

Recommendation Status Report: Unsafe events at Heathrow Tunnel Junction

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

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Report Title	Unsafe events at Heathrow Tunnel Junction
Report Number	20/2015
Date of Incident	28/12/2014

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
20/2015/01	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to achieve a more effective balance between audits of safety related paperwork and direct observation of on-site safety behaviour which would not be detected by a paperwork audit.</p> <p>Network Rail, liaising with Principal Contractors, should review management systems for monitoring railway safety arrangements on major construction sites not separated from the railway by a permanent barrier. The review should identify any improvements needed to ensure that, in addition to appropriate auditing of paperwork after completion of shifts, the management systems promote sufficient direct observation of on-site activities and workgroup questioning to give adequate confidence that mandated safe systems of work are being correctly implemented throughout each shift. Network Rail should then implement any improvements identified by the review (paragraphs 134a and 135a).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
20/2015/02	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to prevent non-conformance developing into normal practice within a possession management team. The wording acknowledges that Network Rail is currently implementing a process which will result in the engineering supervisor role being undertaken by a 'safe work leader'.</p> <p>Network Rail should review the monitoring arrangements applying to engineering supervisors/safe work leaders managing engineering worksites. The review should establish:</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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			<p>l any improvements needed to give adequate confidence that the monitoring arrangements can identify where the actions of an engineering supervisor/safe work leader are not in compliance with the railway rulebook (for example when ensuring staff and equipment are clear of the line and concluding that the railway is safe to return to traffic); and</p> <p>l how those actions can be corrected before they become habitual.</p> <p>Network Rail should then implement any improvements identified by the review (paragraphs 132a, 135a and 136a).</p>	
20/2015/03	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce risks associated with a COSS being the only route by which railway safety information is provided to their workgroup. It applies only on relatively large construction sites on which it is practicable to provide such information.</p> <p>Network Rail, liaising with Principal Contractors, should identify and provide a process for implementing, where practicable, improved arrangements for communicating safe working limits to all workers on large construction sites not separated from the railway by a permanent barrier. This communication, such as signage highlighting lines which have recently reopened, should increase the likelihood of staff recognising and then challenging the proposed safe system of work (paragraphs 134a and 135b).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
20/2015/04	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to consider possible solutions to the practical problems experienced by engineering supervisors when controlling access for numerous COSSs using multiple RT3199 forms. If practicable, an alternative method of control (possibly a matrix sign-in sheet operated within a robust process) should be introduced. The</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware</p>

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		<p>wording acknowledges that the engineering supervisor role will, in future, be undertaken by a safe work leader.</p> <p>Network Rail should review whether the use of multiple RT3199 forms should be replaced by an alternative, risk assessed, process for engineering supervisors/safe work leaders controlling worksites which comprise both multiple lines and activities undertaken by several workgroups. If justified by this review, Network Rail should introduce an appropriate alternative process (paragraph 132b).</p>	<p>that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
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