

Recommendation Status Report: Buffer stop collision at Enfield Town station

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

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Report Title	Buffer stop collision at Enfield Town station
Report Number	13/2022
Date of Incident	12/10/2021

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
13/2022/01	Open	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Arriva Rail London's drivers to declare when they are significantly fatigued so that they do not drive trains when unfit to do so.</p> <p>Arriva Rail London should review, and revise as necessary, its procedures for fatigue and attendance management to promote self-reporting by train drivers, and other safety-critical staff, when they feel that they are, or are likely to become, fatigued in a way that may affect their fitness to safely undertake their duties. It should also consider how these arrangements are briefed and implemented so that they proactively develop and maintain an environment where self-reporting of such fatigue is encouraged and considered acceptable, and where staff do not fear that there will be negative consequences if they do declare themselves unfit for duty.</p> <p>In addition, Arriva Rail London should put in place arrangements to monitor the effectiveness of self-reporting mechanisms for fatigue and identify areas for improvement. The review should consider best practice from other operators and transport systems (paragraphs 107a.i and 108).</p> <p>This recommendation may also apply to other train and freight operating companies.</p>	ORR has reported that Arriva Rail London has a proposed action plan and timescale for delivery to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR will advise when the status of this recommendation changes.
13/2022/02	Open	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail to better manage the risks of collisions at buffer stops.</p> <p>Network Rail, in conjunction with RSSB, should review its process, and associated guidance, for assessing the risks of collisions at buffer stops so that realistic values of risk are derived from it. This review should ensure</p>	ORR has reported that Network Rail has a proposed action plan and timescale for delivery to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR will advise

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			that the contributions of engineered protection systems, such as TPWS, are correctly modelled as part of this process. Network Rail should also develop guidance for end users of the process so that they are able to determine what further risk reduction measures may be required to ensure that risks are reduced so far as is reasonably practicable (paragraph 109).	when the status of this recommendation changes.
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