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
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# COMMONWEALTH REPORTING SERVICE

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## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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ROYAL COMMISSION INTO BRITISH

NUCLEAR TESTS IN AUSTRALIA

MR JUSTICE J.R. McCLELLAND, President  
MRS J. FITCH, Commissioner  
DR W.J. JONAS, Commissioner

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON WEDNESDAY, 7 NOVEMBER 1984, AT 9.33 AM

Continued from 6.11.84

Secretary to the Commission

Mr John Atkinson  
GPO Box 4044  
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THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr McClellan?

MR McCLELLAN: Thank you, your Honour. I call Mr Flannery.

ALAN CHARLES FLANNERY, sworn:

MR McCLELLAN: Thank you, Mr Flannery. I think your full name is Alan Charles Flannery?---That is correct.

Is that correct?---Yes.

I think you live at 85 Chesterville Road, Cheltenham in Victoria?---Yes.

And I think you have made a statement in relation to the matters of concern to the commission?---I have.

And do you have a copy of that statement there?---I have.

Thank you. I tender the statement. It can be marked RC130.

I wonder, sir, if you would mind telling me how old you are?  
I am sorry, you were born in 1921. Yes, I am sorry. You indicated in the statement that you were recruited into the Commonwealth Investigation Service in 1948 as part of a team to provide security for the long-range weapons organization in South Australia. And in 1950 the Department of Supply security organization was apparently formed for the same purpose and you became a member of that?---That is correct.

In March 1953 you were apparently briefed by the chief security officer at the Department of Supply in relation to the Totem project. And on 20 March 1953 you became assistant to the project security officer X200 Totem, Mr Colin Morrison. You were based, apparently, at Salisbury but during that time you made numerous visits to Emu, the longest was between 17 and 26 April when you relieved the security officer on site. I wonder if you would tell me, sir, what was the nature of the security operation at Emu at that time? How many officers were involved in carrying out the security?---There was the on-site security officer who was an employee of the Department of Supply. There would have been about half a dozen Commonwealth peace officers.

Half a dozen?---Yes.

And was the security at Emu the responsibility entirely of Australian personnel or did the British perform some

function in relation to that as well?---The British performed no function whatsoever.

No function at all?---No.

You indicate that in September of that year you accompanied stores to Emu, and you assumed duties of the on-site security officer at Emu about 25 October 1953, and you were present on site for Totem 2?  
---Yes.

Now, as a consequence no doubt, you can tell me of the nature of the security operation which was undertaken at the time of the explosion of Totem 2; is that so?  
---Yes.

Can you tell me then what was done to ensure the security of the range immediately prior to - I mean in the days preceding the Totem 2 explosion?---This would have consisted primarily of the trials round the area, and the strict control of personnel within the area.

Well, when you say controls around the area, up to what distance away from the site of the explosion did those patrols take place?---Well, we had a security post near Mabel Creek, this was also at the time of the Redex trials so we did not want people getting off the track and wandering in. So there was a - near Mabel Creek there was a security post; that was the static post. Closer in we would have had the trial round the area, I would say only a few miles radius.

So you patrolled a few miles away from ground zero and you had a static patrol at Mabel Creek?---Yes.

Was anything else done - I have in mind particularly aborigines - to determine whether or not there might have been aborigines close to the firing zone?---There was - from the information we had there was no aborigines likely to be anywhere near the area.

Well then, do I infer that nothing was done to see whether or not there may have been aborigines in the area?  
---No more than we were - seen for any other person.

Sorry?---No more than we were seeing for any - - -

Well, I wonder if I could have an answer. You indicated that there were trials close in. You indicate that the information you had was that there were no aborigines in the area. Do I assume, therefore, no efforts were made to determine whether or not the information you had was correct?---That is correct. There was no check.

No patrols done to see whether or not aborigines might have been within the area, outside the closed in area on the range?---No.

Who made the decision that there would be no patrols for that purpose?---I assume that the - the matter was never discussed so I could not say who made that decision.

Would it have been a responsibility of yours to make a decision such as that?---No.

Would it have been a responsibility of one of your superiors perhaps?---Well, not security superiors. It could have been someone on the administrative side on the Australian section of - at Emu.

Could you nominate the person?---Brigadier Lucas would probably be the person.

Brigadier Lucas. And what title did he hold in relation to the enterprise?---Well, he was the project director during the construction phase. He was also the senior Australian present during the operations.

By the operations you mean during the actual explosions?---Yes.

Now, the information which you say you have that there were no aborigines in the area, where did that information come from?---That would have come from the native patrol officers.

Well, how many of those were there?---Well, I would say at that stage there would only have been one.

Only have been one?---Yes.

Well, he had a gigantic area to cover?---He did.

You would not have been confident that he could provide you with an assurance that there were no aborigines in the area; would you?---Yes.

You were?---All things considered, yes.

Why do you say all things considered?---Well, the fact that the - there was never any evidence that aborigines penetrated that particular area. They were on the outskirts - Ernabella, the stations to the north and east.

Well, when you say there was never any evidence; is this what you were told?---Yes.

Who told you?---I would have been told by MacDougall, by Beadell - Len Beadell, the surveyor explorer - - -

So you relied on MacDougall and Beadell for that information?  
---Yes.

Well, you were present for Totem 2 and after that apparently you underwent a further short course in relation to radiation matters. And you indicate that at one time during that course you entered the Totem 2 radioactive area escorted by a health physics officer, and you indicate the nature of the protection that you were given at that time?---Yes.

You then indicated that you apparently left Emu but you went back for a one day visit on 20 November 1953 in connection, you say, with the departure of the last members of the support unit; but you were not required to visit the radioactive area. Now there has been a suggestion, sir, that Emu was left in a hurry. Have you heard that suggestion?---Emu was left in a hurry.

It was left in a hurry?---Yes.

Why was it left in a hurry?---Because these people had been working almost continuously for a year, for seven days a week in most instances until the final phases and I concluded that they were left there to get out, that they just virtually down tools and walked out.

I see?---I found evidence of this when I visited later. There were still hardened concrete in concrete mixers. They had just walked out.

Was there any suggestion they might have walked out because it was unsafe to be there?---No, never at any time.

But it is your belief that they did move out in a hurry?---Well, they were ordered to move out in a - - -

Ordered to move out were they?---Yes, clear the area; finish; tidy up.

You were there, you say, on a one day visit on 20 November in connection with the departure of the last members of the unit. What was the nature of your connection; what did you have to do?---Well, it was purely to see that everything - that they were ready to leave.

Did you form the view they were ready to leave?---Yes. They left the next day I think.

Notwithstanding the fact that things were left as though they were leaving in a hurry?---Well, these people had been working in - as I said - intensively. They had seen millions of pounds of effort gone up in smoke in two explosions so they did not have much respect for the few stores that were left there.

Well, you indicated you ceased full-time duty at Totem at the end of November 1953 when you accompanied MacDougall overland to Emu on 30 July 1954. You say as you had been advised it was safe to do so before you left Woomera, you traversed both the Totem craters in the land rover. I infer you drove through them; did you?---Drove through. We were told not to stop.

Were they recognizable craters?---Yes, still recognizable.

How deep would they have been?---A depression rather than a saucer. A depression, only a matter of, well, hardly discernible, but still a saucer shaped depression.

After that apparently you went across country without sighting a soul?---That is right.

Until you arrived at Liddells camp at Maralinga on 5 August. Then you went back to Salisbury. Apparently during 1955 you made numerous short visits to Maralinga in connection with the Kittens trials and for purely administrative reasons. Why was it necessary for you to go to Maralinga in connection with the Kittens trials?---Well, the communications with Maralinga at that stage from Adelaide were pretty dicey. We only had HF communications - HF wireless communications - which were not very satisfactory. We had a problem with the security of workers going to the range, and my purpose was to go up and liaise with the range security officer on his requirements for the entry of personnel.

So for most of that year, apart from that, you were at Salisbury?---Yes.

You made a longer visit to Maralinga in July 1956 for the purpose of relieving Keith Lawrence, a range security officer, who was proceeding to a conference in Melbourne. You again visited Maralinga towards the start of the Buffalo series, and in 1956 I think it was about 14 October 1956, you arrived in Maralinga to take up your appointment as range security officer. You then took over from Lawrence and became the range security officer?---That is correct.

Now, sir, what were the duties of the range security officer? ---I was directly responsible to the range commander for the security during long trials periods, and through him to the trials director during trials period for the security of classified information and material, and the prevention of unauthorized access to the area.

When you say, "the area", what area did your responsibilities cover?---Well, theoretically - - -

Just in and around Maralinga and the testing site, or did it extend beyond that?---Well, for the purposes of the classified information, Maralinga and the testing sites. Theoretically I was also responsible for the whole of the prohibited area.

And what about with respect to unauthorised entry? What was your area of responsibility there?---It would have been for the whole of the prohibited area.

Well, I imagine that was a fairly onerous burden?---It was an impossible task.

Impossible task. Why was it impossible?---Well, we relied mostly on notices and because of the vastness of the area and the paucity of the notices it would have been impossible to prevent anyone entering the area and it was not of great moment because there was no real reason for them to be there.

Well -----?---I mean there was no reason for them not to be there in a lot of instances.

Yes. Well, let us take it piece by piece. Are you saying that the fundamental plan was to place notices in the appropriate areas warning people not to come into the prohibited area?---Yes.

And were these notices placed in only one language or more than one language?---Only one language.

What language?---English.

English. And how many notices, or such notices, were there? ---Well, I would think that there would be very few to the north. The only one that I can remember at the north would have been at the entry from Mabel Creek to Tallaringa Well.

And a few in the south, were there?---Quite a few round Watson and in the sand hills before Maralinga.

Of course for someone who has desires upon intruding into the area a notice of that form would not be very effective; would that be correct?---No.

In fact, pretty useless?---Yes, yes.

And, furthermore, if you could not read it it would be even worse than useless; would it not?---Correct.

And of course - now, apart from the notices, what other steps did you take as the man responsible for securing the prohibited area?---Well, as I have said in my statement there is a differentiation between security and safety.



I was responsible for the security of official matter.

Yes?---Of official classified matter. That was we were able to cope with that quite effectively.

Yes - - - ?---We had - - -

I am sorry, I am interested - the line of questioning is in relation to the intrusion of unauthorised persons?  
---Yes.

Apart from notices, what other steps did you take in relation to the intrusion of unauthorised personnel?---Within the - - -

Prohibited area?---We only concentrated on the trials area and the area from the south to Maralinga village and this consisted of securing the high security and high safety areas with what was called closed places. We surrounded them with man-proof fences and put a 24-hour guard on them.

And you did not concern yourselves particularly with intrusion of unauthorised persons outside those areas; is that a fair inference?---That is a fair inference.

Who made the decision not to concern yourselves outside these closed areas?---Well, there was no - it was decided there was no real need.

Well, I appreciate that someone must have decided but who did the decision making?---Well, it - - -

Was that you?---I would not have made that decision.

Do you know who might have?---It would have been done in consultation with the departing British and also with the range commander and myself.

The range commander being, at that stage, Colonel Durance?  
---Colonel Durance, and he was given the areas so far as I know that needed high security coverage.

When you were at Maralinga no doubt you made yourself familiar with the movements of aborigines as known to people of Maralinga, did you?---The aborigines outside the area?

No, within the prohibited area? Did you take steps to familiarize yourself with where aborigines might be or might want to be within the prohibited area?---So far as I was concerned from the information we obtained there was no need - or the aborigines were not likely to be within the prohibited area.

And again, where did that information come from when you were at Maralinga?---That would have come mainly from the native patrol officer.

Again, MacDougall?---MacDougall and McCauley.

And McCauley?---Yes.

Did MacDougall and McCauley report to you as the range security officer?---No.

How did you get your information then from MacDougall and McCauley?---They would have in most instances reported back to their base at Woomera because they were primarily Woomera personnel and any concerns they had would have been fed through the administrative channels at Maralinga.

No doubt you were aware, were you, at the kind of tests that MacDougall and McCauley were required to perform particular patrols within the prohibited area?---Yes. They, during test periods, were placed entirely at the disposal of Maralinga.

And do I infer, therefore, at your disposal?---~~Not at mine.~~ They did not answer to security. We reacted to their directions.

Well, then, at the time of an explosion or prior to an explosion when you were at Maralinga what was the chain of command and I am particularly interested to know what role you played in determining whether or not the range area, or the prohibited area, was safe so the device could be fired?---The - as I said we were supplied with information from the native patrol officers and the immediate area - - -

So, let us get the precise chain of command. We are coming up to a trial?---Yes.

The patrol officers are reporting in to Maralinga, are they? ---Maralinga.

To whom?---They would have been by radio to the administrative - the radio office.

Which is an Australian enterprise?---I think at that stage the Greeks were manning the radio.

Right. And the information that came in, did it come to you? ---Yes. There would have been a copy to me as well as - - -

And did you make decisions in relation to that information? ---Yes.

Right. And who did you communicate those decisions to?---I would have kept the range commander aware of them.

What about the British? Did you talk to the British about them?---No, they simply supplied the means to - particularly in regard to aircraft, for us to react.

And did you have a capacity to say to the British, the range is not safe, not secure, you should not fire?---I did have that capacity, but it never arose.

You never exercised it?---Never needed to.

I see. Well, you would be aware, would you not, that Mr McCauley was required to perform a particular patrol in relation to the Antler series?---Yes.

And he was totally unable to perform that patrol, was he not?---I do not know that.

You have never heard that before?---No, I have not.

Well, just so as I have it clearly. You were present at Maralinga for the Antler series, were you not?---Yes, for the entire Antler series.

And if Mr McCauley was unable by reason of inclement weather to carry out his patrol, you would have expected to have been informed?---I would have expected but I can say I have never at any time received that information.

If you did not receive that information, can you offer me any explanation as to why that could have been?---I cannot.

Would you agree that it suggests a problem in the security system if that occurred?---In the safety system, yes.

Of which you were a part?---Yes.

You indicated in the statement:

As range security officer you were directly responsible to the range commander . . . . . Department of Supply, Adelaide.

You seek to draw a distinction between security and safety responsibilities. You say:

While at times, particularly during trials periods the common purpose . . . . . main reasons of safety.

And then you refer also, further down that paragraph, you say:

Another example of the diversion responsibilities secured in safety . . . . .  
a native welfare officer was attached to range headquarters.

Now, do you know the name of that native welfare officer?---I cannot remember it.

The name, "Smith" does not - - -?---No, it was not Smith.

It was not Smith? What function did that native welfare officer perform at Maralinga?---He, together with me, received any information from the native patrol officers and he also accompanied any of the security personnel that went out on air patrol.

Why was it thought necessary to have a further person in the form of a native welfare officer at Maralinga for the Antler series but not for Buffalo?---I presume this was a decision of the South Australian Government or the --- I think more particularly the South Australian Government Native Affairs.

Well, can you help me as to why it was thought necessary?---I do not know.

There had been, had there not, an authorised intrusion into the test site area by some aborigines prior to the Antler series?---Yes.

Did that cause you concern as the range security officer?---I was not there at the time, but it did cause me concern as it was an unfortunate incident.

Well perhaps it was unfortunate, sir, but did it not suggest to you that there was a grave deficiency in the security system for the range?---Not at all.

Well can you explain to me why it is that if a family of aborigines get right into a contaminated area, which is apparently secure, you did not consider that intrusion to be a serious breach of the security system? ---Well, the contaminated area was not completely secure.

Yes, but it did not suggest to you the efforts you were taking to secure the area had some deficiencies?---No. The - you must realise that security is always a balance between what is ideal and what is attainable with what you have. I think that a good example of this would be what occurred in the commission's offices in Sydney yesterday.

Yes?---There was a penetration made but the vital areas inside  
were not broached, so far as I understand.

But, sir, contrary to - you were concerned, were you not,  
with the protection of human life?---Indirectly, yes.

Well, directly, were you not?---Indirectly.

Were you not the - - -?---I was not the safety officer I was the security officer.

And I thought you told me that it was part of your responsibilities with respect of unauthorised intrusions into this prohibited area?---Yes.

That means humans does not it?---Yes.

Well, do you not agree with me that part of your responsibility is the safety of human life?---My prime responsibility was the security of official - of security classified information.

Well if it was not you, who had the responsibility for the safety of human life, and in particular, for the safety problem represented by unauthorised intrusions into the range?---Well it is ultimately the range commander.

Colonel Durance?---Yes.

When you say ultimately the range commander, do you mean by that you have the responsibility but you report it to Colonel Durance?---I, the responsibility was given as I said to the security organisation, because we happened to have the manpower; or what manpower was available.

Well, can I ask you again, once you become aware, and I appreciate you were not on the range at the time, once you became aware of the fact that an aboriginal family had intruded right into the prohibited area, then into a crater, which at the time was still controlled - - -?---Yes.

Apparently by Health Physics Caravans?---Well, there was not a caravan on site.

There was not?---Not on at the . . . . .

Were you present at the time?---No, I was not, but - - -

Well, I will not stop to debate that, but once you became aware this family had intruded into the area, did you not become concerned about whether or not the steps you were taken ultimately, except responsible to Colonel Durance's, were adequate to secure the range? ---I thought that every available step had been taken to secure the range.

When you say available step, do you mean by that every step that you have the manpower to take?---Security can never be absolute. If we had absolute security we would not have had what happened to Mrs Gandhi last week.

Did you do anything about, perhaps raising with your superiors, whether or not the manpower available to secure the range was adequate?---There would have been discussions

and it would have been concluded there was nothing more we could do.

Well then, let me ask you at that point in time, what were you doing to secure the range from unauthorised intrusion?---Certainly. To the north we had the roving patrols.

Well, let us have it in detail. To the north you had one patrol officer?---One or two, two I would say in - - -

McCauley?---Oh no, Commonwealth police.

Commonwealth police. How far to the north were they?---They were roving round the test area north of . . . . .

So, within what, half a mile or a mile?---Oh no, around the complete perimeter of the - and within the perimeter.

Of the -?---Of all the test area.

Of all the test area?---Yes.

And how often were they patrolled?---They were patrolled and continuously during daylight hour.

And - two of them?---Yes, and we also had a static post on Eatle Tower, which was a tower used during the buffalo series for photography.

So it is a tower from which a man could look out?---Yes.

How far could he see?---Oh, I would say he could see 10 miles or more.

Ten miles or more. That was a tower which, I think, was ultimately abandoned for observation for aboriginals, was it not?---So far as I remember it was still manned until the operation for Antler really began. And then there was so many people involved in the area it did not serve a purpose.

Did you do anything else to secure the range at the time?---No.

Let me ask you this, once you became aware that the aboriginals had intruded, did that cause you concern in relation to the information you had received that there would be no aboriginals in the range area?---It did.

What steps did you take to deal with that concern?---Well, there would have been discussions with MacDougall and McCauley, who would have in turn gone back to places like Ernabella and Giles where there were concentrations of aboriginals, and further talks would have been taken to whoever was in charge of it.

You are not suggesting, are you, that there may be parties of aboriginals not whole communities moving through the range area from time to time?---No.

Well, can you explain to me how it is that if you find a family of four in Maralinga, that did not suggest to you that others might move through the range area?  
---It was concluded by all concerned that it was a chance in a million.

Chance in a million?---Yes. Which has not happened before, and did not happen since.

Do I infer therefore that a decision was made not to concern yourselves with it?---Well, it was not a matter of not concerned, we were very concerned. But if we - the conclusion was reached that nothing more could be done.

You could have, of course, used more native patrol officers, could not you?---In an area of thousands of square miles - - -

~~Do I infer what you are saying to me is that as far as you were concerned, any attempts to secure the range area - the whole of the range area - was a hopeless task?---Impossible.~~

~~Impossible. Did you ever raise that with your superiors?---It was - I - from the outset it was accepted that this was so.~~

Well - - -?---As I said - - -

Accepted by whom?---By you, or by your superiors?---Well, by my superiors - everyone concerned.

Everyone concerned, so I have to accept it that it was impossible to secure?---To have absolute security, yes.

You also indicate at the bottom of your statement that during the Antler series - the native welfare officer you were referred to - you say he was the contact of the native patrol officers. You also accompanied security personnel during daily air reconnaissance prior to tests. Now, who designed the daily air reconnaissance? Was that your responsibility?---It was designed in concert with the native patrol officers from information we had received from MacDougall and McCauley and in consultation with the RAAF who would act on our instructions.

Again, was it you? Did you have the responsibility of saying - - -?  
---Yes. Ultimately it was I.

Right. And, what were the criteria that you determined for the implementation of the aerial patrols?---In consultation



with the air force, the Royal Air Force, we would work out a pattern which would go in ever-increasing circles around the northern, western and eastern parts of the range.

Yes. But what were the criteria? How did you decide what areas would be searched and how far away from Maralinga they would be searched?---They were just general searches.

Right. What do you mean? When did you sit down with the RAAF and say, My concerns are in a sector 40 miles north, 3 miles east and 20 miles west of Maralinga? What did you do?---We made general sweeps.

General sweeps?---Yes.

Over how large an area?---Well, it would cover hundreds of miles.

Hundreds of miles. And these were made prior to each explosion? ---Yes.

And were they made daily before explosions?---Not immediately before, no.

Well, what was the routine? How many days before an explosion did you send up aerial patrols?---Continually until we went into the - and the day we entered a firing sequence.

You entered a firing sequence on the day, and how many days before firing would that be?---About 24 hours.

24 hours. How many days before you entered a firing sequence would you commence the aerial patrols?---They would have gone on in between each sequence.

So it was a continuous process, was it?---Yes.

And I think three aircraft were involved, were they?---Mainly at Varsity there were three aircraft that were made available but we usually used one at Varsity because it had its bomb bay converted into a - - -

Sort of a . . . . . first?---Yes.

And, the aircraft would be sent up at what time of the day? ---About 8 or 9 o'clock.

In the morning?---Yes.

As a daily matter it took off at about that time?---Yes.

Dawn at Maralinga at that stage would have been - certainly at the time of Buffalo and Antler they are about the same time. It would have been about 6 o'clock in the morning, would it? 6.15?---I cannot recall - it would be.

Well, did you make - I withdraw that. What was the reason for deciding to take off at about 8 or 9 o'clock in the morning?---I do not think there was any particular reason.

It is just after breakfast, was it?---Well, probably, yes.

And how long did the flights stay in the air for, on each individual patrol?---I would say 3 to 4 hours.

And would then land and go again or is that the end of the patrol for the day?---It depended. Sometimes we did not do an afternoon patrol, sometimes we did.

And what were the instructions to the crew as to what they were looking for?---The crew were not looking.

Well, the observer?---Well, any movement, any tyre tracks, any sign of fires.

Any movement. That is movement of people on the ground?---Yes.

It would be pretty hard to determine movement of people from the air, would it not?---No, not the way we were flying.

Why? What was so special about the way you were flying?---Well, we did at varying altitudes and particularly on the low sweeps with using the observation platform we could get a 180 degree - at least a 180 degree - views. And, unless someone was deliberately hiding they would have been visible from the air.

Did you contemplate that people might deliberately hide?---Yes.  
We were - - -

What steps did you take in relation to those people?---Well, there were no steps we could take. I could not imagine a group of aborigines hiding.

Were you made aware of the way a group of aborigines might react to an aircraft flying overhead?---No.

Did you make enquiries as to whether or not they might be scared by such a craft and take steps to secrete themselves?---Well, I could - this would take time and if there was any in the area they would have scattered I should imagine, if they were scared.

Well, they certainly, if they were scared, would have taken steps, would they not, to ensure that you did not see them from the air?---I do not think that necessarily follows.

You do not think that follows?---No, I think when a group of any persons panic they run in all directions.

Well, did you make any - - -?---Particularly from aircraft.

Did you make enquiries about how the aborigines might react if they were in the area through aerial patrols?

---I do not know if I made any particular - I would have discussed it with MacDougall I would think. I had the utmost respect for MacDougall and his knowledge of the aborigines.

Well, did any of these patrols ever report back to you any observations of people in the aerial patrol?---No.

Do I assume that what happened was on these days prior to the firing the aircraft took off and covered the same area each time?---Virtually, yes.

And in a three or four hour period, how large an area was the aircraft capable of covering?---The way we flew, we would have covered several hundred square miles.

There is a map there behind you on the left. You see Maralinga down there?---Yes.

Can you indicate to me the aircraft would have patrolled each day?---Round somewhere like that, and in between.

I wonder - you might take my green pen and with a dotted line draw the extremities of the area that you understood your aircraft to be patrolling?  
---I am trying . . . . . would have gone a lot further out.

You can see Emu there; you can see Tartoo Hill?---I do not know Tartoo Hill.

Bright Hill, Moorfield, Mt Willoughby Station, Commonwealth Hill, Granite Down?---Granite Down you said?

Yes?---Yes, we would not have gone . . . . .  
I would say - - -

You have drawn with my green pen an area with a dotted line an area that was searched every morning, is that right?---That is right, at least every morning.

At least every morning. This was done by one aircraft?  
---Usually by one, yes. Making due allowances for nearly 30 years.

It is a pretty large area, is it not?---Yes.

It would not have been possible to cover all of it during the time of the flight, would it?---Well - - -

It would have been a general survey rather than a specific one, would it not?---Yes, but the . . . . . was to fly in a pattern so that we did cover - - -

You are illustrating with your finger that you started close in at Maralinga and flew a pattern east to west gradually moving north - - -?---Or west to east.

To cover the area?---Yes.

Were you satisfied that all of the area could in fact be observed during the course of those flights?  
---At some time.

At some time?---Maybe not all on the one day.

No, so one day you might have seen an area and then you might not see it again for two, three days?---No, I would

say every second day we had a fairly thorough search, but particularly within the inner area. Any parts that there were likely to be people who could have arrived in the area at the time we did not want them.

Over the page on page 5 of your statement you talk about the Health Physics operation. You say that Health Physics procedures at the conclusion of a visit required people to undergo a decontamination process and they could not leave unless there was absolutely no sign of any radioactivity remaining. Now that statement is made from information you have had from others, is that right?---No, that was from personal.

From your own personal experience?---Yes.

You were never allowed to leave until you showed no radioactivity at all?---No.

You describe also the situation in relation to protective clothing. You have described your entry into the Marcoo Crater. Then on page 6 you indicate that that crater and lip were dark grey in colour, the bottom was quite dry as was to be expected. Did the crater, and indeed did the other sites of the explosions that you visited, did they located on the ground a glassified sand?---Yes. I cannot remember this at Marcoo.

Were there any restrictions upon personnel taking pieces of the glassified sands away?---Yes.

What was the restriction?---Well, we were told not to.

You were prohibited from doing so?---Yes.

Was there any control to ensure that that was complied with?  
---Well, I cannot see how anyone could secrete them to get them out.

Well, presumably one could take it in small pieces, could they?  
---Yes, but going through the decontamination procedure there would have been reaction from the Geiger counters.

What about after the decontamination procedures had been removed and the sites remained as crater areas? Were there any controls then on personnel coming in and removing classified samples?---Well, they were warned that they should not, and there were indications that they were entering radioactive areas, and it would be foolhardy. They were told that these pieces were highly radioactive, so unless they were bent on some long term illness they would be foolish to do so.

Did it occur to you that such areas perhaps should have been fenced at the time?---No. I would say after the withdrawal of everyone from the area if it was still radioactivity, that the possibility of fencing should have been seriously considered.

What about the Marcoo Crater at the time the aboriginal family apparently intruded? -Did it occur to you then that perhaps that crater should have been fenced?---No, because of the low degree of residual activity.

Did you raise the question of whether or not it should be fenced with anyone at that stage?---No.

It did not occur to you?---It was not my business.

It was not your business; but your business was security, was it not?---Security. It was not my idea, for example, or my responsibility, to put the tape around the radioactive area.

That was Colonel Durance's, I think?---I think again acting on advice from AWRE.

You record in July 1967 a visit you undertook with Harry Turner . . . . . and you say during that trip you saw natives at Ernabella and about six natives near Giles. On that trip did you stay on main tracks and roads, or did you head off into the scrub?---We stayed on main tracks and the roads.

On page 7, in the middle of the page, you deal with questions of safety and you say you had numerous discussions with Walter Batchelor MacDougall concerning the need to move aboriginals from Ooldea to Yalata near the coast?---Yes.

I wonder if you can explain to me, what was the nature of the need to move aborigines from Ooldea to Yalata, as you understood it?---As I understood it, the need was if they were to survive.

If they were to survive?---Yes.

Why was there a concern about their survival?---Because they were living in abject conditions, they were begging on the - they had an almost complete lack of water, and they were begging on the east-west railway line.

Do you know when they were moved?---No, but I would say 1954, 1955.

So from what you learned, there was never a large number of aboriginals anywhere near Maralinga after construction began, or at any time during the major tests.

Previously there were some barely existing in the sand hills north of Ooldea. You refer to the death of Daisy Bates, and you were told apparently the South Australian government at the time was embarrassed by them, and only too pleased when the offer came to move them to the care of the Lutheran Mission at Yalata. You then describe your knowledge of the Marcoo Crater incident with the aboriginal family. You, I do not think, were not present on the range at the time?---No.

You were away on leave?---I was at the conference in Melbourne.

You say there that, from what you have been told, that the degree of residual radiation from the tests 7 months before had fallen to a level when only a prolonged stay would have caused a health risk. Now, what were you told about whether or not the aboriginals were in fact contaminated by this event?---All I was told was that they had dust on them and they were taken to Health Physics, where they were showered and declared clear.

Were you told whether or not they had, in fact, been contaminated by the dust?---No. As far as I am concerned they were not contaminated.

I am sorry, you were told that they were not contaminated?  
---Yes.

Who told you that?---It would have been by whoever relieved me. I thought at the time it was Stewart Berman who is now deceased, but I am told on reflection it could have been Bertram Frederick William White who did on occasions relieve me.

Was there a great deal of concern expressed about this incident when you got back to Maralinga?---The concern was not that any permanent damage had been done to these people, but there was concern that they had got in because we, as I said, thought it was impossible. Apart from any political considerations for all these people, particularly the aboriginals, we did feel a very high degree of responsibility.

Was there a concern to keep the incident quiet?---From what I can remember, yes. Politically it would have been unwise.

Politically unwise for what?---To the fact that aboriginals had entered the area.

Why did you understand it would have been politically unwise?  
---Well, I think it would have been politically unwise if anyone had entered the area.

Do you mean by that that there would have been concerns expressed at a political level that the security of the range was not adequate?---No, but I think an emotive issue would have arisen.

Well, do you mean by that - an emotive issue expressed as concern that the security of the range was not adequate would have arisen?---I never considered any time that the security of the range was inadequate.

Well, then, sir, what was the emotive issue that you were concerned about arising?---The fact that people of the Aborigine race were able to get in an area, apparently become - into a radioactive area, even though in the event no harm was done.

So was a decision made to keep that quiet, was it?---Well, as I said, I was not on the area, but the decision was certainly made not to bruit it around.

You discuss further in your statement the nature of the security measures, which I think we have dealt with. At the bottom of page 9 you discuss the relationship of Australian personnel to radioactive areas. You indicate that very few Australians were required to enter radioactive areas or handle or be in close proximity to radioactive material?---That is correct.

There were teams of Australian personnel, were there not, who were required to go into the forward areas shortly after the blast?---Health Physics, yes.



Did you have those people in mind when you said - - -?  
I did.

There were also teams who were not health physics teams who were required to go in and retrieve various items of equipment that had been exposed to the explosion, were there not?---That would have been during - - -

Both Buffalo and Antler?---Not Antler.

Not Antler?---The only target response at Maralinga was during One Tree.

The only target response you recall is One Tree?---Yes.

Would that be a target set up for all of the Buffalo series?  
---Not to my knowledge.

You believe it was only for One Tree?---Yes.

Were there any targets set up for the Antler series?---No, not in the same - well as far as I know there were none. There was intense activity before Buffalo - before One Tree.

You indicate that those you received the maximum permissible doses over a period, were the very people who set the levels?---That would have been the scientists.

You mean by that - - -?---The British scientists.

The British people?---Yes. And the health physics people.

Your understanding that Australians did not receive maximum permissible doses?---Apart from health physics, yes.

Do I infer from your statement there that your belief is that the health physics people also set the standards?---If they did not set them, they would have been in agreement with them.

Did you discuss a number of other questions - and you discussed them - particularly role call system prior to explosion, go or no go?---Everyone on the range was required to wear a tag, which I produce.

Oh, thank you. Can I take that from you? This is a personal identification tag, is it?---That is right.

What does the SU 19 on this tag mean?---Well, I was No 19 in the support unit.

And what - you were required to wear this?---Wear it, yes.

And as a consequence be checked off?---Yes.

Were you at the time of an explosion?---Yes.

I see. And were you issued with the same tag for the whole of the time that you were at - - -?---Yes.

Maralinga?---That was for Antler.

That was for Antler, was it?---Yes.

You had a different tag for Buffalo, did you?---Yes.

I see. And that is your ID?---Yes. We also wore passes but that was for - that was for safety purposes, not security.

I think finally you record that in your view, between 1953 and 1957 you claimed to have had a more sustained involvement with operations at Emu and Maralinga and the peripheral activities associated with them than any other person. You were satisfied that the planning of the test was meticulous. Do you say that in relation to the efforts to secure the range as well?---Yes.

You believe that the steps that were taken there were meticulous, do you?---Yes, they were not fool-proof but they were as

And you say that every precaution necessary was taken to ensure the safety of participants and particularly that of Australians everywhere?---Yes, that is my belief.

Do you say that every precaution necessary was taken to secure the range area?---Yes.

Even though you know of at least one, fairly notorious unauthorised intrusion?---I accept that, but I would say that there was less chance of that happening than an intruder in the Queen's bedroom.

Thank you. Your Honour, we might keep the tag if you do not mind, and we will add that to the exhibits. No further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr Flannery, you distinguish between security and safety?---Yes.

And would I be right in saying that the main aspect of security is to ensure that nobody finds out anything which the authority do not want them to know?---Mainly, security classified information, your Honour.

Well, would it be true to say that your principle concern and that of your superiors in relation to Aboriginal intruders into the test area was that nobody should find out that they had managed to get into the area?---No.

MR JAMES: Before I take you to page 2 of your statement, you referred to the absence of human guinea pigs at Maralinga unlike the American tests - paragraph 1? ---Yes.

Do those comments apply to only the tests that you witnessed, or the tests that you knew about?---Well, they can only apply to the tests I witnessed, but I was present before Buffalo during the construction phase and I saw the target response efforts which were being made and there was no inclusion there of any effort for bunkers.

I see. No bunker a distance of some thousands of yards from the ground zero during any of the Buffalo explosions in which a group of officers might stand to be exposed to the blast albeit with some covering - no such bunker as that?---I never saw that but I concede that it could have happened.

All right. No such thing as a centurion tank set up within some thousand or so yards of the ground zero in which live human beings could sit out the explosion?---The only centurion tank I know that was used was during Emu and there was certainly no persons in that.

No such position as would enable a considerably large force of officers to stand in the open, 3,200 yards from ground zero?---This was the indoctrinees?

This is the indoctrinees, yes. You have heard of the indoctriness?---Yes. They were present for One Tree only, if I recall.

Yes. And do I take it then that your comments at page 10 during any firing sequence the majority of Australian personnel, service and civilian, were restricted to the village some 30 kilometres south of Roadside is not intended to cover One Tree nor the indoctrinee force?--That is correct.

And indeed your comments about guinea pigs again are not intended to cover One Tree nor the indoctrinee force?---Yes.

You would agree then with the proposition that from what you heard the indoctrinee force were used as guinea pigs at One Tree?---No, no.

Why not?---The indoctrinees there were for observation purposes only. They were very senior officers and I cannot see that they would be used as guinea pigs.

Would you agree with the proposition that it would not assist their ability to observe to put them in covered bunkers or centurion tanks?---I know of no instance.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean, Mr Flannery, that you do not use senior officers as guinea pigs?---Well, I cannot imagine these circumstances arising.

Oh?---I cannot imagine the senior officers.

MR JAMES: You have mentioned at Emu that the concrete had set in the concrete mixers?---Yes.

Would that indicate to you such a degree of haste as to point to someone not even bothering to tip the mixer up before he fled?---It was not a case of fleeing.

Right. A case of just simply negligently, as it were? ---Negligency --well, the fact that, as I said before, the people working for 12 months, six days a week and seeing the lot go up, the concrete mixer is not going to concern them.

What, food, plates, and cutlery - left on the tables?---Not - I would - not while I was - things had been cleaned up in 1954 when I got there.

Things had been cleaned up by the time you got there?---Yes.

Right. Were there clothes left?---There would not have been any personal clothing - I doubt - I do not know, I did not see any. A lot of stores left.

Certainly. You mentioned that in 1955 you had made numerous short visits to Maralinga in connection with the Kittens trials and for purely administrative reasons, page 3?---Yes.

You mentioned there was some problem with workers going on the range?---The only problem was the security vetting of the workers in Adelaide before they proceeded to . . . . .

I see. This is the entry into the range area?---Entry procedure, yes.

And what sort of workers were these?---At that stage, these would have been Kwinana construction workers.

The administrative reasons were purely connected with that.  
Were these workers arriving at the range in order  
to do construction work for Kwinana?---Yes.

And that was in connection with the building of Maralinga  
village, was it?---That is right.

It had nothing to do with the Kittens trials?---No, no.

And those trials as you understood them were in 1955?  
---The Kittens trials, of course there were  
Kittens trials at Emu.

I see. And do you know how many there were and when they  
were?---No.

You had no function in relation to those at all?---No.

And you know not the nature of such trials?---The need to  
know was applied rigorously.

Indeed the need to know was applied rigorously from the  
most senior officer on down, was it not, as far  
as you knew?---It was, yes.

That included the range commander?---Yes.

And it would be fair to say, would it not, that that title  
range commander, insofar as the gentleman in the  
job could perform the functions one would normally  
expect of such a title, was a joke?---No.

You would not say that?---No, the need to know was applied  
to the - there were scientific results of the  
tests.

In effect the scientists kept a great deal of information  
to themselves?---That is correct. A lot of it  
was UK eyes only.

Was your responsibility to secure UK eyes only documents  
from Australians?---No.

Was your responsibility limited to the Australian classified  
material?---Exactly.

And that you gained no access of any kind to the United  
Kingdom classified material?---I had no clearance  
for UK eyes only.

Who handled the security of UK eyes only classified material?  
---This was handled wholly within the AWRE organisation  
who had a very high sense of security.

Yes. And did you have some liaison there - some person with whom you could liaise for the purposes of security requirements?---Yes. Nominally, as I have said, I went through the Brigadier Durance, but John Tomblin who was the - whom I was associated with from Emu and the Maralinga trials was my contact on security. Also two other British officers who were administrative officers.

Do you remember their names, at all?---Yes. Tom Pearson and Ted Miller.

Now at page 4 of your statement you refer to the area north of Roadside as having virtually lost all security significance after the conclusion of the major tests at Buffalo and Antler?---Yes.

Do you mean by that that during the inter-trial period between Buffalo and Antler it lost all security significance and then regained security significance during the trial period of Antler?---Once a weapon was placed into position in the Antler series, the immediate area was secured.

Yes?---Also of course Roadside was manned.---

Right. And then once the weapon had been exploded your security responsibility - leaving a purely security responsibility - terminated?---That is right.

And the British security responsibility, in terms of information gained from the tests took over?  
---That is right.

So that as I understand it your security and responsibility for the trial sites was weaponing position to seconds, minutes or whatever following the blast?  
---The guard was withdrawn with the crew who were arming the weapon.

Right. So that it was in fact . . . . . before the explosion?---Yes.

And it started only when the weapon was placed in situ, ready for the bang?---That is right.

Thereafter, the only security with which Australia was involved was the officer at the control point at Watson, and somebody at Roadside and the roving patrols you have mentioned?---And we also had - during a trials period a post manned in the sand hills.

I am sorry I - - -?---A post.

A post in the sand hills?---Yes.

I think you have also mentioned, somebody up on a tower?  
---This was only between Buffalo and Antler.

Right. But the rest of the security system and - leave aside Australian classified information - was entirely British?---Yes.

As - - -?---Well, the responsibility for document and trials results - - -

Yes?---Was entirely British, yes.

Well, as far as you knew, the same applied to the personnel from the point of view of safety during the trials period - the ultimate responsibility was totally British?---Yes.

Mr Turner in fact reported at some - you knew Mr Turner?  
---Yes, very well.

He would report in some detail verbally to the AWRE people and furnish quite limited written reports to the range commander because of that security aspect?  
---Yes. That is as I understand.

And indeed, you would have had the task of overseeing the security of Mr Turner's reports to the range commander and see the nature of those reports?  
---No.

Did you oversee Mr Turner's written reports to the range commander?---No. Again the need to know applied, I did not need to know.

Right. But they were short documents, obviously?---Yes - well no, I never concerned myself.

. . . . . with that, right. The - so the information that you can give us on safety is limited basically to what people have told you and what you have seen yourself?---Yes. I might say that security do become dogs bodies a bit.

Yes, of course?---In the absence of anyone else, we had the bodies so they took over the task.

But your bodies were very limited?---Yes.

And you were the only available bodies to perform the sort of random - almost random tasks that stretched from security of this massive area, looking after documents, and meeting whatever requirements people would point to in terms of securing spaces?---Yes.

And for those purposes you had, out of your small corps of men, people stationed 24 hours on the Kittens and Tims areas?---Mm, which were closed places.

Yes. They were the only closed places I think; were they not?  
---Yes.

Right. Now, which were the Kittens and Tims areas that were the closed places - Emu?---Oh no.

The Kittens trials that have taken place at Emu you have referred to, that did not involve a closed place?  
---No, not after the event.

The Kittens and Tims areas are you now referring to the areas near Roadside?---Both south of Roadside.

Right. So that involved two men?---Yes.

Plus their shifts of course?---Well, it was not worked in shifts, they were resident there.

I see. So the 24-hour guard effectively meant somebody living there - - -?---And locking up.

And locking up?---Yes.

But not keeping a watch around the fence or patrolling or anything in that order?---Well the - most of the - there were buildings there.

Yes?---And the buildings were locked.

And people wanting to come in would have to show a pass?  
---Well more - it was more on a list. They all had passes but there were restricted lists - - -

Right?---For these places.

And you have mentioned the nominal roll, in relation to the film badges?---Yes.

Firstly, I suggest to you that was not a roll designed for use with the film badges, but a security roll which was used to number out film badges?---No.



It was a roll peculiarly designed for the use of film badges,  
was it?---Yes.

Right. And that roll went to the range commander?---I presume.

You presume?---Mm.

Well, have you any idea of whether you ever saw one?---Well,  
Harry Turner would be able to tell you that because - - - .

Right. So the only person that would be able to tell us, as  
far as you know, if there was roll designed for  
film badges which was used for that purpose would  
be Harry Turner?---Yes.

Did you ever see such a roll yourself?---I saw - at Emu.

Yes. This is after the Emu - the Totem test?---Yes, after  
Totem 2.

And that was roll of people to whom film badges were issued?  
---Yes.

Who told you that?---I actually saw the roll when I handed  
my film -

You saw a document with names?---Yes.

And numbers?---Mm.

And the heading "film badge issue" or something of that - - -?  
---Well, I do not know if it was even headed, but  
when I handed my badge - my film badge back in,  
I saw my name - - -

You saw your name ticked off on that roll?---Ticked off, yes.

So you assumed that that was full roll, did you?---Yes.

Now, what is a nominal roll; is that a roll in which names  
appear or a, sort of, rough draft roll?---No, a  
nominal roll applying to Antler was a nominal  
roll of everyone in the range area.

And you would have no idea whether this document purported to  
contain everyone in the range area or not for  
Antler?---I am pretty - well, I am certain that it  
did contain, because it had to marry up with the  
labels that had been issued.

Right. So this is why I asked you about the difference between  
a security roll and the film badge roll?---Yes.

You told us you did not see a film badge roll for Antler,  
so I can take it the nominal roll you are talking about  
at page 7 - - -?---But it was a safety administrative  
roll, not a security roll.

Well, certainly, certainly. Page 7, paragraph 2 - well, you refer to film badges, labels and a nominal roll?---Yes.

You are not able to tell us whether the issue of film badges, labels or presence or absence on the nominal roll ever matched up for Antler?---I am able to say that the individual labels and the numbers recorded on the nominal roll were matched up for Antler.

Right. So that the label you have tendered and the nominal roll were matched up and that was so that you did not bomb anybody who might be in the area?---That is right. As a matter of fact there was a delay because someone was wandering round the sand hills.

Yes, some serviceman had taken a Landrover and gone off?  
---Yes.

Was that not a breach of security, a matter for which you might have been responsible?---No, it was a breach of the administration.

~~It was not a breach ---?---It was not in a secure or any -  
it was well south of Roadside.~~

Page 5, first paragraph, the sentence:

For example, unless it was absolutely necessary for people in the course of their duties to enter a radioactive area they just could not.

Now, you do not mean by that they were not physically capable of doing it, do you?---No.

I mean, any serviceman who was minded to sneak around the precautions, duck into a crater and grab himself a souvenir of classified sand could do it if he was minded to do it, could he not?---Yes.

What you mean by that is they just should not?---Should not, and they were greatly discouraged from such practice.

May I say that souveniring over the years has been greatly discouraged by threats of criminal sanction and so forth. It seems only to attract the souvenir hunter the more, does it not?---Well, it was more to prevent the foolhardy than to prevent the souvenirs.

Where did you get the information that you refer to at page 9 that those who received the maximum permissible doses were the very people who set the levels? Did that come from Harry Turner?---I would say no. It could have come from Harry but I think it was the Brit health physics team.

So, whoever it was, somebody told you that there were people who had got maximum permissible levels?---If anyone did, it would have been they.

I see, it was conditional; if anyone did, it would have been they?---Yes.

So whoever told you did not know whether people have got maximum permissible levels or not?---No.

Or beyond maximum permissible levels? It was a mere statement of expectation?---Yes.

You have referred to tests as being on many occasions delayed for days and in some instances weeks because of the rigid standards set by the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee. Firstly, why was it the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee's rigid standards that delayed the tests?---Because of weather conditions.

You knew that the problem came, or the veto had come from the Atomic Weapons Safety Committee not from the British? ---Certainly.

So it was a situation where, so far as you knew, if the British wished to go ahead and explode the bombs the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee stood out against them?---I do not think the British wished to go ahead.

Right. They were delayed for days and in some instances weeks; which were the tests that were delayed for days and in some instances weeks?---Totem 1 was delayed and One Tree was delayed and I say this with a lot of feeling because I was exposed to press parties during these two periods.

Yes, I take your point. Now, your last paragraph, page 11, would you take the view that you had a more sustained involvement with the operations than Harry Turner? ---Well, I was - I do not know if Harry was at Emu but even if he were I would say yes.

And some of the scientific personnel?---At Emu and Maralinga, yes. I did not make this statement without a lot of thought and I just cannot conceive anyone who did have a greater involvement.

I am not suggesting that you in any way did not think as best you could about your own beliefs before making that statement but, you would agree with me that what you say there is founded on your belief, your general impression after it was all over, what you had been told rather than your own area of expertise and what you observed?---No. I knew most of the people involved, the personalities, and I - even excepting Lenny Beadell

who started much earlier and finished later, but he did not have the involvement that I had.

What I am concerned about though is the last sentence of that paragraph?---Yes.

That is your belief, is it not?---The last sentence of the - every precaution.

Planning was meticulous, every precaution?---The planning was meticulous, I have never seen anything like it before or since.

That was your belief?---Well, the fact that - look, I know that the whole - from personal observation, that the whole series was planned meticulously from the movement of stores and personnel from the UK to the firing sequence and this was a superb piece of planning, with movements and actions actually timed to seconds.

You are referring now to the logistics of it all but it goes on to talk about the safety of participants and the Australian people?---Yes.

Would you accept the proposition that as a security officer concerned for classified material and unauthorised intrusions, you are hardly in a position to assure us that scientifically every precaution necessary was taken to ensure the safety of Australians everywhere? ---Unless I have a lot of misplaced faith I am quite satisfied, and I also had my own family and myself which I had a very close interest.

And would you agree that those remarks apply principally to the Australian personnel rather than the British? ---No, the British too from Sir William Penney down were most keen that - even in the interests of their own people on site.

I have nothing further if your Honour pleases.

MR EAMES: Mr Collett.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps Mr Collett before you start we are taking our break a little early today. We will just have a little adjournment.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr Collett?

MR COLLETT: Thank you.

Mr Glannery, you told Mr McClellan a bit about the security arrangements during Totem. I wonder if you could just tell me something about the arrangements, if any, to ensure security between Totem and Mabel - between Emu and Mabel Creek during the Totem period? ---There would have been - or there was a static . . . . at a place called West Point, which was near Mabel Creek. It was just near the Mabel Creek fence which, I think, was referred to yesterday.

It was west of Mabel Creek, was it?---It was West Point. It was one of Beadell's place names. It was nothing there, just a tent, but it was generally referred to as West Point.

What happened there; was there a person there?---There was security personnel from Woomera Station there.

How far was that west of Mabel Creek - Mabel Creek Station? ---It would have been -- oh, less than a mile, I would think, or within a matter of miles, along the road.

So it was within the confines of the Mabel Creek Station boundaries?---Well, from memory, it was on the edge of the boundary.

And was there anything else then between that point and Emu? ---No.

Was that the lump sum of the security arrangements between - - -? ---Yes.

Between the highway at Mabel Creek and - - -?---Yes.

- - - and Emu?---And Emu.

Now, what happened after the Totem tests finished; was that security point abandoned?---That was abandoned immediately after and a full-time Commonwealth Police officer posted to Emu.

Do I take it, then, there was nothing to stop people coming along the road from Mabel Creek to Emu until they got to that security officer at Emu?---Except the nature of the country would deter people but physically there was no barrier.

But I take it there was a pretty reasonable track through to Emu?---Oh, not - - - We broke the back of a landrover going across the sandhills of Tallaringa.

Yes, but a lot of gear had gone through to Emu by the end of Totem, had it not?---Yes, but it was not - - -

I was a very - a fourth-grade bush track, I would describe it as.

You told us a bit about the security at Maralinga and, in particular, the Kittens and TIMS areas that were fenced off?---Yes.

Who comprised the 24-hour guards around those areas? Were they Commonwealth Police or - - -?---Commonwealth Police.

Did they come under your control?---Yes. There was an inspector of Commonwealth Police stationed in the village with an office adjacent to mine, so all orders would go through him. But I wrote the post orders.

You mentioned the role of the native patrol officers in relation to safety. In fact, I think you said there the role was primarily one of safety?---Yes.

And you told us that you had telephone - you got the results of telephone communications with those patrol officers at various times?---Yes. They would radio back to Woomera and there was a direct telephone link with - between Woomera and Maralinga.

Were you given copies of their written reports?---No.

Were you aware they provided written reports regularly? ---I assumed they did.

Well, you said that you responded to their directions. Is there any reason why you would not have got those written reports?---They would just ring up and - oh, a message would come through that it was desirable - well, it would have, in fact it did not, but the arrangement was if they wanted a concentration of effort on a particular area they would have notified us and we would have responded.

Now, can I just ask you about the Antler series and your involvement during the trials there. I take it that you missed the first three trials at Buffalo; is that right?---Yes.

But you were there for the whole of the Antler series?---Yes.

Now, you said in your statement that a native welfare officer was attached to range headquarters for that period? ---Yes.

The period of the Antler trials. Would that have been Mr Weightman?---Weightman is the name.

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And did you work with him during that period?---He shared my office.

Do you know if Mr MacDougall came to the vicinity of Maralinga during the trial?---I have an idea he came near. I do not know if he actually came to Maralinga. I cannot remember him being there.

And can you remember whether you went to Yalata, during the course of the Antler trials, by helicopter?---I did.

What was the purpose of that visit?---Mainly liaison and to see if Pastor Temme had any problems that needed fixing.

When you talk about liaison, what sort of things are you talking about?---Well, just on behalf of the range commander I would have done this, just to ensure that everyone was accounted for and nobody was wandering up the track.

Now, the air controls that you talked about would have taken place, obviously, during the Antler period?---Yes.

And was there ~~---were you involved in a briefing of the crews~~ regularly for those patrols?---I told them - either I or my 2-I-C, who went when I did not go, would have told them.

Would Mr Weightman have been involved in those three things?---He was involved in most of them.

In the briefings, or in going with them, or in what capacity?---Well, passively. But he certainly went as observer and we took turns as observer because of the cramped conditions.

There was only room for one observer, was there?---Yes, yes.

But when you say passively, would he have briefed the crews before - - -?---No.

Who would have done that?---I did.

Were you aware that - sorry, I will withdraw that. Can I just take you to a report of Mr Weightman. Were you aware that Mr Weightman provided reports to the Aborigines Department in Adelaide?---I did not - I was not aware but I could believe that he did.

Can I refer you to various sections of a copy report which appears to have been signed by Mr Weightman and dated 10 September 1957; if I can just read some of that to you, he says:

On 5 September 1957 I was taken to Maralinga village, where I met Flannery and McDonald, the security men with whom I am working...

He says he was briefed by Colonel Durance:

He told us that we were responsible, through him, to assure the safety committee that there were no natives in the areas declared to be dangerous by Health Physics.

Now, it appears that MacDougall had arrived?---Yes, I did not realize MacDougall had - - -

MacDougall reported there were natives in the Everard Park area who were hunting dingo pups and marked out the area on the map where he thought they would be?  
---Yes.

Were you present when MacDougall did that?---I could have been.

It goes on in the next paragraph:

But we considered that these natives constituted our only hazard?

~~---Yes, but they would have been well to the north.~~

~~Yes, but when he says "we considered," was that a consideration that you were involved in or was that?---It would have been MacDougall and he, I would think.~~

And you were relying on MacDougall's assessment, were you?  
---Oh, yes, yes.

And he describes in that report how he accompanied MacDougall as far as Emu. He had problems with the slipping clutch of his vehicle at Emu and he drove back.  
He then says:

I was glad that I returned because Flannery had arranged a security check by RAF helicopter on Monday, September 9 to Yalata and I asked if I could go.

He describes the trip and how they literally dropped in at Tallawan and met the pastor's wife and subsequently caught up with Pastor Temme at - - -?  
---Yes, that is right. He was issuing rations.

Now, Tallawan was another name for Yalata, was it not?---Yes. I have never heard it called as Tallawan.

And he then says in the next paragraph:

It gave me a good deal of pleasure to see the natives, the first bush people I have seen since I joined the department.



Did you know that he had never seen bush people?

---No, I did not. I did not go into his background.

Subsequently in the report he says:

Several RAF aircraft have been placed at my disposal for air patrol work and this morning I briefed the crews concerning where to look and what to look for?

---Well, that may have been so. That is not my recollection.

Well, are you saying that he is wrong when he says that he - - -?

---No. I am not saying he is wrong, it is just that I do not recollect that.

He goes on to say:

Mr MacDougall is sure that we have very little to worry about . . . . . it is good propoganda.?

---Yes.---That would probably be using the Varsity aircraft.

Well, who would have done the instructing of where they went; was it you or Mr Weightman?---It would have been Weightman in that instance.

Now, does that report - and take your time to have a look at it if you want to; does that prompt any other recollection about Weightman's role, or your involvement with Weightman at the time?---Is there any other thing than - - -

Well, I am just inviting you to have a good look at it?---Yes.

And once you have - take your time to read it - and then tell me if there is anything else, any other recollection that prompts about the role of Mr Weightman at that period. Perhaps whilst Mr Flanner - - -?---I think that the reaction of the natives to the presence of the helicopter is significant in that they did not run for cover.

Your Honour, I will make available copies of that report. We are not sure whether it has been tendered as part of the previous McCauley material, but I will forward copies now and that can be sorted out in due course.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well?---The only other comment I have to offer is that I was not aware of the night patrols, day patrols, and early morning patrols, which I presume - if he is referring to aircraft, I was not aware of those, and the helicopter patrolled the actual firing area.

MR COLLETT: I was going to ask you about that. Would not you have been responsible for ordering those patrols?---No, not necessarily. As I said, the aircraft were posted at my disposal. With the arrival on site of Mr Weightman, he would have been given an open cheque so far as they were concerned, so if, for safety reasons, he required that, that would have been quite understandable.

But it is a bit surprising, is it not, that you cannot recall that they ever occurred?---No, because I would have been heavily involved in other things at that time.

Are you sure they did occur?---Well, I can only accept Mr Weightman's - - - So far as ground patrols are concerned, they certainly did occur.

What sort of ground patrols were they?---Well, they would have been by land rover - by Commonwealth police - in the immediate test area.

And how far beyond the perimeter of the - how far beyond ground zero are you talking about when you say "in the immediate test area"?---Well, only a matter of miles.

And who would have done those?---They would have been Commonwealth police, but if there was a helicopter patrol I was not aware of it; but quite possibly.

Now, if you would have a look at about the fifth paragraph from the bottom of the second page, sixth paragraph from the bottom, it is one of the paragraphs that I went through with you. It starts:

Mr McDougall is sure that we have very little to worry . . . . . that has been put through from here to Giles.

Now, I take it there were no road-blocks on that road?---No.

~~At that stage, and I take it from what you - - -?---That road incidentally would join Emu where there were people.~~

~~Yes. Do I take it from what you said earlier in evidence that there were not even any signs?---No.~~

On that road. Although you understood the situation to be that the aborigines north of Emu would not have been able to read signs in any event?---Yes.

He goes on to say:

He asked the RAF to patrol the road and the . . . . . or anything suspicious.

Now, that road, as I understood your evidence, is further north than the area you indicated as being part of those regular patrols. Is that right?  
---Yes.

So that appears to be an additional thing that Mr Weightman asked for?---That would have been additional, that he would have arranged.

He goes on to say:

If nothing else is gained it is good propaganda.

Was that a matter that was discussed between you and Mr Weightman or Mr Weightman and anyone else in your presence?---No. I would say that was a personal observation.

At the time of these searches was it part of your job to tell the press about measures that were being taken to look for aborigines?---No. So far as I am concerned - no, any press involvement was purely to visit and observe the explosion.

And did you have any instructions as to what to tell the press about precautions or precautions relating to aborigines at that time?---No. I was - I had no dealings with the press regarding press releases.

Now, going on to the next paragraph. Can I just go through for the sake of completeness and ask you which patrols you remember as having occurred out of the ones he has listed? You do not remember the night patrols. Is that right?---That is right.

The day patrol?---Yes. I - - -

That is the one you dealt with in evidence, was it?---Yes.

You do not remember an early morning patrol?---No.

And you do not remember a helicopter patrol in the actual firing area, two hours before zero?---No.--- But I could not say they did not occur.--- I - two hours before zero I would have been at roadside and I have no memories of, and I doubt very much considering there were barrage balloons flying whether there would have been any helicopter patrols at that stage close round the firing area.

Because of the danger?---Yes.

And surely, in fact, if they had taken place you would have known about them?---I think I would have seen them.

Yes. Similarly it is pretty unlikely that dawn patrols would have taken place without you knowing about them?---It could have. It quite easily could have because as soon as the firing sequence began about 24 hours before I was taken up with duties other than that.

Now, can I just ask you about the helicopters. You said you used them to travel to Yalata?---Yes.

Were they ever used to go to places as far afield as, say, Emu?---They could have but on other missions rather than aboriginal reasons.

Aboriginal reasons. So it is pretty unlikely they would have been used to go to places as far afield as Ernabella or any of those related places?---Well, I am sure they never went to Ernabella.

So, effectively, the only role of helicopters in relation to aboriginals, as far as you are aware, is to go to Yalata?---Yes. The fixed wing aircraft were much more suitable for search operations.

And in fact the helicopters were really mainly used for non-aboriginal liaison along the east-west line, were they not?---Yes. So far as I was concerned.

Well, can I ask you to turn your mind now to the Buffalo trials, even though you only were there for the last one. Was there - do you recall any equivalent person to Mr Weightman at - - -?---I would say there was not one.

In fact was it not the case that there were not these air patrols and helicopter patrols in the case of the Buffalo tests?---I am not aware.

Well, you have only mentioned that they took place in the Antler series. What I am suggesting to you is that they did not take place in the Buffalo series at all?---Oh, I would think they did.

Well, can you specifically recall any - you having any involvement in them during the Buffalo series? ---No. No, because I only arrived - I arrived just before the last round and did not take over control until after Lawrence had left, after the completion of the Buffalo series.

Did Lawrence hand you any security instructions, or plans or schedules in relation to security when he left? ---Well, the security instructions were there.

And did they deal with aerial and ground searches for aborigines during the Buffalo tests?---No, no.

There was nothing on those?---No. I would say they would have been ad hoc arrangements at the commencement of the tests.

Is not it the case that there were not such air patrols for Buffalo, and that they were something that was brought in after this incident in May 1977 when, to everyone's amazement - 57, 57 - when to everyone's amazement people were found on the crater?---. . . . . I have never thought of that. I could not say that did not happen. The same as I could not say that Weightman was there because of that incident.

But, on reflection, does it not all tie in, Mr Flannery?---It seems reasonable, but I - because of the large number of aircraft that were present in, during the Buffalo series, I cannot see why they were not used for this purpose. But I admit that I have no knowledge whether they were carried out during Buffalo.

Prior to coming to Buffalo, to Maralinga for Buffalo, where were you? Where did you come from?---I was at Salisbury.

Did you hear anything about a Mr Smith languishing at Woomera at that stage?---No.

An aboriginal affairs officer, Mr Smith, does that ring any bell?---No.

In your statement, at page 6, you refer to a trip where you accompanied Harry Turner to the stations to the north of the prohibited area?---Yes.

Can you tell me why Harry Turner went on that trip?---Mainly because he was the - - - There were very few senior Australian civilians on site at that stage - he was the senior health physics and I was the range security officer. That is the only explanation I can offer. He also spoke to the station people and of course he had interest in Mable Creek and that area.

But generally was not his responsibility for the health physics aspects of the range area?---Yes.

And was it not the responsibility of the weapons test safety committee to worry about things like fall-out outside the range area?---Yes.

Now, you describe in your statement the stations that you went to. ~~Is that a full list of the stations?---From memory. We also visited Emu during that trip which I neglected to include, but Mable Creek, Granite Downs, Victoria Downs, Mulga Park and Everard Park from - - -~~

Did you go to Wintinna?---No.

Did you go to Wallatinna?---No.

Any reason why you chose to go to Victory Downs and Mulga Park, rather than the closer stations of Wintinna and Wallatinna?---Well, the road - our ultimate objective was Giles. The road entered the junction at Mable Creek and then we just proceeded round the area.

In fact really you just proceeded up the north-south highway visiting stations along the way?---That is right.

And then across the Northern Territory border?---Yes, yes.

So really you went up the highway, across the territory border to Emu and then - sorry, to Giles, and then back again?---Yes.

Was that the route you took?---Yes. We were supposed to come back direct, a more direct route, but the road was not completed at that stage.

It was not really intended to be an exhaustive trip of all the stations?---No.

And, you say that you briefed the station inhabitants on the coming tests. What were you briefing them about? ---Well, we just warned them that there were going to be a series of tests; about the time they were to happen and - - - This sort of liaison with the

stations had been established many years before from Woomera, not with these particular stations, and it was found to be a valuable means of contact, particularly with movement of people.

What were you warning them about? Security matters, or fall-out, or - - -?---We were not warning. We were just briefing them on the - on the fact the tests were to take place and see if there was anything, any worries, that Maralinga had caused them.

Did you - - -?---Because we were acutely aware of the public relations side.

So there was a fair extent of public relations component in this trip?---Oh, a great extent, and personal contact.

And did you give the station owners any instructions about their own safety during the test?---No. It was not considered necessary.

So I suppose it was not considered necessary to talk to the station owners about their safety, similarly that it was not considered necessary to give them instructions about the safety of aboriginals?---Well, we included all personnel on the stations, and we spoke to the missionary at Ernabella but, of course, he was more McDougall's responsibility than ours, and McDougall would have seen him at a later date than we did.

So that really was not your priority on the trip?---No.

You go on to talk about the arrangements you had with, I think, Mr Rankin at Mable Creek. This is the middle of your statement, page 6 of your statement, where you say:

These people, particularly the Rankins of Mable Creek, provided a valuable means of intelligence concerning the movement of any strangers in the area?

---Yes.

And you call that the "bush telegraph"?---Yes.

Now, in fact, was - how would Rankin communicate with Maralinga? ---He would have had to have gone through Woomera on a party line.

This is the radio telephone?---I think there was a party line. A land-line.

So, I take it then, this communication was not direct to you? ---No. He became - Mable Creek was in the Woomera sphere of influence and had always been. They were one of the early stations that had been visited by people from Woomera.

So, if he was on a party line he was subject to all those usual problems of a party line, like having to wait your turn to get on?---Yes.

Running the risk of everybody else listening in?---This would not have happened during a trials period, of course.

What would have happened then?---Well, at Mount Clarence there was a radiation detection unit and they would have had direct contact with Maralinga.

And how was that, by radio or some other means?---It would have been radio, yes.

Do I understand your statement to be saying that the importance of Rankin's communications from Mabel Creek was very often in non trial periods when strangers might be coming through?---Yes, and when I say strangers, it would be mostly - well, not tourists because they could recognize those, but people who - suspicious people.

And what would he do? Would he - he would telephone Woomera as his first point of contact, would he?---Yes.

So he would not contact you direct?---No.

And then you would get a message from Woomera?---Yes.

How would you -- --?---Well, this in fact did not happen as far as we were concerned, but those were the arrangements.

So are you saying that in fact you never got a message relayed from Rankin?---No.

But that is what would have happened?---That was the agreement.

Now, in fact did you get any messages from Ernabella?---No.

And how was it arranged that Ernabella would get messages through?---That would have been through MacDougall.

But how would they communicate with MacDougall?---Well, MacDougall had - when he was on patrol had three or four a day with Woomera.

But how was the message - how was it envisaged the message would get through from Ernabella?---Well, I presume that Ernabella had some form of communication.

Can you remember what that was?---It would be radio.

Just dealing with that trip that you and Mr Turner took, if we leave aside the trips that the native patrol officers were taking, is that the only trip that was taken by



officers from the Department of Supply or Maralinga to that area prior to the Antler tests?---Yes.

At page 7 of your statement you dealt with what Mr Walter Batchelor MacDougall told you about Ooldea. I will not go through that in any detail, I am just interested to know whether what you have set out at the bottom of page 7 is really just as a result of what Mr MacDougall told you?---I did visit the area and I was appalled at what had been Daisy Bates camp site.

Well, let us deal with that in a second. The information that is contained at the bottom paragraph of page 7 about Ooldea and Daisy Bates?---Yes. There were - - -

Is that as a result of - - -?---My conversations with MacDougall and from information obtained from him.

And that is what you recall of what MacDougall said?---Yes. He was quite unequivocal about that.

When did you visit Ooldea?---In March 1957, at the Ooldea well.

You told us that you were made aware of this incident of aboriginal people being found in the region of the Marcoo crater?---I was, yes.

You were not there at the time?---No.

And, in fact, you had been there in January or February of the same year; had you not?---Yes.

Are you aware that the date of the incident when the aboriginals were found was in May of 1957?---Yes.

So is it not the case that some three to four months, from your statement, before the aborigines were found there, you were at the crater wearing a hood and gloves and over-shoes, and equipped with a dosimeter? ---Yes.

And you were checked and showered when you left the crater? ---Yes.

Well, given that was only three to four months before the aboriginal family was found there, did you ever have any cause to consider that what you were told, namely that the degree of residual radiation from the tests seven months before had fallen to a level when only a prolonged stay would have caused a health risk?---No.

Did you ever have any cause to question that?---I never did because I think that position obtained in the February, otherwise we would have worn - - -

But not in the May?---It was low - so far as I was concerned there was low residual radiation in the February. That was the reason why we were virtually sent in as we stood.

But you said you wore over-shoes, hoods and gloves, did you not?---This was just to stop dust getting on us.

This was a bit of a risk, was it, at Marcoo at that time? ---Well, it was to enable easy cleansing at the health physics area; the gloves and the hood and the over-shoes were discarded.

Notwithstanding that you still had a shower, did you not, when you - - -?---Yes. Well, that was standard operating procedure.

Now, you go on page 8 to speculate or to give the reasons why you regarded the conditions of security to be favourable at Maralinga, and in fact you say at the beginning of - at the middle of page 8:

The very lack of water tended to preclude the unauthorized entry of any people into test areas.

And two sentences later you say, "This, of course, was aided by its very isolation." Now, do I take it that those were factors that were taken into account in any - - -?---Very, very considerably.

So they formed part of your perceptions of security for the region?---Yes.

But might it be the case that one of the other perceptions or one of the other factors that was taken into account was a belief that there were no sites of significance that aborigines were interested in in the area?---Yes. I formed the opinion that there had been no human habitation in that area for many, many years because Tietkins camp site, which had been established 80 years before, was still standing. The well he had dug was still there.

Was the basis of that opinion, only your own observation or what MacDougall or others told you?---No. No, that is my own observation.

Were you given any instructions as to what to do with aboriginal people who you found in the region of the Maralinga range area?---We would have immediately contacted the native patrol officers.

That is what you would have done. Were you given any written instructions about that?---Yes. Well, no written instructions, no.

And why would you have contacted native patrol? Why would you not have dealt with the matter from your own security facilities?---Well, the aboriginals offered no security threat. Had they have been whites we would have taken a more active interest in them.

Well, I will come to that in a second?---So far as security is concerned.

Would you have regarded native patrol because you regarded aborigines as the domain of the native patrol officers?---Certainly.

And did you have instructions as to what you would do if you apprehended a white person who came unauthorized on to the range, for example a tourist - - -?---We had standing instructions.

And were they standing written instructions?---Yes.

What was the effect of those instructions?---Well, they were to be apprehended and questioned.

And then what?---Well, if the explanation was not satisfactory they would have been taken into custody.

It may be that you can help me in relation to this incident at the Marcoo crater in May. From your statement you are aware that the people came from the north before being found near the crater?---Yes.

Were you aware, in fact, that they had come from Ernabella via a rock hole route?---I have heard they came from Ernabella but I did not know the rock hole route.

And you say in your statement that afterwards they were taken to the mission at Yalata?---That is my understanding.

Which is south of the crater and Maralinga. Is there any reason why no effort was made to take them back north where they came from?---I think they - the reason that they were proceeding into our area was to visit relatives or friends who had previously been at Ooldea. I understood, and that is why they were taken to Yalata to be reunited with them.

That is what you were told by - - -?---That is what I was told.

Do you remember who told you that?---It could have come from various sources, but I presume Mr White, my 2-i-C, or my relief.

Yes, Thank you, Mr Flannery.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr Flannery, there is one little thing I would like to clear up. I thought you told us that one of

your methods of ensuring that no aborigines got into the prohibited area was a system of communication between the stations such as Ernabella and your patrol officers, or with Woomera?---Yes.

They were to let you know if there was any movement?---That is right.

Well, after the aboriginal family was found in the prohibited area in May 1957, were you instructed to make any investigation as to how these aborigines had got through your protective net of patrol officers?  
---I was not instructed personally, no, your Honour.

Well, did anybody try to find out?---I would think that MacDougall would have been asked.

By whom?---By the range commander.

Yes, Mr McIntyre?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, thank you, your Honour.

You said, Mr Flannery, that the presence of aboriginals in the area would not have posed a security threat and that you would have reported their presence to a native patrol officer. And then you describe what would have occurred if white persons had been found in the vicinity?---Yes.

Going back to Totem, you said that the information was that there were no aborigines in the area. Now, I think you said that that information came from the native patrol officers. Would that be the case?---From memory, I arrived at Emu immediately before Totem so the strict arrangements I was totally unaware of.

Well, as from the time that you arrived at Totem for Totem 2, was it your function to pass on the information that there were no aborigines in the area to any particular person?---No.

Well, do you know who it was that the native patrol officers advised that in fact there was no information about aborigines being present in the area?---That would have been to the AC Emu who was Brigadier Lucas.

Well, was it any part of your function, do you recall, to assess whether there were aboriginal persons present in the area prior to a test being undertaken?---Not at Totem. I was not there for a long enough period. I would - - -

Well, you have made reference in your statement to the distinction you draw between security and safety?  
---Yes.

In relation to Totem, did you understand any part of your function to be concerned with safety of personnel in the test area, or was it concerned with security to make sure that unauthorized incursions did not get through?---Unauthorized incursions.

Well, were you aware whether any particular person had a responsibility prior to the detonation of Totem 2 to ensure that there were not any aboriginal people inside the test area?---Again I would presume the native patrol officers.

Now, before we leave Emu, you said that it appeared they had downed tools and walked off. When you arrived at Emu - I am sorry - in the visit to Emu that you describe occurring in - - -?---That is right, it was November - - -

November of - - -?---Within days of their departure.

This visit you made, I take it the British personnel had left?  
---Yes.

Were there any Australian personnel still there?---Yes. \_\_\_\_\_

~~How long did it take before the Australian personnel left the Emu area and the peace officer assumed his duties there?---I would say almost immediately.~~

~~What did you understand to be the reason for the quick departure from the area of the British personnel after the trial had finished?---Well, I think it was the trial had been delayed and I presume air bookings and other things had been made, and there was no reason for them to stay there.~~

Was there, in fact, a large amount of equipment left at the Emu site?---Yes.

Would that include trucks and bulldozers and things of that nature?---Yes.

And as well as - - -?---And a lot of electronic equipment.

Were you aware of the reason why those items of equipment were not taken out of the area?---I presumed because they were not worth recovering.

Well, what was the track or the access by road to Emu? What was the nearest established facility to which they could have been taken?---Well, they would have been - had to have been taken either by air or overland to Mabel Creek.

Are you aware of any particular attention was given to the feasibility of taking out the equipment rather than leaving it there?---No. No, I do know a lot was

offered such as air conditioners were offered to the RAAF at Mallala and they recovered them by plane and took them.

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When you made this visit to Emu in 1953 after the British had left, did you see any areas around the village which were marked as being radioactive within the sites?---No. There were no areas round the buildings.

Do you know whether there was any radiation hazard around the area of Emu village at that time you made the visit after the British had left?---No.

You are not aware or you - - -?---As far as I know there was not any.

Did you yourself conduct any radiation monitoring surveys or were you present when any persons made such surveys? ---No.

Well, did this peace officer remain at Emu for some time after the - - -?---He remained at Emu until the commencement of the Buffalo series.

All right, and who took over his responsibility then?---The radiation detection unit.

Was it one person who was located at Emu for the whole time? ---Yes.

For about two years?---Yes.

Who was that?---Sergeant Frank Moffat of the Commonwealth police, who was relieved - - -

When was he - - -?---For leave, but he was there for most of the period.

What, by himself?---Yes.

And what did he do whilst you were there? Did he sit inside the village or did he patrol around the area?---No, he made daily patrols of the crater areas.

Did you have any responsibility to oversee his duties at that time between Totem and Buffalo?---Yes.

Now, coming to your presence at Maralinga for the Antler series, you have mentioned the incident of the aborigines at the Marcoo crater - you were not there, of course, but was the tower - observation tower at Eagle manned at about the time that you were absent, when the natives were found?---It would have been manned before that.

Were you subsequently told of the rough location near the crater where the people were found?---No.

Well, could you see the Marcoo crater from the Eagle Tower?  
---I cannot think. It could have been obstructed.

Well, obstructed by what?---By undulations in the ground or  
. . . . .

Well, I think at page 5 of your statement you have described  
the Marcoo crater itself?---Yes. They could have  
been behind the mound for that matter.

What do you recall as being the depth of the crater?---It is  
hard, I am not good on - - -

Well, just roughly?---I would say roughly 30 feet.

Do you recall whether the sides of the crater were shallow or  
whether they were steep?---Very steep compared -  
particularly compared to the other ones.

Do you ever recall seeing any water in the base of the Marcoo  
crater?---No, or any of the other craters.

You have made a reference to the tasking and the briefing that  
you gave to the RAF, the air crew for these patrols.  
And you said in your statement that, "I think there  
~~were three aircraft and two helicopters located,~~ but  
you said in evidence that there was usually just one  
aircraft that you tasks were briefed to fly. Did  
they come back and return to you afterwards on the  
results of their flights, or did they report to  
somebody else?---Well, somebody - they never did it  
without a member of the security organization, or  
Mr Weightman, present.

What, taking part on the flight?---Yes, and as observers.

Who was the person that actually did the observing? Was it  
the security person?---Yes.

What, went with the flight?---Yes.

Right. And that security person told you afterwards what the  
result was?---Yes.

Well, do you know whether anybody else was tasking aircraft  
- do any kind of searching at the time of Antler?  
---It seems that Mr Weightman was.

Just briefly coming to his statement, do you recall on page 1,  
paragraph 6, it says that:

MacDougall arrived that night and  
we ...

that is Mr MacDougall and Mr Weightman:



... conferred with Colonel Durance.  
We were briefed . . . . .  
dangerous by health physics.

Well, did you yourself understand at Antler that you had any responsibility to advise anybody that there were no natives in any particular areas, as part of your own security duties?---I would not have after the commencement of the Antler series.

Well, do you know who it was, if there was anybody, who had a responsibility to make an assessment as to whether the area of danger was free of aborigines? Just from your own knowledge, not from what you have - - -?  
---Yes. I would say that this would be the native patrol officers or the native welfare officer, Mr Weightman.

Well, did you at any stage have to advise the range commander or any other person at the Antler series that in your view the area was safe from the point of view of harm to the aboriginals in the area?---That never occurred, no.

As far as Antler was concerned, did you regard yourself as having a responsibility for security in the entirety of the Maralinga prohibited areas extending as far west as the Western Australian border, or was there some other area that your responsibility was confined to?  
---I suppose legally it was - it did include the whole area.

Well, in practical terms did you ever talk about the range as being an area other than the Maralinga prohibited area in its entirety?---Yes. The range I considered as being that area on Tietkins Plain north of Roadside.

North of Roadside for how far?---Well, as far as the - as far as the actual tests were conducted and the areas immediately surrounding them.

Just one final thing: in relation to Totem, the Kittens area around the Emu area, was that controlled by security or police officers during the course of the Totem series?---Yes.

Would you say it was not controlled by peace officers other than the one person left at the village after Totem operation had been - - -?---It would have.

Yes, thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr McClellan?

MR McCLELLAN: I have no further questions, your Honour.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Flannery, you are excused.

THE WITNESS WITHDREW

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2744a A.C. FLANNERY  
(Continued on page 2745)

DONALD JAMES STEVENS:

MR McCLELLAN: Mr Stevens, we were about to cross-examine you the other day but there is one matter that I would like to raise with you. You know the controversy that raged then, and perhaps may rage yet, in relation to the Marston findings with respect in particular to the presence of Strontium, I think, in various animals; do you recall that. I am sorry, iodine?---Iodine 131, yes.

In various animals, particularly sheep; do you recall that controversy?---Yes, but not in detail.

The Minister for the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee suggests that in some way the committee could control - I do not suggest anything sinister - but could control the release of the Marston information. Now was that so?---I do not think they felt they could control it. They could comment on the scientific validity of it perhaps.

Well, they tried, did they not, to stop publication in the form in which Marston had drafted it?---Not in the sense, as I recall it, of its scientific content, but there was some doubt about the validity of some of the measurements, perhaps.

Well, may I suggest to you that not only as to the validity of measurements, but indeed as to the nature of the express conclusions. The Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee sought to exercise what I might call editorial control over Dr Marston's paper; do you not agree with that?---I think it may have commented on, as I recall, Dr Marston trying to establish some relationship between iodine 131 measurements in the thyroids of sheep and Strontium 90, and I think the committee had some doubts on scientific grounds whether that was a soundly based relationship.

And it tried to stop publication of the Marston thoughts in that form, did it not?---I do not know that it so much tried to stop it, but drew attention to its doubts about this alleged relationship.

Well, what I would like to know is why it was that there was any relationship between Dr Marston and the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee at all. Why could he not, as a scientist, just publish what he believed irrespective? ---I think it is probably, as I recall the situation,

that Dr Marston was carrying out some measurements under the - under arrangement with UK authorities, particularly - not associated with the Weapons Research Establishment Organization, but with the Agricultural Research Council in the UK, and I think that organization referred the report to the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee for an opinion.

But it was more than that, was it not. There was a long tortuous process before the Marston paper was in fact published and during that time you people on the committee were involved in some fairly heated attempts with editors of various magazines to stop the Marston paper being published in the form in which he wanted it published. Would that not be a fair comment?---I do not think I could agree with "heated"; it was prolonged perhaps but I do not remember it being heated.

You do not remember it being heated, yes, but you have recollection of that process, do you not?---I recall the matter was before the committee, yes.

Well, what I want to know is why the committee had any right; if there is a legal basis for it I would like to know, or if there was some political reason, why it was that the committee was in a position to do or say anything apart from respond perhaps by publishing its own article?---I think it was probably a situation which existed at that time where the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee was regarded, rightly or wrongly, in the administrative arrangements within Australia that it had certain expertise in this area, and I think perhaps it is fair additional comment to make that it was because of this type of situation that the National Radiation Advisory Committee was established to have a body quite separate from the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee which may look at things of that sort.

Well, do I infer that what you are saying is that the editorial board of the scientific journalists had referred the paper to the committee for expert assessment; is that - - -?---I am not certain whether it came from the editorial board or how it came to be the committee now.

There was a direct dispute between Dr Marston and some of the statements made by Professor Titterton in relation to the presence of iodine in thyroids of sheep; do you recall that?---I do not recall the particular position adopted by Professor Titterton or by Dr Marston.

And Dr Marston got to the point of accusing the professor of telling untruths?---I do not know whether that is - I do not - I am not aware now of whether that was the situation.

Now, the other thing I would like you to help me with is that Marston's paper was ultimately published, was it not?---Yes.

In the form in which he wanted it published?---I believe so.  
I - - -

And the committee spent, and the minutes reveal it, more than 12 months talking about replying to it, but so far as the minutes show - or I can tell - it did not in fact reply. Do you recall whether or not the committee ultimately replied to the Marston paper?---No, I cannot recall.

Yes, thank you, I have nothing further.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr James.

MR JAMES: Mr Stevens, if I might cover just that area about which you were asked this morning as a preliminary; could I suggest to you that the way in which the Marston dispute initially arose was that a public pronouncement of the chairman, Sir Ernest Titterton, was reported in a newspaper. Whether Sir Ernest actually said the words or not, not being clear to the effect that there had been no fall-out over the Australian continent arising from the Monte Bello tests, or certainly no increased fall-out, but Marston having obtained various results wished to publish to contradict that newspaper report. Does that bring any memories back to you?---Not really, I would think that - - -

All right?---I was going to say that I think that such a statement would be unlikely and unscientific that there was no fall-out over Australia from such-and-such activity.

No fall-out or no dangerous fall-out or anything of that order. But, however, can I suggest to you that Marston in fact did not end up publishing that which he wanted to publish in full; that in fact some of his interpretation was omitted from the eventual material he published?---I am unable to confirm or deny that.

All right, and could I suggest that that was because the controversy reached such a point that litigation was threatened?---Not to my knowledge.

Well, there were approaches made, were there not, to other scientists and editorial boards of distinction suggesting to them that Marston's paper was unscientific, should not be published, did not deserve to be published?  
---I do not know whether the approaches to editorial boards were made with those comments, but I do believe editorial boards, which is not - as is not unusual - did review the paper.

But I - perhaps I should discriminate between the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee and certain of its members, and would it be fair to say that there was a report to the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee, or a number of reports, of the attitudes of individual members to Marston's paper?---I am sorry, I do not really know whether that happened or not.

Well let me put it bluntly; did Marston's paper arouse the ire of Sir Ernest Titterton?---I do not know whether it is fair to say, "aroused his ire". He may have had, as another scientist, some reservations about the validity of some of the conclusions.

And within the scientific community, when one holds strong views as to reservations, that can lead to quite some difference of opinion, can it not?---It is not unusual for scientists to disagree.

~~And to express their disagreement somewhat forcefully in the scientific literature?---Yes.~~

In fact, as I understand it, the upshot of the exercise was that Sir Ernest prepared a paper in conjunction with others, that he sought to have published by any magazine or - sorry, any journal, that dared to publish Marston's paper; do you recall that?  
---I am not - I do not know those are Titterton's writings.

And can I suggest to you that that paper was the one that Mr McClellan was asking you about?---Well, I do not know the paper and I do not know the circumstances surrounding it.

Leaving that area entirely for the moment, could I come to your original membership of the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee. You have told us that you were the replacement for Dr Eddy?---Yes.

Were you aware of what it was caused Dr Eddy's death?---No, I would not be precise about it. I thought it was some chest infection or a heart condition.

Could I suggest to you that the first meeting you attended of the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee was the

ninth meeting and that that occurred on 23 July 1956 on which date you were effectively co-opted onto the committee; would that sound right to you?  
---It sounds right, yes.

And it was on that occasion that the committee expressed deep regret at the loss of their learned friend, Dr C. Eddy, who died of pneumonia as a result of his conscientiously attending to his duties as a member of the committee at a crucial time in Operation Mosaic at the expense of his health?---I do not remember the exact words at all.

But did you understand that Operation Mosaic had something to do with Dr Eddy's death, because of the work content he put into it?---I am not a medical man. I cannot allege relationships between his death and his work-load which I did not know of. It no doubt was heavy.

But did you understand that at that time when you were co-opted onto the committee, there had been a division of responsibilities between the various members of the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee and that his was in particular the health area?---Well, I did not know it in that way but I - it would not surprise me because the committee was made up of a number of people who had different particular areas of particular disciplines and Dr Eddy's area of discipline was radiation physics.

Radiation physics or health?---Well, health physics if you like. He was not - you refer to him as Dr Eddy, he was a doctor of science, not a medical graduate.

I appreciate that. Did you understand when you took over you took over, as it were, the portfolio for health?  
---I took over the portfolio as a radiation health physicist and not health in the - - -

In the general sense?---Sense, no.

Who else was there on the committee with knowledge of radiation health physics. I should indicate too that the membership at that time appears to have been Professor, as he then was, L.H. Martin; Mr W.A.S. Butement; Professor Titterton; Mr Dwyer and Mr L.P. Carter was the acting secretary; Professor J.P. Baxter?---Well, I suppose if I wanted to make an exclusion I would say that Mr Dwyer, who was the Commonwealth Director of Bureau of Meteorology, would probably have made no particular claim for expertise in radiation health matters. Quickly running through the others, if I might,

Professor L.H. Martin, of course, was a distinguished nuclear physicist who had worked with radiation out at the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge; Professor Baxter, who was associated with atomic energy relationships, therefore he would have had some information; Mr Butement, I am not certain what his particular disciplines in physics were.

Yes, but, see, what I am interested in is health physics. Could I suggest to you that in fact you were the whole input on the health aspect of the physics? ---No, I do think that is - can be correct. I would say if - I commented that Professor Martin had made his post-graduate career in nuclear physics and I think anyone who works with nuclear physics has a responsibility of informing himself of those matters, and when I just went through those of course, I omitted to refer to Professor Titterton. Of course he was a professor of physics at the National University where radiation, radiation devices were being used and he obviously had a responsibility as has Professor Martin at the University of Melbourne, running a department involving radiation, to be informed.

And you would then have regarded Professor Titterton, as he then was, to have had an area of scientific expertise in the biological effects of radiation?---I would think he would have read extensively and had an extensive knowledge of it.

Would that have been the general position from that time, that is 23 July 1956, through to the early 60s that he would have been regarded by you and by the scientific community generally as having an expertise in the biological effects of radiation?---I do not think Professor Titterton would ever claim to be a radiation health physicist. I think he would have claimed, and quite rightly in my mind, of having extensive knowledge in radiation effects, but let me add if I may, that you covered a period from - to 1960 I think. I think an important point to make is that in that period, at the suggestion as I recall it, of Professor Martin and of Sir Leslie, there was established a National Radiation Advisory Committee to provide, with a different type of membership, largely to provide sound back-up - - -

Under Sir Mac Farlane Burnett?---Sir Mac Farlane Burnett was the first chairman of it, yes.



And that was essentially to prescribe standards, was it not?  
---It was not only to prescribe standards, it was to look at the whole broad spectrum of radiation - radiation effects in a lot of areas.

Could I raise with you something that links indirectly with what Mr McClellan has raised? There was, from time to time, within the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee minutes reference to litigation of various sorts, was there not?---I do not remember that I had to consult the crown solicitor on matters of that sort.

In fact, there was reference to the fact that the South Australian legislation might be in conflict with the Defence Undertakings Act and that there was - that is the latest South Australian legislation - advices from the crown solicitor were being sought?  
---Legislation relating to - to what?

Relating to radioactive substances?---I cannot recall when the South Australian legislation relating to that came into effect. It marginally might have been in by 1956 but I am not certain; I doubt it.

But that was not part really of your concern, the question of conflict of laws and constitutional positions; but, nonetheless, was not there a continuing debate that proceeded from the very early meetings after you became a member as to the necessity for blood counts for people entering the area?---It was not only a matter of a debate within the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee. It was, at that time, a debate which was raging through the whole area of radiation health physics and people involved in radiation and physics.

I want to say if I can put it to you correctly, because up until now I gather it has been put in terms of being able to detect radiation damage?---Yes.

And that was the nature of the debate in the health physics area, whether you could detect low dose radiation damage by blood counts, was it not?---Yes.

But the debate that we see revealed in the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee minutes was a requirement by the British authorities that persons entering the area should be tested - receive blood counts - before entering, in order to preclude later litigation. Do you recall that?---I do not recall that - - -

Later claims for compensation and so on - - -?---No; I do not recall that.

Was it not the case that the - the British insisted on there being blood counts for certain scientific and civilian personnel entering the area to preclude possible claims for compensation?---Until you made that last point I -

I would have agreed with you because it was not unusual at that time - going back to 1956 - for people engaged in, let me call it, radiation work as a part of their suitability for that that they would have a medical examination which would involve a blood count; but whether it was a question of litigation, it never occurred to me to look at it that way.

Certainly. So, it was standard practice then to give people blood tests - blood counts before exposing them to radiation - or the risk of radiation exposure?---I think that is true if you take it in a narrow area. I would think I might add, if I may, that it was not unusual then as it is not unusual now for blood counts to be part of a good, sound, occupational health medical examination for employment in any area.

Yes, I take your point; and, therefore, we could expect that people employed in the health physics field, in the target response group, in the forward entry activities and the decontamination activities, according to the state of the art at that time, would have had a full medical including blood counts?---Yes, that is probably true but they probably would not be given it now.

No, I take your point. Right, now the - not only did this controversy relate to blood counts but I think the - the British were also, at one stage, suggesting that - that it would be advisable to have the whole of the film badges issued, monitored. Do you recall that?---I am - I am sorry. The whole of the film badges - - -

All the film badges issued, monitored, developed?---Assessed, yes.

Do you recall when it was that the British first suggested that all film badges should be assessed?---No, I do not.

But it was a fact of which you were aware that up until fairly late in the sequence, I think after the major trials, not all film badges were developed?---That would be in line with practice in a number of establishments - - -

As it then was?---As then was, and more strongly spelt out in words in the current ICRP - International Commission on Radiological Protection - guidelines.

And, indeed, the - I think the use of film badges had gone to the point where the crews of coastal vessels during the mosaic explosions were issued with film badges? ---I think this was done, yes.

Some of which came back darkened?---Yes, I do not know about that but probably could have.

That that was put down by the committee to the effects of heat in engine rooms?---I think I did say the other day in response to a question by the - - or either in the statement or question by the counsel assisting the commission that heat on a film badge can cause it to over-read.

Yes, and that is what this was put down to?---Yes.

But nonetheless, following that incident, more stringent precautions were recommended by the committee for the safeguarding of coastal shipping?---You are referring, I think, to the Monte Bello series of explosions - - -

Yes?---Well, I was not a member of the committee - - -

Certainly, but you knew about this?---Well, I was aware that something like this went on.

Indeed, at your very first meeting, the Seamens Union was threatening a strike unless they were given Geiger counters, were they not?---Well, I do not remember that detail.

Right, well, the pump air division-- sorry, perhaps I should try and get this clear. Your area of responsibility as you understood it in the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee was in accordance with the terms of reference that we see, I think in AIRAC 4 and in AIRAC 9 and, perhaps if I can hand those to you. Well, perhaps could I - oh, for God's sake. Paragraph 9.1?---Yes.

In relation to the Maralinga range: community of suitably qualified persons whose responsibility was to examine information and other data supplied by the United Kingdom Government - can I stop there?---This is 9.1A?

9.1A, yes?---Yes.

Firstly, was all the material that you were given in relation to your functions supplied by the United Kingdom Government? ---No, I would think that in that case one would not have been on the committee with any expertise at all, he would have relied solely on information supplied.

All right. Secondly, relating to atomic weapons tests from time to time proposed to be carried out in Australia for the purpose of determining whether the safety measures proposed to be taken were adequate for the prevention of injury to persons or damage to livestock and other property as a result of such tests; so the first question is proposals - you are dealing with information, proposals for the prevention of injury to persons or damage to livestock and other property; and, second,

to advise the Prime Minister through the Minister of Supply of the conclusions arrived at as a result of such examination and in particular whether additional, alternative or more extensive safety measures are considered necessary or desirable. Does that fairly accord with your understanding of the terms of reference of the committee?---I would have to say that that is a broad description of the terms of reference which had to be turned then into an operational approach.

Yes. And for that purpose did the committee limit its function to the off-range areas?---Its off-range areas, yes. The committee was understood - understood that that was its responsibility.

Now as to your personal understanding of that responsibility; where did you get that from?---It might seem trite to say that I inherited that when I joined the committee.

Right. So you had understood that you had really no responsibility for on-range safety?---That is my understanding.

And indeed, was there not a controversy that continued throughout the minutes and up to the sixties as to whose responsibility the inter-trials period produced for the range, with the committee taking the view that it should not have responsibility for the range during the inter-trials period?---I think the committee did have that view because it did not have any way of effecting a control because the range was being run by the British authorities.

And during the inter-trials period, although there was a range commander, there was only one health physics representative of seniority - Mr Turner, was there not?---Yes. But he did have a team of technical staff which professional people have to rely on to make measurements.

To assist him. But he reported to the AWRE in full with fairly short written reports to the range commander?---Yes.

And indeed from time to time the Atomic Weapons Test safety Committee found it necessary to inquire of the United Kingdom authorities as to what Turner had reported, had they not?---Well, I think this is right. It makes the point that the range was the responsibility of the British authorities.

Yes. And those reports in particular concerned contamination of the Tadge area where it was learned by the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee that there were radio-active pallets in and around Tadge only long after that information had gone to the British hands by a request emanating from the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee?---Well, you remind me of this - I - - -

That is right, though, is it not?---I believe so.

And it was only towards the sixties when the question of clean-up arose, that the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee received the benefit of full and voluminous reports from Mr Turner?---This is right, yes.

So that you were restricted essentially to the information - both practically and theoretically - the information that the British authorities were prepared to give you? Before a test?---Yes, that is right.

And what you learned from previous tests?---That is right.

But you embarked ~~also on such programmes as you could,~~ bearing in mind your operational facilities, to monitor fall-out?---That, of course, was one of the responsibilities which the committee saw because it had the responsibility as the broad terms of reference to advise the Prime Minister and so on, so it could not give its advice as scientists without measurement of fall-out levels.

And you were able to get access to programmes that measured fall-out in terms of, particularly, iodine 131 and Strontium 90?---Not at the 1957/1958 - sorry, 1956/1957. - - -

But thereafter, subsequently?---Thereafter, of course, the committee became involved in a fall-out monitoring programme which related - perhaps even most particularly to fall out from - global fall out, fall out from nuclear weapons tests occurring - - -

All over the place?---In the past, and had occurred in the past.

So do I understand that up until the end of the major firings the committee did not see its role as involved in fall-out monitoring after the event?---Yes, it did involve itself in fall-out monitoring after the event because so-called sticky papers and air samplers did not just stop after the event, they went on for weeks.

All right. And the iodine 131 programme which included the testing of thyroids taken from various animals that also had been initiated much earlier, had it not, prior to the Antler explosion?---Yes, that programme, I think, was part of the programme to which council referred.

Yes?---The study initiated by British Agricultural Research Council.

And there was also a very real concern at the time of the tests in the popular media about the presence of Strontium 90, in various substances, in particular, cows and human milk, was there not? ---I do not know whether I would say in 1956 and 1957 there was a media concern - a public concern expressed in the media, but, of course, this was, if I could use the term, an emerging situation where with the establishment of the United Nations Scientific Committee with certain responsibilities, nations were called on quite specifically to establish who provides scientific information which may assist that committee, and this was, of course, a matter which the Australian Government addressed one way or the other and it was the intent to provide in Australia an expanding programme of fall-out monitoring.

When was this?---Well, I would be looking at 1957 - 58; early 58.

Could I come to 21 June 1957, a meeting at which I think Professor Titterton was present and you were present, Mr Dwyer and Dr . . . . . Now that is mid 1957?---Yes.

Do you recall at that stage that a human bone sampling programme was to be initiated to monitor strontium 90?---I do not know who - well, I cannot identify that was the date what, 21 May 1957, but I am conscious of the fact that a proposal to undertake a human bone sampling programme did arise for Australia, as it did for a number of other countries.

This is in 1957?---That is in 57, yes.

And that what happened in that context was that samples in particular of babies' bones were to be obtained throughout Australia and those samples analysed for the purpose of strontium 90 content and the material forwarded to the British authorities?---The sampling programme, as to when it actually started and how it was initiated, I am now not clear. I would have thought that the National Radiation Advisory Committee which had been I believe, recently established about that time, may have had some major role in the undertaking of that programme. As for the actual measurement of the samples, quite frankly at that stage Australia did not have the facilities to measure strontium 90, although they were later developed at the laboratory which I happened to be director of.

Can I suggest to you that what occurred was - I will just put the heading in this form; heading, Babies Bones, requirement: as many samples as possible are to be obtained. Action: this is to be arranged by Sir Macfarlane Burnett when he returns from United Kingdom. This requirement is to be raised at the next meeting of the NRAC. The cabbages and bones are to be ashed and the secretary is to inquire whether the Department of Supply will provide the necessary furnace and the part time assistance required, possibly at DSL. Professor Titterton is to write to Mr Dawson, AWRE, outlining the programme as agreed to by the safety committee. I suggest to you that is the minute. Does that suggest to you that this was in fact not an international exercise but a request by the British authorities that information be provided as to strontium 90 by these techniques?---No, I do not think it would be correct to say that it was a - in response solely to the - any British approach. It was a programme which was developing internationally then in a number of countries and, of course, you mentioned cabbages and bones. There were other things done, and I am not quite certain when it was done, soil and wheat and - - -

In fact the wheatgrowers of Minnesota, have become upset, have they not, about a particular isotopic content of their wheat, and the Australian wheatgrowers grew restive? ---I do not know whether it was Minnesota that first raised this or what, I would not know.

Oaky, well, from time to time though, this exercise of bone sampling continued; the results were provided to the British authorities?---Not the results. The ash was provided.

I see, so the actual ash and the primary data were provided? ---Only the ash and the - the samples were identified, I think that - - -

They would have to be?---Identified, but I do not think, they may only have been identified as sample No.1 or sample No.2 or - - -

You have no idea how or with whose permission these samples were taken, have you?---I think the whole arrangement for the sampling was arranged as the minute that you read out, when the return of Sir Macfarlane Burnett from an overseas visit. I believe as chairman of the National Radiation Advisory Committee, he made the approaches to state health authorities for such sampling.

I take it all this was kept remarkably confidential, kept from the public?---I do not recall any deliberate attempt but of course the minutes of the meetings were not published - - -

From the practical - - -?---Let me just add if I might, that when the assays, when the measurements of the amount of strontium 90 per gramme of calcium, that is they way it was - activity of strontium 90 per gramme of calcium - and whether it was soil or cabbages or milk or bones and so on, were obtained. These were No.1 published in the scientific literature; copies of those publications were as a part of Australian policy made available to the United Nations scientific committee and it was not alone in this. This was a prominent national effort.

Certainly, I accept all that, but the idea of an Australian authority embarking upon an exercise of, in effect, collecting babies' bones for the presence of strontium 90 from nuclear tests, had that been given popular currency as opposed to scientific currency, it might well have produced a politically embarrassing climate for the continuation of the tests, might it not?---Well, I do not - I cannot express an opinion on that. I would be guessing.

Is that because the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee told us did not look at matters of politics?---The committee was not really involved in political decisions.



What about the question of the urgency of various firings, that is the firings of various rounds. Now, do I understand that you were told at one of the meetings of the committee that there had been a defect in meteorological information such that the committee was placed in a difficult position when the meteorological circumstances were marginal?---I do not recall that - could I ask what date this was?

Firstly, I take you to the 26th meeting: do you recall that - - -? What date?

That is the meeting of October 6th - perhaps if I take you to the whole of those; the meeting of, sorry, September 11th to the 14th, that was at the Maralinga - - -?---1956?

Yes, I think so. I am trying to find a year date on the documents. Take, firstly, the 26th, which was September 11th to the 14th, it was a sort of moveable feast at Maralinga that meeting?---1956?

1956, you were present?---Yes.

With Professor Titterton, Mr Dwyer, Mr Moroney, at Maralinga? ---At 56, or is it - - -?

1957, it must be?---57, I am sorry.

I am sorry, I apologise. And you recall being present?---Well, I was there if it is recorded there.

Right. Do you recall that that was the occasion on which the question of firing on a Sunday came up?---Yes.

And Sir William Penney was spoken to about firing weapons on Sunday?---I just have doubts where Sir William was the trials director in 1957. I thought he was in 1956, I thought Mr Charles Adams was - - -

Yes, he was. I am not suggesting he was there?---Oh, I see.

But the question came up at the meeting about a communication to Sir William about firing on a Sunday being in most circumstances unacceptable?---Well, I - - -

I am giving that to you to try and assist your memory?---Yes.

Do you recall the proposition at that meeting being with reference to two prior attempts to fire the weapon - perhaps if I show you - - -?---I do not recall that detail but I presume what it really means in simple language was that the meteorological condition which had been predicted did not continue.

See, the reference in that minute to the first firing attempt and the proposed firing on the morning of the 12th was cancelled by the trials director as although the earlier data did imply some chance of a likely improvement

this did not materialise?---Local improvement in the meteorological conditions?

Conditions, yes. Then on the second occasion the firing programme for the afternoon of the 13th was cancelled although there had been hopes, I think is as good as I can put it, that conditions would improve?---That favourable meteorological conditions for the firing to meet the requirements were not actually introduced yet.

Then there is another attempt. the third firing attempt and the minute records that the safety committee therefore conferred with the trials director's proposal to fire on September 14th?---Yes.

Moving then to the 27th minute, that deals with round two?  
---Yes.

And again there is a cancellation on the 21st; again a cancellation on the 24th and then a proposal to fire on the 25th?---Yes.

The 28th meeting, round three, again adverse conditions. Again a proposal to fire on 9 October?---Yes.

Were you aware of any firing of a test during marginal meteorological circumstances?---No, I think to my knowledge meteorological circumstances under which firings occurred were ones which would as far as able, assuming which involved - assuming a continuation of favourable meteorological conditions occurred. But I just add, if I might, that of course you showed me now minutes of the AWTSC which went over several days and I think counsel on Monday said he could not find such minutes and I think this is the thing which has happened, if I might make that observation.

But when linked together in one - - -?---Yes, and I think that perhaps if I might add further that your drawing my attention to those possible opportunities of firing, indicates, or confirms what I was saying, that the committee AWTSC in conjunction with the British authorities continued to watch the meteorological conditions to see how a forward predicted favourable situation developed.

In relation to those precise meetings, we have Mr Dwyer as the only meteorologist present. Your function was really as a member of the committee in the final decision making stage rather than to add any expertise, was it not?---In meteorology?

In any field at that stage. This is right on the zero hour, veto time?---Well I think I would have had input into the committee in terms of what is a meteorological pattern how - because this meteorological pattern determined having regard for the expected yield and the manner in which the device was going to be fired

and determine the fallout pattern and when you say  
Mr Dwyer was the only meteorological expert, there  
were of course, Australian meteorologists working - - -

No, I am just talking about on the committee?---On the committee,  
sure.

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2762-2763

D.J. STEVENS

By the time the 34th meeting came around, again, you were not present at that meeting but a paper was presented to the committee, 34th meeting, 13 March 1958?  
---Yes. I was not a member of the committee at that stage. I had resigned.

The paper was presented to the committee: The establishment of upper wind finding facilities at Cobar, New South Wales. There is reference to 5 of the 7 explosions having clouds that passed over northern or central New South Wales. At paragraph 7. There is reference again in this paper; though it appears to be blanked out, in almost the bottom paragraph:

Such a station could be of value  
in the . . . . . the  
north east or south east.

See the bottom words?---Yes.

If one looks at the next photocopy page, they appear a little more clearly, underneath the map of various sampling stations. Do you see that there?---Yes.

Were you ever aware of a suggestion that there might be marginal conditions for firing?---I do not think it was marginal in the sense that, at the time of the firing that the desirable conditions would not be met, but the concern I think at that stage, and we are going back 30 years and while some of us might doubt that meteorology has improved in that time, I think we can say that there have been great increases, great improvements, in meteorological forecastings as a result of satellite and other type of information. I think that was only expressing the view of any scientist that improved information would have improved the confidence with which one could say a meteorological pattern was established.

I accept all that, but was there some sort of category of the circumstances suitable for firing, in terms of: suitable, marginal, not suitable?---Well, clearly, suitable, acceptable if you like, and unacceptable.

Were clearly there?---Were clearly there, yes.

But were there some marginal circumstances in which - - -?  
---Only, as I would recall as a non-meteorological, a concern about whether a pattern of meteorology which was developing was going to be maintained.

In those circumstances, were you aware of any firings having taken place whilst you were on the the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee?---Not to my knowledge in circumstances where lack of confidence existed in the meteorological conditions.

Despite the fact that we now understand from that minute that there was a lack of upper wind testing stations that might have helped to resolve marginal situations?---Well, I think that I would have to say that scientists often find themselves with a lack of information. If I might illustrate, I recall that in 1958 at the UN Scientific Committee when I happened to be chairman of a physical sub-group; I attended with a part of the team, a media conference, and this was just before the first report of the committee came out, and I was asked by some representative of the media did the committee have sufficient information. I recall quite clearly saying we had adequate information but all scientists like more information.

Would it be fair to say that you were left in a position where you would now consider you might not have had adequate information of a meteorological nature to decide whether the firing was marginal or acceptable?---No, I do not think that we ever fired, to my knowledge - sorry, we did not fire, but firing occurred at a time when, to our knowledge on the basis of information, it was other than acceptable.

THE PRESIDENT: I think at that stage we will adjourn to 2 pm.

#### LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT

MR McCLELLAN: Your Honour, before Mr Stevens continues, might I just indicate for the purposes of the transcript that the letter that Mr Collett referred to this morning of 10 September 1957 to Mr Bartlett is in fact exhibit RC101.

THE PRESIDENT: That is the Weightman letter.

MR McCLELLAN: That is the Weightman letter, yes. It was in fact RC101.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr James.

MR JAMES: Mr Stevens, I wanted to try and get something clear about this strontium 90 sampling programme. Firstly, do I understand that you were of the view that it was not as a request from the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment but as part of some sort of general programme that the sampling of human and, in particular, baby bone occurred? ---Trading on my recollection, I would have to - I do not believe at this point in time that the

programme arose solely or as a direct result of, or totally as a result of, any British proposal.

Could I take you, in that case, to the minutes of the 35th meeting held on 9 April 1958 which - according to the minute you were present - and in particular to item 2e relating to the strontium survey, to this reference there to a report in relation to that programme for 1957. Taking you to the report, it commences:

Following the discussions between representatives of . . . . . programmes were agreed on.

?---Yes, I read that.

In the next paragraph:- indeed, I think the responsibility lay with the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee. The second paragraph goes to the question of infant bone tissue?---Yes, and other bone tissue.

And of bone tissue for comparison. There is reference in that report to discreet approaches to pathologists? ---It reads, "Pathologists have been approached".

Yes, and it goes on to talk about discreet inquiries and so forth?---Yes. It is my recollection that the AWTSC made - the approach to pathologists was made through the State Health Authorities to pathologists at the request of the chairman of NRAC.

That, of course, is not referred to in that report?---No.

But do you recall that report?---I really would have to say no, I do not recall that report.

But would you be prepared now, having seen it, to accept the proposition that a request was made by the British authorities to the AWTSC to obtain infant bone samples for the purpose of strontium 90 calculations arising in particular with regard to the British tests?---I have not read it closely enough to be certain that the British proposal, which I will accept for the minute, of course, related solely to the British tests - - -

I am not suggesting solely to the British tests, but particularly in relation to the British tests?---Partly related to British tests, but more predominantly related to the global fallout situation.

I might capture that minute. Can I take you from your work with the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee to what you did for AIRAC. Firstly, did you provide two AIRAC, and for the purposes in particular

of the preparation of AIRAC 9, your memory of the events that had occurred whilst you were with the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee? ---I was not interviewed formally by AIRAC in the preparation of AIRAC 9. I think I responded to a question from counsel assisting the commission that I took a low key, a rather more inactive role in AIRAC 9 than I may have in other AIRAC publications. That was because of my association with AWTSC and NRAC.

And should I - to get it clear, I think there came a point of time at which you resigned from the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee with a definite object in mind?---That was in early 1958, and probably the last meeting that I may have attended was the one which you referred me to when my successor, Dr J.H. Martin, not to be confused with Sir Leslie Martin, was appointee.

And what was the object that caused you to resign from the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee?---Well, I suppose time available to do other scientific activities in which I had a heavy commitment, including the United Nations Scientific Committee Representation of Australia, running a scientific laboratory which at that stage I had seen the need for as perhaps a logical place to establish a facility, a scientific facility, to make the type of assays which were being carried out on behalf of Australia by the AWRE organisation.

Would it be fair to say that at that time you thought it was time Australia stood on its own two feet and had its own monitoring facility?---I certainly saw that in the context of the UN Scientific Committee, having seen the need for and having - in part of the committee which, through the General Assembly, called on nations to provide detailed information of fallout . . . . .

And it was not, in your view, satisfactory to rely on the information being provided to the AWTSC by the English authorities?---I would not like my answer to be interpreted that I had any lack of confidence in what the British scientists were doing about the assays, but I envisaged a programme, as did the UN, of a much more comprehensive programme than I felt that the British authorities might be willing to get involved in in terms of workload.

Would you agree with the proposition that the data being provided by the French authorities to Australia was not as full and comprehensive as you would have wished, for the purposes of a monitoring exercise?---I think we all start off by crawling

before we walk and I would think that in 1958 what we envisaged in any discussions about a monitoring programme which might be appropriate or inappropriate at that time in - with hindsight was probably inadequate, and this was the sort of thing that we had in mind - I had in mind, rather - when I was working on proposals to be made to my department, as part of the Commonwealth organization, to suggest that there should be established - it was not just personal interest - at my laboratory a facility which would have comprehensive monitoring capacity.



When you came to AIRAC, whilst you took a low key approach you would recall in particular, would you not, the . . . . . at 4.1 showing the nuclear weapons tests and the yield?---AIRAC 9?

Yes, AIRAC 9?---Yes, I recall this table.

I take it you were provided, when part of the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee, with better figures for yield than are shown in that table?---Yes. As I indicated earlier Monday, and perhaps today, we certainly got better information than just kiloton range. There was - - -

Mile yield and kiloton, yes?---Yes. Expected yield, perhaps maximum yield, also was provided.

Were you ever provided with actual yields after explosions? ---I do not know that I was ever privy to that information.

Of course had you been provided with that you would have had some measure for testing the accuracy of the expected yield figures you were given before each explosion? ---Yes.

So that it would have been an information that one would normally look to for subsequent tests to know what was the yield of the last one?---I think each test was probably different in character and it would be difficult to relate one yield with another.

Why not publish more accurate data as to yield in table 4.1 in AIRAC 9?---I do not know.

Similarly, in relation to the bone sample programme and the strontium 90 testing, I think there is no reference to that at all in AIRAC 9, although there is reference to thyroids?---Yes, well, the strontium 90 programme and - it went beyond strontium 90; it went to caesium 137 and so on. The programmes were developed primarily with regard to global fall-out as I knew it.

Can I take you to paragraph 12.9 in AIRAC 9. One is left to deal there with strontium 90 purely by way of instrument, is one not?---The word "estimates" relates to the estimates of dose commitment: this is not the concentration per gram of calcium of - - -

Certainly, no, I appreciate that, but at the same time there is no reference there to the material from which such an estimate could be made, and surely that material would include the actual strontium 90 content observed in calcium taken by the bone sampling programme?---I suppose that one - I would comment that while this AIRAC 9 gives a modicum of scientific information, I think that it should be borne in mind that it was really prepared as a - for, what

might be called, the informed lay reader rather without all the scientific information. I have not looked at the references, whether there are any references to the published data.

Do you agree with the proposition that even as late as the publication of AIRAC 9 public reference to the bone sampling of babies could have caused some degree of emotional disquiet?---It might have done so, but I think I should also say in responding to that question that it is my recollection that, first of all, that AWTSC published the data in scientific literature.

Scientific literature, but not for informed laymen?---Published the data in scientific literature and that copies of that, those, data were tabled in Parliament which is often the place where information to the public emerges. So I do not think there was any attempt to keep it quiet - hush-hush anyway.

Now, were you aware of any season for the firings, so that in the event that the first of a series of explosions did not go off on time, time for the year might run out?---I was not conscious of a seasonal relationship for the firings, except perhaps that the weather might be more acceptable for the people who were living in the desert conditions.

Were you aware of any urgent of political necessity for firings to take place at any given time?---I was not conscious of any imposed circumstance other than the requirement for, what I might be permitted to describe as, safe firing conditions.

Might I take you to paragraph 16.8 in AIRAC 9?---What page is it on?

It is page 56?---Paragraph?

Paragraph 16.8. The allegation, One Tree was eventually fired under unsafe weather conditions?---Well, all I can say is, to my knowledge, I think the firing of One Tree, and I do not know which round it was,  
- - -

The first of the Buffalo rounds?---The first - was fired in a - to meet the safety criteria and not as a member of AWTSC for political reasons.

Yes. Not for political reasons. I appreciate that, but the argument that is put in 16.8 seems to be that it was not fired in unsafe conditions because, in fact, it turned out that there were not unsafe results?  
---Yes.

Is that a summary of the argument?---Well, it was not fired in unsafe conditions and the, the - as I read it quickly - the last sentence, I think, refers to the fact that the - was at most about 2 per cent of the agreed level.

So that it did not turn out wrong, so therefore it was not fired in unsafe conditions. Is that the way the argument is presented in that paragraph?---I do not have - I have not read it as closely as that. I do not think that is a fair interpretation.

All right. What I want to put to you is: are you now sure in your own mind that One Tree was not eventually fired after many delays in marginal conditions? ---I do not believe it was. I think it was fired in conditions which complied with the criteria and there was no imposed firing requirement.

Would you look further up to the reference for the fall-out over Adelaide?---Yes.

And the reference to the claim in a number of publications that Adelaide was unexpectedly subjected to heavy fall-out following Kite in October 1956?---Yes.

Do you recall that question coming before the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee?---My memory is, and my statement does indicate I think, that I believe I was not present at Maralinga for the Kite explosion. I was on the way to New York.

I accept that, but did you ever hear of these allegations being put prior to AIRAC 9?---I was aware because of the pattern of fall-out which tracked, and the way the fall-out monitoring occurred that there had been a - - -

Greater than expected fall-out over- - -?---A secondary cloud but I am not aware of the circumstances which surrounded it; whether the change occurred just prior or just after the firing, or whether they were anticipated.

So you are in no position to assist us as to whether that firing was in marginal conditions?---No, I could not. I do not believe it would have been.

Were you concerned in any particular manner with any of the particular chapters of AIRAC 9?---No. I was not - I do not think so, no.

In terms of your particular areas of expertise does chapters 9, 10, and 11 constituting Australian responsibility to safety, criteria for safe firing conditions and early fall-out? Did anyone refer to you specifically for your assistance on those three chapters?---I was probably asked and . . . . . in my memory agree with that, but I think those chapters you refer to, without looking at them, would have been based on documentary research by the drafter of the report.

That is Dr Watson?---That is Dr Watson.

You do not recall any specific approach to you on those three matters?---I had no particular contribution.

Could I take you to paragraph 10.9 again?---I am sorry. What page?

Page 31?---Yes.

The methods used to predict fall-out were not infallible and were necessarily based more on theory than on observation, although the AWRE conducted an active programme of research to refine the methods of prediction. Whilst you were with the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee were you aware of that active programme of research to refine the methods of prediction, and its results?---I would not be able to say what I knew in detail of any active research programme, but I would just have to add, of course, that the British - the United Kingdom - authorities were just starting a nuclear test programme on the atmosphere. They undoubtedly based a lot of their prediction approach on information that they probably acquired from the US and they were expanding on their own experience: they were being scientists.

And therefore the next sentence is not surprising:

It is therefore not surprising that the post-firing analysis . . . . . cloud height and fall-out pattern.

Were you ever told that the post-firing analysis in relation to any particular firing yielded a result at variance with the predictions?---I would have to say yes, but I do not recall it ever being represented to me, or to the committee, that there was a major difference between the prediction and the - what occurred.

Why would you have to say yes?---Well, because I think we did hear from time to time when the committee met again with British authorities that they were having a slightly different approach to prediction in view of, their forward prediction in view of what occurred.

You have told us that AIRAC 9 did not conduct an inquiry; it conducted a review?---Yes. That is what its terms of reference said it should do.

Certainly. Could you conclude that a review that made so little approach to you, you having been a principal participant in the events to which it refers, was at all an adequate review?---I think the review did not suffer because I was not sitting before AIRAC, not as a member but as a person being

interviewed. I believe that at the time this review was undertaken there were discussions with a number of people who were involved, and there was a considerable search of literature, and things of that sort, of documentation, and I am, as I said on Monday, I am sure that Dr Watson, and a member of the committee, council, did not see the trials. I did not see every relevant file: I think I observed that files beget files and I am sure things are still being turned up.

You were taken in your evidence-in-chief to a letter from Mr Dwyer to present to Professor Titterton of 6 December 1957 as to problems tracking clouds, and in particular the phrases put to you it is not certain that the searching aircraft have located significant cloud?---I think that, yes, I recall that but I do not recall the detail. I think the particular reference about tracking cloud related, in that letter on . . . . . since Monday, related more to the tracking of the cloud remote from the range area as the cloud got diluted and things of that sort.

That is the area of your responsibility, is it not?---That is right, yes.

If there were aircraft problems of lack of adequate upper wind sampling stations; what else would you have had to ensure the safety of the Australian public from the movement of the cloud which in five to seven tests at least passed over northern and central New South Wales?---Well, the committee's responsibility was not that it could not do anything about the cloud once it formed and was being carried by the prevailing meteorological conditions. The committee's responsibility in that post firing was to monitor and those air meteorological stations, I think you are referring to, was perhaps more directed - or one concern, or at least my concern would have been to perhaps identify more precisely where the cloud was heading so that we might have made in the laboratory perhaps if necessary some selection of what samples should be measured prior to others.

But you could learn from experience, could you not? If there were problems about the monitoring and that in terms of monitoring instruments we have heard mention of that; if there is problems about the high wind flow detection there is problems about the aircraft, would you not expect the British to have told you so that you could look with greater care at the prospects of a later firing, particularly if the weather might be marginal?---I am sorry, I just - could you repeat that, I am not quite certain - - -

Well, I will withdraw it. It speaks for itself. Let me put it to you this way: AIRAC 9 suggests basically that everything was always all right; does it not?---Well, I do not think it says everything was always all right.

Well, perhaps if we come just to the general conclusion, paragraph 1.2(a):

The measures taken to protect  
the public and the personnel  
. . . . . and almost  
certainly were effective.

?---Yes, I think that is a fair statement.

If there is a problem about ground monitoring, a problem about aircraftcloud tracking; a problem about upper wind stations then how is it possible to say that the tests were well planned and almost certainly were effective?---The measures were well planned and almost certainly - not the test - - -

Almost certainly effective, yes?---I think that in the context of a monitoring programme and ultimately the AWTSC was interested in the fallout deposit and the measurement results of it, I think that has been borne out.

And so that we can scrub the words, well planned, and insert the word, fortuitous?---Oh, no; I think I would say and I think I indicated the other day to counsel assisting the commission that they were well planned in the state of knowledge at the time and I think I would be confident in saying had the British tests continued in Australia beyond, say, into the 1958, the measures for monitoring would have been better planned because we were looking to improving the monitoring programme, having regard for the scientists of some short comings; but I would think that would only just improve the accuracy without raising major problems.

So that would it be fair to say that you are of the view that there was room for improvement in what went on, but no need to refer to that in AIRAC 9?---I think there was room for improvement in the light of improvements which take place in science over 30 years, or 10 years or five years.

But the difference was 1956/57 to 1958 that you have been talking about; is it not? If the tests went on in 1958 there would have been improvement?---Well, I would not like to be certain that the improvements that we were thinking about would have been put into field in 1958 had tests been carried out; but let me say that things were done, for example, in 1958 if my memory serves me, for the first time in Australia and almost the first time in the world there was a programme to monitor iodine 131 in milk, instituted by the laboratory and that is the sort of thing that occurred.

And that specifically is referred to in AIRAC 9, is it not? Chapter 12?---I would have thought not.

If you have a look at the portion:

For each test series the Atomic  
Weapons Test Safety Committee  
monitored . . . . .  
in representative milk supplies.

Is that the programme you are referring to?  
---Excuse me, could you direct my attention - - -?

12, 12, third sentence?---12, 12 - - -

Page 42, 12, 12, third sentence?---12, 12, third sentence - - -

For each test series the AWTSC?---I think that relates to  
French nuclear testing in the Pacific began in 1966.

Yes?---For each test series insert - French one - - -

That only relates to the French - I see, that only relates to  
the French testing and that links up through the  
sentence to this, the later expanse of the French  
nuclear tests in the Pacific can be used to provide  
an estimate which they approved?---Yes. The other  
thing that was not there which I referred to was  
that I think in 1958 the laboratory did institute  
a milk - an iodine and milk sampling programme  
relating to British tests, not in Australia but in  
the Christmas Islands in the Pacific.

Right. I have nothing further, if the commission pleases.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr Eames?

MR EAMES: Doctor, I suppose in the atmosphere of a commission  
like this now it is a little bit unreal in trying to  
get the mood of 30 years ago and what it was like out  
on Maralinga range. There is no doubt a sense of  
unreality about it all, is there?---I do not know  
about unreality but a certain degree of remoteness  
in time anyway.

Well, in fact, when all these events were going on I suppose  
from a scientists point of view it was all pretty  
exciting?---I do not think I ever regarded it as  
exciting; I regarded it as a job, a challenge that  
I was asked to undertake and myself and my colleagues  
both in the laboratory and elsewhere did the best we  
could.

But no doubt from a scientists point of view the access to  
English scientists, and no doubt scientists from other  
parts of the world, Canadians and so forth, that  
would have made it for you a satisfying period?---I think  
professionally it was satisfying in a sense that any  
scientist finds benefit from sharing views with  
opposite numbers whatever country it is.



All of these events were occurring at a time where there had been in 1955, 56 there had been a number of tests conducted around the world by various governments?----Yes.

It was not quite the space race but there was an element of competition in the air, I suppose?---I do not know whether it was competition but it was going on.

I am sorry?---I am sorry, I do not know it is proper to call it a competition but several nations were involved.

Well, certainly there was - - -?---Well, three nations were involved.

Which were the three?---USSR, USA and the UK.

Yes. Well, certainly it was within the scientific community - that is the western scientific community it was regarded as pretty important that the tests which were being conducted in 1955 and 56 went off well? ---Well, some scientific - we had different interests and I think I would just add that that was certainly recognised as a matter of national and international interest because of the action taken by the United Nations General Assembly.

Yes. And as far as the test safety committee was concerned, no doubt you felt a certain pleasure at the idea of the - I do not mean that in the wrong way; but you certainly wanted the English to be successful with the experiments and the detonations which they were conducting?---I think my only wish was that in that context was that as a member of the committee I could contribute to discharging the committee responsibility to afford safe conditions.

Yes, but is it not fair to say that all of the people on the test committee, although they were concerned to ensure that the tests were conducted safely, equally had an interest in the success of the programme? They wanted the British to succeed; they did not want them to have some highly publicised flops?---I do not think I ever thought that I was hoping that they would succeed because of British loyalty or what have you.

You certainly were not hoping, I suppose, that the fuse would be lit and it would fizz on any of these tests, were you?---I think not.

Yes. So to that extent you shared the enthusiasm of the British scientists at the range who no doubt were themselves very excited and enthusiastic about having a successful series rather than an unsuccessful series? ---I am sure they would have been upset if it was unsuccessful.

Yes. Well, to the extent that the scientific community involved in these tests involved the Atomic Test Safety committee personnel as well, they shared that general hope, optimism for the success of the tests, did they not?---Yes, I think they would not want them to fail.

I mean, it would be a fair comment to make, would it not, that so far as the atomic test committee was concerned or so far as nuclear fission was concerned you were all pretty dedicated anglers, were you not?---I do not think I was an angler in the fishing competition I was interested in an area which is radiation  
. . . . .

Well there were no dedicated opponents to the concept of nuclear arms on the committee, were there?---I do not think that I could identify anyone's personal view; I do not think we ever discussed our position, personal position about that.

Well, doctor, could we put it another way: Did you ever hear Professor Titterton or any other members of the committee come out with a heresy suggesting that the nuclear test programme was morally wrong?---I would have to say no, I have not heard any member of the committee make that statement.

In fact, had any one of them made a comment to that effect ..... you would have been absolutely astonished, would you not?---I guess so, yes.

Yes, because it was perfectly well understood that the Atomic Test Safety committee comprised people who were totally dedicated to that sort of programme of nuclear development?---No, I would not agree on that. Taking my position I would not say that I looked at my membership of AWTSC as saying, inferring that I was dedicated to development of nuclear - - -

Well, leave aside the test safety committee part of it; were you nonetheless a believer in 1955/56 in the development programme of atomic weapons?---I would have to say quite honestly that I have not asked myself that question.

It was getting pretty late in the day not to ask the question, was it not? Was that not the feel, the activity that you were involved in one which it could be taken assumed that you were a supporter of it?---I think I would have to comment by saying that my activity as a member of the Atomic Weapons Test Safety committee was only a small part, responsible though it might have been, of my professional life as then director of the laboratory.

Well, are you saying that you could be a member of the Atomic Test Safety committee in those days without holding an opinion as to whether nuclear test programmes were good or bad?---Yes, I believe I could discharge my responsibility without asking myself that question.

Do you say that that was the case, that in 1956 you held no opinion as to whether nuclear test programmes of the sort that were taking place at Maralinga were good or bad?---Looking back 28 years, I could not give you a categoric answer what my position of mind was at that stage about those tests.

Do you say that you had even considered it in 1956 or that the issue had not simply arisen at all?---I believe I had not addressed it in detail.

Well, does that mean it is possible that had you addressed it in detail you might have been a supporter of it? ---Well, I cannot deny that.

But certainly so far as the other members of the committee were concerned there was no sense of ambiguity on their part, was there?---Well, there were - at 1956 sorry, 1957, anyway, there were only three members of the committee Professor Titterton, Mr Dwyer and myself and I do not know in detail whether they had thought it through the same way as you are suggesting I might have.

Doctor, do you have any doubt that Professor Titterton and Mr Dwyer believed implicitly in the programme that was taking place, that it was the right thing to be doing?---I cannot speak for them really but I am aware of course that Professor Titterton had a long association with nuclear test programmes. Mr Dwyer, I would believe, from recollection had none.

Well, do you say it is now - you have no idea as to whether or not Dr Dwyer during that time held any views about whether the test programme was a good thing or not? ---I have no recollection of his views on that.

Well, what about the expanded committee? Can you recall anyone on the expanded committee who you now have any doubts about their opinion on the topic?---The 1956 committee?

Yes?---I never had a discussion with them about the subject.

Do you have any doubts now about what their philosophy was, that expanded committee in 1956 was there a heretic among them?---I do not know.

Well, on the other hand, are you aware of anyone who held opposing views, who held views that the test programme was bad, dangerous or potentially so?---On that committee of 1956?

Yes?---No, I do not know.

Could I read something to you on - this is taken from the Symonds report, at page 30, it records that in May 16, 1955 Prime Minister Menzies wrote to the Minister of Defence:

That the safety committee should be  
Martin, Chairman, Titterton, Butement  
Dr Eddy and Professor Baxter.

He comments that, and I quote:

I believe the committee must include  
members who are sufficiently well known  
. . . . .atomic  
experiments.

Do you really think that any member of the 1956 committee could seriously be said to be a person who did not have any interest in any way in the success of the defence experiments that the British were conducting?---Well, I did not know then or as I was not a member I do not know now what the late Leslie Martin's position was. I never knew Mr Butement well enough to even think about it. The only person that I would have known closely enough on that list was the late Dr Eddy and like me I do not think he had a position. He saw himself doing a job in a particular area of expertise.

So you believe he simply held no opinion on the subject?---I do not know if he held an opinion or not. He did not discuss an opinion with me.

And you do not know whether you held an opinion or not?---I do not recall whether I held an opinion or not.

Well, doctor, you said in your statement in dealing with AIRAC9 and in particular dealing with the work that was done by Dr Watson, that it was with confidence that you relied on the professional confidence and scientific integrity of Dr Watson in his review. Tell me this, when you were on the test committee in 1956 and thereafter, is that also your position that if something was put forward by another scientist you would simply accept it if you relied on their integrity?---If I knew them well enough to have that confidence and if it was in an area of my competence and I could view it dispassionately I would have to say yes.

Was not the situation this, that the test safety committee to a very great extent was totally dependent on the British giving them information?---They needed the information provided by the British with respect to yields, firing conditions - yes, firing conditions and to some degree the prediction of fall-out patterns backed up by meteorological services which included Australian people.

Was it not the case that the committee always had to formulate the questions to ask the British rather than the British simply volunteering information?---I think that the - for a given test explosion, one of a series, the initial meeting with the British authorities they informed the committee what was going to be done and what the expected yield was and things of that sort and certainly the committee did ask British authorities questions.

You were dependent, having asked questions, on the British giving honest answers and, more importantly, on the British not withholding any information; was that not so?---Yes, I suppose - - -

Because just as you never got to see Dr Watson's raw data you never got to see the English government's raw data either, did you?---No.

And so if they had held information back from you that of course would be a serious breach of the integrity that you would be relying on?---Yes. Let me - could I just backtrack one thing.

Yes?---That I would think that I would have to say to you that with regard - an important facet of the prediction of the fall-out pattern and so on from a given test was the meteorological data and the committee was certainly fortunate that they had available on it an expert in meteorology like Mr Dwyer who had some of his staff attached to the British group.

Well, it was not just a question of requiring information on matters relating to meteorology, was it. The Minor trials in particular were a classic area where you depended almost totally on the British providing you with information?---Yes.

And indeed so secret were the Minor trials that is it not the fact that not a single Australian was permitted to be present during those trials?---I do not know whether that is absolutely correct. I - - -

I am sorry, I should correct it, there was a truck driver? Apart from the truck driver, do you know of any Australian scientist who was permitted to be present during any of the Minor trials to observe them?---I would not be - I would believe that it was probable that the name that has been mentioned this morning I had heard, Mr Turner who was the Australian health physics representative at Maralinga at the time, whether he was present during Minor trials, he certainly was present shortly after because he had certain responsibilities.

Well, we have not heard yet from Mr Turner but, apart from Mr Turner, can you think of a single scientist that would have been present on account of the Australian Government at those trials conducted by the English? ---No, not on behalf of the Australian Government.

And certainly not on behalf of the test safety committee?--- That is right.

Which was charged with the responsibility for assessing the safety of those tests just as it had been for the major trials?---Off site.

Sorry?---Off site, off site.

Off site?---Yes.

But, nonetheless, you were charged with the responsibility of advising the government on the safety of those tests?  
---Yes.

Yes. And, so, none of you were present, nor did you have any representative present for any of those trials. Did it not then mean that you were entirely dependant on the British giving you accurate information about what they were doing at the trials?---Yes, yes.

And they never volunteered anything, did they?---Yes, they did provide information.

Well, sorry. I should put that another way. Was that in response to your requests that they provided information?---They made, as I recall it, they made a proposal to carry out a Minor trials series and provided information on the type of experiments which were carried out in those.

But the TSC committee was pretty bothered about what the British were doing in the Minor trials, was not it?  
---Well, it would be failing in what it should have been doing if it was not bothered.

But it did not seek to overcome that difficulty by insisting that it have someone present at the tests?---I think it relied on asking questions till it obtained information which it believed satisfied its concerns.

The tests which were of particular concern with the Vixen B tests are tests in 1960, were not they?---H'm.

These were the ones that - to refresh your memory - that had the potential that fissile material was being used and there were questions about whether the test ban treaty might be impressed?---Well, this has been suggested to me, yes.

Well, I take it you knew that at the time, did not you?---I would not be certain and I think counsel assisting the commission showed me something the other day. I would have to have my memory refreshed whether I was at that stage a member of the - had rejoined - the AWTSC.

Well, Vixen B took place in 1960. I do not know precisely what dates in 1960?---It could be, of course, that although the series took place in 1960 that the approval - the proposal to undertake them would undoubtedly have been made somewhat prior in time to the actual appearance of the tests - of the trials.

Well, do you recall whether you were on the committee in 1960?  
---I was at some time.

It is suggested 7 September. Yes, the first of the Vixen B rounds was fired, was fired - sorry, with another three to be fired by 3 October. Now, if you cannot remember, say so. I cannot offhand remember your evidence but can you recall whether you were on the Test Safety Committee at that time?---I would have been on the Test Safety Committee as I recall it on those dates of firing which you mentioned.

Yes?---It is possible and I am trying to answer the question as well as I can. It is possible that an approval following a proposal from the Nuclear Authority was given before I rejoined the committee.

Well, is it - the Symonds Report records that on 23 August of that year, the trials director has obviously been asked by the DDAWRE - director, I suppose. DD?  
---Deputy director, AWRE.

Right. Of AWRE, about fixing the firing circuit safety and the AWRE officer responsible has assured him that all practicable steps have been taken to avoid errors; that he of course realises the possible catastrophic nature of a mistake, and has promised to re-emphasise to those concerned the need for rigid adherence to the planned procedure. All concerned are fully aware of their responsibilities so he need have no worries about this. Does that jog your memory at all about concern that there could be a catastrophic result if something went wrong with Vixen B?---No, it does not. That what you read out did not relate to AWTSC, it related to - - -

No, quite. Well, perhaps does that suggest to you that if these matters of concern were being expressed they might have been expressed on the AWRE but you did not get to hear about it on the TSC safety committee?  
---Well, the detailed discussion of the - you referred to Vixen B - may have taken place before I returned to the committee. I am not certain.



It is suggested you were on the committee that could have been overseas at the time of the tests?

MR McCLELLAN: No, at the time of the detailed discussion.

MR EAMES: Right. All right, well, possibly you were overseas at the time of the discussion in August, but presumably if you were overseas you did not hear anything about it on your return?  
---No, that would be - - -

Yes, and tell me, doctor, when - I have been putting to you questions about the relationship between the Australians and the British and the extent to which you were dependent on the British being frank with you in providing information, let me just ask you this. Were you at all suspicious about the fact that the British were not inviting anyone from Australia, any Australian scientists, to be present at the Minor trials?---I do not think so.

When AIRAC 9 was being produced, the counsel made a point of seeking information from the British authorities, is that right? If you look at AIRAC 9, page 27, paragraph 9.4. Well, actually, I think this is referring to the test safety committee itself, but I will just deal with that whilst we are on it. We are talking about exercising its own responsibility:

AWTSC requires sufficient information from the United Kingdom authorities on the nature . . . . . information before it to execute its responsibilities.

What I was actually looking for was the question of the step that AIRAC took to obtain information for itself. I think that is on page 1?---I think - - -

Then 1.4:

AIRAC has undertaken its task by examining the records relevant to the safety of the nuclear . . . . . These include former members of the Test Safety Committee.

Could I ask you this: Do you know whether in preparing its report which became AIRAC 9, did AIRAC seek assistance and information from the British authorities?---They certainly, as it is stated there, sought from the British authorities information about monitoring doses to personnel on site.

Was the information that was sought restricted to that?  
The British were being asked only to supply  
information about monitoring?---I believe it probably  
was, but I could not be absolutely certain.

Well, is that something you have discussed with Dr Watson  
at all?---No, I have not discussed it seriously.

Tell me, on 2 August of this year, Professor Clarke wrote  
yet another letter, this time to his Minister, the  
Honourable Barry Cohen, dealing with exposure of  
Australians to radiation at Maralinga. Are you  
familiar with that letter which went out on the  
AIRAC letterhead?---I was not a member of AIRAC  
after about June 1983, and I have not seen the  
letter.

All right. Well, perhaps if I can just read it:

Since publication of the report,  
British Nuclear Tests in Australia,  
a review of operational . . . . .  
. . . . . in the light of the  
new information.

Are you aware that even after the publication of  
AIRAC 9 that information even later than that  
came in from the British, which suggested that  
some of the information that was in AIRAC 9 was  
inadequate?---AIRAC 9, I am just checking, was  
dated January 1983.

January 1983?---I concluded my term of service on AIRAC about  
May/June 1983. I am not aware of any discussions  
nor have I discussed with any member of AIRAC what  
went on after AIRAC 9 was published and tabled.

Well, could I ask you this: does it disturb you the thought that if Airac was asked to produce information relating to the effects on individuals of radiation doses that they apparently did not supply all the relative information when requested?---Well, I think I would have to say, as I said before in response to a question earlier put by counsel and then referred to before, this was not a - AIRAC9 was not based on a detailed inquiry, a collecting of information by interviewing a very, very large number of people. And it is disturbing of course, that there is information still coming out and it probably may be that, your Honour, before this committee - commission finishes there may be other information.

But AIRAC did not suggest in even the slightest way, did it, that the studies of records that it made was an inadequate study, that it was limited in any way? ---Well, what you read to me from that letter to me does not suggest that AIRACs review was inadequate but the information which was provided by you know the persons they approached was - had to be supplemented.

Well, you see, let me tell you what the supplementary information was. This was taken from the same letter and just referring to the second Buffalo test, the Marcoo test, and I am quoting:

After the first Buffalo test some of the IF . . . . . after the Marcoo tests.

Does it strike you, doctor, that that is pretty significant information for the British not to have supplied if AIRAC had requested their assistance relating to doses when they were preparing AIRAC9? ---I think about, you know, to put my finger on it, there is a reference to - - -

Yes, there is - there is a reference to - I am not sure what pages, there is a reference to areas of, I think it is 2000 metres and 4,500 metres with respect to Marcoo?---Yes.

But no reference to Australians being in trenches nor to servicemen being in - whether the British or not - being in a tank only 1800 metres odd from the blast?---Yes. No, I cannot comment on that at all.

Now what I want to ask you is this. If that sort of information was withheld or, at least, if not withheld, was not supplied by the British at the time that requests were made, do you now feel completely confident when it comes to the

question of what sort of dose levels, what sort of fallout levels there were, if you have to rely on the British documents, the British information? ---Well, taking fallout levels, of course, the AWTSC relied on its own monitoring outside the range. I cannot disagree with you that on what is written in that letter that there was subsequent information provided by the British. I do not know whether the letter explains the circumstances why the information was not provided earlier.

Well, whatever the explanation might be, it is pretty worrying as you having been a person who signed AIRAC 9 saying amongst other things, AIRAC has undertaken its task by examining the records relevant to the safety of the nuclear tests etcetera. Is that not so?---Well, I think one would probably have been better written relevant and available.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the letter that you quoted from, Mr Eames?

MR EAMES: That was 2 August 1984.

Doctor, do you think there is a danger that when scientists say we will rely on other scientists and base our reliance on an acceptance of their integrity, that you run the risk that you could be gullible? ---I do not know that I run the risk of being gullible, I think that scientists are continually basing their decisions and their directions of research, directions of scientific interest on other scientists findings.

But would you agree if one was to be a guardian of the public interest, that to be an adequate guardian of the public interest, one should not be relying on information supplied by other people in these circumstances where you are talking about nuclear tests?---Well, quite frankly, I think that reliance had to be placed by anyone who served in that area on other scientists' information, other information that was necessary.

Well, are you now saying that you are not quite sure whether your reliance was properly placed insofar as you relied on Doctor Watson in the preparation of AIRAC 9?---No, I am not saying that. I believe that within the documentation that he saw and the information that he made available, I believe he is - his draft report - draft - drafting provided. a reasonable assessment of the situation, reasonable review.

Pardon me one second. You were asked earlier about Doctor Marston. I just want to deal with one matter relating to that, to the question of a fall-out. On 9 August 1957 a letter was written from Bill to Dear Ernest. I suppose we could all win the prize fairly easily by backing the double and saying if it was signed from the UK Atomic Energy, Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, it is a letter from Mr Penney or Sir William Penney to Mr Titterton, Professor Titterton?  
---Was it - - -

9 August 1957 from the Atomic Weapons Safety Committee file?  
---Was it addressed, Dear Ernest, or Dear Bill. I am sorry I - - -

Dear Ernest?---Okay.

From Bill?---Right.

Incidentally did, were there any - - -?---I would have to agree with the double.

Did you get any Dear Don letters from Bill?---No. Bill and I did not know one another as well as that. - - -

All right. Well, Ernest's letter said this:

Your letter of 29 July has crossed with mine of 31st. The conditions affecting publication of Marston's paper . . . . . getting the alarmists' passages removed.

Were you aware of - I think you were asked earlier by counsel whether you were aware of attempts to excise portions of the Marstons paper prior to study. Does that cause you to have any doubts about whether there was at least an exercise being attempted?---I have not any doubts that there was an attempt to ensure that the scientific conclusions were soundly based. I certainly did not see the Dear Ernest from Bill letter.

Do you think you should have?---Well, I do not think so.

Tell me, how did, how did the committee operate. Was there a good deal of activity on the committee that was simply dealt with by Sir Ernest or Professor Titterton as he then was which would not come to committee members?---I think all matters which involve a committee decision were discussed in committee. I would think it is possible that Sir Ernest Titterton has discussions with people

in the UK Atomic Weapons Research Establishment on matters of particular areas, of particular area of expertise, just the same way as no doubt Mr Dwyer as Commonwealth Director of Bureau of Meteorology had discussions with opposite numbers just the same way, in meteorological matters, just the same way I had discussions with people from AWRE in the instrumentation radiation and health matters and in that sort of context I do recall without knowing any detail that I visited AWRE on one occasion and I did not go anywhere near people such as Sir William Penney. My visit was to see the people in the health physics area.

Tell me, was it common, on the Atomic Weapons Test Committee, for there to be strongly divergent views and substantial argument and disagreement between members?---I think there were occasions when we substantially disagreed and these things, like all committees, particularly small committee, were finally thrashed out.

Would you say that you all appeared to have equal significance in decisions being reached on the committee?---I think the ultimate decisions were committee decisions.

So that the committee would stand by any of the decisions - the committee members would stand by any of the decisions made by the committee at which they were present?---I think this is fair comment. I think the committee members accepted their responsibility as a member of the committee, and if they did not disagree and have it recorded then they agreed with the decision.

Yes.

I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr McIntyre?

MR McINTYRE: Dr Stevens?---Mr Stevens.

I am sorry: Mr Stevens?---I am not a surgeon.

I think you were asked a question in relation to long-range fallout when reference was made to the table on page 41 of AIRAC 9 entitled "Table 12.2, Population Dose Commitment from Strontium 90 and Caesium 137" and I think I recall the question put - you were asked why AIRAC relied upon estimates and not actual estimates. Do you recall that?---Yes, I recall the question.

Is it the case - and correct me if I am wrong - that a large proportion of the Strontium 90 and Caesium 137 on continent of Australia would in fact have come from overseas nuclear tests? Is that a matter about which you are aware or not?---I certainly would agree with the proposition you are putting that it was necessary to make estimates of dose commitment due to Strontium 90 and Caesium 137 due to nuclear tests in Australia because a significant - I am sorry, I do not like the word "significant"; a major point - part of the Strontium 90/Caesium 137 in the Australian environment, putting it in the broadest terms, would be due to global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the atmosphere outside Australia.

And is the fallout from Strontium 90 and Caesium 137 of a long nature - that is, a long half life?---Oh, yes. The Strontium 90/Caesium 137, without putting an exact figure on it, which makes my memory tick over, half life of those two radio nuclei is approximately 30 years.

If there had been nuclear tests carried out in the world atmosphere for some years before, the effects of those tests, as far as the deposition of Strontium 90 and Caesium 137 would be fairly - would last for quite a while?---What fraction - if those tests were carried out in the northern hemisphere, what fraction of the Strontium 90 or Caesium 137 which went into the troposphere, . . . or the stratosphere, reaching Australia would depend on the yield of those weapons and so on.

In summary, it was necessary for AIRAC 9 to make those estimates because they could not distinguish between that proportion of the long-term fallout, in terms of Strontium 90 and Caesium 137, which would have come from the Australian tests and that which would have come from the overseas tests?---The Strontium 90 released, or the Caesium 137 released, has not got a tag on it which says, "I am from such-and-such a test," no.

Now, reference has been made to Mr Turner's reports. Do you recall whether or not reports from Mr Turner, copies of which went to AWRE, in fact went to the Commonwealth Radiation Laboratory in addition, by way of information copies?---I think - my memory on this would be along these lines: to answer your question the simple way would be to say yes, they came to AW - sorry: Commonwealth X-Ray and Radium Laboratory, then I would have to quickly say they did not come to the Commonwealth X-Ray and Radium Laboratory as official communications . . . . . Laboratory because they would have gone to a specially-designated officer who had a particular role to play, and that was Mr Richardson, Turner being, in essence, responsible to Richardson.

Well, did it have the effect of keeping the laboratory aware of what was occurring on the range?---To a degree because, although Richardson was an officer of the laboratory, he would bring things to my attention officially if necessary.

Coming to the function of the Test Safety Committee at Maralinga for the major trials, do you ever recall any occasion when the committee advised the British authorities that conditions for firing were unsatisfactory, to your recollection?---I think I tried



to cover that in a general way in the statement which counsel assisting referred to. I could not identify particular occasions. There certainly were occasions when it was very - very quickly a consensus was reached between British authorities and the AWTSC that the meteorological pattern was just not acceptable.

Were there ever any occasions that you can recall when the views of the test safety committee differed from that of the British authorities in considering the same question?---I could not recall any. I think we generally came to a consensus reasonably - - -

Do you ever recall in relation to the Minor trials when the committee was assessing whether or not they carried with them, say, firing criteria, any change in the firing conditions being originally proposed by the British, ie, the test safety committee requiring the British to change their firing criteria?---No, I could not recall any detail of that sort.

A couple of further things before I finish: you said on Monday that blood testing showed itself to be a waste of time. What was the reason for that? ---I do not know that I said showed itself to be a waste of time, but in particular circumstances I think I probably said that the consensus reached world wide that blood counting - and this is a . . . . . blood counts - was of little value in assessing the suitability of a person to engage specifically in radiation work, although it might be - I think I put this point in today - and a very appropriate, and indeed medical people advise me that it is an essential part of every occupational health pre-medical examination.

Reference has been made by my learned friend, Mr James, asking you about the criteria to safe firing to problems with ground sampling. Were you aware of any particular problems that were in existence during Buffalo or Antler in relation to the functioning of the sampling equipment in the Australian continent?---I am sorry, could I just - - -

I will try it again. Reference is made to the question of whether there was any problems with ground sampling of the fallout cloud in Australia. Do you recall in 1956 or 1957 whether there were any specific problems in relation to the functioning or the operation of the equipments used for ground sampling, ie sticky paper or other - - -?---In my statement which counsel led me through I certainly made reference to two problems. One was the air samples in relation to the foot as being clogged with dust and therefore not ensuring a stand - I think I used the words standard

throughput. They were designed hopefully to have a standard volume we would know. And, secondly, with regard to sticky papers I did refer to the fact that under, I think I used the words, heavy continuous rain, there would be some loss of material.

Do you have any recollection as to whether that was a particularly significant problem, that is the effect of rain upon the sticky paper?---Well, we did recognize the fact there would be loss. I think I indicated to counsel that this was probably not of such a major concern because in doing what we decided we had to do with the calculated radiation dose, in those calculations we did not take account of correction factors which would have reduced the dose calculation - the actual dose calculated - from a given deposit. I believe on reflection that that calculation to take account of the, let me call it, wash-off, did try to use a factor to compensate for the wash-off. Because not only were the sticky papers come to us for measurement, but most of those - almost the whole lot of those sticky papers - were taken at meteorological stations or meteorological sub-stations, and we were provided with not only the period of exposure, which was a set period, but also the measured rainfall at those stations. So some attempt was made to make a correction for that.

With regard to the measurements of rainfall from these meteorological sub-stations, can you recall whether there was any identifiable percentage of papers that were subject to this problem, or was it something that you could not really gauge?---Well, I certainly could not remember a percentage of what number would be involved. But there were records of the rainfall which occurred during the period of sampling.

Was it a cause of any major concern at the time when you were monitoring these - or reading these papers as they came in?---Only it served to highlight for the committee that there were shortcomings, and these methods of fallout sampling which had been introduced in 1956 and used in 1957, and as I said in my statement, I think, that this had prompted the committee to think about the need for improving fallout monitoring procedures.

Do you think that in the end that it would have made any significant difference to the plotted path of the cloud and the records which were compiled indicating the amount of fallout from the cloud?---It certainly, I do not think, made any significant difference to the plotted path of the cloud. It may have made a small difference, either up or down, because of the correction factors involved of the calculated dose - the doses calculated from the measurement of the fallout deposit.

Yes, thank you.

MRS FINCH: Mr Stevens, were you aware of any problems with the sticky papers in the heat?---Commissioner, no, I was not aware of that.

It was never suggested that sticky papers might lose some of their stickiness when exposed to the sun for several hours?---No, I was not aware of that problem, commissioner.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr McClellan?

MR McCLELLAN: It would be logical that that would be the case though, would it not?---Well, it might be, yes. It depends on the construction of - - -

By the way, that raises the question did you ever go and talk to the men in the field who were using the stick paper devices?---I did not go in the field.

Do you know whether anyone in charge of the operation would have done so, the . . . . .?---Well, the secretary of the AWTSC at some time may have had discussions.---I think we expected, and I have no doubt we did receive - when I say "we" I am talking generally of AWTSC - receive information from these various meteorological stations and sub-stations about performance and problems they had.

Mr Stevens, since Monday I can inform you that we have now been able to find a copy of the missing minutes, being the minutes of the tenth meeting of the Atomic Weapons Safety Committee, and they being, gentlemen, I am glad to say, they are classified. Can I raise with you, firstly I think one matter, unrelated to what we were talking about on Monday, that this meeting which was held on 28 July 1956, and you were a member - - -?---A new boy, yes.

Well, and you were present, dealt with one matter of interest perhaps under the heading "Indocrination of the Public". Now, what do you understand by the meaning of the word, "indoctrination"?---If I had been writing that I would not have used the word indoctrination, I would have used the word, "informing", and I think that is what was meant.

Do you?---Yes.

The heading is, "Indoctrination of the Public", is it not?---Yes, I agree.

And reference to one dictionary - I am not sure which - or how authoritative it is, suggests that the word "indoctrination" means instruct in doctrine?  
---I would not disagree with that possibility.

The minute goes on to say, "The chairman stated the minister proposed to ask Sir William Penney to speak over the Australian radio network as part of the indoctrination of the public." Now, does that accord with what you recall was a concern of the committee at that time - to indoctrinate the public?---I do not believe it was intended to indoctrinate the public, but rather to inform the public.

Well, the word has been used twice, so far, has it not?  
---Yes. Once in a heading and once in a sentence.

Right - and it also requests - - -

THE PRESIDENT: And again further down - - -

MR McCLELLAN: Yes, well, I will come to that - and it also requested Professor Martin to make a broadcast on a special weekly feature programme. The chairman further stated that, "he would submit any such talk for approval by the committee before he spoke over the radio network." Do you know why it was thought necessary for the chairman to submit any talk for approval by the committee?  
---I suppose he was going to call on his committee members to vet his proposed talk so that he would not have any errors of fact or - - -

Could it be to make sure he got the story right?---The story in the sense of the scientific story but not in the sense of indoctrination - I would rather say providing sound information.

Well, then, can you explain to me why yet again in the next paragraph it is said, "The members appreciated the need for indoctrination of the public." What was the need for indoctrination of the public?---I find no difficulty in understanding that sentence. If I could be permitted - - -

Sure?---For replacing indoctrination by the need for informing the public.

Well, I would assume it would be correct to say that Mr Carter and indeed, Professor Martin, were careful men, were they not?---Professor Martin, of course, was extremely experienced in writing and so on. Mr Carter I do not know his background. He was an acting secretary at the time. I do not know how long he acted.

THE PRESIDENT: Was he addicted to Orwellian language?---  
Excuse me, your Honour - which, Sir Leslie Martin or  
- - -

Yes, or either of them, or any members of the committee?---Oh,  
I do not think so.

MR McCLELLAN: And, of course, these minutes are - the practice,  
I am sorry, of the committee, was to read these minutes  
and confirm them at the following meeting, was it not?---  
Yes.

So, we can assume, can we not, that you at the next meeting -  
I will just make sure that you were present, yes -  
joined in the decision to confirm the minutes of the  
tenth meeting?---Yes, and I - - -

So, at the time you accepted the committee had made a decision  
but it was appropriate for there to be undertaken a  
programme by which the public could be indoctrinated?---  
I agree, except on the - except in the - perhaps a  
misunderstanding or non-appreciation that to me the  
intention was to inform.

Well, can you tell me this, then? ...What was it intended to  
inform the public about? The public knew that tests  
were going to take place, did they not?---Yes. Well,  
I - yes, well, they had taken place.

And why was it thought necessary that a man of the standing of  
Professor Martin should embark upon an organised and  
approved programme of delivering lectures to the public?  
---I think there is probably some misunderstandings about  
how radioactive material was transported by prevailing  
winds, how there is - and there still is - a misunderstanding  
between radioactivity on the one hand, radioactive  
contamination, radioactivity, and radiation dose on the  
other. I think there probably was a feeling - and I am  
only taking myself back 28 years - that the view, that  
what the committee was measuring was measuring fall-out  
deposit and what it was able to derive from that was  
radiation dose and one made assessment of any possible  
detriment to health through radiation dose.

It is clear, is it not - perhaps your memory has been jogged by  
this minute - that there was significant public concern  
as to whether or not the British would be allowed to test  
in Australia at the time?---Well, I am sure there was some  
concern. I do not know whether I could be able to agree  
or deny that significant - - -

We have heard, in fact, of organised groups of people getting - or  
moving towards Maralinga - for the purpose of demonstrating  
their opposition to what was proposed. We have heard  
that they in fact got as far as Ceduna. Had you heard  
of that?---I do not recall it, no.

You do not recall it. It is reasonable to infer, is it not, that  
the decision by the committee that it was necessary to  
embark upon a programme of indoctrination might have been

designed to endeavour to quell the concerns that had been expressed about the proposal?---I think the aim would have been to inform the public about the tests. I do not know if it was directed specific to what you suggest.

And you would recall, would you not, that in the 50s, the word "indoctrination" or "to indoctrinate" was a concept which was often talked about in a political context, was not it?---I do not know whether I knew it in 1950 but I know what the word indoctrinate means, to teach.

Well, I am younger than you, but is it not correct that in the 50s there was great debate about whether or not the various communist countries were indulging in indoctrination of their own populations?---Yes.

So that anyone using the word "indoctrinate" in a minute in 1956 could not have, but had in mind the current use of that word in relation to instruction of large groups of people; would not that be right?---I am not certain that I would believe that the intent of the use of the word was to inform.

Sir, I suggest to you the intent of the use of the word in this minute was quite clear, and that was to persuade the Australian public that these tests were an acceptable enterprise to be conducted in Australia; that is so, is not it?---I cannot comment on that really, I do not know what the intent - other than my belief it was to inform.

I suggest to you that in fact this minute reveals that your committee was prepared to play a part in that programme of instruction of the Australian public; is that not so?---I cannot recall the discussion and I cannot agree with that.

One further matter that I should put to you in relation to it - well, to the minute - is that it would appear - and I should give you the opportunity of looking at it - the question of the safety of aborigines was not dealt with, at least in the record of that meeting?---Well, it is not in the heading, is it?

Well, take your time, because it is a matter of, I suggest to you, great significance?---No, I see no reference to aborigines in that minute.

All right. Look at me if you would then - with what is the agenda to that meeting. The agenda is for the meeting to be held on 28 July 1956, and by the way, you see item 4 there picks up the same or has the short title "indoctrination of the public"?---Yes, I see that.

Which obviously was considered and carried through into that minute that we have just looked at. Also it is clear that there is to be a discussion, so it is said, of Buffalo trials - this is item 2B2, safety of aborigines?---Yes.

Now, it was obviously proposed to discuss it, but there is no record in the minutes of it ever being discussed, is there?---Not in the minutes, no.

And this was the question, you recall, that I took you through the other day in the earlier minutes where this matter of concern, having regard to an AWRE report as to the affect upon the aboriginal population, was raised and the committee decided that it was something that needed to be looked at; you recall that, do not you?---Yes, I do.

Now, in the - we have now got hold of the copy of the tenth - minutes of the 10th meeting by which time you were a member. Can you tell me whether your committee ever thereafter considered and made a decision in relation to the criteria which would be applied to the tests having regard to the likely safety of aborigines?---I believe the committee did consider that matter and I believe that the AWTSC did recommend that there should be some lowering of the levels of deep - radioactive deposits and therefore ~~therefore~~ the radiation dose potentially received by aborigines because, as I said the other day, of their living conditions. And I think there was a factor of something like .3, a third to start with because of that factor, and I think subsequently there was another factor of 2 introduced - reduction factor in both cases.

I think I asked you the other day, but I would like you to help me again, if you would. We talked about the minutes - where is my copy, have you got my copy of that? Now, I asked you the other day what you would describe as a nominal burst, and I wonder if - and I think you have described it, but I do not know that we described as kilotons. Can you tell me what you would describe as a nominal burst by reference to a kiloton yield?---Yes, you did ask me the question, I think I said: first it would be - there is used - the term used was to equate the yield to that of the bomb that dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and I think - I hope I went on to say that they were about 20 kilotons, in fact - - -

About - - -?---Sorry.

- - - 20. So, would a 15 kiloton explosion be a nominal burst from your point of view?---Well, one equates them to

the Japanese explosions. In fact, 15 is a pretty close approximation as from what my scientific reading is to what the yield was in those weapons, it was possibly closer to 15 than 20.

Well, 15 is a nominal one, is it?---Yes, I would regard it as nominal.

What about 25?---I think it is approximating to nominal. It is a question of what you take as nominal - 20 - - -

Well, that is what I am trying to find out from you too?---Well, I think the figure being taken would be probably 20, when someone wrote nominal 20 kilotons and therefore I think 20 plus or minus 5 kilotons would be regarded as being nominal.

You indicated to me the other day, however, that a relatively small atomic device would be less than a nominal - - -?  
---Yes.

- - - explosion. Now, I take it therefore that a 15 kilotons explosion would not be a relatively small atomic device?---No; I would be thinking in terms of something less than 10 - - -

Something less than 10?---Kilotons, yes.



So, we can - so, on that basis a 15 kiloton explosion, a 10 kiloton explosion, and certainly a 25 kiloton explosion, would not comply with the description of relatively small atomic devices?---If you use the word, a value of 10, I would call that probably small. Fifteen through to 25 would probably fall in the range of nominal yield.

Well, do you know whether or not before the One Tree explosion, which is recorded as a 15 kiloton explosion, a decision had been made as to whether or not it was safe, having regard to the interests of aborigines, to let off a nominal nuclear device?---I think I believe so, yes. Sorry, before?

Before One Tree was let off - that is the first buffalo explosion - - -?---Yes.

In September 1956?---Yes.

You see, and we have this - I will remind you of this context again. We have this minute of the tenth meeting which occurred on 28 July?---Yes.

And we have no record of any decision being taken with respect to this problem of aborigines, and as I put to you the other day, I cannot find it elsewhere either?  
---Welly--Ee--

What I am asking you, see, is whether or not by the time this, what you have described as this nominal explosion occurred, the problem which had been raised and discussed as a serious problem, had in fact been resolved?---One could not say, yes, to your question without qualifying it by saying, subject to the - except all meteorological conditions.

Well, you would agree with me, would you not, that - and if you would like to have a look at the minutes again, please do; but the problem which had been raised in the minutes of the seventh meeting, and I think it was the minute of the fifth meeting, certainly the seventh meeting, it was a very serious problem?---It was a matter if it was being addressed, and causing concern, yes.

A matter of serious concern?---H'm, h'm.

Is that right?---Yes.

And you would expect, would you not, that if a decision had been made in relation to it, that such a decision would have been recorded in the minutes of the committee?---Yes, I presume so, yes.

And you would also have expected that such a decision would have been made before a device in the nominal yield class was ignited, would you not?---Yes.

So you would have expected to find before 27 September 1956, in a minute somewhere, a record of the fact that the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee had determined that a blast with a nominal yield was safe to fire?---Under appropriate meteorological conditions at the time of firing, yes.

Leaving aside any question of appropriate meteorological conditions, the minutes here clearly say that having regard to the information available, only a relative minor explosion would be possible, do they not?---Yes.

Well, that is irrespective of meteorological conditions. The minutes say, "only relative minor"?---Yes, I think one would have to take into account the unwritten words that the safety committee was not going to approve of firing conditions unless the meteorological circumstances were satisfactory.

Could it be, sir, that this problem proved too difficult for the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee?---I do not think it proved too difficult, no.

Well, then, can you offer me any explanation as to why the problem, having appeared in the agenda for the tenth meeting, does not appear as having been discussed in the minutes of that meeting?---Well, the only thing I could say, whether it was discussed at that meeting I do not know, I cannot recall. I do not know that any - - -

But it would be an omission of enormous proportions, would it not, if it had been discussed at that meeting and not put into the minutes?---I agree, if it was discussed. I am not certain that it was discussed, sir.

But if it was on the agenda, you would also expect it to have been discussed even if it was merely deferred to another meeting; would you not?---Well, yes. In those circumstances, yes.

So we are left, are we not, with a matter of very grave concern. We have the problem raised. We have the agenda which says it is going to be discussed, and then silence; do we not?---Well, I have not been through the minutes - - -

No, just at that meeting?---At that meeting, yes. . . .

At that meeting, we have it on the agenda for that meeting. We have the concern raised twice in the earlier minutes with projections made in relation to it, and then we have a complete silence in the minute of that meeting, do we not?---I would agree with you that the minutes, if it was not discussed, and I can only assume it was not discussed - if it was not discussed then the minutes would be more appropriately written that item, whatever it is, 2 sub-section so-and-so, was deferred.

Deferred?---Yes.

We do not even find that, do we?---No, I agree that it is not there.

Well, then, you offer me any explanation as to why this chain of events is revealed by the documents?---No, I cannot.

Please, I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Stevens, would you not agree that to literate people, indoctrination is a term associated with totalitarian regimes?---It has been a common usage, your Honour, yes.

And that to such literate people it means conditioning the public, often by false propaganda, to believe what the government wants it to believe?---That certainly - taking the word literally, it means that I believe.

Well, did any members of the safety committee have that attitude to the public or to the government?---I do not believe so, your Honour. I believe that the members of the committee were, as I knew them, and that was referred to in the - and I use the term, before I was a new boy, and did not really know some of those members well at the time, that they were being responsible people and they felt that they would be serving the Australian public to inform them, and I certainly do not recall the discussion. I believe that I would not have used the word indoctrinate. I would use the word inform, because that I believe would have been the intent.

All right. Thank you, Mr Stevens. You are excused from further attendance.

THE WITNESS WITHDREW

MR McCLELLAN: Your Honour, I should tender a file which comprises the minutes of the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee and they are, for the record, file number R57/6/6 part 1; part 2 of the same file; part 3 of the same file; part 4; part 5 and a file which is marked R57/6/6 part 0. So that there are six files in all.

THE PRESIDENT: What are these files, Mr McClellan?

MR McCLELLAN: These are the minutes of the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee. Your Honour, I am tendering them in a form which includes still the classified material. The classified material has all been placed inside manila envelopes and marked as such. Some of the material is US classified material and my expectation is that whatever steps might be taken and whoever might, in the near future, become a party to these proceedings, it is most unlikely we will persuade the United States authorities to declassify those documents.

Can I indicate that I will have inserted into the file the minutes of the 10th meeting in their appropriate context - - -

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR McCLELLAN: So that the file to that extent is complete. Now there are indications given in the file that the minutes of the - sorry, it is the 15th - no, I will take the matter up with my friend. There are indications in the file there are at least two of the meetings - or for two of the meetings there is no record of any minutes at all and I assume that means that a search has been made and they cannot be found. I will take up with my friend the question of whether or not further searches can be made.

MR McINTYRE: Yes, well, I have searched for the 10th - the minutes of the 10th meeting and found those but I have not had time to search for the others.

MR McCLELLAN: No.

MR McINTYRE: I will certainly do it this evening.

THE PRESIDENT: All right. Now, what is the status of these documents seeing that they can still contain classified material? Does that mean that the other gentlemen at the bar table cannot inspect them?

MR McCLELLAN: They cannot inspect those documents, your Honour. What was done overnight was that the copy that I worked from on Monday was a photocopy of those files and was made available minus the classified material and until such time as it is declassified that is - - -

THE PRESIDENT: If the classified material were removed, would not get over the difficulties of inspection?

MR McCLELLAN: Well, that is what was done with the photocopies, your Honour. That is the way we did it.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

MR McCLELLAN: Well, we could take them off those files. I think it would be preferable not to.

THE PRESIDENT: Anyhow, I do not hear any complaints from the bar table so I suppose you could - - -

MR EAMES: . . . . . your Honour.

MR McINTYRE: Perhaps I could . . . . . They obviously are very important documents. If we could have access to them in Sydney to photocopy the unclassified portions. I think perhaps it is pretty important. I simply would like to have a set myself.

MR McCLELLAN: I think that should be done, yes. Yes, the logistics of the thing up to here were beyond us but yes, that should be done.

I wonder if I could have my set back before they get lost. They could be marked RC131. You can just give those to Mr Colefax. I am sure . . . . .

Your Honour, I should also indicate, for the record, I cannot - I am not quite sure what I can do with them. They are United Kingdom documents so I suppose I really cannot even mention it, but in the earlier - - -

mk THE PRESIDENT: How do you come by it?

MR McCLELLAN: Oh, I am not going to reveal that, your Honour. You will get me into all sorts of strife. But in the minutes that I was putting to Mr Stevens dealing with this question of the safety of Aborigines on Monday, there was a reference to an AWRE document which is the document I have in my hand. It is entitled in an informative way: Report No O-41/55. But it happens to deal with safety levels for contamination from fall out from atomic weapons trials. I say that again - safety levels for contamination from fall out from atomic weapons trials. Now the minutes of the meeting refer to - and it is the minute of the sixth meeting - refer to that report and an appendix A to that report, which is said to have raised the concerns which led to the further discussion.

Now the copy which I have come by of the copy of that report does not contain an appendix A, and I have asked that the Commonwealth search to see whether or not appendix A is available. It is summarised in the minute of the meeting by saying that this appendix contains an analysis which indicates that the permissible levels of contamination are reduced by a factor of about five in the case of tribal natives which means for a nominal burst, in that material. So that is supposed to be in the appendix which is summarised in the minute, but unfortunately the copy which I have of the report, does not have the appendix attached to it.

I had asked, as I say, that that might be available. I understand that there is some further or impending likelihood of the British becoming involved actively in these proceedings and we might ask of them if they have a copy, in due course, also. I call - - -

MR McINTYRE: Just before my friend calls the next witness, there is one matter which I should attend to before we leave . . . . . forget it entirely. It concerns the production of documents. It does not - . . . . . the status of the problem in Brisbane, your Honour, but I do produce the response to the summons on the Commonwealth to produce documents relating to common law actions, a number of documents which I have indicated . . . . . much interest in the . . . . . in fact relating to compensation claims and their records of documents held by the delegates for the compensation commission, they are produced in response to that summons.

. . . . . Privileged or unprivileged?

MR McINTYRE: Unprivileged. The only documents in relation to which I would produce, not pursuant to the summons, but to the commission for its assistance, in fact, are a summary of an appeal by a Mr - a widow of a Mr Busby - and some notes of an interview of a witness in relation to the Johnson case, your Honour, but I produce those those with the normal rider attached. . . . . would not like to see these letters . . . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr McClellan, are you calling a witness?

MR McCLELLAN: Yes, I am, your Honour. I call Mr Ronan. Mr Ronan? Would you come forward.

JOSEPH FRANCIS RONAN, sworn:

THE PRESIDENT: Sit down, Mr Ronan. Keep your voice up.

MR McCLELLAN: Would you sit down, sir?---I am a bit hard of hearing.

Are you indeed? Can you hear me now?---Yes.

Sir, your full name is John Francis Ronan?---Joseph Francis.

Sorry, Joseph Francis Ronan? Is that correct? Of Longwood Road, Locksley in Victoria?---That is so.

You have made a statement in relation to the matters of concern to the commission, is that so?---That is so.

And you have a copy of the statement there?---Yes.

I tender the statement, it can be marked exhibit RC132.

In the statement, sir, you indicate that you joined the RAAF on 26 July 1949?---That is correct.

~~And you were discharged medically unfit on 10 February 1968?~~

Is that so? In January of 1957 you were transferred to Edinburgh in South Australia and from there to Maralinga where you remained until November of 1957? Is that right? You had various duties at Maralinga and indeed, up to the time of the first explosion you worked as a mechanic in the general workshop?---That is true.

You have described in your statement the nature of the duties that you undertook and also the nature of your observations of particular explosions? ---That is true.

Is that so? So I can take you then to paragraph 18, where you there say that on numerous occasions you went into the area forward of Roadside to repair or bring back vehicles which had been damaged or broken down. You say that you were never given any protective clothing nor were you ever tested for radiation?---That is correct.

Now the vehicles that you were required to bring back, were they painted any particular colour - - -?---Oh, usually - - -

Or did they have any particular identification on them?  
---Oh, usually green.

Usually green?---Green, that is right.

Were any of them painted red?---Oh, the only red vehicles that was involved that I was involved with, were fire tenders.

Any of them painted yellow?---Ah - this one I have got to think - no. No.

In paragraph 20 you say you remember on one occasion driving back towards Maralinga after one of the trigger tests when you saw a dingo about a quarter of a mile from the road?---Yes.

It looked very sick and was walking very slowly with its head down?---Correct.

It seemed to you that its fur was hanging in great folds and flaps down beneath its stomach?---That is true. As if its fur had literally been peeled back from its stomach.

You say about the same time one of the other men in the truck said he could see some Aboriginees in the distance?---True.

Now do you recall the name of that man?---Oh, no, no hope.

No hope? And did you sort of bring the truck to a screaming halt to have a look?---Not being the driver, of course, that was up to the driver, and he done just that.

He did?---Looked around.

He turned around?---Just to look around.

Just to look around. Well, did you all get out and investigate or what?---No.

Why not?---Well, under instructions it is that you do not interfere with anything you see. Just report it.

And did you report it?---Yes, this was reported by our crew commander, at - I think it was at the village that he reported that to the security officer  
- - -

Do you know the name of the person it was reported to?  
---Oh, no. No.



You do not remember?---No.

Mmm?---Have not seen him since.

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J.F. RONAN

And when you say this man saw aborigines in the distance,  
how far in the distance, do you recall?---That would  
be quite a long way off - - -

What, a mile or 10 miles?---Well, maybe a kilometre away.

A kilometre away?---Anybody who could see further than that  
is pretty good.

Are they? You say you do not know if they sent out any  
search parties for the aborigines?---No.

Was there another occasion you were bushwalking . . . . .  
. . . . . when you came across a party of about  
20 aborigines also working in the bush?---That is  
true.

Now, do you recall when about this would have been?---Oh,  
around about June, I think.

June of 1957?---June of 1957.

And you say they looked like mission aborigines because - - -?  
---That was--we were in a slack period then and  
Sunday was usually our day off, and you know, something  
to do, dress up and go for a walk somewhere.

I see. - And you say you saw them about 25 miles southwest  
of Maralinga and quite close to - - -?---That would  
have been quite close to the railway, I think, at  
the time.

Now, you say the last test, you were told, was to be a test  
for the trigger mechanism for a hydrogen bomb?  
---That is true. This is on one of the trigger  
tests.

One of the trigger tests. Who told you that it was going to  
be a trigger test for the hydrogen bomb?---Yes, well,  
this was explained to us. This was explained to us  
prior to the test taking place. Now, this is just  
general scuttlebutt I could not say with any sort of - - -

It was no one in command who told you this, was it?---That is  
right. General talk around the crews, but we were  
informed that it was going to be a big bigger.

Going to be a big bigger?---That is right.

I think you would tell us of your experience when you would  
confirm. I think, that it was a big bigger, would you?  
---Well, after picking myself up about 200 yards away,  
it was.

Well, you described what happened. You say you were told by one of the it was going to be a much bigger explosion so you would have to cover your ears?---That is true.

It was conducted in a special area which was much wider and more open than the previous tests. Tell me what was your hearing like in those days?---My hearing then was hair-trigger.

Fairly good, was it?---Pretty good.

Did it deteriorate at the time of - - -?---Oh, yes. I have definitely got troubles with the left ear.

Yes; but this has been a recent - - -?---Not so much though that I cannot hear but sound has a habit of gelling on me.

Gelling on you, does it? You say it was conducted in a special area which was much wider and more open than the previous tests. Yourself and the crew from the two fire tenders were standing beside your vehicles. About 300 - 400 yards from where the bomb was due to go off?---That is true.

You have been told it would explode at 5 pm, and you were standing around waiting to be given an order to take cover when suddenly, you say, there was a colossal explosion, and you were actually blown a considerable distance from your vehicle. You mean by that you were literally picked up and hurled through the air, were you?---Literally hurled around. Having served in the RAF and during the war and having had quite a few of these go off quite near us, yes, it was big.

It was a big bang, was it?---It was a big bang.

How far were you thrown?---Well, I think, roughly about 150 to 200 yards. Quite a fair - - -

I see; and where did you come to rest?---I might add on that particular one, one of my interests, being a fitter, on the crew was to be concerned about two KVAs which were over on the left-hand side and those two KVAs had a number of fuel drums which were, most, they were diesel fuel drums and there was quite a stack of them, and of course that is the biggest concern, that is why we were - our tender was so near them.

Well, you say - when you regained consciousness, do you infer - do I infer that you were in fact knocked unconscious by this event were you?---Stunned.

Stunned?---Yes.

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J.F. RONAN

You say there were scientists running from the XA building towards you and you recall that vegetation for as far as you could see was smouldering and burning?  
---That is true.

And I assume, in a very polite way the scientists apologised and said the bomb had gone off prematurely, did they?---Probably told me not to wait around any longer.

Well, then you describe the film badge which you wore at Maralinga and you also described certain medical symptoms that you have had since about December of 1957. Apart from your hearing, how is your general health these days?---General health, very bad.

Very bad is it?---Very bad. In fact, I can no longer work effectively.

You can no longer work effectively?---That is right. As a matter of fact they have put me off totally now as unemployable.

Unemployable?---Correct.

And does ~~paragraph 24 of your statement actually record the~~ symptoms which you currently have?---Yes, that is right.

It does, does it?---Yes.

Thank you, Mr Ronan.

MR JAMES: Were there many other film badges in the bin?---Sorry?

Were there many other film badges in the bin?---Oh, there was a great stack of them.

Did you see any list of any kind in which peoples' names were ticked off at the time when you were leaving?---The only list that I remember was that when we handed in our special security pass and our badge together and he just took them - he checked our names off on what appeared to be a check list and all he done with those badges was to throw them away in the bin with the rest.

I have nothing further for this witness.

MR COLLETT: Thank you, sir.

Mr Ronan, do I take it that the journey when you saw the dingo was the same journey when your friend saw the aborigines; or were they - - -?---Same one.

Same one; and can you put a date on that now?---Oh, let me see. I think we had done two small trigger tests and we were on the way back from the second... I think.

that - I think that must have been before the first blast.

The first of the 19 - - -?---First blast, so that would have made it about March. I think the first one went off around about that time, or possibly a bit later. I cannot be accurate on that.

You are talking about the first atomic blast in 1957?---That is right, yes. It was just before then.

Well, when you say just before, a matter of weeks, or months? ---I would say, probably a couple of weeks.

Well, if the first atomic blast was on 14 September 1957 - - -? ---Sorry?

If I tell you that the first atomic blast was on 14 September 1957, does that help you to fix the date of this sighting?----No, no way.

But you think it was a couple of weeks or so before the blast? ---That is right.

Well, that would make it late August, early September; does that sound right to you?---Yes, it could be. I noticed the particular time was that the desert was much cooler at that particular time.

Much cooler was it?---Yes.

What time of the day?---Would be around about 4 o'clock.

Right. Now, do you remember the name of your mate in the fire truck who saw the aborigines?---Fortunately I have not seen any member since leaving Maralinga.

And were you involved in the report, or was that your mate who did that?---Just the crew commander done that.

If you turn to your right you will see a map of Maralinga - but do not get up, I will bring that closer to you. I will just ask you if that helps you to indicate where you saw it? Take your time, have a good look and see if that helps you fix a position?---Well, there is roadside, we were outside the roadside area, we were on the way back to the camp. It would have been a few kilometres away from roadside.

Now, you are in the camp area, which direction are you indicating?---I am coming back now, I presume this is back towards the village?

Yes, it is?---Yes.

There is the airstrip there?---That is right because one of my tests - it was involved with putting the caravan into the area and I had to go to a V junction up near the bomb blast, but if my memory serves me correctly it was a couple of kilometres from roadside.

And are you indicating a position a couple of kilometres south of roadside towards the Maralinga village?---Maralinga village.

On the main road?---On the main road, yes. We are on the good bitumen.

And you were heading back to the village, were you?---Yes.

And can you remember in which direction the aboriginal people were?---When indicated I did not - all I was saying was something about this area up here but I was the one who spotted the dingo over here.

Right; well, the dingo had - - -?---They were moving in this direction.

So the dingo was east of the main road back to Maralinga and the aborigines, you were told, were west of the main road?---That is right. And apparently all moving in the same direction.

And you told us about another occasion when you were bush walking west of the village and you saw some more aborigines?---That was on a Sunday.

It was on a Sunday and was that - was that before or after the day of the dingo?---Oh, that was very late; that was shortly before we packed up. We were just busy doing maintenance work before being withdrawn to our units.

And so, was that after the three atomic tests?---After - after all the explosions were over.

How long after?---Oh, I think - I think it must have been a late - late November because - because we had not much work on and it had to be maybe a week, maybe two before we packed up.

And were you bush walking on your own that day?---Oh, no, no. We usually - we usually went in parties.

Can you remember anybody else who was with you that day?---Oh, there was - let me see. Let me see if I can see - see my mates. Yes. I have got a few photographs.

~~You have got a list of your mates or photographs of your mates,~~ have you?---Yes, yes. Yeh, here it is.

Now you have produced a photograph which has three fellows apparently imbibing with the ---?---Most certainly, they are getting rid of that Maralinga dust.

Did the date 1957 age 33?---That is true.

Are you indicating that those are the blokes who were on the bush walk with you?---That is right. We - well we were the mates, we drank together all the time. One - one of them was a navy bloke, the other was a navy bloke and I was RAAF.

And by reference to that photograph, can you give me the names of those?---I would not have a clue. I only know that the bloke in the middle was called, bluey, if that is of any help.

Bluey. And that is all you know about the identities of your bush walking mates, is it?---That is right, that is right.

Incidentally, which one were you in that photograph?---I was the one on the - on the - on the left.

Right. And you say that these 20 aborigines you saw looked like mission aborigines?---That is right. They were dressed.

Dressed in western - -?---In western clothes.

In western clothes, were they?---That is right.

Did you have a chat with them?---No, no. No touch, no. No touch, keep walking, keep away.

Right. And which direction were they heading?---They were -

towards the railway.

Towards the railway?---So, they could possibly have been - must  
been - might - might have even gotten off a train.

You - you were north of the railway, at that time, yourself,  
Did they appear like they - did it appear as though  
were just out for a stroll or as though they were  
going to camp there?---Just - just - just out for  
a stroll. Just looking around - looking around.

Have - have any food with them or hunting implements, or anything  
like that?---Did not - did not appear to have anything  
with them, just other than - other than the two - their  
own two feet carrying them around like . . . . .

Right. Was there a siding near there. Was there a railway  
siding near there?---It could not have been too far  
away from Watson towards - towards - oh, gee, what is  
the name of the place. Station - station: Just up  
from - up from - up from Watson. I cannot remember  
the name.

What the first station east or west, can you remember?---Towards,  
towards - towards Perth.

Towards Perth, west of - the first station west of Watson. Now,  
did you report that sighting to anybody at Maralinga?  
---Oh, no, no.

Well, you reported the other one, or your mate reported the other  
one, is there any reason why you did not report the  
second sighting?---Well, the way - the way they were  
dressed they appeared to be a group that was in  
control of some - it was in somebody's control. There  
might even have been . . . . ., who knows?

I see. Yes, I have no further questions.

MR McINTYRE: How far were these aboriginals that you saw south  
west of Maralinga near the railway. How far from the  
railway were they?---Well they - I could not honestly  
say how close we were to the railway. We went - you  
know we were out just looking ourselves. I would  
imagine they would have been a couple of kilometres  
or so.

Away from the railway?---Away from the railway.

Coming back to the time you saw the dingo at Maralinga, did you -  
did you yourself see the aborigines in the distance or  
was that just what you were told by your mate?---No,  
no.

You said it was about two weeks before, I think you said, the  
explosion. Are you talking about one of the major  
tests or one of the trigger firings that you - - ?  
---No, we - we attended the triggers. It would have  
been before the major test.



And not before the . . . . . But you say you recall it was cold?---Sorry.

The weather - the weather was cold?---The weather was reasonably cool, that is right. It used to get ruddy hot in that desert . . . . .

Well, if the first explosion took place on September 14; that is the first atomic explosion, is it possible that the sighting of the dingo and the sighting of the aborigines by your mate, might have took place in about May of 1957?---Could have.

That is about five months before the first explosion?---Could - could have, that is right. Now we cannot be - we cannot be honestly too clear on this.

Well, finally, at the time that you were blown over?---Yes.

You were standing beside, I think, the . . . . . with the crew; the two fire tenders?---That is right, yes.

Were they blown across the ground, as well as you?---Sorry.

Were they blown over the ground as well as you?---Yes, yes. As a matter of fact one of ~~one of~~ the blokes, one of the - one of the navy blokes, he was blown right over a tender.

Was anybody hurt?---~~That is the theoretic part of it, we must~~ have been all made of elastic; we just got up and shook ourselves. To my knowledge, I am not aware that anybody suffered any real injury.

Well, were you surprised to be thrown 200 yards and not have any injury?---Er, well, it happened to me during the war and I was not - I was not supposed to have any - any problems out of that either.

And nobody had to seek any medical treatment?---That is right.

Yes, thank you, your Honour?---I would not be game.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Ronan, you are excused. You are excused from further attendance.

THE WITNESS WITHDRAW

MR McINTYRE: I call Mr Scott.

RONALD HUGH SCOTT, sworn:

THE PRESIDENT: Sit down, Mr Scott.

MR McCLELLAND: Your full name, I think, is Ronald Hugh Scott; you live at 4 Biambi Court, Grovedale, South Barwon in Victoria; is that correct?---That is correct, sir.

You have made a statement in relation to the matters before this Royal Commission. I tender the statement; it can be marked RC.133'.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you tendered Mr Raylen's statement?

MR McCLELLAND: You indicate, sir, in the statement that you are now aged 55 years of age and you joined the Navy in February 1945, the Royal Navy, as a petty officer/engineering mechanic - - -?---I retired - - -

Sorry?---I retired, as petty officer.

I am sorry, you retired as petty officer, yes, I am sorry. In 1956, leading mechanic engineering on the HMAS - HMS Diana which was a daring class destroyer, and in that ship you sailed from the United Kingdom to the Montebello Islands to participate in the Mosiac nuclear explosions; is that right?---Yes.

You describe in the statement what occurred and you indicate in paragraph 6 that for the first explosion you were some 40 to 50 miles seaward and to leeward of the explosion, the rest of the fleet was on the opposite side of the islands, to windward. Within an hour of the explosion you had gone to A, B, C stations - A, B, C stations being, what?---Atomic, meteorological and chemical warfare stations.

Which meant that you had all gone below deck?---Yes.

Right. Being below decks you do not exactly know what is going on but you subsequently discovered that have steamed for 16 to 18 hours in the cloud, deliberately, you presume to test the effectiveness of the A, B, C stations which you had all adopted?---Yes, that is so.

During the time you were in the cloud you say two of the ship's crew in your area were continually taking radiation readings on a geiger counter; you do not know what the readings were although they were recorded on paper. After that test you went to Singapore, before returning in time for the second. You followed the same procedure for the second test and this time you lay 80 to 100 miles to seaward and leeward of the explosion when it occurred. You again watched it from the upper deck and again within an hour or so you had gone to A, B, C stations and steamed in the cloud for some 16 to 18 hours.

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Again the interior of the ship was continually monitored for radiation and results were recorded. You say you were never issued with personal radiation monitoring devices, you were not tested for radiation and you indicate thereafter that you went on leave. At the present time your health is good, you do not suffer from any illnesses which you attribute to radiation . . . . .?---That is correct.

Thank you.

MR JAMES: Mr Scott, whereabouts did you steam to for the 16 to 18 hours after the first explosion; that is paragraph 6 of your statement?---Well, at the time of the explosion we were at sea, just steaming probably in circles at about 10 or 12 knots. We did observe the explosion and as the radioactive cloud came to seaward, that is when we battened down and we just steamed in the general area of it.

Right. But do you know what direction you steamed in so as to remain in the cloud for 16 to 18 hours?---Well, to the best of my knowledge it was to the west of the Montebello Islands.

Directly west?---Yes.

Now, on the second occasion, there is reference there to again 16 to 18 hours inside the cloud, steaming. This time you lay about 80 to 100 miles to seaward and leeward when the explosion occurred?---Yes.

I am a little lost about that. What does that mean? 80 miles west - 80 to 100 miles west of the Montebellos?---Yes, yes, to the west.

And then did you steam west again?---Well, we were laying to the west and again I have to suppose, as I did at the time, that we just circled around within the fallout area, which was to the west to the best of my knowledge.

So you were lead to believe at both of those explosions that the cloud path went directly west of Australia?---Yes.

Presumably and out towards the shipping lanes?---Yes.

I have nothing further . . . . .

MR COLLETT: No questions.

MR McINTYRE: No questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr McClelland?

MR McCLELLAND: No, your Honour.

THE PRESIDENT: You are excused. Thank you, Mr Scott.

THE WITNESS WITHDREW

THE PRESIDENT: Mr McClelland?

MR McCLELLAND: Your Honour, I have two further witnesses today and, having regard to the hour, can I see what happens? both Mr Dennis and Mr Killen; can my friends indicate require either of those two gentlemen to be called?

MR JAMES: Mr Dennis very shortly.

MR McINTYRE: Could I have a chance to . . . . .

MR McCLELLAND: Certainly. Well, Mr James, you have indicated you want Mr Dennis, do you?

MR JAMES: Very shortly.

MR McCLELLAND: Perhaps if we can call Mr Dennis at this stage?

ROBERT JOHN DENNIS, sworn:

THE PRESIDENT: Sit down, Mr Dennis.

MR McCLELLAND: Your full name is Robert John Dennis, is that correct?---That is right.

You live at 16 Gannet Street, Mt Eliza in Victoria?---That is right.

You have made a statement in relation to the matters before the Royal Commission?---I have. Can I just refer to that statement - - -

Well, I was going to ask you the next question: is the statement true and correct?---I do not think so, in respect of - - -

You do not think so. Can you tell me where it is not?---In paragraph 8.

Yes?---Having heard Mr Stevenson's prior evidence, after 28 years things have started to come back a little bit. I can remember instances, but the chronological order is very very bad. Also I think that the investigative journalist possibly put thoughts into my mind - - -

You would prefer to take that out, would you?---I feel that we had the safety committee on board, Professor Martin and Dr Eddy are two names that ring bells to me and I feel it was Dr Eddy that was sick.

He might have had pneumonia, I think, might he?---I do not know, all I know is he got very very ill.

Well, justifiably he died shortly thereafter?---And, also, I am not certain - I seem to recall that that happened, that

we took them back before the explosion, not after.  
I could not be too sure.

Right, so what, do you want -

MR JAMES: Perhaps it may assist - look, the witness seems to be indicating that the words after the word, were, in the fourth line of that paragraph perhaps should be deleted?---Yes.

MR McCLELLAND: Yes - - -

MR JAMES: I do not know what his symptoms were?---Symptoms were, yes.

MR McCLELLAND: Is that what you prefer?---That is right.

All right, we can take that out. Anything else?

MR JAMES: I should indicate at this point I have no further cross-examination of this witness?---The only other thing that I have noticed in here that I have signed - is paragraph 27, I was only off for about two days, not 1 fortnight, not two weeks.

MR McCLELLAND: You were off for two days, so we can record the fact that . . . . . paragraph 27, you indicate that the illness that you there refer to lasted for about two days, is that so?---Yes, that is right.

Otherwise the statement is true and correct?---That is right, yes.

I tender that statement, if your Honour pleases. It can be marked RC - I think it is 134?

THE PRESIDENT: 134, that is right.

MR McCLELLAND: I have no further questions.

MR COLLETT: Thank you, sir. Mr Dennis, can I just take you very briefly to paragraph 6 of your statement?---Yes.

Where you describe the cloud that you saw at the time of the second explosion?---Yes.

Now you said you had - in the last sentence there: I recall - I clearly recall seeing the cloud stretching towards the mainland from the islands?---Well to me it seemed to be stretching towards in the south, flattened out into a south - into a - going in a north easterly direction.

In a north easterly direction?---Yes, which would have been almost up the coastline.

Did you see across the mainland?---No, no, we were too far at sea to - - -

Yes, I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr McIntyre?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, your Honour. Who was the investigative journalist you mentioned?---His name was - a David Watson, from, I think it is the London Times.

I see?---He was out here earlier this year.

You mentioned that in the context of paragraph 8. Was there something that arose out of that conversation which you - - -?---Yes, well he was asking me various questions about it and I just mentioned that we carried - one of the things we did was carry a safety committee and someone was - appeared to be ill, or someone definitely was ill, and that was when he volunteered this information which was obviously erroneous.

I see?---Or, may not be erroneous, but it did not apply to who was carried on board . . . . .

Did he volunteer anything else?---No.no.

Paragraph 5, you talk about the practice to lower the boom and catch fish?---Yes.

Did that actually occur after the first explosion, do you recall?---To the best of my knowledge, yes.

Do you have a specific recollection of that?---I cannot put a date on it.

But do you have a specific recollection of catching fish, from the boom, whilst you were anchored off Trimouille Island? ---Yes, yes.

How long after the first explosion was that, do you recall? ---I do not know. I do not know.

Could it have been a matter of days, or weeks, or - - -? ---It would be weeks or - - -

Weeks?---Yes, it would not be much more than weeks - - -

Well, coming to the time you went ashore, you say you stole up to the crater to have a look. Was that after the second, or the first explosion?---It would be after the second explosion.

How long after the second explosion was it that you went and had a look?---This again, I could not be pinned down today, as my recollection of the chronological - trying to remember back 28 years.

How long after the second explosion do you recall your ship stayed in the area?---I would say up to - it would not be much more than a fortnight by the time we loaded and left, probably around about a week.

Were there any other ships in the area, at the time that you went ashore?---Yes, there were all the RN ships.

Royal Naval ships?---Royal Naval ships, yes.

Did you see any of their parties going ashore?---well, there was a Royal Navy party that was ashore, the Royal Marines  
. . . . .

What, and you went with that team?---I went with that team, yes.

I see. Did anybody else from your ship go ashore?---No.

Were they dressed in protective clothing?---No.

What ship did they come from, do you know?---HMS . . . . .  
. . . to the best of my knowledge.

Yes, thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr McClelland?

MR McCLELLAND: Thank you. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Dennis. You are excused.

THE WITNESS WITHDREW

MR McCLELLAND: Finally, Mr Hillam. What is the position, gentlemen? While my friends are - can I just put on to the record in relation to Mr Stevens who I have just had a discussion with. There is a note in the minute of the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee of its 14th meeting, held on 30 August 1956, of a discussion of report O-41/55, which is the report I referred to. In that minute it says, in the discussions which followed the committee agreed with the general basis of the report and accepted the levels of contamination discussed there as satisfactory for the protection of human beings and livestock. There is no - again no discussion, no suggestion of discussion in relation to the question of aborigines and the extent to which controls were necessary, but there is a further reference there to that report, which I think should go on the transcript and be acknowledged.

MR McCLELLAN: Sorry, you want Mr Hillam called?

MR JAMES: He is there.

MR McCLELLAN: Is he? Mr Hillam, yes, would you come forward sir, please. He was hoping you would not say that, Mr McIntyre.

ERIC JOHN HILLAM, sworn:

MR McCLELLAN: Sit down, sir. Your full name, I think, is Eric John Hillam?---That is correct.

Is that correct? You live at 21, is it Sasses Avenue, Bayswater?---Correct.

In Melbourne. You have made a statement in relation to matters within your knowledge of relevance to the Royal Commission. Is that so?---That is true.

Is everything in statement true and correct?---To the best of my memory, yes.

I tender the statement. It can be marked RC135 and indicate I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you want ask any questions, Mr James?

MR JAMES: Very shortly, thank you. I would call, if possible, for the - any dosage record in relation to Mr Hillam, contained in the dosage records of 76 Australians, the radiation doses of which were provided to AIRAC on the basis of the letter of 2 August 1984.

MR McCLELLAN: I can indicate to my friend Mr Hillam is shown in the British records by name, but no dose is shown against his name at all.

MR JAMES: Not - not even a nil dose?

MR McCLELLAN: Well, not even a below 20 dose. What is shown - he is shown twice. He is shown with a question mark on one occasion, but there is no record of any dose in relation to him at all.

MR JAMES: Mr Hillam, you understood that you were not part of the indoctrinee force yourself, did you?---No, not actually. We were not designated as to position or, what we were going to be involved with until we arrived at Maralinga and, at that point, there was only a - a camp staff personnel and we were duly informed then that we were to be part of the work - or the camp strength workforce for the indoctrinee force for the coming atomic tests.



How many of you were attached to the indoctrinee force, as such?---I cannot remember the actual numbers, but the - all the camp staff - we were - we were just a indoctrinee force camp staff with the indoctrinee force personnel in that camp area.

Sure. Were the camp staff 25 or 115, or something between those figures?---50, 50, 70 or something of that nature. Certainly more than 25?---Yes.

And, in terms of that, there were certainly more than 18 drivers, 7 administrative staff?---Well, on that I would not be sure because I did not have much activity with the camp staff outside of the - my own - my own duties.

Yes. Well, how many cooks were there?---That I could not tell you.

All right. This occasion when you witnessed, with Lieutenant Colonel Peach, the test made an impression on you, is there any possibility you could be mistaken about distances?---About?

Distances? I think you tell us you stopped 1000 yards away? ---Yes - it would be fair to state that I could be a little bit out in the distances. Going back in time it is a - it is very hard to visualize all aspects. But I still feel that it - very well be close, anyhow.

Did you see officers wearing small silver pen like devices on the outside of their uniforms?---Not from memory.

Did you see anybody wearing two film badges, rather than just one?---No. All the people I came in contact, but also with myself, just with the one film badge.

And you gave yours back eventually at the end of the - your tour of duty?---Yes.

And you recall the horse . . . . .?---Yes, I - learned there was, we had seen it, when we were in - I was told, later on, probably in the - in the officers' canteen of which we were part of, that the - part of the animal - underground surface - although by visual looking, did not suffer or sustain any great, sort of injury, but the concussion etcetera, would have turned the whole insides to - to jelly and the - the person would have been dead anyhow.

And you have a - a clear and vivid recollection of this?---Yes.

I have nothing further, if your Honour pleases.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr Collett?

MR COLLETT: Thank you, sir.

Mr Hillam, you were at Maralinga for about 5 months in 1956?---That is right.

And about 10 months in 1957. Did you come across any aborigines on the range, whilst you were there?  
---Not to my knowledge. I did not get off the range very much. Very, very rare.

You did not see any?---No, sir.

No further questions, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr McIntyre.

MR McINTYRE: Thank you, sir.

Mr Hillam, you said, in paragraph 5, that you were based at 29 Mile Camp as about a part of 115 camp staff. This was in 1956. Did you understand that your job there was to perform the function of one of the staff to support the indoctrinee force?---Yes.

And, did you live in the same area that the indoctrinee force lived?---Yes.

And, was it a large number of tents that they were living in?---Yes.

Do you - would it be the case that you were stationed at the camp about 11 miles north of the road - the railway, known as 11 Mile Camp?---Yes.

Well, when you were told by Colonel Peach to - to walk for a distance, to observe the explosion, how long did you walk for; do you recall?---No, I do not - I do not think we walked for any - any great deal of time, from memory.

Would it be half an hour, or so?---About - half an hour, three quarters of an hour.

All right. And, you saw the mushroom cloud on the horizon, did you?---Yes, certainly.

Well, do you recall that it was from the camp where you were living with the indoctrinee force that you were asked by Colonel Peach to walk. In other words, that was the area that you left - you left from, prior to witnessing the explosion?---I am very, very vague here.

You see, are you quite certain that you stopped only about - you stopped 3 miles from the point of the explosion? Might it have been quite a distance further back than that?---It could have been.. As I say, it appeared to be that we were relatively close.

Well, do you recall what time of day it was that the explosion took place?---Well, it would have been in the afternoon, because we had our - we had our leather jerkins on and that would be after - after - 3.00 - between 3.00 and 4.00 pm, because up to around about 3.00 pm of a day, we were wearing shorts and thongs and soon after 3 o'clock we was putting on everything we could find.

Do you think it might have been the case that you walked for about 31 miles, from the point that you left the camp to the point where you saw the officers at - walking around the crater? It is a pretty fair way to walk, would not it?---I would not think . . . . .

Well, what is the maximum distance you think that you walked?---A couple of miles.

When you say you saw some officers walking right up to the crater, what was it that you saw that made you think it was the crater?---Well, when we were coming up to - to the actual area, the first thing that we all remarked on was that it looked like a - a big sheet of glass, shiny glass. And, there was nothing to be seen anywhere around about, and it was around about on the perimeter of that that I stopped, and a few of the others did, and the other people just moved straight ahead.

Are you certain this was on the occasion of the explosion? On the same day as the explosion?---I believe so, yes.

Think it might be a few days later?---I believe we moved in - I believe we moved in on the same day as the explosion.

Thank you, your Honour. No further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Hillam. You are excused.

THE WITNESS WITHDREW

MR McCLELLAN: Well, your Honour, then, I tender 4 more statements. I understand I have my friends' - all my friends' consent to this. First the statement of Brian Leslie Robertson which I tender and can be marked RC - 136 - - -

MR McINTYRE: Robertson?

MR McCLELLAN: Yes, Robertson.

MR McINTYRE: I have not got that, your Honour.

MR JAMES: Neither have I.

THE PRESIDENT: Neither have I.

MR McCLELLAN: I am instructed that it was distributed last week and, I am also instructed that my friends have all consented to its tender. I will withdraw the tender of that, at this stage. Do not worry, I will withdraw that; I will deal with that tomorrow, but can I - - -

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have got it here.

MR McCLELLAN: Yes, but if - if Mr McIntyre has not had a chance, your Honour, I will not press it, at this stage, but I will deal, if I may, with Alexander George Crossfield - I understand that is consented to.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR McCLELLAN: That can be RC136, and then George Alfred Harry Lang which I tender. That can be marked 137 and Barry Paul Edwards, which I also tender. That can be marked 138. As I say, I will deal with Mr Robertson's statement tomorrow.

MR JAMES: I consent to the tender of Mr - - - - -

MR McINTYRE: So do I.

MR McCLELLAN: Sorry?

MR McINTYRE: I consent to Mr Robertson's statement. I have just read through it.

MR McCLELLAN: Right, well that can then become 139.

MR JAMES: Are there any more statements to go in?

MR McCLELLAN: Sorry?

MR JAMES: Any more statements to go in? Because the more done today, the more - - -

MR McCLELLAN: No more that I will put in at the moment.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Butement?

MR McCLELLAN: Mr Butement's statement - I do not have a statement from Mr Butement. But I propose to call him tomorrow morning and 10 o'clock would be the appropriate time tomorrow, your Honour.

THE PRESIDENT: All right. I will adjourn until 10.00 tomorrow.

AT 4.45 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED  
UNTIL THURSDAY, 8 NOVEMBER 1984

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