INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF SOCIAL COHESION AND RESILIENCE: ANALYSIS OF THE CALL FOR EVIDENCE

Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC)

Final Report - March 2023

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

About the Independent Review of Social Cohesion

The aim of Dame Sara Khan's Independent Review of Social Cohesion and Resilience is to provide recommendations to the government on protecting and promoting social cohesion, building resilience against extremism in communities and how to better support and protect victims of extremism, including those working in countering extremism.

Purpose of the research

As part of the Review, a call for evidence survey was launched in April 2022 to explore experiences of social cohesion and extremism. The survey asked members of the public about their experiences of being targeted by extremists and their views on social cohesion. RSM UK Consulting LLP was appointed by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) to carry out:

- An analysis of all responses, close-ended and open-ended responses, to the call for evidence survey; and
- Additional primary data collection and analysis - fifteen in-depth interviews with a subset of survey respondents, including a mix of those targeted and not targeted by extremists (or other divisive actors).

Key findings

The findings are presented under three themes:

1. The experiences of those who were targeted by extremists or divisive actors;
2. The role of local authorities and government; and
3. The role of communities and civil society.

1. Experiences of those targeted

The experiences of those targeted by extremists and other divisive actors (e.g., Far Right, Far Left, Islamist, religious fundamentalists, and other ideologically motivated actors) varied across respondents, who reported their own experiences or that of someone they personally knew.

Reasons for, and types of, targeting

The main reason why respondents were targeted was primarily **due to the role they played within their community**. These roles included community leaders, faith leaders and faith activists. In addition to this, personal characteristics - such as faith/belief, race/ethnicity and membership of a minority sect or community – and the interplay between these, were found to be triggers for targeting episodes. In the case of organisations being targeted, the main reason was because of their civil society work.

Perpetrators and the impact on victims

The three most common types of perpetrators identified were:

- Extremists/activists or organisations;
- Faith activists and leaders; and
- Community based individuals and organisations.

How respondents were targeted by perpetrators varied, with reports of harassment, intimidation, propagation of smears, verbal abuse, and ostracisation. **Ostracisation** in particular was used by faith activists to isolate, exclude, and punish individuals from religious communities.

The triggers also varied. Expressing a view or opinion online, engaging with the media, and working to promote democratic values within the community, were cited as the most common triggers.

These targeting episodes impacted victims' **personal and family life** and also had a **psychological impact**, which ranged from poor mental health, low self-esteem, and difficulty in trusting others. Reflected by the deep-rooted nature of the experience of being targeted, the impact of it is often **enduring and long term**. Damage to the victim's social life and reputation, poor quality family relationships, and ostracisation from their community were also reported impacts on the victim's personal and family life.

Reporting of incidents

Most victims reported the incident to the police and those organisations targeted were more likely to report. However, a quarter of individual respondents said that they had not reported the incident at all. They cited various reasons. These included:

- Believing their report would not be taken seriously;
- Wanting to avoid further damage to relationships as they knew the perpetrator;
- Feeling they could handle it themselves or by reporting it to others, such as their employer;
- Fear of repercussions; and
- It did not occur to them, or they did not know how to report the incident.

In addition, organisations recognised that the **under-reporting of extremist incidents** is a major issue facing civil society. They felt there are many organisations across society, such as charities and community groups, who can play a role in supporting victims of extremism to report these incidents.

Irrespective of whether the targeting had been reported to the authorities or not, two thirds of respondents felt that there had been **no outcome for the perpetrator** (such as being arrested or fined). Interviewees also mentioned a lack of outcome following an investigation, or the perpetrator was simply never identified.

Support received after an incident

Most respondents (73%) reported that their **experience was not adequately recognised by the law**, **the police or the government**. Respondents felt that their experiences were not taken seriously, there was insufficient understanding of the issues surrounding their victimisation and the actions of perpetrators were not sufficiently recognised by the law. In addition, a third of respondents said they **had received no follow-up support**, or information about any actions taken following being targeted. Others reported that they had been provided with verbal reassurance (13%) or had safety measures implemented (12%).

When support was received, this included informal emotional support (such as formal therapy/counselling), and implementation of precautions and safety measures. Referral to victim support, or a similar body, was however rated poorly by most respondents.

2. The role of local authorities and central government

Local authorities and public bodies, including central government, play an important role in promoting social cohesion and resilience to extremism, and reducing the impact of acute and long-term conflict, division, and extremist activity.

Social cohesion: Ratings, priority and concerns

Respondents cited the following factors as most important in determining social cohesion in a local area:

1. Lack of racial or religious discrimination (96%);
2. People from different backgrounds getting on well (93%);
3. Trust in democratic institutions (93%); and
4. Public rejection of divisive extremist actors within communities (93%).

There was no clear consensus among respondents about what priority - low, medium or high - should be given to promoting social cohesion in their local authority. However, almost half of them believed that social cohesion was a high priority for their local authority.

Respondents generally expressed **high levels of concern about extremist activity** in their local authority. In particular, those who believed social cohesion was not a priority for their local authority were more likely to express higher levels of concern about extremist activity in their area (60% for individual and 80% for organisational respondents). The types of activities that undermine social cohesion included:

- Events such as marches, protests and boycotts; and
- Activities motivated by racial and ethnic differences that strained community relationships.

Local authority policies and practices

There was a very **low level of awareness** of local authorities' policies and practices on social cohesion and extremism. While the impact of these policies and practices was only known to a minority of respondents, they were positive about their effectiveness. This general lack of awareness extended to policies focused on countering extremism, with few respondents aware of the work their Local Resilience Forum (LRF) was doing.

However, a few examples of good practice used by local authorities were cited:

- Responding to incidents through increased monitoring, support and training to frontline workers;
- Improving communication and networking by building community partnerships;
- Supporting the projects and activities of community organisations; and,
- Community-based mediation, information and building awareness.

On the other hand, examples of poor practice were also discussed. Common responses were that these policies and procedures **lacked direct engagement with communities**.

The key obstacle related to a **perceived lack of governance and leadership**, which included difficulties arising from competing priorities, a lack of central government guidance on policy development, a perceived lack of political will and a lack of awareness of the issued facing local communities.

Policies covering intra-community tensions between members of the same ethnic, racial, or religious community were notably missing from survey responses – both in the examples above and in response to a specific survey question on this topic (71% of respondents did not know or were unaware of such

policies). This is a significant gap in existing policy scope, considering the incidence of such incidents and the lack of their recognition that was reported by survey respondents.

Support from local authorities to local actors working on promoting social cohesion and countering extremism

Less than a quarter of respondents rated the support from local authorities to those working in the counter-extremism and social cohesion space (local actors) to be good or outstanding. Low level and quality of support were often associated with perceptions of low social cohesiveness in local areas. Additionally, those who expressed high levels of concern about local extremist activity also felt there **was insufficient support for local actors** working on promoting social cohesion and countering extremism. Two main barriers to providing adequate support to local actors were cited. The first was linked to a lack of knowledge and understanding of: extremist ideologies, central government guidance and/ or procedure for sharing best practice. The second barrier was linked to a low staff knowledge about the issues facing communities and high staff turnover within the local organisations working on promoting social cohesion and countering extremism. Insufficient funding and a lack of capacity to address instances of extremism were also highlighted as barriers.

In terms of what support should be provided to local actors, these included **sharing information** on best practice via networks and partnerships, **facilitating understanding of community issues** by local actors through local forums and **improving monitoring** and data collection. Forms of support that needed improvement were also discussed. These were a lack of recognition and engagement with local groups, unclear procedures on how to approach issues, siloed working practices, a lack of trust between practitioners and the often short-term nature of many of the programmes trying to promote social cohesion.

Role of the central government

There were mixed views on whether the government plays a helpful or an unhelpful role in supporting local cohesion and counter extremism efforts. A third of respondents believed that the **government plays neither a helpful nor unhelpful role**. Amongst this group, those who felt that central government had played a particularly unhelpful role provided several reasons justifying their opinion. These included:

- Lack of a national cohesion strategy;
- Lack of engagement with professionals working in social cohesion and countering extremism; and,
- Inconsistency in the language and rhetoric used publicly by the government is at odds with the message it is trying to promote. For example, the ‘hostile environment’ around immigration issues.

A third felt that the central government had been helpful and emphasised the **positive impact of investing resources into activities and projects** promoting social cohesion and **the implementation of programmes designed to counter extremism**. But there were concerns about the sustainability of the funding.

3. The role of communities and civil society

Local communities and civil society (these include faith leaders, schools, charities, local leaders such as councillors, and local businesses) also play an important role in promoting social cohesion and preventing extremist events.

Responsibility to challenge extremism and protect social cohesion

90% of respondents believed that **local communities and civil society actors have a responsibility to challenge extremism and protect social cohesion** in their local areas. Faith leaders, local authorities, schools/colleges, and community leaders in particular ought to play a key role in this.

Interviewees provided more insight on how local communities and civil society could achieve this. More **joined up approaches** between civil society, local government, statutory authorities and the third sector can result in greater impact when promoting social cohesion. This could be achieved through providing the space to facilitate dialogue and regular meetings between community groups, with local authorities also promoting the development of community forums. Joined up approaches could also lead to **more effective signposting** of support and services available to the local community. This was viewed as necessary for harder to reach communities accessing services.

Effectiveness in challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion

Respondents reported that **civil society groups play an effective role** in challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion. The findings demonstrate civil society groups, faith leaders and schools/colleges were found to play the most effective role in promoting social cohesion in local communities. Interviewees in particular highlighted:

- The role faith leaders can play in developing and promoting interfaith community groups and dialogue between faith groups and those with non-religious beliefs, and with those with different protected characteristics (such as the LGBTQ+ community). However faith leaders could also play a counter-productive role in the community;
- The role of civil society and third sector groups in organising and running grassroots organisations (such as foodbanks) to bring together those who previously may not have had a voice in community affairs; and
- The role of schools and colleges in educating children and young people about fostering social cohesion in communities.

Nearly a quarter of respondents thought that local businesses and local authorities were the most ineffective. This is not to say they do not have a role to play.

Key obstacles to challenging extremism in local areas

Respondents felt that the key obstacles were those linked to **governance bodies** (including a lack of central government support and guidance, local authorities, statutory bodies etc.) and **skills and resources** (this included a lack of resource and capacity, tools and training, and clarity of roles and responsibilities).

To overcome these key obstacles, respondents cited examples of existing good practice, such as increasing awareness about extremism and supporting the education of communities about other faiths. Specific examples of how to achieve these objectives included community events and school programmes. Interviewees provided additional examples of good practice. These included:

- Creating spaces and promoting opportunities to hold community events;
- Encouraging input from the whole community when designing community projects (co-design); and
- Extending the training and education opportunities for those working directly in social cohesion and countering extremism into local communities.

Cooperation in *preventing* extremist events occurring

Only 28% of respondents believed their local community worked well together in preventing extremist events from occurring. 43% of respondents felt that their local community did not work together. When asked why this might be the case, interviewees highlighted the following issues:

- A lack of engagement with certain communities and minorities and a lack of understanding of the issues facing that community (such as the Traveller community);
- A lack of understanding of certain communities, such as who the leaders are in a given community or why that community may not wish to engage with local programmes and initiatives; and
- Contradictory or conflicting narratives from local and central government that simultaneously talk about improving social cohesion, whilst stoking divisions for political purposes.

Cooperation in *responding* to extremist events

Over a third (38%) of respondents believed that their communities worked together a lot when responding to extremist events. 30% of respondents felt communities responded to a medium extent, with the remainder (32%) feeling that their community did not respond at all.

The survey asked how communities could be empowered to come together and challenge extremism. Interview respondents also mentioned several community building and inter-faith activities that helped people come together and build trust including neighbourhood forums and organised civic responses to major incidents.

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1. THE CALL FOR EVIDENCE

1.1 Introduction

Dame Sara Khan was appointed by the then Prime Minister as the Government's Independent Adviser for Social Cohesion and Resilience at the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) in March 2021. Since then, Dame Sara Khan has been conducting an Independent Review of Social Cohesion and Resilience in order to examine social cohesion and the harm and impact of extremism on individuals and local communities, and to understand how to strengthen social cohesion and build community resilience against extremism.

The overall aim of the Review is to provide recommendations to the Government on protecting and promoting social cohesion, building resilience against extremism in communities and how to better support and protect victims of extremism, including those working to tackle it.

A call for evidence was launched in April 2022 to explore experiences of social cohesion and extremism. The online survey comprised 90 open and closed questions for individuals, local authorities, academics, and practitioners on the following themes:

1. The experiences of those targeted by extremists and other divisive actors;
2. Understanding of the role of local authorities and public bodies in promoting social cohesion and countering extremism; and
3. Supporting local communities and civil society to challenge extremism, develop community resilience and promote social cohesion.

RSM UK Consulting LLP (RSM) was appointed by the DLUHC to carry out:

1. Analysis of all responses, close-ended and open-ended, to the call for evidence survey[1];
2. Additional primary data collection and analysis – fifteen in-depth interviews with a subset of survey respondents, including a mix of those targeted and not targeted by extremists (or other divisive actors). See Appendix 1.

This report presents findings from both strands of the research, and it is structured around the three areas of investigation above. Within each chapter subsection we examine:

1. Headline findings based on overall survey figures.
2. Survey findings broken down by the two respondent subgroups: individual and organisational respondents.
3. Additional analysis based on crosstabulations between 2 survey questions, as appropriate.
4. Supportive quotes and qualitative analysis from survey free-text questions and interviews.
5. Case study boxes based on interview data in blue, wherever relevant.

The charts presented in this report are colour-coded to reflect the following distinctions:

1. Charts in purple or multiple colours (purple, mustard and teal) illustrate survey findings at an overall level.
2. Charts in blue illustrate findings for the individual subgroup; while those in green – the organisational subgroup.

[1] From this point, the Independent Review of Social Cohesion and Resilience call for evidence will be referred to as the 'survey'.

Longer quotes, or those that provide a good summary of the analysis preceding it, are presented in green and italicised. Shorter quotes are blended into the main body text, but italicised.

Survey respondents

The survey received a total of 252 responses, via Microsoft Forms. An additional 12 responses were received via email.

The survey was accessible to all members of the public, during data cleaning 26 cases (11%) of cases were deemed unsuitable to be included in the analysis having not met the minimum standards of quality, strength, comprehensiveness, and relevance. An additional 21 cases were identified for which there were no answers given[2].

A total of 205 responses have been included (post data cleaning) in the survey sample for the analysis presented in this report.

The final responses were distributed 60:40 between those that responded in their individual capacities, and those that responded on behalf of an organisation (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Number of responses by types of respondents (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.4*
Base: *205*

The individual respondents came from a wide variety of age groups (Figure 1.2), with the majority between 35-44 or 45-54 years.

The responses from organisations in the sample (Figure 1.3) were from a broad range of sectors, with significant representation from NGOs or thinktanks (37%), followed by community groups/charities (21%) and local authorities (20%), with fewer responses from the academic research community as well as public bodies such as schools and the police force.

[2] Specifically, 4 cases where respondents did not read and accept the privacy notice, 8 that did not consent to proceed based on the stated conditions relating to data anonymity and publication of findings, and 9 who did not respond to Q9/identify as either individual member of public or as an organisation.

Figure 1.2 Number of responses from individuals by age



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.8*
Base: *122*

Figure 1.3 Number of responses from organisations by sector



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.6*
Base: *81*

Figure 1.4 displays the geographical breakdown of the sample. Responses largely came from London (32%), with the remaining evenly distributed across the North, South, and Midlands (16-21%). Seven responses came from the rest of the UK (outside of England and the remit of the Review), and 1 from New Zealand. Sixteen individuals (8%) preferred not to disclose their location.

Figure 1.4 Number of responses by region (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.9*
Base: *202*

The sample contained an equal split of those with experiences of being targeted (either personally, or, by knowing someone that was) and that had not been targeted by extremist actors.

Figure 1.5 Number of responses by experience with being targeted (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q. 20*
Base: *124 (individual), 81 (organisation)*

Interviewees

In addition to the survey, RSM conducted 15 online semi-structured, in-depth interviews with a sample of survey respondents who consented to be contacted for further evidence gathering activities.

RSM utilised a stratified purposive sampling strategy. Interviewees were split across two groups. Namely, those who have been personally targeted (or knew someone who was targeted) by extremists, and those that had no experience of being personally targeted or knowing someone who was targeted by extremists.

The sample was split to include a higher number of those that were targeted (n=12) based on DLUHC's interest to explore the experiences of those that had been subjected to different forms of extremism, as well as the support they sought and/or received. Additionally, it also included individuals and

organisations not targeted (n=3) to identify more in their views on building community resilience and social cohesion.

Insights from individual interviews are used with the survey findings in three ways:

1. to generate insights that corroborate, contextualise, or explain survey findings.
2. to generate new themes and insights pertinent to the review's goals that had not been covered by the survey.
3. to generate illustrative case studies that provide narrative accounts of respondents' experiences linked to being targeted by extremists, or organisations working on building social cohesion and/or resilience within communities. These case studies generate additional insights and illustrate trends from the quantitative analyses.

1.2 Survey limitations

It is important to acknowledge the following survey limitations:

1. The survey was completed as a public call for evidence by those who were interested in the topic of social cohesion and extremism. The sample of respondents was self-selected and is not representative of the wider population in England.
2. Completion rate for individual questions varied greatly, given that it was not mandatory to respond to all questions.
3. Survey questions were not routed based on respondents' answers to previous questions. Responses to some questions may, therefore, appear to be contradictory to others. For example, some that reported high levels of social cohesion in their area also reported high levels of concern about extremist activity in their area.
4. The survey asked respondents about the role and adequacy of stakeholders including local authorities and civil society actors in social cohesion efforts. These actors also completed the survey and are likely to have biased related findings.

2. EXPERIENCES OF THOSE TARGETED BY EXTREMISTS

Key Messages

Reasons for and types of targeting

1. Respondents were primarily targeted because of their roles as:
    a. community leaders (16%);
    b. faith leaders (13%); and
    c. faith activists (12%).
2. This closely aligned with the key characteristics for which they were targeted:
    a. faith or belief (37%);
    b. race/ethnicity (22%); and
    c. membership of a minority religious sect or community (17%).
3. Interviews highlighted the intersections between different protected characteristics, usually faith/belief and sexual orientation or gender, in being targeted.
4. Intimidation (16%), harassment (15%), and verbal abuse (14%) emerged as the top behaviours through which respondents were targeted. Most targeting occurred both online and offline (55%).
5. The great majority of respondents did not feel their experiences of victimisation were recognised by the law, police, or government (73%). The reasons highlighted in interviews included:
    a. Complaints or experiences not taken seriously, and authorities took little to no action;
    b. Insufficient understanding of the issues surrounding victimisation by authorities; and
    c. The actions of perpetrators not being sufficiently recognised by law.

Perpetrators and impact of targeting on victims

1. The top three perpetrators targeting victims were:
    a. extremist/hate activists or organisations (23%);
    b. faith activist or leaders (15%); and
    c. community-based individuals or organisations including intra- as well as outside-community perpetrators (11%).
2. These perpetrators targeted respondents using a nearly equal mix of five prevalent behaviours: *harassment, intimidation, ostracisation, propagation of smears,* and *verbal abuse*.
    a. Nuances included faith activists favouring ostracisation more than the others (14%), and extra-community perpetrators' increased use of intimidation (33%).
3. Targeting triggers for the top two perpetrators (extremist individuals and extremist organisations) were linked to:
    a. expressing a view online (approximately 29%, varying by perpetrator type);
    b. delivering work to promote or uphold democracy, rights or equality (approximately 27%, varying by perpetrator type); and
    c. engaging with the media (19%).
4. Most respondents (61%) recorded no actions or outcomes for perpetrators irrespective of whether targeting incidents were reported or not. Most interviewees similarly reported that perpetrators were either never found/identified or reported no outcome following an investigation. These findings reflect the need for authorities to follow-up and communicate with victims following an investigation, irrespective of outcomes.
5. Victims reported two main types of impacts irrespective of whether they were targeted offline, online or both:
    a. impact on personal and family life (44%); and

b. psychological impact (32%).

6. Psychological impact emerged as the more widely reported form (64% of total, on average) when victim impact was broken down by the top five types of victimisations experienced.
7. For the significant majority (79%) the extremist behaviour remained ongoing (including, sporadically), irrespective of the types of victimisations experienced.
8. The majority (74%) reported the impact as lasting for more than six months, reflecting that even if incidents stop, victims' psychological wellbeing and everyday lives remain affected for some time.

Reporting of targeting incidents

1. Targeting incidents were reported to the police/law enforcement bodies (35% of the time), followed by 26% not reporting the incident at all.
    a. Many that approached the police or other law enforcement bodies received no response or action (48%); and
    b. A larger proportion of individuals (35%) than organisational respondents (12%) did not report incidents.
2. Interviews highlighted the reasons for not reporting:
    a. Believing reports would not be taken seriously;
    b. Wanting to avoid damaging family relationships where perpetrators were known;
    c. Feeling able to handle the incident themselves or reporting it to others (e.g., employers);
    d. Fearing repercussions; and
    e. Not knowing how to report or being unaware they could be reported.
3. Most interviewees representing organisations recognised that under-reporting of extremist incidents was a major issue and felt that civil society organisations had the potential to play an important role in supporting victims.

Support received after being targeted

1. Reporting targeting incidents to various actors/bodies led to:
    a. No response or action (33%);
    b. Being provided verbal reassurance (13%); and
    c. Safety measures being implemented (12%).
2. The specific forms of support that victims rated highly included:
    a. Informal emotional support (60%);
    b. Implementation of safety measures (50%); and
    c. Referral to the criminal justice system and the subsequent investigation that was carried out (40%).
3. Referrals to Victim Support or a similar body were rated to be poor/very poor (75%).
4. Many that specifically approached the police or other law enforcement bodies received no response or action (48%). The majority (74%) that reported such incidents rated the response (or lack of response) received as poor or very poor.

2.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the survey responses on the experiences of those targeted by extremists and other divisive actors (e.g., Far Right, Far Left, Islamist, religious fundamentalists, and other ideologically motivated actors). Respondents could answer either from their own experiences or that of someone they personally knew. The survey, as the wider Review, uses the following definitions for extremism, and asked respondents to consider these:

- **The Government's 2015 definition of extremism**: Extremism is the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed forces as extremist[3].
- **The Commission for Countering Extremism's 2021 definition of hateful extremism**: Activity or materials directed at an out-group who are perceived as a threat to an in-group motivated by or intending to advance a political, religious or racial supremacist ideology to a) create a climate conducive to hate crime, terrorism or other violence; or b) attempt to erode or destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms of our democratic society as protected under Article 17 of Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 ('HRA')[4].

The analysis conducted by RSM covers four areas:

1. Reasons for and types of targeting behaviours;
2. Perpetrators and impact on victims;
3. Reporting of targeting behaviours, extremist acts, and incidents; and
4. Support received after being targeted.

2.2 Reasons for and types of targeting

Overall, respondents were primarily targeted because of their roles as community leaders (16%), faith leaders (13%) and faith activists (12%) (Figure 2.1). **This closely aligned with the key characteristics for which they were targeted: faith or belief (37%), race/ethnicity (22%) and membership of a minority religious sect or community (17%)** (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.1 Were you/the individual targeted based on the following roles? (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.26*
Base: *72*

[3] HM Government (2015). Counter-Extremism Strategy. London: Counter-Extremism Directorate.
[4] Commission for Countering Extremism (2021). Operating with Impunity. Hateful extremism: The need for a legal framework. Home Office.

Survey respondents were provided with a list of 16 potential roles for which they or those they knew were targeted, with the possibility to choose as many as were applicable. These were re-categorised into the five analytical categories presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Analytical categories: Roles for which individuals/those they knew were targeted

RSM groups	Response option in the survey
Public body roles	i. Local authority official ii. Local councillor iii. MP/Politician iv. Police officer/enforcement (e.g., probation officer, community support officer etc)
Civil society body roles	i. Civil Society Organisation employee/volunteer ii. Human rights campaigner iii. Political activist
Social cohesion roles	i. Academic ii. Counter-extremist professional iii. Teacher/educator iv. Journalist
Faith-based roles	i. Faith leader ii. Faith activist
Other roles	i. Farmer/food producer ii. Other key worker (e.g., nurse, retail, care staff) iii. Community leader

Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.26*

When broken down by respondent subgroups (Figure 2.2), organisational respondents were primarily targeted for performing civil society work (35%) (see case study 1).

Figure 2.2 Were you/the individual targeted based on the following roles? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.26*
Base: *35 (individual), 37 (organisation)*

Besides faith or belief (Figure 2.3), race/ethnicity (22%), minority status (17%), sex/gender (8%), sexual orientation (8%) and disability (3%) were additional characteristics based on which respondents were targeted (see case study 2).

Figure 2.3 Were you/the individual targeted based on the following protected characteristics? (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.27*
Base: *89*

Interviewees highlighted the nuances of being targeted for the above reasons:

"[There was] clear expression from the perpetrator that he was looking for Jews and wanted to harm them" (Interviewee)

"Because they don't want the Hindu viewpoint being shown" (Interviewee)

Interviews also highlighted the intersections between different protected characteristics, usually faith/belief and sexual orientation or gender, in being targeted:

"I can have people who are openly quite hostile towards me because I have a faith and I have an open faith, but equally people who are friends of mine who are LGBT, who might be Christian for example, have said that when they have come out about being Christian within an LGBT community, they have suffered hate in that sense as well" (Interviewee)

"Main drivers are the fact that they don't approve of a woman from within the community calling them out and highlighting some of the problems with the narratives that they are perpetuating" (Interviewee)

Overall, intimidation (16%), harassment (15%), and verbal abuse (14%) emerged as the top behaviours through which respondents were targeted (Figure 2.4). Most of the targeting occurred both online and offline (55%) (Figure 2.6).

Figure 2.4 How were you/the individual targeted? (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.24*
Base: *94*

Figure 2.5 shows that individuals were additionally targeted through doxing (publishing private information on the internet – 16%) and ostracisation (13%), while organisational respondents faced greater verbal abuse (13%) and propagation of smears (12%).

Most respondents (Figure 2.6) were targeted both online and offline. This reflects how pervasive such experiences can be for victims and indicates the levels of support that might be needed to aid them.

Figure 2.5 How were you/the individual targeted? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.24*
Base: *55 (individual), 39 (organisation)*

Figure 2.6 Where did the targeting take place? (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.23*
Base: *95*

Case Study 1: Interviewee account of being targeted because of their work/role

Who I am

I've worked at the Theatre for 22 years to create strong, cohesive communities using stories and creative means. We understand where the sentiment to divide might come from, and then collectively look at how we could deal with these issues. And so, it is about co-creating positive ways of co-existing.

What happened to me

As well as working in the Theatre, I'm also a local councillor. It all started after we had released a video about our work to unite communities through sport and theatre. At first, there were some quite nasty comments saying, "you need to know this person is sleeping with ISIS." Then I found out that this wasn't just a one-off thing, this person had started trolling me. It wasn't just me as an individual that he was targeting, it was also the intent of my work [i.e. unite communities]. I soon got a threat saying, "keep your damn hands off the local football club". And he posted information on me, saying, "hey…people…you better watch out, this is who she is (referencing a sexual activity with terrorists). You need to know about her, and this is where she lives." At that point, once my address was identified, it was just horrible. It had gone beyond just being stupid on social media and was manifesting in the real world. I had a picture of what he looked like, and there were 3 occasions that my tyres had been slashed on my car. That never happens in a small town. I also noticed a bloke who was hanging around in the terrace across from me, and he wasn't familiar. He constantly watched me, and the effect it had on me was to stop coming out of the front of my own house. We left by the back door. I also parked my car in another place. It had an extremely disruptive effect on me, as much as I tried to downplay it.

How I coped and how I was/was not supported

I called the police and was keen that they didn't just treat this as a one-off thing. I am recognisable, and this person didn't like my work to promote community cohesion, or that I was doing it with a football club he supported. He did not like my politics and had also attacked another politician in another town. He was misogynistic as he was using sexualised language to attack women. The police kept saying, "we can't find him, he's not at home every time we go". They asked if I would be willing to meet him and I think that played against me because I wasn't playing the victim. But because the police are under pressure to close things down, I was just getting constant emails going, "shall we just put this to bed now?" And the minimum that I would have liked is for this to be reported to Prevent, because he needed people to question his way of thinking. And the whole point of policing surely is prevention, isn't it? It takes a lot to call the police because we second-guess ourselves constantly. But we can't keep managing these narratives in a way that undermines them because they're potent and poisonous. One of the dissatisfying things was that in the end, they closed the case down because there had been no activity from this guy for a length of time. And I wasn't reassured that the police in different towns pulled together and made any efforts. The borough council felt sorry that this had happened and acted in a positive way. They took my address off the website and informed other councillors to make sure that they knew that there was support if this happened to them.

How this impacted my life

What choice did I have? Do I take down my social media and not do my job as a councillor? Also, because I wasn't playing the victim, the police were satisfied that I was not traumatised. But I had changed my behaviour. I had to second guess what I was doing. Think, "how do I keep my staff safe?". I had to tell my workplace this was happening so that if somebody walked into the building looking a bit…this guy had such an effect on me. People have a right to know where their councillor lives, but now they must ask for my address, which means at least if anything happens, they're traceable. I don't know whether this man gone quiet because he's been found in another situation. There is a great big vacuum in place of me being able to lay it to rest. I keep wondering if he's going to pop up again at some point, but there's nothing anybody can really do about that.

A way forward

I don't think my experience was recognised as being important enough. I wanted it to be escalated and I constantly resisted the idea of closing the case because I didn't feel it had been resolved. We don't want people to get to the point where they're offending, or even at a point where the police might not think it's as serious as it is. We want to make sure that this behaviour is dealt with, and we can only do that by making sure that genuine community cohesion work can continue.

Case Study 2: Interviewee account of being targeted because of religious sect

Who I am

I was in a minority Christian sect since I was about 4 and I left in my early 20s. Although it was perceived from the outside as a more benign Christian group, it was quite extremist. I have since worked with Faith to Faithless and Humanists UK.

What happened to me

I started to feel quite unhappy within the group in my early 20s. Some of it was down to behaviour, because even within the group, only a handful would have been looked at as being good enough for you to mix with. It's a tough gig to keep up that persona. The year I left, I had also met somebody 'worldly' outside the group as well, and that's when the pincers really started to come out for me. When I left, I tried to do so without 'judicial action' [hearings in front of a tribunal of elders], they call it 'fading' in the ex-community. You'll just gradually miss meetings, not go preaching and fade. That's how I tried and go. My mother was still in it, I wanted to maintain that relationship. That worked for a period, it got very difficult though when the group upped the ante on people who had left and regardless of whether judicial action had been taken against them and they had been formally 'shunned'. People aren't allowed to engage with you, in practice an expulsion. It doesn't sound bad, like people are just ignoring you, but there's a psychological manipulation in how it makes you feel - ostracism. They'll say to people within the group, including other members of your family, that you're being disciplined by God and it is a loving provision, it's how they'll sell it. Even before judicial action, there is a lighter version called 'marking', where others can only associate with you spiritually so others tend to stay out of your way. Members in that group approached my mother, asked about my behaviour, what I'd done, if I'd kept 'clean'. They will turn up at your house and they will track you down. They hold details for where you live until you die, even if you move area or leave the group, they will notify the local group. It controls every element of your life, your healthcare, your personal relationships, your job, your education. Every single element is affected and controlled.

How I coped and how I was/was not supported

So, at the time, I didn't recognise I needed help. I didn't recognise that the group that I'd been in had been so destructive. The people that leave groups, there's this pattern. The discovery, the shock. Trying to work your way back out the other side. When I left, there was nothing. I started working with Faith to Faithless. Because you recognise that there are people out there that need help and input and the sooner they get it, the sooner they reset their life, the better they will be.

How this impacted my life

The psychological impact of leaving, it's like bereavement. And I cried a lot, for people that I'd left behind. I couldn't reach them, because if you tried to explain, they wouldn't engage with you. They'd see you as a spiritually weakened individual. The relationship with my mother got to its worst point in my mid-30s, it was just unbearable. You're trying to look after them, conscious that they might not have so many years left, and you don't want this awful relationship. The way the group behaves, it's very narcissistic. I started to realise that the way that I interacted with people even after leaving was affected by how my core beliefs had been impacted - I wasn't good enough, I felt like I could never do enough and feared the penalty if I didn't meet impossibly high standards. It really impacted every area of your personality and how you behaved, especially if you were a woman.

A way forward

It's awareness and signposting, from critical thinking to finding the resources you need to leave. Raising awareness in the types of organisations that might come across these individuals, for example, universities, if you get people trying to reclaim their education, homelessness and social housing via the local authority if they need shelter. I just about managed to hang on to living at home. GPs, definitely GPs, especially in terms of the psychological impact and support. And that's one of the things that we talked about at Faith to Faithless, it's being there when people are ready at different parts of the journey – the 'arc of recovery'. And initially, it might be really basic, it might be their safety or they need somewhere to stay and get help with benefits, jobs, things like that. It's every aspect of your life that you might need help to resolve.

Responses to open-ended survey questions illustrated the wider context of targeting. For example, victims attacked online reported facing doxing, trolling or being sent direct messages. Others reported that the perpetrators had posted videos on social media warning those in the local community who opposed their political ideology as well as threatening to harm those working in Human Rights advocacy.

"The victim's details were published online, and misinformation was spread, including at the establishment where they worked" (Survey respondent)

"I was targeted by some networks of extremists and trolls, encouraged by a leading far right figure because of something I wrote about progress in race relations – that British/English identity were no longer seen as racially exclusive" (Survey respondent)

Others reported being victims of stalking or harassment. For example, being approached by individuals in the street or in parks, or the intentional targeting of events held in public spaces.

"Some people threatened a person involved in an event we were organising, they harassed him (and his family) outside his home, because they did not agree with the event we were holding (which was bringing Sikhs and Muslims together)" (Survey respondent)

A minority of respondents said that they were either targeted in the home or in the workplace. In this instance it was frequently done by other family members:

"I was ostracised from my family and church community for being gay" (Survey respondent)

A few interviewees reported being targeted in higher education institutions (also see case study 3) through a "*vicious social media campaign" (Interviewee)* by both students and colleagues. Victims reported being accused of Islamophobia and racism for teaching specific courses. One interviewee believed their institution put more effort into protecting and placating the perpetrators rather than supporting them, the victim. They felt this demonstrated how easily an individual's career, wellbeing and safety could be negatively disrupted by false accusations on social media (the interviewee was eventually cleared of wrongdoing):

"I've done absolutely nothing wrong, and yet I was pilloried, vilified, victimised by a bunch of intolerant [students], and [the institution] colluded with them" (Interviewee)

Recognition of targeting experiences by the law

The great majority of respondents (Figure 2.7) did not feel their experiences of victimisation were recognized by the law, police, or government (73%).

Figure 2.7 Do you think these experiences of targeting are recognised by law, the police or Government? (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.21*
Base: *97*

Survey and interview respondents raised the following issues:

- Complaints or experiences were **not taken seriously** when reported and **authorities took little to no action**:

"The initial police response did not recognise the incident as a hate crime [Violently targeted in public], and subsequent efforts by police to identify the perpetrator and undertake the investigation were lacking" (Survey respondent)

"The police had no idea of the extremist hatred crime happening right under their noses. The group that we encountered had beliefs that they had every right to exterminate us on religious grounds" (Survey respondent)

"I've reported these incidents and as I say, the police have ignored them. It feels as though the police are completely disinterested, uninterested in dealing with these issues" (Interviewee)

- There was **insufficient understanding of the issues surrounding their victimisation** by authorities:

"I do not think the local law enforcement recognise or understand the issues regarding religious fundamentalists or ideologically motivated actors within the same community" (Survey respondent)

"I don't think it was recognised as being important enough…I did resist constantly the idea of closing the case because I didn't feel it had been resolved" (Interviewee)

"I'll be honest, I don't think public bodies understand the impact of intra-community hate or violence to members within it, they don't understand what is happening" (Interviewee)

- The **actions of the perpetrators not being sufficiently recognised** by law:

"The abuse falls below hate crime legislation, but the persistence of attacks and misinformation is reputationally damaging, even if not covered by libel law either" (Survey respondent)

"They didn't take into account the hate element, even though it was clearly targeted based on the actions and the words of the offender, against the Jewish community, and also dismissed it as a psychotic episode" (Interviewee)

2.3 Perpetrators and impact of targeting on victims

We were interested in understanding any patterns that emerged from analysing perpetrator types, impact on victims, and actions taken in response to being targeted.

Perpetrators' profile

Overall, **the top three perpetrator groups** targeting victims were (Figure 2.8):

- **Extremist/hate activists or organisations (23%)[5];**
- **Faith activists or leaders (15%)[6]; and**
- **Community-based organisations or individual leaders (11%)[7]; and**
- **Members of the same or different community (10%)[8]** (see case studies 3 and 4).

[5] This overall figure combines the responses for 2 survey response categories: 'extremist of hate activist' and 'extremist or hate group/organisation'.
[6] This overall figure combines the responses for 2 survey response categories: 'faith activist' and 'faith leader'.
[7] This overall figure combines the responses for 2 survey response categories: 'community organisation' and 'community leader'.
[8] This overall figure combines the responses for 2 survey response categories: 'member of same community' and 'member of different community'.

Figure 2.8 Which of the following describes the perpetrator(s)? (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.30*
Base: *88*

Figure 2.9 breaks these down by individual and organisational respondent subgroups.

Figure 2.9 Which of the following describes the perpetrator(s)? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.30*
Base: *51 (individual), 37 (organisation)*

These perpetrators targeted victims both online and offline (Figure 2.10).

Figure 2.10 Which of the following describes the perpetrator(s)? Analysis by mode of targeting (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.30 and Q.23*
Base: *87*

The top five perpetrators targeted respondents using a nearly equal mix of five prevalent behaviours: *harassment, intimidation, ostracisation, propagation of smears,* and *verbal abuse* (Figure 2.11). Some nuances in behaviours included faith activists favouring ostracisation more than the others (14%), and extra-community perpetrators' increased use of intimidation (33%).

Ostracisation entails the social and community-based rejection of individuals in the form of overt and covert acts of exclusion and isolation. Such mechanisms can be understood as holding significant power on individuals generating pressure to conform, but also punish. The implications of not conforming can lead to dishonour and shame within their own community.

Figure 2.11 Which of the following describes the perpetrator(s)? Analysis of top 5 perpetrators by types of targeting (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.24 and Q.30*[9]
Base: *124 (Harassment), 131 (Intimidation), 62 (Ostracisation), 113 (Propagation of smear), 119 (Verbal Abuse)*

[9] Q24 and Q30 were multiple-response questions. The bases indicate the "number of responses". For example, a total of 56 responses corresponded to Harassment as the type of targeting by any of the five prevalent types of perpetrators (seen on the figure). The number of responses is not the same as number of respondents. In this case, we are unable to present the number of unique respondents underlying the data.

Perpetrator behaviours and triggers

We analysed specific perpetrator types against victim attributes such as their work roles and protected characteristics. The top two perpetrators for which we recorded the most responses – extremist individuals and extremist organisations – targeted victims because of them being in the public domain in some way (Figure 2.12, also case study 3).

A deeper analysis of these contexts revealed that targeting triggers were linked to:

- **expressing a view online (approximately 29%, varying by perpetrator type);**
- **delivering work to promote or uphold democracy, rights, or equality (approximately 27%, varying by perpetrator type); and**
- **engaging with the media (19%).**

Figure 2.12 Context/trigger of the perpetrator's extremist behaviour. Analysis by top two perpetrator types (Overall) [10]



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.28 and Q.30*
Base: *77 (extremist individual), 74 (extremist organisation)*

[10] Q28 and Q30 were multiple-response questions. The bases indicate the "number of responses". For example, a total of 33 responses corresponded to extremist individual as the type of perpetrator by the trigger of targeting (seen on the figure). The number of responses is not the same as number of respondents. In this case, we are unable to present the number of unique respondents underlying the data.

Case Study 3: Interviewee account of being targeted by an intra-community perpetrator

Who I am

I'm an academic and a member of the Sikh community. I have witnessed that there are individuals in a few particular groups who use extreme language to create fear and disruption within our community. From those particular groups and individuals of the Sikh community, there was a very strong anti-Muslim and anti-British state rhetoric.

What happened to me

I started calling out problems within our community. As a result, I've become a target for extreme groups. They felt they needed to shut me down. The main driver is they don't approve of an individual from within the Sikh community highlighting the problems of the Sikh community itself. They targeted me personally, on social media, on TV or by attending events that I might be doing. They wrote stories about me in Indian/Sikh media, went on Sikh TV channels, put my picture up and said that I am against the Sikh community, anti-panthic.[1] That's a very strong term to use. If they use a term like that, it creates a feeling that you disrespect the religion and that you are against the community. They threatened to release my address. They knew where my parents lived. They made complaint upon complaint to my employers, their intention was to get me sacked. The community, while large, is small compared to others. So I've come across them in certain events and our paths do regularly cross. I know who they are, and they know who I am.

How I coped and how I was/was not supported

My employer took things seriously once it all went out of control. There were a few men who really did support me from within the community, women were more reluctant to do so publicly because they feared being attacked themselves. A lot of the people would send me private messages saying, 'we're right behind you,'. But they weren't prepared to make themselves publicly known that they support me. I had more support from people outside of my community. My employer took things seriously once it all went out of control.

How this impacted my life

I'm just going to carry on doing and saying what I'm doing and saying. There were particular incidences between 2017 -19 when things got really bad and that had an impact on me. . But then Covid-19 came and that gave me time to rethink and regroup. I thought to myself, 'no, I'm not letting them win on this one because I'm not saying anything wrong.' As a member of the community and as a woman of faith, I'm not doing anything to bring disrepute to the community. What I'm trying to do is highlight that there are certain problems that we need to address, but we need to address in a particular way.

A way forward

I think there needs to be more training and understanding about intra-community tensions, as well as a particular focus on the impact coming from the targeting of particular individuals on the individuals themselves. For them (police, statutory services) to understand that when certain words are used and when members of a community are being targeted, particularly women, they have serious consequences for their safety and position within the community. Professionals need to understand what the implications are of the intra-community tensions and then how that does impact members of a small community. And this is something that I suppose the police, etc., currently don't understand. They don't understand what words or images may mean or the intentions behind them.

Interviewees believed perpetrators targeted them because of:

- the work they were doing (typically in education or the community);

"I think he had general opposition to the Sexual and Relationship Education agenda, and I think he was surprised to find somebody who wasn't supporting his position online" (Interviewee)

"They [demanded]… that I be sacked, that the module be scraped, that I was Islamophobic" (Interviewee)

- support they expressed for a government policy online, with the Prevent programme being singled out, where: *"her comments were supportive of the agenda and then it all got quite nasty" (Interviewee)*.

Perpetrators targeted them due to a combination of interviewees' personal characteristics (protected or otherwise) and the subject matter they were working on. For example, being a woman delivering work in the community to promote social cohesion or belonging to a religious community and the LGBTQIA+ community.

"He may eventually have found me because a lot of the work that I do is around social cohesion, so I think it is directly related to that. I think the other thing is I seem to be a left-wing woman who is in politics" (Interviewee)

Perpetrator behaviours and outcomes

The majority of respondents (61%) recorded no actions or outcomes for perpetrators irrespective of whether targeting incidents were reported or not reported.

Some reported that perpetrators had either not been active recently, or that they were unaware of any outcomes:

"The outcome of complaints of violence heaped on people who attended the event was not made public" (Survey respondent)

Most interviewees similarly reported that the perpetrator was either never found/identified or reported no outcome following an investigation into the targeting.

"So one of the dissatisfying things was that they just in the end sent me an email going, 'Okay there's been no activity from this guy for this length of time so we're going to shut this case down" (Interviewee)

These findings indicate the importance of follow-up communication to victims after an investigation, irrespective of whether there is an outcome or not.

Only one interviewee discussed a clear outcome for the perpetrator, although this was not linked to any actions or investigations conducted by the police or another authority. Instead, it was resolved by the perpetrator's employer: *"he got thrown out of the company" (Interviewee)*.

Impact of targeting on victims

Whether responding as individuals or in an organisational capacity, victims reported two main types of impacts:

- **impact on personal and family life (44%)**; and
- **psychological impact (32%)**.

Examples of impact on personal and family life (highlighted in mustard in Figure 2.13) include damage to professional, personal, or social life and ostracisation from the community. Examples of psychological impact (highlighted in teal in Figure 2.10) include poor mental health, low self-esteem and loss of trust in

others. **Both types of impact were predominantly reported irrespective of whether victims were targeted offline, online or both**.

Figure 2.13 What was the impact on you/the individual of being targeted by extremists? (Overall)[11]



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.32*
Base: *90*

Psychological impact emerged as the more widely reported form (64% of total impact on average) when victim impact was broken down by the top five types of victimisations experienced (see three shades of teal in Figure 2.14).

Figure 2.14 What was the impact on you/the individual of being targeted? Analysis by top 5 types of targeting (Overall)[12]



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.24 and Q.32*
Base: *170 (Harassment), 179 (Intimidation), 98 (Ostracisation), 141 (Propagation of smears), 145 (Verbal abuse)*

[11] Multiple colours (purple, mustard and teal) are used to illustrate survey findings at an overall level grouped according to a specific theme. The findings in purple are based on <10 responses.
[12] Q24 and Q32 were multiple-response questions. The bases indicate the "number of responses". For example, a total of 105 responses corresponded to Harassment as the type of targeting by the prevalent impact on the targeted individuals (seen on the figure). The number of responses is not the same as number of respondents. In this case, we are unable to present the number of unique respondents underlying the data.

Interviews highlighted the full range and intensity of impact, such as:

- developing feelings of paranoia, lasting emotional trauma and increased anxiety;

"I was really spooked when this stranger turned up and it coincided with my tyres being slashed and all the rest of it, it was horrible" (Interviewee)

- the physical toll and related impact of targeting; and

"She had a period of sickness as a result of stress and the effects of the whole thing on her" (Interviewee)

- the reputational and career damage faced included being ostracised by colleagues.

"[They] wanted to end my career, destroy my reputation, deprive me of my livelihood, and ostracise me from my colleagues. They did it all this wilfully or recklessly disregarding the risk to my physical well-being. It was an emotionally terribly, terribly damaging" (Interviewee)

Respondents also reported the ongoing nature of the impact where the targeting episode took place over a period of time. For the significant majority (79%) the extremist behaviour remained ongoing (including, sporadically), irrespective of the types of victimisations experienced. Figures 2.15 and 2.16 report these figures broken down by respondent subgroup and analysed by the top five types of targeting.

Figure 2.15 What has happened as a result of this extremist behaviour? Analysis by top five types of targeting (Individual)[13]



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.24 and Q.31*
Base: *33 (Harassment), 35 (Intimidation), 22 (Ostracisation), 31 (Propagation of smears), 32 (Verbal abuse)*

[13] Q24 and Q31 were multiple-response questions. The bases indicate the "number of responses". For example, a total of 37 responses corresponded to Harassment as the type of targeting by the prevalent results of targeting (seen on the figure). The number of responses is not the same as number of respondents. In this case, we are unable to present the number of unique respondents underlying the data.

Figure 2.16 What has happened as a result of this extremist behaviour? Analysis by top five types of targeting (Organisation)[14]



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.24 and Q.31*
Base: *38 (Harassment), 41 (Intimidation), 16 (Ostracisation), 28 (Propagation of smears), 33 (Verbal abuse)*

The majority of individuals and organisations (74%) reported the impact of being targeted as lasting for more than 6 months (Figure 2.17), **reflecting that even if incidents stop, victims' psychological wellbeing and everyday lives remain affected for some time.** Interestingly, no organisational respondents reported the impact as 'ending immediately'.

Figure 2.17 How long has the impact of being targeted lasted? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.33*
Base: *46 (individual), 34 (organisation)*

Responses to interviews reflect the full range of ways through which victims were impacted:

"It's just a place, the physical place of [work] is just something that's got unpleasant associations for me. I mean, the whole thing still rumbles around my head and I still find myself thinking just these depressive thoughts about it" (Interviewee)

"For me personally, I have…loss of career? Almost, I mean, [it's a] mess in the workplace" (Interviewee)

[14] Ibid.

"So there's a great big vacuum in place of me being able to lay it to rest, the police may have laid it to rest, and I do keep on wondering if he's going to pop up again at some point, but there's nothing anybody can really do about that" (Interviewee)

"It affected her confidence without a doubt and actually, she's now left [her role] and will openly admit that incident and the difficulties of working within the Prevent agenda. She felt she needed to move on" (Interviewee)

A minority of individuals that have spent considerable time working on countering extremism expressed having become numb to being targeted: *"I've been working on this for a while, so I'm very numb to a lot of things" (Interviewee).*

2.4 Reporting of targeting incidents

Overall, survey respondents primarily reported targeting incidents to the police/law enforcement bodies (35%), followed by not reporting the incident at all (26%).

When broken down by individual versus organisational subgroups, **a bigger proportion of individuals did not report targeting incidents (35%) in clear contrast with organisational respondents (12%)** (Figure 2.15 below). This, perhaps, reflects the hesitation, perceived difficulties, and lack of awareness amongst both victims and public bodies of the processes and issues in relation to this type of targeting and abuse. The quotes below capture why individuals did not report incidents:

- Most believed that their report would not be taken seriously, or that the police/authorities would not investigate the incident:

"I don't think the police would do anything about it, or it wouldn't be taken seriously" (Survey respondent)

"Seen as pointless to report. Police or local authorities do not have capacity to act on racism/ anti-immigrant behaviour." (Survey respondent)

- Some wanted to avoid further damage to family relationships or with a known perpetrator:

"I did not want to further damage the relationship and thought he [the perpetrator] would feel sorry for his behaviour" (Survey respondent)

"[Perpetrator] belong[ed] to the same group/community" (Survey respondent)

- Some felt able to handle the behaviour themselves:

"[I] felt I could handle it and [didn't] want to waste police time or exacerbate the situation" (Survey respondent)

- Some feared repercussions:

"Fear of inviting more backlash" (Survey respondent)

"[I was] threatened with injunction and no legal aid to fight back" (Survey respondent)

- Some didn't know how to report the incident:

"*I didn't know what to do" (Survey respondent)*

"[I] was not aware of the procedure or person to report such [an incident to]" (Survey respondent)

- Some reported it, but only to their employer or place of work:

"I only reported it to [manager], our team leader" (Interviewee)

- It did not occur to some to report the incident, or they were unaware that they could do so:

"No. It wouldn't have occurred to me to report it at all" (Interviewee)

Most interviewees representing organisations recognised that under-reporting of extremist incidents is a major issue, and felt that civil society organisations have the potential to play an important role in supporting victims in this regard:

"One of the things that people tell us is that they don't necessarily always want to report to the police, maybe they are fearful. For example, people who may be subject to online bullying or something like that who are gay, for example, they might not be out..." (Interviewee)

"We need to work alongside the police to help individual citizens to understand their role in safeguarding each other and also building cohesive communities, because I don't necessarily think that the public have an understanding of their role within that and that they are part of the puzzle" (Interviewee)

Figure 2.18 If you/the individual reported the incident, who was it reported to? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.34*
Base: *48 (individual), 33 (organisation)*

Respondents also reported incidents by posting them on social media platforms (8% for individuals, 6% for organisations), and reporting to community organisations or leaders (10% for organisational respondents) (Figure 2.18 above).

Figure 2.19 If you/the individual reported the incident, who was it reported to? Analysis by top three types of targeting experienced (Individual)[15]



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.34 and Q.24*
Base: *27 (Harassment), 30 (Intimidation), 26 (Verbal abuse)*

[15] Q24 and Q34 were multiple-response questions. The bases indicate the "number of responses". For example, a total of 27 responses corresponded to Harassment as the type of targeting by the prevalent reporting behaviours (seen on the figure). The number of responses is not the same as number of respondents. In this case, we are unable to present the number of unique respondents underlying the data.

When analysed by the top three forms in which respondents were targeted (harassment, intimidation, and verbal abuse)[16], individuals were more likely to report harassment to the police/law enforcement bodies (41%) and not report verbal abuse (50%) or intimidation (43%) at all (Figure 2.19). As a contrast, organisational respondents were likely to report to the police in bigger majorities (on average, 60%) despite the form of victimisation experienced. Unlike individuals, they also reported incidents to community organisations/leaders and local MPs/Councillors (Figure 2.20). This highlights the value given to local level actors by organisations when it comes to reporting, and by extension, resolving targeting episodes.

Figure 2.20 If you/the individual reported the incident, who was it reported to? Analysis by top three types of targeting experienced (Organisation)[17]



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.34 and Q.24*
Base: *16 (Harassment), 19 (Intimidation), 16 (Verbal abuse)*

Unsurprisingly, the majority (74%) of those that reported incidents to the police/law enforcement rated the response (or lack of) received as poor or very poor.

2.5 Support received after being targeted

Overall, respondents that reported targeting incidents to various actors/bodies:

- **received no response or action (33%);**
- **were provided verbal reassurance (13%);** or
- **had safety measures implemented (12%).**

Many that specifically approached the police or other law enforcement bodies received no response or action (48%) (case study 4).

[16] We only had sufficient data on reporting of incidents against the top 3 forms of victimisation
[17] Ibid.

Case Study 4: Interviewee account of someone who did not feel supported by the police after being targeted

Who are they

They are a member of the Jewish community, where they are a regular at the various events held by the community.

What happened to them

They were going home from work on the train. At the station there was a Menorah (eight-branched candelabrum significant in Jewish practices around the Jewish festival of Hanukkah). There was a man there who asked them if they were Jewish. They said no, then the man replied, 'If you see a Jew, bring him to me.' They went on with their business and went to a supermarket. The man followed them in and heard them mentioning his behaviour to another person. He heard this and shouted at them, 'You ARE Jewish.' He came up to them, punched them, pushed them up against the food aisles and they saw him reach into his pocket as if to pull out a knife. They managed to escape but he took their bag and ran out with it. He made a throat slitting gesture, and they were very shaken up by this. There was a clear motivation from the perpetrator that he was looking for Jews and wanted to harm them. We imagine that the perpetrator saw a symbol of Judaism and sees it as a symptom of a wider stereotype and that symbology is ultimately, to these people, a threat of some kind. Each Hanukkah we see an increase in antisemitic incidents directed towards Jewish symbology and people.

How they coped and how they were/were not supported

Well, the police engagement wasn't as good as we had hoped. The initial responding officer classified it as a knife crime. The police didn't consider the hate element, even though it was clearly targeted against the Jewish community and dismissed it. Only afterwards when they spoke to police contacts, did they admit that it was a complete misclassification. The investigation didn't go beyond a very preliminary stage. They did engage with Jewish communal organisations for emotional support.

How this impacted their life

It has an emotional and mental toll. They were, in the weeks after, completely shaken up by it. Fortunately, most Jewish people in the UK are able to live confidently and without expecting something this aggressive and violent would happen to them. So, there is then a fear of being Jewish in public, of being even in the vicinity of a Jewish space. They thought that this guy might stab them, and that leaves a longer lasting emotional impact which takes a while to recover from.

A way forward

It's also important to say that, in general, the police respond quite well, and that the Jewish community have high levels of confidence in the police and in authorities to deal with this. However, in this case, and others (certainly not all cases), there are different points along the criminal justice system that fail victims with this sort of incident. In this case, it came down to which police officer's desk it landed on. And also signposting victims to other forms of support. Where the victim can be supported through that whole process. Have it explained to them how it works, what to expect when they go to court. Have them accompany them to court itself, just in no legal capacity, but just as a kind of moral support, and throughout offer this more extensive, therapeutic support.

When compared by respondent subgroups (Figure 2.21), higher numbers of individuals reported receiving no response or action (56%) in contrast with organisational respondents (13%). Besides this key difference, the trends reported were broadly the same between respondent subgroups.

Figure 2.21 What was the response received after reporting the incident? (Individual vs organisation)[18]



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.36*
Base: *28 (individual), 29 (organisation)*
Note: *Criminal justice system is shortened to CJS*

Where support was received, the specific forms of support that victims rated highly included:

- **informal emotional support (60%);**
- **implementation of safety measures (50%); and**
- **referral to the criminal justice system and the subsequent investigation that was carried out (40%).**

Referrals to Victim Support or a similar body were rated to be poor/very poor (75%).

Additional analysis indicated that the majority (74%) of those that reported incidents to the police/law enforcement rated the response (or lack of) received as poor or very poor.

Interviews highlighted what was done well in terms of support received, with no clear consensus around strong support from any one source:

- The majority noted that appropriate, proactive action was taken, with reassurances that their concerns were heard:

"Police used powers to move perpetrators to more suitable protest location, issued warnings about online false or inaccurate claims. Council's work with the actual community leaders and in providing community reassurance neutralised the actor's claims" (Survey respondent)

[18] Note totals do not sum to 100% due to rounding.

- Some also felt that the support received was prompt and acknowledged their concerns.

“Good swift response [and] same day call back” (Survey respondent)

- One respondent described what they thought a good response should be: incidents proactively investigated, victims informed of any outcomes, and signposted to Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs):

“*However, a good response and support after reporting an incident would include access to specialist police officers trained in apostasy and the issues apostates experience, access to duty solicitors, a follow-up process/being informed of the outcome of investigation [and] appropriate referral pathways or signposting to provide emotional and practical support” (Survey respondent)*

- Some respondents felt that the quality of the support they received from the authorities would have improved had their complaints been proactively investigated. Since their complaints were not taken seriously, that prevented them from receiving any further, higher quality support that might have been offered to them.

  “I am reporting two case studies, one of which is a refugee…I felt the refugee incident could have been taken more seriously” (Survey respondent)

3. THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Key Messages

Social cohesion: Ratings, priority, and concerns

1. Respondents rated the following factors as most important in deciding how socially cohesive a local area was:
    a. lack of racial or religious discrimination (96%);
    b. people from different backgrounds getting on well (93%);
    c. trust in democratic institutions (93%); and
    d. public rejection of divisive extremist actors in the community (93%).
2. They drew upon several sources of information in making this assessment:
    a. local surveys or data/metrics provided by public bodies;
    b. increased rates of participation in politics;
    c. narratives in newspapers and social media; and
    d. presence of community development programmes.
3. Nearly half respondents (42%) rated their local areas to be somewhat/a lot cohesive.
4. No clear trends emerged in analysing overall ratings, however, almost half of organisational respondents (46%) believed LAs were giving social cohesion issues a high priority.
5. Most (54%) expressed high levels of concern about extremism in their local areas. Survey open-ended responses illustrated the types of activities undermining cohesion:
    a. increased incidence of events such as marches, protests, boycotts; and
    b. activities motivated by racial and ethnic differences (including policy initiatives) that strain community relationships.

Local authority policies and practices

1. The majority did not know if their local authority had any policies on social cohesion (66%) or preventing and countering extremism events (61%), highlighting a gap in the general public's understanding and LA strategies for disseminating information on policies among communities.
2. Those who were aware of policies demonstrated a positive outlook, rating them as somewhat or very effective (45%). Open-ended survey responses described them as focused on developing community cohesion services, tackling extremism and hate crimes, and promoting equality and diversity.
3. Policies covering intra-community tensions were missing from survey responses, reflecting a significant gap in existing policy scope, considering the incidence of intra-community tensions and a lack of their recognition reported earlier in Chapter 2.
4. Nearly all respondents (82%) were unaware of the involvement of Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) in communities. Where aware, almost all (83%) reported that LRFs had not been involved following extremist incidents. These findings highlighted the need to generate awareness and visibility of joined up working in relation to extremist incidents.
5. The majority (68%) did not know if local authorities or public bodies recorded data on targeting experiences. Where aware, most (56%) reported that such data was not recorded, highlighting a potential gap in people's awareness as well as the government's policy and procedures linked to documentation.

6. Responses to open-ended survey questions highlighted the following good practices followed by local authorities in building cohesion and responding to extremist incidents:
    a. Responding to incidents through increased monitoring, support and training to frontline workers;
    b. Improving communication and networking by building community partnerships;
    c. Supporting projects and activities of community organisations and victims through resources; and
    d. Community-based mediation, information, and awareness generation.
7. Examples of poor practices followed by local authorities included a lack of engagement with communities and sharing of information or intelligence across different bodies, and inconsistent policy approaches that lacked longevity.
8. Respondents believed governance issues (37%) posed the biggest obstacles to LAs' policy development and implementation. These included:
    a. competing priorities or statutory duties (10%);
    b. lack of central government guidance on policies (10%);
    c. lack of political will (9%); and
    d. lack of courage in tackling issues (8%).
9. Obstacles linked to skills and resources were also reported (31%), especially by the organisational respondent subgroup.

Support from local authorities to local actors working on promoting social cohesion and countering extremism

1. Overall, less than a quarter (23%) of respondents rated the support from local authorities to local actors as being good or outstanding.
2. Respondents highlighted two sets of barriers faced by LAs in supporting those working on social cohesion and extremism issues:
    a. Linked to policy and knowledge (43%) such as a lack of understanding of extremist ideologies (15%), central government guidance (12%) or best practice sharing (11%), presence of policies and procedures (11%) and low staff knowledge (9%).
    b. Linked to staff (17%) such as a lack of diversity in local authority and public bodies (12%); and high staff turnover (6%).
3. Over half (56%) of survey respondents believed that the biggest impact of low levels of support and protection to local actors was its effect on local community cohesion, specifically:
    a. increase in extremist and divisive narratives in the community (22%);
    b. increase in community tensions, hate crimes, and public disorder (21%); and
    c. reduction in counter-extremism or social cohesion work in the community (13%).
4. A quarter also reported impacts on the workforce, such as negative impacts on emotional and mental health (13%); and challenges in recruitment/retention (12%).
5. Overall, over a third (38%) expressed the need for workplace support, reflecting potential gaps in current provision in relation to financial needs (11%); legal needs (10%); emotional needs (9%); and medical needs (both physical and mental health) (8%).

6. Just over a third (36%) expressed the need for public support including from the community in general (13%), public backing through the local authority (12%), and political support by the public (11%).
7. A quarter expressed the need for advice on security and safety (13%) and on where further support could be sought if needed (12%), reflecting the need for greater awareness and confidence about sources of help and support for local actors.
8. Survey open-ended responses highlighted the following examples of good forms of support to local actors working on social cohesion and extremism issues:
    a. Sharing information on best practice between local actors via networks or partnerships;
    b. Facilitating actors' understanding of community issues through local forums; and
    c. Improving data collection on and monitoring of incidents.
9. Survey open-ended responses also provided the following examples of poor forms of support to those working on social cohesion and extremism issues:
    a. Actors' lack of recognition of and engagement with local groups;
    b. Unclear policies/procedures on how to consistently approach and deal with issues;
    c. Siloed working approaches between national and local organisations;
    d. A lack of trust between different practitioners, which reduces the likelihood of working together in the future; and
    e. The short-term nature of programmes and lack of consultation with local actors.

Role of the national government

1. A third of survey respondents believed that the government plays neither a helpful nor unhelpful role in supporting local cohesion and counter-extremism efforts.
2. Open-ended survey responses highlighted the following as particularly unhelpful:
    a. A lack of a cohesive national approach and engagement with professionals; and
    b. Inconsistent national policy approach, where the narrative is often at odds with actions.
3. Survey responses also highlighted what was found helpful:
    a. The impact of national government resources deployed to deliver local activities; and
    b. The implementation of programmes designed to counter extremism and build the capacity of local authorities.
4. Overall, over half (54%) of the respondents expected the national government to provide advice and direction, specifically guidance on building social cohesion (19%), staff training (18%), and sharing of best practice (17%).
5. About one-third also expected the national government to provide resources (34%), including increased funding (20%) and other forms of dedicated centralised and mobile resources (14%).

3.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses survey responses on the role of local authorities and public bodies in:

- Promoting social cohesion and resilience to extremism; and
- Reducing the impact of acute and long-term conflict, division, and extremist activity.

There is a duty placed on local authorities and public bodies to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism (the Prevent Duty). The survey sought to understand the role of local authorities and public bodies in wider extremist activity that falls below the threshold of terrorism.

The analysis covered six key areas:

1. Social cohesiveness of local areas;
2. Priority given to social cohesion and concerns about extremist activity;
3. Local authority policies and practices on building social cohesion and countering extremism;
4. Local authority support to those actors working on promoting social cohesion and countering extremism; and
5. Role of the central government in building social cohesion and countering extremism.

3.2 Social cohesion: Ratings, priority, and concerns

Overall, respondents rated the following four factors as most important in deciding how socially cohesive a local area is (Figure 3.1):

- **lack of racial or religious discrimination (96%);**
- **people from different backgrounds getting on well (93%);**
- **trust in democratic institutions (93%); and**
- **public rejection of divisive extremist actors in the community (93%).**

Figure 3.1 Rate the importance of the following in determining how cohesive an area is (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.44*
Base: *The number of responses to categories presented in the left-panel ranges between 160-194*

Analysis of the open-ended survey questions indicated that respondents drew upon **several sources in assessing social cohesion**:

- **Local surveys** on data/metrics provided by other public bodies:

"Residents' feedback, crime statistics and analysis, research engagement from community's county councillor feedback, complaints, analysis of referrals to the local authority data from local counter terrorism policing, information provided by the OPCC" (Survey respondent)

- **Rates of participation** in politics[19], with increased participation seen as a positive for improving social cohesion:

"Political participation rates are one example of data that already exists which can be used for this purpose" (Survey respondent)

- **Narratives** in newspapers and social media:

"Indicators are social media comments from local people & newspaper narratives" (Survey respondent)

- Presence of community focused **development programmes**:

"Through our Community Safety Partnership, supported by operational arrangements" (Survey respondent)

The majority of respondents (42%) rated their local areas to be somewhat/a lot cohesive. When broken down by respondent subgroups (Figure 3.2), almost a third of individuals (29%) believed their areas were *not at all/a little* socially cohesive compared to 18% of organisational respondents.

Figure 3.2 How socially cohesive would you say your area is? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.45*
Base: *117 (individual), 66 (organisation)*

Individual respondents reported mixed views about the priority local authorities give to social cohesion in their local areas, with responses split by approximately a third each across 'low', 'medium', and 'high'. However, **almost half of organisational respondents (46%) believed local authorities were giving social cohesion a high priority** (Figure 3.3). However, this trend needs to be interpreted

[19] Political participation includes a broad range of activities through which people develop and express their opinions on the world and how it is governed, and try to take part in and shape the decisions that affect their lives. These activities range from developing thinking about social issues at the individual or family level, joining organizations or other groups, and campaigning at the local, regional or national level, to the process of formal politics, such as voting, joining a political party, or standing for elections.

with caution as several of the organisational respondents were representing the local public bodies being rated in the survey.

Figure 3.3 Please rate how much of a priority local social cohesion is within your local authority (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.47*
Base: *107 (individual), 63 (organisation)*

Concerns around extremist activity in local area

Overall, most respondents (54%) expressed high levels of concern about extremism in their local areas. Organisations were more concerned (68%) than individuals (46%) about high levels of extremist activity (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4 How concerned are you about extremist activity in your local area? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.48*
Base: *114 (individual), 66 (organisation)*

Further analysis showed that those who believed social cohesion was not a priority for their local authority were more likely to express higher levels of concern about extremist activity in their area (80% for organisations and 60% for individual respondents).

Open-ended responses to the survey illustrated the types of extremist activities undermining social cohesion:

- Increased incidence of events such as **marches, protests, boycotts** driven by extremist individuals/groups:

"Extremists try to boycott shops that are owned by some minority groups like Ahmadis. People will not engage on projects if Ahmadi members are also involved in projects" (Survey respondent)

- Activities motivated by **racial and ethnic differences**, including reactions to national policy initiatives, that strained community relationships:

"There has been an increase in activity mainly online due to the resettlement of refugees in some areas from anti minority groups" (Survey respondent)

"Far-right organisations demonstrating outside hotels housing migrants, including on one occasion managing to enter the premises. Upset and concern from local community [and] worry that tensions would escalate" (Survey respondent)

"Whenever Israel is in the news, students in Jewish schools experience an increase in victimisation travelling to and from school" (Survey respondent)

3.3 Local authority policies and practices

The majority of respondents (66%) did not know if their local authority had any social cohesion policies or procedures, including linked to preventing and countering extremist events (61%). This highlights a shortfall in both – the general public's understanding, as well as LA strategies for disseminating information on policies among local communities.

Figures 3.5 and 3.6 present a breakdown of responses by policy type and respondent subgroups (individual and organisational), showing that individuals were less likely to know about policies than organisational respondents. This was to be expected, as organisations were more likely to be aware of policies that directly impacted their work on social cohesion and countering extremism.

Figure 3.5 Does your local authority have social cohesion policies/procedures? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.50*
Base: *114 (individual), 69 (organisation)*

Figure 3.6 Does your local authority have policies/procedures on preventing and countering extremist events? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.51 and Q52*
Base: *116 (Individual), 66 (Organisation)*

Care should be taken when interpreting the analysis below. As Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show, a large proportion of survey respondents were unaware of their local authorities' policies. Therefore, analysis of their appropriateness, and any obstacles to effective policy formation and implementation is based on a very small subset of respondents.

The minority of respondents that were aware of policies (25% on social cohesion and 15% on preventing and countering extremism) described them as focused on:

- **Developing community cohesion services**. For example, residents' forums to help shape service delivery and develop networks between local communities:

"Online residents' Forum to shape the delivery of local services Programme of community researchers who reach out to minority communities staff networks and forums strategic Boards on community safety and cohesion" (Survey respondent)

- **Tackling extremism and hate crimes** and developing long-term strategies focused on reducing socio-economic inequalities:

"Our LA has an excellent 'community strategy' which has replaced the previous social cohesion strategy" (Survey respondent)

- **Promoting equality and diversity**:

"Equality and Diversity Policy to promote equality and challenge discrimination" (Survey respondent)

Policies covering intra-community tensions between members of the same ethnic, racial, or religious community were notably missing from survey responses – both in the examples above and in response to a specific survey question on this topic (71% did not know or were unaware of such policies). This was a significant gap in existing policy scope and awareness, considering the incidence of such incidents and the lack of their recognition, as reported by survey respondents in Chapter 2.

The respondents that were aware of policies demonstrated a generally positive outlook in rating existing policies and procedures on social cohesion and extremism to be somewhat or very effective (45%). When broken down by subgroup, more individuals than organisational respondents

rated existing policies as either ineffective (19% individual, 10% organisational) or counterproductive (14% individual, 10% organisation) (see Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7 How appropriate and effective do you consider LA cohesion and/or extremism policies to be? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.54*
Base:*43 (individual), 31 (organisation)*

Nearly all respondents (82%) did not know if their Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) had been involved in any response and recovery incidents following extremist incidents. **Almost all of those that were aware of their existence reported that LRFs did not respond following a local incident.** These findings highlight the need to generate awareness around LRFs' existence within communities and showcase any work done by them in responding to extremist incidents more widely within the local community.

The majority (68%, Figure 3.8**) also did not know if local authorities or public bodies recorded data on the experiences of those targeted by extremists.** When broken down by subgroups, more individuals (80%) than organisational respondents (53%) were unaware of this practice. **Of those that were aware, most (56%) believed that such data was not recorded, highlighting a potential gap in the public's awareness and the government's policy and procedures on the documentation of extremist acts.** Those who reported this data to be recorded believed it was reported as a hate crime or 'general' extremist activity.

Figure 3.8 Do local authorities and public bodies record data on experiences of those targeted and the support offered to them? (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.69*
Base:*85*

LA practices linked to social cohesion and extremism

Responses to open-ended survey questions highlighted the following **good practices in local authorities** (also see case studies 5[20] and 6):

- **Responding to extremist incidents** by increasing the monitoring of local online activity to map community perceptions, and using community impact assessment and monitoring frameworks:

"We are currently developing a' community tension' monitoring framework to support organisations to respond accordingly/proportionally to extremist attention/activity and help build a more resilient community. This framework will also include awareness raising with both professionals and communities linking to Hate Crime and Prevent agenda" (Survey respondent)

- **Improving communication and networking** by building partnerships between community organisations (such as, police, children's services and education services) to avoid siloed working, and proactively engaging with communities through building clear lines of communication:

"Communication links have been improved linking Prevent with other areas of safeguarding (e.g. neglect) through learning events and training development of a framework for schools to self-evaluate their Prevent work" (Survey respondent)

"[The] local authority has done good work going out and talking to local communities and building grassroots connections and trust. For example, [the] council has done work with faith-based organisations reaching young people and others at risk of radicalisation" (Survey respondent)

- **Increased support and training** to frontline workers in response to extremist or other events that may undermine social cohesion:

"Supportive resources provided to schools at the time of incidents with potential to undermine cohesion, e.g., resources provided when Russia invaded Ukraine. These [resources] support discussion in a safe space of issues and empower teaching staff to address issues" (Survey respondent)

- **Supporting projects and activities** of community organisations to bring people together:

"When we have invited local authority to inter faith events to promote community cohesion, they have been very supportive" (Survey respondent)

- **Supporting victims** (including communities, organisations, and those working on social cohesion and extremism issues) through resources:

"Supportive resources provided to schools at the time of incidents with potential to undermine cohesion…These support discussion in a safe space of issues and empower teaching staff to address issues" (Survey respondent)

- **Community-based mediation, information and awareness generation** efforts through suitable forums and projects:

"The Local Government Association (LGA) runs a special interest group on countering extremism which seems an effective forum for sharing good practice in building resilience to extremism" (Survey respondent)

[20] As has been outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the Prevent duty is placed on local authorities to give due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into **terrorism**, with extremist behaviour falling **below** its threshold. However, the local authority upon which this case study is based uses the Prevent duty as its policy framework for local efforts at countering extremism, reflecting a gap in policy provision on extremist behaviour and the local authority's understanding of what the Prevent duty covers.

Examples of poor practices cited by respondents:

- **Lack of engagement** with communities, including challenging divisive narratives:

"Failure to challenge groups and particularly individuals who support narratives/groups that undermine cohesion" (Survey respondent)

- **Lack of sharing of information or intelligence** across different organisations or bodies:

"There is the complication of currently being a two-tier authority which can limit the sharing of intelligence…It is felt that actions locally are more reactive rather than proactive and not always sharing good practice amongst the right forums" (Survey respondent)

- **Inconsistent policy approaches that lack longevity**, for example, when programmes are implemented without a long-term vison:

"Not applying a consistent approach and following through with it over several years. Change on these things must be generational, it can't be achieved with flash-in-the-pan, one-off projects" (Survey respondent)

Case Study 5: LA working to counter extremism in their area

Who we are

We are a very large geographical area with many districts, boroughs, and parishes. We have a contrasting mix of areas of wealth and deprivation within our borders, which can lead to a degree of social division in our communities. One of our strategic aims is building strong, inclusive, and resilient communities - this is threaded throughout everything that we do as a local authority.

How we define extremism

We see extremism as active opposition to the rule of law and fundamental British values, when people's freedoms are opposed and there is a lack of tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.

What we have done for countering extremism

Our anti-extremism work is focused on the Prevent duty although other areas of our work also counter extremism – for example our community safety work. We have training and confidential briefings for elected members. We have a multi-agency partnership board comprising (amongst others) of statutory, third sector, charitable, voluntary and faith partners, which we lead, facilitate, and hold accountability for. We also have clearly defined responsibilities under Channel which works through a multi-agency core group. We target and mainstream Prevent at every level, with clear reporting lines within wider safeguarding partnerships linked to adults, children and the community. Many who sit on the Prevent Partnership board also sit on other safeguarding and community-focused meetings - this continuity is important to us. We are not complacent and are conscious that delivery needs to be through the partnerships we develop. So, we have very established relationships in place already

The barriers we face

Our ability to contribute to this agenda is made more difficult due to the challenging position social care and partners are currently in as a result of austerity. Sometimes central government priorities are different to those of local government and decisions made centrally can provide challenges in local implementation - dialogue is always the best approach. It is important to have trust between central and local government.

Some communities hold negative views of national and local government's counter-extremism work – extremism is a controversial topic and some community members who support us in our counter-extremism work have found themselves ostracised by members of their own communities who do not support their work. Also some communities have felt demonised by the agenda. Some feel disenfranchised don't want to engage until there is a crisis – often the system is reactive and not proactive for these reasons. Faith leaders are an important group as they can hold a wealth of knowledge and influence in their communities and more energy should be applied here in terms of the reach they have into their own communities. Different priorities can make us forget that we're all on the same side.

A way forward

What is important is that we come together to discuss to find common ground and build trust with communities, who need to feel valued and respected. But we must be mindful of who community leaders are, as no one person can speak for everyone. Extremism work must recognise the level of influence that young people have in communities. Statutory organisations should have an advisory group that includes women and young people. When you have an integrated community that is respectful and tolerant, you know that you will not have cases where individuals are picked off by extremists or those who want to do us harm.

Case Study 6: LA working to promote social cohesion in their area

Who we are

Our area experiences far right activity both in person and online. This is further amplified by people who come into our city from other areas to protest and seed division. Local and national groups use divisive social issues to expand their reach and recruit unwitting followers through social media. There is an urgent focus needed to be given not just to street abuse, but the proliferation of extremism and hate online. We see ourselves as both responding to local issues and building capacity against future unrest and concern.

How we define social cohesion

Social cohesion isn't just about the colour of someone's skin or perceptions about race and religion, or how people arrive here. It is often an intersection of a lot of things. It is also not just about immigration, it's about social mobility as well. What it means keeps changing as society changes because a lot of it is intensely personal. Things can therefore get corrosive, which can fuel hate-based comments.

What we have done for social cohesion

We were one of 43 areas that had a Home Office funded post, but this was pulled. We have a forum comprising statutory partners, police, universities, community groups, and the football club foundation, where we try and work out a shared understanding of what we're all doing and share information about what we are seeing in communities. After funding cuts to the ASB Victim Support Service, we have set up a community safety service to support victims of neighbourhood issues which is now expanding to cover hate crime. The police have also reframed their Victim and Witness Service. We've gone for a third-party independent hate crime reporting service through Stop Hate UK. We also work through community events and projects via local authority and ward funds linked to integration and social cohesion. This funding has also been useful in getting new initiatives up and running. As an employer, we champion integration through our own code of conduct which sets minimum standards of behaviour, hate incident policies for staff and elected members and talk about government's Fundamental British values during training, including to the likes of city taxi drivers. We also run community safety operations in the city centre and on public transport through joint initiatives with the police, Business Improvement District and Passenger Transport Executive. We have standing advisory groups whenever there's a big event taking place, and arrangements in place especially if it can be divisive. I think we are particularly good at building links with non-traditional partners. We do youth engagement as well to address related priorities.

The barriers we face

We're all doing our own bit locally, but there's a gap at national policy level in terms of intentions. We also know the massive level of under-reporting around these issues. A key barrier for us is resources. If we had the resources and the requirement rather than just a requirement and no resources, maybe we could do more. I can't stress enough how challenging the online space is because it is difficult to tackle. For anything you do, we can get the 'Oh you're from the council,', so that sometimes puts a barrier up. We do have people that challenge us for some things we're saying promoting cohesion, not just about race, religion but also sexuality and gender. And if there's nothing to fill in the gap in our joint understanding of what cohesion means to government, there's not really a lot we can do - we don't have the cash or a national framework of assessment so we shouldn't really be surprised if some of these issues continue to grow.

A way forward

A way forward for local authorities is to help articulate how to build those connections at the local level, I would also argue for increasing the reporting of hate crime and discussion around why that might be a good thing. Also, working with the Local Government Association to set up a framework for assessing social cohesion that captures people's understanding of what cohesion is, documents good practices and identifies what needs measuring. We also have a role in coordinating and supporting others working in this space. It is a good thing to let people come up with their own solutions through community groups. But speaking to communities, make sure they're all alright is also important. Add some principles so that councils can know that they're on the right track, and then maybe some risk taking, and learning from research. I'm not asking for much am I?

Key obstacles in the way of local authorities to developing and implementing policies

Survey respondents were provided with a list of 13 potential obstacles in the way of local authorities developing and implementing policies, with the possibility to choose as many as were applicable. These were re-categorised into the four analytical categories presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Analytical categories: key obstacles to local authorities developing and implementing cohesion and extremism policies

RSM groups	Response option in the survey
Obstacles linked to governance/leadership issues	I. Competing priorities/statutory duties II. Lack of central government guidance III. Lack of political will IV. Lack of courage/institutional blindness
Obstacles linked to skills or resources	I. Insufficient funding II. Lack of long-term funding III. Low staff capacity IV. High staff turnover
Obstacles linked to strategy or knowledge	I. Lack of national strategy II. Low staff knowledge III. Lack of best practice sharing IV. Lack of long-term local strategy
Obstacles linked to extremist rhetoric and acts	I. Influence of extremist groups on local authority

Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.58*

Overall, respondents believed governance issues (37%) to pose the biggest obstacles in the way of policy development and implementation. These specifically included:

- competing priorities or statutory duties (10%);
- lack of central government guidance on social cohesion and extremism policies (10%);
- lack of political will (9%); and
- lack of courage (8%) in tackling these issues.

Obstacles linked to skills and resources were also widely reported (31%), especially among organisational respondents (26% individuals, 37% organisations - Figure 3.9).

Figure 3.9 What are the key obstacles to your local authority developing and implementing cohesion and extremism policies or procedures? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.58*
Base: *47 (individual), 34 (organisation)*

3.4 Support from local authorities to local actors

Overall, less than a quarter (23%) of respondents rated the support from local authorities to local actors as good or outstanding. When broken down by subgroups (Figure 3.10), individuals were more likely than organisational respondents to rate support as inadequate or counterproductive. This may be because the organisational respondents were working on social cohesion and extremism and were therefore more likely to say that the support they offer was good.

Figure 3.10 How would you rate the adequacy of local authority support for people working on counter extremism and social cohesion? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.81*
Base: *95 (individual), 63 (organisation)*

A more granular analysis revealed **strong associations between adequacy ratings of the individual** respondent subgroup and:

1. **The extent to which local communities works together to prevent extremism.** For example, individuals that believed their local community to not work together rated the support received from local authorities to be primarily counterproductive (92%);

2. **Level of priority given to social cohesion by local authorities**. For example, individuals that believed their local authority was giving a low priority to matters linked to social cohesion and extremism largely rated the support received from local authorities to be counterproductive (79%);
3. **How socially cohesive respondents thought their area was**. For example, individuals that rated their local areas to be low on social cohesion predominantly rated the support received from local authorities to be counterproductive (71%); and
4. **Levels of concern relating to extremist activity in local areas**. For example, individuals that reported high levels of concern around local extremist activities primarily rated the support received from local authorities to be counterproductive (60%).

Barriers to and impact of low levels of support to local actors

Respondents highlighted two sets of barriers (Figure 3.11) faced by local authorities in supporting those working on social cohesion and extremism issues:

1. **Linked to policy and knowledge (58%)** (highlighted in mustard in Figure 3.11), a lack of:
    - understanding of extremist ideologies (15%);
    - central government guidance (12%);
    - best practice sharing (11%);
    - policies and procedures (11%); and
    - low staff knowledge (9%)[21].
2. **Linked to staff (27%)** (highlighted in teal in Figure 3.11) such as:
    - a lack of diversity in local authority and public bodies (12%); and
    - low staff knowledge (9%); and
    - high staff turnover (6%).

Figure 3.11 What are the barriers faced by LAs and other public bodies in supporting people working on social cohesion and counter extremism? (Overall)[22]



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.83*
Base: *134*

[21] This sub-category appears across both 'policy and knowledge' and 'staff' categories but is highlighted in teal in Figure 3.11.
[22] Multiple colours (purple, mustard and teal) are used to illustrate survey findings at an overall level grouped according to a specific theme.

Analyses of open-ended survey responses illustrated how some of the above barriers manifested:

- **A lack of overall strategy**, including awareness of policies on social cohesion and extremism:

"If there are any policies and regulations in place, they are not widely known or seen to be being implemented" (Survey respondent)

- **A lack of central government guidance** on tackling extremism including clear definitions of what 'extremism' or an 'extremist organisation' is, and what other organisations (such as charities and community groups) are doing in local areas including current best practices:

"Central government guidance does not sufficiently prioritise such grassroots engagement or the necessary funding and resources for it" (Survey respondent)

- **A lack of engagement with local communities**, which leads to a poor understanding of extremist ideologies and local issues. This can lead local actors to sometimes partner with organisations that are seen as exacerbating social tensions:

"Extremism is poorly recognised. Even charities sometimes promote extremism, often under the cloak of the charitable purpose "the advancement of religion". This may be exacerbated by local authorities outsourcing service provision to religious groups" (Survey respondent)

- **Insufficient resources**, including funding and capacity. For example:
    1. A lack of capacity and staffing on existing programmes to deal with escalating instances of extremism or deliver services beyond core services covered by LAs;
    2. Limited or inconsistent funding which prevents the resolution of the lack of capacity; and
    3. Funding cuts anticipated from the central government that further exacerbate these issues.

"The barrier has been that funding has been inconsistent and temporary" (Survey respondent)

- **A lack of courage** or fear of causing offence. For example, limited confidence or action to target extremism within minority communities:

"Research has shown that schools lack the confidence and the training to teach about extremism effectively. Teachers need high-quality resources and training, curriculum time and they need support to know that they must address extremism directly, and not be put off by fear of causing offence" (Survey respondent)

"There is a general lack of care and concern to take action against the perpetrators of extremist attacks targeted at Hindu and Indian communities" (Survey respondent)

- **A perceived lack of political will to fully invest** in confronting extremism and promoting social cohesion, particularly in the face of other competing interests:

"There is a dearth in community leadership and sometimes vested financial and political interests that make real action impossible" (Survey respondent)

Over half of survey respondents (56% - highlighted in mustard in Figure 3.12) **believed that the biggest impact of low levels of support and protection to local actors was its effect on local social cohesion**. Specifically:

- increase in extremist and divisive narratives in the community (22%);
- increase in community tensions, hate crimes, and public disorder (21%); and
- reduction in counter-extremism or social cohesion work in the community (13%).

A quarter (highlighted in teal) also reported impacts on the workforce:

- negative impact on their emotional and mental health (13%); and
- challenges in recruitment/retention (12%).

Figure 3.12 What are the wider social impacts of low levels of support for people working on social cohesion and counter extremism? (Overall)[23]



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.82*
Base: *137*

Support expected for those working on social cohesion and extremism

Overall, **over a third** (**38%**, highlighted in purple in Figure 3.13) **expressed the need for workplace support** reflecting potential gaps in current provision in relation to financial, legal, emotional, and medical needs. **Just over a third** (**36%**, highlighted in teal) **expressed the need for public support of different types** including community support in general, local authority backing, and political support.

A quarter expressed the need for **advice on security and safety** and where further support could be sought as needed (highlighted in mustard), reflecting the need for greater awareness and confidence about sources of help and support for local actors.

Figure 3.13 What more protection and support should be offered to people working on social cohesion and counter extremism? (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.87*
Base: *153*

[23] Multiple colours (purple, mustard and teal) are used to illustrate survey findings at an overall level grouped according to a specific theme.

Half of the survey respondents (**50%**, highlighted in mustard in Figure 3.14) **expected such support to be provided by public authorities** whereas just over **a quarter** (**27**%, highlighted in teal) expected it to come from the **wider civil society, highlighting the need for both sets of actors to work together.**

Figure 3.14 Where should support for people working on social cohesion and counter extremism come from? (Overall)[24]



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.88*
Base: *152*

Survey open-ended responses highlighted examples of good forms of support to local actors working on social cohesion and extremism issues:

- **Sharing information on best practice between local actors via networks or partnerships**. Such networks should include a mix of national and community grassroots organisations that understand local issues:

"The National Consortium for Societal Resilience (NCSR+) is a collection of 60 local government and sector partners which represents 97% of the UK population. We're taking a strategic approach to working together to build societal resilience to emergencies - working across 97% of the UK population through our local government partners" (Survey respondent)

- **Facilitating local actors' understanding of community issues** through local forums and input from faith groups, LAs and regional Prevent teams:

"This local authority has done good work going out and talking to local communities and building grassroots connections and trust" (Survey respondent).

- **Improving data collection** on and monitoring of extremist incidents and activities:

"*We developed a Knowledge Hub group for capturing & exchanging local community tensions in detail with colleagues who also work in countering extremism and social cohesion such as Police and Fire and Rescue. We also use KHub and the LGA SIGCE group to learn and share best practice, acknowledging this is an ever-changing topic area" (Survey respondent)*

Survey open-ended responses also provided examples of poor forms of support to those working on social cohesion and extremism issues:

- Local authority's lack of recognition of and engagement with local groups, which hindered social cohesion efforts in communities;

[24] Multiple colours (purple, mustard and teal) are used to illustrate survey findings at an overall level grouped according to a specific theme.

- No clear policies and procedures on how to consistently approach and deal with local issues;
- Siloed working approaches between national and local organisations;
- A lack of trust between different practitioners working on local cohesion and countering extremism, which reduces the likelihood of working together in the future:

"Important local community partners are often blocked from engagement" (Survey respondent).

- The short-term nature of some programmes and lack of consultation with local actors:

"The short-term nature (2 weeks) of the move to repurpose the facility, the lack of consultation and the fast pace led to a series of avoidable impacts that extremist groups had on the local area and cohesive landscape" (Survey respondent)

3.5 Role of the central government

A third of survey respondents believed that the government plays a neither helpful nor unhelpful role in supporting local cohesion and counter-extremism efforts.

Figure 3.15 To what extent has the central government played a helpful role in supporting social cohesion or countering extremism efforts? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.65*
Base: *47 (individual), 34 (organisation)*

Follow-up questions highlighted what was **particularly unhelpful** about the role played by the central government:

- **A lack of a cohesive national approach** that needs more engagement with professionals working on social cohesion and countering extremism:

"[the] government have the whole picture in my opinion they are not doing enough to challenge or prevent [extremism]. The Government needs to more robust and engaging with citizens who have lived in this country over 15 years" (Survey respondent)

"I think there is disconnect there between what people expect and what actually can be delivered. I think also being candid, some of the decisions by central government don't help local authorities. And so more dialogue would be very, very helpful" (Interviewee)

- **Inconsistent national policy approach**, where the narrative of the government was often seen at odds with the message it was trying to promote, breeding mistrust:

"Inclusion, diversity, and acceptance are all encouraged in schools, but this is a difficult message to get across when poor communications from central government illustrate the opposite. Trust in central government is low, and this is echoed in lack of trust in local government to do the right thing" (Survey respondent)

"I think we observe the government's policy intentions and landscape around cohesion appears somewhat uncertain. Because there's a lot of almost tension building within the system to promote the political narrative…I felt there was like a certain vacuousness to phrases like levelling up, almost, like, an over-promise" (Interviewee)

Some respondents highlighted **what was helpful** about the role played by the central government:

- **The positive impact of investing central government resources** into local activities promoting social cohesion (alongside concerns about its sustainability):

"Our LA was a funded area, and this enabled significant development of cohesion work" (Survey respondent)

- **The implementation of certain programmes** designed to counter extremism (such as, Prevent) and build the capacity of local authorities to implement strategies based on local needs:

"The support from the Regional Prevent team. Local practices such as the Trusted Panel, made up of senior managers to listen to community grievances" (Survey respondent)

"We have a community engagement officer whose job is to build relationships with the different communities and find ways to bring people together. This is really positive and shows the council see cohesion as a top priority" (Survey respondent)

Types of support expected and the recording of extremist events locally

Overall, over half (54%) of the survey respondents expected the central government to provide advice and direction, specifically:

- guidance on how social cohesion and resilience could be developed in local areas (19%);
- staff training (18%); and
- sharing of best practice (17%).

About a third also expected the central government to provide resources (34%), including:

- increased funding (20%); and
- other forms of dedicated centralised and mobile resources (14%).

Figure 3.16 What kind of support should central government provide to local areas? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.67*
Base: *45 (individual), 33 (organisation)*

4. THE ROLE OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Key Messages

Responsibility to challenge extremism and protect social cohesion

1. Ninety per cent of survey respondents believed that local communities and civil society actors – in particular faith leaders, local authorities, schools/colleges, and local leaders - *should* have a responsibility to challenge extremism and protect social cohesion in their local areas.
2. Interviewees believed more joined up approaches between civil society, local government, statutory authorities and the third sector can positively impact the building of social cohesion and countering of extremism. Examples included:
    a. Providing the space and facilitating communities to come together.
    b. Setting up community forums to build links between community organisations.
    c. More effective signposting of support and services available to the local community.

Effectiveness in challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion

1. Civil society groups (49%), faith leaders (46%), and schools and colleges (44%) were found to play the most effective role in challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion. Interviewees highlighted:
    a. The role of faith leaders in developing and promoting interfaith community groups/forums, and dialogue between faith groups and those with non-religious beliefs, e.g., the LGBTQ+ community.
    b. The role of civil society groups and third sector organisations in running grassroots projects (e.g., food banks) to bring together those who do not usually have a voice in the community. They can also serve as third-party liaison organisations that work with statutory bodies, such as the police and hard to reach communities.
    c. The role of schools in educating children about fostering social cohesion in communities.
2. Although faith leaders were considered among the most effective actors, they were also reported to be the most counterproductive (14%).
3. Nearly a quarter believed local businesses were the most ineffective actors, closely followed by local leaders (18%) and local authorities (18%). However, interviewees highlighted the opportunity for local authorities to bring together local community groups, statutory bodies, and other organisations in civil society into community forums.

Key obstacles to challenging extremism in local areas

1. Governance bodies (33%) and skills and resources (31%) posed the greatest obstacles to challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion:
    a. Obstacles linked to governance bodies included, e.g., a lack of local/national political support and central government guidance, a lack of statutory duties, and poor join-up between communities, civil society organisations and local authorities.
    b. Obstacles linked to skills and resources included, e.g., a lack of resource and capacity, tools and training, unclear roles and responsibilities between various actors/bodies, and inadequate funding.

2. Survey open-ended questions and interviews suggested the need for:
    a. Developing awareness on extremism and supporting the education of communities about other faiths and groups.
    b. Engaging with and understanding the needs of minority groups' cultures and practices to effectively empower these communities.
    c. Creating spaces and promoting opportunities to hold community events.
    d. Implementing co-designed approaches to community projects.
    e. Extending training and education opportunities beyond the upskilling of professionals.

Cooperation in *preventing* extremist events from occurring

1. Forty-three per cent believed their local community did not work together to *prevent* extremist events from occurring. Just over a quarter each (28%) believed their local community worked together to a 'medium' or 'high' level.
2. Interviewees highlighted the following issues:
    a. A lack of engagement with local communities (e.g., the Traveller community);
    b. A lack of understanding of certain communities, e.g., who community leaders were or why communities might not wish to engage with local programmes;
    c. Contradictory or conflicting narratives from local/national government and community leaders that simultaneously talk about improving social cohesion, whilst also stoking divisions for political purposes.

Cooperation in *responding* to extremist events

1. Over a third (38%) believed that their communities worked together either somewhat or a lot to respond to extremist events when they occurred. Almost a third (30%) believed communities responded to a 'medium' extent, with a third reporting that they did not respond at all.
2. Respondents believed that community-building and inter-faith activities helped people come together and build trust. Examples included:
    a. Neighbourhood forums;
    b. Community festivals and carnivals that are accessible and free; and
    c. Civic responses to major events.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses survey responses to questions regarding the role of local communities and civil society in social cohesion and in preventing and responding to extremist events. The definition of local communities and civil society used in the survey is broad and comprises of:

- Faith leaders/ Places of worship;
- Local authorities/ Public bodies;
- Civil society groups (anti-racism group, social movement etc);
- Schools and colleges;
- Charities;
- Local leaders (councillors, local MP etc); and
- Local businesses (shop, sports club, music group, pub etc).

The analysis examines key areas in relation to the role of local communities and civil society, as follows:

1. Responsibility to challenge extremism and protect social cohesion;
2. Effectiveness in challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion;
3. Key obstacles to challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion in local areas;
4. Cooperation in preventing extremist events from occurring in local areas; and
5. Cooperation in responding to extremist events in local areas.

4.2 Responsibility to challenge extremism and protect social cohesion

Overall, 90% respondents believed that local communities and civil society actors *should* have a responsibility to challenge extremism and protect social cohesion in their local areas.

Figure 4.1 Should local communities be responsible for challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.73.*
Base:*114 (individual), 73 (organisation)*

On average, 90% (Figure 4.2) believed faith leaders, local authorities, schools/colleges, and local leaders should play an *important* role in challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion.

The individual respondent subgroup rated local businesses, local leaders, charities, educational institutions, and civil society groups as being relatively more important. Contrastingly, the organisational respondent subgroup perceived faith leaders and local authorities as being most important.

Figure 4.2 How important a role should local community actors play in challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion? (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.73 and Q.74*
Base: *185 (faith leaders), 162 (local authorities), 162 (civil society groups), 164 (School/colleges), 162 (charities), 164 (local leaders), 161 (local businesses)*

Interviewees believed more joined up approaches between civil society, local government, statutory authorities and the third sector could positively impact the building of social cohesion and countering of extremism. Examples included:

- **Providing physical space** to facilitate communities coming together:

"We would have a group of Bangladeshi women come in and use our space to have their meetings, do their prayer in, share traditions… the art gallery was then able to work with them to help enrich the art gallery. So any customer that would go into the art gallery would then experience Bangladeshi tradition and culture through the cooking and the fashion and the things that they would make for the gift shop" (Interviewee)

"Also when community groups are doing good things around social cohesion and integration, I think statutory bodies and public bodies need to be showcasing it more" (Interviewee)

- **Setting up community forums** to build links between community organisations that can be used to share best practice.

"I think what councils and councillors are particularly well practised at is building links. But I think what we are particularly good at is building links with non-traditional partners. So, we have that localised priority and action working through the ward communities or through our [LA] funds" (Interviewee)

"We have very close relationships with the police. So it helps to inform some of the training that we do, if we start seeing certain symbols (we had some areas which saw a spike in racist graffiti). And that training is delivered to schools, to teachers, headteachers and safeguarding leads" (Interviewee)

- **More effectively signposting** support and services available to the local community. This was regarded by some as particularly important for harder to reach communities:

"We work within the community hands-on, person to person, so I suppose we find it easy to access the community and find those harder-to-reach groups" (Interviewee)

4.3 Effectiveness in challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion

Overall, respondents reported civil society groups (49%), faith leaders (46%), and schools and colleges (44%) as playing an effective/very effective role (Figure 4.3) in challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion. While faith leaders were considered among the most effective actors, they were also reported to be the most counterproductive (14%), alongside local leaders (15%). Nearly a quarter believed local businesses to be the most ineffective actors, closely followed by local leaders (18%) and local authorities (18%).

Analysis by individual and organisational respondent subgroups replicated the trends above, demonstrating that all actors need to play a part in promoting a joined-up approach to ensure that communities are resilient and cohesively challenging extremism.

Figure 4.3 How effective are these organisations in challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion? (Overall)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.73 and Q.75*
Base: *170 (faith leaders), 148 (local authorities), 150 (civil society groups), 148 (School/colleges), 148 (charities), 149 (local leaders), 147 (local businesses)*

Interviewees discussed a range of examples of how communities and civil society could effectively challenge extremism and protect social cohesion. For example:

- **The role faith leaders could play in developing and promoting interfaith community groups and forums**. These were felt to be particularly effective during instances of increased tensions to promote dialogue and promote further understanding of different faiths and beliefs within a wider community:

"They come together, particularly at times of crisis to curb problems that might be bubbling up within communities. When you have such organisations who are established, visible within their communities and who can react to certain events that might create tensions, I think that is really positive" (Interviewee)

- Faith leaders' role in promoting both **interfaith dialogue especially between faith groups and communities with non-religious beliefs, for example the LGBT+ community**:

"We've got an interfaith commission…that is a way of trying to recognise the harm being done to LGBT people within faith communities but also hostility that exists back towards people of faith as well. So, there is quite a lot of work to do in that space" (Interviewee)

- The role of **local authorities in bringing together community groups, statutory bodies, and other organisations in civil society into community forums**. These were felt to be effective for promoting dialogue, including on what joined up approaches could be implemented:

"It is about supporting others really. The hate crime community tensions working group brings together a mix of statutory and non-statutory partners plus the universities. We just try to talk about what we are up to really, what the plan is, any events, what they are doing and what we are doing" (Interviewee)

- The role of **civil society groups and third sector organisations** in running grassroots projects (e.g., food banks) **to bring together groups who do not usually have a voice in the community**. Another role they can play is that of **third-party liaison organisations** that could work with statutory bodies such as the police and hard to reach communities:

"For example, if we wanted to follow up and ask how the investigation was going, or in some cases there might be additional elements of information or investigation that we can provide. Sometimes, the police or the CPS will ask us for a community impact statement, right, where we could present how this one particular case impacted the wider community" (Interviewee)

- **The role that schools play in educating children about fostering social cohesion in communities**. Often these initiatives were run by other organisations coming into schools to discuss social cohesion and extremism.

4.4 Key obstacles to challenging extremism in local areas

Respondents were asked about the key obstacles to local communities and civil society challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion. In analysing the responses, we have re-grouped the 17 categories against which responses were received in the survey (Table 4.1). **Overall, governance bodies (33%) and skills and resources (31%) were reported as the greatest obstacles to challenging extremism and promoting social cohesion.**

Table 4.1 Analytical categories: key obstacles to local communities and civil society challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion

RSM groups	Response option in the survey
Obstacles linked to governance bodies	I. Lack of central Government support/guidance II. Lack of local/national political support III. Lack of support from local authority IV. Lack of statutory duties V. Poor join up and collaboration between communities, civil society organisations and local authorities
Obstacles linked to civil society engagement	I. Lack of community support and partnership II. Lack of local civil society organisations/activity
Obstacles linked to skills or resources	I. Lack of resource and capacity II. Lack of tools and training III. Unclear roles and responsibilities IV. Inadequate funding
Obstacles linked to strategy or knowledge	I. Lack of strategy II. Low knowledge of or access to extremist actors/organisations III. Low levels of knowledge of best practice

	IV.	Inadequate guidance
Obstacles linked to extremist rhetoric and acts	I. II.	Threats and abuse from extremists and/or those who oppose counter extremism efforts Influence or support of extremist groups on communities and civil society groups

Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.78*

Nearly equal importance was given to these obstacles by individual and organisational respondent subgroups (Figure 4.4), suggesting that dealing with extremism requires a multi-level, long term and comprehensive approach.

Figure 4.4 What are the key obstacles to local communities and civil society in challenging extremism and protecting social cohesion? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.78*
Base: *108 (individual), 70 (organisation)*

Further analysis showed that the key obstacles identified specifically by respondents who believed their local community *did not* work well together to prevent extremist events from occurring were:

- **Lack of strategy (25%),**
- **Lack of guidance (21%) and**
- **Lack of central government support (21%).**

When broken by respondent subgroups, individuals rated a lack of guidance (19%) while organisational respondents rated central government support (26%) as being as the biggest obstacle.

Survey open-ended responses and interviews discussed examples of good practice that could help counter some of these obstacles:

- **Developing better awareness about extremism and supporting the education of communities about other faiths.** Specific examples included raising awareness of various efforts in the community to counter extremism, and providing education programmes in schools:

"StandUp! Education Against Discrimination do excellent work going into schools teaching about the importance of not being a bystander to racism and discrimination" (Survey respondent)

- **Engaging with and understanding the needs of minority groups' cultures and practices to effectively empower these communities**. Respondents felt that LAs and national bodies engaging with business, faith and community groups to amplify voices within the community was an effective tool in promoting social cohesion:

"Although it is tempting to listen to the loudest voices in the room on these issues, particularly when there are highly engaged groups at either end of the spectrum, it is essential to reach out to the whole community and not just listen to those who are most vocal" (Survey respondent)

- **Creating spaces and promoting opportunities to hold community events** that could bring together various groups and where "*engagement helps build up social cohesion, because it gives pathways to communities to communicate with one another*." (Interviewee).
- **Implementing co-designed approaches when designing community projects**. Co-design was felt to be a particularly important as it is a philosophy that incorporates many different voices when developing approaches to support social cohesion:

"*We're working very directly in communities for them to design what the future should look like, sound like and feel like*" *(Interviewee)*

- **Extending training and education opportunities beyond the upskilling of professionals** working to promote social cohesion and counter extremism in local communities. These could help empower communities to recognise and cope with extremism:

"So, my personal view is that we should extend our messaging and training to communities…there is a tendency to see professionals and communities as separate, but actually, it is the people who are walking around the streets during the day who are seeing things that could be important" (Interviewee)

4.5 Cooperation in *preventing* extremist events from occurring

Overall, 43% of respondents believed their local community did not work together to prevent extremist events from occurring. Just over a quarter each (28%) believed their local community worked to a 'medium' or 'high' level.

When broken down by respondent subgroups (Figure 4.5), nearly half of individual respondents felt that the local community did not work together effectively. With the other half almost equally split between those who believed local actors did so either partially or successfully.

Figure 4.5 To what extent does your local community work together to prevent extremist events from occurring? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.76*
Base: *100 (individual), 60 (organisation)*

Open-ended survey responses and interviews provided several examples of poor practices in relation to promoting social cohesion and countering extremism:

- Respondents most commonly reported a **lack of engagement with local communities** such as, the Traveller community, including little recognition of the stigma and hostility they frequently encounter:

"They were and are often spoken about as though they are not part of the community, as though they are only the instigators of ASB/crime, when in fact, they are often the victims. Discrimination towards our Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller community was, and is, often ignored by communities and civil society organisations" (Survey respondent)

- Others believed that whilst there were good intentions behind practices intended to empower local communities, these were **unfocused in their efforts to facilitate social cohesion** and failed to target and engage the right individuals or communities:

"*There is a lot of well-meaning but broadly unfocused activity, particularly in communications, which too often reflect the perspectives of those producing them, rather than identifying a relevant audience and targeting it effectively" (Survey respondent)*

- Respondents also noted a fundamental **lack of understanding of certain communities** as a poor practice. This included a misunderstanding of who in the community should be engaged with, or a lack of recognition around why communities might not want to engage with programmes in the first place:

"PREVENT co-ordinators/leads across Birmingham and Black Country are often recruited from ex-policing backgrounds - a sector that doesn't have the best record of reaching out to marginalised communities in the first instance" (Survey respondent)

- Other examples included **contradictory or conflicting narratives** from the local or central government and other community leaders that simultaneously talked about improving social cohesion, whilst also stoking further divisions for political purposes:

"Our key example of poor practice was some clearly see the benefits in fanning the flames of conflict. For politicians, it can help them rally their base and demonstrate their strength against opponents…this poisons the discourse on those issues and furthers polarisation" (Survey respondent)

4.6 Cooperation in *responding to* extremist events

Overall, over a third of respondents (38%) believed that their communities worked together either somewhat or a lot to respond to extremist events when they occurred. Just over one quarter (30%) believed communities responded to a 'medium' extent, with a third reporting that they did not respond at all.

When broken by respondent subgroup (Figure 4.6), individuals and organisations held divergent views. Over a third of individuals felt that their community worked together a little bit or not at all, in contrast to nearly half of organisational respondents who felt that the community worked together either somewhat or a lot. This indicates that individual respondents were, on the whole, less confident about whether communities worked together in responding to extremist incidents.

Figure 4.6 To what extent does your local community work together to respond to extremist events that actually occur? (Individual vs organisation)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.77*
Base: *99 (individual), 60 (organisation)*

The survey also asked how communities and civil society organisations empowered local communities to come together and challenge extremism. When asked to reflect on good practice respondents felt that community building activities and inter-faith activities helped communities to come together and build trust. **The specific community building activities included:**

- **neighbourhood forums;**
- **community festivals and carnivals;**
- **civic responses to major events** (i.e., We Stand Together in Manchester following the 2017 arena bombing); and
- **grassroot, local organisations organising accessible and free events that draw together various elements to local communities**, where events such as: *"Cultural festivals that are arranged in the community are always loved and well attended." (Survey respondent).*

Respondents said that faith communities working together to promote mutual trust and understanding through interfaith activities do not just promote dialogue between different faiths, but also between faiths and those of no religious denomination:

"The more general example is active local interfaith and belief forums, including humanist involvement in two south-west London boroughs, actively encouraging constructive dialogue and organising, for example, demonstrations of local solidarity comprising people from a wide range of religion and belief backgrounds in response to Islamic terrorist attacks, and the resultant rise in anti-Muslim prejudice" (Survey respondent)

5. CONCLUSIONS

This final chapter presents conclusions from the public consultation – both the survey and follow-on interviews with a subsection (15) of survey respondents – undertaken as part of the Independent Review of Social Cohesion, broken down into three thematic areas.

5.1 Victims, perpetrators and impact of extremist incidents

We found that perpetrators targeted individuals and organisations both online and offline. In the case of individuals, the intersection between the role that they played within a community and their personal characteristics was a key factor for triggering perpetrators' behaviours. Amongst the triggers mentioned, expressing a view or opinion online and engaging with the media were the most popular. When organisations were targeted, their work to promote democratic values within the community was the most common the trigger. Both groups (individual and organisational) were targeted with harassment, ostracisation, intimidation, propagation of smears, and verbal abuse. Ostracisation, in particular, was used by faith activists to isolate, exclude and punish individuals from religious communities.

The top three perpetrators were individual faith activists and leaders, and community-based individuals and organisations.

Despite the long-term and deep-rooted impacts of incidents on their own wellbeing and family life, most victims reported the incident to the police. Organisations were more likely than individuals to report it to the police. In addition, organisations recognised that the under-reporting of extremist incidents was a major issue facing civil society. They felt that many organisations across society, such as charities and community groups, could play a role in supporting victims of extremism to report these incidents. Irrespective of whether the targeting had been reported to the authorities or not, two thirds of respondents said that:

- there had been no outcome for the perpetrator (such as being arrested or fined);
- their experience was not adequately recognised by the law, the police or the government;
- their experience was not taken seriously;
- there was insufficient understanding of the issues surrounding their victimisation; and
- the actions of perpetrators were not sufficiently recognised by the law.

Interviewees also mentioned a lack of outcome following an investigation, or the perpetrator was simply never identified. These findings reflect the need for authorities to follow-up and communicate with victims following an investigation, irrespective of outcomes.

These findings lend to three specific recommendations in relation to victims, perpetrators and targeting behaviours:

1. There is a need for a clearer government policy framework that defines extremist acts and behaviours and provides a set of guidelines for supporting those victimised through targeting incidents, including the monitoring, and reporting of such incidents.
2. Greater levels of awareness need to be built among public authorities dealing with extremist acts and incidents on perpetrator types and the different forms of targeting behaviours, to enable greater adequacy of response mechanisms.
3. There is a need for improved reporting, investigation and follow-up procedures with those victims that choose to report targeting incidents.

5.2 The role of local authorities and central government

Although most respondents rated their local areas to be somewhat or a lot cohesive, they still expressed high levels of concerns about the potential of extremist incidents to undermine social cohesion. This was due to the increased occurrence of public marches or racial/ethnicity-based incidents that created tensions within the community.

Almost all respondents' understanding of local authority policies or practices relating to social cohesion and countering extremism were extremely low, including the involvement of the Local Resilience Forum after an extremist incident had taken place. Their awareness of whether local authorities recorded any data on targeting incidents was also low. While several good practices of the LA were highlighted, particularly the building and strengthening of local partnerships and community-based mechanisms for addressing and mediating tensions, several weaknesses remained. Particularly, lack of data and information sharing across different public and community bodies, poor guidance or political will in tackling issues, and deficits in terms of both skills and resources dedicated towards local cohesion building efforts. A lack of a cohesive national approach to these issues was also highlighted by respondents. As was poor levels of support to those working on social cohesion or countering extremism in local communities. Low support to these local actors was driven by an insufficient understanding of extremist ideologies, and a lack of diversity among staff in local authorities and public bodies. This impacted both the wellbeing and recruitment and retention of the current workforce in this space.

The above findings contribute towards six specific recommendations linked to local authorities and the central government:

1. Greater efforts should be made by local authorities and the central government to increase the public understanding of policies and practices linked to social cohesion and extremism and adequately recording monitoring data related to local provision and incidents.
2. There is a gap within existing policy relating to suitable guidelines for tackling intra-community tensions.
3. There is a lack of any clear policy or support guidelines relating to handling of extremist events that fall below the threshold of terrorist activity.
4. Greater support is needed for those working on building social cohesion and countering extremism in the form of greater workplace support (e.g., financial, legal and health related provisions), and advice on personal security and safety.
5. Greater engagement is needed between local authorities/public bodies and community-based actors or organisations, and closer working relationships between central and local governments and non-governmental bodies.
6. There should be a clear and cohesive national policy framework on social cohesion, investment of national resources in local cohesion initiatives, and increased guidance and support by the central government on building cohesive communities, training staff and through the provision financial and other forms of resources at the local level.

5.3 The role of local communities and civil society

The majority of survey respondents strongly believed that local communities and civil society actors can build social cohesion and challenge extremism in local areas through cooperation and collaboration. Civil society groups, faith leaders, and schools and colleges were noted as being particularly critical in such efforts through their ability to promote interfaith dialogue, run grassroots projects that bring communities together, and educate and foster social cohesion among children and young people. However, most respondents believed that the local community's efforts at working together on such issues were lacking

in relation to both – preventing extremist events from occurring and cooperating in responding to the incidents that did take place. Although local leaders and local authorities were rated by survey respondents as being among the most ineffective in social cohesion efforts, they believed these actors could play a key facilitatory role in bringing the other stakeholders together in addressing current weaknesses.

In this regard, a key weakness highlighted by a third of survey respondents included a lack of specific central and local government support, statutory duties, and guidance to enable local communities and civil society actors to build social cohesion and countering extremism. A second weakness highlighted by one-third of the respondents related to a lack of skills and resources to aid community actors in their work on social cohesion These types of barriers have also been reported in the context of the work of local authorities and the central government, highlighting the need to address them at all levels – central, local, and community – and in relation to the different groups of stakeholders invested in social cohesion issues.

These findings lend towards three recommendations for promoting a more joined-up approach to building social cohesion at the community level:

1. Local governments should play a greater role in facilitating cooperation between local communities, civil society (such as, faith leaders, schools, councillors and local businesses), third-sector actors (such as charitable organisations), and statutory bodies through providing the space, opportunity, and training and educational support to stakeholders to engage and work together.
2. Community-based organisations and civil society actors should generate awareness on extremism among communities, promote awareness of minority cultures and practices, and engage with and understand the needs of different minority groups within their communities.
3. There is a need to build and promote neighbourhood forums and organise community festivals for engaging communities and involving local residents in responding to any major events that occur within local areas.

APPENDIX 1 – METHODOLOGY NOTE

Survey data analysis

The descriptive analysis presented in this report has been based on: (i) tabulation of frequencies and percentages, (ii) crosstabulations between variables of interest using Chi square tests of association. (iii) Analysis of open-ended responses.

a) Frequency base of close-ended questions

There are several considerations that have been taken into account while reporting survey responses. First, in generating the visuals accompany the analysis, close-ended response categories against which no responses were recorded for a given survey question have not been reported. However, any additional insights that can be gleaned in relation to an absence of responses have been included within the accompanying text for that section.

Second, questions with low response rates have been filtered out from the analysis based on the following principles:

- generally, any questions with a total response rate of less than 30 have been excluded from the analysis,
- for multiple-choice questions, each sub-category of response has been reported only if it recorded 30 responses.

Third, questions with several response categories have been recoded to generate insights at a more aggregate level.

Fourth, in line with the survey's focus on England, any crosstabulations that analyse responses based on respondents' region have not included those responding from outside England (included the rest of the world). In a similar vein, any responses received from those who preferred not to disclose their location have been excluded from analysis.

b) Chi Square tests of association

A further component of the descriptive analysis presented in this report is based on conducting Chi square tests of association that demonstrate statistically significant associations between various variables of interest, to highlight any differences in responses between subgroups. The significance tests reported in this report have applied thresholds in a two-step process to analyse the quantitative data:

The first threshold relates to the total number of responses per category of response in a question. Any crosstabulations that do not meet a minimum threshold of 30 have been dropped from the analysis.

The second threshold relates to significant p values resulting from tests of association. A common industry standard of $p<=0.05$ has been applied, such that any Chi square tests of association that do not meet this threshold have been excluded from this report.

Where questions do not pass the significance tests thresholds but yield interesting insights, these have been reported as frequency- or percentage-based crosstabulations visualised using pie and bar charts.

To aid our analysis and draw out the most compelling insights, we only present results for several multiple-response questions for the categories against which the highest responses were recorded. The percentages reported in the charts summarising this analysis display the weighted share of each category with respect to all other categories against which the highest responses were recorded (that is, not including the categories for which the lowest responses were recorded). To illustrate, Figure 3.10 summarises perpetrator types based on the different types of targeting behaviours reported by

respondents. The five perpetrators reported for harassment in the figure do not represent the full range of perpetrators that used harassment as a form of targeting, but only the most prevalent types of perpetrators. The bars in the figure for harassment thus indicate the weighted share of each of the most prevalent types and add up to a 100%.

c) Analysis of open-ended responses

The responses to open-ended questions have been analysed in conjunction with close-ended questions. Broadly, we took two approaches for this analysis. For close-ended survey questions with an 'other' open-ended response category, any responses received were recoded into the original close-ended options, if deemed fit. The visuals reported in the analysis reflect these added numbers. In the rare instance where the 'other' response did not fit back into the original close-ended list of options, any fresh insights generated have been reported within text.

Further, for survey questions that were completely open-ended, qualitative analysis has been dovetailed to bring to light the insights generated through the quantitative analysis. They have also been incorporated wherever they provide additional context or explanation relating to a certain insight being generated through the quantitative analysis.

APPENDIX 2 – FIGURES USED FOR TESTS ON ASSOCIATIONS

The charts presented below only include those for which the Chi Square tests of association undertaken by us came out to be significant. This includes both – test results that have been reported in the main body of the report, as well as those that were not reported because they did not generate any interesting insights.

Figure A1: Level of social cohesion in local area by level of priority given to social cohesion in local area (individuals)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.45 and Q.47*
Base: *107*
Note: Association statistically significant at 1% confidence level

Figure A2: Adequacy of support/protection from LA in social cohesion/counter-extremism by level of social cohesion (individuals)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.45 and Q.81*
Base: *94*
Note: The association is statistically significant at 1% confidence level

Figure A3: Adequacy of support/protection from LA in social cohesion/counter-extremism by level of priority to social cohesion (individuals)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.47 and Q.81*
Base: *89*
Note: The association is statistically significant at 1% confidence level

Figure A4: Adequacy of support/protection from LA in social cohesion/counter-extremism by concerns of extremism (individuals)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.48 and Q.81*
Base: *92*
Note: The association is statistically significant at 1% confidence level

Figure A5: Local communities working together to counter extremism by adequacy of support provided by LA (individuals)



Source: *Call for evidence – Independent Review into Social Cohesion and Resilience Q.76 and Q.81*
Base: *74*
Note: The association is statistically significant at 1% confidence level

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