Recommendation Status Report: Fatal accident at Moreton-on-Lugg, near Hereford

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open **(replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)**	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.

Closed **(replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)**	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.

Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.

Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.

Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report

Report Title	Fatal accident at Moreton-on-Lugg, near Hereford
Report Number	04/2011
Date of Incident	16/01/2010

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
04/2011/01	Closed - I	None	The intention of this recommendation is, where necessary, to implement engineered safeguards at level crossings similar to Moreton-on-Lugg. The objective is to reduce the risk of signallers opening the crossing to road users when a train is approaching, particularly as a result of interruptions or other out-of-course events. Network Rail should identify level crossings operated by railway staff where a single human error could result in the road being opened to the railway when a train is approaching. At each such crossing, Network Rail should consider and, where appropriate, implement engineered safeguards. Safeguards for consideration should include additional reminder appliances, alarms to warn of the approach of trains, approach locking, locking of the route, run-by controls, and local interlocking of train detection and signalling systems with level crossing controls (paragraphs 175 and 178).	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
04/2011/02	Closed - I	None	The intention of this recommendation is that implementation of Network Rail's level crossing risk management process will identify and assess the risks from all aspects of the design, operation and maintenance of equipment and systems, including signalling, so that mitigation measures can be identified and implemented. Network Rail should enhance its level crossing risk management process to include identification, assessment and management of the risk associated with: • human error by signallers and crossing keepers;	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

			• operational arrangements, in particular with regard to the ability of operators to cope with interruptions, such as telephone calls, and other out-of-course events; • equipment design, in particular where it is not compliant with latest design standards; and • maintenance and inspection arrangements, particularly where these are used to identify and remedy any equipment functional and performance deficiency. The process should allow for sufficient liaison between the relevant engineering and operational departments. When addressing risks identified by the implementation of the revised process, Network Rail should prioritise the implementation of required mitigation measures to level crossings where consequences of operator error are severe and not protected by engineered safeguards (paragraphs 171, 172a, 172b, 173, 174a, 174b, 176b and 177).	
04/2011/03	Closed - I	None	The intention of this recommendation is to ensure that whenever signalling renewal or major maintenance work is planned, those responsible understand when it is necessary to formally evaluate the opportunity to improve compliance with the latest engineering standards. Network Rail should develop and implement (paragraph 176a): • criteria for when it is necessary to formally assess the need to bring existing signalling and level crossing assets in line with latest design standards; and • a process to record the findings of such assessments.	ORR reports that Network Rail has issued a briefing note which reiterates the need to consider work that can be done to achieve best practice in design early in the project timescale. ORR are seeking further information on how Network Rail intend to define their policy related to upgrade of equipment, and what constitutes a reasonable opportunity to do so. Network Rail has indicated that it planned to conclude its work in this area by April 2014 with publication in September.

Recommendation Status Report

| 04/2011/04 | Closed - I | Blue | The intention of this recommendation is for Network Rail to understand the risk posed by the use of non-critical information systems in signal boxes and implement practical mitigation measures.

Network Rail should assess the risk associated with the use of TRUST, and similar information systems, by signallers when undertaking safety critical activities, and implement appropriate mitigation measures. This assessment should include a review of the extent to which signallers may be distracted or misled, and the influence of factors such as the location and orientation of any associated equipment (paragraphs 171 and 172b). | ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. |