Recommendation Status Report: Dangerous occurrence at Lindridge Farm user worked crossing, near Bagworth, Leicestershire

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

| Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going) | Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing. | | |
|---|--|--|--|
| Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non- implementation) | ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken. | | |
| Insufficient response: | The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken. | | |
| Superseded: | The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation. | | |
| Awaiting response: | Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation. | | |

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.



| Report Title | Dangerous occurrence at Lindridge Farm user worked crossing, near Bagworth, Leicestershire | | | |
|------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Report Number | 11/2013 | | | |
| Date of Incident | 22/03/2012 | | | |

| Rec No. | Status | RAIB Concern | Recommendation | RAIB Summary of current status |
|------------|------------|--------------|--|---|
| 11/2013/04 | Closed - I | None | The intent of this recommendation is to improve the controls for deferring test logs before a signalling system is commissioned. It calls for the risk to safety, design and functionality to be assessed when deferring an issue raised by a tester on the test log. That way all of the implications of not addressing the test log are considered. Network Rail should revise the controls for managing deferred test logs so that: • the person calling for the deferral of a test log is required to assess the risk to the safety, design and functionality of the signalling system by not closing the test log, record the outcome of their assessment and state any mitigation measures that need to be put in place before the signalling system can be commissioned; and • the tester responsible for commissioning the signalling system is required to review the assessment, agree to the deferral of the test log and to check that the suggested mitigation measures are in place, before allowing the signalling system to be commissioned (paragraph 144i). | ORR reports that the testing handbook was amended and updated. The update requires a final review of all test logs by the tester-in-charge, which included considering the quantity and severity of the items raised on the test logs prior to entry into operational service. This final review is required to confirm that all Test Logs comply with one of the following categories: 1) Retested to the satisfaction of a suitably competent Tester and closed 2) Endorsed and closed 3) Deferred (providing the test log item is not unsafe or cannot be mitigated against) 4) The Deferred Test Log Closure Plan has been signed. Any deferred test logs require an agreed action plan (noted as 4 above). The action plan requires a test log owner, the timescale for closure, the impact assessment |



| 11/2013/05 | Closed - I | None | The intent of this recommendation is to show a level crossing in the correct place on the signaller's display when telephones are fitted to it. It calls for Network Rail's standards to define who can make the changes to the signaller's display, what information is needed to make the changes and how the changes will be checked afterwards. This recommendation also calls for the change to the level crossing to be recorded in the signalling records, either by updating records such as the signalling plan, or by entering the change in the deficiency register. Network Rail should have procedures in place that require the signaller's display to be updated in a controlled manner when telephones are being fitted at a level crossing for the first time. The requirements should also include what steps must be taken to record the change to the level crossing in the signalling source records (paragraph 146a). | and mitigation details, and the rectification action details, which shall include naming the rectification action owner. Network Rail believes the requirements for updating signaller displays are already documented within its standards and therefore it has focused on briefing its staff 'in recognition of the human errors observed in application of these procedures'. Briefings will make people aware in short term but effectiveness will fade over time. The intent of the recommendation was to make it clear who can make changes to signaller display, what information is needed and how the changes will be checked, plus to mandate how the changes will be captured within the signalling records. Network Rail believes all of this is already documented within its standard, albeit it is spread across a number of documents. The recommendation intent was |
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| 11/2013/01 | Ciosea - I | wnite | The intent of this recommendation is to require signalling re-control projects to establish what signalling source records exist for the area being re-controlled, how up-to-date they are and whether they are correlated. If signalling source records are not available, the project's scope should | to specifically document requirements for source records for signalling re-control work so projects were mandated to establish what source records |



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| | | | explicitly include activities at its start to produce them so they are | were needed for such a project. |
| | | | available to designers and checkers for their design work, testers for | Network Rail is relying on |
| | | | testing the design prior to it being commissioned, and to the maintainers | adherence to exisiting standards, |
| | | | afterwards. | which this investigation found |
| | | | | were not followed by East |
| | | | Network Rail should revise its project management processes and | Midlands signalling re-control |
| | | | company standards to require that signalling re-control projects (ie | project. |
| | | | projects transferring the control of signalling from one location to another | No substantive change has been |
| | | | when the interlocking, trackside signalling equipment and infrastructure | made as Network Rail believes its |
| | | | are unchanged) identify the signalling source records that are needed for | standards already cover this. |
| | | | the design, checking and testing of these works. These projects should | RAIB has notified ORR that it |
| | | | then be required to include activities within their scope of work to | disagrees. ORR has sought |
| | | | obtain these signalling source records, including correlating, updating or | further clarification from the end |
| | | | producing records as necessary (paragraphs 144a, 144c and 145). | implementer. \$w |
| 11/2013/02 | Closed - I | None | | ORR has reported that Network |
| | | | | Rail has reported that it has |
| | | | The intent of this recommendation is to provide Network Rail SDG | completed actions taken in |
| | | | designers and checkers with a way of working which will remove the | response to this |
| | | | possibility of incorrect track circuit names being drawn on a signalling or | recommendation. ORR proposes |
| | | | scheme plan during its production, and then missed during the checking | to take no further action unless |
| | | | process. This way of working could be implemented in the software used | they become aware that the |
| | | | by designers or by procedure. It is equally applicable to conceptual work | information provided becomes |
| | | | (such as new designs) and non-conceptual work (such as the | inaccurate. |
| | | | redrawing of an existing design). | |
| | | | | |
| | | | Network Rail should, in consultation with its principal signalling | |
| | | | contractors, review the ways of detecting and addressing incorrect track | |
| | | | circuit names for all types of signalling or scheme plan production. The | |
| | | | review should consider what manual or automatic methods can be used | |
| | | | by designers and checkers. The findings of the review should then be | |
| | | | implemented by means of a time bound programme for changes to the | |
| | | | tools and mandated design processes that cover this activity | |
| | | | (paragraphs 144b, 144b.i, 144b.ii, 144d, 144e and 144f). | |



| 11/2013/03 | Closed - I | None | The intent of this recommendation is to mandate that the position of fixed infrastructure on any new signaller display is correlated to its position on the existing signaller display. By doing this any discrepancies can be identified and the reasons for them understood. | |
|------------|------------|------|---|--|
| | | | Network Rail should revise its design processes so as to specifically require that the position of fixed infrastructure, shown on any new signaller's display being installed by a project, is correlated to its position as shown on the existing signaller's display that is being replaced. This work should be carried out by staff who are qualified as competent to do correlation, and when a discrepancy is found between the new and existing signaller displays, they should record it and investigate the reason for it. Such an investigation should include a check of the accuracy of associated records, such as signalling or scheme plans, and result in the necessary corrections being made to the design or to the records to resolve the discrepancy (paragraphs 144g, 144h and 146b). | |