

Recommendation Status Report: Train travelling with doors open on the Jubilee line

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

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Report Title	Train travelling with doors open on the Jubilee line
Report Number	06/2019
Date of Incident	01/09/2018

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
06/2019/01	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to mitigate the risk of train operators driving a train out of a platform with one or more doors open. It is anticipated that consideration will be given to additional safeguards when the train door interlock cut-out switch is operated.</p> <p>London Underground should review the safety systems associated with control of passenger door opening and closing, including train door interlock cut-out switch operation, on its 1995 and 1996 stock trains. Where such features are inconsistent with current good practice, appropriate remedial action should be undertaken. The review should include gaining a sufficient understanding of train control systems so that potential impacts on door safety can be established (paragraphs 120c and 121a).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that London Underground has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
06/2019/02	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for London Underground to support train operator decision-making when they are dealing with unusual faults under stressful conditions. The review could form an extension of the work London Underground is undertaking in response to Notting Hill Gate recommendation 2 (paragraph 123) but should not delay that work.</p> <p>London Underground should review and, where necessary, take action to equip its train operators with the skills, knowledge and information needed to identify and respond appropriately to faults affecting their trains. This should include consideration of the:</p>	<p>ORR has reported that London Underground has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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			<p>I use of train simulators to practise fault finding; and</p> <p>I provision of documentation, such as quick reference guides, to help train operators transition effectively from a low workload scenario to an unexpected high workload scenario when there is an unusual occurrence during automatic train operation.</p> <p>(paragraphs 120b, 120c, 120d and 121b)</p>	
06/2019/03	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve the reliability of the 1996 stock trains where such unreliability has the potential to have an adverse effect on safety.</p> <p>London Underground should review options and, if appropriate, introduce procedures for routine downloading and review of data from Jubilee line train management systems, with the aim of better understanding, predicting, and preventing possible future failures with potential to impact adversely on safety (paragraph 120a).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that LUL has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
06/2019/04	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve train operators' knowledge about the effects insufficient amounts of sleep can have on performance.</p> <p>London Underground should review and, where necessary, revise its competence and fatigue risk management systems for train operators in order to increase awareness of the adverse effects on human performance from insufficient sleep and inappropriate eating patterns (paragraph 120b and 120c and 120d).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that London Underground has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>