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For use with Documents with Protective Markings up to and including [redacted]

15 AUG 1984

73 herson rd
allumandale
Sydney
RC-2 14/8
20/31
2/10/84
M.C.

Dear [redacted]

with [redacted]

I noticed in yesterday's Herald when you are asking
your submissions from anyone who considers they were
affected by the Mandinga nuclear tests.

I have already seen to see the Director in [redacted] of Veter-
an's Affairs - [redacted] - who let me look at the files
they have there concerning my late husband, but the time [redacted]
even of this important & important period are not there, the
only reference to this period has 'delete all reference' accord-
ing to my local member - [redacted] who has
seen & has a copy of all the papers I have, this means they are
secret & in Canberra. Incidentally, [redacted] [redacted] allowed
me to take photostat of this period of files.

Mr. Brotherton suggested I write to Dept. of Veterans Affairs & [redacted]
which I did & had a letter 6/7/84 ref. 81/3458 from Mr.
Dunbar enclosing [redacted] statement regarding inquiry in
nuclear tests, also the Inductees force note on radiation
levels (D/D 513/51 P1) experienced by its members. I will write
more about this.

The facts are these. My late husband was a very healthy
& young man (can be proved by [redacted] & Army records)
until after he went to Mandinga tests. [redacted] can remember
the only thing he told us about the tests - he was there for 8 weeks -
when he came home was that he & a few others stood with
their backs to the blast, one could see [redacted] in one's
kiss (like an X-Ray) had only sun glasses as protection & when
he was one of the first people into the area to inspect the im-
pact on damaged vehicles etc. he was asked to [redacted]
after joining the Decontamination Centre after making this first
trip he was still reporting 3 rontgens, he made several
other trips as he was a guide for visiting scientists & officers
from England.

about 18 months to 2 years later his health started to de-

longly, pains in legs had to be cut + had several operations on the lower passages. underwent nodes (no special treatment) terrible eruptions on his body which were finally cured, eyesight deteriorating + finally in Singapore he had to be sent back to Royal Alfred Hospital for cancer of the lips + had to have it all removed. In June 1964 he had his first heart attack, at the age of 42, + had to be sent home by sea as he also had a serious kidney problem + could not travel by air at the time.

From that time onwards he was a very sick man, ending up just before he died a T.P.I. He died in April 1978 at the age of 56.

I consider that the bomb was responsible for his death, + health troubles + ruined his career, wife + his family's life etc. He had two daughters + the whole thing was certainly expected us to have a widowed husband + devoted + much loved father at such an early age, + also to see him suffer 22 years of ill health + mental anguish.

Of course I could also say something here about the financial disadvantage it got us then + still during the end of his life + the family after his death compared with the expectancy of the financial gain if he had lived a few + normal life + the retirement pensions + advent etc. today.

I am staying with my daughter at the above address until 30 August, when I shall be returning to my own home - 8 Liverpool Cres. West Malacca, Singapore. I am prepared to interview anyone + shall certainly go to the public hearing on 22 August.


I look forward to your attention to the matter + your reply.

Yours sincerely
[Redacted Signature]


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GROUP

SEPERATOR SHEET


G.P.O. Box 649,
BRISBANE. 4001

16th August, 1984



The Secretary,
Royal Commission into British
Nuclear Tests in Australia,
G.P.O. Box 4044,
SYDNEY. NSW. 2001

Dear Sir/Madam,

Firstly I would be grateful if you would forward a full copy of the Terms of Reference of the Commission.

In 1958 or 1959 as a child in Hughenden, North West Queensland, I recall a great deal of discussion amongst adults regarding "the radioactive cloud" which passed over our town bringing some freak rainstorms after a nuclear test.

My recollections are that there was a great deal of activity involving RAAF Lincoln Bombers and RAF Vulcan Bombers in the area at the same time.

I do not possess the knowledge to say whether or not it was a coincidence but following the freak rainstorms we lost a number of citrus trees which mysteriously died.

I do not even have sufficient knowledge to know whether radioactivity would have such an effect but that was the course attributed by the locals at the time.

Apart from advising the Commission of the above scanty details my main interest in corresponding to you at this time is to ascertain whether or not the town of Hughenden was in the known flight path of radioactive substances and whether or not it can be ascertained if myself and the other residents of the town at the time were exposed to the possibility of radiation.

I look forward to your reply in due course.

Yours faithfully,


DOCUMENT

GROUP

SEPERATOR SHEET

5 Abbott St,
Klemzig, 5087
Sth Aust,
29-8-84

The Secretary,

British Atomic Tests Royal Commission,

I wish to make a submission to the atomic tests Commission.

Please provide information as to;


- Who can provide submissions,
- What topics submissions can be made on,
- How one makes a submission, and
- When one makes a submission.

Please reply urgently, as I understand there is a deadline for Adelaide by 10-9-84.

Yours Sincerely,




not contact yet



3/9.

Submission to the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests
To: The Secretary,
British Tests Enquiry,
GPO Box 4044,
Sydney NSW 2001.



Name: [REDACTED]
Address: [REDACTED]
Phone(work): (08) 2699811
Date of Birth: [REDACTED]

The submission presented is the result of layman research, for I have had no formal legal training. I have not been present at any of the test sites.

The submission I present, comprises an article titled "The Australian Constitution and Response to International Law", followed by two appendices:
Appendix 1. Limited Test Ban Treaty, 5/8/63
Appendix 2. Nürnberg Principles of International Law

The Royal Commission concerns itself with the nature and adequacy of the measures to protect personnel during the British tests.

My article concerns itself with legal protection of personnel during and after the tests. The main area of discussion in the article relates to the legal validity, with respect to the Australian Constitution, of the tests. I conclude the article with a brief discussion on freedom of information, an area of interest that is incidental to and most relevant to proving legal validity.

The article has been handicapped by the complete absence in previous cases before the High Court, of discussion or ruling on four major areas;

- 1) The defence-aggression duality with respect to section 51(vi),
- 2) How the threat of nuclear war has changed the way in which sections 51(vi) and 119 should be interpreted,
- 3) The need for sensitivity to international concensus when defining aggression and protection against invasion,
- 4) The need to take note of rulings and verdicts by representative international courts on matters of war and peace.

As there have not been precedents in the High Court on any of these four crucial topics, the article approaches the question of constitutional validity from a very broad and general perspective. I consider the broad issue of the Australian Constitution with respect to legal response to International Law. A more specific treatment would not be possible until after test cases have pioneered these areas in the High Court.

I do not expect the members of the enquiry to decide on the ultimate correctness or otherwise of my article, but simply to note that it represents a constructive contribution. Indeed, only the justices of the High Court would be empowered to make a final decision concerning correctness.

Because debate on these questions has been non-existent, the awareness of those most affected by the tests, of their legal opportunities has been inadequate. I request that this report be tabled in the Royal Commission report, for otherwise apathy on these legal questions may ensure continued inadequacy of awareness of possible measures for legal protection.

[REDACTED]

Until nations are sensitive, in their national legal structure, to International Law, there will be no peace on Earth. And unless a single nation has the courage to step forth in leadership to demonstrate correct response to International Law, there can be no other future than escalation towards world war.

A few nations touch upon this principle without fully embracing it. The Swiss constitution restricts its federal government from maintaining a powerful, centralized army unless there is "sudden danger from without". In contrast, the American constitution grants its citizens several human rights, but gives its national government relatively unlimited war powers.

Popular opinion among legal experts of this nation, is that the Australian Constitution is lacking in potent controls of military use or abuse. Against such a belief in an ultra-conservative Constitution, the statement I am about to make must seem rather extra-ordinary.

I contend that the Australian Constitution binds the Commonwealth government to be directly responsive to international consensus and International Law in all matters relating to world peace, disarmament, war and aggression.

Such a statement is bold in the face of current conservative interpretations of our nation's Constitution. How then might I justify it?

The argument can only be finally proven by a case going through the High Court, and I sincerely hope that an opportunity will shortly arise for such a court case.

In the meantime I present the reasoning here using the universally recognised foundations for all constitutional argument, the Australian Constitution itself and precedents as laid down in rulings by justices of the High Court.

I base my arguments upon two separate and independent approaches, each of which can by itself substantially support my final conclusion. These two are distribution of power between Commonwealth and States, and State rights.

1) Distribution of Power

(a) Has the Commonwealth government the constitutional power for unlimited war, or to violate international covenants and treaties on peace, disarmament and aggression? I contend that it has not. Let me ask a more specific question. To whom does the "aggression power" belong? (ie the power to engage in a "war of aggression"). To the Commonwealth or State government? The State governments do not have such a power because they do not have the right to raise an army (section 114). But neither does the Commonwealth government hold the "aggression power" unless it can point to a "pigeon hole" which permits it to exercise that specific power (the general rule for distribution of power between Commonwealth and State governments is that the Commonwealth government has only those powers specifically listed for it in the Constitution).

Under which "pigeon hole" for example did the Australian government legally justify itself for its role in the Vietnam War? By common agreement, there is only one such "pigeon hole" which could justify the Vietnam War, namely section 51(vi), the so called "defence power". Section 51(vi) grants the Commonwealth the power for,

"the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States".

The word "defence" needs careful scrutiny. High Court practice demands that words of the Constitution have a reasonably fixed meaning which can be ascertained by reading them in their context, with the aid only of a dictionary. The dictionary meaning of "defence" clearly separates it from "aggression". The words "defence" and "aggression" are mutually exclusive. Section 51(vi) therefore does not bestow upon the Commonwealth government power to commit aggression.

Also section 51(xxix), the "external affairs" power, cannot bestow the power of aggression as it is traditionally interpreted in the High Court as executive and non-military. Military matters where extreme risk of life and duty to kill are concerned require a much more specific definition

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Also section 51(xxix), the "external affairs" power, cannot bestow the power of aggression as it is traditionally interpreted in the High Court as executive and non-military. Military matters where extreme risk of life and duty to kill are concerned require a much more specific definition

than such a vague word as "affairs".

In "Bank Nationalization(H.C.)" the High Court ruled on the financial corporations power (section 51(xx)) and the banking power (section 51(xiii)). If we draw analogy from the decision made in this case, we may infer that the external affairs power probably does not include military power because otherwise the carefully guarded terms of section 51(vi) would be functionless.

As there is no adequate "pigeon hole", then the power to "commit wars of aggression" can only legitimately be exercised through the active support of the States (or, as in the case of the Vietnam War, the choice by the States to not contest the war in the High Court).

(b) Had the Commonwealth government the constitutional power to justify its support for the British nuclear testing programs at Monte Bello, Emu and Maralinga, and to order civilians and military personnel to expose themselves to lethal doses of radioactivity?

There are two separate considerations here.

Firstly, the question of orders to civilians and military personnel to expose themselves to lethal doses of radioactivity. At times of "hot war", the scope of section 51(vi) is defined very broadly, and there would be no question that such orders would be valid under section 51(vi). The British nuclear testing programs however, were all conducted at times of "peace". During times of peace, compulsory exposure to lethal doses of radioactivity is a gross deviation from the scope of section 51(vi), for there is no justification of it for the purpose of defence. Nor does any other section of the act grant the Commonwealth government the power to make such orders. As such, any Commonwealth law, or interpretation of a Commonwealth law, which states that such orders are correct under the defence power, is constitutionally invalid.

In particular there is a legal ruling that deems both civilians and servicemen at Maralinga, for legal purposes to have been under the umbrella of the Defence Department. Such civilians are classed as servicemen. As such, a service person cannot sue the government, the service departments or commanding officers for negligence. Such a ruling would be unconstitutional when applying to orders which were themselves unconstitutional (such as an order for a civilian or member of the armed forces to expose himself to a lethal dose of radiation). In such areas, therefore both civilians and members of the Australian armed forces, have the legal right to sue the Australian government.

Secondly, was the support for the British nuclear testing programs constitutionally valid? There is no specific powerhead in the Constitution for "weapons research", but there is a provision in the Constitution (section 51(xxxix)) for the Commonwealth to operate with respect to "matters incidental" to other powers it exercises. Weapons research is justified as being incidental to the "defence power" (section 51(vi)).

The question of contention is: Was the nuclear testing at Maralinga incidental to the defence of Australia? Such testing I consider to be valid under the "defence power"(section 51(vi) together with section 51(xxxix)) with just one exception.

If any tests occurred after 5/8/63 and if such tests involved nuclear fission then I regard such tests to be invalid constitutionally. Firstly there are two ifs to satisfy which at the time of making this submission were disputed. The results of the Commission enquiry should however clarify both of these points.

(1) Did any tests occur at Maralinga after 5/8/63, which is the date that Great Britain, USSR, and USA signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty? Official government reports advise that the last official test occurred in May'63. There are however allegations of unofficial tests after this date. This is a matter the Commission should be able to answer.

(2) Did any of the limited experiments involve nuclear fission? The last acknowledged atomic explosion occurred at Maralinga on 9/10/57. After that date numerous experimental explosions occurred at Maralinga, in which the primary explosive device was conventional and non-nuclear. The primary explosions however were set off in close proximity to radioactively unstable materials such as plutonium. The question arises, was there also a secondary

explosion of a nuclear fission nature in these later experiments? If there was, besides the effect of a conventional explosion (which would include X-rays and intense heat) there would also be an emission of neutrons and gamma rays at the time of the explosions. Whether or not there were such emissions is a disputed and controversial point, which the Commission should, if not fully answer, at least clarify.

Now if there were tests after 5/8/63 and if such tests involved nuclear fission, then such tests would clearly have constituted a breach by Great Britain of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The terms of the treaty

"prohibit any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere"

(A copy of the treaty is attached as an appendix to this submission).

Now if Great Britain did breach the Limited Test Ban Treaty, then I consider any tests made that so breached, to be constitutionally outside of the Commonwealth "defence power". This is because the overall effect of the tests were therefore to increase the level of World War tension and such activity as a whole represents the very antithesis of "defence". This last sentence draws upon the argument (analysed in more detail in the following section titled "State Rights") that words such as "defence" and "protect .. against invasion" must have different interpretations during a nuclear war age than during a conventional war age. The question of proof of breach will be discussed later on in this article.

StatesRights

There is just one section in the Constitution giving States rights in the area of war and peace. This is the first part of section 119 which reads:

"The Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion"

Here the word "invasion" implies not only military craft and personnel but also bacteria in biological warfare and radiation from nuclear fallout.

This part of the Constitution has never been put into practice, and has therefore become regarded as ineffectual, for two reasons;

1) It has previously been considered only with respect to conventional war.

2) Although the word "shall" in the section seems to direct the Commonwealth government, the question of "how to protect" must remain the Commonwealth government's discretion, under its defence power.

There is however a corollary to this section which would be enforceable in the High Court. Such a corollary may be stated:

"The Commonwealth shall not support invasion of a State".

Such an act of Commonwealth support in the conventional war situation would be extremely unlikely. It does nevertheless relate to a plausible situation in which the Commonwealth government is providing armaments to a nation which is invading one of the States. Such provision of armaments would be unconstitutional under section 119.

It is true therefore that section 119 is for all practical purposes ineffective in the conventional war situation. Such ineffectiveness, however, does not apply to the nuclear war situation.

Clearly, in this age, the greatest threat against Australia and against the several States, is the threat of world wide nuclear war. The issues involved here are very grave, and for this reason the interpretation of section 119 with respect to nuclear war must be placed as of utmost importance in the High Court.,

As the threat of nuclear war clearly transcends the threat of conventional war in importance, then section 119 might well be paraphrased:

"The Commonwealth shall protect every State against the outbreak of nuclear war."

There is no way of protecting Australia once a nuclear war has started. Section 119 therefore directs the Commonwealth government to active participation in activities to prevent the outbreak of world war.

The word "shall" in section 119 directs the Commonwealth government. The States can't demand how the Commonwealth government uses its defence power. They can nevertheless demand that the corollary to section 119 be

put to effect. With respect to world war, the corollary may be re-interpreted:

"The Commonwealth shall refrain from any activity that significantly increases world war tension."

Protection from nuclear war is not a national problem; it is an international problem. A final solution cannot come from a single nation. It can only come from a united effort from the community of nations.

Section 119 therefore directs the Commonwealth government to become involved in the united effort for peace from the community of nations and it is therefore most relevant to ask; What steps must the world community of nations take to ensure future peace on Earth? This is a most relevant question for the High Court to ponder and section 119 cannot be adequately interpreted without answering this question.

I submit that there are 3 steps towards world peace that are self-evident ---- without the nations taking these three steps there can be no world peace, but only escalation of war tension. These steps are:

- (1) The nations of the world must come together in counsel in an atmosphere conducive towards international unity and co-operation.
- (2) The nations must reach a general consensus, by establishing clearly a definition of aggression and a code of offences against the peace and security of mankind.
- (3) Member nations must become obedient to the general consensus on aggression and offences against the peace and security of mankind.

Steps 1) and 2) have already been satisfied to a large extent, through the work of the United Nations. I contend that section 119 directs the Commonwealth government to be obedient to step 3).

In summary therefore, section 119 directs the Commonwealth government to:

- (1) be obedient to the world consensus on codes of aggression
- (2) be obedient to the world consensus on codes of offences against the peace and security of mankind.
- (3) refrain from any activity that significantly increases world war tension.

Why is it that section 119 is ineffective in the conventional war situation, but has a very broad effectiveness with respect to nuclear war? This is because conventional war is a national issue and the discretionary powers entrusted to the Commonwealth government in section 51(vi) must be given full freedom. World war and nuclear war are not national issues and the exercise of section 51(vi) is irrelevant in situations in which humanity will be annihilated in a few hours. World war and nuclear war are international issues and can only be avoided by correct response to international consensus and International law. Section 119 therefore gains a very powerful and previously unexpected relevance.

If participation in the Vietnam War violated international standards of aggression, then there is a strong case to argue that such action increased world war tension and therefore violated section 119 and was unconstitutional.

If at Maralinga, with tests after 5/8/63 we knowingly complied with a breach of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, then such compliance also increased world war tension and so violated section 119 and was therefore unconstitutional. In this regard it is not of importance that it was Great Britain (not Australia) that signed and subsequently breached the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Nor is the fact of a breach in itself constitutionally of any importance. What is important is that compliance with the breach of the Limited Test Ban Treaty was internationally inflammatory and increased world war tension. It is for this reason alone that such action violates section 119.

Before discussing proof and evidence, consider the following paradox.

It is well known among constitutional lawyers and politicians with legal responsibilities, that the words of the Constitution are generally interpreted with respect to their ordinary, literal, dictionary meaning, and that justices of the High Court are prepared to take a powerful stand in demanding an accurate interpretation of the Constitution, even if there are considerable political consequences.

Why then have Vietnam and Malaya never been contested in the High Court by State Labour governments who opposed the Commonwealth actions? Why have the questions of the defence-aggression duality and the interpretation of sections 51(vi) and 119 with respect to nuclear war never been argued before the High Court? Why indeed, has there never even been debate upon these topics? I find myself unable to answer these questions adequately, but I may be able to point to a few reasons for this apathy.

Firstly, debate is stimulated by cases and judgements in the High Court. As there have been no court cases over the defence-aggression duality and nuclear warfare, this stimulus for debate has been denied to the legal community.

Further, there are two illusions commonly held in legal circles, that one might call the illusion of burdensomeness and the illusion of inertia.

The Illusion of Burdensomeness

The High Court has traditionally maintained an atmosphere of aversion towards evidence and decisions made in reference to changing political or military situations. This aversion comes in part from the practical inconvenience of having to treat identical legislation as valid one year and invalid the next. The High Court seeks to make general and lasting decisions rather than decisions that vary from year to year. The idea of having to demonstrate in the High Court the rightness or wrongness of war seems most unpalatable to the High Court justices. They would be drawn into making political decisions, dealing with top secret information, having unbearably long hearings and having the indignity of a forced re-hearing once the military situation changed. The overwhelming burdensomeness of the whole operation would, it is commonly believed, prevent any High Court cases going past a preliminary hearing.

There are a number of points raised here.

I prefer, in this article, to sidestep the question of High Court access to Commonwealth top-secret information, by assuming for simplicity's sake, that the High Court does not have access to Commonwealth top-secret information. The onus of proof therefore lies with the State government.

The aversion of the justices against making political decisions is understandable. However on questions of strict interpretation of the Constitution, the justices have invariably spoken out boldly, even when there are momentous political consequences.

Burdensomeness is a very real and justified concern. However the matters raised in this article are of such extreme importance that a way must be found to determine a correct ruling. Fortunately, the procedures proposed later in this article bypass the probability of long and burdensome hearings before the High Court.

The Illusion of Inertia

The illusion of inertia causes one to remain thinking in old ways, without due consideration of changing events.

Most of the High Court decisions discussing war and peace issues were made before 1945, and the few decisions made since 1945 (eg Communist Party, 1951) were all made with respect to the conventional war problems that were in existence before 1945.

About 1945 however 3 events of monumental importance occurred (Nürnberg, the advent of the nuclear war age and the formation of the United Nations). These events transformed the meanings of war, peace and jurisprudence.

Nürnberg

The Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal recognised 17 Principles of International Law. These principles have become the foundations for the jurisprudence of correct responsibility to International Law.

The first responsibility of justices of the High Court must be to correctly interpret the Australian Constitution. Yet within the ambit of their allocated responsibilities, in all matters of international importance, the justices must be highly sensitive to international jurisprudence, as laid down in the Nürnberg Principles.

For example, it would be incorrect to disregard, on the grounds of burdensomeness of evidence, a State challenge over an alleged war of aggression by the Commonwealth government. Not only do the States have the constitutional right for a correct and complete High Court determination of the correct allocation of power, but the Nürnberg jurisprudence demands sensitivity to and responsibility to International Law and to the welfare of the people of the other nation involved in the war.

Threat of Nuclear War

Since 1945 warfare has entered the nuclear age, and world war now could lead to nuclear annihilation. By this I wish to reinforce the inadequacy of the excuse of "burdensomeness". The issues involved are extreme, and judicial responsibility in the High Courts and the maintenance of State rights in these areas is of first priority, in comparison with all other matters.

In particular all High Court decisions with respect to defence, war and peace to this time have been made in reference to conventional warfare. Therefore all these decisions are subject to review with respect to the legally now more significant issue of nuclear warfare.

The Formation of the United Nations

Whereas the League of Nations was formed upon principles which maintained division among nations, the United Nations was formed upon principles to freely foster the impulse towards international unity. Its General Assembly is a forum through which international consensus is reflected, and the International Court of Justice is a court not tainted by nationalistic or power block bias. It is through such international bodies that a procedure is available for a clearer definition and judgement on issues such as aggression and offences against the peace and security of mankind.

Let us consider the problem of the High Court in clear definition of such words in sections 51(vi) and 119 as "defence" and "protect against invasion". The High Court has two separate considerations.

- (1) Definition of the words must be as clear and truthful as practically possible.
- (2) Such words must be placed in their proper context. At this time the overwhelming context is that if humanity does not prevent world war, then humanity is faced with a nuclear war of annihilation.

If we place these two considerations together we must conclude that clear and truthful definitions of these words are only relevant if they align themselves with the practicalities of how humanity can prevent world war. Anything less would not place these words in their correct context.

Consider now the same question from the international point of view. How can humanity arrive at a sufficiently clear definition of words such as "war, peace, defence, aggression, invasion" sufficient to practically promote world peace? In a phrase, through international consensus. If the international definition does not have broad consensus, then such a definition is useless in practically bringing about world peace.

The only way therefore that the High Court can arrive at a broader framework for defining such words as "defence" and "protect against invasion" is to note international consensus.

There are a number of international agreements on aggression and offences against the peace and security of mankind and on control of nuclear weapons. In seeking a broader definition of such words of the Constitution, the High Court should simply "take note of" such agreements, looking for the hallmark of international consensus.

I wish now to take this same argument one step further, from "definition" to "judgement". Consider for example the problem of the High Court having to judge a Commonwealth government military action, to decide whether it lies within the ambit of section 51(vi); ie whether the military action is an "action of defence" or an "action of aggression". Such judgement can only fulfill the purpose of the hearing if it is placed within its broader constitutional context, which is (as previously reasoned) the prevention of nuclear war. That is such a judgement can only be correct if it is in harmony with the way international judgements are made to promote world

peace. Otherwise the judgement has the faults of national bias, inexperience on international questions, and incapacity to be translated to practical work for world peace; as such the judgement would not reflect the true context within which the sections 51(vi) and 119 of the Constitution must be interpreted, and would therefore not be a truthful judgement.

International co-operation is the foundation stone for materializing peace on Earth. Without such co-operation there can be no hope for peace. Any judgement or ruling on matters of world peace that separates itself from international co-operation is devoid of any true meaning.

The High Court should simply take note of a ruling by an internationally recognised body, court or tribunal, as to whether a military action is essentially defensive or aggressive. Or more generally, the High Court should leave the problem of evidence in international disputes as much as possible to internationally recognised bodies such as the International Court of Justice, and simply "take note of" the verdict. Anything less would not place the High Court judgement in the context in which sections 51(vi) and 119 should be analysed, ie the context of needing to work for world peace.

As an example, during the Vietnam War, it would have been correct procedure (had a State government contested it), to have the question of Australian aggression decided by the International Court of Justice, using international agreements on aggression as a guideline.

The International Court of Justice is the judicial arm of the United Nations. It seeks to resolve disputes between member nations by referring to international covenants and codes; and any treaties or terms that the disputing nations agree to abide by. If Australia is accused of participating in a military act of aggression then that nation against whom Australia is warring would, in all probability, be willing to represent itself as one of the disputing nations before the International Court of Justice. If a State government issues an application for an injunction of restraint against the Commonwealth, then the High Court should direct that the Australian government should present itself as the second party before the International Court of Justice.

This procedure is in full agreement with the High Court preference to avoid the need to determine constitutional validity by presenting evidence of detailed contemporary circumstances before the High Court. The High Court prefers simple, publicly available "facts" of which it can take note. Decisions by the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice or similar representative international bodies are the sorts of "facts" of which it can and should take note, and which therefore also avoid the need for lengthy evidence before the High Court.

Consider another example, a High Court case (state vs Commonwealth) over Maralinga, in which there is a certain amount of evidence available that Great Britain breached the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the decision of whether or not there has been a breach is critical to the direction the High Court would rule in the case. The State government has the right to an international verdict on the question of breach, as such a verdict would then be critical to the High Court ruling. Upon the State's request, the High Court should direct that all relevant evidence about the alleged breach by Great Britain of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, should be tabled before the United Nations (provided such evidence is not harmful towards world peace).

If one of the member nations of the treaty (USA or USSR) formally challenges Great Britain to an International Court of Justice hearing over the question of breach, and if

(1) Great Britain, within a reasonable time, does not accept the challenge for an International Court of Justice hearing,

or (2) Great Britain does accept the challenge and the International Court of Justice rules that Great Britain did in fact breach the Limited Test Ban Treaty,

then the High Court should rule that the refusal of Great Britain to go before the International Court of Justice; or the fact of breach by Great Britain is internationally inflammatory, and Commonwealth government activity

at Maralinga in support of the breach or alleged breach would also be internationally inflammatory and therefore inconsistent with section 119 and therefore constitutionally invalid.

If neither USA nor USSR make a formal challenge then the situation may be deemed as not internationally inflammatory and therefore consistent with section 119.

Summary

In conclusion I would like to summarise how I believe nuclear and defence issues are likely to be regarded in the High Court.

- (1) It seems likely that the international codes on aggression, offences against the peace and security of mankind, and disarmament and nuclear weapons control are binding on the Commonwealth.
- (2) Ratification of international treaties by the Commonwealth government may be of indirect significance in High Court cases. A breach of a ratified treaty undermines Australia's co-operation in the international peace work. If it has a sufficient relevance to war and peace issues, it opposes the State right as stipulated in section 119, and the breach could therefore be unconstitutional.
- (3) Issues such as Pine Gap and nuclear warships in Australian ports would be legitimately embraced by section 51(vi) of the Constitution and are therefore valid.
- (4) Mining and export of uranium are valid constitutionally. Australia is at present demanding strict safeguards on the sale of uranium. It may be possible to demonstrate that certain safeguards on sales are constitutionally binding.
- (5) Military conscription is constitutionally valid, even at times when Australia might be preparing for or participating in a war of aggression. In such cases it should be the war, not conscription that should be the focus of High Court challenge.
- (6) Compulsory disclosure of certain information to State governments may be a valid area of High Court dispute. At Maralinga, the Commonwealth government used its secrecy provisions to prevent knowledge of events which, according to the reasoning in this article, could well have been unconstitutional. The entire question of secrecy can be involved and raises many issues not mentioned in this article.

There are many instances in the Constitution where the founders (of the Constitution) have chosen words carefully in order to avoid too great an emphasis, centralisation, or abuse of power by the Commonwealth. The idea of federation is that there are many areas of power where mutual co-operation between the Commonwealth and the States is necessary.

In particular the founders' choice of words in section 51(vi) and 119 indicates an intention of limitation or restraint upon the Commonwealth lest the Commonwealth usurps too great a military focus of power, by using war situations to its advantage.

I hope these things will soon be recognised.

International Ombudsman

There remains one serious unresolved problem in the preceding argument, namely the disclosure by the Commonwealth government of information critical to a High Court case. Traditionally, the Commonwealth government has maintained a right to secrecy on all matters even indirectly related to defence and national security.

Though certain inroads into the conservative stranglehold on "defence" information could well be made, the overall outlook in this direction is not promising. It seems quite probable that the Commonwealth government could maintain unconstitutional military activities, but could not be successfully challenged in the High Court because of the stranglehold it has on "defence" information.

It seems that the initiatives for correct release of "defence" information must come from the Commonwealth government through legislation or referendum. It is with this thought in mind that I make the following suggestion.

A pathway must be provided whereby there is an independent check against governmental deception and falsification, that bypasses the need for people of conscience bound by security provisions to commit civil disobedience by unlawfully speaking to the media, in order to release vital information.

I propose the power of checking would be vested in an ombudsman or a group of ombudsmen.

Any Australian citizen or resident of Australia would be legally permitted to disclose any information whatsoever to the ombudsman.

It would be imperative that the Australian government clearly and precisely define those rights that it is the duty of the ombudsman to protect. Those rights should be international in their origin being drawn from the covenants on human rights and from various international treaties and agreements (eg on aggression, nuclear non-proliferation etc).

The ombudsman would have power to release information he has received to the general public. The power to release information would however be subject to two important restrictions.

The first condition is that the ombudsman may only publish such information as clearly and directly demonstrates a gross violation of the human rights or treaties he is empowered by the national government to protect.

The second condition is that such release of information must be approved by an international committee of ombudsmen. The committee would check

(1) that the release of information was essential for exposure of violation of rights or treaties the national government has appointed the ombudsman to protect,

(2) that it does not include information unnecessary to release or that diminishes world security (eg weapons technology),

(3) that the correct procedures are being followed by the ombudsman.

It does not matter that there does not yet exist such an international committee of ombudsmen. What does matter is that if the world is to know peace then certain nations must lead in this area and take the first step.

Firstly the Australian government should undertake a commitment in this direction. Secondly the government should advertise its commitment through the United Nations. Thirdly when at least two other nations are sincerely attracted towards the enterprise, an international conference should be organised to manifest the ideal into practice and inaugurate the international committee of ombudsmen. Fourthly the Australian government should legislate to grant correct powers to the Australian ombudsman.

It is my hope that this article will help contribute to the peace work that needs so urgently to be done in both the legal and political spheres.

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water, Moscow, 5 August 1963

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the 'original parties',

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international con-

trol in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons.

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to

put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I. 1. Each of the parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere: beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this sub-paragraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the parties to this Treaty


undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

[*Article II.* Amendments require a majority of all signatories including the assent of all the original signatories.]

Article III. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature . . .

Article IV. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

(Signed): 

2. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal*

Principle I

Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.

Principle II

The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law.

Principle III

The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.

Principle IV

The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.

Principle V

Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law.

Principle VI

The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law:

(a) Crimes against peace:

- (i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;
- (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).

(b) War crimes:

Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.

(c) Crimes against humanity:

Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connexion with any crime against peace or any war crime.

Principle VII

Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law.

*Text adopted by the Commission at its second session, in 1950, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission's report covering the work of that session. The report, which also contains commentaries on the principles, appears in *Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, vol. II.*

DOCUMENT

GROUP

SEPERATOR SHEET

Land, Mining, Engineering &
Photogrammetric SURVEYOR
Town Planner

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Surveyors Act, 1929



REGISTERED BY
THE INSTITUTION OF SURVEYORS, N.S.W.
FOR THE USE OF ITS MEMBERS ONLY


OFFICE: 1ST FLOOR,
11 DUKE STREET, GRAFTON
Phone: (066) 42-4790
P.O. BOX 468, GRAFTON 2460
BRANCH OFFICE:
SHOP 17, 1st FLOOR
221 RIVER ST., MACLEAN
066 45 3033

Reference BMc:J

11th September, 1984

The Secretary,
Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests
in Australia,

G.P.O. Box 4044,
SYDNEY, NSW, 2001



Dear [REDACTED]

Reference: Atomic Tests at Maralinga
Antler Series

I wish to advise you that I was stationed Maralinga prior to and during three atomic tests in 1957. I was a member of the Royal Australian Survey Corp and was initially a Sapper and promoted to Corporal during my posting - Army No. 2/8700.

My duties included the location by survey of the instrument lanes which radiated out from the proposed impact centre of each of the three sites viz. Tadge, Biak and Taranaki, the siting of specific instrument positions, and assisting in the construction works. The only other member of the Royal Australian Survey Corp that was present was [REDACTED] whom I believe died from Cancer after the tests.

I am of the opinion that sufficient precautions were not taken to protect Australian and British Servicemen during the preparation of the Tests, during the Tests nor after the Tests. Whilst I do not appear (at present) to be medically affected by the Tests, the psychological effects resulting from those Tests and media reports have unsettled me. At this stage I am not making a claim against the Commonwealth nor the British Government but I reserve any right to do so.

In particular I would like to comment on the following:-

- "(a) the measures that were taken before and at the time of the tests, and have since been taken, for the purpose of protecting persons in and about Australia and the External Territories against exposure to the harmful effects of ionising

radiation and against contact with radioactive substances and other toxic materials used in or produced by the tests;"

1. My posting to Maralinga was not a voluntary posting, I was ordered there from Eastern Command Field Survey Company which was located at Bundock Street Randwick. At the time I was 22 years of age and did not know of the effects of Radiation.
2. Upon arriving at Maralinga in 1957 I was not informed to any great extent of problems that may be associated with entering radioactive areas. I was instructed that I should wear the white protective clothing and to shower in the "Health" caravan prior to changing back into my normal clothes. I worked in radioactive areas - or what I believe to be radioactive - without the use of any protection to prevent radioactive dust from entering my lungs. It should be remembered that during a great deal of my time at Maralinga I was working near bulldozers which were creating large movements of dust.
3. I saw on many occasions the drivers of bulldozers not using any protective air guards over their mouth and nose whilst working in radioactive/danger zones.
4. I also saw a mechanic (a Lance Corporal from the Royal Engineers) not in any form of protective clothing working on a bulldozer that was still in the danger/radioactive area and which had not been decontaminated.
5. Some of the test equipment for the Antler Series had to be located in areas which had been subject to previous tests - no servicemen that I saw wore any protection apart from the white suits i.e. there was no protection to safeguard what one breathed in through your mouth nor nose.
6. The Summary & Conclusion of "British nuclear tests in Australia - a review of operational safety measures and of possible after-effects" by the Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council 1983 does not appear to be correct in all aspects.
 - (a) In regard to the safety standards and dose limitations by the I.C.R.P., the report states:-

"There is no evidence that there was any departure from compliance with those standards with respect to Australian personnel."

As an Australian who was present, I was not informed

of those standards and I believe that from what I have seen the standards would have been virtually non-existent for persons working in the radioactive areas.

(b) Clause 1.18 states:-

"The precautions taken to ensure that Aborigines living in the area were not endangered by the nuclear tests were carefully planned and executed, and AIRAC has found no evidence that any Aborigines were injured by the nuclear tests."

I personally saw an aboriginal family who had spent a night camped at the impact point of one of the Buffalo series. Myself and other servicemen were in a "health" caravan when the family approached us and wanted to trade a skin (dog or fox) for water. We had to restrain the family from drinking contaminated shower water whilst the security patrol was alerted. I was informed that the family was from a mission and had gone "walkabout" approximately 300-350 miles. From memory this incident occurred not long before the first test of the Antler series. It is noted that Section 13.4 of the report states that "After talking to them it was established that they had walked across about 1.6 km of contaminated ground and had camped for the previous night in the contaminated area, not in a 'bomb crater' as claimed by some of the press reports." I can vividly recall that the family had camped not in the crater but beside it that night. I am of the opinion that the report in clause 13.4 is misleading. Apart from this episode I am not aware of other aborigines having been sited in the area during my term at Maralinga.

7. The Daily Examiner (Grafton N.S.W.) on 31st January 1983 reported that a [REDACTED] who had worked with the Dept. of Supply "faked the results" of radiation meters during operation Antler. The Sydney Morning Herald on 1st February 1983 reported "The Spokesman (for [REDACTED]) said that [REDACTED] was known to the department. 'He could be pushing his case for compensation.' "

I cannot recall my film badge turning "black" however nor can I recall the badge having any serial number on it. If I am correct - how did the authorities manage to determine which badge belonged to who?

In summary, I am of the opinion that the Department of Supply and the Dept. of Defence were at fault in:

- (a) Not ensuring that any safeguards that were to be followed were not fully known to Australian Servicemen.
- (b) There appears to be a strong doubt on the effectiveness of the dosimeters and film badges if the report in the Daily Examiner (referred to previously) is correct.
- (c) There is sufficient evidence that a family of aboriginals camped in a "hot" radioactive area. If these aboriginals were able to walk into the centre of the test area without being observed - how many other aboriginals may have been affected?
- (d) Not supplying sufficient staff in the Health Physics team to ensure that full safeguards were carried out by Australian servicemen in the radioactive areas and that no serviceman should have entered the radioactive area without proper safety clothing.

I would formally request that the Royal Commission make available to me:-

- (i) A copy of any records showing any radiation that I may have been subject to and any possible effect that may result from those readings.
- (ii) How were any radiation readings recorded and a statement confirming that those readings were true and accurate.
- (iii) How did the authorities distinguish my readings from other servicemen and civilians if there was no serial number on the film badges.
- (iv) Advice as to whether the statements alleged by [REDACTED] as reported in the media to the effect that the radiation readings on the dosimeters and film badges were "faked" are correct or otherwise.

If required I am prepared to give evidence at the hearing by the Royal Commission, if it is considered necessary.

Yours faithfully,
[REDACTED]

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SEPERATOR SHEET

16 AUG 1984

C/- NERWEST CATERERS
BARRROW ISLAND 671

14-8-1984

Dear Sir,

With reference to the forthcoming Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia, presided over by [REDACTED]

I wish to submit that I was involved in radiation tests at Monte Bello Islands & have submitted forms to the Department of Health & Energy in Canberra.

I served as a Petty Officer Radar/Radio Electrician in the Royal Australian Navy & was present at Monte Bello serving on HMAS MILDURA in 1951-52 when we initially set up the site for the nuclear explosion that took place on October 2nd 1952.

In 1954 I was drafted from HMAS CHADSTONE to HMAS RARANGELI & also

a P.O.R.E.L. I was instructed by the
Commanding Officer [redacted] to carry
out radiation checks on all equipment
such as A Class Mooring etc with a
Geiger counter that was supplied to me.
Checks were done & radiation was
found to be present. My working
clothes whilst carrying out these
tests were a pair of naval tropical
shorts, sandals & Petty Officer's hat.


I would also like to mention that
no fish caught in the area could be
brought on board without radiation
checks carried out & in the majority
of cases they all recorded high
readings of radiation. At no time
was I instructed by my Commanding
Officer to safeguard myself with
protective clothing whilst carrying
out all these tests.

A Naval lifeboat was also
brought back to HMAS VLEEUWIN & stored
in the Electrical Workshops & I was

requested to carry out radiation checks on the equipment & at all times a high reading was recorded. Once again no warning was given to me to wear protective clothing.

I would appreciate if this information I have supplied would be brought to the Commissioner's notice & I am available to give evidence at the Royal Commission to substantiate my claim for compensation from the Commonwealth Government.

Yours faithfully

A large black rectangular redaction box covering the signature of the sender.

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SEPERATOR SHEET

RECEIVED
14 SEP 1984

26 Pine Street
Hamilton Q40
11-9-84

Dear Sir,

With reference to your letter of 20th August
I am enclosing a signed statement by [REDACTED]
in relation to events at Monte Bello and Manakaya.

We await your further reply.

Yours faithfully,
[REDACTED]

In 1955 I noticed a circulated memo from Air Ministry stating there was a vacancy for volunteers in Australia.

Being young and keen to see the World I volunteered. I was subsequently posted to RAF Western Zoyland near Bridgewater, Somerset. This I found out was a staging post for all RAF personnel going to Australia. In the time we were at RAF Western Zoyland we were issued with RAF tropical uniforms. We were also shown films and attended lectures on Atomic Bombs and their use in warfare, the destruction they caused and the use of geiger counters to detect radiation.

By this time the word was going around camp that we were going to let off Atomic Bombs, but, I can never ever recollect being officially told, or of having an option to withdraw.

At the end of January we (the advance party of 80) were being shipped to Australia. Two groups went in chartered Yorks and the remaining six or eight of us went in chartered aircraft to Adelaide where we were rushed to the Domestic Terminal for a flight to Perth - arriving on the Friday night in February in the middle of a heat wave. On Sunday - someone thought well enough of the RAF, fresh from the snowy conditions of England and took us in open trucks to the beach - Monday morning most RAF were suffering from severe sunburn.

Our job at RAAF Pearce Field was to assemble the Helicopters and the Radio Equipment Vans that we had brought with us, in preparation for the trips to Onslow and Port Hedland, by convoy.

My specific job as a Radio Mechanic was to assist in assembling with two corporals and another aircraftman the radio equipment and making it work. These were VHF Ground to Air Transmitter Receivers.

When the equipment was ready we went in convoy with other vehicles to Onslow, our task to set up a temporary Airfield and Base for the two Helicoptors. Another convoy went to Port Hedland where we set up a back base for the Helicoptors.

In the time we were at Onslow the Helicoptors ferried personnel mail etc. to the HMS "Narvik" based at the Monto Bello Islands.

Also in that time two Atom Bombs were exploded and after one of them we had to wash both Helicoptors down because of contamination but we were not provided with protective clothing. The RAF Flight Crew who helped used their white flying overalls, which I believe they discarded.

At these tests at no time were we told to turn our backs, or not watch. We did not see anything noticeable except the cloud, but, I think it was after the second test that cloud got bigger and bigger and did appear to be right overhead, going inland.

After these tests we were sent back to Elizabeth Field RAAF for a couple of weeks and then we were posted to Maralinga.

Once again we were a small number of RAF Staff and our job was to set up Ground to Air VHF TXS and receivers, most of this had been done when we arrived. The remainder of the work was to install H.F. Transmitters and complicated Rumbic Aerial Arrays for direct transmission to England day or night.

For each notification that a bomb was due to go off, there were many cancellations, and naturally we became quite blaise about the whole affair.


Our instructions on bomb detonisation was to turn our back until the person in charge told us we could turn and look. After each explosion the dust cloud seemed to be hanging and rising very close to us.


We were all supposed to be wearing film badges the whole time we were there, which were collected on what seemed a random pattern, but after all this time might have been once a fortnight.

Incidentally I believe that my badge could have been exposed several times by the back radiation from HF aerials, but we were never told the results anyway. At no time were we issued protective clothing.

After letting off four bombs we were posted to SA and subsequently home to the UK.

My current situation is, that I am dying of Terminal Cancer of the Liver and do not expect much more time.

My Rank on Discharge was 

Signed  ..

Date ...7-9-84.....

26 Pine Street,
HAMILTON. Q. 4007

10th July, 1984.

[REDACTED]
Royal Commission British Atomic Tests,
Australian Government,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Dear Sir,

I am an ex member of the Royal Air Force who served at Monte Bello and Maralinga in 1956. I recently had a stomach cancer removed and still have a terminal cancer of the liver.

I believe that the information I have regarding the conditions for service personnel will be of value to your commission and therefore offer myself as a witness.

Yours faithfully,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Please pass to
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3/7.

DOCUMENT

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SEPERATOR SHEET

ROYAL COMMISSION INTO BRITISH NUCLEAR TESTS IN AUSTRALIA.
SUBMISSION BY [REDACTED] RELATING TO THE TESTS
AT EMU SITE, SOUTH AUSTRALIA, IN OCTOBER, 1953.

This statement is intended to supplement the contents of my report entitled "Protection of Personnel Working in Contaminated Areas Following Explosion of Atomic Weapons" and dated 1st June, 1954. That report, after being cleared by the appropriate authorities in Britain, was presented to the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia at its 38th session in November, 1954, and was attached as an appendix to Council's report of that session. A copy of my report is attached to this statement.

In 1953, as a result of a request from the Chairman of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission to the Director General of the Commonwealth Department of Health, I was stationed for 8 - 9 weeks from 4th September at the camp at Emu, South Australia, the site for the proposed nuclear tests.

At that time, I was Director of Industrial Hygiene and Medicine (subsequently redesignated Director, Occupational Health) at the School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, a research and teaching institution financed by the Commonwealth Department of Health and located at the University of Sydney. (In 1980 the School was renamed Commonwealth Institute of Health).

In my position at the School which I held until my retirement in October, 1975, and as a member of the Occupational Health Committee and of the Radiation Health Committee of the National Health and Medical Research Council for many years, I was directly concerned with industrial hazards and occupational exposures to a wide variety of harmful materials, including radioactive substances and irradiating apparatus.

At Emu I was (civilian) medical officer in charge of the health centre. This was responsible for general health supervision of all persons at the camp, while protection against radiation was the specific responsibility of the radiological hazards (R.H.) group of the British scientific staff. Special radiological safety orders were issued by the scientific superintendent.

My duties primarily comprised medical examinations, treatment and care of general medical problems, and of minor injuries and blood counts when requested. Although not officially responsible for radiation health supervision, I was especially interested in the personal protective measures.

When I visited (once only) the actual test area, one or two days after the test, I was required, as were the persons who accompanied me, to comply with the relevant radiological safety orders, particularly those relating to clothing, personal monitoring and decontamination. Full details of the procedures are set out in my report attached hereto.

Based on my personal but limited experience and observations and having regard to knowledge and information then available from reputedly authoritative sources, I considered that the precautions and protective measures prescribed for persons visiting or working in contaminated areas were thorough and adequate for that particular time.



48 Bushlands Avenue,
GORDON. N.S.W. 2072.

11 SEP 1984

PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL.

WORKING IN CONTAMINATED AREAS

FOLLOWING EXPLOSION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

BY

[REDACTED]
DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH
AND TROPICAL MEDICINE, SYDNEY.

The protection of personnel against radioactive contamination following the explosion of atomic weapons has been discussed in several recent publications, some of which are listed in Appendix A attached to this report.

The main principles involved in protection of those who are required to work in active areas are:-

1. The wearing of special clothing including a respirator.
2. Radiation monitoring:-
 - (a) of the person, e.g. by film badges, pocket dosimeters, and Geiger-Counter type monitors;
 - (b) in the active areas e.g. by dose rate meters, film badges.
3. Avoidance of heavily contaminated areas or limitation of time spent in such areas.
4. Personal cleansing.
5. Decontamination of clothing, instruments, vehicles.
6. Medical supervision.

In this report it is not proposed to discuss all these procedures in detail, but to record some first-hand observations on protection and decontamination of personnel which were made at the test site in Central Australia where atomic weapons were exploded in October, 1953.

Whilst the medical centre at the main camp site was responsible for general health supervision of all personnel at the camp, protection against radiation was the specific responsibility of the Radiological Hazards (R.H.) Group of the British scientific staff. This group consisted of the Group Leader (a chemist), a medical officer, physicists and chemists and other officers with scientific or laboratory training. Their headquarters, laboratories and equipment were located at an area about 3-4 miles from the sites of the explosions;

Radiological Safety Orders for the project were issued by the Scientific Superintendent of the British team. Although these orders were marked confidential, permission was given to me to reproduce Part I (General), and Part III (Protection of Personnel). These Sections are attached to this report as Appendix B. Part II of the Orders provided for the Radiation Exposure Levels which were to be observed. For external radiation the normal working rate permitted was 0.3rep/day, of which the gamma radiation component was not to exceed 0.1r/day. In addition certain values for a lower integrated dose and for a higher integrated dose were specified. These values had been adopted by agreement with the British Ministry of Supply and other interested authorities, having regard to the nature of the particular project. No further exposure during the next twelve months was to be permitted to individuals who received the higher integrated dose.

Other values which were specified in the Radiation Exposure Levels were the permissible tolerances for beta/gamma activity and for alpha activity on the skin, and the dose rates by which "clean" areas in the field were demarcated from "active" areas.

Members of the British staff had been medically examined prior to leaving the United Kingdom, and Australian personnel who were likely to be working in contaminated areas were examined at the camp site prior to the explosions.

Protection and Decontamination.

It will be seen from Part III of the Radiological Safety Orders (Protection of Personnel) that all persons entering or working in a contaminated area were required to wear a full outfit of protective clothing, which in most cases included a respirator. They were also required to wear a film badge on their clothing and to carry at least two pocket dosimeters. It was necessary for each individual to wear a fresh set of protective clothing and a fresh film badge and dosimeters, on each occasion of entering the contaminated area. These articles will be described in more detail.

Clothing.

This consisted of the following items which are listed in the order in which they were put on the body:-

- (i) Aertex cotton combination undersuit (Union suit).
- (ii) Woollen socks.
- (iii) One-piece full length overall of light-weight gaberdine, with long sleeves. This suit was fastened up the back by "zipper" and press studs. The lower portions of the sleeves (below the elbows) and of the trousers (below the knees) were made with two layers of material - the inner to be tucked in behind rubber gloves or rubber boots respectively and the outer layer to be fixed outside the gloves or boots by an elastic tight-fitting band at the cuff.
- (iv) "Sweat" rag about 30" x 30" made of an absorbent cloth, folded around the neck and tucked in beneath the upper part of the overall.
- (v) Respirator. This was made from rubber to a British War Office design. It covered the face, eyes and forehead, and had a single canister on the left-hand side of the face. The filter pad consisted of twenty-four layers of cellulose and activated charcoal. Other types of mask were tested but the one described above was that which was commonly worn.
- (vi) Gaberdine Hood to cover the head and neck area completely. The hood fitted over the respirator and had an open window in front so as to allow uninterrupted vision through the goggles of the respirator. The lower portion of the hood was made with two layers of gaberdine, the inner layer being buttoned on to the upper portion of the overall and the outer layer hanging loosely outside.
- (vii) Long rubber gloves with outer canvas mittens.
- (viii) Rubber gumboots with cotton overshoes.

The protective clothing is designed to protect the wearer against gross contamination by radio-active materials. It prevents direct skin contact with these materials and controls inhalation and ingestion hazards. Whilst clothing gives full protection

against alpha radiation it does not protect completely against beta particles. It gives no protection against gamma flash, or the gamma rays emanating from fission products and from materials in which radio-activity has been induced. The respirator is intended to afford protection against dust inhalation.

Film Badge.

This was worn on the outside of the overall and was approximately the size of dental films often used for monitoring purposes. The film is designed to measure the integrated dose of gamma radiation. Portion of the film may be shielded by a piece of metal, the purpose of this filter being to make the response to various energies more uniform. A rough indication of the beta and soft gamma dose is given by the unshielded portion.

After the film has been developed and densitometer measurements have been made, the dosage received can be determined, and thus a valuable permanent record of the exposure of the individual can be maintained.

Pocket Dosimeters or Ionization Chambers.

At least two self-reading dosimeters were carried. They were of the type known as the Quartz-fibre Electroscope and resembled in size and appearance a pocket fountain pen. They measure gamma radiation - one over the range of 0 to 0.5 rontgen and the other over the range 0 to 5 rontgens. This type of electroscope gives an immediate reading of the total gamma-ray dosage received. The wearer can from time to time take a reading and thus keep a constant check upon his own safety.

In some circumstances a type of dosimeter specially designed to measure beta radiation was also carried.

Procedure Prior to Entering Contaminated Areas.

A diagram showing the "maze" of tents and huts which comprised the Radiological Hazards Control Centre is attached as Appendix C to this report. Tents A to F were those through or beside which personnel had to pass prior to visiting the contaminated areas, and passage into tent H (sometimes), then through J to P and finally through F again was necessary on return from contaminated areas. Barriers were erected to separate the "clean" from the "dirty" sections of the R.H. Control Centre.

The procedure was as follows:-

1. Assemble in Tent A.
2. Pass through Tent B for any special instructions from Group Leader, R.H.
3. Collect film badge and pocket dosimeters from window in Hut C.
4. Collect survey meters and other instruments at counter in Tent D, including one or more portable Dose-Rate Meters. The latter measure the rate at which a particular dose of radiation is being received per hour. One monitor (Pistol-Grip type 1314), records rep per hour of beta radiation over a range of 0 to 50 rep/hour. A second monitor (1313A) measures millirotgens per hour of gamma radiation over a range of 0 to 5000 mr/hour. These monitors are battery-operated and are very convenient for field use.
5. Collect full set of protective clothing, and respirator when necessary, at counter in Tent E.
6. Remove all personal clothing in Tent F and put on the protective clothing in the order listed.

- (4)
7. Leave Tent F and proceed along pathway leading to vehicles, for transport to contaminated sites.

All parties working in contaminated zones were accompanied by a health escort whose task was to ensure that the members of the party did not experience any radiation exposure in excess of the permitted limits. They exercised complete and over-riding authority over the parties in all matters of radiological safety. It was considered preferable for health escorts to be independent of the party to which they were attached, and for individuals not engaged in their normal duties to be made available for this task. The number of individuals working in parties in contaminated areas was kept to a minimum.

As far as could be judged, the rules laid down in Part 11 of the Radiological Safety Orders (Radiation Exposure Levels) were strictly observed in regard to persons working in the radioactive areas.

Procedure for Cleansing and Decontamination.

Upon return to the R.H. Centre after visiting or working in contaminated areas the following procedure was observed:-

1. Drive vehicles to Area G (in open air) for subsequent monitoring and decontamination.
2. Deposit records instruments and other equipment in Tent H for subsequent decontamination.
3. Personnel wait in Area J.
4. When called individually, each person moves to Tent K where film badge and pocket dosimeters are collected, the respirator canister removed for subsequent checking of the filter for radioactivity, and the protective clothing examined with a Radiation Monitor, A.E.R.E. Type 1021 B. This meter has been designed as a health instrument for checking the presence and amount of radio-active contamination on the skin, clothing, benches, floors and walls, as well as in beakers and other chemical glassware. The instrument, which is mains operated and entirely self-contained, is used for accurate measurements of alpha, beta and gamma radiation.

The monitor comprises an Indicating Unit and a Probe Unit. The controls and indicators are incorporated in the Indicating Unit, the indication being by loud speaker or counter-rate-meter. Scales are 0-2, 0-20, 0-200, 0-2000 counts per second.

The radiation-sensitive device is housed in the Probe Unit, two of which are supplied with each monitor:-

- (1) the beta-gamma probe, which contains a very fragile Geiger Counter with a special thin glass wall, and
- (2) the alpha probe which has a very thin window composed of nylon sheet.

In using the monitor to check the skin or clothing, an area of contamination is indicated when the number of counts per second rises above a pre-determined tolerance level.

Clothing of personnel was graded according to the number of counts into "clean", "dirty" and "very dirty", and the "dirty" and "very dirty" portions were marked with chalks of different colours. It was noted that the highest counts were usually found on footwear or on the lower portions of the trousers.

5. Pass to Tent L where all clothing except combinations and socks is removed by another person wearing suitable gown and rubber gloves.

Respirator is also removed here. Clothing is placed in separate bins according to the degree of contamination as indicated by the chalk marks. Personnel sit on the low barrier while rubber boots are removed. As each boot is taken off, the foot is placed on the "clean" side of the barrier. (Protective clothing was subsequently decontaminated in special laundries located elsewhere.)

6. Pass to Tent M where monitoring with the meter 1021 B is again performed and socks and combinations are removed. Collect small face towel when leaving Tent M.
7. Proceed to Hut N for a shower. Scrub all the body thoroughly, specially hair, hands and fingernails, using brushes, soaps, and detergents.
8. After thoroughly drying the body with a towel, proceed by either of the outer passageways to Hut P where final monitoring takes place - firstly by means of radiation monitor 1021 B and then on a "Hand and Foot Monitor" (A.E.R.E. type 1027). This can be used to measure alpha, beta and gamma radiation on hands or feet.

The individual stands on the platform and inserts each hand into a slot so that the fingers touch a rod at the back of the slot. There are separate slots for measuring beta-gamma radiation and alpha radiation. The fingers remain on the rod and the machine begins to operate automatically and continues for thirty seconds. A series of dials records the amount of radiation measured on the hands and feet in relation to the tolerance limit. The machine automatically cuts off at the end of thirty seconds and if the amount of contamination exceeds the tolerance, not only is this revealed on the indicators but a bell also rings. The individual then has to return to the showers, through the central passage, for further cleansing and subsequent remonitoring. This procedure may have to be repeated several times until the radioactive contamination has been removed. The readings of the instrument corresponding to a tolerance level may have to be adjusted according to the level of background radiation, for this may vary from time to time.

9. When declared "clean" the individual leaves Hut P to return to Tent F, where he puts on his personal clothing and leaves by the special pathway for direct return to Group Leader in Tent B.

Conclusion.

Because of security restrictions, no information about radiation dosages received by individuals, or dose-rates at particular distances and times following the explosions, or effects on structures and equipment, is available. It is hoped however that a full report on the project will be made available by the British authorities in due course.

Had it been possible for the Commonwealth Government to provide a radiation survey team for this project, it is felt that much valuable information would have become directly available to the Government. It is hoped that in any future project of this nature the Government will have a representative survey group of trained and experienced persons, with appropriate equipment, in the field.

Sydney,
1st June, 1954.

APPENDIX A.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Protection against radioactive contamination as discussed in a number of recent publications including the following:-

1. Introductory Manual on the Control of Health Hazards from Radioactive Materials (Prepared for the Medical Research Council by the Ministry of Supply, Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Britain) Issue No.2, January, 1949.
2. The Effects of Atomic Weapons. (Prepared for and in co-operation with the U.S. Department of Defence and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission). McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., London, 1950.
3. Medical Physics, Volume 11 (Editor-in-Chief, [REDACTED], Articles on Radiation by several authors. The Year Book Publishers, Inc., Chicago (1951).
4. Radiation Monitoring in Atomic Defense by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Co. Inc. New York, 1951.
5. Atomic Warfare - Manual of Basic Training, Volume 11, Pamphlet No.6, Third Impression, E.M.S.O., London, 1953.
6. Atomic Medicine, Edited by [REDACTED] Second Edition, The Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1953.
7. The Physician in Atom Defence by [REDACTED] The Year Book Publishers, Inc., Chicago, 1953.

....000....

C O N F I D E N T I A L.RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY ORDERSPART I GENERAL.INTRODUCTION

1. Radiation hazards will be present :
 - (a) During transport, storage and assembly of the radioactive components.
 - (b) During the explosions.
 - (c) In certain areas after the explosions due to the presence of radioactive elements on the ground or in the air.

POLICY.

2. An individual will only be exposed intentionally to a radiological hazard when his task makes such exposure unavoidable. The object of the Health Control is to protect personnel from any harmful effects when exposed to radiation hazards.
3. In cases where exposure is necessary :-
 - (a) The individual must have passed the appropriate medical tests.
 - (b) The extent of the exposure will be kept to a minimum and in any case will be within rescribed limits.
 - (c) Personnel will conform to the procedure laid down by Health control.

RE-ENTRY.

4. From H hour onwards entry into and exit from the area forward of the line given by positions D A B C in the direction of the towers and beyond them downwind must be controlled. To achieve this control all personnel proceeding into the area and all personnel returning from the area must pass through the Health Control.

HEALTH CONTROL.

5. Health Control is responsible for :
 - (a) Briefing radiological surveyors and health escorts in their duties and all re-entry parties and vehicle drivers in the radiological conditions at and en route to the sites they are visiting.
 - (b) Ensuring that health escorts accompany all re-entry parties.
 - (c) Providing protective clothing and personal monitoring devices to all personnel.
 - (d) Providing radiological instruments to surveyors and escorts.
 - (e) Decontaminating all personnel on return. Facilities will be provided to enable records and equipment to be decontaminated under supervision.

CLEAN AREAS

6. Clean areas will be established as early as safety restrictions permit. Entry into these clean areas will not be subject to these conditions.

C O N F I D E N T I A L.

PART III PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL.

1. Smoking, eating or drinking in a contaminated area is forbidden.

CLOTHING.

2. All individuals while in a contaminated area will wear the following basic protective clothing:

Union suit
Special overalls including hood
Rubber Gloves
Rubber Boots

3. Respirators will be worn when the inhalation hazard exceeds the tolerance level or in the absence of airborne radioactivity measurements when the gamma dose-rate exceeds 25 mr/hr.

PERSONAL MONITORING.

4. There will be two separate kinds of issue of film badges to personnel. These are:

(a) All personnel at the site will be issued with and wear at all times a film badge after the beginning of the Standby period.

(b) All personnel working in a contaminated area will wear a fresh film badge on each occasion. The issue under (a) above will be worn at all other times.

5. Quartz fibre dosimeters will be carried by all personnel working in a contaminated area.

6. Detailed records will be kept for individual exposures.

DECONTAMINATION.

7. All personnel returning from a contaminated area will be monitored and decontaminated as necessary before being allowed to proceed.

HEALTH ESCORTS.


8. All parties working in a contaminated area will be accompanied by a health escort, whose task is to ensure that the members of the party do not experience any radiation exposure in excess of the permitted limits. Therefore, they will exercise complete and over-riding authority over the parties in all matters of radiological safety.

9. Should such a party experience difficulties so that the radiation exposure levels are likely to frustrate them in the satisfactory completion of their task, then the health escort, will report by radio to Health Control. Dependent on circumstances an increased exposure may be permitted.

MEDICAL

10. The medical officer in Health Control will arrange for the continued medical surveillance of personnel who have been exposed to radiation when he considers this desirable.
11. He will exercise immediate medical control over all personnel wishing to work in a contaminated area.

THE R.H. CONTROL CENTRE.



- A: WAITING.
- B: GROUP LEADER R.H. (BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING)
- C: COLLECT FILM BADGE AND DOSIMETERS.
- D: COLLECT INSTRUMENTS.
- E: COLLECT PROTECTIVE CLOTHING.
- F: CHANGE CLOTHING.
- G: VEHICLE DECONTAMINATION.
- H: INSTRUMENT DECONTAMINATION.
- I: WAITING AREA ('DIRTY').
- J: HAND IN BADGE AND DOSIMETERS. CLOTHING MONITORED.
- K: REMOVE ALL CLOTHING BUT COMBINATIONS AND SOCKS.
- L: SECOND MONITORING. COMBINATIONS AND SOCKS REMOVED.
- M: SHOWERS.
- N: FINAL MONITORING OF PERSONNEL.

APPENDIX C.

DOCUMENT

GROUP

SEPERATOR SHEET

Box 1019 Post Office
TOWNSVILLE 4810
12 SEP 1984

The Secretary
Royal Commission into
British Nuclear Testing in Australia
Box 4044 G.P.O.
SYDNEY 2001

7 Sept 84

Attention [redacted]

Dear Sir,

I am aware, from media information, of the above Royal Commission and I feel it my duty to respectfully notify you of my involvement in a number of the events and exercises being examined.

As a member of the Australian Regular Army I attended the Test Sites at:-

Monte Bello	"Exercise Hurricane"
Emus Clay Pan	"Exercise Totem 1."
" " "	"Exercise Totem 2."

(and other minor experiments)

My details, at that time, were:-

<u>Number</u>	[redacted]
<u>Rank(s)</u>	[redacted]
<u>Name</u>	[redacted]
<u>Corps</u>	Royal Australian Engineers

(Seconded, in confidence, to the British Ministry of Supply and attached to the staff of [redacted])

I believe I am the only surviving member of the Australian Army to have attended all the above exercises and tests.

Detailed information covering all the above was provided, by request, to [redacted] for the Department of National Development and Energy in March 1982 (Dept file reference being 81/516/ 043)

I have no affiliation or connection with any organization or bodies which may be classified as "atomic veterans" As a loyal and conscientious Australian, I feel it my duty to acquaint you of my whereabouts and of my willingness to assist the Commission in any manner, if required.

My present functions are:-

- Regional Director - TNT/ Ansett (North Queensland)
- President - Townsville Chamber of Commerce
- Past President (N.Q) Committee for Employer Support of Reserve Forces.


Member - Army Reserve Recruiting Committee - (Townsville) etc.

My address is as above should you desire to contact me and I enclose my business card for relevant telephone information. I await your further directions. Yours faithfully [redacted]

DOCUMENT

GROUP

SEPERATOR SHEET



20 Fenwick St.,
Orks Estate
A. & J.
via Queenbejan
15th August.

The Secretary,
Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests
in Australia
Sydney,

Dear Sir,

It all started with the
filthy detonation on Monte Bello island.
a very lethal & mismanaged A-Bomb.

The Parliamentary beings in this country
didn't have one iota of savvy relative
to Nuclear science & are to be held
totally responsible for the then & today
forthcomings of the filth then & thru
later years.

I must admit we did have a handful
of academics whom did have a remote
suggestion of the consequences along
with a few prospectors using Geiger

counters, rudimentary scintillometers & radiation dose meters & acquired the knowledge of the filth all over by the use of such instruments. I am one of those prospectors.

The life & welfare of my dear wife & my four offspring along with myself were & are in great jeopardy from the effects of the British senselessness.

Now I served in New Guinea during the Japanese war in that region for two purposes, one, to try & hold back the possible threat to my homeland & in particular the welfare of my wife & children from Japanese ravage.

Only to find a far more devastating attack on my country & my family by the British & their dangerous filth. So whilst the Japanese were an enemy in respect, the British have proven to me a far greater & deadlier enemy & so shall remain

for all time. I surmise that many whom know of such filth were either told to shut up or weren't game to speak.

However as years progressed I learnt of a very strange thing of which I consider to myself to be a personal top secret & am proud of my knowledge which now appears to be poetic justice.

All humans have been analysed & classified as being of a substandard species & are to be not fit to carry on on Earth relative to its needs & welfare & are to be dealt with in due course accordingly.

Terminated with no redress.

Yours

If it was agreed the bombs have mighty powers then you haven't seen what unmerciful calamity is in store for the human. Take my word & knowledge of it.

DOCUMENT

GROUP

SEPERATOR SHEET

16 JUL 1984

[REDACTED]
11 Dericote Way
GREENWOOD WA 6024

Dear [REDACTED]


The Minister for Defence, [REDACTED] has sent me a copy of your letter to him of 22 March 1984, concerning information you provided to the Department of National Development and Energy in 1981 about the British atomic tests program.

I appreciate your willingness to provide information regarding the tests, and will ensure that the information you have provided is considered by my Department. I will also ensure that this information is made available to the Royal Commission established by the Government to inquire into the circumstances and consequences of the British nuclear tests program conducted in Australia.

Yours sincerely

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



24/3
from
11 DERICOTE WAY
Greenwood 6024
W.A.
22 Mar 1984

Right Honourable [REDACTED]
Minister For Defence
House of Representatives
Parliament House
CANBERRA
A.C.T 2600

Government seeks more data on ATOMIC TESTS in the 1950's


Dear Sir,

With reference to the ATOMIC^{TESTS} in the 1950's conducted
at EMU CLAYPAN enquiries have been made by the following
departments:-

- a. DEPARTMENT of HEALTH
Canberra.
- b. DEPARTMENT of RESOURCES & ENERGY
Jolimont Centre.
CANBERRA.

The letter I wrote to the Department of National
Development & Energy covered the following topics.

- a. Place
- b. Location
- c. Employer
- d. Service units
- f. Experimental explosions
- g. Main explosions
- h. Evacuation
- i. Remembered names of personnel involved
in the tests.



the tests.

If you wish, I could send a photocopy of what I wrote to the Department of National Development to you should your require it.

There may be other topics I could elaborate on if they were specific.






COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Acting MINISTER FOR DEFENCE
PARLIAMENT HOUSE
CANBERRA A.C.T. 2600

27 APR 1984


11 Dericot Way,
GREENWOOD. WA. 6024


Dear 

I refer to your letter of 22 March concerning atomic tests at Emu in the 1950s.

The Minister for Resources and Energy has the portfolio responsibility for overall investigation of the conduct of the tests in Australia and the current management of the former atomic test sites. In addition, his Department instructs the Commonwealth on common law actions brought against the Commonwealth.

The Department of Defence, along with other Commonwealth Departments and agencies cooperates in the compilation of information in this matter; accordingly, I will pass a copy of your letter and my reply to my colleague, the Minister for Resources and Energy.

Yours sincerely,



2. 15 1981

11, 2, 3, 4, 5

ARMY NO. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
11 Dericote Way
GREENWOOD WA 6024

May 15th 1981

Dept of National Development
& Energy
Tasman House
Hobart Place
CANBERRA CITY 2601

REFERENCE 80/2189/162 DATED 1ST APRIL 1981
ATOMIC BOMB TESTS IN AUSTRALIA 1953.

1. PLACE

Emu Claypan, Area Code Name X200

2. LOCATION

Long Range Weapons Experimental Range South Australia
482.8km (300 miles) north west of Woomera, or 321.8km
(200 miles) north of Maralinga.

The nearest landmark shown on general information maps
is probably Dingo Claypan. Emu Claypan is approximately
32.1km (20 miles) south west of there.

The nearest map location would be 40.2 (25 miles) north
west of the intersection of 132° longitude and 29° latitude.

3. EMPLOYER

Department of the Army, 7th Independent Field Sqn R.A.E.

4. SERVICE UNITS

The main bulk of personnel were made up from 7th Indep Fd
Sqd RAE, 5 ACS RAAF, other elements were from Ordnance, Raeme,
Signals, Navy, Dept of Supply.

5. THE EXPERIMENTAL EXPLOSIONS

There were thirteen experimental atomic explosions. These
consisted of two explosions of 20 kiloton each and 11
explosions of very low power, these were probably detonation
devices for larger weapons but they still produced residual
radiation.

5. (CONT'D)

The small detonations were conducted in an area starting approximately six miles from the camp site. The experimental sites were known as K Sites 1 to 11, the K designated the experiments as kittens.

All these tests were conducted at speed and with no protective clothing at all.

All measuring, generating and ancillary equipment was designed to be trailer mounted. Prior to a detonation all these trailers with their individual equipments, were backed up to an earthworks blast wall where necessary setting up would be done.

Immediately after the explosion it was get out of the area in case the wind changed direction and blew any dust over us; the only clothing worn was normal issue clothing.

An idea of the procedure is shown in the sketch annex "A".

6. THE MAIN EXPLOSIONS

Prior to the main detonations, all the blockhouses/bunker entrances had to be sandbagged after the scientific personnel had completed their own particular tasks.

These blockhouses/bunkers extended in a straight line at regular intervals back from ground zero (the blast centre) to the road junction where it forked out to the second bomb tower.

After the explosion these same blockhouses/bunkers had to have these sandbags removed.

We were ordered back into the explosion area to do this while things were still smouldering, while we were un-sandbagging, some of the scientists with all their protective clothing on came around to see what progress we were making, the only clothing we service personnel had on was normal working overalls.

When the scientists were asked about radioactivity, they said the area was hot "radiation wise" and we should not be there.

A sketch on clothing is shown in annex "B".

7. EVACUATION

The area was finally vacated in December 1962¹⁹⁵³, it was not long after this that every tooth I had was removed. Before going into this area I had all my teeth, they were in good condition at that time.

8. DOCTORS

Except for military and repatriation, the doctors I have had most to do with are -

(a) [REDACTED]
Faraday Road
Padstow
Sydney NSW

(b) [REDACTED]
14 Davallia Road
Duncraig WA


9. MEDICAL RECORDS

Most of my medical records would be held by Army Central Medical Records and by Veterans Affairs Dept W.A. (File No. [REDACTED]).

10. PERSONNEL NAMES

Listed below are some names I can remember. Naturally I cannot remember them all.

Name



Position

Surveyor
Overall Comdr
O/C Army Component
Overall 21C
Dept Supply
Army Adjt
Clerk Works
Army
Army
Army
RAAF
Army
Army
Army (deceased)(died of cancer)

10. PERSONNEL NAMES (CONT'D)

Name

Position

RAAF

RAAF

RAAF


RAAF


Army


Army

Army

Army







PROTECTIVE SUIT.

DOCUMENT

GROUP

SEPERATOR SHEET

ROYAL COMMISSION INTO BRITISH NUCLEAR

TESTS IN AUSTRALIA

14 SEP 1984

STATEMENT

SURNAME : [REDACTED]
GIVEN NAMES : [REDACTED]
RANK : [REDACTED]
TELEPHONE NO. : 02 - 949 1039
ADDRESS: : 8 Tutus Street,
Balgowlah Heights, 2093.
CURRENT OCCUPATION : Retired
DATE OF BIRTH : [REDACTED]

I attended as an observer on behalf of the Australian Government at the atomic bomb test known as Biak, held on 25 September 1957 at Maralinga. I was there about 3 weeks. I also attended as the only Australian observer at the first British Hydrogen bomb weapons test, code named Grapple, at Christmas Island, 1200 miles south of Hawaii in 1958.

The comparison between two tests is difficult to describe. The test at Maralinga was a tower supported test some 7 miles from the observers. The fire ball and blast were considerable. However, at the hydrogen bomb test at Christmas Island after detonation, the whole visible sky was aflame for many minutes. Also the man standing beside me to witness the Christmas Island test had his arm broken and a shed nearby was blown apart and coconut trees were felled as a result of the force of the blast from the explosion.

At the Maralinga test I was about 7 or 8 miles away from the site. The name of the Commanding Officer was [REDACTED] We were ordered to sit on the ground and not look at the flash for half a minute.

In relation to the Biak test I thought that the British/Australian team ran "a tight ship". After so many years and a busy career I am hazy on the details, but I recollect that the airfilters placed on the ends of the wings of the Canberra aeroplanes worked satisfactorily.