and effective strategic planning when using our Armed Forces. Military strategy is inherently joint. It also sits above single-Service interests, tying together military capabilities to deliver an effect that meets the short-term requirement, but is firmly rooted in a clear understanding of the long-term policy ends. Military strategy has a role to play in developing policy through delivering military advice including, ultimately, the advice delivered by CDS to the Prime Minister. It should respond to the requirements asked of it by politicians and policy-makers, but should also proactively offer up options in support of the Government’s ambitions. Importantly, military strategy must, at all times, be rooted in Defence strategy and policy. Operational policy staffs are embedded within the military strategy function to ensure that planning and operational delivery take place within the boundaries defined by policy.

National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review

1.32. The NSS and SDSR inform strategy formulation. The SDSR process is overseen by PUS and CDS, supported by Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. This is closely coordinated with other government departments and includes our contribution to reviewing the National Security Risk Assessment every two years. Each SDSR outlines the main parts of an affordable force structure, which is planned for delivery in ten years time, based on planning assumptions. The SDSR generates a defence strategic direction document, which translates the outcome into long-term planning direction. The interpretation of this direction for the next five years, particularly in terms of allocating resources, is set out in the Defence Plan.\(^{11}\)

\“\begin{quote}
The SDSR generates a defence strategic direction document, which translates the outcome into long-term planning direction.
\end{quote}\"\n
\(^{11}\) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-plan-2010-2014
1.33. National strategy directs the coordinated use of the three instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic and military. The three instruments of power are underpinned by information.\(^\text{12}\)

### The diplomatic instrument

1.34. Diplomacy is about managing international relations to further national interests. The diplomatic instrument of national power assists the UK to achieve its policy objectives through diplomatic means. Successful diplomacy depends upon the power of persuasive negotiation, reinforced by capable and credible hard power (both military and economic). Diplomacy is enhanced by a combination of reputation and integrity, the skilful interplay of the other instruments of power and effective communication. While diplomacy has traditionally been regarded a state-to-state activity, it is evolving to incorporate other opinion-formers, power-brokers and third parties. The diplomatic instrument is in constant use (including during conflict) when the need to influence allies and neutrals, as well as opponents, is as vital as using military force.

1.35. Defence diplomacy is using Defence assets to support diplomatic objectives and further Defence interests and is a pillar of the UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy (2013).\(^\text{13}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence diplomacy aims to:</th>
<th>Defence diplomacy is supported by:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dispel hostility</td>
<td>Defence sections in embassies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build and maintain trust</td>
<td>Providing military advice and assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in developing responsible, competent and democratically accountable forces</td>
<td>Education and training in the UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate other UK military activity, for example, by setting the conditions for overseas-basing, access or over-flight and cooperation with allies and partners</td>
<td>Conducting overseas training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other influence and engagement activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2 – Defence diplomacy

\(^{12}\) AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine views information as a separate instrument of power.
\(^{13}\) For more information on Defence engagement see Chapter 3.
The economic instrument

1.36. Overseas investment, international flows of capital and trade, and development assistance provide scope for exercising economic influence. The UK can use a range of economic incentives, boycotts, tariffs and sanctions to influence decisions and shape behaviour. The effect of economic measures will be shaped by the economic and political character of those we aim to influence.

1.37. In some circumstances, military force will support the economic instrument (for example, through embargo operations). Placing military equipment contracts or reforming indigenous military structures in a foreign country may foster other positive economic outcomes.

The military instrument

1.38. Military activities supporting national strategy and objectives can range from deterrence and coercion through to applying force to counter a specific threat. The main strategic objectives of any operation involving Defence will be political in nature – this precludes an exclusively military solution to conflict. The military instrument:

- is most effective when employed with the other instruments to achieve national objectives; and

- is ‘not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of policy by different means’.¹⁴

In difficult negotiations with obstructive adversaries, diplomacy might only be successful if backed up by the credible threat of force. The military instrument’s unique contribution is to threaten, or apply, legitimate force to ensure our nation’s security, maintain freedom from foreign oppression and defend national interests. Therefore, the military instrument is as much about influencing minds as physical effects.

1.39. Military utility relies upon the ability and willingness to deploy forces rapidly and effectively, and then sustain them. Many states are unable to overcome the logistic and command and control difficulties inherent in the deployment and operational direction of a modern, technologically-advanced military force. States with armed forces that lack the means of effectively projecting their power on a global scale may only exert regional influence. Our ability to deploy worldwide is a vital element of the UK’s power in international relations.

¹⁴ Clausewitz C Von, Two letters on Strategy, 22 December 1827.
The military instrument is most effective when employed with the other instruments of national power

1.40. Applying force, or the credible threat of using it against those seeking to erode security, can help to maintain the integrity and security of the international system and reassures threatened populations and communities. The extent to which the UK can exert such influence depends on maintaining sufficient and capable forces. The UK maintains a military capability comprising both nuclear and conventional forces, at readiness levels consistent with the assessed threat and perceived intentions of potential opponents.

Information

1.41. Information underpins all three national instruments of power and enables understanding and decision-making. Information should be regarded as a critical resource and its flow will be contested. Advantage can be gained by managing, in relative terms, the information flow better than your opponent. This is known as information superiority.\textsuperscript{15} While information is fundamental to the Government’s approach to crisis management, our national position is that information is not a discrete instrument of power.

1.42. Disseminating information, through a cross-government information strategy, enables the UK to exert diplomatic, economic and military influence in an effective and integrated way. At the same time, intelligence and information received across government shapes operations planning and execution at all levels. In times of crisis, see Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2/13, Information Superiority.
the information strategy must include a strategic narrative,16 which outlines why the UK is engaged and what its objectives are. This narrative is crucial to efficiently managing information, as well as influencing a range of audiences and activities in a consistent, coherent manner.

1.43. **Cyberspace**17 is an operating environment within the information environment. In Defence, cyberspace is the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, (including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, as well as embedded processors and controllers) and the data therein within the information environment. As the world is increasingly interconnected with an associated growth in the use of cyberspace, our ability to operate in cyberspace is vital to our national interest and enables our national security, prosperity and way of life. Defence is increasingly dependent upon cyberspace and can expect adversaries to exploit this dependence. The UK government assesses the cyber threats to its interests and mitigates these through resilience measures, awareness and trusted partnerships. Activities in cyberspace are an essential element of our routine business and are fundamental to planning and conducting operations.

**Employing national power**

1.44. Owing to uneven rates of growth and variations in technology, demography and resources, the geostrategic balance of power between states (and groups within states) changes over time. This may confer advantage on one state (or group) or another. States also determine their posture based on the way their elites and populations perceive their status relative to other states within the international community. These factors, as well as a nation’s propensity for security and stability, determine the relative importance afforded to employing its instruments of power.

1.45. Individually, each instrument of power is limited in terms of its discrete influence and impact. Ideally, they should act together, unified behind a common national goal. How they are employed, in any given situation, requires an understanding of the strategic context and the national policy objectives being sought. To ensure coherence in the pursuit of objectives, strategic communication seeks to synchronise all messages by words, images and actions across the instruments of power and the whole information environment.

1.46. The instruments of national power are finite and their use must be prioritised and balanced. For Defence, this requires understanding the likely threats. This enables us to allocate resources to deal with both current operations and maintain a contingent capability for the unforeseen.

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16 See JDN 1/12, *Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution*.
17 For more information on cyberspace, see Joint Doctrine Note 3/13, *Cyber Operations: The Defence Contribution* (Restricted) and DDCDC *Cyber Primer*, December 2012.
Section 5 – Crisis management

Crisis and their implications

1.47. A key UK policy priority is to prevent conflict or other crises from developing which may affect the UK’s national interests. A crisis marks the point at which events become intensely difficult or dangerous. The term crisis is also used to indicate a period of extreme instability. Effective crisis management comprises:

- the process of preventing, containing or resolving crises before they develop into armed conflict;
- planning for possible escalation; and
- addressing the underlying causes.

This does not imply that all crises can be managed. Their characteristics are likely to change, not least in response to any military or other intervention, and in ways that are not envisaged. Also, the lead-up to a crisis which is resolved peacefully may appear similar to the lead-up to a crisis which escalates into conflict. As it is difficult to predict when conflict will occur, we must be capable of reacting quickly to evolving circumstances.

For more information on crisis management, see JDP 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine.

Cooperation provides the ideal basis for enduring stability
1.48. Relationships between states, between groups and factions within a state, and between state and non-state actors are always competitive and may be classified as those of cooperation, confrontation and conflict.

- Cooperation provides the ideal basis for enduring stability.
- Confrontation arises where differences can no longer be reconciled.
- Conflict results when escalation cannot be prevented or contained, leading to one or other party resorting to violence.

A deterioration in relations may be triggered by a crisis, or may itself constitute one. In reality, the boundaries between cooperation, confrontation and conflict are complex and constantly evolve. Indeed, relationships between states and non-state actors can simultaneously involve elements of cooperation, confrontation and conflict across different areas of interaction. Defence must be capable of operating across this spectrum, conducting military activities to:

- promote mutual cooperation;
- prevent confrontation from escalating into conflict (or at least contain it); and
- through combat operations, set the conditions for conflict resolution.

Cooperation

1.49. Cooperation enables disputes to be managed, controlled or dissipated rather than ending in conflict. While cooperation may develop between actors who share common, or at least compatible, aims and objectives, it can be established and maintained through a more active approach. Given that domestic and international relations involve some degree of discord, including economic competition, cooperation is underpinned by stability.

Confrontation

1.50. When cooperation breaks down, either after a specific event or due to a gradual deterioration in relations, a crisis (possibly including confrontation) may follow. Confrontation is characterised by a clash of wills, where opponents, having failed to reconcile their differences, seek to exert influence over each other. Confrontation may occur between any groups and is not the preserve of state actors.

1.51. The root causes of any crisis can only be addressed effectively through diplomatic and economic means, backed when necessary by the credible threat
of using a capable armed force. Hence, crisis management, and re-establishing enduring stability, will demand an integrated response.

Conflicts

1.52. If differences cannot be resolved satisfactorily by other means, confrontation can rapidly deteriorate into armed conflict. Conflict is characterised by a resort to violence to gain advantage and achieve desired outcomes. An integral part of crisis management is preventing conflict. This is achieved by containing confrontation and preventing escalation or expansion.

War

1.53. War is a state of armed conflict between different countries, or different groups within a country. Warfare is the conduct of war. Clausewitz outlines two facets of war:

- its nature, which remains constant under all circumstances; and
- its character, the variable ‘means by which war has to be fought’ which alters according to context.

1.54. The nature of war has certain enduring features.

- The decision to wage war is an act or expression of policy. The measure of its success is the extent to which belligerents deem its political outcomes to be favourable.
- War is undertaken to maintain a position of advantage, establish a more advantageous situation, or influence the attitudes or behaviour of another party.
- Belligerent opponents may employ all the military and non-military ways and means available to them, to seek success.
- Warfare reflects, among other things, the culture and society of belligerents and other actors.
- Warfare is an inherently unpredictable, often chaotic, human activity.

19 This may be non-lethal, for example, cyber or espionage.
1.55. An operation is defined as: a sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose.\textsuperscript{21} A campaign comprises one or more operations that integrate using the instruments of power to achieve a strategic goal.

Levels of warfare

1.56. The levels of warfare provide a framework within which to rationalise and categorise military activity. This framework, depicted at Figure 1.1, also clarifies the interrelationships between the various levels, although these should not be seen as discrete, as the levels often overlap. The framework of strategic, operational and tactical levels recognises the inevitable compression and blurring between them and reflects their dynamic interrelationship and non-linear interaction. The relationship between what is tactical, operational and strategic is both fluid and contextual. Tactical gains and losses may have far greater strategic effects than that which is immediately obvious.

![Figure 1.1 – Relationships between the levels of warfare](image_url)

\textsuperscript{21} NATO operations are military and contribute to a wider approach including non-military actions. See Allied Administrative Publication-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, (new definition accepted in 2013).
1.57. Information resources enable accurate and timely situational awareness, and understanding. However, information flows can compress the levels of warfare, especially at the operational level, such that reported events and activities, true and false, may have immediate impact at the strategic level. At the same time, this interconnected and information-rich environment invites intervention by strategic-level political and military leaders seeking to influence tactical-level activity.

Strategic

1.58. The strategic level of warfare is the level at which national resources are allocated to achieve the government’s policy goals (set against a backdrop of both national and international imperatives). Achieving these goals usually requires a combination of military force, diplomacy and economic measures, as well as collaboration with other nations’ governments and armed forces and other international organisations and agencies. Strategic success requires foresight, patience, endurance, tenacity and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

Operational

1.59. The operational level of warfare is the level at which operations are planned, conducted and sustained, to contribute to achieving national strategic aims, as well as synchronising action, within theatres or areas of operation. The operational level provides the bridge between the strategic and tactical levels.

1.60. In a national context, the operational level is the responsibility of the Joint Commander, acting with the theatre-level Joint Force Commander (JFC) if deployed. In a multinational setting, the UK national contingent commander will be responsible for integrating the national contribution into the overall force. The national contingent commander:

- advises and influences the deployed multinational force commander;
- applies national policies and caveats; and
- owns the in-theatre responsibility for national activities.

The scale of the operational level is not pre-defined: it should assume a size and shape commensurate with the requirements of the operation.

22 JFC: Throughout this publication Joint Force Commander (JFC) is used when referring to the operational-level commander of a joint force, regardless of how it has been constructed (for example Joint Task Force (JTF), Deployed Joint Task Force (DJTF) or Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)). JFC is used in this way throughout NATO doctrine. The UK’s Joint Forces Command will not be abbreviated in this document.
Tactical

1.61. The tactical level of warfare is the level at which formations, units and individuals ultimately confront an opponent or situation within the joint operations area. The tactical level employs maritime; land; air and space; and special operations forces to deliver a range of effects that together contribute to success on operations. This is the level at which engagements are fought in direct contact with an opponent. In a joint operation, the tactical level normally involves component commanders operating directly to the JFC, although some actions and planning will overlap with the operational level. Under the JFC’s direction, tactical units execute actions to create the required effects in a joint, multinational and multi-agency context, thereby setting the conditions for success.

Significance of the levels of warfare

1.62. While these levels exist formally within the military, the same distinctions are not made within the diplomatic and economic instruments. There are, however, broadly similar levels of decision-making and planning, if only for allocating resources and manpower. To ensure a unified, integrated approach to crisis resolution, it is vital that interaction and cooperation between those planning and coordinating diplomatic, military and economic activities take place at every level.

Key points

- Our national security encompasses the safety of a state and protecting our state from both external and internal threats.
- Alliances and partnerships are fundamental to our approach to defence and security.
- Understanding will guide when, where and how the UK will act to protect and defend its national interests.
- Conducting international politics involves applying national power, within the international system, to support our national or collective interests.
- The UK’s national strategy coordinates the instruments of national power in pursuit of national policy aims to secure our interests.
- National strategy directs the coordinated application of the three instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic and military.
- A key UK policy priority is to prevent conflict or other crises from developing.
- The levels of warfare provide a framework within which to rationalise and categorise military activity.
Chapter 2 outlines the characteristics of the military instrument. It describes fighting power, leadership, and the centrality of joint, integrated and multinational action. The chapter concludes with a précis of legal and ethical considerations.

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With two thousand years of examples behind us we have no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well.

T E Lawrence

No method of education, no system of promotion, no amount of common sense ability is of value unless the leader has in him the root of the matter – Fighting Spirit.

Field Marshal Archibald Percival Wavell
Chapter 2 – The characteristics of the military instrument

Section 1 – Fighting power

2.1. We must retain our fighting power and warfighting excellence – both enable our credibility and utility. When required, we must be able to fight and win to defend our country and our Overseas Territories from external aggression.

2.2. Fighting power defines our ability to fight, and comprises a:

- conceptual component (the thought process);
- moral component (the ability to get people to fight); and
- physical component (the means to fight).

Figure 2.1 outlines the three components of fighting power – none can claim precedence and each mutually supports and informs the other.

![Diagram of the components of fighting power]

Figure 2.1 – The components of fighting power
2.3. Conflict is competitive and adversarial. Belligerents seek to diminish or undermine the fighting power of their opponents while safeguarding their own. Achieving relative superiority is critical in successful military operations.

Human capability

2.4. Fighting power is built upon human capability. Human capability is the collective impact that people have on an enterprise. Human capability underpins Defence’s professionalism, and comprises the valuable skills, knowledge and experience possessed by our people, including those contractors and partners with whom we operate; it provides the decisive edge. Generating human capability requires a whole force approach, in which the right mix of people from regular and reserve forces, the Civil Service and contractors are made capable and motivated.

Human factors

2.5. Fighting power may be enhanced by applying scientific expertise relating to the social, psychological and behavioural aspects of human behaviour. Understanding group dynamics and people’s motivations supports assessments of likely behaviour in complex situations.23

Context

2.6. Fighting power must be considered in context.

a. The character of the situation. Fighting power must be applied in a way that best suits the prevailing situation and conditions. This also includes being aware of political, resource or legal constraints.

b. The environment. Environmental factors will affect the range of options available to commanders and shape military activities. The topography, climate and distribution of the urban, agricultural and industrial landscapes each present threats and opportunities. Societal aspects and the cultural environment will also have an impact on how we apply fighting power and not always in ways that could be immediately obvious. We must be mentally and physically conditioned to operate in the environments we fight in. A force optimised to fight in one scenario may be ill-equipped to operate elsewhere.

c. The opponent. Protecting UK interests may require using force against a wide array of potential opponents, both state and non-state. In some instances, the opponent may have outright numerical superiority. In others, they may

23 Further detail can be found in Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 3/11, Decision Making and Problem Solving: Human and Organisational Factors.
negate our greater mass by using asymmetric tactics or by operating in difficult environments, such as large cities. In either case, success will depend on the quality of our fighting power and the skill with which we apply it. Yet, even when our Armed Forces have numerical and qualitative superiority, high morale and strong resolve may allow an opponent to absorb considerable losses.

d. **Allies, partners and other agencies.** Interoperability is necessary to employ military capability across a coalition force, while role specialisation and burden sharing may promote efficiency. Cooperation and collaboration between the diplomatic, military and economic instruments, as part of an integrated approach, will also need us to interact and coordinate with other agencies. This may further shape the utility of certain aspects of our fighting power, not least interpreting doctrine to accommodate non-military actors and their cultures, practices and procedures. However, role specialisation may also leave a nation’s forces incapable of undertaking certain operations independently. Interoperability may be expensive to achieve and sustain and may also require us to operate to a common standard.

e. **Culture and history.** Understanding the cultural and historical features of a situation, and incorporating that into planning and training, will give us key insights into how we can best apply fighting power.

2.7. The likelihood of success on operations is shaped by:

- coherently applying fighting power against an opponent;
- the uncertainties induced by unpredictable or unpredicted events;
- the interplay of chance; and
- the vagaries of human nature.

When assessing the situation, our commanders must understand the context in which they are applying fighting power. Informed decisions can then be made which will shape the situation. Commanders should aim to apply their strengths against an opponent’s vulnerabilities (while protecting their own comparative weakness).
Section 2 – The conceptual component

2.8. The conceptual component provides a framework of thinking within which military personnel can develop understanding about both their profession and the activities that they may have to undertake. The conceptual component has relevance at all levels of warfare. The aim of the conceptual component is to:

- provide the intellectual basis for our Armed Forces;
- theoretically justify providing and employing our Armed Forces; and
- preserve and take forward corporate memory, experience and knowledge.

In doing so, the conceptual component reflects accumulated experience, improvements to existing practice (gained through lessons and experimentation) and analysis of the future security environment.

2.9. The conceptual component provides commanders with the ability to understand the context within which they operate and serves as the foundation upon which creativity, ingenuity and initiative may be exercised in complex situations. The conceptual component comprises three elements: the principles of war; doctrine; and conceptual innovation.

Principles of war

2.10. The principles of war inform and guide the way in which we apply military power. They are not an exhaustive list, nor need commanders to rigidly follow them. Underpinned by understanding, mission command and the manoeuvrist approach, they represent enduring principles, whose expression and emphasis change in relation to context. The UK’s principles of war are listed on page 30 and 31.

2.11. Mission command. The UK’s philosophy of mission command has four enduring tenets:

- timely decision-making;
- thorough understanding of a superior commander’s intent;
- clear responsibility on the part of subordinates to fulfil intent; and
- determination to take the plan through to a successful conclusion.

24 For more on mission command see Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine and Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine.
2.12. The fundamental guiding principle is the absolute responsibility to act, or to decide not to act, within the framework of a superior commander’s intent. This approach requires a style of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, but which is responsive to superior direction when subordinates overreach themselves.

2.13. In practical terms, mission command has five essential elements:

- commanders must ensure that their subordinates understand their intent, their own contributions and the context within which they are to act;
- commanders should exercise a minimum of control over their subordinates, consistent with their experience and ability, while retaining responsibility for their actions;
- subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and why;
- subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions; and
- subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their superior’s intent.

2.14. Mission command assists subordinates to understand their commander’s intent and their place within their plan. This enables them to execute activity with the maximum freedom of action.

2.15. **Manoeuvrist approach.** The manoeuvrist approach to operations applies strength against identified vulnerabilities, including predominately indirect ways and means of targeting the intellectual and moral component of an opponent’s fighting power. Significant features are momentum, tempo, and agility which, in combination, aim to achieve shock and surprise.\(^\text{25}\)

2.16. While the UK’s *principles of war* are consistent with the *principles of operations* applied by NATO, there are some differences. Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01, *Allied Joint Doctrine* lists the principles of Allied joint and multinational operations. Annex 2A compares the UK’s principles of war with NATO’s principles of operations.

\(^{25}\) For more information, see *AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine*. 
Selection and maintenance of the aim

Selection and maintenance of the aim provides a focus for coordinated effort and a reference point against which to measure progress. Following this principle prevents unnecessary activity and conserves resources. The single aim must pervade subordinate operations so they contribute to achieving the end-state. To ensure that they remain valid, plans must be checked continually against the strategic objectives. Uncertainty, political reality and insufficient understanding of a situation may prevent being able to select a single aim from the outset.

Maintenance of morale

Maintenance of morale is crucial for operational success. High morale is characterised by steadfastness, courage, confidence and sustained hope. Morale manifests itself as staying power and resolve, as well as the will to prevail in spite of provocation and adversity.

Offensive action

Offensive action delivers the benefits inferred by action rather than reaction and the freedom to force a decision. Offensive action is often decisive. However, its application should not preclude defensive action when required. Underpinned by an offensive spirit, offensive action implies a vigorous, incisive approach to exploiting opportunities and seizing the initiative.

Security

Security entails balancing the likelihood of loss against achieving objectives. It demands managing risk, protecting high-value assets and resilience. Security does not imply undue caution or avoiding all risks, for bold action is essential to success. Neither does it demand over-committing our resources to guard against every threat or possibility, thereby diminishing relative fighting power.

Surprise

Surprise limits our opponents’ reaction time by affecting their ability to make decisions. Surprise may also undermine our opponents’ cohesion and morale. Surprising an opponent is a significant way of seizing the initiative and may be a critical precondition for success. Surprise is transient and must be exploited rapidly. Commanders should anticipate the effects of being surprised themselves and make appropriate contingency plans to safeguard their freedom of action.
Concentration of force
do not necessarily require the physical massing of forces, but needs balance to deliver sufficient fighting power at critical points and times. Success depends upon subtle and constant changes of emphasis in time and space to realise effects. Commanders must accept that concentration of force on the main effort may mean economy elsewhere.

Economy of effort
Economy of effort is central to conserving fighting power. Commanders must prioritise resources between engagements, actions and activities; and the sustainability demands of the operation as a whole. Economy of effort is best summarised as creating the right effect, in the right place, at the right time with the appropriate resources.

Flexibility
Flexibility comprises mental and physical aspects. Flexible organisations and cultures encourage people to think creatively, and to be resourceful and imaginative. Flexibility needs the physical and structural ability to allow forces to act rapidly, especially when operating in complex situations. Really flexible organisations are highly responsive. This can be measured in their speed of action/reaction or how quickly a commander seizes the initiative.

Cooperation
Cooperation is based on team spirit and training. Cooperation relies on three interrelated elements: mutual trust and good will; a common aim (or at least unity of purpose); and clearly divided responsibilities (including understanding the capabilities and limitations of others). Within alliances or coalitions, differences must be harmonised and political/military cohesion promoted and protected.

Sustainability
Sustainability is a critical enabler of fighting power. Rigorously assessing logistic realities, including redeployment, is essential to operations planning. Sustainability may be the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility of a particular operation.
Doctrine

2.17. Except where there is a specific need for national doctrine, the UK will adopt and employ NATO doctrine, where necessary with caveats or amplification to reflect our national position. UK doctrine comprises three broad areas.26

- **Joint doctrine.** The joint doctrine architecture of publications, headed by JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine*, comprises NATO and national doctrine publications covering all aspects of military operations.

- **Higher-level environmental doctrine.** Doctrine publications for maritime, land, air and space, special forces and cyber provide the necessary familiarity and broad basis of understanding for joint and component commanders, formations and units to operate effectively across environmental boundaries.

- **Joint tactical doctrine.** Joint tactics, techniques and procedures (JTTPs) and Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs) are prescriptive (often detailed) instructions that encapsulate best practice as established on operations and in training.

Conceptual innovation

2.18. To meet government policy needs and develop future Defence capabilities, the UK maintains a progressive programme of intellectual and academic engagement, education and experimentation. Understanding extant doctrine contributes directly to the conceptual component. The conceptual component is also updated by conceptual innovation, capturing how our thinking changes over time in response to new technologies, structures and challenges.27

Section 3 – The moral component

2.19. Warfare is a human activity and the moral component exerts a decisive psychological influence, both individually and collectively. While morals (principles of right and wrong) is one aspect which enhances cohesion and morale (a sense of confidence and well-being) is another which promotes courage and commitment, the moral component is considerably broader.

26 All our current doctrine can be found at [www.gov.uk/mod/dcdc](http://www.gov.uk/mod/dcdc).
27 For example, see the Joint Concept Note (JCN) 1/14, *Defence Joint Operating Concept*. 

2.20. The moral component of fighting power is about getting people to fight. The moral component comprises three interrelated functions:

- moral cohesion (prepared to fight);
- motivation (enthused to fight); and
- leadership (inspired to fight).

**Moral cohesion**

2.21. Moral cohesion underpins the moral courage to fight and to keep on fighting; moral integrity supports cohesion. Cohesion occurs when individuals work together, share tasks and rewards, and provide mutual support to achieve a common aim. Moral cohesion is built on shared experiences, a common sense of worth, appropriate discipline and collective identity and:

- is sustained by shared common values and standards; and
- embodies genuine and deep comradeship that endures even as the experience of violence and fear of death and injury begin to pervade an individual’s conscious and subconscious.

2.22. A feeling of pride and mutual loyalty uniting the members of a group, an *esprit de corps*, reinforces unit identity and cements moral cohesion. Commanders should consider three key aspects.

a. **Professional ethos.** An exemplary professional ethos, combined with an appealing cultural identity and strong military reputation, is a powerful moral force in its own right. The ethos of each Service[^28] is derived from a number of identifiable and intangible qualities that promote a fighting spirit and a determination to succeed, whatever the conditions. These qualities include:

- physical and moral courage;
- selfless commitment;
- loyalty;
- mental agility;
- initiative;
- stamina;
- adaptability; and
- teamwork.

The characteristics of the military instrument

A willingness to face danger is strengthened by emotional links and commitment to comrades, units and the country.

b. **Self-esteem.** Through membership of our Armed Forces, military personnel derive significant self-esteem and satisfaction with life. Self-esteem is derived from a sense of belonging to a highly-capable, professional organisation.

c. **Tradition.** Team cohesion is strengthened by a sense of heritage, infused by professional reputation and fostered through shared identity. Tradition and custom, manifested in ceremonies, uniforms, museums and Service distinctions, are critical ingredients in promoting and sustaining an *esprit de corps*. The commitment to prevail on operations, whatever the personal cost, is reinforced by an established and proven national and Service reputation for excellence and a consciousness of being part of that tradition.

**Moral integrity**

2.23. Moral integrity provides the foundations upon which both cohesion and motivation are built and requires individuals to have an understanding of right and wrong. Instilled through education and training, moral integrity is reinforced by aligning our people's values with the values and standards of our Armed Forces.

2.24. As an organisation that is democratically accountable and responsible to the society we represent, the moral legitimacy of our Armed Forces depends upon the individual and collective adherence to ethical principles. We must all promote and maintain the highest legal and ethical standards. Commanders are responsible for the moral integrity of their units and units reflect the attitudes of their commanders.

**Motivation**

2.25. Motivation is a product of training, confidence in equipment, leadership, management, reward, discipline and mutual respect. Motivation requires an understanding of both what is going on and what is required. Motivation and high morale (the will to fight and a confidence in succeeding) are interdependent.

2.26. Motivation is susceptible to external influences, including public opinion. The will to fight is substantially reinforced and sustained by the belief that the nation supports us; therefore, the media's contribution is important. Positive reporting reassures Service personnel that they enjoy national support and publicly recognises their personal contribution to an arduous, and often dangerous, endeavour (without
compromising operational security). Equally, adverse media activity can erode morale.

2.27. Motivation is also underpinned by the knowledge that we enjoy a reputation that is built on an honest assessment of what is deliverable – and then delivering it. Therefore, Defence must be both clear on what it can achieve and resolute in executing military power.

Leadership

‘A commander should have a profound understanding of human nature, the knack of smoothing out troubles, the power of winning affection while communicating energy, and the capacity for ruthless determination when required by circumstances. He needs to generate an electrifying current, and keep a cool head in applying it.’

B H Liddell Hart

2.28. Leadership is characterised by projecting personality and purpose to influence subordinates and other key stakeholders (such as contractors) to prevail in demanding circumstances. There is no definitive style of leader and no prescription for leadership. Leadership is not the preserve of senior officers – decisive leadership must be practised at every level. The exercise of leadership is related to individual and group dynamics and the context within which assigned missions and tasks have to be achieved. While natural leaders are rare, training and experience can develop latent potential. Leaders should consider the following:

• leadership is a variable combination of example, persuasion and compulsion;

• effective leaders must demonstrate strength of character, judgement, initiative and professionalism, and use these to address problems and maximise opportunities;

• to gain the respect and commitment of their subordinates, leaders must demonstrate professional competence, fair discipline and moral courage;

• leaders should engender in their subordinates the confidence that breeds initiative and the acceptance of risk and responsibility;

• in the face of adversity, leaders must demonstrate courage and contain their own fear;

29 Liddell Hart B H, Thoughts on War, 1944.
The characteristics of the military instrument

- leaders must not confuse activity with progress;
- calm, confident leadership, enhanced by clear communications, is vital to the success of operations and maintaining morale;
- leadership is based on presence and example;
- relationships should be built, and maintained, with subordinate formations, units and individuals, including contractors and partners;
- managing personnel is no substitute for leadership, but vitally supports it;
- leadership over distance, within large spans of command, decentralised networks, or Allied and joint structures, is challenging; and
- subordinates’ perceptions of their leaders are based on their reputation, demonstration of competence, personal example and authority.

Together, effective leadership and sound management establish and sustain motivation and inspire confidence.

Warfighting

2.29. A warfighting ethos, as distinct from a purely professional one, continues to be fundamental to all those in our Armed Forces. A warfighting ethos:

- comprises initiative, courage and determination;
- enables success in the most demanding circumstances;
- embodies the ideals and duties of military service; and
- unifies those who serve in our Armed Forces.

2.30. Notwithstanding the proportion of our careers engaged in duties other than warfighting, it is essential that we develop and retain the physical and moral fortitude to fight when called upon to do so. Not only must we all accept the legal right and duty to apply lethal force, we also accept a potentially unlimited liability to lay down our lives in the service of the nation.

2.31. Armed conflict is a destructive business characterised by uncertainty, friction and chaos. Fear is commonplace, even when our minds have been conditioned to cope with its challenges. Our best counters to fear are: courage and leadership, coupled with unit cohesion and discipline. We should regularly practise and test all of these counter actions during training.
The Armed Forces Covenant

2.32. The Armed Forces Covenant\(^\text{30}\) is an enduring covenant between UK citizens, Her Majesty’s Government and all those who serve, or have served, in our Armed Forces. The Covenant recognises the extra demands of service life and the sacrifices made in defending our nation.

2.33. We are bound by service. The nature of service is inherently unequal in that we may have to contribute more than we receive. We may be called upon to make the ultimate sacrifice in the service of our country. In putting the needs of the UK, our Service and others before ourselves, we forego some of the rights and freedoms enjoyed by civilians.

2.34. The Covenant outlines a framework for how our Armed Forces community can expect to be treated by the nation and codifies the obligations that the different parties to the Covenant owe to each other. However, the obligations are not conditional. Our duty to serve is never dependent on the other elements of the Covenant being met.

Section 4 – The physical component

2.35. The physical component of fighting power provides the means to fight. The physical component consists of manpower, training, collective performance, equipment and sustainability, at readiness.

Manpower

2.36. As technological and equipment superiority is never guaranteed, Defence invests in its people to provide the decisive edge. The term people includes Service personnel, both regular and reserve, as well as MOD-employed civilians and contracted personnel. It is essential that we invest in our people to ensure there are sufficient numbers who are capable and motivated. A sustainable workforce demands investment in recruiting, developing and retaining high-quality personnel.

2.37. Human capability should be regarded as a key resource and should be fully integrated into Defence planning. Rather than simply relying on superior fire power and technical capabilities, our commanders must seek out, develop and exploit human qualities such as effective thinking, resilience, adaptability and empathy to build the agility which Defence will need in the future operating environment. Commanders should also champion innovative practice.

Training

2.38. To condition military recruits for the hardship and challenges of operations, each undergoes a rigorous selection and initial training process. Collective training shapes them into contributing team members. Further professional development then maintains the requisite skills balance within the overall force structure. Despite the attractions and economies of simulation, an element of live training is necessary to prepare personnel for the reality of combat. We must make sure that we match our training to the complexities of likely operating environments.

Collective performance

2.39. Collective performance is characterised by the high levels of cohesion, confidence and proficiency achieved by units and formations that have trained or operated together. Collective performance is optimised when it integrates partners and contractors. Where time and resources allow, this should be achieved by individual Services to prepare their respective force elements for joint activity.
Thereafter, collective performance should focus on contributing to joint and multinational operations.

**Equipment**

2.40. A credible fighting force depends upon sufficient and effective equipment, optimised and scaled according to likely challenges. Our equipment should match the envisaged scale and intensity of use and easily accommodate human, system and platform requirements.

2.41. Projecting and employing a force demands a balanced and sustainable equipment capability programme. Driven by both strategic need and conceptual innovation, our equipment acquisition programme should be underpinned by both sustainable and robust manufacture and supply, as well as flexible through-life support. While technology may provide an advantage over an opponent, experience has shown that an over-reliance on technology (especially when it is unproven), at the expense of a proven, human-based fighting culture, may increase risk.

**Sustainability**

2.42. Sustainability is an essential element to give us credible and effective fighting power. It is enabled by combining:

- logistics;
- personnel and administrative force structures;
- training and equipment;
- infrastructure; and
- communications and information management.

Logistics links the strategic base (including infrastructure, stock and industrial capacity) with deployed forces. Operational tempo will only be as fast as available logistics capacity.  

**Readiness**

2.43. The UK holds forces at varying states of readiness consistent with the assessed risks and threats. Readiness postures:

- balance the time needed for force generation, preparation and deployment, with available resources;

See JDP 4-00, Logistics for Joint Operations and Bi-SC Joint Operational Guidelines 13/01, Logistics.
The characteristics of the military instrument

- comprise a combination of manpower, equipment availability, sustainability and collective performance;
- indicate the time within which a unit or formation can be made ready to perform tasks; and
- can contribute to deterrence by demonstrating our preparedness and resolve.

Progressive adaptation

2.44. The UK seeks to maintain sufficient military capability to deal with likely crises and conflicts that could threaten its national interests. However, an emerging crisis (from an unforeseen situation or against an unexpected opponent) may require new capabilities or render obsolete those currently held.\(^2\) Therefore, the UK generates and maintains fighting power that, subject to adequate resourcing:

- is broadly balanced and able to deal with a variety of possible scenarios;
- is agile enough to adapt as challenges emerge; and
- can adopt the latest technology and systems.

Section 5 – Generating fighting power

2.45. Fighting power is generated to produce military forces that are capable of succeeding on operations. There is an important, although not an absolute, distinction between having fighting power and generating it. Collective training, for example, provides no capability itself; it is the resulting collective performance that contributes to the physical component. Conceptual innovation provides the basis for future capability development, as well as enhancing our understanding of the likely context within which forces may have to operate.

2.46. Generating fighting power has two implications.

a. Generating fighting power provides the focus for all non-operational activity across Defence. On operations, certain aspects of fighting power such as morale may be enhanced, while others such as equipment may become depleted. A balance should be struck from the strategic through to the tactical levels, between generating fighting power to achieve immediate objectives

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\(^2\) For responses to events that degrade UK-based capability, see JDP 02, Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience.

\(^3\) Major General Fox Connor (2 November 1874 – 13 October 1951) was a Major General of the United States Army. He served as operations officer for the American Expeditionary Force during World War I.
(especially at high tempo over prolonged periods) and efforts to sustain and generate fighting power for the future. This includes maintaining our capability to deal with contingencies.

b. Generating fighting power rests upon supporting foundations. While not contributing directly to operational capability, these are essential to ensure that fighting power can be provided and sustained. A secure home base with adequate technical and domestic accommodation is one tangible aspect of this supporting foundation; providing appropriate health, welfare and administration for our people are others. Just as today’s fighting power is the product of past investment, so current investment will determine the extent of fighting power available in the future.

Section 6 – Orchestrating fighting power

2.47. A commander’s primary responsibility is to orchestrate fighting power, balancing the ways and means to achieve objectives to obtain favourable outcomes (the ends). Their focus must be on effectively coordinating the components of fighting power to:

- optimise their employment throughout the spectrum of current operational requirements; and
- preserve their strength and agility for future use.

Coordinating and synchronising activity is a complex task and will only deliver agility, tempo and unity of effort when planned and conducted by commanders and staffs who are experienced, and have exercised and rehearsed together.
The characteristics of the military instrument

2.48. Command and control, through effective organisations and structures, synchronises activity. Complex operations demand a command and control philosophy that does not rely upon precise control, but is able to function despite uncertainty, disorder and adversity. Command and control enables a commander to identify and manage risk and exploit opportunity, while converting intent into effect. Where control measures are established, these have a role in reducing the complementary need for direct command. Where control measures are ambiguous, weak or absent, more command is required. Command and control systems must have the agility to react to evolving situations. In any environment, the simplest, yet most adaptable system, is best.

2.49. Analysing information and intelligence establishes and maintains situational understanding and supports better decision-making. Networked capabilities can enable effective decision-making and help to synchronise activity. However, near-real time information flows, in ever-increasing volumes and to wider audiences, must be managed to allow information to be exploited. Effective information management ensures that data does not inhibit or overload the commander’s decision-making capacity; this supports information superiority. To process the significant amount of information and data that operations both demand and generate, commanders must demonstrate (and promote) both agile thought and decision-making skills.

2.50. Generating and orchestrating fighting power demands collaboration and coordination. We need to invest early and understand the broad range of our stakeholders. Working together comprises: joint activity between the three single Services; an integrated approach across government; and a multinational perspective.

Section 7 – Working together

2.51. The integrated approach is underpinned by our people – regular and reserve service personnel, MOD civil servants, contractors and other civilians. Working together, these different groups form the ‘whole force’ which delivers Defence outputs. Under the whole force approach, Defence places human capability at the heart of its decision-making and ensures that Defence outputs are delivered by the right mix of capable and motivated people now and in the future, and that people are managed as a strategic resource.34

Joint approach

2.52. UK military operations are executed through joint action, a term used to describe deliberately using and orchestrating military capabilities and activities to realise specific physical and/or psychological effects. Joint action coordinates and synchronises:

- fires (physical or virtual means to realise primarily physical effects);
- information activities (including regional and key leader engagement);
- manoeuvre (used to gain advantage in time and space); and
- outreach (including stabilisation, support to governance and capacity building).\(^35\)

2.53. The joint approach describes activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate. The Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force each own unique specialist capabilities that are built on experience, training and culture. These maximise the contribution of fighting power to the maritime, land, air and space environments. Jointery needs active investment. Commanders need to invest people, time and resources to develop joint practitioners.

2.54. Notions (and expectations) of jointery are often misunderstood. While resource pressures will demand maximum effect from limited means, joint activity must be planned carefully to ensure efficiency. Joint activity is not a means to an end in itself, and it must plan, sequence and execute activity to achieve a desired end-state. Neither should the notion of jointery degrade single-Service ethos. Each cherish hard-won traditions, customs and cultures.

2.55. The benefits of working closely together are clear. Joint activity comprises fusing capabilities to deliver more than the sum of parts. For example, joint enablers comprising cross-cutting capabilities, functions and organisations (such as medical services, training and education, intelligence and cyber) offer operational and resource efficiencies. Joint doctrine offers the operational glue to bind the activities of the Services.

\(^{35}\) Joint action recognises the centrality of influence as an effect, the integration of activities to realise it and that we may seek to influence a range of actors including ourselves, allies, civilian partners and regional audiences in addition to any adversary. Although an integral part of the UK’s approach to operations, joint action is not a capability or an activity in its own right. It is, instead, a framework for considering how we coordinate and synchronise all military activity within the battlespace (cognisant of, and coherent with, non-military lines of operation).
The integrated approach

2.56. The military instrument often plays a decisive role in providing or building a secure environment. However, crisis management cannot succeed without active cross-government and multi-agency cooperation. Effective inter-agency relationships need more than simply harmonising processes. Relationships work better where people value the different cultures involved and show patience and understanding when required. Relationships are also enabled by regular and routine interaction.

2.57. In a national context, an integrated approach requires clear national objectives, strong political leadership and collaboration across departments to make sure that the UK’s national power is coherently applied. A national approach will usually be framed within a broader multinational response, involving many actors including allies, international organisations and non-governmental organisations. As nations and organisations may have competing aims and agendas, achieving coherence in a multinational context is likely to be more challenging than it is in a national context.

2.58. In complex multi-agency situations, involving civilian organisations and possibly a civilian political head of mission, military activity may only address part of the desired outcome. While it is unlikely that absolute consistency will be achieved between civilian and military activities, commanders are to both promote, and support, an integrated approach. An integrated approach comprises four guiding principles.

a. **Proactive engagement** between all entities, ideally ahead of a crisis, enables a more cohesive response to complex situations. To increase the time available for reaction, a shared approach to collecting and interpreting crisis indicators is necessary.

b. **Shared understanding** brings distinct professional, technical and cultural disciplines together, albeit with unique values and perceptions. Understanding helps to meld different capabilities, gives extra perspectives and may enhance resilience. A shared understanding can only be built between crises through cooperative working practices, liaison and education.

c. **Outcome-based thinking** requires all participants to base their thinking on the outcomes required to deliver a favourable situation. Cohesion and coherence, delivered by good leadership, will help all entities to work towards agreed outcome-based objectives that are consistent with the national strategic aims.

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**Note:**

NATO uses the term *comprehensive approach*, which is broadly comparable to the UK’s *integrated approach*. Although, integration implies a greater level of collaboration which may not always be possible during coalition operations due to national or organisational sensitivities.
d. **Collaborative working** enhances the trust that underpins productive relationships. Integrated information management, infrastructure and connectivity, supporting common working practices, generate a more-collaborative ethos.

2.59. An integrated approach requires a culture of collaboration and cooperation, and structures developed to enable shared understanding. This approach fosters collective intent and output-focused objectives – and both enable mutually-supporting action. Where it is not possible to integrate or synchronise activity, commanders must aim to de-conflict execution.

**Multinational and multi-agency operations**

2.60. Although the UK may be required to act alone, in most cases our Armed Forces are likely to operate in partnership. This may be as the lead or as a contributing nation in a NATO operation, with other established allies and partners, or as part of an *ad hoc* coalition. The aim of most multinational responses will be set out as a UN Security Council Resolution or as part of a ceasefire or treaty settlement. Before any national commitment to participate can be made, diplomatic engagement is required to formulate both the multinational aim and the character of the multinational response.

2.61. Just as individual Services bring different attributes and limitations to joint operations, allies and coalition partners will do the same on multinational operations. Understanding other nations’ military capabilities and the ability to merge these into a cohesive force, underpins the conduct of multinational military operations. Our ability to operate with other nations requires flexibility and interoperability. However, working together, in either an integrated or multinational capacity, may confer or generate extra responsibilities for communication and de-confliction. Multinational operations may also generate extra force protection and sustainment requirements.

2.62. When working together, good ‘followership’ is as vital as strong leadership. Military commanders must recognise and promote the benefits of cooperation to achieve unity of purpose, while not necessarily enjoying unity of command. Where a common approach may not be possible owing to national and organisational sensitivities, commanders should seek as inclusive an approach as possible. Effective collaboration requires flexibility, openness and sensitivity towards all stakeholders. For more information on international collaboration see *Annex 2B*. 
The characteristics of the military instrument

Command

2.63. Command\textsuperscript{37} embraces authority, responsibility and accountability. Effective command relies upon timely, accurate and effective decision-making and is underpinned by:

- leadership, requiring varying amounts of regulation, delegation, inspiration and coercion; and
- coordinating activity, through processes and structures, that enable a commander to manage risk, exploit opportunity and achieve his aim.

Section 8 – Legitimacy and force

2.64. When using force, our Armed Forces are subject to national and international law. Their objectives and conduct are subject to democratic parliamentary control which is exercised on its behalf by the Executive. Applying fighting power will be limited to that which is necessary to achieve the desired end-state.

Campaign authority

2.65. Campaign authority is the authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within a given situation. Campaign authority comprises four interdependent factors:

- the perceived legitimacy of the mandate;
- the perceived legitimacy of the manner in which those exercising that mandate conduct themselves both individually and collectively;
- the extent to which factions, local populations and others consent to, comply with, or resist the authority of those executing the mandate; and
- the extent to which the expectations of factions, local populations and others are managed, or met, by those executing the mandate.

2.66. Crisis management activities should be both legal and purposeful. They should also be, and be perceived to be, legitimate, acceptable and appropriate in a broader sense. Campaign authority derives from confidence that the appropriate

\textsuperscript{37} For more on command see AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine and JDP 01 UK Joint Operations Doctrine.
and legitimate measures are employed by those intervening in a crisis. This helps to maintain support from those that shape opinion, share power and grant consent.

2.67. Creating and maintaining campaign authority depends upon continuously assessing the effects and consequences of the activities undertaken. To influence decisions and opinions, which reinforce campaign authority, an effective information strategy, coordinated across all national and international partners in support of the relevant strategic aim and associated objectives, is required.

Legitimacy

2.68. Legitimacy encompasses the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces. As the justification for using force, and the manner in which it is applied, legitimacy has both collective and individual aspects, both of which directly affects the utility of force. Legitimacy is based upon both subjective considerations, such as the values, beliefs and opinions of a variety of audiences (at home and overseas), and demonstrable, objective legality.

2.69. Maintaining legitimacy is crucial. It bolsters morale and promotes cohesion, both within a force and between coalition partners and confers both freedom to act and constraints on military activity. Perceptions of legitimacy are unlikely to be universal or unequivocal and may be shaped by many factors, including the media.
The characteristics of the military instrument

2.70. Once military forces are committed, the perception of the manner in which they conduct themselves is an essential element of overall campaign authority. Maintaining legitimacy depends on a variety of issues, such as a consistently reputable behaviour, moral and ethical considerations, and the prospects of a successful outcome.

Legality

2.71. Defence must operate within a legal framework, defined by applicable national and international law. Observing the rule of law is fundamental to our warfighting ethos and maintaining campaign authority. Legal aspects of UK Defence are detailed at Annex 2C.

Ethics and morality

2.72. Ethical and moral considerations underpin the law and the administration of justice, and are also reflected in operational decision-making and military conduct. Commanders are accountable for their actions and the actions of those under their command. Commanders are duty-bound to ensure that the highest moral and ethical standards are maintained by their subordinates and can achieve this through a robust ethos, personal example, training and education.

2.73. Service personnel will be exposed to the realities and complexities of warfare. They will face opponents with different moral, ethical and legal boundaries and perspectives, while themselves operating under intense scrutiny. The House of Commons Defence Select Committee, domestic law, humanitarian organisations, non-governmental organisations and the media continuously monitor our activities in relation to their moral and ethical impact.

2.74. The trend towards transparency and greater regulation of Defence activities reflects the expectations of the society we serve and whose values we reflect. If we are to maintain campaign authority, then we must respect the morals and ethics of our own culture. Moreover, while never compromising our own moral standards, we must respect local traditions, customs and practices and pay appropriate attention to the needs of minority or otherwise vulnerable groups, such as women, children and ethnic minorities. Our challenge is to ensure that society’s expectations of greater legal and ethical regulation are balanced against the imperatives of operational effectiveness.

38 JDP 3-46, Legal Support to Joint Operations.
Law and political direction

2.75. Political direction, and operational and legal provisions for using force, are detailed in JSP 398, *United Kingdom Rules of Engagement*. We must also respect and comply with the Law of Armed Conflict. Rules of engagement are not a comprehensive statement of either the law or policy, although they take account of both. The rules of engagement:

- **ensure** that military personnel activities remain within the law and are consistent with government policy;
- **define** what we can legally do and not do; and
- **reflect** the operational context.

While rules of engagement may limit activity, they do not limit the legal right to act in self-defence, where such activity is both reasonable and necessary.

2.76. Armed conflict must contribute towards setting the conditions for a political end-state. The way in which we conduct armed conflict, and the dynamic nature of context, means that political constraints and freedoms are a constant reality. Political decisions that affect using force include those that:

- place limitations on objectives and targets;
- delineate the theatre of operations and manpower limits;
- restrict the types of weapons used; and
- aim to avoid escalation.

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41 **JSP 383, The Law of Armed Conflict**.
The characteristics of the military instrument

Annex 2A – The UK principles of war and the principles of Allied joint and multinational operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK principles of war (summary)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the master principle of war. A single, unambiguous aim is key to successful military operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of morale enables a positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, feeling of worth and group cohesion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive action is the practical way in which a commander seeks to gain advantage, sustain momentum and seize the initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security is providing and maintaining an operating environment that gives freedom of action, when and where required, to achieve objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprise is the consequence of confusion induced by deliberately or incidentally introducing the unexpected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration of force involves decisively synchronising applying superior fighting power (physical, intellectual and moral) to realise intended effects, when and where required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy of effort is judiciously exploiting manpower, materiel and time in relation to the achieving objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility is the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances – it comprises agility, responsiveness, resilience and adaptability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation incorporates teamwork and a sharing of dangers, burdens, risks and opportunities in every aspect of warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability requires generating the means by which fighting power and freedom of action are maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No UK equivalent term for simplicity.</td>
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<td>No UK equivalent term for initiative.</td>
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The characteristics of the military instrument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO principles of Allied joint and multinational operations (summary)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition of objectives</strong>, operations must be focused towards clearly defined and commonly understood objectives that contribute to the achievement of the desired end-state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maintenance of morale</strong> demands that commanders give their command an identity, promote self-esteem, inspire it with a sense of common purpose and unity of effort and give achievable aims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No NATO equivalent term for offensive action.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong> enhances freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats. Active and passive security measures help to deny critical information to an adversary. They assist deception and help counter offensive actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surprise</strong> is built on speed, secrecy and deception. If successful, it achieves results disproportionate to the effort expended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concentration of force</strong> demands that combat power should be concentrated at a pre-selected time and place designed to achieve decisive results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy of effort</strong> implies the balance of available resources, given acceptable risk, against a commander’s priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flexibility</strong> demands that plans should be sufficiently flexible to respond to the unexpected and empower commanders with maximum freedom of action. This requires understanding your superior commanders’ intentions, flexibility of mind, rapid decision-making, good organisation and good communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multinationality</strong> demands an attitude of mind that is not only international, but also able to understand differing national perspectives and how they relate to the common purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainment</strong> encompasses planning sustainment into strategy, tactics and administration, including logistic and personnel support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Simplicity</strong> demands simple plans and clear orders to minimise misunderstanding and confusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initiative</strong> can be fostered through trust and mutual understanding and developed by training. It is about recognising and seizing opportunities and solving problems in an original manner.</td>
</tr>
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42 AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine.
Annex 2B – International collaboration

United Nations

2B.1. The UN is the mainstay of the international system and the influence gained by the UK’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council is central to the UK’s foreign policy. The UN Security Council usually provides the mandate for multinational military operations. Such operations can play a vital role in conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation and in alleviating humanitarian crises or human rights abuse. The UN works in close cooperation with other organisations, such as NATO and the EU.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

2B.2. NATO is the cornerstone of transatlantic defence and security and has been central to Europe’s stability since 1949. NATO’s core role remains the commitment to safeguarding the freedom and security of its members by political and military means. NATO has a global role in crisis management and stabilisation and can respond to threats wherever they occur. Intervention may include military assistance to disaster relief operations.

2B.3. As a founder member of the Alliance, the UK plays a full part in NATO with a range of permanent commitments and the ability to assign further capability in times of crisis. The UK also supports NATO standardisation of doctrine, technology and logistics, to promote interoperability between member nations. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO members have committed to transforming the Alliance in response to emerging security challenges and deploying its force to deal with these threats. This has led to creating a flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable NATO Response Force comprising maritime, land and air and space elements. Members have also agreed to improve individual contributions to NATO in key areas, such as strategic air and sealift.

European Union

2B.4. Within its borders, the EU is involved in a range of economic, social, environmental and other activities. The EU also has a broad external agenda, which encompasses cooperation on issues such as international crime, terrorism, economic development and trade. The EU is a leading political player on the world stage.

43 Other regional organisations, such as the African Union could also sanction, for example, peace support operations on the African continent.
stage through its Common Foreign and Security Policy and plays an important complementary role to NATO in enhancing security and stability.

2B.5. The EU has agreed on a European Security and Defence Policy in support of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, to ensure that it has the tools to undertake a more comprehensive role in both military and civilian international crisis management. The European Security and Defence Policy supplements other EU external instruments, such as aid and trade measures, and offers the international community a further option when considering how to respond to global crises. The EU Battlegroup initiative, for example, has evolved to provide capable forces held at high readiness that can be called on by the UN and EU. Members of the EU do not, however, currently share a NATO-style commitment to collective action or defence. Committing national forces to an EU operation remains a sovereign decision for each contributing nation. The EU’s ambition, in terms of military activity, is summarised in the Petersburg Tasks, described in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union (namely humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace enforcement).

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

2B.6. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe has 55 member states, of equal status, covering the whole of Europe and Central Asia, as well as the USA and Canada. The organisation addresses security across the region in three dimensions: political-military; economic/environmental; and human (including promoting human rights and democratic institutions).

2B.7. Through the Vienna Document, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe members committed themselves to an extensive set of confidence and security building measures including:

- annually exchanging military information;
- mechanisms for consulting and cooperating on unusual military activity or other hazardous incidents (with a view to crisis management);
- military contacts and cooperation;
- prior notification and observing military activities above agreed thresholds;
- establishing verification and inspection mechanisms; and
- establishing a network of direct electronic communications.

http://www.osce.org/fsc/86597
Contingent operations overseas

2C.1. The UN Charter\textsuperscript{45} requires that all member states refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state. However, this does not restrict the inherent right of a state to take action in self-defence in response to an armed attack. Further, it may also be lawful to use offensive force in another state’s territory (without its consent) in certain circumstances – under a Chapter VII UN Security Council Resolution – or to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.

a. National (or State) self-defence. States have an inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to restore international peace and security. Self-defence includes protecting a state’s own territorial integrity and may include evacuating its nationals from another state, which is unable or unwilling to provide that protection.

b. UN Security Council authorisation. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council may determine that there is a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. The Security Council may then recommend targeted measures to maintain or restore international peace and security, such as economic sanctions. If required, it may authorise the use of all necessary measures to restore stability and security, which may include the use of force. Security Council authorisations can be granted to regional organisations, such as NATO, as well as to individual member states.

c. Intervention to avert overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. UK policy is that a limited use of force may be justifiable without the UN Security Council’s express authorisation where that is the only means to avert an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Such cases are likely to be exceptional and it should be noted that not all nations share this policy stance. Intervention will depend on an objective assessment of the factual circumstances at the time.

Military operations in the UK

2C.2. National legislation permits UK Armed Forces to be deployed to support the civil authorities. Such support by the MOD and UK Armed Forces – military aid to the

\textsuperscript{45} Charter of the United Nations
Civil authorities (MACA) should always be at the request of those authorities and requires the authorisation of the Defence Council and Defence Ministers. Support to the civil authorities does not usually require additional powers under legislation dealing with emergencies. Therefore, the Service personnel’s conduct is routinely governed by domestic law permitting the use of force in self-defence, to prevent crime or enable the arrest of others in certain circumstances.

**Conducting military operations**

2C.3. Complying with the underpinning principles of the Law of Armed Conflict\(^\text{46}\) – distinction, proportionality, military necessity and humanity – in military operations ensures that due account is taken of the wider ethical considerations from which the law is derived. A combination of domestic and international legal considerations also provides the legal basis for regulating the manner in which military operations overseas are conducted. The Armed Forces Act 2006, subjects Service personnel and their commanders to the criminal law of England and Wales for any criminal conduct committed by them when deployed overseas, as well as being liable for the commission of Service disciplinary offences. Service personnel are also subject to international humanitarian law, encompassing war crimes and other grave breaches of international humanitarian law which have been brought into UK domestic law by Act of Parliament.

2C.4. International humanitarian law regulates the planning and conduct of military operations in international armed conflicts, hostilities in which states act under UN Security Council authority and some internal armed conflicts. Different rules apply to each situation. On multinational operations, other nations’ forces partners may not all be subject to the same legal framework – their applicable domestic laws, for example, are likely to be different. Military activities and Service personnel’s conduct overseas are usually subject to the domestic law of the host nation – for example, concerning traffic safety and the criminal law. The host nation may, via a memorandum of understanding or a status of forces agreement with the UK, recognise that both their law and UK law applies to UK personnel in their country.

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\(^\text{46}\) JSP 383, Law of Armed Conflict.
The utility of Defence

This chapter outlines the utility of Defence in securing the UK's vital national interests. It discusses influence and Defence engagement activities and the concepts of hard and soft power. The chapter concludes by outlining the employment of armed force.

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If the United Kingdom wants to stay in the Premier League of smart power then it must invest in Armed Forces that can generate hard power capability that is credible in respect of conventional coercion and deterrence.

Chief of the Defence Staff, 2013
Chapter 3 – The utility of Defence

Section 1 – Influence

3.1. By integrating the national instruments of power (diplomatic, economic and military – all underpinned by information) the government seeks to influence, through a range of activities, to prevent conflict, protect its legitimate interests and shape a stable world. The UK resides and trades in an increasingly globalised, competitive context. Therefore, maintaining the UK’s security and prosperity is a negotiated and contested process. Threats will appear when they are least expected, often without warning and it is almost impossible to accurately predict the future. The UK has been in a long period where there has been no major threat to our security, freedom or prosperity. The potential for a major state threat or existential threat remains in what will always be a highly competitive and contested global environment. However, in this competitive environment, we must ensure that we are prepared to react to inevitable change. This is executed through diplomatic and economic activity, including membership of international organisations (for example, NATO, the EU, and the UN) and, if justified, our sovereign legal right to use force.

3.2. Within the international legal framework, Defence contributes significantly in supporting the government’s policy aim of influencing the behaviour of any group, nation or state that threatens the UK’s interests. Defence fulfils this through analysing the threat and then recommending the most appropriate response. This approach, known as full-spectrum targeting enables a graduated response (both physical and psychological) to emerging threats and uses a range of Defence capabilities to achieve the desired effects.

3.3. Defence contributes to both deterrence and coercion strategies within an integrated approach. Therefore, the decision to deploy our Armed Forces is a continuation of the use of all of the instruments of national power.

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47 Influence is defined as: the capacity to have an effect on the character or behaviour of someone or something or the effect itself. (Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 12th Edition).
48 Full spectrum targeting is defined as: a holistic approach to targeting reviewing all targets together and apportioning action (lethal and non-lethal) in accordance with the campaign information strategy and desired behavioural objectives. JDP 3-00, Campaign Execution.
3.4. The UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy (2013) aims to inform Defence engagement (out to a 20-year horizon) to achieve influence in a global context. Defence assets have greater utility beyond their threat or use of hard power. Defence engagement is the means by which the UK employs Defence assets and activities to achieve influence without the use or threat of force. However, although Defence engagement may reduce the chances of a conflict occurring, historical precedents illustrates that any kind of engagement, or public commitment, may draw the UK into conflicts it would otherwise not have been involved in.

3.5. There are a number of policy goals for Defence engagement. The International Defence Engagement Strategy works towards policy end-states through four activities:

- security and non-combat operations;
- Defence diplomacy;
- Defence and security exports; and
- regional stability, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation.

49 The Defence contribution to UK influence is one of the seven military tasks defined by the Strategic Defence and Security Review.

50 Image by SAC Dek Traylor © Crown Copyright 2014. A soldier with 1st Battalion The Rifles trains a Malian soldier weapon handling techniques.
Delivering engagement

3.6. Defence engagement activities are built upon developing and maintaining a network of contacts and relationships through all available channels and understanding the broader benefits of (at times) seemingly unrelated activity. This demands proactive investment. Commanders must champion those with the cultural capability, empathy, emotional intelligence and flair for engagement activity with the same vigour they champion their warfighters. International Defence engagement activity includes:

- treaties and alliances;
- senior-level visits;
- the Defence Attaché network;
- capacity building;
- civilian Defence advisers;
- loan-service personnel;
- overseas exchange and liaison officers;
- overseas training advisers;
- security sector reform;
- international Defence training;
- conventional deterrence and reassurance;
- overseas joint exercises;
- ship, unit and aircraft visits; and
- Defence sales and Defence industry cooperation.
Section 3 – Deterrence and coercion

3.7. Nations cannot legally use force to proactively manage their international affairs. However, bounded by international law, nations can defend threats to their legitimate interests. Defence maintains the UK’s security by deterring and addressing threats to the UK’s national interests.

3.8. Deterrence and coercion strategies aim to counter threats to the UK’s security by communicating to potential adversaries the consequences of their anticipated action or inaction. While the threat of a military response can influence our adversaries’ calculation of risk during confrontation, they must be convinced that the full potential costs (the military, economic and diplomatic reaction) of their actions will outweigh any possible benefits. Deterrence and coercion strategies differ:

- deterrence aims to dissuade a course of action; and
- coercion aims to encourage a course of action.

3.9. In strategic terms, deterrence and coercion are ways by which the government might seek to secure policy ends. Deterrence is broader than the UK’s nuclear deterrent capability. The nuclear deterrent is only one of the ways the UK deters threats and aggression. Deterrence and coercion are also achieved through conventional means and a wider, more flexible range of postures and responses.
3.10. Deterrence and coercion strategies will be contested and commanders must understand the weight of effort an opponent will apply to achieve their aims. Opponents will assess:

- how they value the interests of their state or group, compared to their opponents’ interests;
- their perception of the balance of power;
- the bargaining space and whether there are alternative acceptable outcomes available; and
- their expected gains and losses.

Therefore, fully understanding the context, including the cultural, institutional, ideological and motivational factors and the prevailing political, economic and strategic situation – as an opponent perceives it – is crucial.

Reassurance

3.11. If we threaten to impose costs on an opponent to deter unwanted behaviour, we must also reassure them that if they comply then we will not impose those costs. Without this, there is little incentive for the opponent to comply. We can also incentivise opponents, either separately from or in concert with, threats of force. Therefore, our deterrence and coercion strategies should employ all available national instruments (military, diplomatic and economic) in combination. Deterrence and coercion strategies are only viable if our threat of sanction is both credible and deliverable. Apparent weakness or lack of resolve, is unlikely to deter threats.

Behaviour

3.12. Deterrence and coercion activities aim to shape behaviour. However, behaviour can appear irrational for many reasons. This includes:

- ethnic interest groups pursuing their own, rather than national, interests;
- different priorities and beliefs;
- imperfect communication; and
- fatalistic attitude.

Behaviour that we perceive to be irrational may be wholly rational to others in pursuit of their interests. Due to a complex mixture of organisational, political and psychological factors, opponents often do not adhere to rational action as we might judge it. Nevertheless, while most states will not sacrifice their sovereignty or national survival, minimal pressure may be enough to convince an opponent to give up something less important.
Effective deterrence and coercion strategies

3.13. Deterrence and coercion strategies will only succeed if an opponent understands that the threats (or incentives) are credible. Effective deterrence and coercion strategies comprise four principles:

- credibility;
- communication;
- comprehension; and
- capability.

Credibility

3.14. A threat will only carry weight to the extent that an opponent believes there is sufficient will to carry it out. The threat of force is underpinned by battle-winning armed forces and we must retain the capability to use force when required. Credibility can be difficult to establish and maintain. While reputation, resolve and capability play a role, we do not own our credibility. Other participants judge our credibility and their beliefs are only partly affected by what we do. Recognising that we may only be able to make a limited impact on others’ view of our credibility should influence our planning, and may save time and effort.

Communication

3.15. Deterrence and coercion activity will only succeed if those we aim to influence understand the message conveyed. Communicating deterrence and coercion strategies is challenging. Mistakes can be made by incorrectly judging actions and words from one’s own perspective and assuming that what we mean to convey is understood. The clearest signals must be unambiguous, but are also the most expensive to make. There is a role for ambiguity, but this depends on our assessment of the target audience’s appetite for risk.

3.16. Communication is further complicated by cultural and language barriers. Messages intended for one audience can be misunderstood by others. For example, messages to domestic audiences can have an unintended impact on the perceptions of a foreign audience. This can undermine a coherent messaging strategy and reduce the chances of deterrence or coercion succeeding. Also, in crisis and conflict, target audiences are often in stressful situations. Therefore, there may be significant limitations on their abilities – both technical and cognitive – to receive and process messages as we might hope or expect them to.
Comprehension

3.17. Deterrence and coercion activities aim to prevent a crisis escalating. However, those same activities may have unintended effects, which could be more difficult to anticipate and control. Commanders must analyse, assess and understand likely outcomes and plan to counter these. We can improve our comprehension by:

- carefully framing our demands, including timelines;
- offering a choice of outcomes;
- remaining agile as a crisis unfolds;
- changing our posture; and
- using incentives and reassurance.

Capability

3.18. Deterrence will fail if an opponent believes that there is insufficient capability to deliver a threat, even if backed with strong political will. Our established martial tradition, proven operational experience and political resolve underpin capability. Deploying forces signals a very high level of political commitment: for conventional deterrence, the swiftness of deployment may be decisive. Demonstrating sufficient capability is key in all situations.
Hard power

3.19. Hard power uses military capability and economic strength (both sanctions and incentives) to influence the behaviour of states, groups or individuals, or to directly change the course of events. Those using hard power seek to coerce opponents to adopt a particular course of action, which they would not otherwise choose themselves. Military and economic capability are important sources of hard power – they also serve as deterrents.

Hard power limitations

3.20. While hard power may offer a solution to one problem, it may undermine attempts to solve others. Therefore, while hard power may change behaviour, influence activities must consider the broader impact such action may have. Hard power must be viewed as a means to a political end-state and not an end in itself. Commanders must fully understand both the strategic aim and strategic narrative to ensure all action contributes to that end-state. Furthermore, historical precedent exists for hard power both generating and depleting soft power.

Soft power

3.21. Soft power may influence others to adopt a preferred course of action through cultural and ideological means or by encouraging emulation. The instruments of power, including Defence engagement activities, can make a significant contribution and can be used to support soft power being generated. Much of this process lies outside government control. Nevertheless, rather than relying solely on threatening or using military and economic strength, a state could attempt to achieve influence through communicating the attractiveness of its culture and ideology, or through proliferating its norms and values. Soft power is generally slower and more difficult to employ accurately. Therefore, applying soft power demands investing in time and very clear, consistent communication strategies. The ways in which soft power may be effective include:

- culture (when it is attractive to others);
- values (which are seen to be sincere in their application); and
- foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate by others).

Any of which may be reinforced with financial and material incentives.

3.22. To use soft power effectively requires a developed understanding of the intended audience and their societal codes, beliefs and cultures. Although soft power may seem attractive, especially in terms of cost, hard power has a value, potency and immediacy of its own, especially in times of chronic instability or conflict.
3.23. The UK’s success in using soft power is derived from pursuing a long-term narrative which depicts the UK as a competent, robustly inclusive country, whose actions are defensibly legal. This builds trust and makes crisis response easier. Properly executed and coordinated Defence engagement can make a very cost-effective contribution to soft power strategies. Defence has many intangible resources including reputation, professionalism and integrity – and we should protect and maximise the value of these resources.

Smart power

3.24. Hard power and soft power strategies are not bi-polar. Skilful diplomacy, across multiple government departments, will fuse both. This approach is commonly referred to as smart power.

Section 4 – Employing armed force

3.25. The UK’s response to global instability and conflict is to apply all of the instruments of national power to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at source. This recognises the potential need for overseas military operations and that security is often a prerequisite for political and economic progress. Defence maintains the ability to respond to a full range of intervention scenarios to:

- prevent violent conflict;
- enable mediation;
- stabilise situations in, or emerging from, violent conflicts; and
- support recovery and reconstruction.

Annex 3A outlines when armed force may be used.

Applying force

3.26. Within an internationally-agreed legal framework, force may be used as part of a strategy to defend the UK’s legitimate interests. Force may be required to:

- counter an imminent threat;
- diminish our opponents capacity to act; and
- influence situations by degrading an opponent’s will and capability to act and ability to make timely and effective decisions.

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51 Clarke, M Professor, CDS’ Strategic Communications Seminar, 22 March 2011.
3.27. In applying force, threats may be countered by disrupting, defeating or destroying an opponent. In summary:

- **disruption** degrades specific parts of an opponent’s capability, both moral and physical, thereby limiting their freedom of action;

- **defeat** (a broader effect than simply disruption) diminishes an opponent’s will, cohesion, and overall capacity to the extent that they are no longer able to maintain a tangible threat or prevent friendly forces from achieving their objectives; and

- **destruction** is the ultimate level of applied force, where it is considered necessary to eliminate a potential threat.

**Understanding the operational context**

3.28. Effective military engagement depends on an accurate, detailed and informed understanding of the operational context. The operational context is defined by:

- physical factors;
- the relationships between internal and external actors; and
- the prevailing cultural nuances and characteristics.
Conflict prevention

3.29. Early Defence engagement can reduce the likelihood of prolonged instability and reduce military intervention. In addition, conflict prevention activities aim to reduce the possibility of escalation and promote sustainable post-conflict peace. This may reduce, or negate, the need for military intervention to deal with emerging crises, contribute to an understanding of emerging threats, or provide broader humanitarian assistance.

Intervention

3.30. The aim of military intervention is to contribute to peace enforcement or prevent a crisis from escalating and spreading. Focused intervention, using high-readiness forces, may neutralise an emerging threat by coercing actors to modify their behaviour. During peacekeeping operations, the situation may deteriorate unexpectedly demanding combat operations to separate or disarm belligerents. Intervention may involve other government departments, non-governmental organisations or other international organisations, whose capability to provide disaster relief may be hindered by insecurity and violence. Our capacity to operate effectively, underwritten by our combat power and readiness to act, can have a critical role in countering those seeking to promote instability.

3.31. There is unlikely to be complete consensus for an intervention, unless a state or nation’s very survival is threatened. Disaffected, displaced or disempowered elements can be expected to provide active opposition. This may include the use of armed force, intimidation and coercion by criminals, insurgents, opportunists and terrorists. In such situations, it may be necessary to maintain the security and confidence of the local population, concurrent with re-building, reforming or building the capacity of state institutions.

3.32. Security and stabilisation activities involve regenerating and training an indigenous security forces capacity to both enable and sustain their recovery and own security. Commanders will operate within an integrated approach collaborating...
and cooperating with a broad range of stakeholders (potentially with competing perspectives). Other government departments and non-governmental organisations should take responsibility for many lines of operation, such as governance, reconstruction and development. However, experience and history demonstrate that this may not always be the case, especially when security cannot be guaranteed and resources, both human and materiel, are scarce. In such circumstances, commanders should be prepared, within their capabilities, training and authority, to deliver non-military lines of operation.

**Combat**

3.33. Combat may arise unexpectedly during peacekeeping or disaster relief operations, especially in volatile situations. Sporadic outbreaks of intense combat may also occur during otherwise prolonged periods of stable non-violent confrontation. Where force is applied in response to an unexpected deterioration in an otherwise secure environment, or to counter or contain sporadic violence, it is initially likely to be defensive in nature. Should those measures fail, offensive force may be applied to achieve specified objectives, including disrupting, defeating or destroying our opponents.

3.34. Combat may also reinforce an existing, but fragile, peace to stabilise a situation that risks escalating into major conflict, or establish security where it has broken down. Combat operations may be necessary to prevent instability from spreading to provide the security to enable other processes to resolve the more deep-seated causes of conflict. Defence’s role in these circumstances tends to be limited to creating and maintaining a stable environment in which underlying issues can be addressed by non-military means.

**Major combat operations**

3.35. Major combat operations involve diplomatic, military and economic actions, unified by an overall strategy and, ultimately, the full resources of the state. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine* provides the keystone doctrine for planning, executing and supporting Allied joint operations. Although AJP-01 is intended primarily for use by NATO forces, the doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for, operations conducted by a coalition of NATO partners, non-NATO nations and other organisations. JDP 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine* covers our national approach where it differs, or where we need more detail.

3.36. Major combat operations are characterised as a contest between the regular armed forces of states and/or action against large-scale irregular opponents. During major combat operations, the operational context is dominated by the need to
3.37. Major combat operations demand significant financial and organisational commitment, with rehabilitation and recuperation implications that extend beyond the military and the immediate conflict. They are likely to be highly resource-intensive with often protracted and unrestrained violence. An asymmetric advantage in weight of effort or technological superiority can mitigate human and materiel losses. Although some routine and standing commitments will be maintained, such as protecting our overseas territories, fighting power should be concentrated on those aspects that contribute directly to the end-state.

3.38. UK forces in combat are always subject to a distinctive legal framework, including international conventions and the Law of International Armed Conflict.
Annex 3A – When we might use armed force

Protecting the UK’s security

3A.1. Protecting the UK includes having the capacity to deter and defeat military threats or incursions. Protection encompasses the integrity of the UK, its territorial waters and airspace, and provides support to other government departments (termed military aid to civil authorities in matters of security and law enforcement. Military aid to civil authorities may also involve limited manpower to assist local authorities during unforeseen contingencies or more significant resources to assist the civil power in countering, for example, terrorism. If a direct military threat to the UK mainland occurs, appropriate forces (either national or with allies and partners) would be provided to confront the specific threat and to deter further aggression. In most cases, it is anticipated that any substantial threat to the UK would involve using armed forces in a large-scale alliance or coalition operation. The UK also has recourse to strategic nuclear systems.

Protecting the security of our dependent territories

3A.2. We also need to have the capability to protect any UK overseas territory or dependency facing a threat to its security. In some territories, local garrisons are maintained to deter aggression, enable overseas operations and support the civil authorities. In response to serious terrorist incidents, specialist forces may need to deploy. Circumstances may need us to use armed force to mount a large-scale national operation, employing the full range of conventional military capabilities, to fight a limited, but intense, conflict at a considerable distance from the UK.

Responding to a United Nations Security Council Resolution

3A.3. Under Chapter VII, Articles 43 and 45 of the UN Charter, all members are to make available armed forces to contribute to maintaining international peace and security. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council responsible for making the decision to use armed force in response to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, the UK has a particular responsibility to act.
Treaty obligations

3A.4. Membership of NATO involves political obligations (under the terms of the Washington Treaty) which may include assisting an ally, even if the UK’s security is not directly threatened. Also (or alternatively) the EU may request member states to take action (under the modified Brussels Treaty) in certain circumstances. Armed forces may also be deployed as part of a multinational force in a wide variety of operations as a result of decisions taken, and direction, given by the North Atlantic Council or the EU Council of Ministers.

Promoting and defending our national interests worldwide

3A.5. We may also be used to promote national interests across the entire spectrum of military activities, including support to diplomacy, military assistance, humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operations, through to major warfighting. Such engagement is based on assessing the balance of risk and advantages in committing military forces. In view of the UK’s widespread interests and investments, as well as its critical dependence on a stable, secure international environment for trade, it is likely that threats to international security would also represent a threat to our national interests. In these circumstances, Defence may contribute to operations as part of an alliance or coalition, but may have to act alone to protect or promote national interests. In certain situations, the interests at stake may be only indirectly pertinent to the national interest, in a narrow sense, but it may be judged expedient to intervene on humanitarian, compassionate or moral grounds.
The utility of Defence

Notes: