



Policy name: Prevention of Escapes: Management of Internal Security Procedures to Prevent Escape (closed estate)

Reference: N/A

Re-Issue Date: 15 January 2024 for NSF pilot sites ONLY as below

Implementation Date: TBC

HMP Holme House, HMP Doncaster, HMP Lewes, HMP Ford, HMP Wetherby, HMP Wakefield, HMP Downview

No PSI's or service specifications will be cancelled until national rollout of the National Security Framework. Once complete the following PSI's will be cancelled:

Management and security of gate services	2011-14
Management and security of communication/control rooms and internal movement	2011-13
Management and security of keys and locks	2011-55
Management and security of escape list prisoners	2015-10
Management and security of nights	2011-24
Management and security of tools and equipment	2011-54
Security of prisoners at court	2015-26
Management and Security of Visits	PF
NOMS service specification for the provision of secure operating environment: communication and control rooms	
NOMS service specification for nights	
NOMS service specification for the provision of a secure operating environment: gate services	
NOMS service specification for the provision of a secure operating environment: internal prisoner movement	

Introduces amendments to the following documents: N/A

LONG TERM HIGH SECURITY ESTATE AND RESTRICTED STATUS PRISONERS

POLICY REQUIREMENTS

Directions about the security and management of these prisoners must be in line with the following.

- The Identification, Initial Categorisation and Management of Potential and Provisional Category A/Restricted Status Prisoners
- The Review of Security Category - Category A/Restricted Status Prisoners
- Management and Security of Category A Prisoners - Internal
- Management and Security of Category A Prisoners - External Movements
- Management of Restricted Status Prisoners (awaiting publication)

Action required by:

x	HMPPS HQ	x	Governors
x	Public Sector Prisons		Heads of Group
x	Contracted Prisons		The Probation Service
x	Under 18 Young Offender Institutions		Other providers of Probation and Community Services
	HMPPS Rehabilitation Contract Services Team		

Mandatory Actions: All groups referenced above must adhere to the Requirements section of this Policy Framework, which contains all mandatory actions.

For Information: By the implementation date Governors¹ of Public Sector Prisons and Contracted Prisons must ensure that their local procedures do not contain references to the following PSI's/PF's or service specifications:

Management and security of gate services	2011-14
Management and security of communication/control rooms and internal movement	2011-13
Management and security of keys and locks	2011-55
Management and security of escape list prisoners	2015-10
Management and security of nights	2011-24
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NOMS service specification for the provision of secure operating environment: communication and control rooms	
NOMS service specification for nights	
NOMS service specification for the provision of a secure operating environment: gate services	
NOMS service specification for the provision of a secure operating environment: internal prisoner movement	

Governors must ensure that any new local policies that they develop because of this Policy Framework are compliant with relevant legislation, including the Public-Sector Equality Duty (Equality Act, 2010).

Section 6 of the Policy Framework contains guidance to implement the mandatory requirements set out in section 4 of this Policy Framework. Whilst it will not be mandatory to follow what is set out in this guidance, clear reasons to depart from the guidance should be documented locally. Any questions concerning departure from the guidance can be sent to the contact details below.

In this document the term Governor also applies to Directors of Contracted Prisons

How this policy framework will be audited/monitored: In public sector prisons, Prison Group Directors (PGDs) will monitor compliance with requirements set out within the policy framework in their prisons using the auditing and monitoring tools described in this framework.

¹ In this document the term Governor also applies to Directors of Contracted Prisons.

In contracted prisons monitoring of compliance will be through the standard contract management processes.

Health and Safety (H&S) assurance and monitoring for public sector prisons is undertaken through H&S monitoring and assurance within the H&S function, using the H&S audit and reporting tool compliance checklist. The H&S processes may be different for contracted prisons and therefore, contracted prisons must have their own H&S arrangements which ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all employees.

Quality assurance for public sector prisons and contracted prisons is provided by HMPPS Operational and Systems Assurance Group (OSAG) through the security audit.

Mandatory elements of instructions should be subject to management checks (and may be subject to self or peer audit by operational line management), as judged to be appropriate by the managers with responsibility for delivery.

Resource Impact: The identified resource impact for this policy framework document is staffing within the security department. The initial creation, pilot and roll out will impact in terms of the time taken to create the NSF and associated LSS' within establishments.

At this time, it is expected that the new NSF will be placed on the HMPPS intranet so there will be no financial cost associated with a digital platform.

Once the initial phase has been completed, resource implication is not expected to be any different to current requirements around the management of the NSF and establishment LSS.

It is expected that this new framework will assist establishments in reducing the risk of escape. This in turn will be expected to reduce the HMPPS and other agencies financial cost and reputational damage that results from any escape.

Contact : NationalSecurityFrameworkHQ@justice.gov.uk/security.procedures@justice.gov.uk

Deputy/Group Director sign-off: Richard Vince, Deputy Director Security

Approved by OPS for publication: Sarah Coccia, Executive Director Prisons

HMPPS Operational and Systems Assurance Group (OSAG) through the Security Audit.

Revisions

Date	Change
15 January 2024	A number of annexes have been reclassified and removed from gov.uk.

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1. Purpose

- 1.1 HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) is committed to preventing victims by changing lives, working together to protect the public and help people lead law abiding lives.
- 1.2 Public protection is core to the successful and effective delivery of offender management. In managing prisoners in custody and upon release in the community, HMPPS has the protection of the public, including victims, children and vulnerable adults, as an overriding aim in all its activity.
- 1.3 This Policy Framework provides necessary information in a clearer more concise manner improving the way in which we manage security, specifically around escape and abscond from establishments. The document provides establishments, with the information and guidance needed to maintain high levels of security, prevent escape, or abscond and maintain a secure and stable environment for all. It applies to all public and contracted establishments.

2. Evidence

- 2.1 HMPPS Annual Digest available via www.gov.uk on the internet provides year on year stats regarding escapes and absconds.
- 2.2 Consistent and confident application of policies and procedures is fundamental to mitigating these risks and vulnerabilities.

3. Outcomes

- 3.1 Effective use of this Policy Framework and supporting documents will ensure successful maintenance of security and order during all aspects of prison life, preventing prisoners from escaping. Whilst ensuring protection of the public and implementation of the sentences and orders imposed by the courts.
- 3.2 All procedures are conducted in a manner which ensures:
 - Public protection
 - Maintenance of security
 - Health and safety
 - Equality for all - decisions in relation to prevention of escape must not be influenced by any matters irrelevant to the process. Processes must not discriminate against people with the personal protected characteristics protected under the 2010 Equality Act: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage or civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation.
- 3.3 Process and procedures are in place to ensure that staff are fully aware that assessed risks may change and are able to respond accordingly.
- 3.4 The Policy Framework, guidance and supporting tools sets lawful and professional expectations for the prevention of escape from prison custody. This will be measured against the following standards:
 - Incidents which challenge the security, safety, order and control of a prison are resolved through approved practice.
 - Security decision making is defensible and takes account of the risk assessment process to identify and manage local risks.

- Security management systems and practice are characterised by strong leadership, robust governance (reporting and scrutiny), and a learning culture.
- Security management systems, practice and governance meets equalities responsibilities, duty of care and human rights obligations and priorities.

3.5 All within HMPPS to understand and report correctly as per the following definition.

Escape

- A prisoner escapes from prison if they unlawfully gain their liberty by breaching the secure perimeter of a closed prison. An incident is deemed to be an escape and included in the reported annual total if the prisoner is at liberty for at least 15 minutes before recapture or an offence is committed during an escape lasting less than 15 minutes. A 'Category A escape' means the escape of a Category A prisoner. Category A prisoners are those whose escape would be highly dangerous to the public, the police or the security of the State. A prisoner escapes from an escort if they are able to pass beyond the control of escorting staff and leave the escort, the vehicle or the premises (such as a court or hospital).

3.6 The following Policy Frameworks and Prison Service Instructions will remain overarching throughout this document.

- Security Categorisation Policy Framework
- Categorisation and Recategorisation of Women Prisoners
- Women's Policy Framework
- Searching Policy Framework

Requirements (see guidance for further information)

NSF Risk Assessments

- 4.1 To inform the Local Security Strategy (LSS), establishments will need to include an evidence-based assessment process which identifies and highlights the risks to their establishment. The assessment must be a whole prison approach which includes input from a variety of stakeholders of varying grades of all staff.
- 4.2 Risks must be assessed annually as a minimum and in addition, whenever risks are perceived to have changed significantly.
- 4.3 Governors must ensure they have prepared their LSS for each of the five key threat areas outlined in the National Prison Control Strategy. These must adhere to all the required actions and utilise a methodology that identifies further actions to manage the risk. Governors and Directors may choose to develop additional risk assessments to guide a local response to a potential risk that is unique to their establishment, for example, internal movement.
- 4.4 Governors must take into consideration emerging risks influenced by changes in population, new build work, changes to regime and any other identified risk factors.
- 4.5 Throughout this document reference is made to 'local risk assessment' there are no set templates for these local risk assessments, although they must take into consideration:
- Prison type
 - Prison Age (build/ structure)
 - Prisoner demographics including category, age etc.
 - Relevant intelligence
 - Emerging risks

- Current mitigation
- Local risk factors
- Outcome/s
- Access to potential escape equipment.

General

Governors must check that all staff are aware of their role in managing security and that they are familiar with and where to find the establishments LSS including the guidance and associated supporting tools.

- 4.6 Governors must provide annual assurance to their Prison Group Director (PGD) that the LSS is fit for purpose. Evidence of this annual assurance statement (Annex A) must be available and signed by both the PGD and Governor.
- 4.7 In signing this statement, it is for the PGD to satisfy themselves on the level of assurance they wish to apply to the LSS for prisons in their area. This level of assurance may vary between prisons in any area. The level of assurance should also be stated on the form (Annex A).
- 4.8 The minimum level of assurance is that PGDs must satisfy themselves that the key security outputs are set out adequately within the LSS, that they adhere to national policy and reflect local risks of establishments.
- 4.9 PGDs may also specify additional levels of assurance checks including examining some or all locally agreed LSS amendments; drawing on results from national security audits which may identify strengths and weaknesses in security procedures; results from local audits/assurance processes involving security systems; other records such as searching records; more detailed inspection of some or all of the LSS.
- 4.10 Establishments must ensure that a nominated person and deputy are responsible for updating the LSS; this will normally be the Head of Security and Security Custodial Manager.
- 4.11 Heads of Security must complete a physical security “self-audit”, appropriate to the security level of the establishment. This must be completed annually for the High Security Estate, and every two years outside of the High Security Estate for closed establishments. The audit should also include the fabric of the building, perimeter and the equipment that supports the security task. From the audit findings, an action plan should be compiled to detail improvements needed to be undertaken. The physical security audit attached at Annex Q must be undertaken by the Area Property Operations Manager (or their delegate) supported by the security department. All security systems must be properly maintained and supported by the CAFM system this includes (for High Security Estate only) the requirements within the Security Systems Operations Testing Manual (SSOTM).
- 4.12 PGDs should also consider the information obtained from physical security self-audits to satisfy themselves that the physical security measures at each establishment provides a degree of security appropriate for the role of the establishment. Reports should be used to determine priorities in expenditure. In most cases where current standards of physical security cannot be met in full, an adequate standard will still be provided if procedures are adapted to compensate, for example by permitting a higher level of vigilance or supervision.
- 4.13 When completing the physical security self-audit, Heads of Security must consider;
- Overgrown trees and foliage around the perimeter

- Addition of razor wires in areas that have been identified as vulnerable to incident at height
- Use of anti-climb paint in vulnerable areas
- Removal of any equipment adjacent to the perimeter
- Ensuring waste recycling areas remain secure.

A Rehabilitative Culture is... ..all aspects of our culture being safe, decent, hopeful and optimistic about stopping offending.

Procedural Justice

- 4.14 Whilst it is important to ensure that all security procedures are conducted appropriately and take into consideration the safety of all in our establishments and of the public, we must do this alongside a rehabilitative culture and with procedural justice considered throughout.
- 4.15 There is good evidence that when people feel processes are applied and decisions are made fairly, they are more likely to trust authority figures, respect rules and follow them. This is called '**Procedural Justice**' (PJ), and it makes a difference even when outcomes are not in the person's favour or decisions do not go their way.
- 4.16 PJ is one of the foundational features of a rehabilitative prison; that is, it is a necessary part of an environment where all people feel safe and treated decently, and where they have the headspace and opportunity to change. Robust scientific evidence shows that when people feel treated in procedurally just ways, it contributes to a host of better outcomes, including well-being, rehabilitation/reduced recidivism, safety and stability. Communicating in a PJ way should be the foundation of any establishment's security culture helping to improve safety for staff and prisoners, by significantly reducing violence and misconduct. What's more, because PJ is not a specific intervention or service, all our staff, in all grades and roles, can use procedural justice principles every day to improve outcomes.
- Procedural Justice - HMPPS Intranet (gsi.gov.uk)
 - Security & Rehabilitative Culture - YouTube
 - Security & Rehabilitative Culture - HMPPS Intranet (gsi.gov.uk) (*security information hub access required*)
 - Debias Decision Making

State of Security

- 4.17 'State of Security' stems from the principle that Governors and Senior Managers know when they have a good day in their prison but may not always be able to break down the essential elements.
- 4.18 Assessing and understanding what makes our sites safe and secure provides us with the opportunity to enhance the 'now' and build resilience for the 'future' – nothing has demonstrated this better than the global pandemic of COVID-19. The tool allows you to reflect and take stock of your current state, and plan for a new response by understanding the story behind your data. It enables prison staff, as experts, to have a meaningful self-reflection on their individual prison culture with the emphasis on bringing existing information together to use it and think about it in a different way.
- 4.19 All establishments are advised to use the 'state of security' template and principles alongside the risk assessment guidance/process.
- Security & Rehabilitative Culture - HMPPS Intranet (gsi.gov.uk) (*security information hub access required (Annex B)*)

Prevention of Escape - General

- 4.20 The LSS must outline procedures for the following:
- Internal procedures to prevent escape;
 - External (escorts) procedures to prevent escape; and
 - Prevention of escape by management of escape list prisoners.
- 4.21 Governors must ensure they have local contingency plans as per PSI 2014-09 Incident Management Manual detailing the actions to take in the event of any (attempted or actual) escape.
- 4.22 Governors must ensure that all security documentation including assurance records are retained in line with Records, Information Management and Retention Policy
- 4.23 All staff must know what action to take in case of escape, suspected escape, or attempted escape.
- 4.24 Staff must raise an alarm if an immediate response is needed. There are several ways to raise the alarm, these include:
- General Alarm
 - Whistle
 - 'Urgent Message' on the radio net
 - Dial 222 from a landline
 - Personal alarm on the radio
 - Dial 999 if external to the establishment
 - Shouting for assistance.

Factors relating to escapes

- 4.25 Escapes happen when three factors coincide:
1. Changes in prisoner circumstance
 2. Inconsistent application of policies and procedures
 3. Perceptions of weakness in security.
- 4.26 Prisoners can be motivated and willing to try and escape at any time. This remains an ongoing vulnerability for the organisation. There may be no disproportionate difference in a prisoner's characteristics (i.e. gender, ethnicity, marital status, mental health) or offence type, length of sentence, incentive level and workplace. Many may also not have escape history or markers on their records. There remains the possibility for any individual to escape if the three factors come into play.
- 4.27 Prisoners can escape through non-violent means, alone and by exploiting physical infrastructure. There may or may not be assistance involved and/or multiple perpetrators. A number can be pre-meditated and use equipment and aids to facilitate an escape. Being alert to this, having robust security practices and ensuring a secure physical environment will help prevent an escape.
- 4.28 The correct application of procedures is key to prison resilience and the mitigation of escapes. Ensuring during core hours,

Prevention of escape from custody

Internal Procedures

- 4.29 All staff must know what actions to take in the event of an (attempted or actual) escape as per area of work and local contingency plans.
- 4.30 There must be at least 4 routine roll checks per day, the LSS must describe the times of these roll checks and the actions to take in the event of an incorrect roll, at least one of these roll checks must take place prior to unlock and one at final lock up.
- 4.31 Roll checks must also take place at the following times.
- Routine practice full prison standfast roll checks must take place at least once every month.
 - Standfast roll check in line with local contingency plans (see guidance for procedure).
 - A correct prisoner roll must be confirmed before skips/skip lorries are permitted to leave the prison. All vehicles and their contents must be subject to a thorough search as per Searching Policy Framework.
 - Following freeflow/mass movement to activity (unless a risk assessment is in place that mitigates the risk of escape and identifies what other control measures are in place).

The gate and reception (where operating) should always maintain a 'running roll'.

- 4.32 Staff in all areas should ensure:
- A written record of the number of prisoners in the area is kept up to date; and
 - They are always aware of and responsible for the location of their prisoners.
- 4.33 A Residential unit must:
- Maintain an up to date running roll.
 - Staff visiting the unit who may be collecting prisoners for other appointments/classes etc must inform/update wing staff of the movement prior to it happening and again on return.
 - Wings with classrooms and prisoners attending from other areas must ensure these prisoners are also accounted for, on the unit roll.
- 4.34 Activity Areas must ensure:
- An up to date running roll is maintained of that area.
 - Prisoners are supervised during work sessions.
 - Staff regularly move around the work area to ensure prisoners are visible and accounted for.
 - Prisoners are not allowed unauthorised access to any office or sensitive area and must always be supervised when in an office or similar.
- 4.35 Staff supervising prisoners on the exercise yards or sports fields must ensure:
- They carry out a security check of the area before use, checking for damage to fences/gates, throw overs, weapons and any other Security/Health and Safety concerns.
 - They draw a radio join the net using the allocated call sign.
 - Always maintain a running roll.
 - Always monitor these prisoners, be aware of blind spots and call for assistance if required.

A Roll Check Template Form can be found at Annex C.

4.36 Full roll reconciliation must take place after mass movement contributing to a safe and secure environment by always knowing the whereabouts of prisoners who are unlocked.

4.37 Full roll reconciliation process:

- Not a stand-fast roll check, provided that an establishment has cleared their roll before a movement period commences.
- There is no need to re-count areas where numbers have remained static.
- Count prisoners in/out of areas, ensuring these movement figures match.
- Add these to static numbers in all other areas to produce a total figure.
- Provided the post-movement figure matches the pre-movement figure there is no need to physically re-count all areas.

Gate

4.38 Governors must ensure that the LSS includes instructions for security within the gate area to be maintained. Many prison rules and YOI rules have a bearing on gate functions. Prison Rules (The Prison Rules 1999) specific to the gate in relation to escape are:

- Prison Rule 41/YOI Rule 46 - Search (of prisoners).
- Prison Rule 71/YOI Rule 75 - Control of persons and vehicles; (1) power to stop, examine or search people or vehicles; (2) power of removal from a prison.
- Prison Act 1952 Section 39 (Prison Act 1952).

4.39 The duties of Gate staff must include several key duties:

- Identifying, controlling and recording the authorised entry and exit of prisoners, people, vehicles and materials.
- Ensuring that searching procedures are carried out for individuals, vehicles and materials in line with the Searching Policy Framework.
- Preventing key loss by controlling the storage, issue and receipt of security keys particularly for those establishments without TRAKA electronic key storage systems.
- Ensuring 'front of house' customer service is professional, consistent and contributes to a secure environment.

4.40 LSS instructions must reflect the individual circumstances of the establishment. Where an establishment has more than one gate, these instructions apply to all gates.

4.41 Where a prison has a vehicle lock or an inner and outer gate, at least one gate (either the inner or outer gate) must be secured when people and vehicles are entering or leaving. If the vehicle is too long for the lock, staff (and dogs if available) must be deployed to prevent prisoners escaping and be provided with searching equipment, e.g., torches, under body and overhead mirrors, for the search of vehicles.

Enhanced Gate Security (EGS)

4.42 Where EGS is in use, Governors must ensure that the LSS reflects all required actions in line with the EGS guidance in line with Conveyance Policy Framework.

Entry & Exit

4.43 All establishments must conduct a local risk assessment which will be uploaded to the LSS and identify the necessary outcomes for the entry and exit of all (including staff, prisoners, visitors, contractors and vehicles) in to and out of the establishment. All staff working in the gate area must have access to and understand these requirements.

4.44 Governors must ensure that before being allowed access to the establishment staff (directly and non-directly employed), contractors and visitors who are not social or official visitors as described in the Conveyance Policy Framework, have acquired the security clearances appropriate to the environment in which they will have access. The level of security clearance varies according to the security category of the establishment and the rank or status of the person. (The policy covering the security clearance necessary for individuals to access and move within an establishment is set out on the My Services website).

Staff (directly and non-directly employed)

4.45 All staff should carry a valid form of identification (ID) which will be specific to their role and employer. Some staff members may have locally made temporary ID whilst they are waiting for their ID to arrive.

4.46 On both arrival and exit of the establishment, staff should show this ID to gate staff upon request, if they do not have ID on request and the gate staff do not recognise them as an employee, then they should not be allowed either entry or exit of the establishment until their identification can be verified. This verification process should be conducted by a member of staff who is not with them at the time as this could be an escape attempt with staff members under duress.

4.47 All staff directly and non-directly employed who are given access to the establishment must receive a comprehensive security induction (Annex D) including:

- Security key talk.
- Ways to raise the alarm.
- Actions to take in the event of an emergency/incident.
- Submission of intelligence reports.
- Corruption prevention.
- Radio etiquette/procedures.

Visitors for staff/contractors

4.48 Visitors for staff/contractors to the establishment should provide in date photographic ID and should be accompanied by an appropriate escorting member of staff throughout.

4.49 The gate should have been informed of these arrangements in advance by the staff member they are visiting (Annex E) it is further recommended that they are provided with a 'visitors ID card and lanyard' to display at all times.

4.50 Upon exit of the establishment their identification must be verified prior to exiting the final door/gate of the establishment.

Vehicles (see also Conveyance Policy Framework)

Movement/Escorting

4.51 The LSS must advise on vehicles permitted access to the establishment without internal escort following a local risk assessment completed alongside Annex A of the Workplace Transport Policy Framework.

4.52 This decision is more commonly carried out in the open estate, but some closed establishments may also allow for specific vehicles.

4.53 Vehicles should not be allowed entry until escorting staff are in position and ready to complete the escort. Emergency vehicles should be allowed at least into the sterile area to prevent delays in responding.

- 4.54 Vehicles and their occupants when within the establishment, must be confined to areas to which prisoners do not have access, unless under escort or when a local risk assessment determines otherwise.
- 4.55 Establishments must have a training plan/programme in place to ensure escorting staff, at the earliest opportunity, complete Vehicle Escort End User training (included as part of the National Operational Support Grade (OSG) course) prior to carrying out vehicle escort duties.
- 4.56 Escorting vehicles is a high-risk activity and the cause of life changing injury not least crush injury due to standing in the wrong position or failing to pin gates back, therefore establishments must ensure they have sufficient trained staff on duty to carry out this task.
- 4.57 If in exceptional circumstances no trained staff are available, they should:
- Gain permission from the communications room prior to moving from the gate or returning to the gate with the vehicle. For those establishments in the open estate that do not operate a communications/control room, this will be authorised by the gate staff where appropriate. Vehicles requiring authorisation in the open estate will be identified in advance by local risk assessment and authorisation for entry gained from the Orderly Officer if needed.
 - Control and monitor those whom they are escorting from the point of entry to the point of exit.
 - Know the identities of those they are escorting.
 - Possess a thorough knowledge of the geography of the establishment and the areas in the establishment to which those they are escorting are permitted access. (Careful consideration to the use of maps should be taken as these could be used as an escape aid).
 - Be aware of the actions to take in the event of an emergency/incident.
 - Be proficient in the use of the establishment's radio net and any technical aids or equipment associated with the escorting role (mirrors, torches etc).
 - Be aware of the security and safety requirements of the establishment and of the vehicle to be escorted.
 - Have an understanding of the Workplace Transport Policy Framework in regard to Health & Safety requirements, including the wearing of a high vis jacket/vest.
 - Ensure all onboard cameras are switched off/covered to prevent recording within the establishment as per Conveyance Policy Framework.
 - Ensure if the vehicle has been authorised to enter a prisoner area, then a roll check of the area must be conducted prior to leaving the area accounting for all prisoners.

Exit

- 4.58 When the vehicle is ready to leave, the vehicle should be searched once more as per the Searching Policy Framework to ensure that no one or anything is being conveyed out of the prison and therefore preventing the risk of escape.
- 4.59 Before drivers, passengers and the vehicle can exit the gate, their identification should be checked against the records for when the vehicle arrived at the gate. If for any reason this cannot be verified, they must be held at the gate until it can be.

Prisoners through the gate

- 4.60 All prisoner movement through the gate area must be recorded and a running roll maintained, ensuring only authorised exit and entry.

- 4.61 The entry and exit of prisoners by vehicle must be in line with individual risk assessment for those prisoners who are undergoing local escort or in line with other service provider agreements for the police, escort contractor services, immigration removal services.
- 4.62 Gate passes (gate pass books available via Branston NDC) must accompany all prisoners exiting the gate under escort.
- 4.63 All prisoners exiting the gate not under escort must have their identity confirmed, this may be via biometrics, a discharge checklist or photographic ID, this will be dependent on the establishment and available technology at point of exit.
- 4.64 In an emergency such as a life-threatening situation, it may be necessary for an emergency vehicle to pass straight through the vehicle lock without stopping this may be on both entry and exit, it must be remembered, that an ambulance with a prisoner onboard when exiting will have staff members in attendance and a gate pass to aid with roll reconciliation will be brought to the gate shortly after. This decision will be directed by the manager on the scene of the incident (Duty Governor/Orderly Officer) and will be communicated to the gate via the radio net.
- 4.65 Relevant staff must be aware of the process to follow in these emergency circumstances ensuring that no delays are caused. This must include the procedures for:
- Authority needed and process to open both vehicle gates simultaneously.
 - Escort departure with no escort risk assessment or PER.
 - Escort departure with no gate pass.
 - Returning of keys, radio and PPE for escorting staff.
- 4.66 All staff working in the gate must know that unlawfully at large (UAL) prisoners surrendering must not be given access to the establishment until identification is confirmed and confirmation that they were UAL is received from either the police or the establishment they escaped or absconded from. Once this is confirmed normal reception procedures for the receiving establishment must take place.

Discharge of Prisoners

- 4.67 Several checks must be made prior to the discharge of a prisoner at the necessary stages and the staff conducting these checks must have received the appropriate training relevant to their role in the discharge process.

Sentenced prisoners:

- Sentence calculations (14 and 2-day checks).
- Identification confirmed.
- No outstanding cases.
- Licences/restrictions issued confirmed and explained to prisoner.

Remand/Bail prisoners

- Official confirmation received from the courts
- Confirmation that all sureties are met.
- No outstanding cases.
- Identification confirmed.
- Restrictions upon release confirmed and explained to prisoner.

ROTL

- Licence in place and conditions understood by prisoner.
- Identification confirmed.

- 4.68 Governors must ensure that that for 'out of hours' discharges, if the necessary checks cannot be completely and confidently carried out by a competent/trained member of staff, the decision must be made as to whether the risk of release in error outweighs the risk and litigation of holding a prisoner overnight until the checks can be made. These checks should be carried out on the next working day as a maximum.
- 4.69 All prisoners attending the gate in the closed estate for any form of discharge must be accompanied by a member of staff with a gate pass and exit via the vehicle gate. The gate pass must include the reason for discharge and the prisoner's identity this will be handed to the gate staff at the time of the prisoner's discharge.

Visits

Attempting to leave with visitors or instead of visitors

- 4.70 The LSS must set out the security procedures applicable to that establishment to ensure prisoners are prevented from escaping during a visit.
- 4.71 Conveyance of items during visits may be to assist in the facilitation of an escape. See Conveyance Policy Framework.
- 4.72 Prisoners may use visits to facilitate an escape. This may be done in two ways:
- Attempting to leave with visitors or instead of visitors; and/or
 - Visitors conveying items during the visit that may assist in an escape attempt.
- 4.73 To prevent this, staff working in visits should:
- Record a description of each prisoners clothing and footwear before they enter the visits room.
 - Identify each prisoner against the visits list before they enter the visits area
 - Ensure that there is no swapping of clothing or provision of additional clothing during the visit.
 - When the visits are over, ensure that visitors leave the visits area first, while prisoners remain seated.
 - As prisoners leave the visits area, confirm their identity once more against the visits list and ensure that all those who entered the visits area are present upon leaving.
 - As prisoners leave the visits area, check their clothing against what has been noted upon their entrance.
 - Not allow visitors to leave the premises until all prisoners are accounted for. They should have already exited the visits area but should remain in a waiting area into the prisoner roll is confirmed as correct.
 - Conduct a visual search of the visits area to ensure that no items have been left behind, for example in bins, under furniture or in bathrooms.
 - Utilise biometric systems for both prisoners and visitors, where possible.
 - Where biometrics are not available, a visible role should be maintained and checked by patrol staff irregularly but frequently throughout the visit session.
- 4.74 Governors have the discretion to require prisoners to wear distinctive clothing to aid staff. This may include bibs, sashes, armbands, or e-list clothing where appropriate. However, it should be recognised that this may have a detrimental impact upon the quality and atmosphere of visits, and such should only be used where necessary to maintain effective security. If prisoners are required to wear distinctive clothing, this must be explained in the LSS.

Communications Room

- 4.75 The terminology of emergency control room may also be used; however, this is usually reserved for the high security estate.
- 4.76 For those establishments with a communications room. The LSS must clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the communications room and those staff grades working within.
- 4.77 The communications room must have responsibility for the following as a minimum:
- Controlling and authorising vehicle, prisoner, social and official visitor movement within the establishment with emphasis on E list, Category A prisoners and others which may be considered high risk.
 - Control of the radio net, maintaining secure practices and operating procedures
 - Management of initial responses to incidents and emergencies.
 - Understanding and control of contingency plans.
 - Maintain records of all occurrences.
- 4.78 All E list and Category A prisoners must be allocated a book number, and this must be communicated to the communications room via the radio net when seeking permission to move these prisoners (e.g. 'permission to move book number 1 from ***** to *****').
- 4.79 Establishments must have a training plan/programme in place to ensure communications room staff, at the earliest opportunity, complete:
- Prison Radio Control Room Procedures (2.5 days – offered as a national course by Learning and Development).
- 4.80 All staff identified to attend the Prison Radio Control Room Procedures course must have completed mandatory eLearning (available within Mylearning, "Control Room for Future Operatives eLearning") before attending the face-to-face course. The eLearning does not allow a staff member to work in a Prison Radio Communications Room/Emergency Control Room function – it is a pre-requisite for the face-to-face course.
- 4.81 The facilities management team must maintain all security related equipment in line with contractual agreements.
- 4.82 The LSS must include details of maintenance contracts company details and emergency contact numbers for all technologies used for security purposes and for all essential security equipment.

Radios

- 4.83 The 'digital Tetra radio communications system' should be used in establishments in line with Prison Radio Communications.
- 4.84 All staff must be made aware of the risks of transmissions being illegally scanned from outside the prison and the procedures taken to maintain radio discipline, which include:
- All staff are trained in the use of radios if in charge of individual or parties of prisoners (directly and non-directly employed).
 - Only nationally approved call signs are used (Annex F).
 - At least two net test calls are conducted per day (one day/one night) and faults investigated/reported.
 - A record of the identities of all outstations is maintained.
 - Every residential (closed establishments) unit has at least one member of staff having drawn a radio and logged on.
 - All night staff must draw a radio and log onto the net.
 - Radio etiquette and professionalism are always used by staff.

- 4.85 Radio handsets must always be retained securely in the possession of staff or returned to the dedicated secure storage point. (This also includes all other PPE issued to staff including PAVA/BWVC/Batons/Rigid Cuffs/Fish Knives).
- 4.86 All operational staff supervising prisoners outside of residential units must draw a radio and join the network using dedicated call signs.
- 4.87 All staff supervising prisoners (for example, education and substance misuse workers) without a radio or in an area out of range of the radio network must have means of raising the alarm in an emergency and know what actions to take.
- 4.88 It is important that staff are aware of 'blind spots' of the radio network which provide limited/nil reception, it is recommended that these areas when identified are listed within the LSS and staff are given guidance on other steps to take including the use of whistles, emergency landline etc. (Annex D). This is also applicable for those staff who are non-operational and do not carry a radio such as education, substance misuse workers etc.
- 4.89 All radios must be accounted for as soon as is practicable after final lock up.
- 4.90 Radios must be securely stored and issued; the system used for this will be individual to each establishment but must include a method of identifying the member of staff who drew the radio (outside of signing on the net).
- 4.91 Radios should never be left unattended and should always be retained securely in the possession of staff or returned to the dedicated storage point. If a radio is unaccounted for then the radio must be 'stunned' immediately by the communications room and 'tool loss' procedures followed.

Internal Movement

- 4.92 All internal movement must consider Health & Safety requirements in line with Health and Safety policy documents and instructions.
- 4.93 The safety of all must also be considered when planning and carrying out internal moves. See Safety Policy Framework (*to be published*) for further guidance.

Internal movement of prisoners

- 4.94 Following a local risk assessment, the LSS must describe the control and supervision measures for internal movement of prisoners around the establishment. Taking into consideration at least the following times:
- Mass movement.
 - Individual movement to appointments etc.
 - Group movement (to gym classes etc).
 - Movement and accommodation of those prisoners who are deemed a security risk (E List, Cat A, Potential/provisional Cat A, restricted status).
- 4.95 Movements of E list, Cat A, Potential/Provisional Cat A, restricted status prisoners must be secure and recorded. They must not take place without prior authorisation from the communications room. The communications should always know the whereabouts of these prisoners.

Internal movement of social and official visitors

4.96 Following a local risk assessment, the LSS must describe the control and supervision measures for internal movement of social and official visitors, these measures must be establishment specific taking into consideration:

- Numbers of visitors moved at a time.
- Time of visits.
- Other internal movement in the area.
- Positioning of visits hall.
- Safety of visitors.
- Route to be taken.

Perimeter

4.97 It is an offence under Section 40cb of the Prison Act 1952 for a person who, without authorisation, throws any article or substance into a prison is guilty of an offence. “Any article” does not include a reference to a List A article, a List B article, or a List C article. “throwing” an article or substance into a prison includes a reference to doing anything from outside the prison that results in the article or substance being projected or conveyed over or through a boundary of the prison so as to land inside the prison.

4.98 Under Section 39 of the Prison Act 1952 a person is guilty of an offence who,
a) assists a prisoner in escaping or attempting to escape from a prison; or
b) intending to facilitate the escape of a prisoner;
i. brings, throws or otherwise conveys anything into a prison,
ii. causes another person to bring, throw or otherwise convey anything into a prison, or
iii. gives anything to a prisoner or leaves anything in any place (whether inside or outside a prison).

4.99 Internal and external perimeter checks/patrols must take place daily, however the times and quantities of these will differ between establishments, utilising the state of security and local risk assessment process will aid establishments with identifying their specific need.

4.100 Local contingency plans must be in place and outline the actions to take following the positive indication of a threat to the perimeter or a failure of any fitted security equipment.

4.101 If an officer, in the course of their duties, finds someone who they have reasonable belief has, or is about to throw an article into a prison (physically or via other means) or assist with an escape or abscond from a prison then they may use the powers of a constable granted under the Prison Act 1952 and effect an arrest. The powers of arrest are set out in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE).

4.102 Prior to the use of PACE powers an officer should consider personal and public safety as a priority and where they deem it unsafe to utilise PACE powers to stop the “throw over” attempt then priority should be given to the following:

- Raising the alarm within the establishment.
- Recording information to assist police such as descriptions or perpetrators, types of vehicles or registrations.
- Contacting police.
- Following any local contingencies available.

- 4.103 If an OSG, in the course of their duties, finds someone who they have reasonable belief has, or is about to throw an article into a prison (physically or via other means) or assist with an escape or abscond from a prison then they must maintain their own safety and:
- Raise the alarm within the establishment.
 - Record information to assist police such as descriptions or perpetrators, types of vehicles or registrations.
 - Contact police.
 - Follow any local contingencies available.

Members of the public filming

- 4.104 Is it an offence under 40D of the Prison Act 1952 for a person who, without authorisation takes a photograph, or makes a sound-recording, inside a prison.
- 4.105 Where an officer in the course of their duties has reason to believe that a person is making an unauthorised recording, or video of the inside of a prison then they must carry out the following actions:
- Ask the person if they have authorisation to take photographs/videos.
 - Where insufficient proof of authorised filming is given inform the person that they are in breach of section 40d of the prison act and that this is a criminal offence.
 - Direct the person to stop their recording/capturing of images.
 - If the person is on prison property, they should be directed to leave
 - Raise the alarm and request assistance.
 - The establishment should request police attendance at the earliest opportunities.
 - If CCTV is in action, staff may inform them that they are being filmed and this may be sent on to the police.
 - Do not engage; reply "No Comment".
 - Do not react. Whilst this can be difficult, remember that footage of staff reacting is more likely to get likes, shares and views. By not reacting, you take away their power.
 - The 1st on scene should remain in the vicinity of the person until relived. The staff member should not engage with the person other than replying "no comment" to questions, or to remind them they are breaching section 40d of the prisons act, or to request they leave HMPPS property.
- 4.106 There is no definition of a prison boundary in the Prison Act or the Prison Rules 1999. As such, the most likely interpretation is that a prison boundary is the physical boundary which marks and/or effects the segregation of the prisoners from those outside the prison. This is most likely to be considered a wall or fence for closed establishments, or beyond obvious barriers such as a vehicle barrier for open sites.
- 4.107 It is not an offence for individuals to film outside a prison, as long as any images captured are not images from inside a prison. Areas accessible by the public, such as pedestrian footpaths and prison car parks would be considered outside the prison boundary and therefore are not private property. Furthermore, examples such as filming of officers queuing to enter a prison building would not be deemed to be an offence.

Night Procedures

- 4.108 Nights can be a difficult, lonely time for staff members and therefore staying alert and aware of surroundings is vitally important. Prisoners may use the night state as a period to attempt escape, due to reduced staffing levels. Staff are often alone on a wing throughout the night and although safe due to locked doors, can often be the subject of attempted conditioning and manipulation.

- 4.109 All Operational Support Grades (OSGs) should have a period of 'shadowing' and complete the two-week OSG training course, which covers all things related to 'Nights' as well as typical duties and Suicide and Self-harm procedures, prior to being alone on night duty.
- 4.110 Officers should have completed the Prison Officer training course prior to any night duty and Night Orderly Officers must be given the opportunity to shadow a set of nights prior to carrying out Night Orderly Officer duties.
- 4.111 All staff on nights must complete In Cell Fire (RPE) Training, prior to conducting night duty. (staff can book through POELT-osgcourse@gov.sscl.com) or alternatively complete their local training return for OSG training need).
- 4.112 Every establishment operates differently and therefore needs an individual set of night operating procedures, it is recommended that these procedures are not written in silo and take into consideration all factors.
- 4.113 There are four main priorities during night state:
- All Night Staff are aware of information necessary to maintain the safety and security of the establishment.
 - The establishment remains safe and secure in the event of prisoners being unlocked at night.
 - The establishment remains safe and secure in the event of prisoners being moved within the prison at night.
 - The establishment remains safe and secure in the event of prisoners being received or discharged at night.
- 4.114 Night staffing and procedures must be agreed locally, subject to the requirements of the establishment. These must be set out in the establishments Local Security Strategy (LSS) and approved by the PGD.
- 4.115 Night Staff must be aware of the local requirements to maintain the safety and security of the establishment. This will include locking procedures, patrols, ACCT observations and the secure movement of prisoners during night state.
- 4.116 A Duty Governor must always be on call throughout the night. They must be informed immediately of serious events to include;
- Death in Custody
 - Serious Fire
 - Escape/attempted escape
 - Emergency discharge to hospital
 - Location of any prisoner to the segregation unit.
 - Placing a prisoner on constant supervision

Commencement of Duty – Day to Night Handover

- 4.117 A full roll check must take place prior to entering night state. The night lock up roll must be collated by the orderly office once all prisoners are secured in their relevant cells. This must be recorded on the 'night lock up sheet' and handed to the NOO.
- 4.118 Staff must be allocated specific sets of keys for nights and/or pouches which must be attached to key chains. All staff must be in possession of a radio and a cut down tool (fish knife).
- 4.119 The NOO must conduct a full key and radio check and sign for it once complete on the night lock up sheet. Any missing keys or radios must be reported as per key / radio compromise procedures.

- 4.120 Night Orderly officer (NOO) must receive a full briefing from the day Orderly Officer
- 4.121 Night Staff must receive a full briefing from day staff on residential accommodation to include the segregation unit.
- 4.122 There must be a night procedures sheet to document key information as part of the handover. Handovers should include the following key elements:
- Prisoners on ACCT documents or constant supervision
 - Newly arrived prisoners subject to first night observations
 - E List prisoners
 - Potential Category A Prisoners
 - Key incidents that have occurred during the day that staff will need to be aware of (missed medications, individuals that have received bad news, prisoners who have been involved in serious incidents).
 - Any prisoners on escort or bedwatch.
 - Any prisoners remaining in reception (late court arrivals for example)
- 4.123 Prior to the day staff leaving residential accommodation, night staff must account for all prisoners and undertake a physical check of cells and relevant doors to ensure they are secure. Staff must also ensure all relevant gates and emergency fire equipment are unlocked.

Night Staff Requirements

- 4.124 All night staff must be briefed at the start of the week by the NOO and made aware of the actions to take in an incident situation. This will include how to summon assistance and containment of the incident (where possible). The following incidents must be covered;
- Escape
 - Attempted escape
 - Death in custody
 - Fire
 - Serious self-harm
- 4.125 Other situations may arise during night state such as a loss of electricity or water and staff must be able to locate the local contingency plans that set out how to manage various types of incidents. The NOO must be competent in carrying out the actions within the contingency plans.
- 4.126 The Duty Governor must be informed immediately if an incident occurs
- 4.127 Establishments must have local procedures that include staff undertaking a period of shadowing during night state. This must include the observation of night duties incorporating all safety procedures relating to suicide and self-harm. Shadowing must take place before any staff member is left alone on a residential accommodation during night state. In addition, all staff working nights must have completed In Cell Fire (RPE) Training.

Late Receptions / Court Arrivals:

- 4.128 Local establishments are likely to still be processing prisoners as the establishment enters night state. Local procedures must take this into account and the LSS must specify the procedures to be undertaken which may include;
- Prisoner orderlies and peers being returned to their residential units.

- Remaining prisoners secured in holding rooms in reception evenly distributing the number of prisoners between all the holding rooms available.
- Numbers of prisoners that be unlocked in reception at any time, whether this to be first night in prison interviewed or to see the medical staff.
- Procedures for movement of prisoners from reception to the first night centre/other residential accommodation.

Entering Night State

4.129 Once all day staff have left, all prisoners are accounted for, keys and radios have been checked, the NOO will prepare the establishment for night state. This must include;

- Closing the main Gate for the night
- Ensuring all doubles (where applicable) have been applied throughout the establishment.
- Ensuring all night staff are fully briefed and in their correct places.
- Ensuring that patrolling staff have been briefed on any internal perimeter checks required throughout the night.

NOO Visits

4.130 The NOO must make visits throughout the night to all residential units including segregation and healthcare units (where applicable)

4.131 The purpose of these visits is to check the welfare of the staff, identify and discuss any concerns or issues and gain assurance of the completion of relevant documentation

4.132 Night visits must be recorded on the night sheet.

Prisoners Conduct and Behaviour During Night State

4.133 Night staff must be fully aware of the procedures for managing inappropriate prisoner behaviour during the night state including the procedures for challenging these (e.g., adjudication, incentive procedures) and appropriate recording on Nomis.

4.134 If a prisoners behaviour needs addressing further the NOO should be contacted to make any assessment and further decision. This may include moving a highly disruptive prisoner for the safety of themselves/ others or other appropriate action. All actions must be recorded and justified on NOMIS and in the unit observation book.

At Risk Prisoners

4.135 The LSS must set out procedures for the observation of those in special security categories to include:

- Category A prisoners
- E List prisoners
- Restricted Status and protected witnesses
- Individuals at risk of self-harm/ suicide.

4.136 The following prisoners must be checked hourly during night state;

- Exceptional Category A prisoners
- High-Risk Category A prisoners
- Potential Category A prisoners held temporarily outside the Category A Estate
- Provisional Category A prisoners held temporarily outside the Category A Estate.

- E List standard prisoners
- E List Heightened prisoners
- All prisoners held in segregation

Night Patrols

- 4.137 Regular patrols of residential accommodation and landings should take place between 2200hrs and 0600hrs and may include undertaking any ACCT observations.
- 4.138 The end of every landing should be visited, and this procedure documented on the night sheet. Establishments may have other ways of recording these patrols to include systems such as 'pegging'.
- 4.139 Patrols should be irregular, for example not taking place at the same time every hour.
- 4.140 Patrols should also include the completion of fire safety checks during night state.

Entering a Cell at Night

- 4.141 All prisoners must be locked up during the night state unless authorised by management or on the instructions of the Healthcare staff.
- 4.142 The LSS must clearly state how many staff must normally be present before prisoner accommodation can be unlocked as well as the local procedures that staff should follow if faced with a potentially life-threatening situation when there are no other staff in the immediate vicinity.
- 4.143 Staff must have access to the LSS and be made aware of the implications of this for their role in maintaining security during the night state.
- 4.144 There are many incidents that may occur at night and it is difficult to be prescriptive about what actions to take in each particular case. The following is a guide to the minimum mandatory actions that are required before opening cell doors at night.
- 4.145 Under normal circumstances, authority to unlock a cell at night must be given by the Night Orderly Officer (NOO) and no cell will be opened unless a minimum of two/three (subject to local risk assessment procedures) members of staff are present one of whom should be the NOO.
- 4.146 However, staff have a duty of care to prisoners, to themselves and to other staff. The preservation of life must take precedence over the directions above. Where there is, or appears to be, immediate danger to life, then cells may be unlocked without the authority of the NOO (but subject to the conditions set out below) and an individual member of staff may enter the cell on their own. However, night staff should not take action that they feel would put themselves or others in unnecessary danger.
- 4.147 Before entering a cell:
- every effort should be made to gain a verbal response from the prisoner;
 - this, together with what the member of staff can observe through the panel and any knowledge of the occupant(s), should inform a rapid dynamic risk assessment of the situation and a decision on whether to enter immediately or wait for assistance; and
 - the Communications Room/Control Room must be informed before entering the cell stating the location of the cell and describing the circumstances that require intervention.

- 4.148 Although it is not possible to include a check list of every potential risk in a live situation, some things that may be considered as part of a rapid dynamic risk assessment could also include:
- the presentation of the prisoner who appears to be in danger
 - whether or not it is a single or shared cell
 - the occupant's security category
 - the occupant's history of self-harm and/or violence if known? Are they likely to act erratically?
 - how vulnerable does entering the cell make the member of staff?
 - the level of visibility into the cell, can a clear assessment be made of what the prisoner may have in their hands?
 - is there anything that could be used as a weapon?
 - is there anyone else who is at risk?
 - how can staff exit the situation if needed?
 - how confident does the member of staff feel? How close are other colleagues to assist?
- 4.149 If a decision is taken to enter a cell, staff must tell their colleagues what they are doing.
- 4.150 Contact the Control Room or Orderly Officer before entering the cell and provide the location of the cell and describe the circumstances that require intervention.
- 4.151 If it is not possible to inform a colleague, staff should summon assistance using a personal or general alarm.
- 4.152 If applicable use the emergency response codes 'red' or 'blue' over the radio which will call for an immediate local healthcare response where this service is available, as well as emergency services.
- 4.153 The Communication/Control Room must then contact the NOO and inform them of the situation. Staff will be deployed immediately to the cell.
- 4.154 Cells should only be entered using the sealed pouches. The NOO "doubles keys" should never be taken onto a wing. Before a cell door is opened, the doubles key should be secured to the key chain of another member of staff who remains outside of the immediate area of the establishment.
- 4.155 Where observation panels are covered, the NOO should be informed immediately and staff deployed to the cell. In these circumstances a decision by a member of staff to enter the cell immediately on their own will be more difficult as there is less evidence to inform an immediate risk assessment.

Prisoner Movement During Night State

- 4.156 The LSS must clearly state how many staff must normally be present before any prisoner accommodation can be unlocked to include single and double cells in addition to dormitory/spur style accommodation.
- 4.157 All prisoner movements during the night state must be co-ordinated and approved by the NOO with appropriate staffing according to the known risks relating to the individual prisoner concerned.
- 4.158 In addition, the LSS must specify the requirements around keys and their use during night state. Doubles keys must never be in the vicinity of an open cell door. When entering a wing to unlock a cell, the only keys in possession of the staff should be a cell key and a

class 3 key (if attached to the night pouch). These must be secured to the staff member via the key chain.

- 4.159 All other keys (class 2 and class 1 doubles key) must be retained by a member of staff off wing behind a secured gate. (Other entry routes to the wing must also be secured prior to the cell being unlocked). This secures the area should a hostage situation emerge.
- 4.160 Any time a cell door is unlocked it must be recorded in the unit observation book and on the night sheet.

Breaking Night State to Permit Visitors

- 4.161 The LSS will set out the circumstances under which the night state may be justifiably broken and the secure perimeter of the establishment breached. Establishments must take into account the potential risk that arises when the gate is unlocked and whether any person wishing to enter may be under coercion.

Duty Governor Night Visits

- 4.162 At least one night visit must take place per month by a Duty Governor. To ensure the security of this visit and that the Duty Governor is not under coercion, establishments must have specific local procedures set out to manage this visit. This may include the Duty Governor contacting the prison prior to arrival and supplying a password to the NOO. The password must be confirmed by the NOO before entry to the establishment is permitted. The password should be changed regularly.
- 4.163 If the password is incorrect the police must be informed and entry to the establishment must be refused.

Statutory Right of Entry

- 4.164 The NOO must be aware of who has a statutory right of entry, Prior to the entry of the individual, ID must be confirmed, and the NOO must be content that the visitor is not under coercion. Any concerns must be reported to the Duty Governor and the Police immediately.
- 4.165 In accordance with the provisions of the S19(1) of the Prison Act 1952, Prison Rule 79(2), YOI rule 77(2), S20 and S48 of the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 and S54 of the Food Act 1990, the following people have a statutory right to enter a prison at any time:
- Justices of the Peace for the County or Borough of the prison or the prisoner in question.
 - Members of the prison's IMB.
 - Health & Safety Inspectors of the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) enforcing Health & Safety legislation.
 - Local Authority Environmental Health Officers enforcing the 1990 Food Act or Food Safety (General Food Hygiene) Regulations 1995; and
 - Members of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
- 4.166 If the NOO does not feel comfortable in allowing access, (for example reduced staffing levels as a result of an emergency escort would mean the visit can be conducted securely) then access must be denied, and immediate contact made with the Duty Governor. The situation must be clearly explained to the visitor(s).
- 4.167 All night visits must be recorded.

Emergency Services and Emergency Escorts

- 4.168 Night state will need to be broken in the event of a medical emergency. There must be clear instructions in the LSS and the Gate about the unhindered admission of any emergency services vehicles and personnel during night state.
- 4.169 Immediate and safe access must be provided to the emergency services when entering the establishment. NOO will need to ensure that escorting staff are available to permit entry via the gate and that they are aware of the quickest route to different parts of the prison.
- 4.170 In cold weather, some establishments will need to have anti-freeze or other measures on hand and stored in the vehicle lock/gate area to release any frozen locks that may delay entry.
- 4.171 In the case of an emergency life threatening escort, the prisoner can be escorted on a PER document alone with the security risk assessment following later. The Duty Governor must be contacted to discuss the risk and agree staffing levels and restraint requirements prior to dispatch. The Prisoner Escort Record (PER) must be used to record all prisoner movement and events. On most occasions an emergency escort will consist of two escorting officers but in some circumstances, three officers may be required. The minimum requirement is 2 officers.
- 4.172 The NOO will remain in charge of the prison and will need to assess what work can continue to be safely carried out, or whether there is a need to attempt to call more staff in (this would be done in consultation with the Duty Governor). Any reduction in work duties during night state will need to be recorded outlining the circumstances.

Exiting Night State

- 4.173 Prior to coming out of night state, the following may take place where relevant;
- Internal Perimeter Check
 - Removal of doubles
 - Full key check
 - Full roll check
 - Staffing the Gate
- 4.174 A full handover must be given to the daytime Orderly Officer to include:
- The night's events
 - Any security concerns
 - Prisoners subject to open ACCT documents
 - Prisoners on constant supervision
 - Any prisoners located to Segregation during the night
 - Any E-List and/or Pot / Cat A Prisoners.
 - Any hospital escorts/ bedwatches

Keys and Locks

- 4.175 All staff must ensure gates and doors are always secured:
- A Class I gate and/or door being left unsecured and unattended could aid prisoners in escape or escape attempts.
 - Open Class II gates and doors can allow prisoners into unauthorised areas leading to several possible security breaches.
 - Unsecured gates and doors increase the risk of violence and disorder, including hostage incidents and concerted indiscipline.
 - Incidents and compromises may require additional roll checks. This impedes regime delivery and impacts the prison's state of security and stability.

- 4.176 All staff must 'prove before they move' by after locking any gate or door, attempting to push/pull open to ensure lock is secured in the door/gate frame.
- 4.177 All staff must be aware of the actions alongside (Annex G) to take in relation to the actual or possible compromise of any a key or lock, this process must be reflected in local contingency plans and must include:
- **Broken key/broken lock** – individual to always stay with the lock/broken key, asking for assistance over the radio net or waiting until another staff member passes by.
 - **Loss or suspected loss of key/keys** – report to the orderly office/duty manager immediately, orderly officer /duty manager to consider freezing the gate, using chains to secure areas, stand fast roll check, area search, CCTV.
 - **Keys exiting the establishment** – last key holder to be contacted immediately, either by telephone or in person, if necessary, keys to be returned to the establishment once located and sealed in an evidence bag whilst a decision is made on the need for forensic testing and further investigations.
- 4.178 Any key/lock incident either actual or suspected must be reported via local reporting procedures and to:
- On the single incident line: 0207 147 4021.
 - NOMIS incident reporting system.
 - FM Operations locking store.
 - The Prison Group Director.
 - Deputy Directors (DD) of the Long Term High Security Estate (LTHSE) for those prisons in the LTHSE.
- 4.179 Incidents turning out to be false alarms must be re-submitted as a minor incident on the reporting system.
- 4.180 The decision to re-lock an establishment in the event of a key or lock incident may only be made by the relevant PGD, or DD LTHSE.
- 4.181 All Class I, II and III security keys (and bunches of such, except handcuff keys) for use by staff must be given a number and stored in a key safe/electronic key management cabinet in a secure location. Each establishment will have specific processes, these must be described in the LSS and include:
- the procedures for the secure storage, allocation, issue, return and safe keeping of keys.
 - Arrangements for the storage of spare security keys including access rights.
 - The storage and issue procedures for all keys including works, handcuff, and body belt keys.
 - Procedures for the secure use of key safes including access for auditors and senior managers.
- 4.182 If any member of staff arrives for duty with no key chain they must not be issued or draw keys, instead they must follow the specific instructions detailed in the LSS for reporting for duty with no key chain and replacement/loan of a key chain (if the key chain has been lost or stolen, this must also be reported via an intelligence report).
- 4.183 If operating a manual key safe, the safe must be locked overnight/when not in use.
- 4.184 If operating a manual key safe the numbered positions in the key safe must never be empty (a one for one tally system must be used).

- 4.185 Arrangements must be in place to prevent key holders leaving the establishment with their keys. This will vary in each establishment due to installed technology; it is advised that ALL staff show their empty key chain to the gate staff on exit.
- 4.186 The LSS must set out:
- Procedures for the locations and use of Class I doubles keys and master suite keys (the numbers of these in circulation must be limited and carefully controlled).
 - The agreed frequency and type of daily key check to be made and by whom, (a minimum of 1 key check for the main key safe/electronic management key safe must take place after lock up per day must take place).
 - Procedures for the restricted use of keys in night state and application of doubles.
- 4.187 A full key audit must take place at least once every six months and:
- Within one month of a new Head of Security taking up post.
 - Within one month of a new Security Key Manager (usually a Band 5) taking up post.
- 4.188 Spare security keys must be kept and stored securely; these arrangements must be set out in the LSS. As a minimum these must be stored in a secure locked safe and recorded on the key ledger, with access only being given to the Security Key Manager, Head of Security and Deputy Governor.
- 4.189 A record of daily key check must be made in the Gate Occurrence Book or equivalent.
- 4.190 No security keys must be taken out of the prison, unless agreed by the governor and the circumstances set out within the LSS. (Generally only court keys and a small selection of class III keys used for visitor's centres etc).
- 4.191 The LSS must set out the operational procedures for fully automated electronic key safes where they are installed.
- 4.192 Prisoners must not be allowed to handle or examine any key or lock.
- 4.193 Once drawn, keys must always be attached to the person by a chain. Establishments must also have systems in place for secure key storage when staff are using the gym/showers. Keys must not be taken into shower areas due to damage to the keys caused by rusting, options may include for establishments to have secure lockers, with individual keys issued to staff whilst showering (like that of public swimming pools) or a smaller electronic key management system located in the gymnasium.
- 4.194 Establishments must have systems in place for the storage of keys during times such as control and restraint (C&R) incidents in full PPE ensuring staff have somewhere safe and secure to store their keys, this could be a secure safe in the C&R kit room or similar, at no time should one member of staff take control of numerous key bunches on their key chain.
- 4.195 Keys must be kept in pockets or key pouches when not in use. Ensuring the key flag/bit is not visible.
- 4.196 Only issued Prison Service key chains should be used by staff and only one key chain used at a time to prevent entanglement, at times it may be necessary to have two clips on the key chain to assist with maintaining security of Orderly Officer key bunches or similar.

- 4.197 Keys must not be able to touch the floor when the key chain is fully extended (vertically down from belt), this prevents damage to the keys if dropped.
- 4.198 Key rings must be sealed with tamper evident seals to prevent unauthorised removal or adding of keys to a bunch.
- 4.199 Excessive force must not be used to open any lock. Any difficulty in opening any lock must be reported immediately to the Facilities Management (FM) Services Site Manager and the Security Department/Orderly Officer.
- 4.200 The LSS must set out clear guidelines as to whom keys can be issued to, types of keys and management of gates, doors and electronic key management systems. This must include:
- Access to keys and training for the Fire Service in case of emergency.
 - Identify who can draw keys and the type of keys they can hold.
 - Sets out the procedures and training that anyone issued with keys must complete to ensure that they are competent in the secure use of keys and locks.
 - Be clear that Class I and II locks must be locked back securely if left open.
 - Be clear staff must not leave Class I & II locks (including wooden outer doors) unlocked or unattended. This is to prevent prisoners from tampering with the lock.
 - Be clear that Class I works locks must always be double locked when the lock is not in use.
 - Be clear that Class I locks must be double locked at night unless the PGD (or the Director of High Security Prisons) has exceptionally agreed otherwise.
 - Be clear that Class I locks must only be locked back in accordance with the procedures set out within the LSS.
 - Governors must have assurance (to prevent any data breach) that any person's details (biometrics, PIN number, name etc) that are stored on the electronic key management system are deleted from the system at the earliest opportunity, when they are no longer an authorised visitor, or a directly/non-directly employed member of staff.
- 4.201 Each prison must keep a ledger/record of all keys, including all types of handcuff/restraint keys (Annex H).
- 4.202 The ledger/record of keys will include the following information:
- The running total for each type of key in stock including those not in use and stored securely in a safe.
 - The numbers of each type received from FM Operations Secure Lock Store and the date received.
 - The number of each type of key in use.
 - Information about individual keys not on main locking suites.
 - Information about when keys are returned to Security Locking Section for destruction.
 - Gross total for each type of keys held.
 - Crown Court keys (where appropriate).
- 4.203 There must be a complete and up to date set of locking schedules and floor plans for the establishment held by the facilities manager.
- 4.204 No locks or alternative suiting may be installed, including padlocks and rim mounted locks, except those specified on the schedule.

- 4.205 Requests for changes to locking schedules must be made to the CAD (Computer Assisted Design) Manager in FM Operations. Requests must be accompanied by a draft revised plan and schedule showing details of the changes requested.
- 4.206 Spare or replacement keys and locks must be ordered from FM Operations Secure Lock Store. Security keys must not be obtained from local sources or cut on key cutting machines.
- 4.207 Obsolete or damaged keys and levers must be returned to FM Operations Secure Lock Store for safe disposal. They must be returned with the appropriate documentation that gives the quantity, type, code and suiting information and a Condemnation form A40 completed (Annex I).
- 4.208 Local arrangements must be in place for the acceptance of new keys from FM Operations Secure Lock Store. Keys must be counted immediately, and the total recorded in both the key ledger and the delivery documentation (which must be returned to FM Operations Secure Lock Store).
- 4.209 Deliveries and collections to/from FM Operations Secure Lock Store must be made by two security cleared members of staff when collecting suited products.

Crown Courts

- 4.210 FM Operations Secure Lock Store at HMP Full Sutton will supply and issue the locks for Crown Court custody suites as required.

Suites of control locks will be provided in the following locations:

- Doors on the perimeter of the secure area giving access to it;
- Female defendants' area; and
- All other areas excluding stores rooms, offices, rest rooms and interview rooms.

- 4.211 To ensure security, the method of keying "Control Locks" will follow current HMPPS policy for keying within prisons. All doors that permit access to the Custody Area from other parts of the court and the external entry points must be fitted with keyholes on the secure side only.
- 4.212 Existing Crown Court cells using gates in place of cell doors must have physical protection to the lock to prevent defendants reaching or tampering with the lock.
- 4.213 Keys must be always kept secure to maintain key and lock security and kept in a locked key safe when not in use.
- 4.214 Key bunches must not be taken by individual members of staff/contractor's staff outside of the Crown Court Secure Area which is bounded by the prisoner entrance, the dock entrance and the door between the visits waiting area and the secure area. Staff/contractors working within the visits area will require a single suited key.
- 4.215 All security locks in the custody area must be left in the unlocked and open condition when the secure area is not in use thereby removing the necessity to leave keys with the court administration.
- 4.216 The LSS must set out local agreements for those Crown Courts attached directly to a police station to allow the police to use the secure cells when the Court is not sitting (i.e., normally

weekends and bank holidays). The control of any security keys designated for police use must be arranged so that signed receipts are obtained from any police officers issued with the keys to provide a complete audit trail of their use. When not in use the key bunch must be securely stored in a key safe which is under the control of the Senior Police Officer on duty.

- 4.217 It is the duty of the escort contractors nominated manager to ensure that key security and control are maintained in all parts of the custody area.
- 4.218 The security custody suite keys, where they exist, must be checked and counted at the beginning and end of each working day. A full key check of crown court keys must take place in line with para 4.122.
- 4.219 The escort contractor nominated manager must report immediately by telephone and in writing, any potential security deficiencies to the establishment responsible for the maintenance of the fabric of the court building and FM Operations Secure Lock Store
- 4.220 It is the duty of the nominated manager within the prison to ensure that key security and control are maintained in all parts of the custody area through regular visual and physical inspections of those parts of the Crown Court for which the escort contractors are responsible. The manager with this responsibility should be Band 5 or above and inspections should be conducted at least once every six months in line with the full establishment key audit.

Padlocks

- 4.221 Only padlocks supplied by FM Operations Secure Lock Store must be used, and identified where in use on the locking schedule. Where padlocks are in use, key staff including the head of security and orderly officer are to be made aware of where the keys are held.
- 4.222 Chains and padlocks for use during incidents must be provided by FM Operations Secure Lock Store.

Disclosure

- 4.223 Disclosure of a lock or key occurs when it is considered beyond reasonable doubt that an individual (or individuals) has had enough opportunity to copy, manufacture or otherwise effect the means for operation of a lock or key.
- 4.224 Not all compromises result in disclosure, minor incidents will be dealt with locally and may result in the replacement of a lock or the condemnation of a key.
- 4.225 More serious security, complex breaches or intelligence threats/risks which would have an immediate effect on the physical security of the establishment must be referred immediately by the establishment to the FM Operations Locking Store.
- 4.226 Disclosure procedures and guidelines for the above circumstances are set out in Annex J.

Tools and Equipment

- 4.227 Tools and equipment must be managed and stored appropriately to prevent the use of these items being used/fashioned into weapons, or for use as escape aids. This includes items in healthcare emergency response kits/grab bags or similar.

4.228 All staff must be aware of the actions to take in relation to identifying a missing tool/s or equipment and this process must be reflected in the LSS and local contingency plans in line with PSI 2014-09 Incident Management.

Initial actions to take, must include:

- No prisoners are to leave the area of the missing tool.
- Prisoners are asked if they know the whereabouts of the missing tool.
- Missing tool to be reported to Orderly Officer/Duty Manager immediately with full details of when the tool was last seen, and who it was last issued to.
- Await further instruction from the Orderly Officer/Duty Manager.
- The Orderly Officer/Duty manager will utilise contingency plans and instruct all areas of necessary actions to take, including searching of prisoners etc.

Tools Risk Assessment

4.229 The security department will conduct a risk assessment (Annex K) of all tools including those held by outside facilities management departments and plant machinery taking into consideration tool type, location, and who will have access/use of it to determine which items must be marked. The completed risk assessments must be uploaded to the LSS and must consider:

- The security category of the prison, age and profile of the population.
- The potential danger each tool, tool type/item of equipment would pose to the security of the prison if it were lost.
- The likelihood of the item being taken for unauthorised use (i.e., if it is a tool not issued or accessible to prisoners, or if it is used in an area to which prisoners may have access).
- Equipment (including cutlery or servery tools) located in staff rest areas/kitchens which are adjacent to either prisoner accommodation or prisoner recreational areas.
- Tools and equipment used by healthcare staff/dentists/doctors and other visiting healthcare professionals must never be issued/used by prisoners.

4.230 There are no set timescales for tools to be re-risk assessed, however this must be done if a change of prison category, profile of the population takes place or if intelligence is received regarding certain tools being used as weapons/escape aids.

4.231 A central inventory and local inventories of all tools within the establishment must be maintained and kept up to date. Local inventories should not obscure the view of the shadow boards when in place. The inventory must identify both the name of the tool and the unique code for that tool.

4.232 Tools must not be added or removed (physically or on the inventory), by anybody but the security department.

Prisoner Workplace Risk Assessment

4.1 Upon completion of tool risk assessments, no prisoner should be given access to tools until they have been approved to attend work/education via an individual prisoner workplace risk assessment in accordance with the guidance set out in the Activity Hub Toolkit. As a minimum, prisoner workplace risk assessments (see template at Annex L) must include consideration of the following:

- Security category.
- Incentive level.
- Current offence details and offence history (to include any public protection concerns).

- Mental and physical health.
- Sentence length.
- Previous adjudications in particular for violence and disorder.
- Custodial behaviour (last 12 months).
- Security concerns (to include links to organised crime and extremism), summary of intelligence.
- Safer custody information to include gang affiliation, CSIP (Challenge, Support & Intervention Plan) details, viper score.

Workplace Risk Assessment

- 4.233 All activity areas must have an individual workplace risk assessment (Annex M), this must be reviewed on receipt of any specific intelligence to that area or at least every 12 months.
- 4.234 Establishments may adapt the workplace risk assessments to suit establishment need however the workplace risk assessment must include as a minimum all information included on Annex M.

Unique Marking

- 4.235 Each establishment will have a unique coding system for tools which will identify:
- the establishment
 - the area the tool is from
 - the tool number

For example: HOI-WKSHP6-1 relates to High Down (HOI) Workshop 6 (wkshp6) tool number 1 (1)

This allows for each tool to be accounted for in the correct place and helps easily identify a tool of which there may be multiple of in different locations within a prison.

- 4.236 The LSS will identify which tools and equipment will be identified in this way and they must be marked in a non-erasable way such as etching. Small tools such as dentistry tools may be photographed and displayed alongside the relevant storage area. Other tools that cannot be etched should be colour coded.

For example:

- Workshop 1 could be orange and workshop 2 could be blue, so tools could easily be identified as to where they originated from.
- All 6" screwdriver handles could be blue and all 4" screwdriver handles could be green.

Storage

- 4.237 Any tools that have been identified as posing a high risk to security and are used regularly must be stored in either a secure shadow board or secure cupboard, dependant on the size of the item, items such as domestic irons do not always fit into a shadow board, these would then be in a secure cupboard but accounted for in the same way as if in a shadow board.
- 4.238 Mops and brooms are vital for prisoners and staff to maintain standards of cleanliness and decency and therefore there will be times when prisoners have these in their cells. All staff and prisoners must be aware and remain vigilant to the risk these could cause if fashioned into/used as a weapon or escape aid. Staff must remove and dispose of safely any adapted

or broken mops and brooms or handles with no head attached. Tools such as mops and brooms for example, which are assessed as posing a lower risk to the security of the establishment may be stored in a cupboard that is locked when they are not in use, systems should be in place for accounting for these items.

- 4.239 Small tools, such as dentistry tools can be stored together as a kit, the kit should have a clear inventory attached to it to identify the tools in the kit. Items such as these should be secured when not in use (photographs of such tools rather than etching may be appropriate for accounting purposes).
- 4.240 Stock control systems along with disposal records must also be in place for disposal of medical equipment such as needles, syringes, suture kits etc.
- 4.241 Stores, gate and security departments should have a system in place to identify the delivery of any new tools, this will enable the security department to take control of these prior to issue to any area, ensuring they have been risk assessed and etched/marked in the correct manner.
- 4.242 In all areas of the establishment dependant on where prisoners work, they will routinely have access to several materials, including, cleaning materials, solvents, adhesives, chemicals, petrol or other products used in workplaces. The LSS must specify the procedure for securely storing these items in line with Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Guidelines and regular checks to ensure they have not been misused or taken.
- 4.243 Due to the variety of different materials across the estate there is no set procedure for secure storage of these materials, consideration should be made to:
- Chaining of containers
 - Locking in appropriate storage cupboards
 - Materials only issued to prisoners by staff.

Issue/Receipt

- 4.244 Tools which are assessed as suitable for prisoner use, must be secured appropriately and the LSS must include a system for the secure issue/receipt of all tools and equipment given to prisoners, this system must include locations of tool within the prison, when and to which prisoner they were issued (ST2).
- 4.245 Prisoners should never be given direct access to shadow boards/tool cupboards, and they should never be left unlocked.
- 4.246 A replica system for issue of tools to staff must also be in place.
- 4.247 All tools/equipment must be accounted for at the end of each work/association/or activity session. If a tool is identified as missing this must be reported immediately, staff should not waste time looking for the tool prior to reporting as missing. (Fully plastic serving tools do not need to be etched or accounted for in the same way as other tools at the end of a session, however it is advised that an accountability system is put in place to ensure the smooth running of the serving each session).
- 4.248 Tools and equipment used by healthcare staff/doctors/dentists or other visiting healthcare professionals must always be stored securely.

- 4.249 Staff must not bring their own tools or equipment into the prison without first gaining authority from prison management as per Conveyance Policy Framework.
- 4.250 Any tool or item of equipment that is brought into the prison must be listed and controlled so that it cannot be taken or misused by prisoners.
- 4.251 Staff must always be aware of the potential security threats from any large and/or moveable item(s) in use around the prison which can be placed near or against a perimeter wall or fence.
- 4.252 If any items are found to be insecure or close to the perimeter then they must be moved immediately, if possible and/or reported to the security and facilities management teams so that they can be secured/moved.
- 4.253 It may be appropriate dependant on the circumstances to report via the radio net and remain with the items until moved/secured, this will depend on several factors including access by prisoners and proximity to the perimeter, therefore the member of staff finding the items will be required to conduct a dynamic risk assessment in relation to the immediate risk they pose.

Disposal

- 4.254 Any broken tools including items such as hacksaw blades, must be disposed of promptly and securely, with records to show disposal point and date of disposal. Systems should be in place to identify missing tools (due to breakage) from shadow boards and tool inventories (ST3).

High Risk Items

- 4.255 Systems must be in place for storing, controlling, and positioning of high-risk items which could assist an attempted escape.
- 4.256 Where emergency response kits contain items such as scissors, suture kits or compressed gas, they must be treated as high-risk tools and therefore must be marked and checked appropriately.

Signage/TV aerials and similar

- 4.257 Whilst it is important to ensure appropriate signage is displayed and items such as TV aerials are vital for prisons to operate smoothly. Care and consideration must be taken prior to fitting/installing these, as they could be used as climbing/escape aids and must only be fitted/installed with agreement of the security manager.
- 4.258 Consideration must be given to:
- Proximity to fence/wall
 - Installation height
 - Ease of access by prisoners to item.

Skips

- 4.259 Skips should only be placed in locations approved by the security manager and adequate security measures put in place to manage any risks identified.

- 4.260 All skips must be in a good sound condition. Access points to the interior of the skip must be lockable using a padlock and chain, or any other approved method.
- 4.261 The keys used to secure the skip must always be in control of the member of staff, who oversees the skip. The member of staff must always open and secure the skip between uses whilst controlling prisoner access to the area/skip.
- 4.262 Prisoners must not have access to the security keys for skips under any circumstances.
- 4.263 Procedures for delivery/removal of any skips must be documented within the LSS (ST4) taking into consideration restrictions for prisoner movement whilst skips are being collected/removed.
- 4.264 In establishments where prisoners are locked up over lunch, it is advised that skips are agreed to be collected/removed at these times once the lunch time roll has been reported as correct and prior to any further prisoner movement.
- 4.265 A correct prisoner roll must be confirmed before skips/skip lorries are permitted to leave the prison. All vehicles and their contents must be subject to a thorough search.

Climbing Aids

- 4.266 All climbing aids (step ladders, extendable ladders, and scaffold towers/platforms) must be locked in a secure store when not in use.
- 4.267 Whilst climbing aids are in use, they must be closely supervised by a member of staff who has a radio and has joined the net. If possible, it is advised to train CCTV on to the area and monitor as an extra security measure.
- 4.268 Once work has been completed the communications room must be informed of this and the climbing aid returned to secure storage.
- 4.269 If a step or extendable ladder is in intermittent use during a job, it must be laid horizontal and locked securely to a fixed point within the immediate vicinity of the work site when it is not in use. Chains and padlocks should be used for this, if working near the perimeter fence the ladder should not be secured (even horizontal) near to the perimeter.
- 4.270 All scaffolding must be securely clad/sheeted to deter potential incidents at height or attempted escapes. Other security measures such as alarms and CCTV coverage should be considered. These considerations should have been made/agreed and documented at the 4:20 meeting (works/security pre work meeting) (ST5).
- 4.271 Scaffolding poles and planks must be securely stored when not in use.

Climbing aids used for prisoner tuition

- 4.272 Several prisons operate educational/vocational courses for prisoners which may include the use of ladders, scaffolding and other such items.
- 4.273 These items must only be used under the supervision of instructors, always secured when not in use and only ever used in a controlled manner and never in the vicinity of the perimeter.

Plant machinery

- 4.274 The term 'plant' refers to machinery, equipment and apparatus used for an industrial activity. Typically, in construction, 'plant' refers to heavy machinery and equipment used during construction works.
- 4.275 Security Departments must risk assess all internal and external vehicles and plant to establish the level of risk they pose to security. If the plant machinery is part of the establishment's assets, then this must be risk assessed under the tools and equipment risk assessment process, ensuring procedures are in place for immobilisation and secure storage. This risk assessment must be undertaken before approval is given for its entry into the establishment.
- 4.276 Any plant machinery that is required to enter the establishment on a temporary basis must be agreed by the security and facilities management departments and normal entry and exit procedures for vehicles followed.
- 4.277 Before any commencement of movement with a high-risk vehicle/plant the Communications room must be informed to which location it will be going to and its route.
- 4.278 On completion of any work which required the use of a high-risk vehicle or plant, the vehicle must be immobilised and made secure as a minimum.

Other available escape/climbing aids

- 4.279 Use of the following equipment (this list is not exhaustive) must be managed carefully, must not be near perimeters and must always be chained and padlocked to prevent it being moved to the perimeter edge.
- storage of cabling
 - wheelie bins
 - storage of bed frames
 - storage of wooden pallets
 - storage of metal cages
 - use of sports equipment.

Sports Equipment/Gyms

- 4.280 All gym equipment must be accounted for at the end of every session. This includes items such as ropes, wall bars, badminton nets, agility ladders and similar.

Facilities Management

- 4.281 A full and auditable inventory of all works tools must always be maintained by the facilities management team manager, they must have in place systems for disposal and replenishment of tools in the same way as all other tools in the establishment. All tools should be stored in shadow boards/cupboards when not in use and the tally system used when taken out (ST2).
- 4.282 Tools must not normally be issued to prisoners, but in circumstances where prisoners do have legitimate access a full workplace and prisoner workplace risk assessment must be undertaken in advance.

- 4.283 A full and auditable inventory of all work's tools always must be maintained by a responsible manager.
- 4.284 It will be necessary for facilities management teams to use their tools around the establishment, they should always have an up-to-date inventory of tools they are carrying with them on their person, this inventory must include all items including items such as drill bits, saw blades, screwdriver heads and so on. Tools must be checked against this inventory when moving between workplaces (upon leaving and arriving at new destinations) (Annex O).

Contractor's tools

- 4.285 Procedures must be in place for controlling tools that contractors use. These tools must not be issued to or used by any prisoners.
- 4.286 Prior to visiting a list of tools required must be provided to the security department, this may be via a 420 meeting for bigger/longer term projects.
- 4.287 Upon arrival the escorting member of staff must make an inventory of all tools/equipment entering the establishment. The use of an authorised polaroid camera or similar may be useful for this, the use of a camera will provide a means of checking tools without items being wrongly named/identified.
- 4.288 All tools equipment must be checked against the inventory by the escorting member of staff when moving between workplaces (upon leaving and arriving at new destinations) and on exit of the establishment.

Stores

- 4.289 All staff working within the stores must be sufficiently trained to search the accommodation, items within the stores, and the prisoners with legitimate access to the stores area. Staff must also be able to demonstrate that they are competent in the use of handheld metal detectors.
- 4.290 There must be a strategy in place for searching all prisoners with access to the stores.
- 4.291 Outgoing goods could provide an effective hiding place for prisoners who are attempting escape, all outgoing goods must be searched and remain sterile from prisoners once this search has taken place.
- 4.292 The Stores and its contents must be searched at unpredictable times. The searching policy must state the frequency of searches to be conducted in the stores.
- 4.293 To assist with maintaining the security of stores, staff working in stores must:
- Make thorough daily checks on all tools, items of equipment, or stored materials.
 - Maintain a stores log/register.
 - Be fully aware of everything held in stores and its exact location.
 - Take appropriate measures to prevent the compromise of security or good order of the prison and theft by prisoners.
 - The store's manager must undertake a physical security check of all doors, windows and, where appropriate, machinery. This must be carried out simultaneously with the fire check daily and signed for in the stores/log register.

4.294 A nominated manager is required to check and sign the stores log/register daily. Staff working within stores areas within prisons are contractor employed, alongside a daily check and signature of the store's log/register by the nominated stores manager the contractors site manager must also check and sign the stores log/register at least once every three months, identifying and reporting appropriately any discrepancies.

Staff Personal Protective Equipment

4.295 Staff personal protective equipment if left unattended or not secured properly could also be used as a weapon or as an escape aid and therefore must also be always accounted for.

4.296 Personal issue cut-down tools (big fish) and other PPE which may be issued to named individuals on a permanent basis must be marked/etched.

4.297 Batons:

- Batons each have a unique identification number, and these must be issued individually to members of staff and a central log maintained.
- Batons must be stored in secure storage inside the establishment (not outside locker rooms), they can be taken out of the establishment for escorts/bedwatches and detached duty.
- If they are to be carried in a personal vehicle (on-route to detached duty), then the governor must provide a covering letter to the member of staff to produce to the police if stopped (Annex N).
- If the staff member is carrying out bedwatch duties for another establishment, then that establishment should provide a baton for the staff member when reporting for duty.

4.298 Rigid bar handcuffs:

- Rigid bar handcuffs each have a unique identification number, and these must be issued individually to members of staff and a central log maintained.
- Rigid bar handcuffs must be stored in secure storage inside the establishment (not outside locker rooms), they can be taken out of the establishment for escorts/bedwatches (they should not be used as the primary restraints) and detached duty.
- If they are to be carried in a personal vehicle (on-route to detached duty), then the governor must provide a covering letter to the member of staff to produce to the police if stopped (Annex N).
- If the staff member is carrying out bedwatch duties for another establishment, then that establishment should provide a rigid bar cuff for the staff member when reporting for duty if deemed as necessary to take on the bedwatch.

4.299 Cut down tools (big fish):

- Cut down tools must be individually marked/etched with a unique identification number, and these should be issued individually to members of staff and a central log maintained.
- Cut down tools must be stored in secure storage inside the establishment (not outside locker rooms), they can be taken out of the establishment for escorts/bedwatches and detached duty.
- If they are to be carried in a personal vehicle (on-route to detached duty), then the governor must provide a covering letter to the member of staff to produce to the police if stopped (Annex N).

- If the staff member is carrying out bedwatch duties for another establishment, then that establishment should provide a cut down tool for the staff member when reporting for duty if deemed as necessary to take on the bedwatch.

4.300 PAVA:

- PAVA cans each have a unique identification number, and these must be issued individually to members of staff and a central log maintained.
- PAVA must be stored in secure storage inside the establishment (not outside locker rooms).
- PAVA must never exit the gate of the establishment except when on external perimeter patrol as part of official duty.
- If attending an establishment on detached duty, PAVA must be provided by that establishment.

4.301 All PPE must also be either returned to dedicated storage or establishments must provide staff with secure storage for when using the gym or similar, PPE must not be left unattended.

Covert testing

4.302 Establishments outside of high security estate must conduct a local risk assessment to determine whether any programme of covert testing of escort procedures (including application of restraints) is necessary or would be beneficial. Covert testing provides assurance that all measures to prevent escape are being carried out. See guidance for further information on assurance processes.

4.303 It is important that covert testing is conducted using the proper procedures and in line with the Covert Testing Policy Framework (awaiting publication).

Constraints

5.1 There are dependencies between this Policy Framework and the following policy documents:

- Searching Policy Framework - this Policy Framework sets out the measures to prevent and deter escape.
- Evidence Policy Framework – this Policy Framework sets out the requirements for all evidence.
- Prevention of Escape Policy Framework – External Escorts.
- Management of E List Prisoners Policy Framework.

Data Protection

5.2 Any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual recorded as a consequence of this framework will be processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018, UK General Data Protection Regulation and PSI 04/2018 Records Information Management Policy. A full Data Protection Impact Assessment has been completed in support of this Policy Framework.

Freedom of Information Act

5.3 This document has been assessed as OFFICIAL and therefore suitable for public release. A small percentage of supporting tools have been marked as OFFICIAL SENSITIVE and will not be available for public release.


Diversity & Inclusion

- 5.4 When communicating to staff, prisoners or visitors, establishments are expected to ensure that briefing documents and information is available in a variety of formats including easy read, braille, voice, and other languages.
- 5.6 A full Equality Impact Assessment has been completed in support of this Policy Framework.

6. Guidance

NSF Risk Assessments

- 6.1 An evidence-based approach should be used determine the levels and frequency of processes and procedures dependent on the threat to individual establishment.
- 6.2 Establishments must take into account known deficiencies in security, good order or discipline and the security aims of the prison. The risk assessment must also include the quality of intelligence received within the establishment and factors which may indicate or pose a potential risk or threat to the security and/or safety of the establishment.
- 6.3 To support the evidence-based approach, establishments are encouraged to complete their own ‘State of Security’ assessments which has been identified as best practice in this area.



- 6.4 The concept of State of Security stems from the principle that Governors and Senior Managers know when they have a ‘good day’ in their prison but may not always be able to break down the essential elements.
- 6.5 State of Security aims to look beyond performance measures to establish how we achieve our security objectives against the baseline of a ‘good’ prison state. To help understand the state of a prison’s security, consideration must be given to the components that make it up. This includes allowing prison staff, as experts, to meaningfully self-reflect on their prison’s culture, rather than being over reliant on or governed by audit processes.
- 6.6 At all times, including during a crisis or extreme pressure, the stability of sites is paramount. When rapid changes are occurring, it has been essential for effective plans to be established to minimise the potential risk to the health of both staff and prisoners whilst ensuring that prisons remain safe, decent and secure.
- 6.7 Security & Rehabilitative Culture - HMPPS Intranet (gsi.gov.uk) (*security information hub access required (Annex B)*)

Consideration of Corruption

Staff corruption takes place across all of our security threats, it is important for all staff to remain vigilant to this risk and report any suspicions / wrongdoing appropriately

HMPPS Counter Corruption and Reporting Wrongdoing Policy Framework outlines the responsibilities of all HMPPS staff and non-directly employed persons to report suspicions of wrongdoing and corruption at the earliest opportunity through the appropriate channels. HMPPS defines corruption as a person in a position of authority or trust who abuses their position for benefit or gain for themselves or for another person.

The reporting member of staff must give consideration as to whether or not a breach is a result of corrupt behaviour when considering reporting the breach. If so, or if in doubt, this must be reported via one of the following routes:

- Submission of a CPIR on the Mercury Reporting system
- Talking to the Local Counter Corruption Manager (LCCM)
- **Confidential Email:** CCU-National@justice.gov.uk
- **Confidential mail box:** Counter Corruption Unit, 8th Floor Tower, 102 Petty France, London, SW1H 9AJ
- Calling the independently-administered 24/7 Integrity Hotline: 0800 917 6877
- Reporting online: <https://forms.theilene.co.uk/hmpps>

Consideration must be given to minimising the number of people aware of the reported breach to maintain the integrity of any counter corruption investigation.

General

- 6.8 All staff working in the establishment both directly and indirectly employed are to be aware of how and where to find the LSS, guidance and supporting tools, this can be facilitated via initial security inductions (Annex D), staff briefings and similar, although it will be the decision of each establishment the approach they wish to take.
- 6.9 PGDs together with Governors are required to sign an annual assurance statement that states that the LSS of that prison is fit for purpose and the level of assurance to be carried out. Annex A sets out a simple model assurance statement which, once complete, should be uploaded to the LSS for audit purposes.
- 6.10 The minimum level of assurance is that PGDs must satisfy themselves that the key security outputs are set out adequately within the LSS, that they adhere to national policy and reflect local risks of establishments.
- 6.11 The Head of Security and Security Custodial Manager will normally be responsible for making updates to the LSS however, they are expected to provide the expectation and direction and any member of staff may be used to make the physical updates once approved, this could be used as a development opportunity or to support somebody on a phased return or restricted duties.

Prevention of Escape – General

- 6.12 All staff must know what action to take in case of escape, suspected escape or attempted escape. These actions are the same for a variety of incidents across the establishment and it would be recommended that they are taught as part of the initial security induction of staff (Annex D).
- General Alarm;
 - Whistle;

- 'Urgent Message' on the radio net;
- Dial 222 from a landline;
- Personal alarm on the radio;
- Dial 999 if external to the establishment; and
- Shouting for assistance.

6.13 It is recognised that several establishments may not use whistles as a standard method to raise the alarm, however staff should still be provided with a whistle and informed on how to use them correctly, this would also provide assurance for periods of detached duty or similar.

Internal procedures to prevent escape

6.14 Who escapes?

- No disproportionate difference in gender, ethnicity, marital status or mental health
- Limited evidence to suggest differences in offence type, length of sentence, incentive level and workplace.
- Only two reliable and evidenced indicators:
 - Age (25-44); and
 - History of escape (previous perpetrators are twice as likely to escape or attempt to than those who have previously not)
- Large number may not have E-list markers on their records
- Male prisoners represent largest gender group of those escaping or attempting to do so (due to majority of the prison population being male), however, females are proportionately more likely to escape


6.15 How do escapes occur from custody?

- Largest proportions are non-violent;
- Often perpetrated alone via scaling the perimeter fence however if involve assistance can be more successful;
- Large percentage assessed as pre-meditated, with the use of equipment and aids to facilitate escape;
- Mostly attempted from Category C establishments;
- Often occur between April and June;
- Mostly during the core day (06:00-17:00); over half successful escapes in the morning leading to lunch; and
- Our greatest resilience is between 22:00-05:59.

6.16 Escapes happen when three factors coincide:

1. Changes in prisoner circumstance;
2. Inconsistent application of policies and procedures; and
3. Perceptions of weakness in security.

ESCAPES HAPPEN WHEN THREE FACTORS COINCIDE:



6.17 Changes in prisoner circumstances:

A significant life event has been related to escapes, such as imminent sentencing, divorce, illness, or birth of a baby social detachment is a significant catalyst for escapes, with a large percentage of incidents reported to be motivated by a lack of family contact.

6.18 Inconsistent application of policies and procedures:

The role of procedural security and staff security capability is a consistent yet underreported contributor to escapes Investigations into escapes from custody have shown a misapplication of security procedures.

6.19 Prisoner perceives security as weak:

6.20 If prisoners perceive security as weak and pregnable, they are more likely to attempt an escape Prisoners cite realising an escape from custody was possible, whether that was loose restraints, inadequate supervision or absence searching practices, motivated their desire and willingness to do so oOur vulnerability to escapes is compounded by the over reliance on physical infrastructure to manage the risk.

Prevention / Support

- 6.21 To aid with the prevention of escape and abscond, a number of principles should be followed along with continued support for those in our care throughout their time in custody:
- effective application of procedures by confident and capable people.
 - consistent application of policies and procedures meeting perceptions of weakness and changes in a prisoner’s circumstances.
 - prevent the opportunity, remove the desire to escape.
 - consideration and effective implementation of procedural justice and rehab culture in all aspects of security.
 - remaining vigilant not becoming over-reliant on physical. infrastructure to manage the risk.

Support for Prisoners

- 6.22 It must be recognised that as an understanding of the reasons for escape increase, resulting in improved implementation of procedures and increase in staff confidence, this restricts the opportunity of escape, prisoners therefore may feel frustrated and seek further outlets to vent their frustrations, this may include attempts of violence and disorder or self-harm and suicide.
- 6.23 There are several policies, processes and key areas that can help support prisoners. Some of these are listed below and should be always considered throughout a prisoner’s time in custody, to aid with the avoidance of prisoners feeling like they have no choice but to escape / abscond from custody, or carry out other actions due to frustrations.

PRISONERS SUPPORT	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Keyworkers• Family support
------------------------------	---

- Substance Misuse Services
- Mental Health Services
- Pastoral Support
- Individual Case Management
- ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody & Teamwork) / PSI 64/2011 Prisoners at risk of harm to self, to others and from others. Prison service instructions (PSIs) - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)
- CSIP (Challenge, Support & Intervention Plan) Challenge, Support, and Intervention Plan - HMPPS Intranet (gsi.gov.uk)
- PSI 07/2015 Early Days in Custody Prison service instructions (PSIs) - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)
- Serious and Organised Crime Policy Framework Prison & Probation Policy Frameworks - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)
- Debt Materials and Learning for prisoners Safety - HMPPS Intranet (gsi.gov.uk)
- Listener Scheme & Samaritans Safety - HMPPS Intranet (gsi.gov.uk)

How Security Risks Operate.

6.24 A security risk starts with someone having hostile intent.

- Some prisoners will undertake hostile reconnaissance. This means they will analyse our procedures, personnel and physical measures and look for weakness.
- Having identified weaknesses, they will plan to exploit these weaknesses to achieve their ambition.

Prevention of escapes from custody.

Roll Checks (ST6)

6.25 The 'roll' is the number of prisoners held in an establishment, at any one time, this is any prisoner who is on the inside of the prison perimeter, including those lodging on a van whilst other prisoners are dropped off.

6.26 Accounting for all prisoners, always, is important to identify any escapes (attempted or actual).

6.27 To aid with maintaining a prison roll, the gate and reception (where operating) should always maintain a prison roll, recording the:

- Unlock roll
- Discharge
- Receptions
- Current roll.

6.28 It is recommended that this be clearly displayed in the gate lodge area and must also be recorded in the gate book.

Stand fast roll check

6.29 A stand fast roll check is an ad hoc (when necessary or needed) roll check.

- 6.30 There are several circumstances where a stand fast roll check may be called, these may include (this list is not exhaustive):
- Gate found open
 - Missing prisoner
 - Hole in fence
 - Escape aid found near perimeter wall (rope/ladder).
- 6.31 The procedures to follow will be the same in each circumstance and may operate alongside escape contingency plans.
- 6.32 Any member of staff coming across or being alerted to any of the above circumstances must raise the alarm in the appropriate manner immediately at which point a stand fast roll check will be called.

Stand Fast Roll Check Procedure

- 6.33 A stand fast roll check will be managed by the communications room/orderly officer.
- 6.34 Consideration to deploying fixed posts must be made at each stage (fixed posts is a system used in closed establishments in which staff attend a dedicated internal section of the wall/fence, usually identified by a large number or letter, each staff member should be in the line of sight of the next staff member and are to monitor that section of wall for any breaches of security) (ST7).
- 6.35 Consideration to freezing the gate must be made at each stage, freezing the gate will result in no persons or vehicles exiting the gate without permission from the Duty Governor, consideration should be given to whom can enter the establishment, this may include staff but not contractors, but may include Prisoner Escort Contractor Services (PECS) with prisoners onboard to ensure decency.
- 6.36 Emergency Service vehicles must be allowed to both access and leave the establishment.
- 6.37 The stand fast roll check will be announced over the radio net, it is advised to use the alarm warble at this stage to gain staff attention.
- 6.38 Acknowledgements should be obtained via the radio to all relevant areas/call signs.
- 6.39 At the announcement, the following will take place:
- All areas with the establishment will secure the area and cease all movement to and from their department/area including work parties;
 - All areas will carry out a physical head count of all prisoners;
 - All areas will contact the communications room/orderly officer by landline or radio to report numbers; and
 - The communications room/orderly officer will be responsible for collating the roll.
- 6.40 If the roll is incorrect then 'incorrect roll' procedures and/or escape contingency plans should be activated if not already done so.
- 6.41 Incorrect roll procedures should be set out in the LSS and may include the below procedures at different stages throughout.
- Recount, unlocking all cell doors, checking under beds/behind curtains etc;

- Checking locations of all prisoners via NOMIS and the use of ID cards/other identifying paperwork;
- Swapping locations (A wing count B wing/B wing count A wing and so on).
- Returning all prisoners from activity/appointments, taking into consideration the routes for return; and
- Cross referencing gate passes between reception and the gate to ensure all discharges have been accounted for correctly.

6.42 It must be remembered however that all these actions can take time, allowing any escaped prisoner to make further their getaway, therefore no delays should be made in implementing escape contingency plans.

Gate (see also Conveyance Policy Framework)

6.43 The Gate area is that part of the prison through which people, vehicles and materials are allowed into and out of the establishment. The gate is a high-risk area in terms of escape and could be the weakest point for escape if not managed correctly and confidently.

6.44 Staff working in the gate carry out a vital role in maintaining security and preventing escape.

6.45 Maintaining a professional 'front of house' customer service approach is one of the first steps contributing to maintaining a secure environment, supported further by following procedures set out in the Searching Policy Framework, Conveyance and Prevention of Escape Policy Frameworks.

6.46 Gate staff play a key part in the smooth operation of the prison and maintaining the regime, it is important that gate staff have a copy of the published/current prison regime, allowing them to liaise with delivery drivers etc and be able to provide understanding and explanation as to why a vehicle may not be allowed access immediately, due to clashes with mass movement or similar.

Entry and Exit

6.47 The conveyance and searching policy frameworks should be referred to for searching and ID requirements.

Staff

6.48 Prisoners may use the opportunity of staff exiting the establishment to disguise themselves as a staff member in a bid to 'walk out', to prevent this staff should show their ID before exiting the final locked gate/door of the establishment.

Vehicles

6.49 To prevent escape the correct searching and movement of vehicles in establishments is vital. An exit search is one of the most important searches to take place.

6.50 In 2019 a prisoner escaped from one our establishments under a vehicle. ST17 depicts how this happened, identifies key learning, and displays how important it is to maintain all security procedures.

6.51 The efficient movement of vehicles is necessary to maintain both security and an efficient prison regime, gate staff need to be aware of the establishments requirements for entry and exit of vehicles.

6.52 As no vehicle (unless emergency) should enter the establishment unless the escorting member of staff is present and ready to conduct the escort, no vehicle should wait in a position that may impede entry or exit of emergency vehicles. As good practice 'no parking/no waiting' signage in these areas is recommended (both internal and external of the establishment).

Signage is available from: - HMP Coldingley (coldingleysigns@justice.gov.uk)

6.53 Many prisons have a vehicle lock or an inner and outer gate, at least one gate either the inner or outer gate should always be secured to provide a further line of defence from escape.

6.54 In some circumstances this may not always be possible:

- Emergency vehicle access in life threatening situations
- Vehicle too long for the lock
- Gate failure (mechanical or electrical).

6.55 The decision to open both gates simultaneously will generally be under the direction or supervision of an appropriate manager (Band 5 or above) and only in exceptional circumstances, all staff working in the gate must be aware of how to operate any necessary 'overrides' if this is needed.

6.56 To aid with the prevention of escape, extra staff will be deployed to the area to manage both gates and consideration to the use of patrol dogs if available. The use of patrol dogs and when they can be used will always be under the direction of the dog handler/dog team and Prison Dogs Policy Framework.

Prisoners through the gate

6.57 The gate is the final line of defence for prisoners exiting the establishment and preventing an escape.

6.58 In several establishments' prisoners will move through the gate either on entry or exit on most days for different reasons:

- As part of outside work parties
- Final Discharge
- Release on Temporary license (ROTL)
- Escorts HMPPS and Contactor.

6.59 It is therefore vital that gate staff understand their role in preventing the unauthorised exit and entry of prisoners and are confident in doing so. Utilising the State of Security process and including all grades of staff will aid with this.

6.60 All prisoners attending the gate for any form of discharge are accompanied by a member of staff with a gate pass, which will inform the gate the reason for discharge and the prisoner's identity.

6.61 Several checks should have been conducted prior to the prisoner arriving at the gate in the case of final discharge, it is advised for sentence calculations to be carried out by trained staff and in line with the Sentence Calculations Policy Framework.

6.62 As part of the final discharge process carried out by the discharging officer in Reception (Band 4 or above) the prisoner's identity should be confirmed using a selection of different questions (Annex S).

Communications Room

- 6.63 The communications room will be the 'hub' of the prison in most establishments, controlling prisoner movement, vehicle movement, emergency situations, staff and prisoner safety (general/fire alarms) and so on.
- 6.64 Incident managers should ensure communications room staff are kept informed of relevant information about incidents throughout.
- 6.65 Security and/or Orderly Officers should ensure that the communications room are kept informed about specific prisoners as issues arise, particularly relating to any E list, category A or other prisoners considered to present a risk to security.

Prisoner Movement

- 6.66 Movement of prisoners around the establishment either unescorted, mass movement or in small groups may leave establishments vulnerable to escape due to many influencing factors.
- 6.67 In 2019 a prisoner escaped from one of our establishments during freeflow, the below report identifies how important it is to maintain all procedures.
 - Report of escape during freeflow from HMPPS establishment in 2019 (ST8).
- 6.68 It is easy for staff to be distracted when supervising the unloading of prisoners from a vehicle, consideration should be given to the individual risk factors of each establishment and whether it is necessary to handcuff prisoners prior to exiting a vehicle, entering reception and vice versa.
- 6.69 For more guidance on the movement of prisoners please see ST9, an instructional video, poster and guidance document.

Perimeter Security

- 6.70 Establishments have varying types/layers of perimeter security, ranging from fences, walls, prisoner intrusion detection systems (PIDs), CCTV, internal/external patrols and others, these layers of security are in place not only to prevent escape but also conveyance of illicit items. Local assessments should identify the strategies used to maintain perimeter security in line with the current threat and mitigating factors.
- 6.71 Where perimeter security includes physical checking of the fence through staff patrols, this should be co-ordinated by the communication room and a record of the check should be made with the Security Department.
- 6.72 Consideration should always be given to staff safety, especially in relation to external wall patrols, staff should also be aware of their limitations in relation to apprehension/challenge of persons outside of the establishment.
- 6.73 It must be remembered that officers and above can use PACE powers of arrest but if doing so should consider other factors especially around their own safety, if they are to use their powers of arrest then the following caution must be issued to the person being arrested:

I am (state name)

I must inform you that you are under arrest on suspicion of

You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.

- 6.74 The arresting officer should detain the person under arrest and call the police, do not question the individual but document anything stated by the person under arrest to use as evidence.

Members of the public filming

- 6.75 See (ST10) for more guidance in relation to members of the public filming.

Gates and Doors



- 6.76 Prove you have locked a gate or door before moving away (prove before you move) (ST11).
- 6.77 Securing and locking doors and gates is a critical security task.
- 6.78 Gates and doors are fundamental parts of our physical security.
- 6.79 Safety and Security are compromised when gates and doors are left unattended or unlocked.
- 6.80 A Class I gate and/or door being left unsecured and unattended could aid prisoners in escape or escape attempts.
- 6.81 It is the member of staff's responsibility to ensure that the gate or door is closed correctly and secured in the frame. Unsecured gates and doors may increase the risk of violence and disorder, including hostage incidents and concerted indiscipline. Leaving a gate unlocked for someone else to follow provides opportunity for prisoners to access unauthorised areas. A member of staff could be distracted or be required to change direction resulting in the gate or door being left unsecured.
- 6.82 Open Class II gates and doors can allow prisoners into unauthorised areas leading to several possible security breaches.
- 6.83 Incidents and compromises may require additional roll checks. This impedes regime delivery and impacts the prison's state of security and stability.


The following should be highlighted to all staff:

- Be responsible and follow correct locking procedures and processes for all class types.
- Be mindful of who is around you when moving across the site. It may be appropriate to check ID, if you are asked to leave a gate open or allow someone through.

- Be aware of your surroundings, other members of staff and their movements. They may not be passing through the same gates and doors as you.
- Be vigilant, help spot potential incidents before they occur and report faulty or difficult locks so that they can be fixed.
- Report key and lock incidents and compromises correctly.
- If you come across a gate which has been left unsecured incorrectly, secure it and report it.

Keys and Locks

- 6.84 Security keys are a fundamental part of day-to-day life in a prison and carry one of the biggest risks regarding escape, disorder etc. It is important that all key holders understand fully their responsibilities regarding key control/discipline.
- 6.85 To provide effective movement around the establishment there are three main security keys namely Class I, II and III.
- 6.86 All security keys are made of three parts: Bow, Shaft, Bit/Flag



- 6.87 Class I locks can be mechanical, magnetic, or electronic. Their purpose is to form a secure perimeter and they may be found on:
- Cell doors (including gated cells).
 - Gates on the perimeter of all buildings containing prisoner accommodation.
 - The main entrance to the prison.
 - Control and restraint staircases: external ground floor gates, control and restraint doors, and the staircase side of bolt holes (keyhole on the secure side only).
 - Access to perimeter sterile areas.
 - The perimeter security of Close Supervision Centres (CSCs); and
 - Control and restraint staircases, “weather” doors, escape doors from landings to a bolthole (keyhole on both sides), plus a bolt on the sterile side.
- 6.88 Class I locks should never be left unlocked or unattended. This is to prevent prisoners from tampering with the lock. Lock backs may be used.
- 6.89 Class II locks can be mechanical or magnetic. They are used in locations where a lower level of security and control is required, and they may be fitted to:
- The prisoners’ side of doors next to building perimeter gates which themselves are fitted with a Class I lock.
 - Internal control doors and gates within the secured perimeter of a building.
 - Doors and gates of other buildings within the secure perimeter of the prison, such as workshops, education facilities, and gymnasias.
 - Gates in zone control fences.

- Control and restraint staircases, “weather” doors, escape doors from landings to a bolthole (keyhole on both sides), plus a bolt on the sterile side.
- 6.90 Other than where authorised during the night state, no Class II locks (including wooden outer doors) are to be left unlocked or unattended. This is to prevent prisoners from tampering with the lock. Lock backs may be used.
- 6.91 Class III locks (Identification lettering and numbering on ‘bow’ of key - EX, AX, EN etc). Examples of where these will normally be used are:
- Internal doors such as offices, locker rooms, and staff toilets.
 - Accountable suites of locks fitted internally and externally to prisoner areas, which are additional to the Class II lock and are locked when the facility is not in use.
 - Buildings outside of the secure perimeter of the prison such as the visitor centre, staff locker rooms and the officer’s mess.
 - The LSS should set a target for the total number of different suited locks, and this should not exceed 25 different suited locks on class 3 keys per establishment
- 6.92 Each establishment will have different procedures for the storage of keys, dependant on factors individual to that prison, the establishment LSS should describe the procedures specific to that establishment to enable all staff to understand their roles and responsibilities.

Electronic Key Management Systems (TRAKA)

- 6.93 Electronic key management systems are operated by individual users, utilising biometric fingerprint readers or individually assigned PIN numbers.
- 6.94 When enrolling new users (ST12) the security department will ensure only the necessary keys are allocated to the new user, for examples:
- Only Band 3 and above operational staff (or equivalent in contracted prisons) are given access to cell keys.
 - Specialist keys are only allocated to those staff working in those areas.
- 6.95 On accessing the cabinet ‘green’ lights will identify the keys that have been allocated to an individual with ‘red’ lights identifying those keys not allocated, to aid those staff with colour vision deficiency, security departments should turn off the red lights on the main server for the individual user. This will enable those users to be able to identify keys allocated to them (ST13).
- 6.96 Electronic management systems are at risk of failure due to power cuts, generator failures etc, all cabinets are backed up with internal power supplies and manual override functions embedded, allowing manual key issue, and reset options (ST14).

Daily key checks

- 6.97 Carrying out key checks provide assurance that all security keys have been accounted for and not taken out of the establishment/lost, whilst also ensuring that all staff are safe and not missing, both scenarios should be taken into consideration when completing a key check.

Scenario:

- 1900hrs key check
- Keys ‘blue 35’ not in key safe/electronic key management system.

- Keys were issued to Mr R Sterling of the education department at 1330hrs.

To consider:

- Has Mr R sterling left the establishment with the keys?
- Is Mr R Sterling working late and not informed anybody?
- Has Mr R Sterling been taken hostage?

It is therefore important to carry out all appropriate actions to locate the missing keys as quickly as possible in line with local contingency plans.

Full key checks (audit)

- 6.98 It is good practice to use the six-monthly full key check as a time to check for not only any missing keys but also damage to keys and an opportunity to remove any keys out of circulation which are no longer in use (this includes those keys in works departments).
- 6.99 For efficiency it is advised that key audits take place overnight when most keys have been returned to storage.
- 6.100 Any discrepancies are a potential key compromise, in which case the discrepancy needs reporting to NIMU, on IRS, security intelligence report submission, Prison Group Director informed, and local investigations commenced.

Keys allowed outside the establishment

- 6.101 There are a small number of Class III keys which may need to exit the establishment for areas such as visitors' centres, works access, staff locker rooms and alike. These keys are not to be stored on a bunch and instead on an individual ring to prevent other security keys being taken out of the establishment.
- 6.102 These keys could be stored in electronic key management systems were possible, ensuring only appropriate enrolled users have access, or alternatively stored securely in the main gate area and signed in/out when issued. The procedures for these keys and location of storage should be described in the LSS.
- 6.103 Cuff keys may also be taken outside of the establishment for the purposes of an external escort and should remain attached to the escorting officers (not the officer cuffed to the prisoner) key chain.

Reading/photography

- 6.104 It is important for all staff members to keep keys concealed when about the person, to prevent 'reading' of keys or unlawful photography of keys by prisoners (mobile phones). Key pouches are available for issue to staff via NDC Branston.
- 6.105 On occasion in establishments filming and photography does take place for many varied reasons, including TV documentaries, training videos, journalist articles and so on, any filming/photography if not controlled appropriately could result in security keys being recorded, allowing copies to be made by anybody viewing the filming/photography, in order to stop this all camera operatives are to be briefed fully by the security department in advance, of the restrictions in regard to recording keys and locks and all key holders informed in advance of the filming/photography taking place.

Keys testing

6.106 On occasion following a key compromise, it may be necessary to have the keys forensically tested, this is a local decision to be made dependant on the circumstances of the compromise. HMPPS hold a contract with Royal Armouries to enable this. Details and procedures can be obtained from security.procedures@justice.gov.uk.

Nights

6.107 On entering night state and during some incidents, (dependant on the circumstances as per local contingency plans), all residential areas (in closed conditions) will be 'doubled', this is a secondary lock to secure the area further.

6.108 During night state limited keys are to be issued to staff, local night procedures/night orders will describe the keys to be issued and to whom, patrol staff will be issued a sealed pouch usually with just a cell key, to allow access to a cell in an emergency.

Key Maintenance

6.109 Key rings will be sealed with tamper evident seals (ST15) to prevent unauthorised removal or adding of keys to a bunch and to prevent keys 'falling off' a bunch. No other keys should be added to a security bunch, such as locker keys, filing cabinet keys etc.

6.110 Keys can become worn and damaged over time affecting their functionality, if this is the case then the security manager should be informed of the key type and bunch number to arrange replacement, this is the responsibility of all staff to prevent key/lock incidents of broken keys, keys stuck in locks etc.

6.111 In the same way as keys are and need to be accounted for to maintain security, locks also need to be, however locks and locking schedules will be managed by the facilities management team.

6.112 Spare or replacement locks are to be ordered from FM Operations Secure Lock Store (FMOperationsTeam@justice.gov.uk).

Order (Lead) Times (keys and locks)

Keys - 8 Calendar weeks from supplier receipt of a valid purchase order.

Locks-12 Calendar weeks from supplier receipt of a valid purchase order.

Padlocks 8-10 Calendar weeks from supplier receipt of a valid purchase order.

Crown Courts

6.113 Nominated establishments will have responsibility for the keys and locks of their local crown court custody suites, it is the responsibility of the designated security manager to maintain and audit crown court keys on their local ledger along with the establishment's other security keys and within the same timescales.

Padlocks

6.114 There are times in establishments when the use of padlocks will be necessary, this may be on a permanent basis for securing items which will not fit in shadow boards, cupboards etc or on a temporary basis for short term security solution:

6.115 Examples of padlock use may include securing of:

- Climbing aids/ladders;
- Wheelie bins;
- Skips;

- Vehicles; and
- Gates with chains (during activation of contingency plans).

6.116 The only padlocks to be used are (ST16):

- 1K42 Ava;
- 1K11 Battleship; and
- 1K21 Cruiser

Tools and Equipment

6.117 Tools and equipment if not controlled properly can assist prisoners with escape, acts of violence within prison and a range of other criminal activities.

6.118 Within a prison environment tools and equipment incorporate a wide variety of items, ranging from as simple as an iron on a wing, computers in education, to heavy plant machinery such as a cherry picker in the facilities management department.

6.119 Remaining vigilant to risk always is key, staff must always be aware of the potential security threats from item(s) in use around the prison which can be placed near or against a perimeter wall or fence or used to assist with escape/acts of violence.

Tool control

6.120 Due to the potential of tools being used as escape aids/weapons, it is important that we always know the whereabouts of such items and that all staff receive an induction in tool control relevant to the area they work.

Other available escape aids

Climbing aids

6.121 Remaining vigilant as we move around establishments is one of the keyways to prevent escape, many items are used in the day to day running of an establishment and could be used to assist with escape, the list below provides some examples of the types of equipment we may come across, however this list is not exhaustive, and each establishment must ensure they are aware and managing their own risks:

- Cabling
- Wheelie bins
- Bed frames
- Wooden pallets
- Metal cages.

Buildings

6.122 Low buildings and flat roof buildings especially those near the perimeter may also provide prisoners the means/incentive to attempt escape, Buildings of this sort should be considered when completing risk assessments for mass movement, freeflow and similar.

Sports Equipment/Gyms

6.123 Physical Education Instructors (PEI's) will use a wide variety of equipment both internal and external to aid with the training and physical improvement of prisoners, this equipment is often attractive to prisoners and will often also be an ideal escape aid.

Facilities Management Teams (works)

6.124 Facilities management teams will have a large variety of tools and equipment that they use daily, including building, plumbing, carpentry and electrical tools.

Contractors

6.125 It will be necessary for contractors to enter establishments on a regular basis, this may be for routine maintenance, ongoing building works or one visit to repair/maintain a system.

Stores

6.126 Stores areas hold large amounts of items which would be attractive to prisoners and could be used as escape aids or to assist with ongoing criminal activities.

Staff Personal Protective Equipment

6.127 Prison Officers will be personally issued items of personal protective equipment either on temporary or permanent basis, these items remain the responsibility of the member of staff, however there are several restrictions in place to prevent loss of items and to remain in line with the law. These restrictions are detailed in the paragraphs 4.230 - 4.235.

The PPE items referred to here are:

- Batons
- Rigid bar cuffs
- PAVA
- Cut down tools (big fish knives).

7. Annexes

Annex A	LSS Annual assurance statement
Annex B (Official Sensitive)	Security information hub application
Annex C (Official Sensitive)	Roll check template form
Annex D (Official sensitive)	Security induction / key talk examples
Annex E	Official visitors form
Annex F (Official Sensitive)	Radio call signs
Annex G (Official Sensitive)	Actions to take (key compromise)
Annex H	Key Ledger
Annex I	Keys condemnation form
Annex J	Keys disclosure guidelines and forms
Annex K	Tools risk assessment template
Annex L (Official sensitive)	Prisoner workplace risk assessment template
Annex M (Official sensitive)	Workplace risk assessment template
Annex N	Authorisation letter for staff template (travelling with PPE)
Annex O	Tool inventory (facilities management teams) template
Annex P (Official sensitive)	Serviceability and replacement of standard handcuffs
Annex Q (Official sensitive)	Physical security self audit template
Annex R (Official Sensitive)	Night operating procedures

Annex S (Official sensitive)	Prisoner final discharge checklist
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Supporting Tools

ST1 (Official sensitive)	Night procedures e-learning Night procedures infographic
ST2 (Official sensitive)	Issue/receipt of tools process
ST3 (Official sensitive)	Tool disposal process
ST4 (Official Sensitive)	Skip removal process
ST5 (Official sensitive)	4:20 meeting example templates
ST6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roll check procedure instructional video • Roll check procedure poster • Roll check procedure guidance
ST7 (Official Sensitive)	Fixed Posts
ST8 (Official sensitive)	Escape during freeflow 2019 report and learning
ST9 (Official sensitive)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal movement of prisoners guidance • Internal movement of prisoners poster • Internal movement of prisoners instructional video clip
ST10 (official Sensitive)	Members of public filming guidance
ST11 (Official sensitive)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prove before you move stickers • Prove before you move info poster • Lock and secure guidance
ST12 (Official Sensitive)	Enrol new users (TRAKA)
ST13 (Official Sensitive)	Colour deficiency process (TRAKA)
ST14 (Official Sensitive)	Override procedure (TRAKA)
ST15 (Official Sensitive)	Key tamper evident seals
ST16 (Official Sensitive)	Approved padlocks
ST17	Gate procedures to prevent escape- video