

Recommendation Status Report: Freight train derailment at Petteril Bridge Junction

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

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Report Title	Freight train derailment at Petteril Bridge Junction
Report Number	10/2023
Date of Incident	19/10/2022

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
10/2023/01	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to understand and manage the risks associated with the operation of freight trains in low adhesion conditions.</p> <p>Network Rail and the freight operating companies should work in collaboration with RSSB to review the risks faced by freight wagons during normal brake applications in foreseeably low adhesion conditions. This work should include a detailed assessment of the risk of individual wheelsets sliding sufficiently so that they generate self-sustaining wheel flats that can ultimately lead to derailment. It should also identify what mitigations may be necessary to ensure that these risks are adequately controlled. Network Rail, the freight operating companies and RSSB should use the findings from this review to evaluate the processes, standards and guidance documents relating to the management of rail adhesion and the operation of freight trains in low adhesion conditions. Network Rail, the freight operating companies and RSSB should produce a time-bound plan to implement any changes found to be necessary from this process (paragraphs 178a.i and 179a).</p>	
10/2023/02	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that the rules relating to sequential axle counter failures are clear.</p> <p>RSSB, working in consultation with Network Rail, should review the sections of GERT8000 (the Rule Book) relevant to sequential axle counter failures. This review should consider the type of operating incidents that such failures may indicate and identify what mitigations may be necessary to ensure that these risks are adequately controlled. RSSB should update the Rule Book as required following this review. Network Rail should</p>	

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			ensure that relevant staff working for them are appropriately briefed and trained on any new or amended rules which result from this update (paragraph 178b.i).	
10/2023/03	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to understand and review the effectiveness and safety of the Rule Book requirement for freight train drivers to regularly look back along their train.</p> <p>Freight operating companies, represented through the Rail Freight Operations Group, working in conjunction with RSSB, should work to understand the purpose and effectiveness of the Rule Book and other operating requirements for drivers to look back along a freight train while it is moving. This work should consider the risks that looking back is seeking to mitigate, the effectiveness of this measure as a mitigation, and the additional risks that are introduced as a result of the activity. It should also consider what alternative mitigations could be used to appropriately address these risks, and implement any changes to standards, processes and rules identified as necessary (paragraph 180a).</p>	