

Recommendation Status Report: Train overspeeding at Spital Junction, Peterborough

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



Report Title	Train overspeeding at Spital Junction, Peterborough
Report Number	06/2023
Date of Incident	17/04/2022

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
06/2023/01	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of Lumo drivers overspeeding at diverging junctions where there is a significant reduction in maximum permitted speeds.</p> <p>Lumo (East Coast Trains Limited) should review, and amend as necessary, its route risk assessment process to ensure that it considers junctions where there is a potential for a greater risk of overspeeding (such as where there is a large distance between the point where a driver is given a clear aspect and the junction and/or where there is a large speed differential between the main and diverging routes). Based on this revised risk assessment, Lumo should review the control measures in place intended to ensure that the risk from drivers exceeding permissible speeds at diverging junctions is adequately mitigated. This review should include consideration of the professional knowledge, training and assessment of its train drivers. Lumo should implement any changes necessary to mitigate the risk of overspeeding at junctions (paragraph 202b.i, 203a). This recommendation may also apply to other train operators.</p>	
06/2023/02	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail to work with operators of trains to assess the risks of trains overspeeding at junctions fitted with approach controls.</p> <p>Network Rail should:</p> <p>a) Identify junctions fitted with approach controls where the risk from overspeeding could lead to derailment, injuries or damage (paragraphs 202c and 203b).</p>	

Recommendation Status Report



			<p>b) Share this information with the operators of trains which use the identified junctions to facilitate a collective re-assessment of the risk of trains overspeeding at those junctions. This assessment should consider, among other factors, the acceleration capability of the rolling stock using the junctions, the degree of overspeed and the potential consequences.</p>	
06/2023/03	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of trains overspeeding at junctions by considering appropriate mitigation measures.</p> <p>Based on the findings of the assessments undertaken as part of Recommendation 2 (paragraphs 202c and 203b), Network Rail, in conjunction with train operators, should jointly consider and implement risk mitigation measures at the junctions identified where the risk from overspeeding could lead to derailment, overturning or damage. Such risk mitigation measures could include:</p> <p>a) technical means (such as additional protection by signalling configuration changes) and/or the use of new technology (such as in-cab information systems to better inform drivers)</p> <p>b) operational considerations (such as reinforcing driver awareness, changes to service patterns and/or how signallers regulate trains at these junctions).</p>	
06/2023/04	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to minimise the risks from falling luggage on Lumo train services.</p> <p>Lumo should assess the risks of high volumes of large and likely heavy luggage stowed in overhead luggage racks which can fall on passengers if trains suffer significant lateral accelerations. This assessment should specifically examine the design of overhead luggage racks, the amount of alternative luggage storage space provided and passenger luggage</p>	

Recommendation Status Report



			policies. Lumo should implement any control measures identified as appropriate (paragraph 204).	
--	--	--	---	--